G.R. No.

168495

July 2, 2010

DANSART SECURITY FORCE & ALLIED SERVICES COMPANY and DANILO A.

SARTE, Petitioners,
vs.
JEAN O. BAGOY,* Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Jean O. Bagoy was employed by Dansart Security Force and Allied
Services Company to guard the establishments of its various clients such as Ironcorn,
Chowking and Hindu Temple. However, from April 1999 until November 2001,
respondent had allegedly been caught sleeping on the job and incurred absences
without leave, for which he was given notices of disciplinary action.
respondent filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch a Complaint3 against petitioners
for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium
pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. In her Position Paper, respondent
alleged: (1) that she had been required to report for work daily from 7:00 a.m to 7:00
p.m. with a salary rate of P166.00 per day, which was increased to P180.00 in January
2001; (2) that she was required to work even on Sundays and holidays but was not
paid holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay; and (3) that since
December 2001, she had been on floating status, tantamount to constructive dismissal.
Petitioners countered that it was respondent who abandoned her work beginning
November 2001. Petitioners, likewise, presented several reports issued by the National
Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) stating that all
mandatory wage increases and other related monetary benefits were complied with by
petitioner security agency, in rebuttal of respondent's claim of non-payment of wages
and benefits.
The Labor Arbiter issued a Decision favorable to respondent with regard to her money
claims, but did not rule on the issue of illegal dismissal as this was not included in her
complaint. The NLRC reversed the labor arbiter and held that the DOLE reports, stating
that petitioner security agency had been complying with all mandatory wage increases
and other monetary benefits, should be given proper respect. The CA annulled and set
aside the NLRC decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiters.
Petitioners only assail the weight ascribed by the Labor Arbiter and the CA to the
evidence, asseverating that such documents from the DOLE must be given greater
importance as the NLRC did.

ISSUE: Whether the DOLE Certifications should be considered as sufficient proof that
petitioners paid respondent proper wages and all other monetary benefits to which she
was entitled as an employee.
HELD: NO.
The Court has repeatedly ruled that any doubt arising from the evaluation of evidence
as between the employer and the employee must be resolved in favor of the
latter.Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that the burden of proving payment of
monetary claims rests on the employer.
G & M Philippines, Inc. v. Cuambot, to wit:
x x x one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is
that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar
documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave,
and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the
worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden
of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with
payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it. x x x
In this case, petitioners failed to discharge such burden of proof. The Certifications from
the DOLE stated that there are no pending labor cases against petitioners filed before
said office, but said certifications "do not cover cases filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board." The
Order18 dated January 17, 2001 issued by the DOLE, in fact, showed that in the year
2000, petitioner security agency was found to have committed the following
violations: underpayment of overtime pay, underpayment of 13th month pay,
underpayment of 5 days Service Incentive Leave Pay, and underpayment of night
shift differential pay. Then, said Order stated that, since petitioner security agency
had submitted "[p]ayrolls showing backwages of the above-noted violations amounting
to x x x (P443,512.51) benefitting 279 guards" to show compliance with labor laws, "the
DOLE considered the inspection closed and terminated." For the years 2001and 2002,
the DOLE Reports stated only that based on records submitted by petitioners, it had no
violations. Verily, such documents from the DOLE do not conclusively prove that
respondent, in particular, has been paid all her salaries and other benefits in full. In
fact, the Order dated January 17, 2001 even bolsters respondent's claim that she had
not been paid overtime pay, 13th month pay, and Service Incentive Leave Pay. The
statement in said Order, that backwages for 279 guards had been paid, does not in any
way prove that respondent is one of those 279 guards, since petitioners failed to
present personnel files, payrolls, remittances, and other similar documents which
would have proven payment of respondent's money claims. It was entirely within
petitioners' power to present such employment records that should necessarily be in
their possession; hence, failure to present such evidence must be taken against them.

PNB v. Florence CABANSAG/2005

FACTS:
Cabansag was a tourist in Singapore, applied for a job as Credit Officer in the
Singapore branch of PNB. Bank VP Ruben Tobias recommended to PNB
Manila her appointment to the position, which PNB Manila approved.
Cabansag, upon application with the SG government, was issued an
Employment Pass valid for two years.
Dec. 1998, Tobias offered temporary appointment to Cabansag as Credit
Officer, upon the ff. terms: 3 months probation, full confidentiality, agreement
not to be employed outside of office hours in any manner for any purpose
whatsoever, termination notice of 1 day within period of probation or 1 month
notice upon confirmation or the equivalent of 1days or months salary in lieu of
notice) Cabansag accepted and assumed office March, 1999, she was
issued an Overseas Employment Certificate by POEA, certifying her being a
bona fide contract worker for Singapore
Barely 3 months in office, she submitted a Performance Report to Tobias on
which the latter, being impressed, commented Good Work. April, 1999,
however, while in the flat she shared with two other officers of the Bank, she
was told that Tobias wanted her to resign from her job. Tobias, the next day,
confirmed the information to her saying it was a cost-cutting measure and that
PNB SG was to be sold or transformed into a remittance office and either way
she had to go.
Cabansag requested for a formal notice, which Tobias did not give.
Subsequently, he called on her again on two occasions demanding that she
resign (saying that PNB had hired a Chinese speaking Credit Officer to be able
to penetrate the market), but Cabansag refused. Eventually, on April 20, 1999,
she was issued a termination letter by Tobias.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Cabansag, finding illegal dismissal and lack of
due process on the part of the respondents, and ordered her reinstatement
and payment to her, among others, of backwages, damages, attorneys fees
NLRC affirmed, though reduced award of moral & exemplary damages
CA concurred, stating that Cabansags procurement of employment pass with
SG govt did not constitute a waiver of the jurisdiction of Philippine labor laws
over her person and that PNB failed to adduce evidence of just cause or due
process for her termination

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by Labor Arbiters

ISSUE:
WON NLRC NCR has jurisdiction and is the appropriate venue for the settlement of the
dispute and WON Cabansag had been illegally dismissed
HELD/RATIO:

SC reiterated: basic policy that all Filipino workers, whether employed locally
or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social

legislations; our labor statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws or

judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign country.
NLRC jurisdiction provided by Art. 217 of LC: Labor Arbiters shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension,
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

R.A. 8042 also provides under SECTION 10. Money Claims.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after
the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.
Labor arbiters thus clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes
involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW).
Being a direct hire in Singapore did not mean she is beyond the coverage of
Philippine laws; in fact, her securing of the POEA certificate supports the
contrary. The case of Royal Crown International v NLRC bolsters the fact of
protective mantle of Phil. Labor laws, notwithstanding the existence of contrary
contract stipulations. Such policy of protection is embodied in the Constitution,
the Labor Code and Art. 17 of Civil Code.
As to venue, R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers & Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995)
governs. Cabansag properly falls under the classification of migrant worker

(person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a

remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be
used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker) and thus has two options
as to venue: (1) at the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or
(2) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her
dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines -specifically to her residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her
Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice
of proper venue.
As to 3rd issue, Cabansag at that time already deemed a regular employee,
following the cessation of her probationary status. As such, she is entitled to
full benefits, privileges, rights under the law. In dismissing employees, the
employer must furnish them two written notices: 1) one to apprise them of the
particular acts or omissions for which their dismissal is sought; and 2) the
other to inform them of the decision to dismiss them. As to the requirement of
a hearing, its essence lies simply in the opportunity to be heard. Both were not
complied with.
There was no just cause for her termination either. Section 282-284 of LC
provide the grounds for dismissal, none of which PNB asserted or proved.
PNB asserts that Cabansag agreed to be bound by the terms of the contract.
However, as time and again stated by the Court: contractual stipulations
should not contravene labor laws and since contracts of employment are
imbued with public interest, the provisions of positive law are deemed to
govern the contractual relations.
Manner of termination (harassment, pressure) also justify the award of
damages.
Assailed decision therefore affirmed.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
June 30, 1988, SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a
firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT
OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari
and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males
or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department
Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is
claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to
the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further
enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of
Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong,
United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the
challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
ISSUE/HELD : WON Dept Order No. 1 valid exercise of Police Power under consti
YES
RATIO:

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty,
the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been
afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that
the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of
course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to
women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not
upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court
accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned.
There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that
insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne
by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no
quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself

("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the
host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means
impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap
measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances
of each case.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an
argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it
would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are
similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select
person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person
or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To
apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by
B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a
classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to
B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and
needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based
on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization
of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the
young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.
There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that
calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory
legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion
of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords
protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
DO 1 does not contemplate a total ban.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the
right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public
safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority
vested in it by the Labor Code.27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply
because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the
legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated.
As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-

taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all,
decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from
home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it
has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to
the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and
enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to
maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that
suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a
decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that
this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

G.R. No. 138193

March 5, 2003

OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and FERMIN F.
GUERRERO, respondents.
Doctrine: Unilateral decisions to alter the use of a vessel from overseas service to
coastwise shipping will not affect the validity of an existing employment contract validly
executed. Workers should not be prejudiced by actions done solely by employers
without the former's consent or participation.
Facts:
Guerrero was hired by OSM for and in behalf of its principal, Phil Carrier to board its
vessel MN '[Princess] Hoa' as a Master Mariner for a contract period of 10 months. He
boarded the vessel in July 1994 and complied faithfully with the duties assigned to him.
Guerrero alleged that from the start of his work with MN 'Princess Hoa', he was not
paid any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel sometime in
January 1995 because he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities. For almost
7 months, despite the services he rendered, no compensation or remuneration was
ever paid to him. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries,
overtime pay and vacation pay against OSM Shipping and its principal, Philippine
Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co (PC-SASCO).
OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an American
company which owns MN 'Princess Hoa', then a foreign registered vessel, appointed
Philippine Carrier as ship manager particularly to negotiate, transact and deal with any
third persons, entities or corporations in the planning of crewing selection or
determination of qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date, OSM entered
into a Crew Agreement with Phil Carrier for the purpose of processing the documents
of crew members of MN 'Princess Hoa'. Thereafter, the contract of Guerrero was
processed before the POEA on September 1994.
OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel.
Instead of using it for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus,
the crewmembers hired never left the Philippines and were merely used by the
shipowner in the coastwise trade. Considering that the MN 'Princess Hoa' was a
foreign registered vessel and could not be used in the coastwise trade, the shipowner
converted the vessel to Philippine registry on September 1994 by way of bareboat
chartering it out to another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping Lines Co.
(PCSLC). To do this, the shipowner through Conrado Tendido had to terminate its
management agreement with PC-SASCO on September 1994. In the same letter of

termination, the ship owner stated that it has bareboat chartered out the vessel to said
[PCSLC] and converted it into Philippine registry. Consequently, PC-SASCO
terminated its crew agreement with OSM in a letter dated December 1994. Because of
the bareboat charter of the vessel to PCSLC and its subsequent conversion to
Philippine registry and use in coastwise trade as well as to the termination of the
management agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination of contract
ensued whereby PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent
owner/employer of the crew.
As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of
complainant's wages.
Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday rendered a Decision in favor of Guerrero. OSM and its
principal, PC-SASCO, were ordered to jointly and severally pay Guerrero his unpaid
salaries and allowances, accrued fixed overtime pay, vacation leave pay and
termination pay. The Decision held that there was a constructive dismissal of private
respondent, since he had not been paid his salary for seven months. It also dismissed
OSM's contention that there was a novation of the employment contract.
NLRC affirmed the LA's Decision, with a modification as to the amount of liability. CA
dismissed the petition because OSM failed to comply with the requirements of Section
3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private
respondent?
Held: No
Ratio:
The Court is mindful of the plight of Guerrero and, indeed, of workers in general who
are seeking to recover wages that are being unlawfully withheld from them. Such
recovery should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of their survival. This case is
now on its ninth year since its inception at the LA's office. Its remand to the CA will only
unduly delay its disposition. In the interest of substantial justice, this Court will decide
the case on the merits based upon the records of the case.
On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, OSM does not deny hiring Guerrero as master
mariner. However, it argues that since he was not deployed overseas, his employment
contract became ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent. Petitioner
contends that using the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering it to
another principal had the effect of novating the employment contract. We are not
persuaded.

As approved by POEA, OSM was the legitimate manning agent of PC-SASCO. As

such, it was allowed to select, recruit, hire and deploy seamen on board the vessel M/V
Princess Hoa, which was managed by its principal, PC-SASCO. It was in this capacity
that OSM hired Guerrero as master mariner. They then executed and agreed upon an
employment contract.
An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the
parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof:
(a) consent of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of
the contract and (c) cause of the obligation. Based on the perfected contract, Guerrero
complied with his obligations thereunder and rendered his services on board the
vessel. Contrary to OSM's contention, the contract had an object, which was the
rendition of service by Guerrero on board the vessel. The non-deployment of the ship
overseas did not affect the validity of the perfected employment contract. After all, the
decision to use the vessel for coastwise shipping was made by OSM only and did not
bear the written conformity of Guerrero. A contract cannot be novated by the will of only
one party. The claim of OSM that it processed the contract of Guerrero with the POEA
only after he had started working is also without merit. OSM cannot use its own
misfeasance to defeat his claim.
OSM, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its principal, PC-SASCO, for
Guerrero's claim. This conclusion is in accordance with Section 1 of Rule II of the
POEA Rules and Regulations. Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved
workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. The fact that OSM
and its principal have already terminated their agency agreement does not relieve the
former of its liability.

[G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996]

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR,
then Secretary of the Department of the Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE
BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
FACTS:
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President
Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to
Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of
the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed
at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No.
28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was
tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of
performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994,
issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for
screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary
prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on
January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally
contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged
existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses
without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist
Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the
constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders. JMM
Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a
Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court. The trial
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, respondent court dismissed the same.

ISSUE: WON the issued department orders of the Dep. Of Labor are a valid exercise
of police power and not violative of any constitutional rights? YES
HELD:
Salus populi est suprema lex. A thorough review of the facts and circumstances
leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compelled the court to rule that the Artist
Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance
were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
Purpose of the Regulations (Issuances of the Orders)
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute
ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure
which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very
least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists
abroad. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those
passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore
exposing themselves to possible exploitation. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at
least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates
government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. Obviously,
protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the
welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional
duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
The Profession as a Property Right vs Police Power
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living
because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of
which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of
the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the
execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public
health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum

non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to
define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as
not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that
licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the
settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice
of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass
rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their
trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the
Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors
and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or
had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their
licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of
a property right under the due process clause. So long as Professionals and other
workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Do not violate the Non-Impairment Clause and Equal Protection Clause
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact
the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to
contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that
"[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the government." Equally important, into every contract is read provisions
of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the
agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the
assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The court does not agree. In the case at bar, the
challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers
destined for jobs abroad.
Holding (maybe?)
These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring
Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse
and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory
agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing
the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures
enable our government to assume a measure of control.

matters related to
manpower industry.

The Executive Secretary v CA

Petitioners:

Executive Sec, Sec of Justice, Labor Sec, POEA, OWWA

No standing as to
unskilled workers. ARCo
did not even implead
them. No evidence that
they were given authority
by said workers to sue in
their behalf.

Respondents: Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Charter (ARCO)

Facts:
RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 took effect on July 15,
1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8042 was published in
the April 7, 1996 issue of Manila Bulletin. Before the law took effect, ARCO filed on July
17, 1995 a petition for declaratory relief to declare as unconstitutional several sections:
Sec 6 (a)-(m) on illegal recruitment, Sec 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Sec
9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitment. ARCO alleged that RA 8042 was
self-executory and that no implementing rules were needed.

Ex post facto laws

and bill of attainder

Violates the
Consti
prohibition.

Not ex post facto

because it is not applied
retroactively. RA 8042 is
an amendment of LC.

RTC declared RA 8042 as unconstitutional. CA affirmed. SC reversed.

Provision / Issue

Respondent
(unconsti)

Petitioners
(consti)

Supreme Court

Locus standi

With standing.
Sued in behalf of
11 member
agencies that will
sustain damage
as a result of the
law.

No standing.
Not a juridical
entity. ARCO
will not
sustain
damage.

With standing to
represent its 11
members but not the
unskilled workers.

Representation of
members An
association has standing
to complain of injuries to
its members. Must show
that the suing party has
substantial relation to the
damaged party.

Under AOI, ARCOs

purpose is to act as
representative on

The provision
presume that a
licensed agency
is guilty upon a
finding that it
committed any of
the prohibited
acts (presumed
guilty).

Not bill of attainder as

well. Conviction will only
be made after trial..

Bills of attainder
legislative acts which
inflict punishment without
judicial trial.

Elements:
1. affected
individuals/groups
2. imposition of
punishment
3. lack of judicial trial

Sec 2 (g)
Deployment of
SKILLED workers
only

Violates Sec 1 Art

3 of Consti
- discriminated
against skilled
and unskilled
workers
- violation of
equal protection
clause (EPC),
due process
- encourages flyby-night agencies

Sec 6 Illegal
Recruitment
Act of canvassing,
enlisting,
contractingworkers
and includes
referring, contract
services, promising
or advertising for
employment by a
non-licensee or nonholder or authority.

Illegal recruitment by
SYNDICATE or in
LARGE SCALE shall
be considered an
offense involving
economic
sabotage.

Placed licensed
agencies on
equal footing with
illegal recruiters.

Repugnant to
EPC.

Agencies will
automatically be
considered large
scale/syndicate
because they
operate with
manpower of
more than 3
persons.

NOT UNCONSTI

On the assailed
provisions, Court said
that it is moot since
Court has already
applied said provisions in
numerous cases. Hence
not unconstitutional.

State has a right to

regulate a
profession/trade under
its police power.

Employee of an entity
engaged in illegal
recruitment may be
criminally liable as
principal if he has
actively and
consciously
participated in illegal
recruitment.

Penalizing unlicensed
agencies and
officers/employees
working in gov't is not
offensive. The accused
will only be convicted
AFTER trial.

Syndicate illegal
recruitment by a
group of 3 or more
persons conspiring or
confederating with
one another.

Large Scale
committed against 3
or more persons
individually or as a
group.
Sec 7 Penalties
Imprisonment of not
less than 6 yrs. but
not more than 12
years, and fine of
200-500k

Penalty is
disproportionate
to the prohibited
acts.

Life imprisonment
and fine 500-1M
(economic sabotage
or if victim is a minor)
Sec 11 Mandatory
provisions of
resolution of illegal
recruitment cases
90 days from receipt
of complaint

SC:

90 day period is
relatively short.
Serving of
summons upon
foreign employers
and filing of
answer requires a
longer time.

Court admonished the RTC for declaring the RA unconsti without elaborating on its
reasons.

On its Face invalidation of statues must be used sparingly and only as a last resort.

To be entitled to a prelim injunction to declare a law unconsti, said party must show
irreparable harm.

Fear or chilling effect does not by itself justify the prohibition on the State to enforce
said law.

Congress is empowered to define what shall constitute a crime and to prescribe

punishment.

Class legislation denies rights to one which are accorded to others or inflicts upon 1
individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another.

Mere speculation of harm/damage is not enough to sustain an injunction.

G.R. No. 154213

August 23, 2012

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY,

INC., Petitioners,
vs. ESTANISLAO SURIO, et. al., Respondents.
FACTS:

Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by

petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., and manned and operated by
petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc.
While on board the vessel, the respondents had experienced delays in payment
of their wages and in the remittance of their allotments and they were not paid
for extra work or extra overtime; they also complained of inadequate equipment
and poor working conditions
When the vessel came to dock in Switzerland, authorities from the International
Transport Federation (ITF) boarded and found out that indeed the respondents
were receiving less than the prevailing wage rates negotiations followed
between ITF and the vessel owner which resulted in payment of differentials to
the respondents and their subsequent repatriation to the Philippines
A few days after, however, Eastern Mediterranean filed at the POEA a complaint
for disciplinary action against the newly-repatriated respondents based on
breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of wage increases
During pendency of the action, R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995, vesting with the Labor Arbiter
original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising out of employeremployee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers (jurisdiction was
formerly exercised by POEA)
POEA dismissed the complaint appeal made with NLRC, which also
dismissed, saying they had no jurisdiction petitioners filed pet. For certiorari
and mandamus with SC which referred the same to CA CA dismissed ruling
that jurisdiction lay with POEA, to the exclusion of NLRC
ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the
POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions
HELD/RATIO:

Perusal of the POEA rules and the IRR of R.A. 8042 show that NLRC has no
jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by the POEA; the matter of

inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA

Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the
exclusion of NLRC
Although the passage of the new law transferred jurisdiction over money claims
from POEA to the Labor Arbiter, POEA retained jurisdiction over
disciplinary/administrative cases involving overseas workers
Petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the POEA to the
Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct
on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC [When Republic
Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases
decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of
Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section
38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987]
RELEVANT DISCUSSION BY SC:
o

In a way, R.A. 8042 was a procedural law.

Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners complaint by virtue of the case being then
still pending or undetermined at the time of the laws passage, there being no vested
rights in rules of procedure. They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to
ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint
was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its
implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their
appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment
rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to
prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the
right to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired. Conversely and by analogy,
an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes
into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided
by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal
from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the
taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the
procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with
and resolved. This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in
character, and is available only if granted by law or statute.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.Petitioner,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division; HON.
ERNESTO S. DINOPOL, in his capacity as Labor Arbiter, NLRC; NCR, Arbitration
Branch, Quezon City and DIVINA A. MONTEHERMOZO,Respondents.
January 25, 2006 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed Divina A.

Montehermozo (Divina) to Taiwan as domestic helper under 12-month
contract. This is with assistance of Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang.
After the 12-month contract expired, Divina continued to work for 2 more
years.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a
complaint2 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against
Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign
principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that she was
underpaid.
Divina was claiming the refund of the deduction for income tax and savings
under the one-year and 2-year extened contract.
Deduction for Income Tax
Deduction for Savings
Year

1997

NT10,450.00

NT23,100.00

1998

NT9,500.00

NT36,000.00

1999

NT13,300.00

NT36,000.00;

Sunace says she was not entitled to refund for 24 months savings because
employer did not deduct any from her salary from there. There is also no basis
for her claim of tax refund because as the she finished her one year
contract and hence, was not illegally dismissed by her employer. (not entitled
to compensation because no injury suffered)
Reacting to Divinas Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . .
answer to complainants position paper"7 alleging that Divinas 2-year
extension of her contract was without its knowledge and consent, hence, it had
no liability attaching to any claim arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed

a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an Affidavit of

Desistance, copy of each document was annexed to said ". . . answer to
complainants position paper."
Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunaces claim that the extension of Divinas contract
for two more years was without its knowledge (communication between
Sunace and Edmund Wang). Labor Arbiter also says that any agreement for
settlement (quitclaim) should be reduced to writing and signed by parties and
counsel before Labor Arbiter. Held for Divina, Sunace and Adelaida Perge
(owner) jointly and severally for the amounts.
NLRC affirmed LA.

CA dismissed petition for certiorari. Principal-agent relationship.

Issue: WON Sunace can be held liable for the money claims of Divina
Held: No. Sunace not privy to extended contract.Petition granted.
Ratio:
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker to Sunace,
the only basis of a finding of continuous communication, reads verbatim:
xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything about her saving in police
station. As we contact with her employer, she took back her saving already last
years. And they did not deduct any money from her salary. Or she will call back
her employer to check it again. If her employer said yes! we will get it back for
her.
Thank you and best regards.
Edmund Wang
President
The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract
executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace
and the Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divinas allegedly withheld savings
does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract. As
Sunace points out in its Reply filed before the Court of Appeals,
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to the
petitioner that the private respondent had t[aken] already her savings from her foreign
employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the
extension or the petitioners consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to
assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons
issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory
conference following Divinas filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound
under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto.
As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divinas claims
arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its
agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original
employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered
into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil
Code reading
The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the
agent, dealing directly with third persons.

People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Domingo Panis 142 SCRA 664 (1986)
Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the CFI of Zambales and Olongapo
City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a
license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and
promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an
offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the
four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the Abug is being prosecuted under Article 39 in
relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However,
as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition
of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue: What is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known
as the Labor Code.
Held/Ratio:
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to
any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
The posture of the petitioner is that Abug is being prosecuted under Article 39 in
relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However,
as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper

authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition
of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of Abug is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts
mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the
requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always
in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may
involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only
of an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of
two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the
petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where
the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not
when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule
nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment
and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b)
win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected
in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in
the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision
for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been
available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers

seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even
borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical
deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
[G.R. No. 121777. January 24, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAROL M. DELA
PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment
in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and
penalizing said crime. The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the
conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),
received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of
the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties
include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, together with a friend, a certain
Mayeth Bellotindos, went to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City,
where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. After personally confirming
that there were activities being conducted by the woman named Carol Figueroa that
might involve illegal recruitment, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter by having one of the female
members of CIS, an Eileen Fermindoza, pose as an applicant.
The entrapment was conducted in the morning of February 2 and Carol Figueroa was
arrested. She and a certain Jasmine Alejandro and three other women suspected to be
applicants were taken to the CIS office for investigation.
In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many
aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was not able to
present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators. A check by Ramos
with the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed or authorized to conduct
recruitment. A certification dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by
Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy
Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical
Hospital, who executed their respective written statements. According to them, they

heard from friends that a woman was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore so
they went and apply.
The accused was charged and convicted before the RTC of Zamboanga City for the
crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and sentenced to life
imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.
The accused appealed assigning several errors to the court, contending in main that
the law defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates
the due process clause. Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth assigned error, that
she was denied the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUES:
1.

WON Sec. 13(b) of PD 442, as amended, otherwise known as Illegal Recruitment

is unconstitutional? NO

2.

WON appellant was denied equal protection of the laws? NO

3.

WON appellant is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in a large scale? NO.
Guilty of only 2 counts of simple illegal recruitment

HELD:
1.

Constitutionality of Section 13(b) of PD 442.

A perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face must be distinguished
from legislation couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a
standard though defectively phrasedin which case, it may be saved by proper
construction.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant
invokes People vs. Panis, where this Court, to use appellants term, criticized the
definition of recruitment and placement.
However, the Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help
shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records
notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the
proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent
of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity
is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer
from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may
be convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant
apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment
referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a
prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant
misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of
individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom
of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct
which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that
it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. However,
appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced
by the definition of recruitment and placement that would render the same
constitutionally overbroad.
2.

On Equal Protection.

Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that
although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out
application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the
only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From
this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of
regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the
alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the
laws.

A discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear

and intentional discrimination. Appellant has failed to show that, in charging
appellant in court, that there was a clear and intentional discrimination on
the part of the prosecuting officials.

The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecutions sound

assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that
a person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting
officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be

overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed,

appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption.
3.

Appellant is Guilty of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment only.

A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each
case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a
group. In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been
recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been
promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial;
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense
was committed against three or more persons.
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even
the other persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of
recruiting only the three persons named in the information Araneta, Modesto and
Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons present in
the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those alleged to
have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
Because the prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed recruitment and
placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in
large scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more
persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of simple illegal recruitment,
one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for that committed
against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty
of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.

People of the PH v LOMA Goce y Olalia, DAN Goce and NELLY Agustin, accused
Facts:
Jan 1988 information for illegal recruitment by a syndicate and in large scale was
filed against Sps. Goce and Agustin. A warrant of arrest was issued but none of them
was arrested. Case was archived.
Mar 1989 Rogelio Salado, complainant, learned of the whereabouts of Agustin. By
virtue of the standing WOA, Agustin was arrested. The case was revived. Agustin was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Four Complainants:

Rogelio Salado he was introduced to Agustin by his brother in law, Lorenzo

Alvarez, in March or April 1987. Agustin presented herself as manager of
Clover Placement Agency and showed Salado a copy of a job order for Oman.
She requested 5k as processing fee for which a receipt was issued. Agustin
later introduced Salado to the Sps. Goce, owners, where they requested a
higher fee of 12k. Receipts were issued.
Ramona Salado spouse of Rogelio. She was introduced to Agustin by her
brother Alvarez. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman.
Salado agreed since she will be working in Oman same as her hubby. She
initially paid 2k, then an additional 2k.
Dionisio Masaya applied for a job in Oman via Clover Placement Agency. He
initially paid 1.9k, then an additional 10k.
Ernesto Alvarez was offered by Agustin a job as ambulance driver in Oman,
with salary of $600-$700. He paid 3k.
Bottom line all complainants were not able to leave for Oman. They discovered that
the agency was not licensed by POEA.
Agustins defense she was a neighbor of the Sps. Goce who were licensed recruiters
and owners of Clover. Because said agency was able to send her son to Saudi, she
agreed to INTRODUCE the complainants to the Sps. She denied any participation in
the illegal recruitment since INTRODUCING an applicant is not one of those prohibited
acts. She admits giving money to some of the complainants but claims that it is not for
partial payment /return of the fees but as a loan which she extended to them.
Issues:

1.

WON act of introducing falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment / WON
there is proof that Agustin offered or promised overseas employment to
complainants.

2.

WON there is proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment

Ratio
1.

Agustin is accused of violating Art 38 & 39 LC.

Art 38, as amended by PD 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including the
prohibited practices in Art 34 undertaken by non-licensees / non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Art 39. It further provides that illegal
recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if: (a)
committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another; (b) in large scale against three or more
persons individually or as a group.
All accused are not licensed to recruit as certified by POEA and are therefore guilty of
illegal recruitment if proven that they committed any of the prohibited acts. Hence
Agustin is claiming that the act of introducing applicants to the owners of a placement
agency is not illegal.
Court said that under LC, recruitment and placement refer to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes
REFERRALS, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not Referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of
an applicant for employment after an intial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.
Despite denials of Agustin, the testimonial evidence of all four complainants show that
she further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment (meaning, her participation
did not just end when she introduced them to the Sps.) It was Agustin who informed
them of the fees to pay and the papers they had to submit. She also represented
herself as the manager of the agency and claimed that she/agency is able to send
Filipinos for employment abroad by showing job orders. She also persuaded them to
take these job offers. All these show that she played a pivotal role.
As to the claim that there was no proof that she obtained money from them, this is
belied by the photocopies of the receipts. Court said when the original has been lost or
cannot be produced, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents or
by the recollection of witnesses. Even still, the absence of receipts will not warrant the
acquittal of Agustin. In People v Comia, the Court held that failure to ask for receipt for
fees paid, and failure to present receipts is not fatal to the case. Their testimonies,
being clear and positive, are sufficient to establish that factum probandum.

2.

Evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish that Agustin

confabulated with the Sps. In their plan to deceive the complainants. Although
the other accused have not been tried, there is sufficient basis for Agustins
conviction as discussed above. (yan talaga sabi sa case, ikli lang)

HELD/RATIO: Ortiz-Miyake guilty only of simple illegal recruitment (and estafa).

LC: recruitment and placement is ". . . any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; becomes illegal if one has no authorization
for performing such acts; becomes large scale if done against three or more
persons whether individually or as a group

Right of accused to confront del Rosario and Generillo was not afforded her.
Testimonies of sister and mother, respectively, mere hearsay. Although
testimonies from the previous case could have been used, the decision
convicting the accused of another crime (in that previous case, estafa) cannot
be sustained for being violative of the accuseds right to confront witnesses.

Conviction of illegal recruitment does not preclude conviction for estafa.

Burden of proof was only successfully established as to victim Marasigan.
Since large scale not established, conviction is only for simple illegal
recruitment (and estafa).

RTC affirmed.
PEOPLE V. ORTIZ-MIYAKE
FACTS:

Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale,

following a complaint filed by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and
Rosamar del Rosario. Marasigan had also charged her with estafa by means
of false pretenses.

Only Marasigan was able to testify, however, as the other two complainants
were abroad. Marasigan said Ortiz-Miyake promised her a job as factory
worker in Taiwan. The former gave her P5,000 initially as placement fee,
which amount subsequently became P23,000 paid in installments upon the
demands of the accused. Accused gave assurances that Marasigan would
have no problem getting a visa and a plane ticket. She was unable to go to
Taiwan, as there was no ticket booked for her and, in fact, the supposed
agency did not even know Miyake.

On the other hand, Generillo was represented by her mother, while del
Rosarios sister testified in court on the latters behalf. As they were not
personally present, however, during the transactions with Miyake, they could
only claim they gave certain amounts that were supposed to go to Miyake, and
concluded that since their relatives had not been able to leave as promised by
Miyake, then they were necessarily victims of illegal recruitment by the
accused. A POEA representative also testified that Miyake had no
authorization to recruit workers for overseas employment. [Miyake claiming
she only offered discounted plane tickets to the supposed victims]

TC convicted the accused, largely basing their decision on the previous

decision rendered by

Paranaque MeTC, where the two complainants now absent had filed charges of estafa
against Miyake. The Court there had convicted Miyake.
ISSUE: won Miyake can be held liable for illegal recruitment on a large scale

G.R. No. 173198

June 1, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOLORES OCDEN, AccusedAppellant.

Facts:
Ocden was originally charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and six counts of
estafa by way of false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud. All seven cases against Ocden were consolidated and were tried
jointly after Ocden pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented three witnesses namely: Marilyn Mana-a and Rizalina
Ferrer, complainants; and Julia Golidan, mother of complainants Jeffries and Howard
Golidan.
Mana-a testified that sometime in the second week of August 1998, she and Isabel
Dao-as went to Ocdens house to apply for work as factory workers in Italy. They were
required by Ocden to submit their bio-data and passports, pay the placement fee
of P70,000, and to undergo medical examination.
Upon submitting her bio-data and passport, Mana-a paid Ocden P500 for her certificate
of employment andP20,000 as down payment for her placement fee. On September
1998, Ocden accompanied Mana-a and 20 other applicants to Zamora Medical Clinic
for their medical examinations, for which each of the applicants paid P3,000. Mana-a
also paid to Ocden P22,000 as the second installment on her placement fee. When
Josephine Lawanag, Mana-as sister, withdrew her application, Lawanags P15,000
placement fee, already paid to Ocden, was credited to Mana-a.
Ferrer narrated that she and her daughter Jennilyn were interested to work overseas.
About the second week of September 1998, they approached Ocden through Fely
Alipio. Ocden showed Ferrer and Jennilyn a copy of a job order from Italy for factory
workers who could earn as much as $90,000 to $100,000. In the first week of October
1998, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to apply for work, so they submitted their passports
and pictures to Ocden. Ferrer also went to Manila for medical examination, for which
she spent P3,500. Ferrer paid to Ocden in November 1998 the initial amount
of P20,000, and in December 1998 the balance of her and Jennilyns placement fees.
All in all, Ferrer paid Ocden P140,000, as evidenced by the receipts issued by Ocden.
Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers
to be sent to Italy. Their flight was scheduled in December 1998. In preparation for their

flight to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they were introduced by Ocden
to Erlinda Ramos. Ocden and Ramos then accompanied Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio to
the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to Ferrer, Jennilyn,
and Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application for
Italy would be processed.
Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of
their money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the
POEA that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter. Expecting a job overseas, Ferrer took a
leave of absence from her work. Thus, she lost income and spent for transportation
and food expenses.
According to Golidan, sometime in October 1998, she inquired from Ocden about the
latters overseas recruitment. Ocden informed Golidan that the placement fee
was P70,000 for each applicant, that the accepted applicants would be sent by batches
overseas, and that priority would be given to those who paid their placement fees early.
In October 1998, Golidan brought her sons, Jeffries and Howard, to Ocden. On the
same date, Jeffries and Howard handed over to Ocden their passports and P40,000 as
down payment on their placement fees. In December 1998, Jeffries and Howard paid
the balance of their placement fees amounting to P100,000. Ocden issued receipts for
these two payments. Ocden then informed Golidan that the first batch of accepted
applicants had already left, and that Jeffries would be included in the second batch for
deployment, while Howard in the third batch.
In anticipation of their deployment to Italy, Jeffries and Howard left for Manila in
December 1998. Through a telephone call, Jeffries informed Golidan that his flight to
Italy was scheduled on December 16. However, Golidan was surprised to again
receive a telephone call from Jeffries saying that his flight to Italy was delayed due to
insufficiency of funds, and that Ocden went back to Baguio to look for additional funds.
When Golidan went to see Ocden, Ocden was about to leave for Manila so she could
be there in time for the scheduled flights of Jeffries and Howard.
On December 19, Golidan received another telephone call from Jeffries who was in
Zamboanga with the other applicants. Jeffries informed Golidan that he was stranded
in Zamboanga because Ramos did not give him his passport. Ramos was the one who
briefed the overseas job applicants in Baguio sometime in November 1998. Jeffries
instructed Golidan to ask Ocdens help in looking for Ramos. Golidan, however, could
not find Ocden in Baguio.
Golidan, with the other applicants, Mana-a and Dao-as, went to Manila to meet Ocden.
When Golidan asked why Jeffries was in Zamboanga, Ocden replied that it would be
easier for Jeffries and the other applicants to acquire their visas to Italy in Zamboanga.

Ocden was also able to contact Ramos, who assured Golidan that Jeffries would be
able to get his passport. When Golidan went back home to Baguio, she learned
through a telephone call from Jeffries that Howard was now likewise stranded in
Zamboanga.
By January 1999, Jeffries and Howard were still in Zamboanga. Jeffries refused to
accede to Golidans prodding for him and Howard to go home, saying that the
recruiters were already working out the release of the funds for the applicants to get to
Italy. Golidan went to Ocden, and the latter told her not to worry as her sons would
already be flying to Italy because the same factory owner in Italy, looking for workers,
undertook to shoulder the applicants travel expenses. Yet, Jeffries called Golidan once
more telling her that he and the other applicants were still in Zamboanga.
Golidan went to Ocdens residence. This time, Ocdens husband gave Golidan P23,000
which the latter could use to fetch the applicants, including Jeffries and Howard, who
were stranded in Zamboanga. Golidan traveled again to Manila with Mana-a and Daoas. When they saw each other, Golidan informed Ocden regarding the P23,000 which
the latters husband gave to her. Ocden begged Golidan to give her the money
because she needed it badly. Of the P23,000, Golidan retained P10,000, Dao-as
received P3,000, and Ocden got the rest. Jeffries, Howard and five other applicants,
accompanied by Ocden, were able to return to Manila.
Thereafter, Golidan and her sons went to Ocdens residence to ask for a refund of the
money they had paid to Ocden. Ocden was able to return only P50,000. Golidan and
her sons went to the Baguio office of the POEA, where they discovered that Ocden
was not a licensed recruiter.
Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an
applicant for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the
recruiter.
RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.
CA affirmed Ocdens conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the
three counts of estafa.
Issue: W/N Ocden was guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.
Held: Yes
Ratio:

Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she
is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations
of the prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she was a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers. No certification attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution.
Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code defines and enumerates the acts which
constitute recruitment and placement:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising for advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, broadened the
concept of illegal recruitment and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that
constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042
are reproduced below:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a
loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to
recruitment or employment;

(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor
Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker
who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health
or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such
other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved
and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual
signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the
same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or
member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged
directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code
and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of
Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day but not more than 12 years and a fine
of P200,000 nor more than P500,000.
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five P500,000 nor more
than P1,000,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage
as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally
recruited is less than 18 years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send
complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their
money in order to be employed.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would
constitute illegal recruitment "whether committed by any person, whether a nonlicensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority." Among such acts, under
Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred
by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the
workers fault."
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by
a licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is
inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by
receiving placement fees, evidenced by receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to
reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons the amounts they had paid
when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own.
Contrary to Ocdens claims, Golidan had personal knowledge of Ocdens illegal
recruitment activities, which she could competently testify to. Golidan herself had

personal dealings with Ocden as Golidan assisted her sons, Jeffries and Howard, in
completing the requirements for their overseas job applications, and later on, in getting
back home from Zamboanga where Jeffries and Howard were stranded, and in
demanding a refund from Ocden of the placement fees paid. That Golidan is seeking a
reimbursement of the placement fees paid for the failed deployment of her sons Jeffries
and Howard strengthens, rather than weakens, the prosecutions case. Going back to
illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, failure to reimburse
the expenses incurred by the worker when deployment does not actually take place,
without the workers fault, is illegal recruitment.
The affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by Jeffries and Howard does not
exonerate Ocden from criminal liability when the prosecution had successfully proved
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Romero)
Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially
when it is executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses
who had given them, later on, changed their mind for one reason or another, for such
rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witness.
Ocdens denial of any illegal recruitment activity cannot stand against the prosecution
witnesses positive identification of her in court as the person who induced them to part
with their money upon the misrepresentation and false promise of deployment to Italy
as factory workers. Besides, despite several opportunities given to Ocden by the RTC,
she failed to present Ramos, who Ocden alleged to be the real recruiter and to whom
she turned over the placement fees paid by her co-applicants.
Ocden further argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently establish that she illegally
recruited at least three persons, to constitute illegal recruitment on a large scale. Out of
the victims named in the Information, only Mana-a and Ferrer testified in court. Mana-a
did not complete her testimony. Ocden again objects to Golidans testimony as
hearsay, not being based on Golidans personal knowledge.
Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale,
that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
In People v. Hu, we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be
based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons,
whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at
least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient
evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this

case, there is conclusive evidence that Ocden recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans
sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as factory workers in Italy.
We are likewise affirming the conviction of Ocden for the crime of estafa. The very
same evidence proving Ocdens liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. (People v. Yabut)
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Both these
elements are present in the instant case. The penalty for estafa depends on the
amount of defraudation.

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
on non-impairment of contracts - NO

G.R. No. 167614

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector

MAIN ISSUE: Last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Tribunal

Monetary Claims Awarded

Other
Awards

LA

US$8,770 (3 months of the unexpired portion of the

contract, based on the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Sec 10, RA No. 8042 )

10% Fees;
No moral
and
exemplary
damages

applied the salary rate of $2,590.00, consisting of

petitioner's basic salary, $1,400.00/month +
$700.00/month, fixed OT pay, +

FACTS:

Duration of Contract:
12 months

Position: Chief Officer

Basic pay: US$1,400/m

Overtime Pay
US$700/m

Vacation Leave: 7
days/month

Hours of Work: 48
hrs/wk

$490.00/month, VL pay = $2,590.00/month.

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:

On the date of his departure, he was constrained to accept a downgraded

employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would
be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
Philippines on May 26, 1998. (There is an unexpired term of 9 months, 23 days)

Petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims as well as moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.

ISSUES:

NLRC

US$4,245 (3 months)
-reduced the applicable salary rate from $2,590.00
to $1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 does not
provide for the award of overtime pay, which should
be proven to have been actually performed, and for
vacation leave pay.

10% Fees;
No moral
and
exemplary
damages

CA affirmed the NLRC, and skirted the constitutional issue just raised by
petitioner.
YES
HELD:
1.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring
respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

2.

On the second issue, the answer is in the affirmative.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis
OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words
"for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three
months."

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year;
and

The subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract
periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than
one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.

Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The provisions of the New Civil Code do not expressly provide for the remedies
available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged. However, it is noted that in
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich, the Court carried over the principles on
the payment of damages underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied
the same to a case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period
employment contract was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already
in effect. The same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino
workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the

adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concluded that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in
that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion v Sps. Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (in
behalf of daughter Jasmin), White Falcon Services, and Jaime Ortiz (Pres. Of
White Falcon)

LArb dismissed for lack of merit, giving credence to Al Birk medical report

NLRC reversed, found Jasmin a victim of compensable work-connected

criminal aggression; both agencies are solidarily liable to pay $113; later
reduced to $80k

CA affirmed; later reduced the award to $8k (monthly salary x remaining

contract period)

Sps. Cuaresma (in behalf of Jasmin) v White Falcon and Becmen

Facts:
Jan 1997 Jasmin was deployed by Becmen to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk
Hospital in Saudi under a 3 year contract, for $247/mo.
June 1998 - she died. Jessie Fajardo, co-worker, found her dead inside her dormitory
room with mouth foaming and smelling of poison. Medical report of Al-Birk Hosp stated
that the cause of death was poisoning halt in blood circulation, respiratory system
and brain damage due to poisoning from unknown substance.
Sep 1998 her body was repatriated to Manila. The City Health Officer of Cabanatuan
found that Jasmin died under violent circumstances not poisoning abrasions at her
inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears;
lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and
hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib
fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora.
Mar 1999 Jasmins body was exhumed by NBI. Toxicology report tested negative ffor
non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.
Sps. Cuaresmas received from OWWA the following: 50k death benefits, 50k loss of
life; 20k funeral expenses; 10k medical reimbursement.
Nov 1999 Sps. Filed complaint against Becmen and Rajab & Silsilah Co (principal in
Saudi) claiming death and insurance benefits. Sps. Claim that Jasmins death was
work-related having occurred at the employers premises; their entitled to iqama
insurance; compensatory damages amounting to $103k which is the sum of her
monthly salary 35 years (she was 25 yo when she died, assuming she would survive
until 60 yo).
Becmen and Rajab claim that Jasmin committed suicide and relied on the medical
report of Al Birk. They deny liability since the Sps. Had already received their benefits
from OWWA. Later, Becmen manifested that Rajab had terminated their agency, and
impleaded White Falcon as the new agency of Rajab.
Summary of Rulings

Issues

WON entitled to insurance NO

WON death is compensable NO

WON death was by suicide NO

WON Becmen and Falcon are liable YES, solidary liability

Ratio
1.

NOT entitled to insurance.

The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her
employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule,
stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public
order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. An examination
of said employment agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or other
benefits/privileges than the following:
1.
1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
2.
Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines
at the end thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month
service;
3.
Transportation to and from work;
4.
Free living accommodations;
5.
Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic
surgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6.
Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but
the exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport
renewal, sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
7.
Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after
twenty four-months of continuous service;

8.
Eight days public holidays per year;
9.
The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated
as per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death
or other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and
appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
Absence for provisions on social security and other benefits does not make the
contract infirm under PH laws since under Saudi law, foreign employer is not obliged to
provide her these benefits.
2. Death NOT WORK RELATED, therefore not compensable (i.e., not liable for
lost earnings)
At time of death, Jasmin was not on duty but at her dormitory room on personal time.
Court stated that the foreign employer cannot be expected to ensure her safety even
while she is not on duty. What an employee does on free time is beyond the employers
sphere of inquiry.
The dormitory room also cannot be considered as employers premises.
3. Jasmin DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE
Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into
her employment contract. This is beyond human comprehension for a 25 yo Filipina
especially since suicide is contrary to Christian belief. Court cited Filipinas resilience
despite abuse and maltreatment. Based on past OFW experiences, Filipinas do not
simply commit suicide but rather endure.
Court also found that Saudi police and autopsy reports are patently inconclusive. Their
report is contradicted by the City Health Officer and by NBI. Even the toxicology report
tested negative for poisonous substances.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to death.
4. Rajab, Becmen, White Falcon solidarily liable for moral and exemplary
damages
Court admonished Becmen and Falcon for simply dismissing Jasmins case as one of
suicide instead of fighting for her rights. The Agencies prioritized their corporate interest
over that of Jasmin.
RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act provides that the State shall at all
times uphold the dignity of its citizens, whether in the country or overseas. The rights
and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos are adequately protected and
safeguarded.
Becmen and Falcon, both licensed recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by
RA 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to deployed OFWs,
be the first to come the rescue of our distressed OFWs; and have the primary
obligation to protect the rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs. It should have
been them who sought justice for Jasmin. Instead, it was the parents who requested an

autopsy in the Ph to confirm the Saudi report. Court stated that the parents have done
all that was within their power to investigate Jasmins case on their own.
Art 19 CC every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art 21 CC any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the later for the
damage.
Art 24 CC in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at
a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Rajab, Becmen and Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because
they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Fil workers enjoy the protective mantel of
PH labor and social laws, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is
in keeping with the Consti provision for the State to afford protection to labor, promote
full employement, ensure equal work opportunities.
All labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer.
As a result of their misconduct, Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages for which
Becmen and Falcon are solidarily liable. Grant of moral damages to the employee
by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Art 2219
(10) CC.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-basd
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employement.
This is meanth to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment. If
the agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners are
also solidarily liable.
Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not absolve Becmen.
CA decision set aside. Awarded P2.5M as moral damages, P250k as exemplary
damages.