BAYAN, KARAPATAN ET AL VS. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA April 25, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners come in three groups: First is Bayan, et al in GR No. 169838, second is Jess del Prado, et al in GR No. 169849 and third is Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al in GR No. 169881. They alleged their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rallies, marches and protests they participated were violently dispersed, some are arrested and detained and caused injuries to several by policemen implementing BP No. 880. All petitioners assails BP No. 880, some in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy. Their contentions are the following: 1. That BP No. 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which Philippines is a signatory; 2. That the provisions of BP No. 880 are not mere regulations but prohibitions as it is allegedly a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances; 3. That BP No. 880 requires permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger and that it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government; 4. That two standards stated in the law (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent; and 5. That CPR is void for it alters and contravenes the standard of maximum tolerance. ISSUES: Whether or not BP No. 880 is constitutional. Whether or not Calibrated Preemptive Response is legal and constitutional. HELD:
The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of BP. 880. The SC
reiterated that the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the constitution but it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. And that power to regulate is vested to the government through police power.Furthermore, the SC said that the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health and that is the recognized exception to the exercise of right even under the Universal Declaration on Civil and Political Rights. The SC ruled that BP No. 880 is only a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. As explained and given in Reyes v. Bagatsing, that freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern, it must be accorded with utmost respect, must not be limited and denied except on showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has right to prevent it. The SC stated that the law provides a precise and sufficient standard - the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not inconsistent standard. And that a fair and impartial reading of BP No. 880 readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places, that the reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. In CPR, the SC rules for the discontinuation of the the usage of CPR for it means and serves only for the same purpose as maximum tolerance. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law which maximum tolerance.