NYPD: Guidelines For Use of Force in New York City

Police Use of Force in New York City:
Findings and Recommendations on

NYPDs Policies and Practices
New York City Department of Investigation

Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD)
Mark G. Peters
Commissioner
Philip K. Eure
Inspector General for the NYPD
October 1, 2015
POLICEUSEOFFORCEINNEWYORKCITY:FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONSONNYPDSPOLICIESANDPRACTICES
OCTOBER2015
TableofContents
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
ExecutiveSummaryandIntroduction...............................................................................1
Methodology......................................................................................................................6
Analyticsfrom179SubstantiatedUseofForceCCRBCases..........................................10
TrackingForceIncidentsInvolvingNYPDOfficers...........................................................20
a. TheImportanceofReportingandDocumentingForceIncidents..............................20
b. NYPDsPoliciesandPracticesRegardingForceReportingandDocumentation........21
i. NYPDPatrolGuideDoesNotDefineForceorEstablishLevelsofForce....21
ii. NYPDLacksaUniformPolicyonReportingForceIncidents..........................23
iii. NYPDForceReportingIsInconsistentinPractice..........................................24
c. TheNeedforUniformForceReportingandDocumentation.....................................26
ForceDeEscalationPoliciesandPracticesinNYPD........................................................28
a. DeEscalationintheField:MissedOpportunitiesbyNYPDOfficers..........................28
b. NYPDsDeEscalationPolicies:AreasforImprovement.............................................34
i. NYPDPatrolGuide..........................................................................................34
ii. ModelPractices..............................................................................................34
NYPDTraining...................................................................................................................39
a. TheImportanceofTraining........................................................................................39
b. NYPDTrainingOverview.............................................................................................39
i. PoliceAcademyEducationandTrainingCenter............................................39
1. AcademyCoursesRelevanttoUseofForce......................................39
2. Scenario/Simulation(FirearmsandTactics)......................................40
ii. InServiceTraining..........................................................................................41
c. ModelPracticesforDeEscalationTraining................................................................42
d. AssessmentofNYPDsTraining...................................................................................43
i. AcademyTraining...........................................................................................43
ii. InServiceTraining..........................................................................................44
Discipline...........................................................................................................................45
a. OIGNYPDsDeparturesfromCCRBsRecommendations..........................................45
b. DisciplinaryOutcomesAcross104SubstantiatedUseofForceAllegations..............46
i. MeasuringthePenalty...................................................................................54
c. ChangesinHowCCRBandNYPDWorkTogether.......................................................55
i. RequirementtoProvideWrittenExplanationforDownwardDepartures....55
ii. Reconsideration..............................................................................................56
Recommendations............................................................................................................58
Appendices
OCTOBER2015
I.
ExecutiveSummaryandIntroduction
Useofforceisadefiningissueinmodernpolicing.Policeofficers,bytheverynatureof
theirduties,areentrusted,empowered,andattimesobligatedbylocalgovernmentstouse
forceagainstcitizenswhenappropriate.Inexchangeforthisgrantofpower,communitiesand
theirpolicedepartmentsrequirethattheuseofforcebegovernedbyasetofstandards.These
standardsstemfromthepremisethattheforceusedmustbereasonable,anidearootedinthe
FourthAmendmentoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.Reasonableuseofforceand
constitutionalpolicingrequireequaltreatmentofallindividuals,properapplicationofforce,
andaccountabilityfortheconductofpoliceofficers.
FollowingthedeathofEricGarnerinStatenIslandin2014andothersacrossthenation,
therehasbeenapubliccallforgreateraccountabilitywhenpoliceofficersuseforcethat
appearsneitherreasonablenorproportional.Policedepartmentsandpoliceaccountability
agenciesacrossthecountryhavetakenuptheissueofuseofforceinanefforttoimprove
policingandensurethatallofficersareworthyofthetremendouspowerandtrustafforded
thembytheircommunities.
InJanuary2015,theNewYorkCityDepartmentofInvestigationsOfficeoftheInspector
GeneralfortheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(OIGNYPD)releaseditsfirstreport,
ObservationsonAccountabilityandTransparencyinTenNYPDChokeholdCases(Chokehold
Report).Inthatreport,OIGNYPDfoundthattheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(NYPD)
disciplinarysystemwascomplex,multitiered,andoftendeliveredinconsistentresultsincases
involvingchokeholds.OIGNYPDpromisedtofurtherinvestigateNYPDsuseofforceby
reviewingalargersampleofforceinvestigations.ThisReport,whichisalargerandmore
sophisticatedinquiryintouseofforce,fulfillsthatpromise.Manyoftheissuesaddressedinthe
ChokeholdReportsurfaceagaininthislargerdataset.
ThisReportexaminesfiveaspectsofuseofforcewithinNYPD:(1)trends;(2)reporting;
(3)deescalation;(4)training;and(5)discipline.TheReportbeginsbyhighlightingdataand
trendsfromexcessiveorunnecessaryforcecasessubstantiatedbytheCivilianComplaint
ReviewBoard(CCRB).CCRBsubstantiated207allegationsofforcein179casesbetween2010
and2014,anotablymodestnumber,giventhesizeofNYPD,andapositiveindicationofthe
NYPDsrestraint.1OIGNYPDsreviewinvolvedonlynondeadlyforcecasesinvestigatedby
NYCDepartmentofInvestigationCommissionerMarkG.PetersandInspectorGeneralfortheNYPDPhilipK.Eure
thankthestaffofOIGNYPDfortheirefforts,persistence,andinsightinhelpingtoproducethisReport,especially
SandraMusumeci,DeputyInspectorGeneral;AsimRehman,GeneralCounsel;ThomasMahoney,Directorof
Investigations;VTsienFan,SeniorPolicyManager;J.OlabisiMatthews,SeniorInvestigator;JosephCarinha,Senior
Investigator;ConstanceGonzalezHood,SeniorInvestigator;CynthiaKao,ExaminingAttorney;MichaelAcampora,
SpecialInvestigator;PatrickCahill,SpecialInvestigator;JosephProcopio,SpecialInvestigator;ArturoSanchez,
SpecialInvestigator;SaroltaSandor,SpecialInvestigator;KanikaKhanna,PolicyAnalyst;JustynRichardson,Policy
Analyst;AlessandraSienraCanas,PolicyAnalyst;MarielleMoore,PolicyAnalyst;ChristopherTellet,PolicyAnalyst;
SyedA.Ameer,Auditor;BettyDiop,DataAssistant;SenoraHarvey,ClericalAssistant;andAlisonRogers,Legal
OCTOBER2015
CCRB,asnolethalforcewasusedinthe179substantiatedcases.Asdiscussedbelow,this
investigationdemonstratesseveralissuesofrealconcern.
Becauseaccountabilitybeginswithaccesstoreliabledata,thisReportdescribeshow
NYPDdoesanddoesnottrackuseofforcedata,andhowtheusefulnessofthatinformation
canbeimprovedbyadoptingamorepreciseuseofforcepolicycoupledwithstandardized
forcereporting.
ThisReportnextpresentsthefindingsofanindependentanalysisofforcecaseswhere
someofficersnotonlymissedtheopportunitytodeescalatetheincident,buttookmeasures
whichaffirmativelyescalatedtheencounter.Giventhesefindings,theReportexamines
policiesofotherlawenforcementagenciesregardingdeescalationtacticsandreviewswhat
NYPDiscurrentlydoingtoaddressexcessiveforceanddeescalationthroughtraining.The
Reportthensuggestswaysinwhichtrainingandpolicycanbeimprovedwithrespecttode
escalationtacticsandotherrelatedskills.
Lastly,thisReportanalyzesandevaluatesNYPDsdisciplinarysystem,includingaclose
reviewofcaseswhereOIGNYPD,throughindependentreview,determinedthattheuseof
forcewasnotreasonablebyanystandardandnotjustifiedbyanyexigentcircumstancesorthe
needtoprotectanofficersorthepublicssafety.Historically,NYPDhasfrequentlyfailedto
disciplineofficerswhouseforcewithoutjustification.ThisReportthusoffers
recommendationstoimprovethedisciplinaryprocesssothatofficerswhouseexcessiveforce
areproperlyheldaccountable.
OIGNYPDsanalysisandrecommendationsarebasedonNYPDpoliciesandpracticesas
ofthedateofpublicationofthisReport.NYPD,however,hasinformedOIGNYPDthatithas
beenreviewingitsuseofforcepoliciesandproceduresandthatitanticipatesmakingrevisions
tothePatrolGuideregardingtheuseofforceinthenearfuture.Thepotentialareasofrevision
includeupdateddefinitionsconcerningforce,newpoliciesregardingdeescalation,
responsibilitiesofwitnessofficersinuseofforceincidents,reportingobligationsconcerning
forceincidents,anddataanalysisonuseofforceincidents.NYPDhasalsorecentlycreateda
dedicatedForceInvestigationDivisiontoinvestigateallfirearmdischarges,deathsincustody,
anduseofforceincidentsthatarelikelytocausedeath.NYPDrecentlybriefedOIGNYPDon
thesenewpoliciesandprocedures;itisclearthattheproposedchanges,whenimplemented,
willaddressanumberoftheconcernsraisedinthisReport.
Intern.ThecontributionsmadebyLesleyBrovner,FirstDeputyCommissioner,arealsoappreciated.Our
gratitudeisalsoextendedtotheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandotheragenciesandorganizationsnotedfor
theircooperationduringthepreparationofthisReport.
1
Thistotalof207substantiatedforceallegationsisbasedonthedataprovidedtoOIGNYPDbyCCRB.Thetotal
numberofsubstantiatedforceallegationsrepresentsapproximately2.0%ofthemorethan10,000allegationsof
forcereceivedbyCCRBfrom2010to2014.SeeCCRB,APP.ACCRBCOMPLAINTDATA2014(2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014annualreportstatsappendix.pdf(lastvisitedSep8,2015).
OCTOBER2015
ForthisReport,OIGNYPDassembledateamwithprofessionalbackgroundsinlaw
enforcement,policeoversight,law,andquantitativeandqualitativedataanalysis.Thismulti
disciplinaryteamengagedinaninvestigationthatincluded,amongotherthings:
Adetailedanalysisofall179caseswhereCCRBdeterminedthatofficersusedexcessive
orunnecessaryforcefrom2010to2014;
AreviewoftheaccompanyingNYPDdisciplinaryrecordsforover100casesthathad
reachedfinaldisciplinarydispositionsasofthewritingofthisReport;
AnassessmentofNYPDPatrolGuideproceduresonuseofforceandareviewof
policiesofotherpolicedepartments;
EvaluationofNYPDsPoliceAcademyandinservicetrainingmodulesonuseofforce.
Throughthiswork,OIGNYPDreachedseveralconclusionsregardingNYPDuseofforcepolicies,
practices,training,anddiscipline:
NYPDscurrentuseofforcepolicyisvagueandimprecise,providinglittle
guidancetoindividualofficersonwhatactionsconstituteforce.NYPDscurrent
useofforcePatrolGuideprocedure,whichisbarelymorethanapageoftext,is
completelysilentonwhatactionsconstituteforce.ThePatrolGuidelikewise
prohibitsexcessiveforcewhileofferingnoclarityonwhatconstitutesexcessive
force.Officersaregivenfewclearcutruleswhendeterminingwhethertheir
actionsconstituteforceandwhethersuchactionsmustbereported.Asaresult,
NYPDshouldadoptamorepreciseuseofforcePatrolGuideprocedurethat
includesgreaterclarityonwhatismeantbyforce,excessiveforce,anddeadly
physicalforce.
NYPDscurrentproceduresfordocumentingandreportingforceincidentsare
fragmentedacrossnumerousforms,andofficersfrequentlyusegenericlanguage
thatfailstocapturethespecificsofanencounter.Thelackofacentralized,
uniformuseofforcereportingmechanismleavesofficerswithoutguidanceabout
reportingforceandNYPDwithoutadequatedataregardingpoliceofficeruseof
force.Itiscurrentlyimpossibletoaccuratelyandcomprehensivelytracktheuseof
forcebyNYPDofficers.Asaresult,NYPDshouldreviseitsuseofforcepolicyto
createanewreportingformthatrequiresofficerstocaptureallincidentsofforce
usingdescriptivelanguage.
NYPDsPatrolGuidedoesnotproperlyinstructofficerstodeescalateencounters
withthepublic.ConsideringNYPDsstatedcommitmenttodeescalationtraining,
theoverallbenefitsofsuchstrategiesinpolicing,andthestridesthathavebeen
madeinupdatingthepoliciesofpeerlawenforcementagencies,theDepartment
shouldincludedeescalationprinciplesaspartofitsuseofforceproceduresinthe
PatrolGuide.
3
OCTOBER2015
NYPDtrainingdoesnotadequatelyfocusondeescalation.Thereislittletono
substantivefocusondeescalationinNYPDstrainingprograms.TheDepartment
shouldbolsteritseffortstotrainofficersindeescalationanddomoretoreinforce
itsimportance.NYPDshouldaddaspecificPoliceAcademycourseondeescalation
andincorporatesuchtacticsmoreheavilyinitsclassroomandpracticaltraining
environments.
Intheperiodreviewed,NYPDfrequentlyfailedtoimposedisciplineevenwhen
providedwithevidenceofexcessiveforce.NYPDimposednodisciplinewith
respectto37of104,or35.6%,ofsubstantiatedallegationsinwhichOIGNYPDs
independentreviewconfirmedthatofficersusedexcessiveforcethatwasnot
warrantedunderthecircumstances.Forthosecasesdecidedinthefouryears
between2010and2013,NYPDdeclinedtoimposedisciplinein34of77allegations,
or44.1%ofthetime.NYPD,however,declineddisciplineinthreeof27allegations,
or11.1%ofthetime,inthecasesdecidedin2014and2015.Althoughtherateis
trendingdownward,giventhesmallnumberofdatapointssinceJanuary2014,OIG
NYPDwillcontinuetomonitortheissue.
NYPDandCCRBcontinuetodisagreeonhowofficersshouldbeheldaccountable
foruseofexcessiveforce,butthetwoagencieshavetakenstepstowards
harmonizingdisciplinaryresultsandimprovingagencycooperation.Across92
substantiateduseofforceallegations,NYPDdeparteddownwardfromCCRBs
disciplinaryrecommendationsorimposednodisciplinaryactionwhatsoever
67.4%ofthetime.2AreviewoftheNYPDsdisciplinarydecisionssinceJanuary
2014indicatesthattherateofdisciplinarydowngradinginuseofforcecaseshas
recentlyslowed.Ofthe20disciplinarydeterminationsreviewedduringthisperiod,
NYPDimposedalesserornopenaltyinfourinstances,or20.0%ofthetime.
Nevertheless,thegulfbetweenCCRBandNYPDremains.Thesefindingsshowthat
thedissonancebetweenNYPDandCCRBobservedinOIGNYPDsChokeholdReport
ispartofalargerpatternofincongruousdisciplinarydecisions.Inrecentyears,
however,anumberofchangeshavebeenmaderegardinghowNYPDandCCRB
interact.AmongthesedevelopmentsisthereconsiderationprocesswherebyNYPD
canrequestthatCCRBrereviewadeterminationorpenaltyrecommendation.
SincethereconsiderationprocesswentintoeffectinDecember2014,ratherthan
departdownwardfromCCRBsdisciplinaryrecommendations,NYPDhassentcases
backtoCCRBtobereviewedagain.OIGNYPDhasnotyetreviewedthefulleffects
ofthenewreconsiderationprocess.
Forinformationexplainingwhythisanalysisinvolved92substantiatedallegationsasopposedtothepreviously
mentioned104substantiatedallegationspleaseseeSectionVII:Discipline.
OCTOBER2015
NYPDshouldpublishanannualreportaddressingtheuseofforcebyofficers.This
reportwouldtrackandcollectvariouscomponentsrelatedtouseofforce,including
thoseaddressedinthisReport,suchasofficertenure,assignments,age,typeof
forceused,pertinentinformationregardingmembersofthepublicsubjectedto
force,aswellasofficerinjuries,disciplinarytrendsandoutcomes,andotherdata
deemednecessaryforacomprehensiveunderstandingoftheissue.Suchareport
wouldpromotegreatertransparencyandaccountabilitywhileallowingNYPDto
consolidateandlearnfromdataonuseofforce.
OCTOBER2015
II.
Methodology
ForthisReport,OIGNYPDassembledateamwithprofessionalbackgroundsinlaw
enforcement,policeoversight,law,andquantitativeandqualitativedataanalysis.Theteam
conductedarigorousandmeticulousinvestigationandreviewofthepertinentissuesrelatedto
useofforceincidentsinvolvingNYPD.3
OIGNYPDbeganbyreviewingexistingliteraturefromavarietyofsources,bothpolicy
orientedandacademic,togainacomprehensiveunderstandingoftheresearchmethodsand
findingsonpoliceuseofforce.OIGNYPDthenreviewedthepoliciesandproceduresofNYPD
andotherpolicedepartmentsnationwide.
OIGNYPDexaminedallcasesfrom2010to2014inwhichCCRBsubstantiatedforce
allegations.4OIGNYPDtrackedthese179casesfromtheirsubstantiationbyCCRBtotheendof
theirrespectivelifecyclesatNYPD.5OIGNYPDselectedtheseCCRBcasesforinquirybecause
thatagencyhadalreadymadedeterminationsafterfullinvestigationsthatofficersunjustifiably
usedexcessiveorunnecessaryforce.OIGNYPDthereafterconducteditsownreviewofthe
forceallegations.AmongtheforcetypessubstantiatedbyCCRBwerephysicalcontact,
chokeholds,pepperspray,andashooting.6Eachcasewasreviewedinordertoidentifyseveral
variables,whichincluded:
Subjectofficersassignmentandtenure;
Age,gender,andraceornationaloriginofsubjectofficers;
Age,gender,andraceornationaloriginofcomplainants;7
Whetherandhowforcewasdocumented.
3
OIGNYPDsteamwassupervisedbyaformerprosecutorwithaPh.D.incriminologyandjusticepolicyandan
attorneywithexperienceinpoliceoversight.Theteammembersresponsibleforthereviewofthesubstantiated
forcecasesincludedindividualswithadvanceddegreesincriminaljusticeandpublicpolicyandexperiencein
auditing,policyresearch,andacademia.Theteammembersresponsibleforthedeescalationreviewincludeda
formerpoliceoversightinvestigator,aveteranofIrelandsNationalPoliceService,andaformermemberofthe
U.S.SecretServiceUniformedDivision.ThisteamreceivedguidancefromaretiredNYPDlieutenantandaretired
NYPDdetectivewhohaveacombined55yearsofexperiencewithNYPD.
4
Becausetherewereonlynineclosedcaseswithincidentdatesin2014,casesfromthatyearrepresentonly5.0%
ofthesample.Anyadditionalforcecomplaintsfrom2014maystillbeunderinvestigation.
5
Insomeinstances,thesubstantiatedCCRBcasesproceededfromthedisciplinaryrecommendationbythat
agencysBoardtoadministrativeprosecutionbeforetheNYPDDeputyCommissionerofTrialsandultimatelyto
thePoliceCommissioner,whereafinaldecisiononthedisciplinewasmade.Inotherinstances,theCCRBcases
wereclosedatearlierpointsintheprocesswithoutdisciplinebeingimposed,suchaswhenaninvestigationwas
dismissedbecauseitwentbeyondthe18monthstatuteoflimitationsforadministrativecharges.
6
Onecaseinthisreviewinvolvedanincidentinwhichamanwasshotinthebuttocksbythesubjectofficer.CCRB
investigatedtheincidentasagunfiredallegationandtheInternalAffairsBureau(IAB),theunitwithinNYPD
responsibleforinvestigatingtheuseofdeadlyforceatthetime,alsoinvestigatedtheincident.
7
ForthepurposesofthisReport,allindividualsidentifiedbyCCRBasvictimswillbereferredtoascomplainants.
Complainantsincludethosewhofiledthecomplaintthemselvesandthosewhohadcomplaintsfiledontheir
behalf.
OCTOBER2015
Inadditiontorecordingandcompilingstatisticaldataonthe179substantiatedCCRBuse
offorce cases, OIGNYPD designated a specialized group to conduct a specific casebycase
reviewofeachCCRBsubstantiatedallegationwithafocusondeescalationtacticsandavariety
ofrelatedelements.Theinvestigatorsinthisgroupdeterminedtheincidentdynamicsforeach
forceallegation,basedonthecontentsoftherelevantCCRBinvestigativefiles(includingfirst
handevidence,suchasvideofootage),andtrackedcriteriasuchas:
Whetherthecomplainantphysicallyresistedtheofficersinanyway;
Whetheranyuseofforcewasnecessarytoachievealegitimateaim;
Whethertheforceusedwasproportionateunderthecircumstances;
Whethertheuseofforcewasobjectivelyreasonable;and
Whetherdeescalationtechniquescouldhavebeendeployedasanalternative.
OIGNYPDstaffalsovisitedNYPDsPoliceAcademyEducationandTrainingCenter
(Academy)onmultipleoccasions,observedscenarioandsimulatorbasedtrainings,and
interviewednumerousrecruits,instructors,andpolicymakersregardingtraining,useofforce,
anddeescalation.OIGNYPDperformedacarefulreviewoftheAcademyssyllabusand
analyzedvariouscoursematerials.OIGNYPDlikewisereviewedthepoliciesandproceduresof
NYPDandseverallawenforcementagenciesacrossthecountryandconductedresearchon
modelpracticesbyexaminingalternativeuseofforcemodels,U.S.DepartmentofJustice
reports,andrelatedstudies.OIGNYPDalsoexploredissuessuchastheeffectivenessof
trainingandtherequirementsforrecruitingandappointingtrainers.
Inassessingwhetherofficerswereappropriatelydisciplinedforhavingusedexcessive
force,OIGNYPDfollowedeachsubstantiatedCCRBforceallegationasitmadeitswaythrough
NYPDscomplexdisciplinarysystem.Thisincludedareviewofthedocumentsconsideredby
theNYPDDepartmentAdvocatesOffice(DAO)andCCRBsAdministrativeProsecutionUnit
(APU)informulatingrecommendationsforpenaltiesforthesubjectofficersandwhethersuch
documentssuchasmonitoringhistory,Departmentrecognitions,andevaluationsby
commandingofficersareusedappropriatelyandeffectively.OIGNYPDalsonotedthe
frequencyofdeparturesbetweenCCRBsrecommendeddisciplineandthefinaldiscipline
imposedbythePoliceCommissioner.InadditiontoanalyzingtheDAOandAPUfiles,OIGNYPD
alsoexaminedthechangesthatbothCCRBandNYPDhaveadopted,suchasthe
reconsiderationofsomeCCRBdeterminations,inanefforttoimproveNYPDsdisciplinary
system.8
OIGNYPDalsosentformerPoliceCommissionerRaymondKellyaninvitationtomeetanddiscusstheReports
investigativefindingspriortothepublicationofthisReport.CommissionerKellydeclinedtomeetwithOIGNYPD.
OCTOBER2015
NYPDPatrolGuideProceduresRegardingForce
TheNYPDPatrolGuidecontainsseveralproceduresregardingtheuseofforce,thefull
languageofwhichisattachedtothisReportasAppendixA.Theseproceduresincludethe
following:
PATROLGUIDE20311USEOFFORCE
PatrolGuide20311providesthatalluniformedmembersofserviceareresponsible
andaccountablefortheproperuseofforceunderappropriatecircumstances.Patrol
Guide20311furtherpermitsofficerstousetheamountofforcenecessaryto
overcomeresistance...toeffectanarrestortakeamentallyilloremotionallydisturbed
personintocustody.9
PATROLGUIDE20312DEADLYPHYSICALFORCE
PatrolGuide20312acknowledgesthatdeadlyphysicalforceisthemostseriousact
thatanofficercanengagein.Theprocedurestatesthatofficersshoulduseonlythe
minimalamountofforcenecessarytoprotecthumanlife.Officerscannotusedeadly
forceunlesstheyhaveprobablecausetobelievetheymustprotectthemselvesor
anotherpersonpresentfromimminentdeathorseriousphysicalinjury.10
PATROLGUIDE21295USEOFPEPPERSPRAYDEVICES
PatrolGuide21295providesofficerswithguidelinesforboththeusageofpepper
sprayandthedocumentationofthatusage.PerthePatrolGuideprocedure,pepper
spraymaybeusedwhenamemberreasonablybelievesitisnecessarytoeffectanarrest
ofaresistingsuspect,forselfdefenseordefenseofanotherfromunlawfulforce,orto
takearesistingemotionallydisturbedpersonintocustody.PatrolGuide21295
continues,Inmanycases,pepperspraywillreduceoreliminatetheneedforsubstantial
physicalforcetoeffectanarrestorgaincustody.Itwilloftenreducethepotentialfor
injuriestomembersandsuspectsthatmayresultfromphysicalrestraintanditshouldbe
regardedasapossiblealternativetosuchforceandrestraint,wherepractical.Patrol
Guide21295notesthatpeppersprayisnottobeusedinsituationsthatdonotrequire
anyphysicalforceandthatitmaybeusedinarrestorcustodialrestrainsituations
wherephysicalpresenceand/orverbalcommandshavenotbeen,orwouldnotbe,
effectiveinovercomingphysicalresistance.11
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,USEOFFORCE[PROC.NO.]20311(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,DEADLYPHYSICALFORCE[PROC.NO.]20312(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
11
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,USEOFPEPPERSPRAYDEVICES[PROC.NO.]21295(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
10
OCTOBER2015
PATROLGUIDE212117USEOFCONDUCTEDENERGYDEVICES
PatrolGuide212117isdesignedtoinformmembersoftheserviceofcircumstances
underwhichaConductiveEnergyDevice(CED)[commonlyreferredtoasaTaser]may
beintentionallyusedandtorecordinstanceswhenaConductedEnergyDevicehasbeen
used.PatrolGuide212117providesthataCEDisclassifiedasalesslethaldeviceand
isintendedtoaugmentandprovideagreatermarginofsafetyforofficerswhomight
otherwisebeforcedtophysicallysubdueadangeroussubject.TheuseofaCEDiswithin
therangeofuseoflesslethaldevicessuchaspeppersprayorabatonontheforce
continuumduetoitseffectivenessatadistanceandatcloserange.Theprovision
furtherstatesthat[i]tisstrictlyprohibitedtousetheCEDonpersonsasaformof
coercionorpunishmentandonpersonswhopassivelyresist(e.g.,goinglimp,offeringno
activephysicalresistance).12
12
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,USEOFCONDUCTEDENERGYDEVICES(CED)[PROC.NO.]212117(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
OCTOBER2015
III.
Analyticsfrom179SubstantiatedUseofForceCCRBCases
UntilNYPDhasaformalandcomprehensivemethodforcollectingforcedata,numerous
questionsaboutuseofforcepracticeswillremainunanswered.Intheinterim,significant
observationscanstillbemadebystudyingalternativedatasets.Thissectionpresentsseveral
statisticalobservationsregardingofficersandcomplainantsinuseofforceencounters.The
datainthissectionaredrawnfromthe179substantiatedCCRBforcecasesreviewedbyOIG
NYPDandotherrelevantsources.Althoughtheobservationsandfindingsfromthedata
analyzedherearebasedonasubsetofforcecases,theymaybeindicativeofbroadertrends
andpatternsinNYPD.
Figure1:AllegationsAccordingtoCCRBForceType/Category
CCRBForceType/Category
PhysicalForce
Nightstick/OtherInstrument
PepperSpray
Chokehold
Gun
HitAgainstInanimateObject
Vehicle
Other
Total
NumberofAllegationsAcross
All179Cases
137
16
15
11
10
9
4
5
207
Percentage
66.2%
7.7%
7.3%
5.3%
4.8%
4.4%
1.9%
2.2%
100%
Figure2belowillustratesthecasesbyuseofforcetype,organizedbyyear.The
overwhelmingmajorityofthesubstantiatedcomplaintsconcernedphysicalforce,asopposed
tootherformsofforce.AlthoughOIGNYPDreviewedcasessubstantiatedbyCCRBbetween
2010and2014,oneoftheunderlyingforceencountersinvolvedinthesecasesdatesbackto
2005.
10
OCTOBER2015
2014
Figure2:CasesbyYearandForceType/Category13
PHYSICALFORCE
1
1
GUN
VEHICLE
26
PHYSICALFORCE
2013
PEPPERSPRAY
1
1
OTHER
NIGHTSTICK/OTHERINSTRUMENT
HITAGAINSTINANIMATEOBJECT
GUN
CHOKEHOLD
VEHICLE
29
2012
PHYSICALFORCE
2
2
24
2011
PHYSICALFORCE
1
1
PEPPERSPRAY
OTHER
HITAGAINSTINANIMATEOBJECT
12
PHYSICALFORCE
PEPPERSPRAY
2010
YearandCategoryType
GUN
CHOKEHOLD
GUN
CHOKEHOLD
VEHICLE
19
2009
PHYSICALFORCE
PEPPERSPRAY
OTHER
GUN
2
2
2
2008
PHYSICALFORCE
PEPPERSPRAY
1
1
2005
CHOKEHOLD
GUN
10
15
20
25
30
35
NumberofCases
13
TheCCRBcasesamplerequestedbyOIGNYPDcontained179substantiatedcasesthatwereclosedbetween
2010and2014.Thissampleincludedcaseswithincidentdatesgoingasfarbackas2005,duetothelengthoftime
ittookCCRBtoclosetheinvestigation.Becausetherewereonlynineclosedcaseswithincidentdatesin2014,
casesfromthatyearrepresentonly5.0%ofthesample.Anyadditionalforcecomplaintsfrom2014maystillbe
underinvestigation.
11
OCTOBER2015
Figure3:SubjectOfficerDuty/AssignmentatTimeofForceEncounter
Duty/Assignment
Patrol
AntiCrime
FootPost/Patrol
Impact
Conditions
Narcotics
Auto(Burglary/Buy/Bust)
DetectiveSquad
Gang
Housing
Sergeant/LieutenantOperator
CentralBooking
Transit
VariousIndividualAssignments
(e.g.,FleetServices,Traffic,SergeantOperator,etc.)
Total
NumberofOfficers
AcrossAll179Cases
43
28
21
21
18
18
4
4
4
4
3
2
2
18
190
Percentage
22.6%
14.7%
11.1%
11.1%
9.5%
9.5%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
1.6%
1.1%
1.1%
9.5%
100%
Fromthetableabove,itappears,notsurprisingly,thatofficersassignedtodutiesthat
heavilyinvolveinteractionswiththepublicrepresentedmostoftheuseofforcecomplaints
fromthesample.Examplesofsuchassignmentsincludetransit,patrol,Impact,and
conditions.14
14
AntiCrimeofficersareassignedtoperformspecializedpatrolandenforcementinplainclothes.Theseofficers
conductshortterminvestigations,patrolcrimepronelocations,andattempttopreventviolentstreetcrime(i.e.,
assaults,burglaries,weaponsoffenses,sexcrimes,andweaponspossession).
Conditionsofficersareassignedtoperformspecializedpatrolandenforcementofprecinctspecificconditionsat
variouslocationsthathavebeenidentifiedbyprecinctmanagement.Conditionsofficerstypicallyfocustheir
enforcementeffortsonQualityofLifeissuessuchasopencontainerviolations,disorderlygroups,graffiti,public
urination,aggressivepanhandling,andexcessivenoisecomplaints.
Impactofficerswereuniformedofficersassignedwithinanimpactzone.OperationImpactwastypicallyan
officersfirstassignmentoutoftheAcademy,andlastedapproximatelyonetothreeyears.Impactofficerswere
assignedtoviolenceproneareasofthecityinordertoreducecrimethroughacriticalmassofresourcesand
enforcementaction.Impactofficerswerenotassignedtopatrol,butrathertheyweredeployedonstrictfoot
postswithintheirzonesandwereresponsibleforaddressingconditionswithintheirpost.UnderPolice
CommissionerWilliamBratton,theDepartmentmodifiedtheOperationImpactprogramsuchthatnewrecruits
arenowfirstplacedinlocalprecincts,wheretheyareabletoworkcloselywithmoreexperiencedofficersin
traditionalprecinctassignments.
12
OCTOBER2015
Figure4:TenureofOfficersInvolvedinForceEncounters
25
20 20
20
NumberofOfficers
17
15
18
16
14
13
11
9
10
9
7
4
5
3
5
3
3
1
21
23
27
29
0
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
NumberofYearsofService
Figure4illustratestheyearsofserviceforsubjectofficersinvolvedinsubstantiateduse
offorcecases.Itisevidentfromthegraphthatthebulkofthecasesinvolveofficerswhoarein
theirfirstsevenyearsofservice.
13
OCTOBER2015
Figure5:AgesofComplainants
14
13
NumberofComplainants
12
10
10
99
8
6
6
7
6
6
5
5
4
2
2
2222
333
2
1
1111111
0
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 43 45 47 49 51 55 57 60 67
AgesofComplainants
Figure6:AgesofOfficers
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
NumberofOfficers
12
12
10
10
9
8
6
6
6
5
3
2
2
2
2
1
0
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 49 54 57
AgesofOfficers
14
OCTOBER2015
Figures5and6aboveillustratetheagedistributionofthesubjectofficersand
complainantsintheanalyzedcases.Thechartsshowthatsuchencountersmorefrequently
involvebothyoungercomplainantsandyoungerofficers.
AsseeninFigure7abelow,oftheforcecasesOIGNYPDreviewed,96.8%ofofficers
involvedweremalewhile3.2%werefemale.Thesenumbersraisethespecterthatthegender
disparityamonguniformedNYPDofficershasabearingonthevolumeofforceencountersin
NewYorkCity.15Figure7billustratesthegendercompositionofalluniformedNYPDofficers,
withmalesrepresenting83.0%ofofficersandfemalesrepresenting17.0%ofofficers.Itshould
alsobenotedthat,asseeninFigure8a,malecomplainantsarepredominantlyrepresentedin
thesampleasopposedtofemalecomplainants87.1%ofthecomplainantsintheanalyzed
casesweremen,while12.9%ofthecomplainantswerewomen.16
15
SeeKIMLONSWAY,ETAL.,MEN,WOMEN,ANDPOLICEEXCESSIVEFORCE:ATALEOFTWOGENDERS.ACONTENTANALYSISOFCIVIL
LIABILITYCASES,SUSTAINEDALLEGATIONS&CITIZENCOMPLAINTS(NatlCtr.forWomen&Policing2002),astudyfinding
thattherepresentationofofficersinexcessiveforcecasesispredominantlymale,withcorresponding
consequencesintermsofsustainedallegations,citizencomplaints,andcourtjudgmentsandsettlements.Alater
studyin2007suggeststhatfemaleofficersandsamegenderfemalefemaleofficerpairsarelesslikelytouse
physicalforcethanmalecounterpartsinpolicecitizenencounters.AmieM.Schuck&CaraRabeHemp,Women
Police,16WOMEN&CRIM.JUST.91117(2007).
16
ThedatainFigures8band11bshowingNewYorkCityspopulationbygenderandraceornationaloriginare
includedforreferencepurposes.ItshouldbenotedthatthebreakdownofNewYorkCityspopulationhas
changedovertime.Accordingly,thisfactshouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhenmakingcomparisonsbetween
thepopulationdataandcomplainantdataforthevariablesdiscussedinthisReportraceornationaloriginand
genderasthevalueofthesepopulationstatisticsascomparatorsmayvaryastheagesofthedatasetsincrease.
Further,itshouldalsobenotedthatapersondoesnotneedtobearesidentofNewYorkCityinordertofilea
complaintwithCCRB.
15
OCTOBER2015
Figure7:GenderCompositionofOfficersInvolvedinForceEncountersVersusAllNYPD
Officers17
AllUniformedNYPDOfficers
OfficersInvolvedinForceEncounter
byGender
byGender
3.2%
17.0%
96.8%
Female
83.0%
Male
(7a)
Male
Female
(7b)
Figure8:GenderCompositionofComplainantsinForceEncountersVersusNYCPopulation
ComplainantsbyGender
NewYorkCityPopulationbyGender
12.9%
52.5%
47.5%
87.1%
Female
Male
(8a)
Male
Female
(8b)
17
TheNYPDandNewYorkCitygendercompositiondataincludedinFigure7bandFigure8bwereobtainedfrom
NEWYORKCITYPOLICEDEPT,ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT2013(2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/nypd_annual_firearms_discharge_report_
2013.pdf,andNEWYORKCITYDEPTOFCITYPLANNING,Population2010DemographicTables,NYC.GOV(2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/demo_tables_2010.shtml,respectively.Thedemographicdatawere
basedonthe2010U.S.Census.ItshouldbenotedthatthebreakdownofNYPDwillvarydependingontheyear.
Accordingly,therewillbeavarianceinthevalueofthesedataasacomparatorasthedifferenceintheageofthe
datasetsincreases.
16
OCTOBER2015
Figure9:RaceorNationalOriginofOfficersandComplainantsInvolvedinForceEncounters
80
67
70
60
50
30
25
17
2
ASIANCOMPLAINANT
3
WHITECOMPLAINANT
ASIANCOMPLAINANT
9
2
WHITECOMPLAINANT
ASIAN/HISPANICCOMPLAINANT
ASIANCOMPLAINANT
HISPANICCOMPLAINANT
10
BLACKCOMPLAINANT
10
BLACKOFFICERS
15.8%
HISPANICOFFICERS
23.7%
WHITECOMPLAINANT
HISPANICCOMPLAINANT
BLACKCOMPLAINANT
HISPANICCOMPLAINANT
BLACKCOMPLAINANT
HISPANICCOMPLAINANT
BLACKCOMPLAINANT
ASIANOFFICERS
4.2%
20
16
20
ASIANCOMPLAINANT
NUMBEROFCOMPLAINANTS
40
WHITEOFFICERS
56.3%
Figure9illustratesthesubjectofficersraceornationaloriginascomparedtothe
complainantsraceornationalorigininthe179substantiatedCCRBcases.BlacksandHispanics
arethemostheavilyimpacteddemographicgroupsfromthesamplewith57.8%black
complainantsand30.3%Hispaniccomplainants.18
18
ApersonwhoidentifiesasHispaniccanbeofanyrace.SeeU.S.EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITYCOMMN,EEO1
InstructionBooklet,EEOC.GOV,app.at4(Jan.2006),availableat
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/2007instructions.cfm(HispanicorLatinoApersonofCuban,
Mexican,PuertoRican,SouthorCentralAmerican,orotherSpanishcultureororiginregardlessofrace.).
17
OCTOBER2015
Figure10:RaceorNationalOriginCompositionofOfficersInvolvedinForceEncounters
VersusAllUniformedNYPDOfficers19
RaceorNationalOriginCompositionof
OfficersInvolvedinForceEncounters
56.3%
RaceorNationalOriginComposition
ofUniformedNYPDOfficers
Asian
23.7%
Asian
51.5%
Black
Black
26.7%
White
White
Hispanic
Hispanic
Other
6.2% <1%
4.2%
15.8%
(10a)
15.6%
(10b)
Figure11:RaceorNationalOriginCompositionofComplainantsVersusNewYorkCity
Population20
RaceorNationalOriginCompositionof
Complainants
RaceorNationalOriginComposition
ofNewYorkCityPopulation
7.6%
Asian
30.3%
Asian
32.8%
Black
Black
28.9%
White
Hispanic
57.8%
White
Hispanic
Other
Other
22.6%
3.8% <1.0%
(11a)
13.0%
2.7%
(11b)
19
TheNYPDandNewYorkCityraceornationalorigincompositiondataincludedinFigures10band11bwere
obtainedfromNEWYORKCITYPOLICEDEPT,CRIMEANDENFORCEMENTACTIVITYINNEWYORKCITY(JAN1DEC31,2014)
(2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/enforcement_report_year_end_2014.pdf.
Thedemographicdatawerebasedonthe2013AmericanCommunitySurveyadministeredbytheU.S.Census
Bureau.
20
Figure11adoesnotincludeonecomplainantthatdeclinedtodisclosehis/herraceornationalorigintoCCRB.
18
OCTOBER2015
AsnotedinFigure11a,blacksrepresent57.8%ofthecomplainantsinthereviewed
forcecases.ThisstatisticstandsincontrasttohowblacksarerepresentedacrossNewYork
City,makingup22.6%oftheentirepopulation,asseeninFigure11b.Thesestatisticsare
generallyconsistentwiththeraceornationalorigincompositionofcomplainantsacrossall
formsofallegedpolicemisconductcitywide.21
Whilewhiteofficersaremoreheavilyrepresentedthanofficersofcoloramongthe
subjectofficersfoundtohaveusedexcessiveorunnecessaryforceinthesesubstantiatedCCRB
cases,theraceornationaloriginofofficersinvolvedinthesubstantiateduseofforcecasesis
generallyconsistentwiththeoveralldemographiccompositionofNYPDspoliceforce,asseen
aboveinFigure10b.Thoughtherawnumbersmaysuggestracialdisproportionalityregarding
thetreatmentofblackcomplainantsbywhiteofficers,afterevaluatingthepoolof179force
casessubstantiatedbyCCRB,OIGNYPDfoundnostatisticallysignificantrelationshipbetween
officerraceornationaloriginandcomplainantraceornationalorigin.22
21
SeeCCRB,APP.ACCRBCOMPLAINTDATA2014(2015),http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014annual
reportstatsappendix.pdf(lastvisitedSep10,2015).
22
Specifically,OIGNYPDusedachisquaretesttodeterminestatisticalsignificance(whethertherelationships
betweenofficerandcomplainantraceornationaloriginwasrandom).Theresultsofthistestindicatethatthe
relationshipbetweenofficersandcomplainantsintermsofraceornationaloriginisnotstatisticallysignificant.
Simplyput,whatwasobservedisrandomlyoccurring.
19
OCTOBER2015
IV.
TrackingForceIncidentsInvolvingNYPDOfficers
Acriticalelementtounderstanding,analyzing,andimprovingpolicepracticesregarding
forceishavingaccurateandreliableuseofforcedata.Acompleteaccountingofuseofforceis
currentlyimpossiblebecauseNYPDlacksacentralizedandreliablewaytoidentifyandtrack
forceincidents,regardlessofwhethertheyarejustified.Whilecertainsourcesofdatado
existsuchassubstantiatedCCRBuseofforcecasestheyarenotcomprehensive.
NYPDscurrentinabilitytotrackforcedataisrootedintwocorerealities.First,the
Departmentswrittenuseofforcepolicydoeslittletoclarifythebasicquestionofhowto
defineforce,leavingofficerswithoutguidanceonwhatshouldbereported.Second,the
reportingrequirementsregardingforceincidentsarenotcomprehensive.Insomeinstances,
thereisnoobligationtodocumentforceatall.Moreover,areviewofthecaseswhere
reportingwasrequiredrevealedthatofficersfrequentlydidnotdocumentforceinrequired
paperworkinsituationswhereforcewasused.Also,ininstanceswheredocumentationwas
requiredinmultipleplaces,theofficerdocumentedforceonsomeformsbutomitted
documentationonothers.
Aspreviouslymentioned,OIGNYPDisawarethatNYPDispotentiallyrevisingitspolicies
andproceduresinthisareainvolvingthetrackingandreportingofforceincidents.
a. TheImportanceofReportingandDocumentingForceIncidents
Consistentreportingandrobustdocumentationofforceincidentsarenecessaryto
ensurebothtransparencyandaccountabilitywithinpolicedepartments.Onlywhenofficers
consistentlyandaccuratelyreportanddocumenttheuseofforcewilltherebeastrengthened
reviewprocessandanenhancedaccountabilitysystem.23
TheCommissiononAccreditationforLawEnforcementAgencies(CALEA)recommends
that,inordertopromoteconsistentreportingandensureproperdocumentation,officers
shouldhavetoreportallforceused,evenininstanceswherelessthanlethalforcewas
applied.24Indeed,theuseofforcepoliciesofsomepolicedepartmentsfirstdefineorillustrate
examplesoftherangeofforceofficersmaydeployintheperformanceoftheirdutiesandthen
mandatethattheuseofanyofthedelineatedexamplesofforcebereported.25
23
Lawenforcementagenciesshouldhavecomprehensivepoliciesontheuseofforcethatincludetraining,
investigations,prosecutions,datacollection,andinformationsharing.Thesepoliciesmustbeclear,concise,and
openlyavailableforpublicinspection.U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE,FINALREPORTOFTHEPRESIDENTSTASKFORCEON21ST
CENTURYPOLICING(2015),http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf(lastvisitedSept.
10,2015).
24
COMMNONACCREDITATIONFORLAWENFORCEMENTAGENCIES(CALEA),STANDARD1.3.6REPORTINGUSESOFFORCE(2008).
25
See,e.g.,LASVEGASMETRO.POLICEDEPT,GENERALORDER[DIR.NO.]GO02112(EffectiveJune22,2012)(Concerning
UseofForcePolicy);2015SEATTLEPOLICEMANUAL,USEOFFORCEREPORTINGtit.8.400POL1(1)(EffectiveSept.1,
2015);DENVERPOLICEDEPTOPERATIONSMANUAL,UseofForcePolicy105.0(1)b(LastUpdatedApr.30,2015).
20
OCTOBER2015
TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticehasidentifiedproperdocumentationandreportingof
useofforceasanidealstandardofanylawenforcementagencyandhasrecommendedthis
protocoltoseveralpolicedepartmentsaroundthecountry.Forexample,undertheSeattle
PoliceDepartmentsuseofforcepolicy,officersarerequiredtothoroughlydocumentall
reportableusesofforcetothebestoftheirability,includingadescriptionofeachforce
application.26
b. NYPDsPoliciesandPracticesRegardingForceReportingandDocumentation
Accordingtothe2013LawEnforcementManagementandAdministrativeStatistics
(LEMAS)surveyconductedbytheBureauofJusticeStatistics,acomponentoftheU.S.
DepartmentofJustice,asofJanuary2013,65.6%oflawenforcementagenciesusedaspecial
formtodocumenttheuseofforce.27Bycontrast,27.9%oflawenforcementagencies
surveyed,includingNYPD,respondedthattheydocumentedforceonlyinarrestreports,
therebylargelyfailingtocollectdataonuseofforceencountersthatdidnotresultinarrests.
NYPDsresponsestotheLEMASsurveyalsorevealthattheDepartmentspoliciesandpractices
arelackingwithrespecttotheconsistencyofdefinitionsforforcereportingandthecollection
ofdataforalluseofforceincidents.
i. NYPDPatrolGuideDoesNotDefineForceorEstablishLevelsofForce
Trackingtheuseofforcebypoliceofficersfirstrequiresdefiningwhatismeantby
force,excessiveforce,anddeadlyforce.Whenapolicedepartmentprovidesclearand
practicaldefinitionsofsuchterms,officershaveabetterunderstandingofwhatisexpectedof
them,andcommunitieshaveabetterunderstandingofwhattoexpectfromlawenforcement.
Aspreviouslyestablished,theauthoritytouseforcetoaddressasituationisoneofthegreatest
powersthatsocietygivestolawenforcementandtheexerciseofthatpowercanhaveserious
consequences.Accordingly,lawenforcementandcommunitiesalikemusthaveaconsistent
understandingofwhatismeantbyforce.
TheNYPDPatrolGuidecontainsnodefinitionofforce.WhilePatrolGuide20311
providesbroadprinciplesdeclaringthatforcemustbelimitedtowhatisnecessaryunderthe
circumstances,theguidedoesnotclarifywhatactionsconstituteforce.Likewise,although
PatrolGuide20311statesinhighlightedlanguagethatEXCESSIVEFORCEWILLNOTBE
TOLERATED,itdoesnotdefineorclarifywhatismeantbyexcessiveforce.Finally,whilethe
PatrolGuidecontainsaseparatesectiononDeadlyPhysicalForcewithclear,delineated
26
SeattlePoliceDepartmentsuseofforcepolicyoutlinestheelementsthatmustbeincludedintheuseofforce
reportforeachlevelofreportableuseofforce.Forafullexplanationoftheselevelsofforce,seeAppendixB.
27
U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE,OFF.JUST.PROGRAMS,BUREAUJUST.STAT.,LAWENFORCEMENTMANAGEMENTANDADMINISTRATIVE
STATISTICS(LEMAS)2013,ICPSR36164v1(InteruniversityConsortiumPol.&Soc.Res.[distributor],2015),
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36164.v1.http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36164.v1.
21
OCTOBER2015
instructionsonwhendeadlyforceispermittedandwhenfirearmsuseisprohibited,20312
doesnotdefinewhatconstitutesdeadlyphysicalforce.28
Tosomeobservers,thenotionsofforce,excessiveforce,anddeadlyphysical
forcemaybesoselfevidentthatawrittendefinitionisredundantandunnecessary.However,
closeconsiderationoftheissueshowsthatthetermsarenotsoobviousindeeddifferent
policedepartmentshavedifferentdefinitionsandNYPDneedstoclarifyitspolicies.Clear
standardsanddefinitionsareimportanttoensuringconsistency,predictability,and
accountability,evenwhenseeminglyobvious.
Givingforceapracticaldefinitionisnotasintuitiveasitappearsatfirstglance.The
PatrolGuideissilentonspecifics.Forexample,anofficerisnotinformedwhethershovingor
takingasuspecttothegroundisauseofforce.ThePatrolGuidessilenceonthisissueresults
inindividualofficersdeterminingforthemselveswhethertheiractionsshouldbereported.
Additionally,NYPDdoesexplainotherarguablyselfevidentterms.TheDepartmenthas
electedtoincludedefinitionswithrespecttodeadlyuseofforce,andthePatrolGuide
definesProfessionalJudgmentasjudgmentbasednotonlyuponexperienceasanindividual
buttakingintoaccounttheknowledge,experience,andtraininggainedthroughemploymentas
apoliceofficer.29
Moreover,NYPDhasrecognizedtheimportanceofofficersunderstandingforceand
relatedterms.Throughitsvarioususeofforcetrainingmaterials,NYPDalreadydefines
deadlyphysicalforceasphysicalforcewhich,underthecircumstancesinwhichitisused,is
readilycapableofcausingdeathorotherseriousphysicalinjury.30Thelessonplanslikewise
stresstheimportanceoftraineesbeingabletodefinephysicalforce,deadlyphysicalforce,
physicalinjury,[and]seriousphysicalinjury.31
Notably,otherpolicedepartmentsincludedefinitionsofsuchtermsintheiroperations
materials.Severallawenforcementagencies,suchasthoseinSeattle,Miami,LasVegas,and
Denver,haveoperationsmanualsthatincludedefinitionsfordeadlyforce.Someofthese
manualslimittheforcedefinitiontodeathscenarios(e.g.,Denver:Thatforce,theintended,
natural,andprobableconsequenceofwhichistoproducedeathandwhichdoes,infact,
28
Theentrydoesnotdifferentiatebetweenactionssuchasuseofafirearmasopposedtoakicktothehead,both
ofwhichcouldpotentiallykillanindividual.
29
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,DEADLYPHYSICALFORCE[PROC.NO.]20312(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
30
NYPD,POLICESTUDENTSGUIDEUSEOFFORCE,at21(July2014);NYPD,REINSTATEMENTTRAININGPROGRAMUSEOF
FORCE15382A000008,at12.
31
NYPD,REINSTATEMENTTRAININGPROGRAMUSEOFFORCE15382A000008,at1.
22
OCTOBER2015
producedeath).32Othershavedefinitionsthatrefertobothdeathandseriousphysicalinjury
(e.g.,Miami:Deadlyforce:Forcethatislikelytocausedeathorseriousphysicalinjury.).33
Ratherthandefiningforceasasingleterm,somepolicedepartmentsprovideformal
definitionsforlevelsofforcelessthandeadlyforce.Forexample,inadditiontodefining
DeadlyForce,theUseofForceGeneralOrderoftheLasVegasMetropolitanPolice
Department(LVMPD)includesdefinitionsforNonDeadlyForce,IntermediateForce,and
LowLevelForce.Bydividingforceintolevels,LVMPDisabletoprovideofficerswithspecific
guidanceonthetypesofforcethatmustbereportedandthosethatdonotrequirereporting.34
Ofthedepartmentssurveyed,SeattleemploysthemostdetaileddefinitionofForce.
TheSeattlePoliceDepartmentsmanualdefinesForceasanyphysicalcoercionbyanofficer
inperformanceofofficialduties,andthenprovidesadditionaldefinitionsoffourlevelsof
force:DeMinimis,TypeI,TypeII,andTypeIII.35
Asnotedabove,NYPDsproposeduseofforceproceduresplantoincludedefinitional
languageregardingwhatconstitutesexcessiveforce.Anyrevisionstotheuseofforce
procedureshouldprovideofficersandthepublicwithgreaterclarityregardingwhatismeant
byforce,excessiveforce,anddeadlyphysicalforce.Thisaddedclaritywillaidofficersin
identifyingwhenforcewasused,whichwillinturnleadtomoreaccuratereportingand
trackingofforce.
ii. NYPDLacksaUniformPolicyonReportingForceIncidents
Improvedaccountabilityonuseofforcerequiresallofficerstounderstandwhatforceis
andwhentoreportit.Onceofficersunderstandwhatforceisandwhenithasbeenused,they
mustbeabletoreportitinawaythatisbothaccurateandtraceable.Policymakerscanthen
usethatinformationtounderstandhowfrequentlyforceisused,howitisbeingused,andon
whomitisbeingused.Currently,NYPDsreportingproceduresarefrustratedbyanumberof
systemicproblems.
NYPDsreportingproceduresanddocumentationmechanismsontheuseofforce
appeartobefragmented.Unlikethemanypolicedepartmentsaroundthecountrythathave
policiesrequiringtheseparatedocumentationofforceincidents,suchasSeattleandCleveland,
NYPDdoesnothaveaseparate,centralized,andmandatoryuseofforceformfordocumenting
whenphysicalforcehasbeenused.Instead,NYPDhasavarietyofformsanddocumentsthat
32
DENVERPOLICEDEPTOPERATIONSMANUAL,supranote25,at20.
MiamiBeachPoliceDeptStandardOperatingProc.USEOFFORCE[SOPNO.]017(EffectiveJuly3,2000,Revised
Jan.12,2010),availableathttps://cbsmiami.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/useofforce.pdf.
34
LASVEGASMETRO.POLICEDEPT,GENERALORDER[DIR.NO.]GO02112,supranote25,at20.
35
SEATTLEPOLICEMANUAL,USEOFFORCEDEFINITIONStit.8.050(EffectiveSept.1,2015),availableat
http://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/title8useofforce/8050useofforcedefinitions.Forafullexplanation
oftheselevelsofforce,seeAppendixB.
33
23
OCTOBER2015
officersarerequiredtocompletedependingontheincident.Thispatchworksetofforms
designedtotrackotherinformationdoesnotcapturetheentireuniverseofforcecases.
Forexample,whenforceisusedpursuanttoanarrest,theNYPDarrestreportasks
officerstonotewhetherforcewasused.Ifforcewasused,theofficercanselectaspecified
forceoption.Officersarealsorequiredtofollowspecificreportingprocedureswhenafirearm
isdischarged(PatrolGuide21229)orwhenaConductedEnergyDevice,alsoknownasa
Taser,isused(PatrolGuide212117).NYPDpolicycontainsotherreportingrequirementsfor
othertypesofforce,includingcertainmemobookrequirements.36Thismyriadofreporting
requirementsresultsinscattered,nonuniformdataregardingforceincidents.
Inaddition,PatrolGuide20721obligatesallmembersofservicetoreportcriminal
activityorothermisconductofanykindincludingtheuseofexcessiveforceorperjurythatis
committedbymemberoftheservicewhetheronoroffduty.Thisreportcanbemade
anonymouslytoNYPDsInternalAffairsBureau(IAB).Notably,PatrolGuide20721makes
clearthat[f]ailuretoreportcorruption,othermisconduct,orallegationsofsuchactis,initself,
anoffenseofseriousmisconductandwillbechargedassuchwhenuncoveredduringan
investigation.
However,certaintypesofforceevadereportingrequirementsaltogether.Forexample,
policeincidentswhereforceisusedandnoarrestismademaynotnecessarilytriggera
reportingrequirement.Asaresult,NYPDdoesnothaveadequatedataonthefulluniverseof
forceincidents.
iii. NYPDForceReportingIsInconsistentinPractice
Consideringthediverseyetdeficientreportingrequirementsthatcurrentlyexist,
coupledwiththefundamentallackofdefinitionregardingwhatconductconstitutesforceand
excessiveforce,NYPDofficersareleftwithlittleguidanceonhowtoreportforceincidents.
Consistentwiththeseobservations,OIGNYPDsreviewofthe179substantiatedCCRBforce
casesrevealedthatofficersdidnotalwaysdocumentwhenforcewasusedand,whenforcewas
documented,thepaperworkwasofteneitherinadequateorinaccurate.37Asnotedpreviously,
NYPDpoliciesrequireofficerstoreportonlycertainforceincidents.Inthecasesreviewed,
therewasatotalof207substantiatedallegationsofforce.Amongthecaseswhereofficersdid
reportforce,theforcewasdocumentedonvariousformsincluding:
36
TheNYPDPatrolGuiderequiresthatofficersrecordintheiractivitylog[i]nformationpertinenttoan
assignmentorobserved/suspectedviolationoflaw,i.e.,actiontakennarrativedisposition,formspreparedwith
identifyingserialnumber,etc....2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,ACTIVITYLOGS[PROC.NO.]21208(EffectiveAug.1,
2013).
37
Asnotedabove,substantiatedcasesareasmallsubsetofthetotalnumberofcomplaintsmadetoCCRB.
24
OCTOBER2015
ArrestReport;
UF250(StopandFriskReport);
MemoBook;
CommandLog;38
ConductedEnergyDevice(CED)DischargeReport;
FirearmsDischargeReport;
JuvenileReport;
UF49(UnusualOccurrenceReport);
AIDEDReport.39
Incaseswhereofficersdiddocumenttheuseofforce,theyoftenemployedgeneric
languagesuchashandsonsuspect,forcedvictimagainstwall,andforcewasusedin
handcuffingcomplainantinordertoovercomeresistance.Also,ratherthanclearlyarticulating
thetype,nature,andseriousnessoftheresistanceposedbythecitizenthatledtotheuseof
force,officerstendedtouseconclusorylanguagesuchas,forceusedtoovercomeassault,
victimattemptedtoassaultdetective,andthedetectiveusedtheminimalamountofforce
tosubdueandrestrainthedefendant.
Inmanyofthesecases,suchasthoseresultinginarrests,documentationofforcewas
required.AparticularlytroublingpatternuncoveredduringOIGNYPDsreviewwasthe
inaccuratedocumentationofforce.NYPDsarrestreporthasasectionthatrequiresofficersto
indicatewhetherforcewasused(yesorno)andthetypeofandreasonforsuchforce.In
54outof108instanceswherearrestsweremade,or50.0%ofthetime,theofficerwho
completedthearrestreportaffirmativelyreportedthatforcewasnotused.In39ofthese54
instances,theofficercompletingthereportwasnotthepersonwhousedtheforce,andmay
notevenhavebeenpresentatthescene,andthereforemayhavebeenunabletodetailthe
natureoftheforceusedand/orwhyitwasused.However,therewerealso15instanceswhere
thearrestingofficerwasthesubjectofficeranddocumentedthatforcewasnotused,even
thoughCCRBlatersubstantiatedtheuseofexcessiveforcebythatofficer.Whetherthese
officersintentionallymisrepresentedtheforceeventorreasonablybelievedthatforce,an
undefinedterm,wasnotusedcannotbedeterminedfromthecasefilesalone.Nevertheless,
OIGNYPDsanalysisfurtherunderscorestheneedforpoliciesthatprovideclearguidanceabout
whatconstitutesforceandhowforcemustbereported.40
Themyriadofreportingobligations,alongwiththelackofaseparateuseofforceform
andacentralizedsystemofcollectingdataontheuseofforcebyofficers,contributedtoalack
38
NYPDCommandLogsareledgerslocatedbehindthedeskofaprecinctstationhouse.CommandLogsdocument
thedailychangesinprisoners,property,andpersonnelforthestationhouse.
39
AIDEDReportsarecompletedwheneveranindividual,whetheritbeamemberofthepublic(exceptprisoners)
oranNYPDofficer,isinjuredduringanincidentinvolvingthepoliceandreceivesmedicalattention.
40
OIGNYPDhasprovidedNYPDwithalistofthe15officersnotedabovewithrecommendationsforfurtherreview
asappropriate.
25
OCTOBER2015
ofuniformityintheformsofficerswereusingtoreportforce.Insomeinstances,officerswere
documentingtheuseofforceonsomeforms,butomittingitonothers,leadingtoapatternof
inconsistency.Inotherinstances,theuseofforcewasnotdocumentedanywherewhatsoever.
Moreover,NYPDsdeficientreportinganddocumentationprocessesarguablyhamperedCCRBs
abilitytofullyinvestigateforcecasesbyrenderingitdifficulttodeterminehowmuchforcewas
usedandwhy,potentiallyresultinginahighnumberofunsubstantiatedcases.41
c. TheNeedforUniformForceReportingandDocumentation
Tohelpensurebetteraccountability,NYPDmustdevelopclearpoliciesthatrequirethe
documentationofuseofforcebyallofficersinvolvedinanincident.Suchpoliciesmustprovide
sufficientguidancetoofficersonhowtoreportforceandwhatinformationthereportmust
contain,includingarequirementthatofficersspecify,withparticularity,thekindofforceused
andtheresistancetheymayhaveencountered.
Aseparateuseofforceformwouldcapturethesalientandrelevantdetailsofan
encounterinacomprehensiveandthoroughmanner.Theformshouldrecordwhatinjury,if
any,wassustainedbythecitizenasaresultoftheforceusedandshouldalsodocumentthe
identitiesofallotherofficersatthesceneoftheforceincident.Adoptingaseparateuseof
forceformwillimprovetheinternalandexternalreviewprocessesforforceincidents.Because
NYPDlacksadedicateduseofforceform,itislikelythatforceencountersarecurrentlybeing
underreported.
Indocumentinguseofforce,officersshouldarticulatethetype,nature,and
seriousnessofresistanceexhibitedbythe[citizen]thatprecededtheuseofforce.42Vagueor
genericlanguagethatdoesnotdescribewithsufficientparticularitythelevelandtypeofforce
usedmustbeavoidedinordertoallowforproperreviewandassessment.Officersshouldalso
avoiddescriptionsofforceincidentswithoutreferencingwhetherotherofficersusedforceor
thetimingoftheuseofforce.43
Inadditiontoimprovingdatacollectionandpromotingpoliceaccountability,auniform
andstandarduseofforceformwouldalsoassistsupervisorsincarryingouttheirimportant
functionsintheDepartment.UnderPatrolGuide20601,supervisorsareunderadutyto
reportviolationsobserved...tocommanding/executiveofficersforcorrectiveaction.
41
Between2010and2014,CCRBunsubstantiated2,914(28.0%)forceallegations.Theremainderconsistedof
4,583(44.0%)exonerated,1,554(14.9%)unfounded,1,038(10.0%)officerunidentified,and123(1.2%)
miscellaneousforceallegations.SeeCCRB,supranote1,at2.
42
LetterfromJonathanM.Smith,ChiefSpecialLitigationSection,U.S.DeptofJusticeC.R.Div.,toMichael
McGinn,PortlandMayor,Portland15(Dec.16,2011)(regardingSeattlePoliceDepartmentCivilRightsPatternor
PracticeInvestigation),availableat
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_121611.pdf(lastvisitedAug27,
2015).
43
Id.
26
OCTOBER2015
Supervisorsarerequiredtoprepareareport[u]ponobservingorbecomingawareofa
violationoftherulesorproceduresbyamemberoftheservice.
Similarly,areviewofotherpolicedepartmentsshowedthatsupervisorsinthose
departmentsarelikewiseresponsibleforensuringthattheirsubordinateofficersproperly
documentandreportallforceusedandarealsoresponsibleforinitiallyassessingtheofficers
compliancewithdepartmentalprocedures.Uniformuseofforcereportingmechanismswould
assistsupervisorsinensuringthatofficersunderstandtheirreportingobligationsandare
complyingwithnecessaryprocedures.Informationfromtheseformswillalsoserveasauseful
toolforNYPDtocollectdataandidentifyofficersfortrainingandothernondisciplinary
mechanismsthroughEarlyInterventionSystems.44
Moreover,severalcasesamongthosereviewedbyOIGNYPDinvolvedinjuriesto
officers.Amorecomprehensiveuseofforcereportingmechanismcouldbeusefulin
identifyingimprovedsafetyprotocolsandequipment.
Finally,collecting,analyzing,andpublishingallaspectsofdatapertinenttouseofforce
arealsointegraltogainingabetter,morecomprehensiveunderstandingoftheissueand
improvingcorrespondingpoliciesandprocedures.
44
ForanintroductiontoEarlyInterventionSystems,pleaseseeOIGNYPDsApril2015report,USINGDATAFROM
LAWSUITSANDLEGALCLAIMSINVOLVINGNYPDTOIMPROVEPOLICING711(2015),availableat
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oignypd/assets/downloads/pdf/20150420litigationdatareport.pdf.
27
OCTOBER2015
V.
ForceDeEscalationPoliciesandPracticesinNYPD
AsrecognizedinNewYorkCityandacrossthenation,deescalationpoliciesandtactics
havethepotentialtogreatlymitigatetheuseofexcessiveforcebypoliceofficers.De
escalationtacticshaveaproventrackrecordofnotonlylimitingforce,butalsoensuringofficer
safety.AsrecentlysummarizedbytheU.S.DepartmentofJustice:
Deescalationmorebroadlyreferstothestrategicslowingdownofanincidentin
amannerthatallowsofficersmoretime,distance,spaceandtacticalflexibility
duringdynamicsituationsonthestreet.Applyingthesespecificskillsincreases
thepotentialforresolvingthesituationwithminimizedforceornoforceatall,
whichreducesthelikelihoodofinjurytothepublic,increasesofficersafetyand
mitigatestheimmediacyofpotentialorongoingthreats.Areductioninuseof
forceincidentsalsoreducescommunitycomplaints,promotestheperceptionof
proceduraljusticeand,mostimportantly,promotesresolutionofeventswiththe
publicscompliance.45
OIGNYPDsinvestigationsuggeststhatNYPDofficersrarelyusedeescalation
andthattheDepartmentspoliciesandtrainingcurrentlydonotadequatelyaddressde
escalationasausefultacticforofficersinthefield.
Aspreviouslymentioned,NYPDiscurrentlycontemplatingpotentialrevisionsto
itsdeescalationpoliciesandprocedures.
a. DeEscalationintheField:MissedOpportunitiesbyNYPDOfficers
In addition to recording and compiling statistical data on the 179 substantiated CCRB
forcecases,OIGNYPDdesignatedaspecializedteamconsistingofemployeeswithprofessional
backgroundsinlawenforcementandpoliceoversighttoconductacasebycasereviewofeach
CCRBsubstantiatedallegationwithafocusontheuseofdeescalationtactics.Thisteambased
their analysis on the contents of the relevant CCRB investigative files (including firsthand
evidence,suchasvideofootage)andtrackedcriteriasuchas:
Whetherthecomplainantphysicallyresistedtheofficersinanyway;
Whetheranyuseofforcewasnecessarytoachievealegitimateaim;
Whethertheforceusedwasproportionatetothecircumstances;
Whethertheuseofforcewasobjectivelyreasonable;and
Whetherdeescalationtechniquescouldhavebeendeployedasanalternative.
45
USAOW.DIST.WA,JusticeDepartmentApplaudsAdoptionofPoliceDepartmentWideTacticalDeEscalation
TrainingProgramInSeattle,U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE(Apr.16,2015),http://www.justice.gov/usaowdwa/pr/justice
departmentapplaudsadoptionpolicedepartmentwidetacticaldeescalation(lastvisitedSept.10,2015).
28
OCTOBER2015
OIGNYPDsreviewoftheCCRBcasesfoundthatofficerstoooftendidnotdeescalate
encounters,failedtointerveneinencounterswhereotherofficersusedexcessiveforceagainst
membersofthepublic,andescalatedencountersthemselves.
Officerinteractionswithmembersofthepublicarefluid,oftenunpredictablesituations
whereofficerssometimeshavetobemindfulofmanyfactorsandarecalledupontomake
splitseconddecisions.Thereisnoonesizefitsallapproach,andwhetherofficersshould
deployforceorusedeescalationtacticsisaquestionthatdependsontheunique
circumstancesofthecase.Thatsaid,afterconductinganindividualreviewoftheCCRBcase
files,OIGNYPDinvestigatorsdeterminedthatindozensofincidents,officerswerepresented
withtheopportunitytodeescalatethesituationbutultimatelydidnot.Thisobservationis
limitedtothe179caseswhereCCRBsubstantiatedtheuseofforce,andofficersmaybeusing
deescalationtacticsinother,unreportedincidents.Nevertheless,OIGNYPDsanalysisreveals
thatincaseswhereforcewasused,suchuseofforcearguablycouldhavebeenprevented
throughdeescalation.
SubstantiatedCCRBCaseStudy:CouldDeEscalationTacticsHaveBeenUsedtoPreventa
ForceEncounter?
Atapproximately2:40a.m.inManhattan,a45yearoldmalecomplainantwalkedoutofhis
apartmenttotakeoutthetrashandlockedhimselfoutofthebuilding.
Inthevideofootageoftheencounter,themancanbeseenspeakingtotwoofficersas
heattemptstoexplainhispredicament.Thesubjectofficerwalksawaytowardtheentranceof
theapartmentbuildingasthecomplainantcontinuesspeakingwiththesecondofficer.The
manisvisiblyfrustratedbythesituationandiswavinghishandsaroundashespeaks.
AccordingtotheCCRBinvestigativereport,thesubjectofficerstatedthathesmelled
alcoholonthecomplainantsbreathanddidnotbelievethathewasaresidentofthebuilding.
Whentheofficersaskedthemanforidentification,herepliedthathedidnothaveit.Theman
furtherstatedthathehadlockedhimselfoutofhisapartment.Thesubjectofficertoldthe
complainantthathecouldnotenterthebuildingandthathehadtoleavebecausehedidnot
haveidentification.ThesubjectofficertoldCCRBthathethenaskedthecomplainanttoleave
threetimes,andthateachtimethemanrespondedthathelivedinthebuilding.
Thevideoshowsthecomplainantandthesubjectofficerinaheatedconversationwhen
thesubjectofficerbeginsyellingandpointinghisfingerinthemansface.Thesubjectofficer
thenaggressivelypushesthecomplainanttotheground.Thesubjectofficerwalksovertothe
complainantwhileheislyingonthegroundandcontinuestoyellandpointhisfingerathim.
29
OCTOBER2015
Thesecondofficerfailedtointervenewhenthesubjectofficerinitiallylosthistemper
andstoodseveralfeetawaywithhishandsinhispockets.Thesecondofficerremainedpassive
anddidnothingtointerveneortakecontrolofthesituation,evenoncethecomplainantwason
thegroundandthesubjectofficercontinuedtoyellathim.
CCRBsubstantiatedtheforceallegationagainstthesubjectofficerandheultimately
receivedaCommandDiscipline.
SubstantiatedCCRBCaseStudy:CouldDeEscalationTacticsHaveBeenUsedtoPreventa
ForceEncounter?
Atapproximately12:50a.m.inManhattan,a15yearoldmalecomplainantwaswalkingonthe
sidewalkwhenhewasapproachedbytwoofficers.
Intheaudiorecordingoftheencounter,thesubjectofficerinitiallyappearstobetheonly
person speaking to the boy. Moments later, however, a second officer also engages the
complainant.Theboyprotestshavingbeenstoppedandmentionsthatthestopwashissecond
injusttwoblocks.
AccordingtotheCCRBinvestigativereport,thesubjectofficersearchedthecomplainant.
Whentheboyobjectedthattherewasnocauseforthestop,thesubjectofficeraskedhimto
stop using derogatory language and informed him that if he did not comply, he would be
arrested.
Theaudioindicatesthatthecomplainantandthesubjectofficerareengagedinaheated
conversation during which the subject officer is taking exception to the boy protesting the
rationaleforthe stop. Each timethecomplainant speaks,itappearstointensifytheensuing
verbalresponsesofbothofficers.Ascuffleensuesbetweenthesubjectofficerandtheboywhich
resultsinthesubjectofficerpushinghimrepeatedly.
CCRB substantiated the force allegation against the subject officer, but he ultimately
receivednodiscipline.
30
OCTOBER2015
Amongthe179CCRBcases,OIGNYPDalsoidentifiedasubstantialnumberof
encounterswhereabystanderofficerorwitnessofficerwhowasnotthesubjectofficerinthe
forcecomplaintwaspresentand,basedontheevidenceintheCCRBcasefile,couldhave
intervenedandpotentiallypreventedtheuseofforce.Despitesuchopportunities,however,
bystanderofficersintervenedinveryfewinstances.PatrolGuide20311statesthat
[m]embersoftheservicearerequiredtomaintaincontrolorinterveneiftheuseofforce
againstasubjectclearlybecomesexcessive.Failuretodosomayresultinbothcriminaland
civilliability.ThecasesreviewedbyOIGNYPDunderscoretheneedtotrainofficersto
interveneinsituationswheretheywitnessfellowofficersengaginginexcessiveforce.
SubstantiatedCCRBCaseStudy:FailureofOfficerstoIntervene
Atapproximately9:00p.m.inQueens,a26yearoldmalecomplainantwasridinghisbicycleon
thesidewalkwhenhewasapproachedbyfourofficers.
Inthevideofootageoftheencounter,thesubjectofficerinitiallyappearstobetheonly
personspeakingtothecomplainant.Thecomplainantisvisiblyangry,wavinghishandsabout
andmovingaroundthesidewalkwiththethreeotherofficersflankinghim.
AccordingtotheCCRBinvestigativereport,thesubjectofficerhadaskedthemanfor
identification.Thecomplainantsaidhedidnothaveit.Thesubjectofficerthenaskedhimto
providehisname,andwhenthemanrefusedtodoso,thesubjectofficerinformedhimthathe
wouldbearrestedifhedidnotcomply.
Thevideoshowsthecomplainantandthesubjectofficerinaheatedconversationwhen
thesubjectofficerpunchesthemaninthefacefourtimes.Thesubjectofficerthenbends
downandpullsoutthecomplainantslegsfrombeneathhim,causinghimtofallbackwards
ontothesidewalk.Thesubjectofficerthendeliversanothertwopunchestothemanwhilehe
isontheground.
Throughouttheentireencounter,oneofthefourofficershasbeenstandingtotheside
observingtheinteraction.Thisofficerdoesnotinterveneafterthefirst,second,third,orfourth
striketothecomplainantsface,andhedoesnotevenmove.Theofficerstandspassively,a
fewfeetaway,withhisthumbshookedinhisbelt.Onlyoncethemanisonthegroundandhas
beenstruckafifthandsixthtimedoesthatofficerapproach,placeonehandonthesubject
officersback,andappeartointervenehalfheartedly.
CCRBsubstantiatedtheforceallegationagainstthesubjectofficer.Theotherofficers
forceallegationswereexoneratedbyCCRB.AtthetimeofthewritingofthisReport,no
disciplinarydecisionhasbeenreachedinthiscase,despitethematterbeingintheNYPD
disciplinaryprocessforthepastsevenmonths.
31
OCTOBER2015
Althoughofficerencountersarefluidandtheviabilityofdeescalationtacticsmaybe
drivenbyseveralfactors,theuseofforceisaseriousundertakingandresponsibility.Officers
shouldavoidaffirmativelyescalatingsituationswhenofficersafetyisnotatrisk.OIGNYPDs
analysisofthe179CCRBcasesalsodeterminedthatin26instances,or14.5%ofthetime,
officersactuallyescalatedthesituationathand.Examplesofsuchbehaviorinclude,butarenot
limitedto,theuseofincendiarylanguage,makingunnecessaryphysicalcontact,anddrawing
weaponsatinappropriatetimes.46
SubstantiatedCCRBCaseStudy:ForceEscalatedbyOfficer
Atapproximately11:00p.m.intheBronx,amalecomplainantwasstandingwithinafewfeetof
threeofficersandtwoothermen,recordingtheirinteractiononhiscellphone.
Inthevideofootageoftheencounter,thesubjectofficerappearstobeassistingtwo
otherofficersinrestrainingtwocombativemeninfrontoftheentrancetoabuilding.
AccordingtotheCCRBinvestigativereport,thesubjectofficerstoppedthemenbecause
hesuspectedtheyweredrinkingalcoholinpublic.Whenthesubjectofficerapproached,he
askedthemenwhattheyweredoingandwheretheylived.Thesubjectofficerthenasked
themtoprovideidentification,andwhentheyrefusedtodoso,thethreeofficersbeganto
placethemeninhandcuffs.
Thevideoshowsthecomplainantapproachingtheofficersastheyareattemptingto
placethetwoothermeninhandcuffs.Thecomplainantisholdinghiscellphonewithtwo
handsinanattempttorecordtheinteractionbetweentheofficersandthemen.Whenthe
subjectofficerrealizesthatthecomplainantisstandingnearby,thesubjectofficerviolently
swingshisrightarmtowardsthecomplainantscellphone,thendrawsandpointshisfirearmat
thecomplainantandusesprofanityandracialepithetswhileaggressivelycommandingthe
complainanttoputawaythephone.
CCRBsubstantiatedtheforceallegationagainstthesubjectofficer.Nootherforce
allegationsweremadeagainsttheotherofficers.Disciplinewasnotimposedinthiscase
becausethestatuteoflimitationexpiredbeforeCCRBforwardedthecasetoNYPDfor
disciplinarydisposition.
46
OIGNYPDhasprovidedalistofthese26officerstoNYPDwithrecommendationsforfurtherreviewas
appropriate.
32
OCTOBER2015
SubstantiatedCCRBCaseStudy:ForceEscalatedbyOfficer
Atapproximately10:30p.m.inQueens,amalecomplainantwasstandingoutsideashopping
centerwithasecondmalecomplainantandanothermanwhenthefirstcomplainantinteracted
withanoffdutyofficerwhowasenteringthepremises.
Inthevideofootageoftheencounter,thefirstcomplainantisseenstandingoutsidethe
shoppingcenterwhentheoffdutysubjectofficerapproachesandappearstolightlyshovehis
waythroughthepathofthecomplainantsandtheotherman.Astheofficerentersthe
shoppingcenter,thefirstcomplainantcanbeseenstandingoutsidemakingahandgesture
withhisarmsstretchedoutathissidestoreflectthathewasupsetbythesubjectofficers
shove.Aclearexchangeofwordsensuesbetweenthefirstcomplainantandthesubjectofficer.
Astheexchangecontinues,thesubjectofficercanbeseenturningaroundandwalkingback
towardsthedooroftheshoppingcentertoconfrontthefirstcomplainant.Whiledoingso,the
subjectofficerliftshisshirttorevealhisshieldandserviceweaponandunclipsanobjectfrom
thewaistbandofhisshorts.Whenthesubjectofficerapproachesthefirstcomplainant,he
pushesthefirstcomplainantwithtwohands,causinghimtomoveseveralfeetback.
Additionally,thesubjectofficerstrikesthesecondcomplainantwiththeobjectinhisright
hand.Thesubjectofficeristhenseenwalkingawayfromthemenandreenterstheshopping
center.
AccordingtotheCCRBinvestigativereport,thesubjectofficerbelievedthatthemen
standinginfrontoftheshoppingcenterappearedsuspiciousandwereblockingtheentrance.
ThesubjectofficerdeniedpushingthefirstcomplainantandtoldCCRBthatasheattemptedto
enter,thefirstcomplainantadvancedinhisdirection.Asaresult,thesubjectofficerstretched
hisarmsouttokeephimatadistance.
CCRBsubstantiatedthetwoforceallegationsagainstthesubjectofficer.Atthetimeof
thewritingofthisReport,nodisciplinarydecisionhasbeenreachedinthiscasedespitethe
matterbeingintheNYPDdisciplinaryprocessforthepast20months.
Astheseexamplesshow,NYPDofficersarenotonlymissingopportunitiestode
escalate,butaresometimesactivelyescalatingsituationswithmembersofthepublic,thereby
suggestingthattheDepartmentmaynoteffectivelypromotetheuseofdeescalationtacticsin
thefield.Thesolutiontothisissueliesinbothpolicyandtraining.
33
OCTOBER2015
b. NYPDsDeEscalationPolicies:AreasforImprovement
Coretoanydeescalationprogramisthedeescalationpolicy.Inadditiontotraining
andpromotingaculturearounddeescalation,aclearlywrittenpolicyisneededtoinform
membersofapolicedepartmentoftherules,parameters,andprinciplesthatguidepolice
officerconductduringencounterswiththepublic.Writtenpolicieshavetheopportunitynot
onlytoinformofficersabouttheroleandbenefitsofdeescalationinsuchencounters,butalso
toeducateofficersonspecificdeescalationtoolsandtactics.47
i. NYPDPatrolGuide
WhileNYPDhasrecentlyrefocuseditseffortsonprovidingofficerswithdeescalation
training,theNYPDPatrolGuideremainsrelativelysilentondeescalationtoolsandonan
officersresponsibilitywithrespecttodeescalationtactics.
Asnotedabove,thecoreuseofforceprovisionofthePatrolGuiderequiresthat
officersuseonlytheamountofforcenecessarytoaddressthesituation.PatrolGuide20311
stressesthatofficersonlyuseminimumnecessaryforceand[e]mploynonlethal
alternatives,asappropriate.PatrolGuide20311alsoincludesprohibitionsagainstcertain
formsofexcessiveforce,suchaschokeholds,conductthatmayresultinchestcompressions,
anddangerousformsofrestraint.Consistentwiththeseprohibitions,thePatrolGuidenotes
that[m]embersofservicearerequiredtomaintaincontrolorinterveneiftheuseofforce
againstasubjectclearlybecomesexcessive.48
ThePatrolGuidearticulatesapolicyontheneedfortheapplicationofforcetobe
proportionaltothecircumstancesandimposesanaffirmativedutyonofficerstopreventthe
unnecessaryescalationofforcewhenitappearsexcessive.However,itdoesnotarticulatea
policyontheimportanceofreducingthelikelihoodthatforceisneededinagivensituation.
ii. ModelPractices
Severalpolicedepartmentsacrossthecountryhaverevisedtheiruseofforcepoliciesto
incorporatedeescalationconcepts.Theserangefromstatementsofprinciplethatremind
officersoftheimportanceofdeescalationtofirmrequirementsthatobligeofficerstode
escalatethesituationwhenappropriate.
Forexample,PPDDirective10ofthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartmentbeginsitssection
onuseofforcewiththefollowinggoal:
A.GOAL:Toalwaysattempttodeescalateanysituationwhereforcemay
becomenecessary.Intheeventforcebecomesunavoidable,touseonlythe
minimal.
47
Lawenforcementagencypoliciesfortrainingonuseofforceshouldemphasizedeescalationandalternatives
toarrestorsummonsinsituationswhereappropriate.U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE,supranote27,at21.
48
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,USEOFFORCE[PROC.NO.]20311(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
34
OCTOBER2015
B.Theamountofforce,thecontinueduseofanyforce,andthetypeof
policeequipmentutilizedalldependuponthesituationbeingfacedbythe
officer.However,oncethethreathasbeenovercomeorasubjectissecurely
incustody,itisanofficersresponsibilitytodeescalateandimmediately
addressanyinjuriesthesuspectmayhavesustained.49
Otherlargecitypolicedepartmentslikewisehaveguidelinesthatremind
officersoftherolethatdeescalationcanplay.Forexample,theuseofforcepolicy
inDenverstates:
Policingrequiresthatattimesanofficermustexercisecontrolofaviolent,
assaultive,orresistingindividualtomakeanarrest,ortoprotecttheofficer,
otherofficers,ormembersofthegeneralpublicfromriskofimminentharm.
Officersmayeitherescalateordeescalatetheuseofforceasthesituation
progressesorcircumstanceschange.50
Bycontrast,someuseofforcepoliciesrequirethatofficersactivelytakestepstode
escalatethesituationwhenappropriate.Forexample,theSeattlePoliceDepartment(SPD)s
useofforcepolicynotesthefollowing:
1.WhenSafeundertheTotalityoftheCircumstancesandTimeand
CircumstancesPermit,OfficersShallUseDeEscalationTacticsinOrderto
ReducetheNeedforForce.
Deescalationtacticsandtechniquesareactionsusedbyofficers,whensafe
andwithoutcompromisinglawenforcementpriorities,whichseekto
minimizethelikelihoodoftheneedtouseforceduringanincidentand
increasethelikelihoodofvoluntarycompliance.
Whensafeandfeasibleunderthetotalityofcircumstances,officersshall
attempttoslowdownorstabilizethesituationsothatmoretime,options
andresourcesareavailableforincidentresolution.51
49
Phila.PoliceDept,USEOFFORCEINVOLVINGTHEDISCHARGEOFFIREARMS[Dir.]10(EffectiveMay23,2014)
DENVERPOLICEDEPTOPERATIONSMANUAL,supranote25,at20.
51
SEATTLEPOLICEMANUAL,USINGFORCEtit.8.200POL1(1)(EffectiveSept.1,2015),availableat
http://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/title8useofforce/8100deescalation;seealsoChi.PoliceDept,USEOF
FORCEMODEL[GEN.OR.]G030201,availableathttp://directives.chicagopolice.org/lt2015/data/a7a57be2128ff3f0
ae9128fff44306f3da7b28a19.html,(Whenforceisapplied,amemberwillescalateordeescalatetotheamount
offorcewhichisreasonablynecessarytoovercomethesubjectsresistanceandtogaincontrol.).
50
35
OCTOBER2015
SPDhasconfirmedthatthispolicyimposesarequirementonofficers,undercertain
circumstances,toattempttodeescalatethesituationbeforeresortingtoforce.52Significantly,
SPDspolicyregardingdeescalationisseparatefromandprecedesthepoliciesongeneraluse
offorceanddeadlyuseofforce,suggestingthatdeescalationshouldbeconsideredbyofficers
beforetheybegintoconsiderdeployinganylevelofforce.
TheU.S.DepartmentofJustice(DOJ),whichregularlyreviewsusesofforcebypolice
departmentsacrossthenation,hasconsistentlyfoundfaultwithlawenforcementfailuresto
deescalatesituationsthatresultedinexcessiveforceandhasidentifiedtheneedforeffective
deescalationpoliciesandtraining.53In2001,DOJpublishedPrinciplesforPromotingPolice
Integrity(Principles),whichnotesthat,[d]ependingonthecircumstances,officersmayfindit
necessarytoescalateordeescalatetheuseofforcebyprogressingupordowntheforce
continuum.Principleslikewisenoted,Wherenondeadlyforceisauthorized,officersshould
assesstheincidenttodeterminewhichnondeadlytechniqueorweaponwillbestdeescalate
theincidentandbringitundercontrolinasafemanner.54
Coupledwithtrainingandashiftinpolicingculture,writtenpoliciesallowpolice
departmentstoarticulateprinciples,establishrequirements,andsetexpectationsofpolice
officers.ConsideringNYPDsstatedcommitmenttodeescalationtraining,theoverallbenefits
ofdeescalationstrategiesinpolicing,andthestridesthathavebeenmadeinupdatingthe
policiesofotherpeerpolicedepartments,NYPDshouldincludedeescalationprinciplesaspart
ofitsuseofforceproceduresinthePatrolGuide.
Toensurethatpoliceofficersconsiderthefullrangeofoptionsduringencounterswith
thepublic,theUseofForcepolicyintheNYPDPatrolGuideshouldnotonlyidentifythelevelof
forcepermittedinvariousscenarios,butshouldalsorequireofficerstotakestepstoreducethe
likelihoodthatforcewillbeneededinthefirstplace.NYPDspolicyshouldincludeclear
languageregardinganofficersobligationtodeescalate,suchasthatusedbySPD:Whensafe
underthetotalityofthecircumstancesandtimeandcircumstancespermit,officersshalluse
deescalationtacticsinordertoreducetheneedforforce.
52
FIFTHSEMIANNUALREPORTJUNE2015at13(2015),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/557f3f8fe4b0e62e4460ff9b/143440270341
9/Fifth+Semiannual+Report.pdf(lastvisitedAug27,2015).
53
Seee.g.,U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE,INVESTIGATIONOFTHEFERGUSONPOLICEDEPARTMENT(2015);LetterfromVanitaGupta,
ActingAssistantAttorneyGeneral,U.S.DeptofJusticeCiv.R.Div.,toFrankG.Jackson,ClevelandMayor,Cleveland
(Dec.4,2014)(regardingtheInvestigationoftheClevelandDivisionofPolice).;LetterfromThomasE.Perez,
AssistantAttorneyGeneral,U.S.DeptofJusticeC.R.Div.,toManuelOrosa,MiamiPoliceChief(July9,
2013)(regardingtheInvestigationofCityofMiamiPoliceDepartment);;U.S.DeptofJustice,INVESTIGATIONOFTHE
NEWARKPOLICEDEPARTMENT(July22,2014);LetterfromThomasE.Perez,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,U.S.Deptof
JusticeC.R.Div.,toSamAdams,PortlandMayor,Portland(Sept.12,2012)(regardingtheInvestigationofthe
PortlandPoliceBureau).;LetterfromJonathanM.Smith,supranote42,at26(regardingSeattlePoliceDepartment
CivilRightsPatternorPracticeInvestigation).
54
U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE,PRINCIPLESFORPROMOTINGPOLICEINTEGRITYat4(January2001).
36
OCTOBER2015
SeattlePoliceDepartmentsUseofForcePolicy
InDecember2011,theCivilRightsDivisionoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice
(DOJ)publishedtheresultsofaninemonthinvestigationoftheSeattlePoliceDepartment
(SPD).DOJfoundthatSPDhadengagedinapatternorpracticeofexcessiveforcethatviolated
theU.S.Constitutionandfederallaw.TheinvestigationconcludedthatdeficienciesinSPDs
training,policies,andoversightwithregardtotheuseofforcecontributetotheconstitutional
violations.
TheCityofSeattle(theCity)eventuallysettledwithDOJ,andtheConsentDecree
becameanenforceableorderoftheCourtinJuly2012.TheConsentDecreerequiredsweeping
reformsofSPDsuseofforcepolicies,practices,andtraining.
ByDecember2013,theCity,DOJ,andtheSeattlePoliceMonitorhadagreedonafinal
draftoftheuseofforcepolicies,whichwerethenapprovedbythefederalcourtoverseeing
thedecree.ThenewuseofforcepolicyincludedanumberofchangesandadditionstoSPD.55
TheConsentDecree:
Establishedthatocersmustaccomplishthepolicemissionwiththecooperationofthe
publicaseffectivelyaspossible,withminimalrelianceupontheuseofphysicalforce;
Requiredtheuseofdeescalationtacticsandtechniques;
Determinedthattheforceusedmustbeobjectivelyreasonableandnecessaryunderthe
circumstances,andproportionaltothethreatorresistanceofasubject;
Acknowledgedthattheconductofocerspriortotheneedtouseforcewillbeweighedas
afactorwhenSPDassessesanyuseofforceincident;
Clearlydefinedforce,whenforcewasappropriate,whenforceisprohibited,andwhenand
howtoreportforce;
Definedandenhancedresponsibili esforsupervisorsandcreatedtheForceInves ga on
Team,anindependentteamtoinvestigateofficerinvolvedshootings,incustodydeaths,and
seriousassaultsonofficers;
CreatedtheUseofForceReviewBoardtoreviewallTypeIIandTypeIIIuseofforce
incidents;and
Createdproceduralmanualstoprovideguidanceonusingnonlethalforcedevices.
55
SEATTLEPOLICEMONITORSTHIRDSEMIANNUALREPORT,U.S.v.Seattle,No.C121282JLR(W.D.Wash.)(TrialFiling)
(2015)(No.154),availableat
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542ae579e4b06a3cb8b707db/1412097401
712/Third_Seattle_Police_Monitor_s_Third_Semiannual_Report_dated_June_16_2014.pdf(lastvisitedAug27,
2015).
37
OCTOBER2015
ThenActingAssistantAttorneyGeneralJocelynSamuels,headofDOJsCivilRightsDivision,
hailedthepolicyasauseofforcepolicythatwillserveasamodelforpolicedepartments
nationwideanddeclaredthat[t]hispolicywillhelpensurethatthepeopleofSeattlehavea
policedepartmentthatrespectstheConstitution,securesthesafetyofthepublic,andearns
theconfidenceofthecommunity.56
56
USAOW.DIST.WA,DOJHailsMilestoneinSeattlePoliceDepartmentReformEffortswithCourtsApprovalof
NewUseofForcePolicy,U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE(Dec.17,2013),http://www.justice.gov/usaowdwa/pr/dojhails
milestoneseattlepolicedepartmentreformeffortscourtsapprovalnewuse(lastvisitedSept.10,2015).
38
OCTOBER2015
VI.
NYPDTraining
a. TheImportanceofTraining
NYPDsPatrolGuideproceduresareanimportantguideforofficers,butareessentially
incompletewithoutapropertrainingmechanismtocomplementthem.WhilethePatrolGuide
providesofficerswithdirectiononwhattheycanandcannotdo,traininginstructsofficerson
themorepracticalaspectsoftheirjobs.NYPDstrainingprogramiscomprisedoftwomain
components:apoliceacademyforrecruitsandinservicecoursesforswornmembersof
service.Asnotedbelow,whiledeescalationtacticsareintroducedduringNYPDtraining,more
focusedtrainingisrequired.
b. NYPDTrainingOverview
i.
PoliceAcademyEducationandTrainingCenter
ThecenterpieceofNYPDstrainingprogramisthePoliceAcademyEducationand
TrainingCenter(theAcademy),locatedinCollegePoint,Queens.AllnewNYPDofficersattend
theAcademy,whichisasixmonthtrainingprogrambrokenintothreetrimesters,withexams
followingeachtrimester.57Eachday,recruitsspendfourandahalfhoursintheclassroomand
twoandahalfhoursinthegym.NYPDsupcomingrecruitclass,scheduledtobegintrainingin
October2015,willhave700recruits.58
TheAcademysclassroomcurriculumconsistsof53coursesthataredividedintothree
categories:LegalStudies,Humanities,andPoliceStudies.Thereare19coursesintheLegal
Studiessectionofthecurriculumforatotalof136.5hours,16coursesintheHumanities
sectionofthecurriculumforatotalof199.5hours,and18coursesinthePoliceStudiessection
ofthecurriculumforatotalof132hours.
1. AcademyCoursesRelevanttoUseofForce
OIGNYPDidentifiedonlyoneninehourAcademycourse,entitledUseofForce,that
directlypertainstoofficersuseofforce.TheAcademycurriculumalsoincludesanotherfour
andahalfhourcourse,entitledPolicingProfessionally,thatfeaturesalternativestrategiesto
usingforce,butonlyindirectlyaddressesuseofforceordeescalationtactics.OIGNYPDalso
reviewedsevenadditionalcoursesfromtheAcademyscurriculumthatmakepassingmention
ofuseofforce.59
57
AccordingtotheinterviewedAcademystaff,recruitsmustscorea75%orhigherontheexamstopass.
NYPDtraditionallyhadtwoclassesperyear,butisnowmovingtofourclassesperyear.
59
Theadditionalcoursesreviewedwere:PolicingaMulticulturalSociety,PolicingImpartially,Authorityand
Ethics,Discretion,CommunityInteractionandProblemSolving,MentalIllness,and,Policingthe
EmotionallyDisturbed.
58
39
OCTOBER2015
ThegoaloftheAcademysUseofForcecourseistotrainofficerstodifferentiate
betweenthevariousphysicalforceoptionsavailabletothem.Thetrainingisalsomeantto
prepareofficerstoexplainhowtheforceusedwasreasonable,basedonatotalityofthe
circumstances.Thecourseteachesofficerstodeterminetheamountofforcethattheyare
permittedtouseinagivensituation,takingintoaccountboththegeneralnatureofthe
situationtheyareconfrontingandthedangerpresentedtotheofficer.
TheAcademysPolicingProfessionallycourseconcentratesonofficers
communicationwiththepublicanddemonstratesskillstheycanusetoeffectivelygain
voluntarycompliance.Amongthetopicscoveredarewhatitmeanstobeprofessional;
explanationsofdiscretion,effectivecommunication/activelylistening,andperception;various
NYPDstreetclichs;andanoverviewofthevariousagenciesthataddresspolicemisconduct,
suchasCCRB.PolicingProfessionallyistheonlypartoftherecruitAcademycurriculumthat
emphasizeshowofficerscandeescalatesituations,teachingtherecruitstomaintaincontrolof
theiremotions,useverbalandnonverbalcommunicationincludingactivelistening,andbe
assertive,asopposedtoconfrontationaloraggressive.ThecoursealsoincludesaFiveStep
AppealProcesscomprisedof:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
anethicalappeal;
acontext/rationalappeal;
apersonalappeal;
apracticalappeal;and
aninvoluntaryappeal.
Officersaremeanttoprogressthroughtheappealstageswiththegoalofgainingvoluntary
compliance,butthefinalstage,involuntaryappeal,acknowledgesthattheymusttakepolice
actionifthatcannotbeaccomplished.
2. Scenario/Simulation(FirearmsandTactics)
Aftercompletingtheinitialclassroomportionoftheirstudies,NYPDrecruitsbegina15
daycoursecalledFirearmsandTacticswhichtakesplacebothattheAcademyandatan
NYPDfacilityatRodmansNeckintheBronx.AspartoftheFirearmsandTacticstraining,
recruitsreceiveinstructioninfirearmssafety,fundamentalsofshooting,weapons
maintenance,peppersprayusage,andvarioustacticalmaneuvers.60Recruitsareevaluatedby
amarksmanshipexamonwhichtheymustscorea78%topassandawrittenexamthatfocuses
onpeppersprayandexertion.Allofficerswhofailthemarksmanshipexamarepermittedupto
fourrequalificationattempts.
Ineachscenario,recruitsrespondtoacallatalocationandtheninteractwiththe
variousinstructorswhoposeasmembersofthepublicinvolvedwiththeincident.Whenthe
60
Lessonsintacticalmaneuversinclude:reflexiveresponses,closecombattraining,vehiclecoverand
concealment,lowlighttraining/flashlighttechniques,fluidforcedrills,threatrecognitiondrills,andbarricadedrills.
40
OCTOBER2015
scenariosconclude,instructorsassesstherecruitsperformancebyfirstaskingtheparticipating
recruitsandthentheobservingrecruitsfortheirfeedback,andthenbysubsequentlypointing
outtheirerrorsandadvisingthemonthesafest,mostefficientwaystomanagetheincidentsin
question.
Inearly2015,OIGNYPDinvestigatorsattendedportionsoftheFirearmsandTactics
programandobservedofficersparticipatinginscenarioandsimulationbasedexercises.Atthe
time,thesehandsonexercisesmadeuponlyasmallpercentageoftherecruitsentiretraining
(threeoutofapproximately180days).NYPDhasinformedOIGNYPDthattheDepartmenthas
recentlyadoptedamorescenariofocusedtrainingmodel,whichfeatureshandsontraining
aftereachweekofAcademyinstruction.
ThescenarioexercisestakeplaceattheAcademysmockenvironmentarea,whichis
madeupofmultiplestagedareasmeanttoreplicatelocationsaroundthecity,suchasan
apartment,abar,anATMvestibule,andasubwaycar.
ii.
InServiceTraining
InadditiontoNYPDsAcademytrainingprogramforrecruits,theDepartmentoffersa
suiteofinservicetrainingclassesforactivemembersofservice.Someinservicetraining
modulesaremeantforofficerssentbacktotheAcademytoworkoncertainskillsorabilities,
whileothersareDepartmentwidecourses.Inservicetrainingalsoincludesrequalifyingfor
shooting,whichallofficersmustdotwiceayear.61
ThemostrecentofNYPDstrainingprogramsforinserviceofficersistheSmartPolicing
(20K)Initiative,(SmartPolicing)whichwaslargelyconceivedinresponsetothedeathofEric
GarnerinJuly2014.TheSmartPolicing(20K)Initiativeisathreedayprogrammeantto
refreshandreeducateapproximately26,000activeofficers.OIGNYPDinvestigatorssatinon
thefulltrainingprogram.
ThefirstdayofSmartPolicing,NYPDBlueCourage:SafePolicingforOfficersandthe
Public,focusesonwhatNYPDreferstoasproceduraljustice.62Proceduraljustice
emphasizestreatingcitizensfairlyandwithrespect,andiscenteredonfourkeyprinciples:
1)
2)
3)
4)
fairnessandconsistencyofruleapplication;
impartialityandunbiaseddecisionmakerneutrality;
citizenvoiceindecisionmaking;and
transparencyandopennessinprocess.63
61
Thelargestpoolofofficerssentbackforretraininghasfivetosevenyearsofexperience.
ADVANCEMENTPROJECT,LIMITINGPOLICEUSEOFFORCE:PROMISINGCOMMUNITYCENTEREDSTRATEGIES14,2122(PolicyLink
2014).
63
Id.at14.
62
41
OCTOBER2015
OntheseconddayofSmartPolicing,instructorsnotethatNYPDisthemostrestrained
majorpolicedepartmentinthecountryintheuseofforce.Officersaretheninstructedon
crisisandconflictcommunication,andgainingvoluntarycomplianceinnonviolentbutnon
cooperativesituations.Instructorslistskillslinkedtothesetactics,suchas:
deescalation;
activelistening;
timemanagement;
buildingempathy/rapport;and
usinginfluence.
ThethirddayoftheSmartPolicingcourseisgearedtowardsrefreshingandretraining
officersonbasicdefensivetactics.Thepresentationfeaturesinstructorsdemonstratingvarious
handtohandtechniquesinfrontoftheclass,followedbyofficerspracticingthemaneuvers
themselves.Theinstructorsalsoreviewhowtoperformaproperarmbarinaccordancewith
NYPDpolicyandhaveofficerspracticethemovewithapartner.64Followingthearmbar
training,officerspracticetechniquesforfallingtothegroundwithminimalimpactand
defendingthemselvesonceontheground.
SincefirstimplementingtheprograminDecember2014,NYPDhasmodifiedand
redesignedit,takingaccountoffeedbackandmakingchanges,suchasaddingmidnighttraining
sessionsforofficersassignedtolatenighttours.
OIGNYPDbelievesthatadditionaltrainingpersonnelandincreasedfundingforthe
AcademywouldimprovethequalityandeffectivenessofNYPDtraining,aswellaspermitthe
Academytoincreasethenumberofofficerstrainedeachyear.
c. ModelPracticesforDeEscalationTraining
OIGNYPDreviewedtheSeattlePoliceDepartments(SPDs)deescalationtrainingas
thatdepartmentisrecognizedforhavingoneofthemostdevelopeddeescalationpoliciesin
thecountry.65AsofDecember2014,allSPDofficershadundergonea32hour,inclasstraining
onnewuseofforcepolicies,whichincludedafourhourcoursecalled,TacticalDeEscalation,
atleasteighthoursoflivetrainingonhowofficersshoulddealwithpeopleinbehavioralcrises,
andeighthoursoftrainingonstops,detentions,andbiasfreepolicing.66Afullerdescriptionof
SPDsdeescalationtrainingisavailableinAppendixC.
64
TheconsensusamongtheofficersattendingthetrainingwhospoketoOIGNYPDwasthat,inarealworld
scenario,theproperarmbarwasunrealisticandundependableduringaphysicalencounter.
65
SamuelWalker,THECOMMUNITYVOICEINPOLICING:OLDISSUES,NEWEVIDENCE(Feb.2015),
https://nacole.org/wpcontent/uploads/WalkerSeattlePaperFeb4.pdf.
66
POLICEEXEC.RESEARCHFORUM,CRITICALISSUESINPOLICINGSERIES:REENGINEERINGTRAININGONPOLICEUSEOFFORCE(2015)
[hereinafterCRITICALISSUES2015],http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining.pdf(lastvisitedAug
27,2015).
42
OCTOBER2015
d. AssessmentofNYPDsTraining
i.
AcademyTraining
NYPDsscenarioandsimulationtrainingsarethorough,valuableexercises.Thescenario
andsimulationinstructorswhotaughttheclassesthatOIGNYPDobservedwereengaging,
knowledgeable,andeagertooffertherecruitsconstructivecriticismthatcouldhelpthemin
realworldencounters.However,whenrepresentativesofOIGNYPDattendedthescenario
andsimulationtrainings,thoseexercisesfilledonlythreeoutofapproximately180daysof
recruitstimeattheAcademy.Accordingtoa2015nationwidesurveyconductedbythePolice
ExecutiveResearchForum(PERF),anaverageof24hoursinbasictrainingisspentonuseof
forcescenariobasedtraining.67WhileNYPDisroughlyonparwiththesestatistics,thelackof
practicaltrainingisfeltamongrecruitsandinstructors.MultipleNYPDpersonnelwhowere
interviewedattheAcademyacknowledgedthebrevityofthescenarioandsimulationtrainings,
andexpressedadesirefortheseprogramstobelengthenedandfurtherdeveloped.NYPD
recruitsalsocommentedonhowtheywereonlyabletorunthroughthepracticaltraining
exercisesonceortwice,duetotimeandlogisticalconstraints,andasaresult,felttheywere
unabletofullygrasptheconceptsbeingtaught.
Recruitsneedtopracticetheapplicationoftheirlearnedskillsinscenariospriorto
dealingwiththepublic.InadditiontothewrittenfinalexamattheAcademy,apractical
assessmentthatpresentssituationsinwhichanofficermustuseNYPDtechniquestoproblem
solveshouldbeimplementedinordertofullyevaluaterecruits.Accordingtoasurvey
conductedbytheCensusofStateandLocalLawEnforcementTrainingAcademies(CLETA),74%
ofsurveyedagenciesevaluatedrecruitswithscenariobasedexams.68Practicalexamsshouldbe
pairedwiththewrittenexamsthatfolloweachAcademytrimesterinordertomonitorrecruits
progressandreinforcetheimportanceoftheirinteractionswiththepublic.Otherportionsof
recruitstraining,suchasclassroomworkandfirearmsproficiency,arealreadyevaluatedwith
gradedexams.TheAcademyshouldadoptaformalevaluationsystemforitsscenariobased
trainingifNYPDistopreparerecruitsforthesortsofencounterstheywillfaceeverydayonthe
job.
ThereisalsotoolittlefocusondeescalationduringNYPDstrainingsessions.According
tothe2015PERFsurvey,anaverageofeighthourswasdevotedtotrainingofficersinde
escalationnationwide,comparedtoanaverageof58hoursoffirearmstrainingand49hoursof
defensivetactics.69NYPDspendsonlyaportionofafourandahalfhourcourseteachingde
67
U.S.DEPTOFJUSTICE,BUREAUJUST.STAT.,CENSUSOFSTATEANDLOCALLAWENFORCEMENTTRAININGACADEMIES2006
(CLETA2006),ICPSR27262(InteruniversityConsortiumPol.&Soc.Res.[distributor]2012),
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/27262/version/1.
68
PoliceExecutiveResearchForum,CRITICALISSUESINPOLICINGSERIESREENGINEERINGTRAININGONPOLICEUSEOF
FORCE(2015),http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining.pdf(lastvisitedAug27,2015).
69
Id.
43
OCTOBER2015
escalation,outof468classroomhourslessthanonepercentofthecurriculum.Thereis
currentlynoAcademycoursespecificallydevotedtolearningandpracticingdeescalation
techniques.Whilethereisvalueindiscussingdeescalationinthecontextofrelevantclasses,
suchasPolicingProfessionally,astandalonecourseconcentratingondeescalationandtactical
communicationwoulddemonstratetheimportanceoftheseskillsetstorecruits,andalsoallow
themtoimmersethemselvesinthematerial.
ii.
InServiceTraining
WhenmembersofOIGNYPDsstaffattendedtheinserviceSmartPolicingprogram,the
instructorsmerelyskimmedoverthedeescalationskillsanddidnotengagewiththeofficers
beingtrainedduringthepresentation.Theinstructorsemphasizedthatofficersshoulduse
properandeffectivecommunicationinsteadofusingforce,butprovidednoconcreteexamples,
scenarios,oranecdotesinordertoteachofficershowtodeescalateasituationanddidlittleto
reinforcetheimportanceofdeescalation.SimilartotheAcademytraining,inservicetraining
shouldincludeagreaterfocusondeescalation,bothintheclassroomandinscenariobased
situations.
44
OCTOBER2015
VII.
Discipline
NYPDsdisciplinarysystemiscomplex,withmultipleoffices,bothwithinandoutsidethe
Department,workingtowardsthegoalofmaintainingaccountabilityofofficerswhoengagein
misconduct.
ForthisReport,OIGNYPDreviewed179substantiatedCCRBcaseswithatotalof207
allegations.Forthedisciplinereview,OIGNYPDexcluded59casesthatarecurrentlypending
finaldispositionatNYPDand12casesinwhichOIGNYPDsteamofformerlawenforcement
andpoliceoversightprofessionalsdisagreedwithCCRBsdisposition.OIGNYPDalsoexcluded
thefivecaseswherethestatuteoflimitationsexpiredbeforedisciplinecouldbeimposedand
onecasewheretheofficerretiredbeforethecasewasclosed.Finally,OIGNYPDexcludedthe
threecasesinwhichCCRBreverseditsownfindingordisciplinaryrecommendationupona
requestforreconsiderationbyNYPD.70Withalloftheseexclusions,OIGNYPDcloselyanalyzed
theremaining100cases,comprising104allegations,forthedisciplinereview.
a. OIGNYPDsDeparturesfromCCRBsRecommendations
Afterathoroughreviewoftheinvestigativefilesforthe179CCRBcases,OIGNYPD
investigatorsultimatelyreachedadifferentconclusionin12instances,or6.7%ofthetime.In
these12cases,OIGNYPDdeterminedthattheexcessiveforceinquestionwaseither:
1) proportionalandobjectivelyreasonablebasedonthetotalityofthecircumstances;or
2) substantiatedwithinsufficientevidencetodetermine,basedonapreponderanceofthe
evidence,thattheofficersactionsconstitutedmisconduct.
Forexample,consideringtheharmfulconsequencesthatcanresultfromtheuseof
firearms,NYPDpolicystatesthatofficerscandrawtheirserviceweaponandpointittoward
someoneaslongasthereisareasonablefearfortheofficersoranother'spersonalsafety.In
certaincaseswhereCCRBdeterminedthattheofficerhadimproperlyusedforcebydrawinga
serviceweapon,OIGNYPDinvestigatorsinsteadconcludedthattheofficersinthesespecific
caseshadarticulatedsufficientjustificationstodrawandpointtheirserviceweapons.Inother
caseswhereCCRBdeterminedthatofficershadimproperlyusedexcessivephysicalforce,OIG
NYPDinvestigatorsconcludedthat,underthespecificfactsofthesecases,theofficersuseof
forcewasreasonablegiventheneedtoovercomeviolentresistance.
Ineachcase,OIGNYPDsreviewteamconductedasearchingreviewoftheinvestigative
fileandrigorouslyexaminedeachcase,eventhoughtheydidnotreinterviewtheinvolved
officers.OIGNYPDsfindingsarelimitedtothescopeandpurposeofthisReportandthefact
thatOIGNYPDhasreachedadifferentconclusionisnotastatementaboutCCRBsownfindings
andprocesses.
70
NYCCCRB,APUANDPOLICEDISCIPLINE,http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/police/police.shtml(lastvisitedSep
10,2015).
45
OCTOBER2015
b. DisciplinaryOutcomesAcross104SubstantiatedUseofForceAllegations
CATEGORIESOFNYPDDISCIPLINE
Instructions
CommandDiscipline
Instructionsareanonpunitivemeasureofdiscipline,whichrequiresthe
subjectofficertoreceiveinstructionfromtheircommandingofficeron
properconductandprocedureswithrespecttoanysubstantiated
allegations.SometimesthememberissenttothePoliceAcademyfor
retraining.71
CommandDisciplineisamoreseriousbutnonjudicialpunishmentthat
willbeadjudicatedataninformalhearingbyacommandingofficer.72
Thepenaltiesrangefromawarningtotheforfeitureofvacationdays,all
dependingontheseverityofthemisconductandtheofficerspast
disciplinaryrecordandperformancerecord.Itisdividedintotwo
schedules:
ScheduleA:appliestolessseriousmisconductandcarriesupto
forfeitureoffivevacationdays(i.e.,improperlykeptuniformor
equipment,failuretomaintainneatandcleanpersonalappearance,
usinganyunauthorizedelectronic/digitaldevicewhileonduty,etc.).73
ScheduleB:appliestomoreseriousmisconductandcarriespenaltiesof
forfeitureofupto10vacationdays(i.e.,lossofDepartmentproperty,
failuretosafeguardaprisoner,etc.).
Chargesand
Specifications
ChargesandSpecificationsarethemostseriousdisciplinarymeasure,
whichcanbefiledagainstanofficerwhocommitsseriousmisconduct.
ChargesandSpecificationsmayresultinanOfficialDepartmentTrial
prosecutedbytheDepartmentAdvocatesOffice(DAO)orbyCCRBs
AdministrativeProsecutionUnit(APU).
Ifanofficerisfoundguiltyofmisconduct,thepenaltiesmayrangefrom
theforfeitureofvacationdaystotermination.
71
NYCCCRB,APUANDPOLICEDISCIPLINE,http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/police/police.shtml(lastvisitedSep
10,2015).
72
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,COMMANDDISCIPLINE[PROC.NO.]20602(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
73
2014NYPDPATROLGUIDE,VIOLATIONSSUBJECTTOCOMMANDDISCIPLINE[PROC.NO.]20312(EffectiveAug.1,2013).
46
OCTOBER2015
Asnoted,OIGNYPDexamined104substantiatedallegationsfromtheinitialcomplaint
throughinvestigation,prosecution,andfinaldecision.Fromthesedata,OIGNYPDfoundthat
thetrendsinitiallyobservedintheJanuary2015ChokeholdReportarenotananomaly,but
appeartobeendemicofalargerdissonancebetweenCCRBandNYPD.Inanumberofcases,
theDepartmenthasfailedtomeetitsfundamentalobligationtopoliceitself.
NYPDfrequentlyfailedtoimposedisciplineevenwhenprovidedwithevidenceof
excessiveforce.NYPDimposednodisciplinein37of104,or35.6%,ofsubstantiatedallegations
inwhichOIGNYPDsindependentreviewconfirmedthatofficersusedexcessiveforcethatwas
notwarrantedunderthecircumstances.AsnotedinFigure12below,inthecasesdecided
priortoJanuary2014,NYPDdeclinedtoimposedisciplinein34of77allegations,or44.1%of
thetime.AfterJanuary1,2014,NYPDdeclineddisciplineinthreeof27allegations,or11.1%of
thetime.Althoughtherateistrendingdownward,giventhesmallnumberofdatapointspost
January1,2014,OIGNYPDwillcontinuetomonitortheissue.
47
OCTOBER2015
Figure12:FinalDisciplinaryDispositionsAcross104SubstantiatedUseofForceAllegations74
BreakdownofFinal
DisciplinaryDispositions
(20102015)
Instructions
Total
Percentage
19
18.3%
ACommandDiscipline
0%
BCommandDiscipline
13
12.5%
ChargesandSpecifications
Nodisciplinaryaction
Total
35
37
104
33.6%
35.6%
100%
BreakdownofFinal
(20102013)
Instructions
Total
Percentage
18
23.4%
ACommandDiscipline
0%
BCommandDiscipline
10
13%
Total
15
34
77
19.5%
44.1%
100%
BreakdownofFinal
(20142015)
Instructions
Total
Percentage
3.7%
ACommandDiscipline
0%
BCommandDiscipline
11.1%
Total
20
3
27
74.1%
11.1%
100%
74
The104countexcludesoneallegationagainstapoliceofficerwhoretiredbeforethedispositionofthecaseand
sixallegations(overfivecases)wherethestatuteoflimitationsexpiredbeforetheconclusionoftherespective
cases.
48
OCTOBER2015
Furthermore,intheChokeholdReport,OIGNYPDexaminedthescenariosunderwhich
NYPDdowngradedthedisciplinerecommendedbyCCRB.Inthatreport,OIGNYPDfoundthat
thePoliceCommissionerdepartedfromCCRBsdisciplinaryrecommendationinsixoutofsix
chokeholdcases.OIGNYPDslatestresearchillustrateshowthistrendofdownward
departuresisnotlimitedtochokeholdcases.AsshownintheFigure13below,OIGNYPD
foundthatacross92substantiateduseofforceallegations,NYPDdeparteddownwardfrom
CCRBsdisciplinaryrecommendationorimposednodisciplinaryactionwhatsoever67.4%of
thetime.75Therateofdisciplinarydowngradinginuseofforcecaseshasslowedinthelast18
months.Nevertheless,thegulfbetweenCCRBandNYPDremainsandshouldbeaddressed.
Figure13:DispositionsinwhichNYPDDepartedfromCCRBsRecommendation
Departures(20102015)
DepartedDownward
DepartedUpward
UpheldRecommendation
Total
Total
62
1
29
92
Percentage
67.4%
1.1%
31.5%
100%
Total
58
1
13
72
Percentage
80.6%
1.4%
18%
100%
DepartedDownward
DepartedUpward
Total
Total
Percentage
DepartedDownward
4
20.0%
DepartedUpward
0
0%
16
80.0%
Total
20
100%
Figure14belowillustratesthefulllifecycleofthe111allegationsthathadprogressed
tofinaldispositionatthetimeofthewritingofthisReport.76Eachdotinthechartrepresents
oneallegation.TheFinalDispositionsectionofthechartshowsonlythemostseverepenalty
imposedperallegation.Manyofthepenaltiesarefrequentlypackagedtogether,suchasa
forfeitureofvacationdaysandInstructions.
75
ThiscountexcludesthethreeallegationsinwhichtheBoardmadenodisciplinaryrecommendationsandthe
nineallegationsinwhichNYPDsprosecutingauthorityupheldCCRBsrecommendation,i.e.,Chargesand
Specificationswerebroughtagainsttheofficers.However,becauseNYPDsadministrativejudgerecommendeda
NotGuiltydispositionineachofthesecases,nodisciplinewasultimatelyimposed.
76
The111allegationshereincludeallofthe104allegationsdiscussedabove,plustheonecasewherethesubject
officerretiredandthefivecases(sixallegations)wherethestatuteoflimitationsexpiredbeforetheconclusionof
thecases.
49
OCTOBER2015
Figure14:LifecyclesofSubstantiatedCCRBForceAllegations
50
OCTOBER2015
Currently,whenCCRBrecommendsChargesandSpecifications,thecaseisprosecuted
byCCRBsAPU.77PriortothecreationofAPU,however,DAOreviewedalldisciplinary
recommendationsissuedbyCCRBandmadeitsownrecommendationstothePolice
Commissioner.Atotalof97outofthe111useofforceallegationswereunderDAOs
jurisdictionandtheremaining14allegationswerehandledbyAPU.
OIGNYPDobservedthatoverthese97useofforceallegations,DAOsmostcommon
disciplinaryrecommendationtothePoliceCommissionerwasnodisciplinaryactionatall,which
occurredin33instances,or34.0%ofthetime.Bycontrast,DAOrecommendedChargesand
Specifications,thehighestpossiblelevelofdiscipline,in23,or23.7%,oftheallegations.78
Inthe23instanceswhereDAOrecommendedChargesandSpecifications,thePolice
Commissionerimposeddisciplinein20cases,or87.0%ofthetime,withtheremainingthree
cases,or13.0%,beinginstanceswheretheNYPDsadministrativejudgerecommendeda
dispositionofnotguilty.Figure15belowshowsalloftheChargesandSpecifications
dispositionsthatprogressedthroughDAO,thetrialoutcomes,andtheultimatepenalty,ifany,
imposedforthoseallegations.
77
SeeinfraApp.D(forafullunderstandingofhowAPUwascreatedandhowitfunctions).
Oftheremaining41allegations,four(4.1%)wereclosedadministrativelybecausethestatuteoflimitationshad
expired,one(1.0%)wasclosedasitwasagainstapoliceofficerwhoretiredbeforethefinaldispositionofthecase,
andDAOrecommendedInstructions(21allegations,21.6%)orScheduleBCommandDiscipline(15allegations
15.5%)intheremaininginstances.DAOdidnotrecommendScheduleACommandDisciplineinanyofthe97
allegations.
78
51
OCTOBER2015
Figure15:LifecyclesoftheChargesandSpecificationsAllegationsProsecutedbyDAO
Asnoted,APUhassincetakenovertheprosecutionofcasesininstanceswhereCCRB
hasrecommendedChargesandSpecifications.79Figure16belowillustratesthefulllifecycles
79
DAO,however,continuestoreviewallothercaseswhereCCRBhasrecommendedlowerpenalties.Pursuantto
142oftheRulesoftheCCRB,DAOmayalsoreviewcasesinlimitedcircumstanceswherethePolice
CommissionerdeterminesthattheBoardsprosecutionofChargeswouldbedetrimentaltothePolice
Departmentsdisciplinaryprocess.Theseincludecaseswherethereareparallelorrelatedcriminal
52
OCTOBER2015
ofthe12allegationsthathadprogressedthroughAPUtofinaldispositionatthetimeofthe
writingofthisReport.80Ofthe12substantiatedallegationsprosecutedbyAPU,sixresultedin
notguiltyfindings,fiveresultedinsometypeofguiltydisposition,andtheremaining
allegationresultedinanolocontendere(nocontest)plea.
Figure16:LifecyclesoftheChargesandSpecificationsAllegationsProsecutedbyAPU
investigations,orwhen,intheinstanceofanofficerwithnodisciplinaryhistoryorpriorsubstantiated[CCRB]
complaints,basedonsuchanofficersrecordanddisciplinaryhistorytheinterestsofjusticewouldnotbeserved.
80
Thisnumberexcludestwoallegationsthatwereclosedadministrativelyasthestatuteoflimitationsexpired.
53
OCTOBER2015
i.
MeasuringthePenalty
ItiscurrentlyimpossibleforOIGNYPDtodeterminehowmuchanofficerispunished
whentherearemultipleallegationsagainsttheofficer.InthepaperworkproducedbyDAO,
finaldispositionscombineallpenaltiesintoasinglepenalty.Asaresult,itcannotbe
determinedhowmuchofthesanctioncanbeattributedtoeachdistinctcharge.81
Forexample,inonecaseOIGNYPDreviewedforthisReport,anofficerfacedonecount
forpunchingacomplainant,fourcountsforunlawfulstops,andonecountforanunlawful
arrest.Theofficerpleadnolocontenderetothechargesandreceivedapenaltyof30vacation
days.InthecasefileproducedbyDAO,itisimpossibletodeterminehowmanydayswere
leviedspecificallyforthepunch.
Determiningtheadequacyofpunishmentisalwaysgoingtodependonthefactsofa
givencase,butfailingtomakecleartheweightofaparticularinstanceofmisconduct
confoundsreviewerslookingtodetermineadequacyofpunishmentandactivelyhampersthe
abilityofofficerstounderstandthecostbreakdownofparticularinstancesofmisconduct.
Furtherfrustratingtheprocessisdeterminingtheextenttowhichanofficersplacement
onforcemonitoringmayimpactthesanction.WhileNYPDhasaccesstoavarietyof
information,rangingfromthesubjectofficersdisciplinaryrecordsandCCRBhistorytotheir
commandingofficersevaluation,itisnotpossibletodeterminehowmuchweight,ifany,NYPD
placedonanyofthesesourcesofinformationinaparticularcase.82
Forexample,OIGNYPDnotedthatfivesubjectofficersinthecompletedCCRBforce
caseshadalreadybeenplacedonforcemonitoringatthetimetheunderlyingforceallegation
wasreferredtoNYPDforadjudication.Whiletheofficersmonitoringhistorywas
acknowledgedbyNYPD,thesefiveofficersstillreceivednodisciplineforhavingusedexcessive
force.Moreover,withrespecttoChargesandSpecificationcaseshandledbyAPU,NYPD
voluntarilyprovidedAPUwithdataontheofficersproductivity,butmonitoringhistory,an
importantfactorthatmightimpactAPUsdecisiononwhatpenaltytoseek,wasnotprovided
toAPU.
OIGNYPDthereforebelievesthat,asathresholdmatter,eachallegationshouldhaveits
specificpenaltysetforthinNYPDdocumentssothateveryindividualinstanceofmisconduct
canbemeasured.Oncetheactualweightismeasured,theadequacyofthepenaltycanbe
determined.Additionally,whileNYPDnoteswhichfactorswereconsideredinarrivingata
penalty,NYPDshouldalsoexplicitlyindicatehowmuchweight,ifany,wasgiventoanyofthese
81
ItisunclearfromareviewofthedisciplinarydocumentswhetherNYPDdisaggregatesthepenaltyimposedon
DAOdocumentsandonlyaggregatesthemonfinaldispositiondocuments.Asitstands,OIGNYPDisunableto
measureuniquepenaltiesforeachallegation,basedonthedocumentationprovidedbyNYPD.
82
NYPDmaintainsaCentralPersonnelIndex(CPI)foreachofficer,whichcontainsinformationsuchasdisciplinary
history,monitoringhistory,andwhethertheofficerhasbeenanameddefendantinacivillawsuit.
54
OCTOBER2015
factors.Lastly,theDepartmentshouldstudywhetherthedisciplineitimposesisactually
reducingoccurrencesofexcessiveforceandachievingthedesireddeterrenteffect.
c. ChangesinHowCCRBandNYPDWorkTogether
BecauseOIGNYPDssamplewascomprisedofsubstantiatedCCRBforcecasesfrom
2010through2014,itisimportanttoacknowledgethattherewerethreechangesinhowCCRB
caseswerehandledbyNYPDduringthattimeperiod:
1) SinceApril11,2013,APUhasbeenprosecutingCCRBcasesdirectlyinNYPDsTrial
Room.Priortothatdate,DAOprosecutedallsubstantiatedCCRBcases.
2) SinceApril11,2013,thePoliceCommissionerisrequiredtoprovide,inwriting,an
explanationincaseswhereCCRBrecommendedthatChargesandSpecificationsbe
imposed,andNYPDdeparteddownwardfromCCRBsrecommendations.
3) SinceDecember2014,DAOmayrequestthatCCRBreopenandreconsiderthe
dispositionorpenaltyrecommendationofacase.DAOmayprovideadditionallegalor
factualinformationtobetakenintoaccountinthereconsiderationprocess.
i.
RequirementtoProvideWrittenExplanationforDownwardDepartures
OIGNYPDsinvestigationrevealedanumberofcasesinwhichthePoliceCommissioner
didnotprovideanywrittenexplanationfordownwarddepartures.AsnotedintheChokehold
Report,thePoliceCommissionerwasundernoobligationtogiveanysuchexplanationuntil
April11,2013,pursuanttotheRulesoftheCityofNewYork,Title38A,Chapter1,146(f)
(RulesoftheCCRB).83CityruleshavesincerequiredthePoliceCommissionertoprovide
somemeasureoftransparencyconcerningdisciplinarydecisionsinCCRBcases.Putsimply,
whilethePoliceCommissionerstillhasfullauthorityanddiscretiontoimposediscipline
deemedappropriate,theCommissionermustnowanswerforthosedisciplinarydecisionsin
certaincasesbyprovidingreasonsforanydownwarddeparturefromadisciplinedetermination
recommendedbyCCRB.ThisrequirementwasadoptedfollowingtheentryofaMemorandum
ofUnderstanding(MOU)betweenNYPDandCCRBandappliestocasesinwhichtheallegation
hasbeensubstantiatedagainstanofficerandwheretheBoardrecommendsthatformal
ChargesandSpecificationsbebroughtagainstsuchofficer.84
AsseeninFigure17,ofthe104substantiatedallegationsreviewedthatwereaffected
bytheMOU,CCRBrecommendedChargesandSpecificationsin28instances.Ofthese28
ChargesandSpecificationsrecommendations,eightweremadein2013.ThePolice
CommissionerupheldChargesandSpecificationsintwoofthoseeightinstances,anddeparted
downwardfromCCRBsdisciplinaryrecommendationsofChargesandSpecificationsinthe
83
RulesoftheCityofNewYork,Title38A,Chapter1,146(f).
Id.at141(a).
84
55
OCTOBER2015
othersix.ThePoliceCommissionerdidnotprovideawrittenexplanationforanyofthese
departures.InthecasesdecidedbythePoliceCommissionersinceJanuary1,2014,CCRB
recommendedChargesandSpecificationsin20instances.ThePoliceCommissionerupheld
CCRBsrecommendationsallofthoseinstances.85
Figure17:FailuretoProvideWrittenExplanation/ObligationtoProvideWrittenExplanation
UnderCCRB/NYPDMOU
TimePeriod
Allegationswhere
Allegationswhere
PoliceCommissioner
CCRB
DepartedDownward
Recommended
andwasObligated
Chargesand
Specificationssince toProvideWritten
Explanation
CCRBMOU
8
28.6%
6
100%
20
71.4%
0
0%
28
100%
6
100%
2013
20142015
Total
ii.
Reconsideration
Written
Explanations
Provided
0%
0%
OnDecember10,2014,pursuantto155(b)oftheRulesoftheCCRB,thatagency
reviseditsReconsiderationorReopeningofCasesprocessandadoptedanewprotocol
wherebyNYPD,throughDAO,cannowrequestinwritingthatCCRBreconsiderthedisposition
and/orpenaltyrecommendationofaCCRBdecision.86Uponreceiptofthiswrittenrequest,
CCRBmayreconsiderorreopenthecaseif:
1) ThepenaltyrecommendedforthecasebythedecidingpanelorFullBoardagainst
anysubjectofficerisfoundbytheFullBoardtobeinappropriateorexcessive;or
2) Thereexistnewfactsorevidencethatwerenotpreviouslyknownbythedeciding
panelorFullBoardwhichcouldreasonablyleadtoadifferentfindingor
recommendationinthecase;or
3) Therearemattersoffactorlawwhicharefoundtohavebeenoverlookedor
misapprehendedbythedecidingpanelorFullBoard.
RulesofCCRB,155(b).
85
ThiscountexcludestheonecaseinwhichCCRBreverseditsowndeterminationoftheallegationfrom
substantiatedtounsubstantiateduponreviewofNYPDsrequestforreconsideration.Inthiscase,thePolice
CommissionerimposednodisciplinaryactionbecauseCCRBultimatelyunsubstantiatedtheallegation.
86
Statisticalinformationregardinguseofreconsiderationfrom2013through2015canbefoundonCCRBs
website.CCRB,ReconsiderationAnalysis(July8,2015),http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/report
casereconsiderationanalysis20150708.pdf(lastvisitedSeptember8,2015).
56
OCTOBER2015
AllrequestsforreconsiderationmustbesenttoCCRBwithin30daysofCCRBsinitial
findingsandrecommendations.IfCCRBchoosestorereviewthecase,thecaseisrepresented
tothepanelthatinitiallyvotedtosubstantiatethecasewiththeadditionofDAOsfactualor
legalinformation.TheCCRBpanelthenreviewsandrevotesonthedispositionofthecase.If
CCRBdeclinestorereviewthecase,CCRBmuststateitsreasons.87Thisprocess,accordingto
CCRB,wouldallowforcorrectingmistakendecisionsorpenaltiesandachievinganewlevelof
respectforCCRBdecisions.
Sincethenewreconsiderationprocesswentintoeffect,ratherthandepartdownward
fromCCRBsdisciplinaryrecommendations,NYPDhassentmorecasesbackfor
reconsideration.88Thisprocesshasaffordedbothagenciestheopportunitytoincreasetheir
collaborationregardingthedisciplinaryprocess.WhileCCRBandNYPDarearrivingatmore
harmoniousdecisions,OIGNYPDhasnotyetreviewedthefulleffectsofthenew
reconsiderationprocess.AsrecentlynotedbyCCRBinitssemiannualreport,DAOhas
increaseditsrateofagreementwiththeBoardsrecommendationsbothforsubstantiations
andfordiscipline.89Also,accordingtoCCRB,DAOhasgivenmoredeferencetotheCCRB
process,resultinginrecordhighimplementationof[CCRBs]recommendations.90
87
CCRBhasnotedthatitisassigninglawyerstotheBoardsreconsiderationpanelstodraftmemostobesentback
toDAOexplainingthepanelsdecisiononreconsideration.
88
NYPDrequestedreconsiderationinsevenofthe179substantiatedforcecasesreviewedbyOIGNYPDforthis
Report.Twocasesinvolvedreconsiderationofnonforceallegations.Oftheremainingfive,thepanelreversedits
dispositionontheforceallegationsintwocasesandrefusedtoalteritsdispositiononthethird.APUagreedto
settletoalesserpenaltyonthefourthcaseandDAOdeclinedprosecutiononthefifthcasewhileitwaspending
reconsideration.ExcludedfromOIGNYPDsreviewofthe179substantiatedforcecasesinvolvedacasewhereby
thepanelinitiallyunsubstantiatedtheforceallegationbutthenreverseditsdecisionafterNYPDsrequestfor
reconsiderationonnonforceallegations.
89
NEWYORKCITYCIVILIANCOMPLAINTREVIEWBD.,SEMIANNUALREPORTJANUARYJUNE2015(2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2015SemiAnnualReportWeb.pdf.
90
Id.at24.
57
OCTOBER2015
VIII.
Recommendations
OIGNYPDsrecommendationsaredesignedtoimproveNYPDstrackingofforcedata
andtocurbexcessiveforcethroughbettertrainingandenhancedaccountabilityofthe
disciplinarysystem.Therecommendationsbelowareorganizedwithrespecttofourmajor
areasinvolvingNYPDspoliciesandpracticesgoverningofficersuseofforce.Theseareas
relatetoNYPDs:(1)useofforcepolicy;(2)reportinganddocumentationmechanismsforuse
offorce;(3)trainingonforceanddeescalation;and(4)disciplinarysystem.91
A.USEOFFORCEPOLICY
Trackingtheuseofforcebypoliceofficersfirstrequiresdefiningwhatismeantby
force,excessiveforce,anddeadlyforce.ThecurrentNYPDPatrolGuidecontainsno
definitionofforce.WhilePatrolGuide20311providesbroadprinciplesdeclaringthatforce
mustbelimitedtowhatisnecessaryunderthecircumstances,theguidedoesnotclarifywhat
actionsconstituteforce.Likewise,PatrolGuide20311statesinhighlightedlanguagethat
EXCESSIVEFORCEWILLNOTBETOLERATED,butthePatrolGuidedoesnotdefineorclarify
whatismeantbyexcessiveforce.WhilethePatrolGuidecontainsaseparatesectionon
DeadlyPhysicalForcewithclear,delineatedinstructionsonwhendeadlyforceispermitted
andwhenfirearmsuseisprohibited,PatrolGuide20312doesnotdefinewhatconstitutes
deadlyphysicalforce.
TheNYPDPatrolGuideisrelativelysilentondeescalation,atacticwhichhasseen
greateradoptionnationwideandwhichOIGNYPDbelievesshouldberequiredinallencounters
whereappropriate.
1. TheNYPDPatrolGuideshouldincludedefinitionallanguagethatprovidesofficersand
thepublicwithgreaterclarityregardingwhatismeantbyforce,excessiveforce,
anddeadlyphysicalforce.
2. NYPDshouldupdatePatrolGuide20311governinguseofforceandrequireofficers
todeescalateallencounterswhereappropriate.
91
Aspreviouslymentioned,NYPDiscurrentlycontemplatingrevisionstothePatrolGuidewhichareexpectedto
includechangestotheDepartmentsuseofforcepoliciesandprocedures,includingthetrackingandreportingof
forceincidents.
58
OCTOBER2015
B.REPORTINGANDDOCUMENTATION
NYPDcurrentlydoesnothaveaseparate,centralized,andmandatoryuseofforceform
fordocumentingwhenphysicalforcehasbeenused.Instead,theDepartmenthasavarietyof
formsanddocumentsthatofficersarerequiredtocompletedependingontheincident.This
patchworksetofforms,designedtotrackotherdata,doesnotcapturetheentireuniverseof
forcecases.OIGNYPDsreviewof179CCRBforcecasesfurtherrevealedthatofficersdidnot
alwaysdocumentwhenforcewasusedand,whenforcewasdocumented,thepaperworkwas
ofteneitherinadequateorinaccurate.Becauseofthelackofadequatereporting,thereislikely
tobecurrentunderreportingofforceencountersbyofficers.
Tohelpensurebetteraccountability,NYPDmustdevelopclearpoliciesthatrequirethe
documentationofuseofforcebyallofficersinvolvedinanincident.Suchapolicymustprovide
sufficientguidancetoofficersonhowtoreportforceandwhatinformationthereportmust
contain,includingarequirementthatofficersspecifywithparticularitythekindofforceused
andtheresistancetheymayhaveencountered.Aseparateuseofforceformwouldcapture
thesalientandrelevantdetailsinacomprehensiveandthoroughmanner.
Finally,becauseoftheimportanceofuseofforceissues,NYPDshouldcollect,analyze,
andpublishcomprehensivedataontheissueinordertoimproveitspoliciesandprocedures
andeducatethepublicabouthowandwhenofficersdeployforce.
3. NYPDshouldcreateaseparate,uniformuseofforcereportingform.
4. Withrespecttothenewlycreatedform,NYPDshouldrequireallofficerswhether
thesubjectofaforceinvestigationorawitnesstoauseofforcetodocumentand
reportallforceincidents.Whencompletingthisdocument,officersshoulduse
descriptivelanguagetoarticulatetheeventsleadinguptotheuseofforcein
encounterswiththepublic,thereasonwhytheforcewasused,andthelevelandtype
offorceused.
5. NYPDshouldcreateadatabasetotrackcomprehensiveDepartmentwideinformation
onuseofforce,includingdatacompiledfromtheuseofforceforms.
6. NYPDshouldcompiledataandpublish,onanannualbasis,areportaddressing
Departmentwidemetricsonuseofforce,includingbutnotlimitedtoinformation
fromthenewuseofforcereportingform.Thisreportwouldtrackandcollectvarious
componentsrelatedtotheissueofuseofforce,includingthoseaddressedinthis
Report,suchasofficertenure,assignments,age,typeofforceused,pertinent
informationregardingmembersofthepublicsubjectedtoforce,aswellasofficer
injuries,disciplinarytrendsandoutcomes,andotherdatadeemednecessaryfora
comprehensiveunderstandingoftheissue.
59
OCTOBER2015
C.TRAINING
Deescalationpoliciesandtacticshavethepotentialtogreatlymitigatetheuseof
excessiveforcebypoliceofficers.Deescalationtacticshaveaproventrackrecordofnotonly
limitingforce,butensuringofficersafety.OIGNYPDsreview,however,revealedthereistoo
littlefocusondeescalationduringNYPDstrainingsessions.TheDepartmentspendsonlya
portionofafourandahalfhourcourseteachingdeescalationlessthanonepercentofthe
468hoursofclassroominstruction.ThereiscurrentlynoAcademycoursespecificallydevoted
tolearningandpracticingdeescalationtechniques.Thereisalsoaclearneedtotrainofficers
tointerveneinsituationswheretheywitnessfellowofficersengaginginmisconduct.
Furthermore,improvementscanbemadewithrespecttohowstudentsareevaluated.
WrittenexamswhichconstitutethebulkofAcademytestingshouldbepairedwithpractical,
scenariobasedexamswhichallowstudentstodemonstratetheskillstheyhavelearned.Such
scenariobasedexamsshouldbeincorporatedintotheAcademysoverallevaluationofthe
studentifNYPDistopreparerecruitsforthetypesofencounterstheywillfaceeverydayon
thejob.
7. NYPDtrainingshouldplaceastrongerandmorethoroughemphasisondeescalation
tacticsandphilosophy,byaddingspecificPoliceAcademyandinservicecourseson
deescalationthatincorporatebothclassroomandscenariobasedtraining.
8. NYPDshouldincorporateaformalevaluationsystemforallscenariobasedtrainings
concerningtheuseofforce.
9. NYPDshouldincreasefundingandpersonnelatthePoliceAcademywithrespectto
trainingforbothrecruitsandinserviceofficers.
10. NYPDshouldimplementtrainingtoinstructofficerstointerveneinsituationswhere
otherofficersescalateencounters,useexcessiveforce,and/orcommitother
misconduct.
11. NYPDshouldreviewuseofforcetrendstoidentifywhichcategoriesofofficers(e.g.,
byyearsofserviceand/ordutyassignments)aremostinneedofdeescalationand
useofforceinservicetraining,andthenimplementsuchinstruction.
60
OCTOBER2015
D.DISCIPLINE
MonitoringNYPDsdisciplinarysystemiscomplicatedbyaninabilitytoprecisely
measuretheadequacyofsanctions.Becausedisciplinaryrecommendationsandfinal
dispositionscombinealldisciplinarydispositionsintoasinglepenaltyinthepaperwork
producedbyDAO,itisimpossibletodeterminehowmuchofthesanctioncanbeattributedto
eachdistinctcharge.
Furtherconfoundingtheprocessisdeterminingtheextenttowhichanofficers
placementonforcemonitoringmayimpactthesanction.WhileNYPDhasaccesstoavarietyof
informationrangingfromsubjectofficersdisciplinaryrecordsandCCRBhistoriestotheir
commandingofficersevaluation,itisnotpossibletodeterminehowmuchweight,ifany,NYPD
placesonanyofthesesourcesofinformationinaparticularcase.
OIGNYPDthereforebelievesthat,asathresholdmatter,eachallegationshouldhaveits
specificpenaltysetforthinNYPDdocumentssothateachindividualinstanceofmisconductcan
bemeasured.Oncetheactualweightoftheinfractionismeasured,theadequacyofapenalty
canbedetermined.Additionally,whileNYPDnoteswhichfactorswereconsideredinarrivingat
apenalty,NYPDshouldalsoexplicitlyindicatehowmuchweight,ifany,wasgiventoanyof
thesefactors.Lastly,NYPDshouldstudywhetherthedisciplineitimposesisactuallyreducing
occurrencesofexcessiveforceandachievingthedesireddeterrenteffect.
12. Indisciplinarycaseswheretherearemultipledisciplinarycounts,eachcountshould
haveanaccompanying,distinctpenalty,asopposedtoanaggregatedpenaltyforall
counts.
13. NYPDshouldcollect,review,andcomparedataregardingdisciplinarypenalties
imposedinuseofforcecasesandreportontheeffectsofdisciplinarypenaltiesonthe
frequencyofincidentsofexcessiveforce.NYPDshouldpublishdatainthepreviously
mentionedannualreport(Recommendation#6)onthenumberandpercentageof
casesinwhichthePoliceCommissionerreducesordeclinesdiscipline.
14. NYPDshouldsetforth,inwriting,initsdisciplinarypaperworktheextenttowhichan
officersplacementonforcemonitoringhasorhasnotimpactedthepenaltyimposed.
15. NYPDshouldshareasubjectofficersforcemonitoringhistorywithCCRBs
AdministrativeProsecutionUnit(APU)sincethisinformationisacriticalelementthat
mustbetakenintoconsiderationwhenCCRBrecommendspenalties.
61
OCTOBER2015
Pleasecontactusat:
OfficeoftheInspectorGeneralfortheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment
NewYorkCityDepartmentofInvestigation
80MaidenLane
NewYork,NY10038
Telephone:(212)8065200
www.nyc.gov/oignypd
Forgeneralinquiries,pleaseemailinquiry@oignypd.nyc.gov
ForOIGNYPDsPressOffice,pleasecall(212)8065225oremailpress@oignypd.nyc.gov
ForOIGNYPDsCommunityOutreachUnit,pleasecall(212)8065234oremail
communityoutreach@oignypd.nyc.gov
62
APPENDIX A
NYPD Patrol Guide Procedures
PATROL GUIDE
Section: General Regulations
Procedure No:
203-11
USE OF FORCE
DATE ISSUED:
08/01/13
USE OF FORCE
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
1 of 2
All uniformed members of the service are responsible and accountable for the
proper use of force under appropriate circumstances. Members of the service are
reminded that the application of force must be consistent with existing law and
with New York City Police Department Values, by which we pledge to value
human life and respect the dignity of each individual. Depending upon the
circumstances, both federal and state laws provide for criminal sanctions and
civil liability against uniformed members of the service, when force is deemed
excessive, wrongful or improperly applied.
The primary duty of all members of the service is to preserve human life. Only
that amount of force necessary to overcome resistance will be used to effect an
arrest or take a mentally ill or emotionally disturbed person into custody. Deadly
physical force will be used ONLY as a last resort and consistent with Department
policy and the law.
At the scene of a police incident, many members of the service may be present
and some members may not be directly involved in taking police actions.
However, this does not relieve any member present of the obligation to ensure
that the requirements of the law and Department regulations are complied with.
Members of the service are required to maintain control or intervene if the use of
force against a subject clearly becomes excessive. Failure to do so may result in
both criminal and civil liability. EXCESSIVE FORCE WILL NOT BE
TOLERATED.
All members of the service at the scene of a police incident must:
a.
Immediately establish firearms control
b.
Use minimum necessary force
c.
Employ non-lethal alternatives, as appropriate.
Members of the New York City Police Department will NOT use chokeholds. A
chokehold shall include, but is not limited to, any pressure to the throat or
windpipe, which may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air.
Whenever it becomes necessary to take a violent or resisting subject into custody,
responding officers should utilize appropriate tactics in a coordinated effort to overcome
resistance (for example see P.G. 216-05, Mentally Ill or Emotionally Disturbed
Persons). The patrol supervisor, if present, should direct and control all activity.
Whenever possible, members should make every effort to avoid tactics, such as sitting or
standing on a subjects chest, which may result in chest compression, thereby reducing
the subjects ability to breathe.
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
203-11
USE OF FORCE
(continued)
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
2 of 2
Persons taken into custody (i.e., arrest, mentally ill, emotionally disturbed, etc.)
shall be rear cuffed at the earliest opportunity to reduce the potential for
resistance, which may cause injuries. In addition, alternate restraining devices
(Velcro straps, mesh restraining blankets, etc.) shall be used, at the earliest
opportunity, to restrain or further restrain a subject whose actions or behavior
may cause injury to himself/herself or others.
After an individual has been controlled and placed under custodial restraint using
handcuffs and other authorized methods, the person should be positioned so as to
promote free breathing. The subject should not be maintained or transported in a
face down position.
The member assuming custody of the subject should closely observe him or her
for any apparent injuries. If the area is dark, a flashlight or other source of
illumination should be used to maintain a clear view of the subject at all times.
If a person appears to be having difficulty breathing or is otherwise
demonstrating life-threatening symptoms, medical assistance will be requested
immediately. The patrol supervisor will direct that alternate means to maintain
custody be utilized, if appropriate.
The use of restraints to hog-tie (restraining person by connecting or tying rear
cuffed hands to cuffed or shackled ankles or legs) subjects and the transportation
of subjects in a face down position within any vehicle are prohibited.
PATROL GUIDE
Section: General Regulations
Procedure No:
203-12
DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE

DATE ISSUED:
08/01/13
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
1 of 1
The New York City Police Department recognizes the value of all human life and
is committed to respecting the dignity of every individual. The primary duty of
all members of the service is to preserve human life.
DEADLY
PHYSICAL
FORCE
The most serious act in which a police officer can engage is the use of deadly force.
The power to carry and use firearms in the course of public service is an awesome
responsibility. Respect for human life requires that, in all cases, firearms be used as
a last resort, and then only to protect life. Uniformed members of the service should
use only the minimal amount of force necessary to protect human life. Where
feasible, and consistent with personal safety, some warning, such as POLICE DONT MOVE, should be given. Deadly force is never justified in the defense of
property. Above all, the safety of the public and uniformed members of the service
must be the overriding concern whenever the use of firearms is considered.
DEFINITION
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT judgment based not only upon experience as

an individual but taking into account the knowledge, experience, and training
gained through employment as a police officer.
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIREARMS
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF
THE SERVICE
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Police officers shall not use deadly physical force against another person
unless they have probable cause to believe they must protect themselves
or another person present from imminent death or serious physical injury.
Police officers shall not discharge their weapons when, in their professional
judgment, doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons.
Police officers shall not discharge their firearms in defense of property.
Police officers shall not discharge their firearms to subdue a fleeing felon
who presents no threat of imminent death or serious physical injury to
themselves or another person present.
Police officers shall not fire warning shots.
Police officers shall not discharge their firearms to summon assistance
except in emergency situations when someones personal safety is
endangered and unless no other reasonable means is available.
Police officers shall not discharge their firearms at or from a moving
vehicle unless deadly physical force is being used against the police
officer or another person present, by means other than a moving vehicle.
Police officers shall not discharge their firearms at a dog or other animal
except to protect themselves or another person from physical injury and
there is no other reasonable means to eliminate the threat.
Police officers shall not, under any circumstances, cock a firearm.
Firearms must be fired double action at all times.
PATROL GUIDE
Section: Command Operations
Procedure No:
212-95
USE OF PEPPER SPRAY DEVICES

DATE ISSUED:
08/01/13
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
1 of 4
PURPOSE
To inform uniformed members of the service of circumstances under which

pepper spray may be intentionally discharged and to record instances where
pepper spray has been discharged, intentionally or accidentally.
SCOPE
Use of Oleoresin Capsicum (O.C.) pepper spray constitutes physical force under
the New York State Penal Law. Use of pepper spray is proper when used in
accordance with Article 35 of the Penal Law and Department procedures. O.C.
pepper spray may be used when a member reasonably believes it is necessary to
effect an arrest of a resisting suspect, for self-defense or defense of another from
unlawful force, or to take a resisting emotionally disturbed person into custody.
In many cases, pepper spray will reduce or eliminate the need for substantial
physical force to effect an arrest or gain custody. It will often reduce the
potential for injuries to members and suspects that may result from physical
restraint and it should be regarded as a possible alternative to such force and
restraint, where practical. Pepper spray shall not be used in situations that do not
require the use of physical force. O.C. pepper spray may be used in arrest or
custodial restraint situations where physical presence and/or verbal commands
have not been, or would not be, effective in overcoming physical resistance.
PROCEDURE
When necessary to use pepper spray device:
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF
THE SERVICE
1.
2.
Hold pepper spray in an upright position, aim and discharge pepper spray
into a subjects eyes for maximum effectiveness, using two one second
bursts, at a minimum distance of three feet, and only in situations when
the uniformed member of the service reasonably believes that it is
necessary to:
a.
Protect self, or another from unlawful use of force (e.g., assault)
b.
Effect an arrest, or establish physical control of a subject resisting arrest
c.
Establish physical control of a subject attempting to flee from
arrest or custody
d.
Establish physical control of an emotionally disturbed person (EDP)
e.
Control a dangerous animal, by deterring an attack, to prevent
injury to persons or animals present.
Effect arrest of criminal suspect against who pepper spray was used and
charge with crime which initiated use of the pepper spray.
a.
Add resisting arrest charge, when appropriate
b.
P.G. 210-13, Release Of Prisoners - General Procedure will be
complied with if it is determined that arrested person did not
commit the crime or that no crime was committed.
c.
P.G. 216-05, Mentally Ill Or Emotionally Disturbed Persons, will
be complied with, when appropriate.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-95
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
2 of 4
NOTE
Do not use pepper spray on subjects who passively resist (e.g., going limp, offering no
active physical resistance). If possible, avoid using pepper spray on persons who appear
to be in frail health, young children, women believed to be pregnant, or persons with
known respiratory conditions. Avoid discharging pepper spray indiscriminately over a
large area for disorder control. (Members who are specifically trained in the use of
pepper spray for disorder control may use pepper spray in accordance with their training,
and within Department guidelines, and as authorized by supervisors.). In addition, avoid
using O.C. spray in small contained areas such as automobiles and closets.
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF
THE SERVICE
(continued)
3.
4.
5.
6.
NOTE
Request response of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) once the

situation is under control.
a.
Advise person sprayed that EMS is responding.
Remove the subject from the contaminated area and expose to fresh air
while awaiting the arrival of EMS, or transportation to hospital/
stationhouse if tactically feasible.
a.
Determine whether the person sprayed is wearing contact lenses.
(It is strongly recommended that contact lenses be removed as
soon as possible after exposure to O.C. spray.)
Position subject on his/her side or in a sitting position to promote free breathing.
a.
The subject should never be maintained or transported in a face
down position.
b.
Do not sit, stand, or kneel on subjects chest or back.
Provide assistance to subject as follows:
a.
When consistent with members safety, and provided a source of
water is readily available, the uniformed member should flush the
contaminated skin area of a subject with profuse amounts of water.
b.
Repeat flushing at short intervals, if necessary, until symptoms of
distress subside.
c.
Continue flushing the contaminated skin of the subject in custody,
at the stationhouse as needed.
d.
Commence the flushing of a subjects contaminated skin upon
arrival at the stationhouse, if this has not already been done.
Do not rub or touch skin of contaminated person, as the initial effect of pepper spray
does not dissipate for 15 - 20 minutes. Also, do not use salves, creams, ointments,
commercial eye washes or bandages. The desk officer will ensure that all prisoners who
have been sprayed with pepper spray receive appropriate first aid, if needed, upon
arrival at the stationhouse. Desk officers are also responsible for ensuring that
prisoners who have been sprayed with pepper spray are properly observed throughout
the arrest process, and that they receive prompt medical attention if they need or request
it. A Command Log entry will be made stating whether the prisoner has had his/her skin
flushed with water, been examined by EMS, or been transported to the hospital.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-95
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF
THE SERVICE
(continued)
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
7.
8.
9.
3 of 4
Transport prisoner immediately to the emergency room of the nearest

hospital if he/she is demonstrating difficulty breathing, or exhibiting signs
of severe stress, hyperventilation etc.
a.
Windows of transport vehicle should be kept open
b.
Members who come in contact with persons who have been exposed
to pepper spray must thoroughly wash their hands afterward and
avoid having any contaminated clothing make contact with their face
c.
Advise hospital staff that pepper spray has been used on prisoner.
Prepare ON LINE BOOKING SYSTEM ARREST WORKSHEET (PD
244-159) and MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PRISONER (PD 244-150)
in arrest situations.
Complete the AIDED REPORT WORKSHEET (PD 304-152b) in nonarrest situations, e.g. EDP, and:
a.
Check box O.C. Spray Used
b.
Enter rank, name, and tax registry number, of each MOS who
discharged spray in the Details caption
c.
List the time, doctors name, and diagnosis under Details
caption, when applicable.
COMMANDING 10.
OFFICER,
M.I.S.D.
Provide a quarterly printout of all arrest and aided incidents where pepper spray
was discharged to the commanding officer, Firearms and Tactics Section.
COMMANDING 11.
OFFICER,
FIREARMS
AND TACTICS
SECTION
Analyze situations where O.C. spray was employed to evaluate its

effectiveness.
a.
As appropriate, modify existing training/tactics relative to the use
of pepper spray.
ADDITIONAL
DATA
The only pepper spray authorized for use is the type issued to all uniformed members
through the Firearms and Tactics Section.
In order to maintain the effectiveness of the spray, it is recommended that the device be
shaken at the start of each tour. Carrying the pepper spray device during normal patrol
duty should be sufficient to keep the solution thoroughly mixed.
Pepper spray will not automatically stop all subjects, and even when it does
incapacitate, the effects are temporary. Members should therefore be ready to use other
appropriate force options and tactics.
When performing duty in uniform, the pepper spray shall be carried in its holster attached
to the non-shooting side of the gun belt. When performing enforcement duty in civilian
clothes the pepper spray must be carried, in the holster attached either to a belt or in
another appropriate manner. Undercover members may opt not to carry the pepper spray.
Members of the service may carry the pepper spray device during off duty hours.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
212-95
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
4 of 4
RELATED
PROCEDURES
Lost or Damaged Uniform (P.G. 204-07)

Prisoner Requiring Medical/Psychiatric Treatment (P.G. 210-04)
Release of Prisoners - General Procedure (P.G. 210-13)
Hazardous Material (P.G. 212-37)
Hostage/Barricaded Persons (P.G. 212-38)
Aided Cases - General Procedure (P.G. 216-01)
Preparation of Aided Report Worksheet (P.G. 216-02)
Mentally Ill or Emotionally Disturbed Persons (P.G. 216-05)
Loss or Theft of Department Property (P.G. 219-20)
FORMS AND
REPORTS
AIDED REPORT WORKSHEET (PD304-152b)

ON LINE BOOKING SYSTEM ARREST WORKSHEET (PD244-159)
PATROL GUIDE
Section: Command Operations
Procedure No:
212-117
USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICES (CED)

DATE ISSUED:
08/01/13
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
1 of 8
PURPOSE
To inform members of the service of circumstances under which a Conducted Energy

Device (CED) may be intentionally used and to record instances when a Conducted
Energy Device has been used. CEDs will only be used by authorized uniformed members
of the service. Additionally, all patrol supervisors and platoon commanders performing
patrol duty assigned to the Patrol Services, Housing and Transit Bureaus will be required
to carry a CED in a Department issued holster as authorized.
SCOPE
A Conducted Energy Device (CED) can be an effective means of subduing suspects and
emotionally disturbed persons (EDPs) in a safe manner. A CED is classified as a less
lethal device and is intended to augment and provide a greater margin of safety for officers
who might otherwise be forced to physically subdue a dangerous subject. The use of a
CED is within the range of use of less lethal devices such as pepper spray or a baton on the
force continuum due to its effectiveness at a distance and at close range.
A CED should only be used against persons who are actively physically resisting,
exhibiting active physical aggression, or to prevent individuals from physically injuring
themselves or other person(s) actually present. In many cases, a CED will reduce or
eliminate the need for deadly physical force. It will often reduce the potential for injuries
to members and suspects that may result from physical restraint and should be regarded as
a possible alternative to such force and restraint, where practical. It is prohibited to use a
CED in situations that do not require the use of physical force.
DEFINITIONS
CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICE (CED) - a device primarily designed to disrupt a

subjects central nervous system by means of using electrical energy sufficient to cause
uncontrolled muscle contractions and override an individuals motor responses.
ACTIVATE (ACTIVATION) To cause the CED to arm by releasing the safety,
thereby causing the CED laser sight to operate.
CARTRIDGE a replaceable cartridge which discharges two darts on connecting
wires sending a high voltage/low current signal into a subject.
DARTS probes that are discharged from a CED and are designed to penetrate
the skin; wires are attached to the probes leading back to the CED.
DISCHARGE To activate a CED, depress the trigger and cause an electric
current to flow. Discharge will result in arcing (no cartridge is present) or darts
being fired (cartridge is present).
TOUCH STUN To use the CED and discharge the device in a manner such that the
hand-held unit makes direct contact with an intended subjects body. Touch stun mode
should only be used in exceptional circumstances and not as a primary method of use.
Therefore, when touch stun mode is used, an investigation will be conducted by the
commanding officer/duty captain to determine if the CED was properly used.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-117
DEFINITIONS
(continued)
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
2 of 8
AUTHORIZED UNIFORMED MEMBER OF THE SERVICE A uniformed

member of the service who has received authorized Department training in the
use of the CED.
INVESTIGATING SUPERVISOR - As used in this procedure will be as follows:
a.
b.
The next highest ranking supervisor in the chain of command of the

member who discharged the CED,
The commanding officer/duty captain for instances of touch stun incidents, when
CED is used on a person in police custody or an accidental discharge of a CED
has occurred resulting in an injury to any person.
NOTE
If the investigating supervisor is from a command other than Patrol Services Bureau,
Housing Bureau or Transit Bureau and is not available, the investigating supervisor will
be the next higher ranking supervisor from the Patrol Services Bureau. (e.g., If a
sergeant assigned to a Highway Unit discharges a CED and a lieutenant is unavailable
from that Unit to investigate the discharge, a PSB lieutenant or duty captain will
conduct the investigation.)
PROCEDURE
To provide for control, accountability, issuance, use and investigation of the use
of Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs):
COMMANDING 1.
OFFICER
2.
3.
NOTE
Designate a secure area under the control of the desk officer or

appropriate supervisor for the storage of CEDs and cartridges.
Ensure availability, operability, and distribution of CEDs assigned to the
command on all tours.
Ensure that all supervisors performing patrol duties in the command are
trained in the use of CEDs.
a.
ONLY authorized uniformed members of the service will be assigned
to carry CEDs.
When requesting a replacement or loaner of a CED, replacement of batteries, chargers,

or holsters, commanding officers are required to prepare and deliver a Typed
Letterhead with item(s) needing replacement, to the Commanding Officer, Firearms and
Tactics Section.
When requesting replacement cartridges, commanding officers shall prepare and deliver
a Typed Letterhead to the Commanding Officer, Firearms and Tactics Section and shall
attach a copy of the related LESS LETHAL/RESCUE EQUIPMENT USE REPORT
(PD 320-151).
DESK OFFICER/
UNIT
SUPERVISOR
4.
Account for all CEDs and cartridges assigned to the command at the
commencement of each tour.
a.
Make a Command Log entry, include serial numbers.
b.
Commands that do not maintain a Command Log will account
for CEDs and cartridges in an appropriate Department log.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-117
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
3 of 8
DESK OFFICER/
UNIT
SUPERVISOR
(continued)
5.
NOTE
If available, additional CEDs may be assigned to other authorized uniformed members of the
service throughout the tour as determined by the commanding officer.
6.
7.
8.
Assign CEDs to authorized uniformed members of the service on each tour taking
into account the following:
a.
At least one operable CED must be assigned to a patrol supervisor and/or
platoon commander performing patrol duty at all times.
b.
One operable CED must be maintained at the desk.
Indicate rank, name, shield number/tax number, as applicable, of

assigned member(s) in the Command Log.
a.
Make entry on roll call, identifying member(s) assigned a CED for tour.
b.
Place notation CED next to the name of member(s) assigned a CED.
Ensure CEDs, without cartridge attached, are connected to charger, if
appropriate, while unassigned.
Notify commanding officer when CED is inoperable.
AUTHORIZED
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF THE
SERVICE/
PATROL
SUPERVISOR/
PLATOON
COMMANDER
9.
NOTE
Only conducted energy devices authorized by the Commanding Officer, Firearms and Tactics
Section will be carried by members of the service. Carrying or use of any other unauthorized
conducted energy device may result in disciplinary action.
10.
NOTE
Carry CED only when trained by the Firearms and Tactics Section.
a.
CED must be carried on the non-shooting side, in a Department
approved holster, attached to gunbelt, and secured to person.
b.
Emergency Services Unit and uniformed personnel, performing duty
in civilian attire, will carry CED in a holster approved by Commanding
Officer, Firearms and Tactics Section and Commanding Officer, Special
Operations Division, as appropriate.
Inspect CED to ensure operability.

a.
Point CED in safe direction
b.
Remove cartridge from CED
c.
Release the safety (place safety in off position)
d.
Ensure the laser is visible and that the battery status light
indicates device is energized
e.
Conduct spark test
f.
Replace battery if either laser is not visible, battery status light does not
operate or if spark test results confirm a weak battery
g.
Re-inspect CED unit after battery pack is replaced
h.
Engage safety
i.
Attach cartridge to CED.
Cartridges must be removed and secured away from the CED prior to conducting an inspection.
Accidental discharges resulting in injuries may occur if a cartridge is left attached to the CED while
conducting an inspection.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-117
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
4 of 8
NOTE
(continued)
Members are reminded that each discharge is registered on the CEDs internal memory that
records the date and time of each discharge. Therefore, whenever a CED is discharged (including a
spark test to ensure operability or an accidental discharge), such discharge must be recorded in the
members ACTIVITY LOG (PD112-145), INVESTIGATORS DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT
(PD439-156), Command Log or other appropriate Department record.
AUTHORIZED
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF THE
SERVICE/
PATROL
SUPERVISOR/
PLATOON
COMMANDER
11.
12.
13.
Inform desk officer/supervisor if the CED does not operate subsequent to

battery replacement, is inoperable, or requires repair/replacement.
Make ACTIVITY LOG entry and include:
a.
Results of inspection
b.
Serial number of CED
c.
Name of desk officer/supervisor notified if CED is inoperable.
Return CED to desk officer upon completion of tour.
USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICE (CED)

AUTHORIZED
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF THE
SERVICE/
PATROL
SUPERVISOR/
PLATOON
COMMANDER
14.
15.
NOTE
CEDs should only be used against persons who are actively physically resisting,
exhibiting active physical aggression or to prevent individuals from physically injuring
themselves or other person(s) actually present. Members of the service are reminded of
the availability of Emergency Service Unit.
16.
NOTE
Assess situation and determine if the use of a CED would be appropriate.

Consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding the minimum
amount of force necessary to overcome resistance when effecting an
arrest or when taking mentally ill or an emotionally disturbed person into
custody. Some factors to consider when determining the appropriate use
of force include but are not limited to:
a.
officer/subject size disparity
b.
officer/subject strength disparity
c.
officer/subject age disparity
d.
officers perception of the subjects willingness to resist
e.
officers perception of the immediate threat to the subject,
members of the service and bystanders
f.
suspects violent history, if known
g.
officers location is a hostile environment
h.
officers perception of the subject being under the influence of a
stimulant/narcotic which would effect pain tolerance and violence.
Issue an appropriate warning, consistent with personal safety, to the

intended subject and other members of the service present prior to
discharging the CED.
The recommended point of aim is lower center mass for frontal discharges (below the
chest) and below the neck area for discharges at a suspects back. Avoid discharging at
an individuals head, neck and chest, if possible. When practical, discharge the CED at
the subjects back. The CED should not be intentionally aimed at an individuals groin.
Members will not discharge two CEDs simultaneously on a subject.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-117
NOTE
(continued)
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
5 of 8
When a CED is used against a subject it shall be for one standard discharge cycle and
the member using the CED must then reassess the situation. Only the minimum number
of cycles necessary to place the subject in custody shall be used. In no situation will
more than three standard discharge cycles be used against any subject. Members are
reminded of other appropriate force options should the CED fail.
It is strictly prohibited to use the CED on persons as a form of coercion or punishment and on
persons who passively resist (e.g., going limp, offering no active physical resistance).
When possible, the CED should not be used on children, the elderly, obviously pregnant females,
the frail, against subjects operating or riding on any moving device or vehicle (e.g., motorists,
bicyclists, skateboarders) where the subject may fall while it is in motion or in situations where the
subject may fall from an elevated surface.
The CED should not be used when combustible gases or flammable liquids are present.
AUTHORIZED
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF THE
SERVICE/
PATROL
SUPERVISOR/
PLATOON
COMMANDER
(continued)
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
NOTE
Restrain individual, and secure CED.

a.
Effect arrest of criminal suspect against whom CED was used.
b.
Comply with P.G. 210-13, Release of Prisoner General Procedure
if arrested person did not commit the crime or no crime was
committed.
c.
Comply with P.G. 216-05, Mentally Ill or Emotionally
Disturbed Persons, when appropriate.
Request response of FDNY Emergency Medical Service (EMS), if person
received a CED discharge.
a.
Any person who has been struck by a CED dart or who has had a CED
used on him or her in touch stun mode must be examined at a medical
facility.
Render reasonable aid as necessary.
Break the CED wire by hand approximately four to six inches from the dart,
taking into account the circumstances including the status of the subject.
a.
Any dart that has penetrated the skin of any person will only be removed
by medical personnel.
Safeguard CED cartridge.
If a CED was discharged and the darts did not make any contact with the subject (e.g., skin,
clothing, etc.), the wire connecting the dart to the cartridge may be broken by hand. The dart
portion shall be disposed of in a sharps container and the spent cartridge may be disposed of in
the trash and not vouchered. An investigation will still be conducted by the investigating supervisor
regarding the use of the CED.
Spent CED cartridges used by Emergency Service Unit personnel will be safeguarded and
vouchered, when appropriate, by the command of record for the subject on whom the CED
was used.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-117
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
DESK OFFICER/
PATROL
SUPERVISOR/
PLATOON
COMMANDER/
UNIT
SUPERVISOR
22.
23.
ASSIGNED
UNIFORMED
MEMBER OF
THE SERVICE
26.
24.
25.
27.
28.
29.
30.
6 of 8
Request response of investigating supervisor.

Identify witnesses and record names in ACTIVITY LOG,
INVESTIGATORS DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT or Command Log
as appropriate.
Assign member of the service to ride in body of ambulance with prisoner
or aided.
Direct member of the service to take photographs of points of contact on
subjects body resulting from CED darts or touch stun.
Inform hospital staff that a CED has been used on the individual.
a.
Record name of person notified in ACTIVITY LOG.
Photograph points of contact on subjects body resulting from CED darts or
touch stun.
a.
Photos should be taken in a manner to maintain the subjects
privacy, when appropriate (e.g., behind curtain, private room, etc.).
Prepare ON LINE BOOKING SYSTEM ARREST WORKSHEET
(PD244-150) and MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PRISONER (PD
244-150) in arrest situations.
Complete AIDED REPORT WORKSHEET (PD304-152b) in nonarrest situations.
Prepare PROPERTY CLERK INVOICE WORKSHEET (PD521-141a).
a.
Cartridge used will be placed in a Plastic Security Envelope and
delivered to desk officer, include photographs, when applicable.
b.
Ensure PROPERTY CLERK INVOICE number is documented in
appropriate Department forms prepared.
NOTE
Darts will not be vouchered but should be disposed of in a sharps container by

medical personnel. Members of the service should refrain from handling a dart that has
been removed from a subject.
INVESTIGATING
SUPERVISOR
31.
32.
33.
34.
Conduct investigation regarding use of CED.

Notify Firearms and Tactics Section:
a.
Obtain FTS CED Log Number
b.
Enter FTS CED Log Number and name of person notified in
Telephone Record.
Prepare LESS LETHAL/RESCUE EQUIPMENT USE REPORT.
a.
Prepare REPORT when probes are discharged regardless of
whether probes made contact with subject.
b.
Enter FTS CED Log Number on REPORT
c.
Deliver REPORT to commanding officer.
Deliver copies of other reports prepared in connection with CED usage
to commanding officer.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
DATE EFFECTIVE:
212-117
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
COMMANDING 35.
36.
OFFICER/
DUTY
CAPTAIN
37.
38.
COMMANDING 39.
40.
OFFICER,
FIREARMS
41.
AND TACTICS
SECTION
42.
7 of 8
Conduct investigation when required to act as investigating supervisor.

Prepare a Typed Letterhead with results of investigation and include
recommendations (e.g., recommend disciplinary action, retraining, use
was within guidelines, etc.)when:
a.
CED is used in touch stun mode only
b.
Used on a person in police custody
c.
Accidental discharge of a CED has resulted in an injury to any
person.
Attach copy of Typed Letterhead, if prepared, to the completed LESS
LETHAL/RESCUE EQUIPMENT USE REPORT.
Distribute copies of Typed Letterhead, when prepared, and attached
LESS LETHAL/RESCUE EQUIPMENT USE REPORT to the
following:
a.
Chief of Department (THROUGH CHANNELS)
b.
Chief, Internal Affairs Bureau
c.
Bureau Chief concerned
d.
Commanding Officer, Firearm and Tactics Section (DIRECT)
e.
Commanding Officer concerned
44.
Maintain a log /database for CED usage.

Maintain copies of LESS LETHAL/RESCUE EQUIPMENT USE
REPORTS in a binder and input data into database.
Maintain a database of information regarding LESS LETHAL/RESCUE
EQUIPMENT USE REPORTS.
Compile data regarding use and effectiveness of CEDs used by members
of the Department.
Compile a list of CED usage on a monthly basis and forward to the Chief
of Department.
Incorporate relevant information into tactical training.
COMMANDING
OFFICER,
INVESTIGATION
REVIEW
SECTION
45.
Review adequacy of investigations and appropriateness of CED usage.
ADDITIONAL
DATA
If a CED has been seized for investigative purposes, it is the responsibility of the
investigative unit to ensure a notification is made to the Commanding Officer, Firearms
and Tactics Section. Commands which have had a CED seized for investigative
purposes will be responsible for retrieving the CED upon the conclusion of the
investigation.
RELATED
PROCEDURES
Prisoners Requiring Medical/Psychiatric Treatment (P.G. 210-04)

Release of Prisoner General Procedure (P.G. 210-13)
Aided Cases - General Procedure (P.G. 216-01)
Mentally Ill or Emotionally Disturbed Persons (P.G. 216-05)
Invoicing Property General Procedure (P.G. 218-01)
Required Equipment (P.G. 204-09)
Use of Force (P.G. 203-11)
Deadly Physical Force (P.G. 203-12)
43.
PATROL GUIDE
PROCEDURE NUMBER:
212-117
FORMS AND
REPORTS
DATE EFFECTIVE:
REVISION NUMBER:
PAGE:
08/01/13
8 of 8
PROPERTY CLERK INVOICE WORKSHEET (PD521-141A)

AIDED REPORT WORKSHEET (PD 304-152B)
LESS LETHAL/RESCUE EQUIPMENT USE REPORT (PD 320-151)
ON-LINE BOOKING SYSTEM ARREST WORKSHEET (PD 255-159)
MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PRISONER (PD 244-159)
ACTIVITY LOG (PD112-145)
INVESTIGATORS DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT (PD439-156)
Typed Letterhead
APPENDIX B
Overview of Seattle Police Department
Documentation of Force Policy
Overview of Seattle Police Department Documentation of Force Policy

Seattle Police Departments (SPDs) Use of Force policy outlines the elements that must
be included in the use-of-force report for each level of reportable use of force:
For Type I Force, the report must include the name and serial number of the officer
who used force; the names of the other officers or identified witnesses present, an account
of the officers actions in using force, the suspects actions that led to the application of
force, a detailed description of any force and non-force actions used to achieve the law
enforcement objective, and the observed results, and the name of the supervisor screening
the incident.1
For Type II Force, the report must include, the name and serial number of the officer
who used force, the names of other officers, whether or not they used force, and identified
witnesses present, a detailed description of the circumstances, and the valid law enforcement
objective, that led up to the contact with the subject, a detailed description of the
circumstances, and the valid law enforcement objective, that led up to the contact with the
subject, a detailed description of the words, actions or behaviors of the subject that
precipitated the need for force, a detailed description of any force and non-force actions
used, how those actions furthered the intended law enforcement objective, and the observed
results, a detailed description of any force clearly observed being used by other officers
during this incident, a detailed description of any apparent injury to the subject, any
complaint of injury, or the lack of injury, including information regarding any medical aid or
medical evaluation provided, the name and serial number of the sergeant who screened the
incident.2
For Type III Force, rather than provide a written report, if requested to do so, officers
are to participate in an audio-taped interview with the case sergeant and detectives by the
conclusion of their shift, unless exigent circumstances require an extension. The interview is to
include, the name and serial number of the officer who used force, the names of other
officers or identified witnesses present, a detailed description of the circumstances that led
up to the contact with the subject, a detailed description of the words, actions or behaviours
of the subject that precipitated the need for force, a detailed description of any force and
non-force actions used to achieve the law enforcement objective, and the observed results, a
detailed description of any force clearly observed being used by other officers during this
incident, a detailed description of any apparent injury to the subject, any complaint of injury,
or the lack of injury, including information regarding any medical aid or medical evaluation
provided, and the name and serial number of the sergeant who screened the incident.3
1
SEATTLE POLICE DEPT, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, 8.400-POL-1 USE OF FORCE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION
(Effective Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---use-of-force/8400---use-of-forcereporting-and-investigation.
2
Id.
3
Id.
Under this policy, [a]ll uses of force are reportable except for de minimis force, which is
described as [p]hysical interaction meant to separate, guide, and/or control that does not
cause pain or injury.4 For example, using hands or equipment to stop, push back, separate or
escort, the use of compliance holds without the use of sufficient force to cause pain, and
unresisted handcuffing without transient pain.5
4
5
Id.
Id.
APPENDIX C
Overview of Seattle Police Department
De-Escalation Training
Overview of Seattle Police Department De-Escalation Training

Seattle Police Departments (SPD) in-service training program includes a four-hour unit
dedicated to de-escalation, called Tactical De-Escalation. The training unit consists of both a
classroom lecture and hands-on, scenario-based exercises. During the training, cadets learn
how to de-escalate situations with a series of verbal techniques, known as the O.P.E.N.
Model. The techniques are:
1)
2)
3)
4)
O: Open-ended questions;
P: Paraphrasing;
E: Empathy statements; and
N: Next steps.
Officers participate in body language and body positioning exercises and practice the O.P.E.N.
Model in oral de-escalation drills.
SPDs training also includes another tactical de-escalation model, called 3-S. The 3-S
model consists of three steps for officers to take in order to de-escalate an encounter:
1) Scene Control (use techniques to reduce officer and civilian exposure to risk; slow
down events; [employ] trained de-escalation skills to reduce potential escalation;
and perform a threat assessment)
2) Start Suspect Engagement (begin communicating with the suspect)
3) Solution (employ reasonable de-escalation tactics; assess if the suspect can be
arrested or seized without significant escalation of force; and after a verbal
warning, arrest the suspect if necessary.)6
The 3-S model is based on a nationally recognized hostage negotiation force-reduction
model for tactical incidents and was developed to provide patrol officers a streamlined
version of de-escalation to employ in dynamic situations such as traffic stops or tactical
events.7 The 3-S model puts a major emphasis on active listening and extended
communication.
Another portion of SPDs Tactical De-Escalation training teaches officers the 7 Stages of
Escalation, which are:
1) Calm: Person relatively calm / cooperative.
2) Trigger: Person experiences unresolved conflicts. This triggers the persons behavior
to escalate.
3) Agitation: Person increasingly unfocused /upset.
4) Acceleration: Conflict remains unresolved. Person focuses on the conflict.
5) Peak: Person out of control / exhibits severe behavior.
6
7
SEATTLE POLICE DEPT EDUCATION & TRAINING SECTION, TACTICAL DE-ESCALATION 2015 TRAINING PLAN 9 (2015).
Id. at 8.
6) De-escalation: Vents in the peak stage, person displays confusion. Severity of peak
behavior subsides.
7) Recovery: Person displays willingness to participate in activities.
The 7 Stages of Escalation lecture details how escalation levels increase, how to look out
for various aggression triggers, and how tactical de-escalation can lead to a positive outcome in
these incidents.8
Id. at 23-4.
APPENDIX D
Overview of 2012 Memorandum of
Understanding between CCRB and NYPD
Overview of 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between CCRB and NYPD

After substantiating an allegation of police misconduct, CCRBs practice is to
recommend that NYPD discipline the subject officer involved. Until recently, all substantiated
CCRB cases were sent to NYPDs Department Advocates Office (DAO) for review and
consideration of recommended penalties, and if Administrative Charges were recommended,
possible prosecution.
Traditionally, DAO attorneys reviewed the complete CCRB investigative file, examined
the subject officers prior disciplinary record, performance record, and history of CCRB
complaints, and, where relevant, considered the viability of a prosecution for Administrative
Charges. Based on its independent review of these factors, DAO developed its own case
analysis and recommendation memorandum for each case, which either supported or differed
from the findings and recommendations of CCRB. Notably, DAO is not an investigative unit and
does not conduct its own independent investigations. Instead, DAO reviewed and evaluated
CCRBs investigations with an eye toward making disciplinary recommendations to the Police
Commissioner and, where Administrative Charges were sought, determining whether
prosecution was viable).9 When DAO agreed that Administrative Charges were appropriate, it
prepared and served Charges and Specifications on the subject officer and proceeded to a trial
or negotiated settlement before an administrative law judge within NYPDs Office of the Deputy
Commissioner of Trials.
In 2012, NYPD and CCRB signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that shifted
responsibility for prosecuting substantiated CCRB excessive Force, abuse of authority,
discourtesy, and offensive language cases from NYPDs DAO to CCRBs own, newly created
See, e.g., Testimony of Julie Schwartz at 4462:16-4468:17, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08-cv-1034(SAS) (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 12, 2011).
Administrative Prosecution Unit (APU).10 CCRB prosecutors from the APU have been handling
the prosecutions of substantiated FADO cases since April 11, 2013.11
Importantly, to promote uniformity in prosecutions and disciplinary recommendations,
the MOU requires that APU attorneys endeavor to understand and apply the same disciplinary
processes and standards used by NYPD, to the extent practicable and relevant.12 The MOU
also expressly contemplates a cooperative relationship between DAO and the APU as needed
to effectively evaluate, prepare, and prosecute each case.13
The decision to prosecute a substantiated use-of-force case is not the end of the story.
Whether DAO or APU files Administrative Charges and brings a case to trial before the Deputy
Commissioner of Trials or makes a disciplinary recommendation of something less severe than
Administrative Charges, the issue of discipline is ultimately left to the discretion of the Police
Commissioner. Only the Police Commissioner has the authority to actually impose discipline
upon a police officer or to decide whether to impose discipline at all.14
10
The MOU provides for limited exceptions where the Police Commissioner may retain jurisdiction of
substantiated FADO cases where the Police Commissioner determines that CCRBs prosecution of Charges and
Specifications in a substantiated case would be detrimental to the Police Departments disciplinary process. For
example, the Police Commissioner may decide to not allow CCRBs APU to prosecute substantiated cases where
there are parallel or related criminal investigations or when the Police Commissioner determines that the interests
of justice would not be served, based on the subject officers lack of disciplinary history or prior substantiated
CCRB complaints. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD (CCRB) AND THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF SUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS 2, 20
(April 2, 2012) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding of April 2, 2012], available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/APU_MOU.pdf. Significantly, the APU has authority to prosecute
and plea bargain only cases where Administrative Charges are being filed. It does not have jurisdiction over cases
where a Command Discipline or Instructions are recommended. While CCRB may, with approval of the CCRB
Board, decline charges for prosecution altogether, it is not authorized to decline prosecution of Administrative
Charges and then recommend lower levels of discipline. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding of April 2, 2012
at 1, 12, 21.
11
See CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., JANUARY JUNE 2013 REPORT 15 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/CCRBsemi2013_jan_June.pdf.
12
See Memorandum of Understanding of April 2, 2012 at 11.
13
Id. at 16.
14
See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, tit. 14, 14-115 (Discipline of Members); NEW YORK CITY CHARTER,
ch. 18, 434; RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, tit. 38, ch. 15B, 15-12, 15-18; see also, RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
tit. 38-a, ch. 1, 1-45 (Rules of the Civilian Complaint Review Board) (The Police Commissioner shall retain in all
respects the authority and discretion to make final disciplinary recommendations.); NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, ch. 18A, 440(e).

NYPD: Guidelines For Use of Force in New York City

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Police Use of Force in New York City:

Findings and Recommendations on

New York City Department of Investigation

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE

PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT judgment based not only upon experience as

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

USE OF PEPPER SPRAY DEVICES

To inform uniformed members of the service of circumstances under which

When necessary to use pepper spray device:

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Request response of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) once the

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Transport prisoner immediately to the emergency room of the nearest

Analyze situations where O.C. spray was employed to evaluate its

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Lost or Damaged Uniform (P.G. 204-07)

AIDED REPORT WORKSHEET (PD304-152b)

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICES (CED)

To inform members of the service of circumstances under which a Conducted Energy

CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICE (CED) - a device primarily designed to disrupt a

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

AUTHORIZED UNIFORMED MEMBER OF THE SERVICE A uniformed

The next highest ranking supervisor in the chain of command of the

Designate a secure area under the control of the desk officer or

When requesting a replacement or loaner of a CED, replacement of batteries, chargers,

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Indicate rank, name, shield number/tax number, as applicable, of

Inspect CED to ensure operability.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Inform desk officer/supervisor if the CED does not operate subsequent to

USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICE (CED)

Assess situation and determine if the use of a CED would be appropriate.

Issue an appropriate warning, consistent with personal safety, to the

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Restrain individual, and secure CED.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Request response of investigating supervisor.

Darts will not be vouchered but should be disposed of in a sharps container by

Conduct investigation regarding use of CED.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Conduct investigation when required to act as investigating supervisor.

Maintain a log /database for CED usage.

Review adequacy of investigations and appropriateness of CED usage.

Prisoners Requiring Medical/Psychiatric Treatment (P.G. 210-04)

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

PROPERTY CLERK INVOICE WORKSHEET (PD521-141A)

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Overview of Seattle Police Department Documentation of Force Policy

Overview of Seattle Police Department De-Escalation Training

Overview of 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between CCRB and NYPD

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