POSSESSION: Theory

Exceptions Thereto

of

Irrevindicability

and

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP v.

SANTOS
G.R. No. 80298, 26 April 1990
FACTS:
Jose Cruz ordered 406 books from EDCA through
telephone, payable on delivery. Cruz issued a personal
check covering the purchase price for the books. Cruz
sold 120 books to Santos who, upon verifying the sellers
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him the
purchase price. Upon investigation, EDCA confirmed that
Cruz was an impostor and had no intention of paying the
books ordered (the check issued bounced). Thus, with
the assistance of police, EDCA forcibly seized the books
from Santos and threatened her with prosecution for
buying stolen property.
Santos sued for the recovery of the books after demand
for their return was rejected by EDCA. EDCA argued that
pursuant to Article 559 of the Civil Code, it has the right
to recover the books since it was unlawfully deprived
thereof.
ISSUE: Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment
therefor was dishonored?
RULING: NO. There was no unlawful deprivation of
property, which would entitle the petitioner to recover a
property from the person possessing it in good faith.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz
acquired ownership over the books, which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that
he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter
between him and EDCA and did not impair the title
acquired by the private respondents to the books. Nonpayment only creates a right to demand payment or to
rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the
case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation
above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it
to another.
LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. NO. 42859
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a
man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession,
however, possession is not gained by mere nominal
CLAIM.
FACTS:
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel
of land, containing an area of around 24,000,000
hectares. He presents Exhibit L as proof of his
possession over the land. Exhibit L is a certified copy of
an application. This application states that Lasams
predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag, has owned the
land since time immemorial. However, the property
described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and
the property sought to be registered is 24,000,000
hectares.
Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of
land which is the same parcel described in another
Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the land delineated
the property based on what the possessor at that time
pointed out to him; he based his study mostly on
hearsay. According to the applicant, before his
occupation of the land, only about 2 hectares were

cultivated. But then, they justified this by invoking the

doctrine of constructive possession (That a person in
possession of the land does not have to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession).
Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on
the ground that
a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and
b) that the land sought to be registered is public land.
ISSUE:
Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the
required possession during the time prescribed by law?
Is he entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of land
considering that the area possessed is only 2 hectares?
HELD:
First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid
application because the identity o the land was not
clearly established.
Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have
possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is
lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied and the
extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes the doctrine
of constructive possession, the said application is subject
to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to
observe that among these qualifications is one
particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy
with reference to the portion of land actually in
possession of the claimant. While, therefore, possession
in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession, possession is not
gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The mere planting of a
sign or a symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellanlike claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a
document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not
only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the
land therein referred to. The document in such a case
is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at
all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what
is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the
property sought to be registered is included in that
title.
While "possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section
54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol
of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while
it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.

FELIPA CORDERO (Deceased) MAURO OCAMPO,

CASIMIRO OCAMPO and ELISEA OCAMPO v.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL AND CA
G.R. No. L-36789, 25 July 1983
FACTS:
Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, husband of Felipa Cordero and
father of the other petitiones, died on May 17, 1958, and
left several properties. Petitioners took possession of the
properties left by him, among others is a riceland.
However, they found out that a portion of the same was
possessed by Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and
Dalmacio Montaos. Petitioners filed a civil case alleging
that Victoria P. Cabral continued claiming to be the owner
of the land while her co-defendants continued
recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the
plaintiffs despite demands to vacate the property. They
also claim that due to respondents' occupancy of the
aforementioned portion of land, petitioners failed to
realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of
palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the harvesttime of 1958 up to the present. RTC dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, even though the CA found that the
disputed piece of land is registered in the name of the
petitioners but because of the supposed oral sale of the
same to the predecessors of the defendants mentioned
by the petitioners on appeal, it affirmed the judgment of
the trial court dismissing the complaint for the recovery of
the land.
ISSUES:
1. Are the heirs of the registered owner entitled to the
land?
2. May the respondents be held liable for reimbursement
of fruits received?
RULING:
1. YES. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the
disputed portion of the land is admittedly part of the land
originally registered in the name of petitioners
predecessor in interest. There should be no question that
that title had become imprescriptible and the original
registrant as well as his successors had the right to
vindicate their ownership against anybody else.
2. YES. The respondents, by their own admission, are in
possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence
that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their
good faith ceased when they were served with summons
to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from
the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor
could have received.

LEDESMA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86051, 1 September 1992
FACTS:
On September 27, 1977, a person representing himself
to be Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for his father,
a certain Rustico T. Consunji, two brand new motor
vehicles(Isuzu Gemini and Holden Premier Vehicle) from
Citiwide Motors, Inc. Citiwide Motors delivered the twoabove described motor vehicles to the person who
represented himself as Jojo Consunji, allegedly the son
of the purported buyer, Rustico T. Consunji, and said
person in turn issued a managers check of the PCIB for
the amount of P101,000.00 as full payment of the value
of the two motor vehicles.However, when Citiwid Motors
deposited the said check, it was dishonored by the bank

on the ground that it was tampered with, the correct

amount of P101.00 having been raised to P101,000.00
per the banks notice of dishonor. Citiwide Motors
reported to the Philippine Constabulary the criminal act
perpetrated by the person who misrepresented himself
as Jojo Consunji and in the course of the investigation,
Citiwide Motors learned that the real identity of the
wrongdoer/impostor is Armando Suarez who has a long
line of criminal cases against him for estafa using his
similar modus operandi. On October 17, 1977, plaintiffappellant was able to recover the Holden Premier vehicle
which was found abandoned somewhere in Quezon City.
On the other hand, Citiwide
Motors learned that the Isuzu Gemini was transferred by
Armando Suarez to third persons and was in the
possession of one Jaime Ledesma at the time plaintiffappellant instituted this action for replevin on November
16, 1977.
In his defense, Jaime Ledesma claims that he purchased
and paid for the subject vehicle in good faith from its
registered owner, one Pedro Neyra, as evidenced by the
Land Transportation Commission Registration Certificate.
After posting the necessary bond in the amount double
the value of the subject motor vehicle, plaintiff-appellant
was able to recover possession of the 1977 Isuzu Gemini
as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return.
ISSUE: Is Citiwide Motors unlawfully deprived of the cars
when it sold the same to a person who purported to be
authorized by the buyer to get hold of the same on the
faith of the managers check issued?
RULING: YES. A party who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same
from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it
in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the
first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition
is equivalent to a title. There are three requisites to make
possession of movable property equivalent to title,
namely:
(a) the possession should be in good faith;
(b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of
the thing; and
(c) the possession is in the concept of owner.
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has
been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have
voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the
justification for the exceptions found under the second
sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code. There was a
perfected unconditional contract of sale between private
respondent and the original vendee. The former
voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of
registration of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee
even if the said vendee was represented by someone
who used a fictitious nameand likewise voluntarily
delivered the cars and the certificate of registration to the
vendees alleged representative. Title thereto was
forthwith transferred to the vendee. The subsequent
dishonor of the check because of the alteration merely
amounted to a failure of consideration which does not
render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or
rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor
for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC. Thus, the Court
ruled that considering that Ledesma had successfully
proven that he acquired the property in good faith from
the vendor and for a valuable consideration, he was
unlawfully divested of the car in his possession.