Combating terrorism

General Pervez Musharrafs homecoming after his most significant foreign tour turned out
to be subdued since it coincided with the biggest sectarian massacre in Pakistani history.
The July 4 killings in Quetta, with over 110 casualties (including almost 50 fatalities), were
as a gruesome reminder to the government that an organized gang can undermine Pakistans
image and stability and challenge the writ of the government at a time and place of its
choosing.
Last year, in February 2002, when President Musharraf was in the US, Daniel Pearl was
kidnapped and killed. On June 8, again at Quetta, 13 police recruits were killed, and the
government is apparently clueless regarding the identity of the killers, although clearly they
would be part of the same chain. Earlier, a high-ranking police official was gunned down in
the same province in an escalating pattern of sponsored and organized violence.Three
messages flow from this massacre.First, successive governments, indeed the Pakistani
State, have abysmally failed to get on top of a problem festering since 1987, which today is
the single biggest threat to Pakistans security and social stability. 2000 lives have been lost
in sponsored sectarian strife, but in what is clearly a tribute to the maturity and mindset of
the people of Pakistan, such targeted killings have not evoked any sectarian riots, only a
revulsion against such acts that are repugnant to Islamic teachings and the principles of
humanity.Second, it seems the focus of this organized sectarian terrorism has shifted from
Karachi to Quetta. In recent years, over a 100 doctors and lawyers were victims of targeted
sectarian terrorism in Karachi, apart from places of worship and foreign installations.
Third, Pakistans most strategic, sensitive and otherwise tranquil province of Balochistan,
which has had a tradition of ethnic and sectarian harmony, could well be destabilised if such
sectarian terrorism recurs. Balochistan is strategic because it borders two unstable
neighbours - Iran and Afghanistan - while its sensitivity can be gauged from the fact that the
countrys biggest mega-project- the Gwadar Port - is also being built there with Chinese
assistance.Interestingly, this sectarian terrorism also coincides with major developments in
Balochistans vicinity. In Afghanistan, the American 82nd Airborne Division has launched
Operation Deny Haven against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants, following the June 17
meeting of the Tripartite Commission of the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Troops of the
three countries have also been coordinating actions on the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border.Regarding Iran, media reports have said that while the United States has ruled out an
invasion of Iran, it is working on what experts term as the Bani Sadr Option. In 1981,
President Bani Sadr revolted against the regime, resigned and then fled to Paris after the
failure to foment an uprising. Now, according to a report in the Arabic daily al Watan
(June 27), the CIA has reported to President Bush that the US is actually incapable of
triggering a popular revolution or a staging a military coup to overthrow the regime in Iran.
Resultantly, the US administration is said to be secretly encouraging President Khatami to
resign his post and trigger a major
political crisis as a prelude to introducing radical changes in the Iranian regime.It is in this
geopolitical context that the monster of sectarian terrorism is raising its ugly head in
Balochistan. Two military regimes and six elected civilian governments have failed to
tackle a problem that now has developed crisis proportions.This is surprising since this is
certainly not a new problem or something unique to Pakistan.Is it simply lack of

administrative competence, the usual ineptitude that is officialdoms hallmark, when it

comes to resolving vital issues? Or is it more an absence of will to act decisively to stamp
out sectarian terrorism, despite the gravity of the threat it poses to Pakistans future?This
failure is all the more inexplicable, since Pakistans state security apparatus has been
extremely efficient in nabbing over 500 al Qaeda operatives in the past 18 months, a fact
that earned President Musharraf accolades from President Bush himself at Camp David.
Why is such alacrity and competence absent when it comes to tracking down a largely
home-grown terror network which has been operating fairly openly against the interests of
Pakistan and its people for well over the past decade?Pakistani policymakers need to learn
lessons from the painful past when the growth of the sectarian Frankenstein was winked at
due to political expediency,
since some of these unsavoury elements may have been useful tools in furthering objectives
in domestic politics and foreign policy. However, such immoral tactics boomerang on those
who may be their sponsors. Sins sown in the past come to reap in the present with a
vengeance.Take Americas embrace of Saddam as an ally against revolutionary Iran, or
Indira Gandhis sponsorship of the Sikh extremist Sant Jarnail Singh Bindhranwale since
she sought to use him to counter the Akali Dal, or the Israelis initial encouragement of
Hamas to undercut Arafat during the first Palestinian uprising in the late 1980s.For
Pakistans government, it is not good enough to come out with bureaucratic responses to
sectarian terrorism. There is a now a standard operating procedure of a regimes response
to terrorism. After each terror strike, the Federal Government expresses its concern but
says that since law and order is a provincial subject; it is primarily a provincial problem.
The provincial government retorts by blaming it on the proverbial foreign hand, which is
usually mysterious and elusive. And the Intelligence agencies smugly shrug off any
responsibility by saying that tackling terrorism is not our mandate. Terrorism is not
something unique to Pakistan. It has afflicted democratic societies as well, who have
overcome it, without violating fundamental rights. How did Italy smash the Red Brigades,
the Germans the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Japanese the Red Army or the Americans trace
the UnaBomber after a 20 year relentless pursuit during which he killed educationists and
intellectuals through letter bombs? The government can surmount this problem over a 3-5
year timeframe, provided the issue is grappled within a clinical, professional, non-partisan
manner in accordance with the rule of law. There is need to get the facts right so that the
right diagnosis brings out the correct prescription of the problem. In 1997, the Punjab
Police chief had told the Federal Cabinet that there were 160 hardened terrorists trained for
target killings operating in the Punjab, whose lists and profiles were with the relevant
intelligence organisations. In Karachi, the Police had records of 137 free lance terrorists,
generally hired criminals who normally do contract killings for the right amount at the
behest of anonymous clients. By now, the problem would certainly have proliferated and
gotten worse, but it is by no means insurmountable. This problem combines intelligence
gathering, rigorous investigation and coordination among different outfits, namely, the four
provincial police set-ups, four Special Branch organizations that provide intelligence
reports to the Provincial Chief Executive, the ISI, the MI and the IB. There should be better
coordination among these 11 different outfits, plus sharing of intelligence and a common
strategy among different outfits to tackle terrorism.Pakistan also needs to develop a strategy
to combat, contain and crush terrorism treating it as a national security issue that is today
the single biggest source of domestic destabilisation. No Ministry or the military alone can

do it, because they are not trained for this task. For starters, a lead agency deputed
specifically for this purpose should be constituted to coordinate this task in a full-time,
wholesome manner, as none exists right now. Even in the United States, despite a whopping
30 billion dollars budget for their myriad intelligence agencies, the Bush Administration has
had to establish a brand new organization, the Department of Homeland Security, to combat
terrorism after 9/11. A special Anti-Terrorism Task Force as a permanent body needs to be
established which should include trained investigators, intelligence specialists, experienced
police officers, political analysts, psychologists, and technical experts. This Force should
function as the central information-cum-action centre, i.e., collecting and analysing
information and ordering action against terrorism.The country and the people have suffered
enough on account of ad hocism in countering terrorism. In any case, all efforts at
promoting investment and projecting a better image for Pakistan will fail, just because of
this inability to combat terrorism at home.