Senate vs.

Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the
North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements
were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which
took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by
the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President,
from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by
the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite
EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly

investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently
true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.
The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not
only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held
in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in
aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress
to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.
It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour

is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to

appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance
as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No.

200238, February 9, 2012
FACTS:
Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M.
Garcia III, filed before the Supreme Court an original civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop the
Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing the
Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it
issued against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The
subpoena assailed by petitioners covers the foreign currency denominated
accounts allegedly owned by the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of
the Philippine Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from
further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign
currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?
RULING:

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

enjoining the respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also
REQUIRED the respondents to COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.]
YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it
from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign
currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.
There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable
injustice.
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits
of the Chief Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA
6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of
foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the
written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the
recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. 15th Division of the
Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for
foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositors

right to privacy in relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the
prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has presented any such written
waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA
1405, it is not an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits under RA 6426.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member
was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a
representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean
one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest
in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The
respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power
of judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions
with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs
counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner
lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of
Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is
imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees
for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over
the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the
legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is
the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to
a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate
in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house
in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no

liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the
term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed
the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2,
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of

the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This

second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a
political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In
fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away
with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by

virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review

questions which are not truly political in nature.
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives
Committee On Justice, et.al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011

Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non

quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is
not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it
by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done.
The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.

FACTS: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel,

et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner.
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group)
filed another impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were
endorsed by different Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as
chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary
General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of
Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of
Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the
House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010,
found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to
have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of
the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider

the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent
refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised
petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints,
drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55
members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010,
found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The
determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations,
hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be
rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice
directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.

ISSUE: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present

impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the
Constitution?)

HELD: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the
first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that
within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may
be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior
to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what
the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on
the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by
the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a
word covers its enlarged and plural sense.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an

impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of
impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like
the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot
light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the
candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the
impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the
same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE
that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those
motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is
only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common
parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a
committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to
the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment,
the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further
debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same
impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and
the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in
perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding.
Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a
maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an
impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that
[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta

movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by
the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its

initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a

verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.
Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the
act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each
having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from
referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and
unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a
resolution for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as
espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of
Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on
Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the
recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these
scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally
imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the
series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.