Bataclan vs.

Medina
Facts.
The bus left amadeo Cavite by midnight ,while the bus was running within Imus, Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the
road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but 4 passengers were
trapped. After hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum and, a fierce fire started, burning and all but
consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the
lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
The widow on Bataclan filed case to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees
Issue:
1. w/n the bus operator is negligent (yes)
2. W/n the overturning of the bus OR the fire is the proximate cause
Held:
1. The court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding. The
bus operator is liable for breach of contract of common carrier.

2. Proximate Cause- that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.'
the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call
for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle
to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus

can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.The
gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too
near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
compensatory, moral, and other damages, attorney's fees
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
Facts:
Around 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktailsand-dinner meeting with his boss he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection not far from his home, and when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car owned by Phoenix parked on
the right hand side of the Street facing the oncoming traffic.
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out
onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had
earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the
permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too
late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of Dionisios injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had
parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix or due to his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass
Held:
The Court held that the proximate cause of the accident was the wrongful manner in which the dump
truck was parked. The collision of Dionisio' s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
or independent cause.

The truck driver's negligence was an indispensable and efficient cause. the petitioner truck driver
owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the
very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking
of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. - is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances,
the defendant may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the
defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts .

Quezon City vs. Dacara

Facts:
DacaraJR while driving the sedan of his father, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings
found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City
government. As a result, Dacarra Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered
extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.Dacarra Sr. filed a case for
damages against the QC Government but the latter claimed that they exercised due care by
providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the
reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latters
negligence and failure to exercise due care.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of the incident is the negligence of QC.
Held:
Yes. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
According to the report even of the policeman lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign
perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist provides that no none was
found at the scene of the accident.
Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative
to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the
same
Teague vs. Fernandez
Facts:

The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M.
Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of
the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice (Exhs. "C", "C-1" to "C-5" and "4")
located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said
second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although it
had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which
was provided with two fire-escape ladders (Exh. "4"), and the presence of each of said fireexits was indicated on the wall (Exh. "5").
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for
surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between
that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic
Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six
assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried
to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be
afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete, and
that the fire was anyway, across the street. They told the students not to rush out but just to
go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the
instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the students the above
admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three students in order to quiet them
down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and
tried with outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing and pushing their way to the
stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of
the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the
stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four
students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead
and several others injured on account of the stampede.
xxx xxx xxx
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the upper lip,
contused abrasions in different parts of the body, internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and
third right ribs. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures
of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as
owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and
dismissed the case. The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which by a divided vote of
3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and
sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000.00, plus interest at the
legal rate from the date the complaint was filed.
The case came up to this Court on a petition for review filed by the defendant below.

The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter to be referred to as the
petitioner, was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. This
provision reads as follows:
Sec. 491. Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. ... All buildings and separate sections
of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories,
having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all
public or quasi-public buildings having less than three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium,
schools, reformatories, places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or
panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not
less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty
degrees from the perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall
likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall
be placed as far apart as possible.
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact that the second storey of the GilArmi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although
at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.
In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of negligence and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez, reliance is based on a number of
authorities in the American jurisdiction, thus: .
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has
happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation
of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury. (65 C.J.S. 1156).
The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence,
negligence as a matter or law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence
per se for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a
suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man would
observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify
their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those
who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of
care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or
negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is
immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting
such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on
the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury
would result from such violation. .... (65 C.J.S. pp. 623-628).
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by
exceeding the speed limit, for example, do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was
unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance

intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was
intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is
a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has
no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent
reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance
anticipated. This court has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of
the manner of driving. (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
... However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury
intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not
necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be
found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character and in the
natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to Prevent. (38 Am Jur 841).
The petitioner has raised a number of issues. The first is that Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of
the City of Manila refers to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of
private ownership. It will be noted from the text of the ordinance, however, that it is not ownership which
determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements, but rather the use or the purpose for
which a particular building is utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is devoted to any
one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance for instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute
precisely was then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that
such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or
reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which
the building is devoted.
It is next contended that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the
building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner herein, who is a mere lessee, who should be liable
for the violation. The contention ignores the fact that it was the use of the building for school purposes
which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the owners
who was responsible for such use.
The next issue, indeed the basic one, raised by the petitioner is whether or not the failure to comply with
the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. The case
ofVillanueva Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina, G. R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, is cited in support
of the contention that such failure was not the proximate cause. It is there stated by this Court:
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death
of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of
"Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot
be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury
complained of. A statement of the doctrine relied upon is found in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo, L8328, May 18, 1956, wherein this Court, citing Corpus Juris said:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no
causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a
faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the
petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in
point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was
a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation
which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in
case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was
bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this
particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire
in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go
down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for
under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus, as
stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or
ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of
the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the
cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner is that the complaint did not specifically allege that the
ordinance in question had been violated. The violation, however, as an act of negligence which gave rise
to liability, was sufficiently comprehended within paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads: .
Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross negligence of the
defendant who failed to exercise due care and diligence for the safety of its students in not
providing the building with adequate fire exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to

avoid the stampede, aside from the fact that the defendant did not have a permit to use the
building as a school-house.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.