Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Petitioner,

G. R. No. 191002

- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

(JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
JAIME N. SORIANO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191032

- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

(JBC),
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191057

- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

(JBC),
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF
SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF
THE CONSTITUTION TO
APPOINTMENTS TO THE

A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC

JUDICIARY,
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
x-----------------------x
JOHN G. PERALTA,
Petitioner,
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC).
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PETER IRVING CORVERA;
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM;
ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.;
NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLES LAWYERS;
MARLOU B. UBANO;
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its
Immediate Past President, ATTY.
ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and
the latter in his own personal
capacity as a MEMBER of the
PHILIPPINE BAR;
MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER;
BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN
(BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR.
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO;
BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR.;

G.R. No. 191149

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,

RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE)
CHAIRMAN FERDINAND
GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY) SECRETARY
GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO;
ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN
PARA SA KAUNLARAN
(ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN
KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO
ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR
ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS)
CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK
TERRY LACUANAN RIDON;
NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NUSP)
CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN
RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS
GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE
ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP)
CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA
ANGELA GUEVARRA;
WALDEN F. BELLO and
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES;
WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS
ORGANIZATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by
YOLANDA QUISUMBING-

JAVELLANA; BELLEZA
ALOJADO DEMAISIP;
TERESITA GANDIONCOOLEDAN; MA. VERENA
KASILAG-VILLANUEVA;
MARILYN STA. ROMANA;
LEONILA DE JESUS; and
GUINEVERE DE LEON.
Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. AMADOR Z.
TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP
GovernorSouthern Luzon), and
ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBP GovernorEastern Visayas),
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 191342

- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

(JBC),
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
PHILIPPINE BAR
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 191420

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

and HER EXCELLENCY
GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
March 17, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.
May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which
provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from
the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates
nominated or being considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list
of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII? Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
Precs of the Consolidated Cases
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively
commenced G.R. No. 191002[1] and G.R. No. 191149[2] as special civil actions
for certiorariand mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the

incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next
Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191032,[3] Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition,
proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection and nomination
proceedings for the position of Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus,[4] the Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not
covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive
Department.
In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC,[5] petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a
former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC
on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 191342,[6] which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with
the petitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B.
Inting, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and
Eastern Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting
a list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment
during the period provided for in Section 15, Article VII.
All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question
whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental
importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any
Presidents most important appointment.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively (Valenzuela),[7] by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII

prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial

positions during the period therein fixed.
In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the
issue expressed by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is
prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before the
coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on
June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to
appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway,
paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the
election ban has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list of
at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.
[8]
He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself the judicial function
that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution, which has limited it to the task of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to finally
resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme
Court under the Constitution. As such, he contends that the JBC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of nominees to the
President; and that a final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions
raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go a
long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system.[9]
In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved
unanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and selection
process for the position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the
appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself,
the Presidents authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of the
Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process, unless a
nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.[10]

For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No. 191057 that
unorthodox and exceptional circumstances spawned by the discordant
interpretations, due perhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15, Art. VII in
relation to Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution have bred a

frenzied inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional provisions mentioned that

has divided the bench and the bar and the general public as well, because of its
dimensional impact to the nation and the people, thereby fashioning
transcendental questions or issues affecting the JBCs proper exercise of its
principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary by submitting
only to the President (not to the next President) a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy from which the
members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts may be
appointed.[11] PHILCONSA further believes and submits that now is the time to
revisit and review Valenzuela, the strange and exotic Decision of the Court en
banc.[12]
Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel
the JBC to immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its
nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the
Constitution in the event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a
Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.[13]
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy,
considering that the JBC has initiated the process of receiving applications for the
position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the evaluation process for the
applications to the position, and is perilously near completing the nomination
process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the President,
entering into the period of the ban on midnight appointments on March 10, 2010,
which only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition
to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list, especially if it will
be cone within the period of the ban on midnight appointments.[14]
Antecedents
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section

9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex
officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the
process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a
resolution,[15] which reads:
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May
17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato
S. Puno.
It will publish the opening of the position for applications or
recommendations; deliberate on the list of candidates; publish the names of
candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the applications; conduct public
interviews of candidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates.
As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in
the light of the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes
and will consider all views on the matter.
18 January 2010.

(sgd.)
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court &
Ex-Officio Secretary
Judicial and Bar Council

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement dated January
20, 2010,[16] viz:

The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application
or recommendation, of the position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT, which will be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO.
Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not
later than 4 February 2010 (Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat xxx:

The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine

Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star.[17]
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered
for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
25, 2010, respectively.[18]
Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew his name
from consideration through his letter dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who
accepted their nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Arturo
D. Brion; and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan).
Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales. [19] Declining
their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the
Executive Officer of the JBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller,
Jr. (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February
8, 2010).[20]
The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro
(for failure to meet the standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor
Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the
Office of the Ombudsman).[21]

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next
step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to
file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than
February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona,
Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro,
Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came
out in thePhilippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13,
2010.[22]
Issues
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when
to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the
controversy now before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is
marching in quick step towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the
retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legal
luminaries, but also among non-legal quarters, and brought out highly disparate
opinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or
not. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointments
of two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed this issue now
before us as an administrative matter to avoid any possible polemics concerning
the matter, but he opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela would be
miniscule [sic] compared to the polemics that have now erupted in regard to the
current controversy, and that unless put to a halt, and this may only be achieved
by a ruling from the Court, the integrity of the process and the credibility of
whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Justice, may irreparably be
impaired.[23]
Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the
order of the chronological filing of their petitions.

G.R. No. 191002

a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the
constitutional question of whether the incumbent President can
appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to
appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno
when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement
on May 17, 2010?
G.R. No. 191032
a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme
Court en banc?
G.R. No. 191057
a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution applicable only to positions in
the Executive Department?
b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution also applies to members of the Judiciary, may such
appointments be excepted because they are impressed with public
interest or are demanded by the exigencies of public service,
thereby justifying these appointments during the period of
prohibition?
c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to include
and submit the names of nominees who manifested interest to be
nominated for the position of Chief Justice on the understanding
that his/her nomination will be submitted to the next President in
view of the prohibition against presidential appointments from
March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC

a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to

appointments to positions in the Judiciary under Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution?
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the
Judiciary after March 10, 2010, including that for the position of
Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010?
G.R. No. 191149
a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the
short list to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo?
G.R. No. 191342
a. Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of nominees to
the incumbent President without committing a grave violation of
the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent
President from making midnight appointments two months
immediately preceding the next presidential elections until the end
of her term?
b. Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the
candidates for the position of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid
in view of the JBCs illegal composition allowing each member
from the Senate and the House of Representatives to have one vote
each?
On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the consolidated petitions, except that
filed inG.R. No. 191342.
On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, reporting therein that
the next stage of the process for the selection of the nominees for the position of
Chief Justice would be the public interview of the candidates and the preparation
of the short list of candidates, including the interview of the constitutional
experts, as may be needed.[24] It stated:[25]

Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the
shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1),
Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence
thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on
Presidential appointments two (2) months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term and Section 261 (g),
Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.
12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution,
the JBC will be guided by its decision in these consolidated Petitions and
Administrative Matter.

On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially
stating that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement by May 17, 2010.
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the
JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees in the Judiciary; (b) the JBCs function to recommend is a continuing
process, which does not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination,
because the goal is to submit the list of nominees to Malacaang on the very day
the vacancy arises;[26] the JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it
commenced and set in motion the process of selecting the nominees to be
submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief
Justice Puno;[27] (c) petitioner Sorianos theory that it is the Supreme Court, not the
President, who has the power to appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and
proceeds from his misinterpretation of the phrase members of the Supreme Court
found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as referring only to the
Associate Justices, to the exclusion of the Chief Justice; [28] (d) a writ
of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the
President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three nominees is
unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is
mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose
principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve who has the
authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretion to

withhold the list from the President; [29] and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees,
considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to include in or exclude
from the list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBCs determination of
who it nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty.[30]
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; [31] that in their deliberations on the
mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers
neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its
effects on such period, or vice versa;[32] that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found
in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures,[33]such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC
Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to
which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized
that there might be the imperative need for an appointment during the period of
the ban, like when the membership of the Supreme Court should be so reduced
that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question
requiring expeditious resolution be divided; [34] and that Valenzuela also
recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the prohibition.[35]

Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for
the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of
cases involving sensitive political issues is quite expected; [36] (b) the Court acts
as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President and Vice President and, as such, has the power to correct manifest errors
on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC); [37] (c) if
history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed
immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of
the Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice
immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno; [38] and (d) should the next
Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start
the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.[39]
On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following comments/oppositionsin-intervention, to wit:

(a) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty.

Peter Irving Corvera (Corvera);[40]
(b) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty.
Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim);
(c) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 23, 2010 of Atty.
Alfonso V. Tan, Jr. (Tan);
(d) The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 1, 2010 of
the National Union of Peoples Lawyers (NUPL);
(e) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Atty.
Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano);

(f) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of

Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur Chapter and its
Immediate Past President, Atty. Israelito P. Torreon (IBP- Davao
del Sur);
(g) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of Atty.
Mitchell John L. Boiser (Boiser);
(h)The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated
February 26, 2010 of BAYAN Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo;
BAYAN Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; Confederation
for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government
Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite; Kalipunan
ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria
Arellano; Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para
sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken Leonard Ramos;
Tayo ang Pag-asa Convenor Alvin Peters; League of Filipino
Students (LFS) Chairman James Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon;
National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) Chairman
Einstein Recedes, College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP)
Chairman Vijae Alquisola; and Student Christian Movement of the
Philippines (SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela Guevarra
(BAYAN et al.);
(i) The opposition-in-intervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F.
Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello et al.); and
(j) The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March
4, 2010 of the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the
Philippines (WTLOP), represented by Atty. Yolanda QuisumbingJavellana; Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip; Atty. Teresita
Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag-Villanueva; Atty.
Marilyn Sta. Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; and Atty. Guinevere
de Leon (WTLOP).

Intervenors
Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et
al., Corvera,
IBP
Davao
del Sur, and NUPL take the position that De Castros petition was bereft of any
basis, because under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is

constitutionally banned from making any appointments from March 10,

2010 until June 30, 2010, including the appointment of the successor of Chief
Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to submit the list
of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition is already in
effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against midnight appointments was applied by
the Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by then President Ramos, with
the Court holding that the duty of the President to fill the vacancies within 90 days
from occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the submission
of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional
prohibition.
Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et
al. oppose the insistence that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the
President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the
appointment, because that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the absence of
a Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute
disruption or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They insist that even
without the successor of Chief Justice Puno being appointed by the incumbent
President, the Court is allowed to sit and adjudge en banc or in divisions of three,
five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court is not
necessary; that petitioner De Castros fears are unfounded and baseless, being
based on a mere possibility, the occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is not
in the national interest to have a Chief Justice whose appointment is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation will create a crisis in
the judicial system and will worsen an already vulnerable political situation.
ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political situation in
the country when the election-related questions reach the Court as false, because there
is an existing law on filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the office of Chief
Justice; that the law is Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has not been
repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other law; that a temporaryor
an acting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that the designation
of an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated by
practical necessity; that the practice was intended to be enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, but the Commissioners decided not to write it in the Constitution on
account of the settled practice; that the practice was followed under the 1987
Constitution, when, in 1992, at the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B.

Fernan, Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting Chief
Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that said filling up of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used by
analogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Court has
shown that this rule of succession has been repeatedly observed and has become a part
of its tradition.

Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that

the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as an election offense the act of any
government official who appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in salary or
remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee during the
period of 45 days before a regular election; that the provision covers all appointing
heads, officials, and officers of a government office, agency or instrumentality,
including the President; that for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief
Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban
under the Omnibus Election Code,constitutes an election offense; that even an
appointment of the next Chief Justice prior to the election ban is fundamentally
invalid and without effect because there can be no appointment until a vacancy
occurs; and that the vacancy for the position can occur only by May 17, 2010.
Intervenor Boiser adds that De Castros prayer to compel the submission of
nominees by the JBC to the incumbent President is off-tangent because the position
of Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a submission
of such list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposed
advance appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will be
unconstitutional; and that no list of nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there
is no vacancy.
All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section 15, Article VII makes no
distinction between the kinds of appointments made by the President; and that the
Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the President of the two judges
during the prohibition period were void.

Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not apply only to the appointments in the Executive Department,
but also to judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that
Section 15 does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted the
prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Sorianos contention that
the power to appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the
Supreme Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of
the Supreme Court as contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any
rate, the term members was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612,
February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court; that PHILCONSAs prayer that the Court pass a resolution
declaring that persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but with conditions,
shall not be considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the
arguments in the body of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency between the
allegations in the body and the relief prayed for highlights the lack of merit of
PHILCONSAs petition; that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from the
constitutional prohibition on the President; and that the Court must direct the JBC
to follow the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only to the next
duly elected President after the period of the constitutional ban against midnight
appointments has expired.
Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC because it is neither a
judicial nor a quasi-judicial body has no duty under the Constitution to resolve
the question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during
the period of prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up with a short list,
it still has to bow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should
the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial
function, but simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that the
application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not
violate the principle of separation of powers, because said provision is an
exception.

Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBCs act
of nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not
involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of the
JBC in submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that the call for
applications only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the Supreme Court;
and that the commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill the
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins from the retirement on May
17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is no definite legal basis for any party to
claim that the submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the
President by the JBC is a matter of right under law.
The main question presented in all the filings herein because it involves
two seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution imperatively demands
the attention and resolution of this Court, the only authority that can resolve the
question definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests on the ever-present
need,first, to safeguard the independence, reputation, and integrity of the entire
Judiciary, particularly this Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily dragged
into the harsh polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to settle once and
for all the doubt about an outgoing Presidents power to appoint to the Judiciary
within the long period starting two months before the presidential elections until
the end of the presidential term; and third, to set a definite guideline for the JBC to
follow in the discharge of its primary office of screening and nominating qualified
persons for appointment to the Judiciary.
Thus, we resolve.
Ruling of the Court
Locus Standi of Petitioners
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners
have locus standi.
Black defines locus standi as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.[41] In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often
burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the

ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to

correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient
functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required,
therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc.:[42]
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[43] Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been
or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.[44]

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,[45] the Court adopted

the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action
had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Vera was followed
in Custodio v. President of the Senate,[46] Manila Race Horse Trainers Association
v. De la Fuente,[47] Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, [48] and Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works.[49]
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a
mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,[50] the Court liberalized
the approach when the cases had transcendental importance. Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to
be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.[51]

In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,[52] this Court decided to

resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their far-reaching implications,
even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach
of Aquino
v.
Commission
on
Elections has
been
adopted
in
several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations, and rulings.[53]
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner
may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it
is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to
protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as
a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the
issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless
equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
[54]
the Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v.
Silk,[55] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different
category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[56] In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the
duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With
respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan[57] held that the right of a citizen and a
taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied.[58]

Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and
Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on
behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment of the

next Chief Justice. De Castro and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers, with
Soriano averring that he is affected by the continuing proceedings in the JBC,
which involve unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds.[59]
PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, non-profit organization
existing under the law for the purpose of defending, protecting, and preserving the
Constitution and promoting its growth and flowering. It also alleges that the Court
has recognized its legal standing to file cases on constitutional issues in several
cases.[60]
In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states that he is a citizen of the
Philippines, a member of the Philippine Bar engaged in the active practice of law,
and a former Solicitor General, former Minister of Justice, former Member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa, and former
member of the Faculty of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that
they have the legal standing to enjoin the submission of the list of nominees by the
JBC to the President, for [a]n adjudication of the proper interpretation and
application of the constitutional ban on midnight appointments with regard to
respondent JBCs function in submitting the list of nominees is well within the
concern of petitioners, who are duty bound to ensure that obedience and respect for
the Constitution is upheld, most especially by government offices, such as
respondent JBC, who are specifically tasked to perform crucial functions in the
whole scheme of our democratic institution. They further allege that, reposed in
them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal interest in the process of selecting the
members of the Supreme Court, and in the selection of the Chief Justice,
considering that the person appointed becomes a member of the body that has
constitutional supervision and authority over them and other members of the legal
profession.[61]
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest
in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus
standi.The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a
whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone

(including the petitioners), regardless of ones personal interest in life, because

they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to
appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also
others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great
number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement
of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has
transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.[62]
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we
dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the
resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than
otherwise. InAgan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc .,[63] we
pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the
wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.[64]
Justiciability
Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no actual case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for adjudication, considering that although the selection process
commenced by the JBC is going on, there is yet no final list of nominees; hence,
there is no imminent controversy as to whether such list must be submitted to the
incumbent President, or reserved for submission to the incoming President.
Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual justiciable controversy that is
ripe for judicial determination, pointing out that petitioner De Castro has not even
shown that the JBC has already completed its selection process and is now ready to

submit the list to the incumbent President; and that petitioner De Castro is merely
presenting a hypothetical scenario that is clearly not sufficient for the Court to
exercise its power of judicial review.
Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castros petition rests
on an overbroad and vague allegation of political tension, which is insufficient
basis for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are seeking a mere
advisory opinion on what the JBC and the President should do, and are not
invoking any issues that are justiciable in nature.
Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no conflict of legal rights and
no assertion of opposite legal claims in any of the petitions; that PHILCONSA
does not allege any action taken by the JBC, but simply avers that the conditional
manifestations of two Members of the Court, accented by the divided opinions and
interpretations of legal experts, or associations of lawyers and law students on the
issues published in the daily newspapers are matters of paramount and
transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general public; that PHILCONSA
fails not only to cite any legal duty or allege any failure to perform the duty, but
also to indicate what specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does
not even attempt to portray the matter as a controversy or conflict of rights, but,
instead, prays that the Court should rule for the guidance of the JBC; that the fact
that the Court supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the Court can
rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition, because supervision involves
oversight, which means that the subordinate officer or body must first act, and if
such action is not in accordance with prescribed rules, then, and only then, may the
person exercising oversight order the action to be redone to conform to the
prescribed rules; that the Mendoza petition does not allege that the JBC has
performed a specific act susceptible to correction for being illegal or
unconstitutional; and that the Mendoza petition asks the Court to issue an advisory
ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to correct a wrong act by the JBC,
but to declare the state of the law in the absence of an actual case or controversy.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe
for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the

proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be

submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the
fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the
incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for
judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of
constitutional experts, as may be needed.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC
may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be
doubted. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of
nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of
nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC
through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counterinsistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to
the incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to
the next President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already
prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including
those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the
contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are only some of
the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the
controversy, considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the
vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction,
or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely
settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from

moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the
JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order
for the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough
that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence
of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for
bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.[65] Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only
legal issues remain.
Substantive Merits
I
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or to other appointments to the Judiciary

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.

In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano,

Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the
ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15,
Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

The Court agrees with the submission.

First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and
arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or
whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and
manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the
allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great
departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the
Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the
principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure, as
Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the
Court) explained in his sponsorship speech:
We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of
powers in government because we believe that the only way to protect freedom
and liberty is to separate and divide the awesome powers of government. Hence,
we return to the separation of powers doctrine and the legislative, executive and
judicial departments.[66]

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,

among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties
and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1)
and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon
the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the
Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Although Valenzuela[67] came to hold that the prohibition covered even

judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not
firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the
confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about
the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary,
which confirmationValenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of
Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:
V

. Intent of the Constitutional Commission

The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution

discloses that the original proposal was to have an eleven-member Supreme
Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the number of Justices to
fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any
appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed that
any vacancy must be filled within two months from the date that the vacancy
occurs. His proposal to have a 15-member Court was not initially
adopted. Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size of the
Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies,
Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision (anent the Courts membership) of
the same mandate that IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE
FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF. He
later agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As
thus amended, the proposal was approved. As it turned out, however, the
Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was that the
section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a
command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1)
of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is
couched in stronger negative language - that a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments
The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of
Article VIII, the following paragraph: WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS,
THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY
DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST (of nominees by the Judicial
and Bar Council to the President). Davide stated that his purpose was to provide a
uniform rule for lower courts. According to him, the 90-day period should be
counted from submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of the
possibility that the President might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC
thus need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the
President of his appointing power two months immediately before the next
presidential elections up to the end of his term - was approved without
discussion.[68]

However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did

not advance or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records
disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the
initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, a command [to the President] to fill
up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence, which

even Valenzuela conceded.[69] The exchanges during deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a
vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the
President, viz:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court,
together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads:
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the
vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the
past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a complete complement.[70]

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced[71] should not be
disregarded.
Thereby, Sections
4(1)
imposes
on
the
President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to
do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to
fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to
establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot
be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section
15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.
Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the
Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly warranted.
According to an authority on statutory construction:[72]

xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the
statute by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be
effective. It is not easy to draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter,
which may not in some manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears
to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly,
each provision was inserted for a definite reason. Often by considering the
enactment in its entirety, what appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared
up and the provisions reconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will
be favored over one which leaves some word or provision meaningless because of
inconsistency. But a word should not be given effect, if to do so gives the statute a
meaning contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if full effect
cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made effective as far as
possible. Nor should the provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be
harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may be that two provisions
are irreconcilable; if so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers
should control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where
there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute, the
provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest expression of
the legislative will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved criticism. It is
seldom applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable conflict exists
between different sections of the same act, and after all other means of
ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been exhausted. Where the
conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rules
application, largely because of the principle of implied repeal.

In this connection, PHILCONSAs urging of a revisit and a review

of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express
intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII
stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It
further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of
Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to
unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of
the framers.[73]
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief
Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the
Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be
allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. [74] It will not do to
merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein

is
entirely
incompatible
with
what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently,
Valenzuela nowdeserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII
all other appointments in the Judiciary.

does

not

apply

as

well

to

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of

Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from
being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt
with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.[75] In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so
observed, stating that:
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
xxx
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consists of the so-called midnight appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was
held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President,
President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no
more than a caretaker administrator whose duty was to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President. Said the Court:
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them
in a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with
some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill
all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.

As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to

important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new
President. Such appointments, so long as they are few and so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, can be made by
the outgoing President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President
Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It
may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight
appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their
number and the time of their making but also appointments presumed
made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII
allowing appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided
is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the
making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of
the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies
in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this
Courts view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the
disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban
which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every
six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily
by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in
their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of
elections and, for that reason, their making is considered an election offense.[76]

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition
to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to
extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured
that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight
appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or

made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a
desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, [77] the
appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not
be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior processing of candidates.
Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the
purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or
meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily
shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent; hence, the
enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose,
and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.[78]
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to
the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of
the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at
any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be
assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they
first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the
creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing
away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating
process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to
appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice
Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question
raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the
Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that
on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no
application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.[79] This confirmation
was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration
the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.[80]
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration
to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on
interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the

Presidents power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII could have been dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998,
hadValenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a
distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15,
and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke
appointments made by an Acting President,[81] and evidently refers only to
appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to appointments
in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the
independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. [82] The letter and
spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the
books that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their
mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first and second level courts and
the Justices of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional
Commission restored the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments after the requirement was removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet,
because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include
appointments to the Judiciary.[83]
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.[84] It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 betweenSection 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of

appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily
and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to
appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of
ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and
Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme
Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in
a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself
suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also
become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the
incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial
independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need
for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor
of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because
anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1),
Article VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy
occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the
need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be
time remaining in the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is
easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its comment.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the
second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May
14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period
of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of
the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full
mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is

that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest
possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for
appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply
with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to
assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an
absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the
framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period,
or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article
VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt
on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to
appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting
justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court
from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It
speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members
or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the
JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the
Court as Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend
itself to a deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good
issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate

President Juan Ponce Enriles statement that the President can appoint the Chief
Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
II
The Judiciary Act of 1948
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of
1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the
successor.

Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:

Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. In case of a vacancy in the
office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the
duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who
is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice
who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.

The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in
the office of the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to
perform his duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and
powers of the office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice
who is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the
disability is removed.
Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral
matter after the Court has hereby resolved the question of consequence, we do not
find it amiss to confront the matter now.
We cannot agree with the posture.
A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme
Court is composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be

appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is
appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an
acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the
framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the
Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution.
Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to
forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the
plain intent of the Constitution.
For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent,
not one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme
of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet
appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties
and powers of the office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted
because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation process
might take longer than expected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is
preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over.
Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments
are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the
leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed
occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary,
because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice
performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire
Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the
Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next
Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make
within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that
the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap
between the retirement and the resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one
hand, and the appointment to and assumption of office of his successor, on the
other hand. As summarized in the comment of the OSG, the chronology of
succession is as follows:
1. When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18, 1988,
Chief Justice Pedro Yap was appointed on the same day;
2. When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice
Marcelo Fernan was appointed on the same day;
3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa was appointed the following
day, December 8, 1991;
4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. was sworn into office the following
early morning ofNovember 30, 1998;
5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban was appointed the next day, December
20, 2005; and
6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006,
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno took his oath as Chief Justice
at midnight of December 6, 2006.[85]
III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. [86] It is proper when the
act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or

officer.Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion

in a particular way.[87]
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the
plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be
performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of
at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.

However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to
fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the
lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus,
the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the
President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to
enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period

allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the
JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted
under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the
list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of
the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies
within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein
should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for
every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of
duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.
[88]
For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained
delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting
the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been
delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. Theduty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.[89]

Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions

for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for
that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17,
2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to
fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

IV
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only
the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Sorianos petition for
prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from
intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks
merit.
On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is
similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the
JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex
officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby
prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum
number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on
the petitioners actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that
they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the
petitioners lack locus standion that issue.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002
and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being
premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No.
191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the
Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill
the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;

(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for
the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to
fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the
short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with
this decision.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]

Filed on February 9, 2010.

Begun on February 23, 2010.
Initiated on February 10, 2010.
Commenced on February 11, 2010.
Dated February 15, 2010.
Filed on March 8, 2010.
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.
Petition in G.R. No. 191002, pp. 3-4.
Id., p. 5.
Petition in G.R. No. 191032, pp. 4-8.
Petition in G.R. No. 191057, pp. 1-2.
Id., p. 11.
Petition in G.R. No. 191149.
Petition in G.R. No. 191342.
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/JBCreCJ.pdf
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/jbc_announce_2009/jan22%20%2710.pdf
Comment of the JBC, p. 3.
Id.
Id., pp. 4-5.
Id., p. 5.
Id.
Id., p. 6.

[23]

Petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, pp. 5-6.

Comment of the JBC, p. 6.
[25]
Id., p. 7; bold emphasis is in the original text.
[26]
Comment of the OSG, pp. 13-14.
[27]
Id., p. 14.
[28]
Id., p. 15.
[29]
Id., pp. 20-24.
[30]
Id., pp. 25-27.
[31]
Id., pp. 29-30.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id., pp. 32-33.
[34]
Id., pp. 34-35.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id., pp. 35-36. The OSG posits:
National interest compels the President to make such appointment for it is particularly during this
crucial period when national leaders are seeking fresh mandates from the people that the Supreme Court,
more than at any other time, represents stability. Hence, a full court is ideal to ensure not only due
deliberation on and careful consideration of issues but also expeditious disposition of cases.
Indeed, such function becomes especially significant in view of the fact that this is the first time that the
whole country will experience automated elections.
[37]
Id., pp. 36-37. The OSG stresses:
The possible fallouts or serious aftermath of allowing a vacuum in the position of the Chief Justice may
be greater and riskier than the consequences or repercussions of inaction. Needless to state, the appointment
of the Chief Justice of this Honorable Court (sic) is the most important appointment vested by the 1987
Constitution to (sic) the President.
[38]
Id., p. 37.
[39]
Id., p. 38.
[40]
Filed by Atty. Pitero M. Reig.
[41]
Blacks Law Dictionary, 941 (6th Ed. 1991).
[42]
G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.
[43]
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562-563, citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 633 (1962).
[44]
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra; Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000; 342 SCRA
449, 478.
[45]
65 Phil. 56.
[46]
G.R. No. 117, November 7, 1945 (Unreported).
[47]
G.R. No. 2947, January 11, 1959 (Unreported).
[48]
77 Phil. 1012 (1947).
[49]
110 Phil. 331 (1960).
[50]
84 Phil. 368 (1949)
[51]
E.g., Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152 (in which the Court
ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources
are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi); Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449 (in
which the Court held that given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the
standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial
review of the Visiting Forces Agreement); Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA
739 (in which the Court, albeit conceding that the petitioners might not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers
without a showing that Balikatan 02-01 involved the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers,
reiterated Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, declaring that cases of transcendental importance must be
settled promptly and definitely and the standing requirements may be relaxed); and Osmea v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 100318, 100308, 100417,100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750 (in which the Court held that
where serious constitutional questions were involved, thetranscendental importance to the public of the cases
demanded that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure).
[52]
L-No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.
[24]

[53]

E.g., Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27 (in which the Court held that it is
sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen interested in the execution of the law, because the question is one of public
duty and the enforcement of a public right, and the people are the real party-in-interest); Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530 (in which the Court declared that where an assertion of
a public right is involved, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen and is part of the general public which possesses the right); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, L. No. 81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 (in which the Court disregarded objections to
taxpayers lack of personality to sue in determining the validity of the VAT Law); Albano v. Reyes, G.R. No. 83551,
July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264 (in which the Court pronounced that although no expenditure of public funds was
involved in the questioned contract, the petitioner was nonetheless clothed with the legal personality under the
disclosure provision of the Constitution to question it, considering its important role in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved, indicating that public interest was definitely
involved); and Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343 (in which the Court ruled that it had the discretion to waive the requirement of locus
standi in determining the validity of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, although
the petitioners were not, strictly speaking, covered by the definition of proper party).
[54]
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
[55]
275 Ky 91, 120 SW2d 765 (1938).
[56]
19 Wend. 56 (1837).
[57]
232 NC 48, 59 SE2d 359 (1950).
[58]
Bold emphasis is in the original text.
[59]
Petition in G.R. No. 191032, p. 2.
[60]
Petition in G.R. No. 191057, pp. 3-4; citing the cases of PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA
479; PHILCONSA v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300; PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506; and Lambino v. COMELEC,
505 SCRA 160.
[61]
Petition in G.R. No. 191342, pp. 2-3.
[62]
See, for instance, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA
81 (where the petitioner questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
law enforcement, asserting that IBP was the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty
to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, but the Court held that the IBP had not shown that it was so tasked:
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by
the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It
will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issue now, rather than later, and went on to resolve the issues because the petitioner advanced constitutional issues
that deserved the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents).
[63]
Supra, note 42, p. 645.
[64]
Id.
[65]
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976); Regional Rail Reoganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138148 (1974).
[66]
Record of Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V., p. 912, October 12, 1998.
[67]
Supra, note 6, p. 426-427, stating:
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the
restriction on the Presidents power of appointment, it is this Courts view that, as a general proposition, in
case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases.
Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to
exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as
earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is considered an
election offense.
To the contention that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII should prevail
over Section 15 of Article VII, because they may be considered later expressions of the people when they
adopted the Constitution, it suffices to point out that the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one,
single, instrument.

To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of
the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership
of the court be so reduced that it will have no quorum or should the voting on a particularly important
question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither
Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
[68]
Id., pp. 422-423.
[69]
Id., p. 423.
[70]
Record of Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V., pp. 632-633.
[71]
Dizon v. Encarnacion, G.R. No. L-18615, December 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714.
[72]
Crawford, Earl. T., The Construction of Statutes, Thomas Law Book Company, St. Louis, Missouri, 262-264
(1940).
[73]
Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA
456, 472; citing Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 4 SCRA 285, (1962).
[74]
According to Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984): Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly
required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification. The
special justification for the reversal of Valenzuela lies in its intrinsic unsoundness.
[75]
No. L-19313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1.
[76]
Supra, note 6, pp. 424-426; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis.
[77]
Aytona v. Castillo, supra, note 74, pp. 8-10 (N.B. - In the time material to Aytona, there were judges of the
Court of First Instance who were appointed to districts that had no vacancies, because the incumbents had not
qualified for other districts to which they had been supposedly transferred or promoted; at any rate, the appointments
still required confirmation by the Commission on Appointments).
[78]
Crawford, op. cit., supra, note 72, pp. 248-249.
[79]
Supra, note 6, p. 413.
[80]
Id.
[81]
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the
elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
[82]
Cruz, I., Philippine Political Law, 253 (2002); also Rilloraza v. Vargas, 80 Phil. 297 (1948).
[83]
Record of Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V., p. 908, which indicates that in
his sponsorship speech delivered on October 12, 1986 on the floor of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Teofisto Guingona explained that [a]ppointments to the judiciary shall not be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
[84]
Rodriguez, Statutory Construction, 171 (1999).
[85]
Comment of the OSG, p. 37.
[86]
Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[87]
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 143.
[88]
Nery v. Gamolo, A.M. No. P-01-1508, February 7, 2003, 397 SCRA 110, citing Musni v. Morales, 315 SCRA
85, 86 (1999).
[89]
Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273.

. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
LEAH M. NAZARENO, CARLO

G.R. No. 181559

M.
CUAL,
ROGELIO
B.
CLAMONTE, FLORECITA M.
LLOSA,
ROGELIO
S.
VILLARUBIA,
RICARDO
M.
GONZALES, JR., ROSSEL MARIE
G. GUTIERREZ, NICANOR F.
VILLAROSA, JR., MARIE SUE F.
CUAL, MIRAMICHI MAJELLA B.
MARIOT, ALMA F. RAMIREZ,
ANTOLIN D. ZAMAR, JR.,
MARIO S. ALILING, TEODULO
SALVORO, JR., PHILIP JANSON
ALTAMARINO,
ANTONIETTA
PADURA,
ADOLFO
R.
CORNELIA, IAN RYAN PATULA,
WILLIAM
TANOY,
VICTOR
ARBAS,
JEANITH
CUAL,
BRAULIO SAYSON, DAWN M.
VILLAROSA,
AGUSTIN
A.
RENDOQUE,
ENRIQUETA
TUMONGHA,
LIONEL
P.
BANOGON,
ROSALITO
VERGANTINOS,
MARIO
T.
CUAL,
JR.,
ELAINE
MAY
TUMONGHA,
NORMAN
F.
VILLAROSA,
RICARDO
C.
PATULA, RACHEL BANAGUA,
RODOLFO A. CALUGCUGAN,
PERGENTINO CUAL, BERNARD
J.
OZOA,
ROGER
JOHN
AROMIN, CHERYL E. NOCETE,
MARIVIC SANCHEZ, CRISPIN
DURAN, REBECO LINGCONG,
ANNA
LEE
ESTRABELA,
MELCHOR
B.
MAQUILING,
RAUL
MOLAS,
OSCAR
KINIKITO,
DARWIN
B.
CONEJOS,
ROMEL
CUAL,
ROQUETA AMOR, DISODADO
LAJATO, PAUL PINO, LITO

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

PINERO, RODULFO ZOSA, JR.

and JORGE ARBOLADO,
Petitioners,
- versus CITY
OF
DUMAGUETE,
represented by CITY MAYOR
AGUSTIN
PERDICES,
DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR.,
ERLINDA
TUMONGHA,
JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND
Promulgated:
ARACELI CAMPOS,
October 2, 2009
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The integrity and reliability of our civil service is, perhaps, never more sorely
tested than in the impassioned demagoguery of elections. Amidst the struggle of
personalities, ideologies, and platforms, the vigor and resilience of a professional
civil service can only be preserved where our laws ensure that partisanship plays
no part in the appointing process. Consequently, we affirm the validity of a
regulation issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC or the Commission)
intended to ensure that appointments and promotions in the civil service are made
solely on the basis of qualifications, instead of political loyalties or patronage.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated August 28,
2007 and its Resolution[2] dated January 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
00665. The case stemmed from CSC Field Offices invalidation of petitioners
appointments as employees of the City of Dumaguete, which was affirmed by the
CSC Regional Office, by the Commission en banc and by the Court of Appeals.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUNDS

Accreditation of Dumaguete City by
the Civil Service Commission
On October 25, 1999, pursuant to the Commissions Accreditation Program,
the CSC issued Resolution No. 992411,[3] which granted the City Government of
Dumaguete the authority to take final action on all its appointments, subject
to, inter alia, the following conditions:
1. That the exercise of said authority shall be subject to Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations and within the limits and restrictions of the implementing
guidelines of the CSC Accreditation Program as amended (MC No. 27, s.
1994);
xxxx
5. That appointments issued under this authority shall be subject to monthly
monitoring by the [Civil Service Field Office] CSFO concerned;
xxxx
9. That appointments found in the course of monthly monitoring to have been
issued and acted upon in violation of pertinent rules, standards, and
regulations shall immediately be invalidated by the Civil Service Regional
Office (CSRO), upon recommendation by the CSFO.

Appointments
made
outgoing Mayor Remollo

by

Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election

in the May 14, 2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R.
Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7, and 11, 2001, outgoing Mayor Remollo
promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall employees,
including the herein 52 petitioners.
On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising
ceremony at the Dumaguete City Hall grounds that he would not honor the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the
City Administrator, respondent Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to direct respondent City

Assistant Treasurer Erlinda C. Tumongha (now deceased), to refrain from making

any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on
their new positions.
The Petition for Mandamus before
the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City
Thus, on August 1, 2001, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with
Injunction and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order against
the City of Dumaguete, represented by respondent city mayor Perdices and city
officers Dumalag, Tumongha, Josephine Mae Flores, and Araceli Campos. The
petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 13013, and raffled to Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from taking any action or issuing
any orders nullifying their appointments.
In a Decision[4] dated March 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
petition; petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in an
Order[5]dated April 26, 2007. The issues involved in Civil Case No. 13013 have
twice been elevated to and eventually resolved by the Court in G.R. Nos.
177795[6] and168484.[7]
Revocation of Appointments by the
Civil Service Commission Field
Office
Relative to this main case, on August 1, 2001, the CSC Field Office in
Dumaguete City, through Director II Fabio R. Abucejo, revoked and invalidated
the appointments of the petitioners (the August 1, 2001 Order) based of the
following findings:
1. There were a total of 15 promotional appointments and 74 original
appointments issued as reflected in the submitted [Report of Personnel
Actions] ROPA for the month of June 2001.
2. There was only one (1) en banc meeting of the City Personnel Selection Board
(PSB) held on 5 June 2001 to consider the number of appointments thus

issued and there was no other call for a PSB meeting certified to by the City
[Human Resource Management Officer] HRMO.
3. There were no minutes available to show the deliberations of the PSB of the
89 appointments listed in the ROPA as certified by the City HRMO.
4. There were no PSB statements certifying that there was actual screening and
evaluation done on all candidates for each position.
5. The appointing officer of the 89 appointments was an outgoing local official
who lost during the 14 May 2001 elections for City Mayor of Dumaguete
City.
6. The 89 appointments were all issued after the elections and when the new city
mayor was about to assume office.[8]

Director Abucejo invalidated the appointments as the same were done in

violation of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001, the pertinent portions
of which provide:
WHEREAS, the May 14, 2001 national and local elections have just
concluded and the Commission anticipates controversies that would arise
involving appointments issued by outgoing local chief executives immediately
before or after the elections;
WHEREAS, the Commission observed the tendency of some outgoing
local chief executives to issue appointments even after the elections, especially
when their successors have already been proclaimed.
WHEREAS, the practice of some outgoing local chief executives causes
animosities between the outgoing and incoming officials and the people who are
immediately affected and are made to suffer the consequences thereof are the
ordinary civil servants, and eventually, to a large extent, their constituents
themselves;
WHEREAS, one of the reasons behind the prohibition in issuing
appointments or hiring new employees during the prohibited period as provided
for in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 2001, is to prevent the
occurrence of the foregoing, among others;[9]
WHEREAS, local elective officials whose terms of office are about to
expire, are deemed as caretaker administrators who are duty bound to prepare
for the smooth and orderly transfer of power and authority to the incoming local
chief executives;

WHEREAS, under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the

President or Acting President is prohibited from making appointments two (2)
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety;
WHEREAS, while there is no equivalent provision in the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160) or in the Civil Service Law (Book
V of Executive Order No. 292) of the abovestated prohibition, the rationale
against the prohibition on the issuance of midnight appointments by the
President is applicable to appointments extended by outgoing local chief
executives immediately before and/or after the elections;
xxxx
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission, pursuant to its constitutional
mandate as the control personnel agency of the government, hereby issues and
adopts the following guidelines:
xxxx
3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment,
promotion or demotion, except in cases of renewal and reinstatement, regardless
of status, which are issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of
effectivity and/or date of receipt by the Commission, including its Regional or
Field Offices, of said appointments or the Report of Personnel Actions (ROPA) as
the case may be, shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur
relative to their issuance:
a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel
Selection Board (PSB) before the prohibited period on the issuance of
appointments as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its meeting;
b) That the appointee is qualified;
c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice
public service and/or endanger public safety;
d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after
the elections.
4. The term mass appointments refers to those issued in bulk or in large
number after the elections by an outgoing local chief executive and there is no
apparent need for their immediate issuance.

On September 4, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

August 1, 2001 Order before the CSC Region VII Office in Cebu. The motion
was, however, denied on the ground that it should have been filed before the office
of Director Abucejo in Dumaguete City. Thereafter, on October 31, 2001,
petitioners asked the CSC Region VII Office in Cebu to treat their previous Motion
for Reconsideration as their appeal.
On February 14, 2002, the CSC Region VII Office affirmed the August 1,
2001 Order. Subsequently, an Appeal to the Commission en banc was filed
through registered mail by 52 of the original 89 appointees, the petitioners herein,
namely:
Name
1. Leah M. Nazareno
2. Carlo M. Cual
3.
4.
5.
6.

Rogelio B. Clamonte
Florecita Llosa
Rogelio S. Villarubia
Rossel Marie G. Gutierrez

Former Position

New Position

Legal Researcher
Legislative Staff
Officer I
Public Services
Supply Officer I
Agriculturist II
Casual/Plantilla

Asst. Dept. Head I

Legislative Staff
Officer III
Supply Officer IV
Records Officer II
Agriculturist III
Supervising
Environmental
Management
Specialist
Dentist II
Social Welfare
Officer I
Records Officer II

7. Nicanor F. Villarosa, Jr.

8. Marie Sue Cual

Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla

9. Miramichi
Majella
B.
Mariot
10. Alma F. Ramirez
11. Antolin D. Zamar, Jr.
12. Mario S. Aliling
13. Teodulo Salvoro, Jr.
14. Philip Janson Altamarino
15. Antonieta Padura
16. Adolfo Cornelia
17. Ian Ryan Patula
18. William Tanoy
19. Victor Arbas

Casual/Plantilla

20. Jeanith Cual

Casual/Plantilla

Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla

Clerk IV
Metro Aide II
Driver II
Metro Aide II
Clerk I
Metro Aide II
Metro Aide II
Metro Aide II
Metro Aide II
Public Services
Foreman
Utility Worker II

Date of
Appointment
7-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01

5-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
5-Jun-01

Name

Former Position

New Position

21. Braulio Sayson

Casual/Plantilla

22. Dawn Villarosa

23. Agustin Rendoque
24. Enriqueta Tumongha
25. Lionel Banogon
26. Rosalito Vergantinos

Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla

27. Mario Cual, Jr.

28. Elaine Tumongha

Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla

29. Norman Villarosa

30. Ricardo C. Patula

Casual/Plantilla
Casual/Plantilla

31. Rachel Banagua

32. Rodolfo Calugcugan
33. Pergentino Cual
34. Bernard Ozoa
35. Roger J. Aromin
36. Cheryl Nocete
37. Marivic Sanchez
38. Crispin Duran
39. Rebeco Lingcong
40. Anna Lee Estrabela
41. Melchor Maquiling
42. Raul Molas

Casual/Plantilla
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order

Mechanical Plant
Supervisor
Clerk I
Utility Worker I
Utility Worker II
Clerk II
Pest Control
Worker II
Utility Foreman
Registration
Officer I
Utility Worker I
Revenue
Collection Clerk I
Utility Worker I
Driver I
Metro Aide II
Utility Worker I
Utility Worker I
Utility Worker I
Utility Worker I
Metro Aide II
Metro Aide II
Cash Clerk III
Engineer I
Construction and
Maintenance
Foreman
Electrician II
Engineering Aide
Metro Aide II
Dental Aide
Pest Control
Worker II
Utility Worker II
Metro Aide II
Metro Aide II
Traffic Aide I
Asst. Dept. Head I

43. Oscar Kinikito

44. Darwin Conejos
45. Romel Cual
46. Roqueta Amor
47. Diosdado Lajato
48. Paul Pino
49. Lito Piero
50. Rodulfo Zosa, Jr.
51. Jorge Arbolado
52. Ricardo M. Gonzales, Jr.

Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
Job Order
OIC-General
Services Officer

Date of
Appointment
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
7-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
11-Jun-01
5-Jun-01
5-Jun-01

Ruling of the CSC en banc and the

Court of Appeals
On August 23, 2004, the CSC en banc issued Resolution No. 040932 denying
petitioners' appeal, and affirming the invalidation of their appointments on the
ground that these were mass appointments made by an outgoing local chief
executive.[10] The Commission explained:
The rationale behind the prohibition in CSC Resolution No. 01-0988 is not
hard to comprehend. The prohibition is designed to discourage losing candidates
from extending appointments to their protgs or from giving their constituents
promised positions (CSC Resolution No. 97-0317 dated January 17, 1997, Re:
Roldan B. Casinillo). Moreover, the same is intended to prevent the outgoing
local chief executive from hurriedly issuing appointments which would subvert
the policies of the incoming leadership. Thus, any means that would directly or
indirectly circumvent the purposes for which said Resolution was promulgated
should not be allowed, particularly when the appointments were issued by the
appointing authority who lost in said election.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the

Commission on April 11, 2005, through CSC Resolution No. 050473.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00665. On August 28, 2007, the Court of
Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed CSC Resolution No. 040932 dated August
23, 2004 and CSC Resolution No. 050473 dated April 11, 2005, ratiocinating that:
The spirit behind CSC Resolution No. 010988 is evident from its preamble.
It was issued to thwart the nefarious practice by outgoing local chief executives in
making appointments before, during, and/or after the regular local elections for
ulterior partisan motives. Said practice being analogous to midnight
appointments by the President or Acting President, the CSC then promulgated
Resolution No. 010988, to suppress the mischief and evils attributed to mass
appointments made by local chief executives.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals

in a Resolution dated January 11, 2008.
THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

Before us, petitioners maintain that CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid
because the Commission is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass
appointments at the local government level. Petitioners cite De Rama v. Court of
Appeals[11] which held that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is only
applicable to the President or Acting President. They claim that outgoing or
defeated local appointing authorities are authorized to make appointments of
qualified individuals until their last day in office, and that not all mass
appointments are invalid. Finally, petitioners claim that because Dumaguete City
had been granted authority to take final action on all appointments, the
Commission did not have any authority to disapprove the appointments made by
outgoing mayor Remollo.
In their Comment dated May 15, 2008,[12] respondents argue that petitioners
appointments violated civil service rules and regulations other than CSC
Resolution No. 010988. Respondents also assert that the Commission is
authorized to invalidate the petitioners appointments, because the CSC
accreditation program carried with it the caveat that said exercise of authority
shall be subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations. Finally, respondents
claim that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping because the issues in this case
and in G.R. No. 177795 are the same.
OUR RULING
We find that the Civil Service Commission has the authority to issue CSC
Resolution No. 010988 and that the invalidation of petitioners appointments was
warranted. Consequently, we affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 28, 2007 and its Resolution dated January 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 00665.
The CSC has the authority to
establish rules to promote efficiency
in the civil service
The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, [13] has
statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and
professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807,[14] or the Civil

Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission,
including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments:
Section 9: Powers and functions of the Commission The Commission
shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
(b)

Prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for

carrying into effect the provisions of this Decree x x x

(c)

Promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service and
adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient, and
effective personnel administration in the government;

xxxx
(h)

Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in

the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the
armed forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualifications; (Emphasis supplied)

Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, also provides:
Section 12:
Powers and Functions The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
(2)

prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;

(3)

promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the Civil Service and
adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient, and effective
personnel administration in the government;

(4)

take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in

the Civil Service including extension of Service beyond retirement age;

(5)

inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, offices, local government units, and other
instrumentalities of the government, including government owned and
controlled corporations. (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the above-cited statutory provisions authorize the Commission to

prescribe, amend, and enforce rules to cover the civil service. The legislative
standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority
are set out in the statutes, to wit: to promote economical, efficient, and effective
personnel administration.
The Reasons behind CSC Resolution
No. 010988
We also find that there was substantial reason behind the issuance of CSC
Resolution No. 010988. It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against
the issuance of mass appointments by defeated local government officials prior
to the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a midnight
appointment, proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those appointments
made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election. [15] As
we ruled in De Rama v. Court of Appeals:[16]
The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling
the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the
only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight
appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.

However, even while affirming De Rama, we explained in Quirog v. Aumentado,

[17]
that:
We, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean
that the raison d' etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may
not be applied to those made by chief executives of local government units, as
here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even
preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan
purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new
policies. (Emphasis supplied)

Quirog also involved the disapproval of an appointment for non-compliance

with CSC Resolution No. 010988. However, we found that Quirogs appointment

was made on June 1, 2001, or three days prior to the issuance of CSC Resolution
No. 010988. As such, we ruled that the retroactive application of the law was not
warranted.
In Sales v. Carreon, Jr.,[18] we had occasion to discuss the reasons behind the
prohibition by the Commission of mass appointments after the
elections. Salesinvolved the issuance of 83 appointments made by then Dapitan
City Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz in his last month of office (on June 1, 18, and
27, 2001), which the newly elected Mayor, Rodolfo H. Carreon, subsequently
revoked, on the ground that these violated CSC Resolution No. 010988 in relation
to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban on issuing
appointments in the civil service during the election period. In Sales, we declared:
This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief
executives to issue "midnight" appointments, especially after their successors
have been proclaimed. It does not only cause animosities between the outgoing
and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those
appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments
instead of attending to their functions.[19]

It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on appointments

before and after the elections. Appointments are banned prior to the elections to
ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to
prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To
this end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the
Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. [20] After the elections, appointments
by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned
in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and
incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in
implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not
used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the
outgoing local officials.
Not all Mass Appointments are
Prohibited

Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials
are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all mass
appointments. However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone
the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to
fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in
bulk. In Nazareno v. Dumaguete,[21] we explained:
CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not totally proscribe the local chief
executive from making any appointments immediately before and after elections.
The same Resolution provides that the validity of an appointment issued
immediately before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive is to
be determined on the basis of the nature, character, and merit of the
individual appointment and the particular circumstances surrounding the
same.

Corollarily, we held in Sales,[22] that:

x x x [e]ach appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature,
character, and merits of the individual appointment and the circumstances
surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en masse by
the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried
maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and
propriety that this Court has struck down "midnight" appointments.

In the instant case, Mayor Remollo issued the 89 original and promotional
appointments on three separate dates, but within a ten-day period, in the same
month that he left office.[23] Further, the Commissions audit found violations of
CSC rules and regulations that justified the disapproval of the appointments. In
this regard,CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, otherwise known as the Revised
Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, provides:
Section 1 Appointments submitted to the CSC office concerned should
meet the requirements listed hereunder. Non-compliance with such requirements
shall be grounds for disapproval of said appointments:
xxxx
(h) Personnel Selection Board (PSB) Evaluation/Screening. Appointees
should be screened and evaluated by the PSB, if applicable. As proof thereof, a
certification signed by the Chairman of the Board at the back of the appointment
or alternatively, a copy of the proceedings/ minutes of the Boards deliberation

shall be submitted together with the appointment. The issuance of the

appointment shall not be earlier than the date of the final screening/deliberation of
the PSB.

Here, there was only one en banc meeting of the city PSB to consider the
appointments, without any evidence that there were any deliberations on the
qualifications of the petitioners, or any indication that there was an urgent need for
the immediate issuance of such appointments. The absence of evidence showing
careful consideration of the merits of each appointment, and the timing and the
number of appointments, militate against petitioners cause. On the contrary, the
prevailing circumstances in this case indicate that the appointments were hurriedly
issued by the outgoing administration.
The Accreditation of Dumaguete
City did not remove the CSCs
authority to review appointments
We find that the authority granted by CSC Resolution No. 992411 to the City
Government of Dumaguete to take final action on all its appointments did not
deprive the Commission of its authority and duty to review appointments. Indeed,
Resolution No. 992411 states that such exercise of authority shall be subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations and that appointments in violation of
pertinent rules shall immediately be invalidated.
Moreover, Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 provides that notwithstanding the initial approval of an
appointment, the same may be recalled for [v]iolation of other existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations. The CSC is empowered to take appropriate
action on all appointments and other personnel actions and that such power
includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.[24]
Petitioners have not engaged in
forum shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[25] Forum-shopping has been
defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered

in one forum, seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[26]
Although the factual antecedents of the cases brought before this Court are
the same, they involve different issues. The petition for Mandamus with Injunction
and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 13013, and raised before this Court as
G.R. No. 177795, challenged respondents refusal to recognize petitioners
appointments and to pay petitioners salaries, salary adjustments, and other
emoluments. The petition only entailed the applications for the issuance of a writ
ofmandamus and for the award of damages. The present case docketed as G.R.
No. 181559, on the other hand, involves the merits of petitioners appeal from
theinvalidation and revocation of their appointments by the CSC-Field Office,
which was affirmed by the CSC-Regional Office, CSC en banc, and the Court of
Appeals.
In any event, this issue had already been settled in our Decision of June 19,
2009 in G.R. No. 177795, which found petitioners not guilty of forum shopping, to
wit:
True, that the [Petition in G.R. No. 177795] and the one in G.R. No.
181559 are interrelated, but they are not necessarily the same for this Court to
adjudge that the filing of both by petitioners constitutes forum shopping. In G.R.
No. 181559, the Court will resolve whether or not the petitioners appointments
are valid. [In G.R. No. 177795], petitioners are claiming a right to the salaries,
salary adjustments and other emoluments during the pendency of the
administrative cases, regardless of how the CSC decided the validity of their
appointments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of

Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00665 dated August 28, 2007
affirming CSC Resolution No. 040932 dated August 23, 2004 and CSC Resolution
No. 050473 dated April 11, 2005, and its Resolution dated January 11, 2008
denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On official leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]

[7]

[8]

On official leave.
On leave.
Rollo, pp. 40-55; penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla and Stephen C. Cruz.
Id. at 57-59.
Id. at 212-214.
See Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, G.R. No. 177795, June 19, 2009.
Id.
Id. In this case, we affirmed the Decision dated March 27, 2007 and Order dated April 26, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court. We ruled that petitioners were not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering
respondents to pay petitioners salaries, salary adjustments, and other emoluments, from September 28, 2001
until final resolution of the case since there was no ministerial duty compellable by a writ of mandamus. We also
ruled that petitioners were not, as yet, entitled to an award for damages resulting from the invalidation of their
appointments.
Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 508. Involved in this case is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70254, and its
Resolutiondated May 6, 2005. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 41, dated September 26, 2001 and January 17, 2001, in Civil
Case No. 13013. We held that both the appointing authority and the appointee may question the disapproval of
an appointment. In this case, the appointing authority who had the right to assail the invalidation of the
appointment is the mayor occupying the position at the time of the institution of the appeal and not the former
mayor who made the assailed appointment. Aggrieved parties, including the Civil Service Commission and the
appointee, also have the right to file motions for reconsideration or to appeal.
Rollo, pp. 146-147.

[9]

Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2001, prescribes specific guidelines relating to the transfer, detail, and
issuance of appointments to civil personnel during elections, namely: (1) a prohibition on the transfer or detail of
personnel within the period from January 2, 2001 until June 13, 2001; and (2) a prohibition of new appointments,
promotions, or increases in salary from March 30, 2001 to May 14, 2001.

[10]

Rollo, pp. 148-157; penned by Commissioner Waldemar Valmores, and concurred in by Chairman Karina
Constantino-David and Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor.
G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 94, 102.
Rollo, pp. 124-173.
Article IX(B), Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs.
Providing For The Organization Of The Civil Service Commission In Accordance With Provisions Of The
Constitution, Prescribing Its Powers And Functions And For Other Purposes (October 6, 1975).
Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Supra note 11.
G.R. No. 163443, November 11, 2008.
G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007, 515 SCRA 597, 601.
In Sales, we found that there had not been proper publication of the vacancies, and there was no first level
representative to the Personnel Selection Board, as required by existing laws and regulations.
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides:
"x x x The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases
During the period of forty five (45) days before regular election and thirty days before a special election (1) any
head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether
provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be
filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be
filled in a manner that may influence the election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need;
Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the
date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void.

[11]
[12]
[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]

[20]

[21]
[22]
[23]

COMELEC Resolution No. 3401, entitled Enforcement Of The Prohibition Against Appointment Or Hiring Of
New Employees; Creation Or Filling Up Of New Positions, Giving Salary Increases; Transferring/Detailing Civil
Service Employees; And Suspension Of Elective Local Officials In Connection With The May 14, 2001
Elections (15 December 2000), also prohibited appointments prior to the elections:
SECTION 1. Prohibited Acts
xxxx
(b) Beginning March 30, 2001 until May 14, 2001, no head, official or appointing officer of any national
or local government office, agency or instrumentally, including government owned or controlled corporation
shall: (1) appoint or hire any new employee, whether permanent, provisional, temporary or casual; or (2) create
and fill any new positions, except upon prior authority of the Commission.
Supra note 4.
Supra note 18, at 603-604.
The assumption date of the winning mayoralty candidate Mayor Perdices was on June 30, 2001.

[24]

[25]

[26]

Sales, supra note 18; Mathay v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 130214, August 9, 1999, 312 SCRA
91,102; Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111471, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 184, 200.
Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14,
2004, 427 SCRA 585, 590.
Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, G.R. No. 146717, May 19, 2006, 490 SCRA 14,
18; Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 207, 217.
Today is Sunday, March 16, 2014

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 154512

November 12, 2002

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA
Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA,
PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS
ABALLA, JR. respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. 154683

November 12, 2002

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
----------------------------G.R. Nos. 155083-84

November 12, 2002

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves
into a Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.
The PRA was convened to initiate the recall2 of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as
Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the
Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in
Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days
from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due
course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc3 promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and periods
of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002
to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before the
COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate
of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. ("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No.
02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as
SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all
anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division 4 dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492
and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall
election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and
Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

G.R. No. 154512

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which
gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the
following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not
all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and
legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective
constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were
conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the
recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be
enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an
additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673
insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the candidates
an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional 15
days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in
SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor in the
recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in
the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post aP20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as
those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates
Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to
assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.

The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa
on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only
10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15
days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite
the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however,
found that
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said
notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were
attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective
officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and careful
verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA concerned
approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the
veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon proper
review, all documents submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was
validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'

x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC,
unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to
PRA members, we ruled that
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of
the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the
Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by
gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority
of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument
deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had
not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall
assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his
representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to
the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets,
notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to
examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and
in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official was elected."

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.
The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The
clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election,
like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is
no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there
would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms. This is clear
from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:6 We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these are
Alternative No. I where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is
no immediate reelection after three successive terms." 7
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term
of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2)
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)."8
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the term limits of Senators 9 and
Representatives of the House.10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election
involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional
Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection
after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term limit,
then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit.
The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." 11

In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is instructive:
"GASCON:12 I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the
Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:13 That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that
period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election
following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year
thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years.
That was the Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least." 14 (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years 15 following his completion of two terms.
The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any
subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the
period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third
consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking
referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive
terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for
mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the
maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the
2001 elections.16 Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor
on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over
his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the
same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service
as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms
ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation
of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new
recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The clear
intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office
and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of

continuity of service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an
interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term
of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to
break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,18 a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a
portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had
served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard
G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12,
2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for
mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was
deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001
elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of
his service as mayor. Talaga's recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption,
there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents
his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case,
we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall
term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference
between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the
respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election. Talaga's recall
term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact, then he
would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior to
the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired
term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity
of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full
term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be
disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then
can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years,
retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This
Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the
people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the
people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they

adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the
same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering
that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'" 19 (Emphasis supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official
elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of
counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ:20 For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term?
So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is
that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House." 21
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies
to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine
consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should
know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running
and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa
because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended
on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24,
2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30,
2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose
their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in
the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.

Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No. 154512 and G.R. No. 154683. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution.
Dismissal then of G.R. No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still hold on to my dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511
(Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100, 121 [1993]) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section
70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is unconstitutional.
Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its
Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the subsequent Resolution of the
COMELEC giving the candidates an additional campaign period of fifteen days from 7 September 2002 rendered moot and
academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The dismissal of the petition therein is also in order.
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R. Nos. 155083-84. I respectfully submit that
private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall
election in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an Interruption In the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates this constitutional restriction,
thus: SEC. 43. Term of office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the Committee on Local Governments of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986. It was introduced at the plenary session by Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. Commenting thereon in his book entitled "The Intent of 1986 Constitution Writers" (1995 ed., p. 699),
Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:
This provision was not found among the Committee's proposals but came as an amendment proposed by
Commissioner Davide. It was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.
Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local officials from serving for more
than three consecutive terms.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory Provision) of the Constitution, and

Executive Order No. 270, as amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election, that is, the election for the first
term under the Constitution for elective local officials, was on 18 January 1988. By express provision of Section 5
of R.A. No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June
1992. The second election, i.e., the election for the second term of elective local officials which expired at noon of
30 June 1995, for elective local officials, was on the second Monday of May 1992 pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An
Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third election, i.e.,
for the third term which expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166. The fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was
on the second Monday of May 1998. The fifth election, i.e., for the fifth term which would expire at noon of 30
June 2004, was on the second Monday of May 2001.Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160, a local official elected in the first local election of 18 January 1988 may be
reelected in the synchronized elections in May 1992 and in May 1995. He could not seek another reelection in the
May 1998 election because that would have been his fourth term. Similarly, a local official who was elected in the
May 1992 election could be reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections.
Private respondent Hagedorn was first elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992 election. He was reelected
in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May 1998 election, expired on 30 June
2001. Therefore, he was constitutionally and statutorily barred from seeking reelection In the May 2001 election, which would
have been his fourth term.
The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof:
"the term of office of elective local officials ... shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive
terms." In short, an elective local official who has served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking reelection for the succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree
when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a
candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001
election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion
between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from
"involuntary severance" from office and the term of office to which it relates.
Let me first discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of "no Immediate reelection after
three consecutive terms." In support of its affirmative conclusion the ponencia quotes the Manifestation of Commissioner Romulo
as entered in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term
of Representatives and local officials, namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2)
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for elective national and local officials. However, the
Commission decided to consider first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer the discussion on the term of elective
local officials until the Commission would consider the report of the Committee on Local Governments. On this point I quote the
pertinent portions of Volume Two, pages 238-245 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its proceedings on 25 July
1986:
THE PRESIDENT. Maybe it will be of help we Just remind ourselves that what we have before us now is the
report of the Committee on the Legislative. Therefore, maybe we should confine ourselves first to what is covered

by the report which is the term of office of the Senators and the Representatives.And with respect to the local
officials, let us await the report of the Committee on Local Governments as to its recommendation on this matter.
MR. RODRIGO. As a matter of fact, I will go further than that, it is my belief, as regards local officials, that we
should leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT. So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the Chairman of the Committee
on the Legislative?
MR. RODRIGO. I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we first talk about the term of
office of the Representatives because we are now discussing the legislative department.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of office of the Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. But are we agreed on these two proposals - the one of Commissioner Garcia where there is
no further election after a total of three terms and the other where there is no Immediate reelection after three
successive terms?
MR. OPLE. Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided to consider the
synchronization of elections. And from that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the terms and decided
related questions within the context of synchronization. Are we now abandoning the original task of
synchronization which could only be fully settled in terms of delimitations on the proposed terms of the President
and the Vice-President, the Members of Congress and the local officials, or do we want to postpone the
synchronization task to a later time after we hear from the Committee on Local Governments and the other
concerned committees?
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of Commissioner Ople?
MR. ROMULO. In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task, because we have decided
on the officials' absolute terms. All we are really talking about now is whether or not they are eligible for
reelection, and I think those are separable issues.
MR. OPLE. If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization task, then I think that is
something to be thankful about. But considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the Acting Floor
Leader that the election of the local officials should be eliminated from the consideration of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO. Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the Members of the House of
Representatives.
MR. OPLE. And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after the elimination
of the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, I think so.


THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, as worded, It is a personal disqualification.
MR. ROMULO. We are now ready to vote, Madam President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots. Anyway the voting would take
only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.
It was 3:40 p.m.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
MR. GASCON. Madam President, may I have a clarification before we count the ballots. The voting now is just for
Representatives. We are not speaking of the term of office of the Senators yet. Is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT. The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.
This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR. GASCON. I think the Issue of whether the Senators could run again for election after their two consecutive
terms or 12 years after a lapse of a period of time has not yet been finalized.
THE PRESIDENT. I beg the Commissioner's pardon.
MR. GASCON. Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.

Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//

Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2; Alternative
No. 2 is approved.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say?
MR. ROMULO. Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some doubts as to the term of
office of the Senators, so I propose that we similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my understanding this
morning that when we voted for the term of office of the Senators, they would not be perpetually disqualified.
THE PRESIDENT. From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to Scheme
No. II; that is, with one reelection. This is already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader propose that we
vote again?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting for six
years they can run again. That is the question that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE PRESIDENT. This morning, Scheme No. I, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with one
reelection - 22 votes; Scheme No. III, no limit on reelection - 17 votes.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with one reelection, the Senator
is perpetually disqualified, so that is a similar question to what we had posed with regard to the House of
Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is perpetually disqualified
after serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualified or he can hibernate - the very word used
- for six years and then run again for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other words, he is entitled
to one immediate reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Another point, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the same

office.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS. In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a period of hibernation, we
have to clarify how long that should be. It could be three years, because in the proposed scheme, every three
years we can elect the Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting Floor
Leader so that we will know what we are going to vote on.
The session is suspended
It was 3:58 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the schemes
are as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the - second scheme is, no immediate
reelection after two successive terms.
Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of
Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT. Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I - /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme No. II
approved.
All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in preparation of their report.
So can we leave this matter now?
The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local officials without immediate reelection was
taken up by the Constitutional Commission much later or specifically on 16 August 1986. On this point, the
pertinent portions of Vol. Three, pages 406-408, Record of the Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.
After Section 4, I propose to Insert a new section to be denominated later as Section 5. It provides as
follows: THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS,
WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL
SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF
THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN
THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. This is in
accordance with the mandate of the Commission when we voted on the terms of officials up to local
officials, excluding the term of barangay officials which was a very specific exception.
MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay
officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT. May we have the reaction of the Committee?

MR. NOLLEDO. The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment?

MR. OPLE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Ople is recognized.'
MR. OPLE. May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.
MR. NOLLEDO. May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.
MR. DAVIDE. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS,
WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND N SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE
FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS
SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

THE PRESIDENT. Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.

Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner Davide which has been read to the body?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the proposed section is approved.
I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of "no immediate reelection" after three
consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the "no immediate reelection" after the 3-term
limit would equally apply to the elective local officials. This accounted for the immediate acceptance by the
Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban
against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to thefourth term, i.e., the term immediately
following the three consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be
able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to restfor the entire immediately succeeding fourth term.
On the next fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent
portions of the debates, recorded in Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:Scheme No. I is without reelection;
Scheme No. II is with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is for 'the Senators.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please consolidate the results of the
voting for President and Vice-President.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we are ready. THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will
please proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I - ///

Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-//
Scheme No. Ill - /////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17 votes for
Scheme No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives, the Congressmen. I
would assume we can use the same choices. Does any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some questions.
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. Scheme No. II says "the Vice-President - with one reelection."
THE PRESIDENT. No, that is for Senators.'
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Guenon is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I suggest one more scheme - with two reelections for the Members of the House of
Representatives?
THE PRESIDENT. So, we shall distribute ballots again.
MR. ROMULO. While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four propositions for
Congressmen: '
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.
Scheme No. III, with two reelections.
Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection. I
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.

MR. DE LOS REYES. The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three years, according to
the first voting; the term of the Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will be 12 years. So, in order for a
Member of the House of Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be entitled to three reelections. I
propose another scheme with three reelections to make it equal.
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my ballot already
and if I erase, this might be disqualified as a marked ballot.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro Is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by Scheme No. II
which we agreed upon earlier. The situation will not happen, because both the Senators and the Congressmen
will have five (5) years on the first election. So, the possibility that the Senators will have a longer term than the
Congressmen is remote.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not really mutually exclusive.
Can we have only these three: without reelection, with reelection and with unlimited reelection? We are asking
here for plurality only, Madam President. Can we eliminate?
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators; without reelection,
with one reelection and unlimited reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.
MR. MONSOD. I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the highest votes be voted upon to
get the key majority. For example, if the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election get the highest
number of votes, then we vote again to get the key majority.
THE PRESIDENT. We will do that. Are all the votes in?
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have 43 ballots.
THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - 0

Scheme No. II - //
Scheme No. III - /////-/////-/////-/////-/
Scheme No. IV - /////-/////-////
Scheme No. V - /////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for Scheme
No. III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is approved.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.. I would like to ask a question for clarification.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this mean two immediate
reelections, or a term of nine consecutive years? Let us say that a Member of the Lower House has been
reelected twice; that means he will serve for nine years. Can he let three years elapse and then run again?
THE PRESIDENT. We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer the question.
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two successive reelections. So
he cannot serve beyond nine consecutive years.
MR. RODRIGO. Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE. Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO. But after nine years he can let one
MR. DAVIDE. He can rest. He can hibernate for three years.
MR. RODRIGO. And run again.
MR. DAVIDE. He can run again.
MR. RODRIGO. And again have nine years as a maximum.
MR. DAVIDE. I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main proponent of this
proposal on two reelections. I would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the record. (underscoring
supplied for emphasis.)
The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" as used in Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from office" is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From
the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three

consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered "involuntary severance from office" because there was
nothing to be severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from
seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede
that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the
rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is not applicable in the case of
Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place during any of the three terms; hence, the
term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance
took place during any of his three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No.
7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very
clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local
official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he
resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a
penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of
Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in the May 2001
election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that
case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of
12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive terms.
Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between Commissioner Suarez and Commissioner Davide
found on page 592, Vol. II of the Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted on pages 19-20 of the ponencia:
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to
serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already
considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the
Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of "term" And if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired
portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the
Lower House.
On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that the term of office of one who is elected in a
special election is considered one term for purposes of determining the three consecutive terms.
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for
which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to hold Is to subvert the rationale of the
three-consecutive-term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound
governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to
hold on to power would spend the first year of the fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of
said term. This would' not be a problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong political machinery.
Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto
Princesa City is oneMark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as interim Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC holding private
respondent Edward Hagedorn a qualified candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election, and to
declare him DISQUALIFIED from seeking reelection for a fourth term or from being a candidate for Mayor in the recall election in

question.

CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr. Justice Carpio speaks for itself. Nonetheless, the complex constitutional
dimensions of the issue for resolution compels this humble concurring opinion. The issue is whether private respondent
Hagedorn is disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City and from
serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term considering that he has thrice been consecutively elected and has
served three full terms as Puerto Princesa City mayor from 1992-1998. In illuminating the gray interstices of this election case,
prudence dictates that ". . . where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically
correct."1
Private respondent Hagedorn was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in 1992, 1995 and 1998 and served three full
terms. In the May 14, 2001 national and local elections, he ran for governor for the Province of Palawan and lost. Petitionerintervenor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City.
On July 2, 2002, three hundred twelve (312) out of five hundred twenty-eight (528) members of the Barangay Officials of Puerto
Princesa City convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Mayor Socrates. On August 21,
2002, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing a calendar of activities for the recall election. Two days after,
Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in said election.
On August 27, 2002, petitioners Adovo and Gilo sought for Hagedorn's immediate disqualification on the ground that he had
served three consecutive full terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa City immediately prior to the recall election and was thus
proscribed by the Constitution from running in said election. On August 30, 2002, petitioner Ollave, Sr. intervened to disqualify
Hagedorn on the same ground.
The recall election was set on September 24, 2002. On September 20, 2002, public respondent COMELEC's First Division
denied the petitions for Hagedorn's disqualification. The following day, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. filed a motion for
reconsideration imploring the COMELEC en banc to reverse the September 20 resolution. On September 23, 2002, the
COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of the First Division holding Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
On September 24, 2002, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. sought recourse in this Court with a Very Urgent Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. On the same date, Mayor
Socrates filed a petition-in-intervention to nullify the September 23 resolution of the COMELEC.
The petitions before us raise the following issues:
"I.
THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT
DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY IN THE SCHEDULED
RECALL ELECTION, THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST A
FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM FOR LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS NOTWITHSTANDING.
II.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO DIVIDE A
SINGLE TERM OF OFFICE INTO TWO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE INTENT AND PURPOSE
FOR HOLDING THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTIONS FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BAR AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS
NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING IN THE UPCOMING RECALL ELECTIONS AS HIS INELIGIBILITY IS NOT APPARENT
UNDER SECTIONS 65 AND 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, SECTIONS 39 AND 40 OF RA 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE), AND RULES 23 AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
V.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT
HAGEDORN IS QUALIFIED TO RUN IN THE RECALL ELECTION EVEN IF HE STANDS DISQUALIFIED FROM SERVING
UNDER A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM AS SUCH IS ALLEGEDLY NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE INSTANT
DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.
VI.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A DEFECTIVE AND
CLEARLY VOID RESOLUTION."2
The foregoing issues may be reduced to the singular issue of whether or not private respondent Hagedorn is disqualified from
running in the September 24, 2002 recall election and serving as mayor of Puerto Princesa City considering that he has been
thrice consecutively elected and has served three full terms in that position from 1992 to 2001.
I find the petitions devoid of merit.
Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:
"Sec. 8: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This constitutional provision is restated in the Local Government Code of 1991, to wit:
"Sec. 43. Term of Office. -. . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected."
We have not interpreted Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in the recall election context of the cases at bar. It is imperative to distill
the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the people who ratified it. 3 Mere reliance on the surface meaning of the words of
the above provision, however, will not suffice to capture this elusive intent. Thus, we turn to the proceedings and debates of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) as an extrinsic aid to interpretation. 4 The Record of the Constitutional Commission shows

that Art. X. Sec. 8 was readily accepted by the Commissioners without much discussion; 5 nonetheless, their debates on setting
the term limit for Representatives show that the rationale for the limit applies to both Representatives and elective local officials.
We quote at length the relevant portions of the debates, to wit:
"MR. GARCIA. I would like to advocate the proposition that no further election for local and legislative officials be
allowed after a total of three terms or nine years. I have four reasons why I would like to advocate this proposal,
which are as follows: (1) to prevent monopoly of political power; (2) to broaden the choice of the people; (3) so
that no one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country; (4) to create a reserve of statesmen both in the
national and local levels. May I explain briefly these four reasons.
First: To prevent monopoly of political power - Our history has shown that prolonged stay in public office
can lead to the creation of entrenched preserves of political dynasties. In this regard, I would also like to
advocate that immediate members of the families of public officials be barred from occupying the same
position being vacated.
Second: To broaden the choice of the people - Although individuals have the right to present themselves
for public office, our times demand that we create structures that will enable more aspirants to offer to
serve and to provide the people a broader choice so that more and more people can be enlisted to the
cause of public service, not just limited only to those who may have the reason or the advantage due to
their position.
Third: No one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country After the official's more than a
decade or nearly a decade of occupying the same public office, I think we should try to encourage a more
team-oriented consensual approach to governance favored by a proposal that will limit public servants to
occupy the same office for three terms. And this would also favor not relying on personalities no matter
how heroic, some of whom, in fact, are now in our midst.
Lastly, the fact that we will not reelect people after three terms would also favor the creation of a reserve
of statesmen both in the national and local levels.
Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure that new ideas and new approaches will be welcome. Public
office will no longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition. At the same time, we will create a reserve of
statesmen, both in the national and local levels, since we will not deprive the community of the wealth of
experience and advice that could come from those who have served for nine years in public office.
Finally, the concept of public service, if political dynasty symbolized by prolonged stay in particular public offices
is barred will have fuller meaning. It will not be limited only to those who directly hold public office, but also to
consultative bodies organized by the people, among whom could be counted those who have served in public
office with accomplishment and distinction, for public service must no longer be limited only to public office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this draft
Constitution, we are recognizing people power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of
voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they will
choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has decreed that those who have served
for a period of nine years are barred from running for the same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are very skilled and
good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be Senators. They may be perfectly honest,

perfectly competent and with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we
provide for Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them to pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here only of
congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the people's choice but we are making a
prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting an
additional qualification for office - that the officials must not have served a total of more than a number of
years in their lifetime.
Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but the
future participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may only be in some areas, but we are
saying that they are going to be barred from running for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his skills
and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is
going to be barred from the same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with respect to many
of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let us
give them this rest period of three years or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their
fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us not bar them for life after serving
the public for a number of years.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE. . . . The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual
disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as
decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about the Commission exercising a sort of
omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating
themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a gap on consecutive service - in
the case of the President, six years; in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators,
one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list
and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be
taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent
future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President
down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those
powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their
families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or unbroken
service of all of these officials. But were we now (to) decide to put these prospective servants of the people or
politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are
taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of
their own freedom of choice.
I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of Representatives here will say that simply getting nominated
on a party ticket is a very poor assurance that the people will return them to the Senate or to the House of
Representatives. There are many casualties along the way of those who want to return to their office, and it is the
people's decision that matters. They judge whether or not a Soc Rodrigo, a Sumulong, a Padilla, an Alonto and a
Rosales, after a first and second term, should go back to the Senate. That is a prerogative of the people that we

should not take away from them -the right to judge those who have served. In any case, we already take away
from the people the freedom to vote for the third termers because we say that a Senator, say, Mr. Rodrigo, is only
good for twelve years. But if he wants to be like Cincinnatus, if he is called back by his people to serve again, let
us say for a period of six years which Commissioner Davide called a period of hibernation which is spent at his
fishpond in Bulacan, Bulacan - because there is a new situation in the country that fairly impels the people to
summon him back, like Cincinnatus in the past, then there will no longer be any Cincinnatus.
That is not perhaps a very important point, but I think we already have succeeded in striking a balance of policies,
so that the structures, about which Commissioner Garcia expressed a very legitimate concern, could henceforth
develop to redistribute opportunities, both in terms of political and economic power, to the great majority of the
people, because very soon, we will also discuss the multiparty system. We have unshackled the Philippine
politics from the two-party system, which really was the most critical support for the perpetuation of political
dynasties in the Philippines. That is quite a victory, but at the same time, let us not despise the role of political
parties. The strength of democracy will depend a lot on how strong our democratic parties are, and a splintering
of all these parties so that we fall back on, let us say, nontraditional parties entirely will mean a great loss to the
vitality and resiliency of our democracy...
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BISHOP BACANI. . . . I think when we voted on the provision that the illiterate be allowed to vote and when we
proposed in this Constitutional Commission for initiative as a way also of empowering our people to engage in the
legislative exercise, we are really presupposing the political maturity of our people. Why is it that that political
maturity seems now to be denied by asking that we should put a constitutional bar to a further election of any
Representative after a term of three years? Why should we not leave that to the premise accepted by practically
everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient
for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to
serve longer?
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MR. GARCIA. I would like to answer Commissioner Bacani. We put a constitutional bar to reelection of any
Representative basically because of the undue advantage of the incumbent. It is not because of lack of trust in
the people. We realize from history that Mexico fought a revolution simply because of the issue of reelection. No
reeleccion, sufragio universal. Basically, it is because of the undue advantage of the incumbent that he
accumulates power, money, party machine or patronage. As regards what Commissioner Aquino has said, politics
is not won by ideals alone; it is won by solid organizing work by organizations that have the capacity to do so; and
normally the incumbent has all the advantages. . .
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THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/" 6 (emphasis
supplied)
In several cases, this Court was guided by the proceedings of the ConCom in construing Art. X, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution in relation to Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Different from the issue
presented by the cases at bar, however, the question in those cases was what constitutes a "term" for purposes

of counting the three consecutive terms allowed under Art. X, Sec. 8. It is apropos to revisit these cases to aid us
in extracting the intent behind said Constitutional provision and properly apply it to the unique case of private
respondent Hagedorn.
The maiden case was Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco 7 which involved the 1998
mayoralty election in Pateros. In 1989, private respondent Capco became mayor by operation of law upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. In 1992, he was elected mayor for a term ending in 1995. In 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending in June 1998. In March 1998, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 1998 mayoralty election of Pateros. Petitioner Borja, Jr., another candidate for mayor,
sought Capco's disqualification on the ground that by June 30, 1998, Capco would have already served as mayor
for three consecutive terms and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term. The COMELEC en banc
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor, thus Borja, Jr. sought recourse in this Court. In dismissing the petition,
we considered the historical background of Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, viz:
"a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no
further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner
Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term (2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 236-243 [Session of July 25, 1986] . . .). Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from]
whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft
constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'
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Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the
notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged
stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them be preserved. (emphasis supplied)
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To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following
cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the
next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full
term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8,
voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the
term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was
elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

xxx

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...the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have
not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding
his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. . .
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur
for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next
election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would
be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the
vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if,
on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the
third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their
freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."8 (emphasis supplied)
We reiterated the Borja ruling in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, et al. 9 which involved the election for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. Prior to the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In the May 1995 elections, he ran for mayor, was proclaimed winner, and assumed office. His
proclamation was, however, contested by his opponent Juan Alvez in an election protest filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales which rendered a decision declaring a failure of elections. Upon appeal of the decision to the COMELEC, Alvez was
declared the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. In February 1998, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida
to vacate the post, and Alvez served the remainder of the term.
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 election for mayor of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli
filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms in
the same office and was thus prohibited from running in the upcoming election. On May 13, 1998, Lonzanida was proclaimed
winner. COMELEC ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified as his assumption to office in 1995, although he was unseated before
the expiration of the term, was considered one full term for purposes of counting the three term limit under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991.
On appeal to this Court, we ruled, viz:
"It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the
petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by

reason of voluntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as a
winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation...
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term
from May 1995- 1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office
from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit." 10 (emphasis supplied)
Finally, in the recent case of Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al.,11 we ruled that a mayor who assumed office via a recall election and
served the unexpired portion of the mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full term for purposes of applying the three
term limit. In this case, therein private respondent Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992 and served the full term. In
1995, he was reelected and again served the full term. In 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. About two years later, a recall
election was held where Talaga, Jr. ran against Tagarao. He (Talaga, Jr.) won and served the remainder of Tagarao's term.
In view of the upcoming May 2001 mayoralty election, Talaga, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy. On March 2, 2001, therein
petitioner Adormeo sought the cancellation of Talaga, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy and/or his disqualification on the ground that
he had been thrice elected and had served three consecutive terms as city mayor. Talaga, Jr., however, was declared qualified
for the position of city mayor. Adormeo thus sought recourse before this Court.
Citing the Borja and Lonzanida rulings, we ruled that Talaga, Jr. was not disqualified as the two conditions for disqualification,
namely (1) the elective official concerned was elected for three consecutive terms in the same post and (2) he has fully served
three consecutive terms, were not met. We did not consider Talaga, Jr.'s service of the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as
service of a full term for purposes of the three term limit. We also ruled that he did not serve for three consecutive terms as there
was a break in his service when he lost to Tagarao in the 1998 elections. We held, viz:
"COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two
years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioner's contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election
violates Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. (footnote omitted) To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment
of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that 'if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired (term), no matter how short, will be considered one term for
the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.'
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives.
Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. (Rollo, pp. 83-84)" 12 (emphasis
supplied)
The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law of Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo show that there are two principal
reasons for the three term limit for elective local officials: (1) to prevent political dynasties perpetuated by the undue advantage of
the incumbent and (2) to broaden the choice of the people by allowing candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people.
Likewise evident in the deliberations is the effort to balance between two interests, namely, the prevention of political dynasties
and broadening the choice of the people on the one hand, and respecting the freedom of choice and voice of the people, on the
other; thus, the calibration between perpetual disqualification after three consecutive terms as proposed by Commissioner

Garcia, and setting a limit on immediate reelection and providing for a hibernation period.
In all three cases - Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo - we ruled that the "term" referred to in the three term limit is service of a full
term of three years for elective local officials. This ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to prevent political dynasties as it is
the service of consecutive full terms that makes service continuous and which opens the gates to political dynasties limiting the
people's choice of leaders. In the words Of Commissioner Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a
proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to
transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on
the continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. (emphasis supplied)" Thus, ConCom set the limit on consecutive full
terms to no more than three. Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is prohibited.
In the cases at bar, however, private respondent Hagedorn will not serve a prohibited fourth consecutive full term as he will be
serving only the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term. Similar to Talaga, Jr. in the Adormeo case, Hagedorn's
service as mayor will not be continuous from the third to a fourth consecutive full term as it was broken when Socrates was
elected in the 2001 regular mayoralty election and served for one year. In the same vein that Talaga, Jr. was elected into office by
recall election and his service of the unexpired portion of the incumbent's term was not considered a consecutive full term for
purposes of applying the three term limit, Hagedorn's service of the unexpired portion of Socrates' term should not also be
counted as a prohibited fourth consecutive full term. It should not make a difference whether the recall election came after the
second consecutive full term as in the Adormeo case or after the third consecutive term as in the cases at bar because the intent
to create a hiatus in service is satisfied in both instances.
Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the interpretation that what is prohibited is the service of a fourth consecutive
full term. Petitioners are correct in foisting the view that "term" is a fixed and definite period of time prescribed by law or the
Constitution during which the public officer may claim to hold the office as a right. It is a fixed and definite period of time to hold
office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments until the expiration of the period. 13 In ascertaining what
"term" means for elective local officials, the Constitution itself provides in Art. X, Sec. 8 that it means a fixed, definite, and full
period of three years, viz: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years ..." Although one or more persons may discharge the duties of the office during this fixed
three-year period, the term is not divided into smaller terms by the number of incumbents who may fill the office. It is one and
indivisible, and term follows term in successive cycles of three years each. If the incumbent or the one elected to the office fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, thereby creating a permanent vacancy,14 the term would
remain unbroken until the recurring election for the office. 15
The provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art. X, Sec. 8 and other articles of the Constitution bolster the interpretation that
for purposes of applying the three term limit, service of a full term of three years is contemplated, viz:
"Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected."
"Art. VI, Sec. 4. . . . No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
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Sec. 7. . . . No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full

term for which he was elected.

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Art. VII, Sec. 4. . . . No Vice-President shall serve more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected."
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in Sec. 43(b), viz:
"Sec. 43(b) . . . No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected." (emphasis supplied)
Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a fixed, definite, and full period, the Constitution, in Art. Vi, Sec. 9, uses the qualifier
"unexpired term" to refer to only a portion of a term, viz:
"Art. VI, Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term." (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 uses the phrase "unexpired term" to mean the remainder of the term,
viz:
"Sec. 44(d). The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of his predecessors. . ." (emphasis supplied)
Thus, when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that "...no such (local elective) official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms," it consistently means that it allows service of a maximum of three consecutive full terms and prohibits service
of a minimum fourth consecutive full term.
In putting a cap on the number of consecutive full terms an elective local official can serve, the ConCom sought to curb the
undue advantage of the incumbent over other aspirants, which advantage makes it easier to found a political dynasty. At the time
of the September 24, 2002 recall election, however, Hagedorn was not the incumbent favored with this feared "undue advantage
of the incumbent." On the contrary, he ran against the incumbent Mayor Socrates who alone could be the subject of recall
election and who, by law, was automatically a candidate in the election. 16 Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty
election of Puerto Princesa City which Socrates won, precisely because he was aware of the three term limit.
It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local official who has
been thrice consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the same position, from running in the
regular election succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that is prohibited because it makes possible service of
more than three consecutive and continuous full terms, i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it
is this continuousness that the ConCom feared would open the gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use
of his undue advantage to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular
elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which petitioners harp on, should be understood. In that case, we opined
that "[a]s finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same
post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office." 17 Indeed, insofar as
regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in that case, there should be a hiatus of at least one full
term of three years.
On the other hand, in the case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election - whether after his first, second, or

third consecutive term- there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent who was recalled. Even in the
case of a local official who initially assumes office via recall election, then wins the two succeeding regular elections and serves
two full terms in the same post, he is not prohibited from seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so
because his service of the remainder of the incumbent's term via recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing
on to his three succeeding full terms. Local officials who assume office via recall election serve only the unexpired portion of the
incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the term of office of
elective local officials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the Constitution also prescribe
synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second Monday of May 1992, 18 which is accomplished if
the local official who assumes office through recall election serves only the incumbent's unexpired term.
It is only in the case of Representatives (and Senators) that "if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired term will be considered one term for purposes of computing the number of successive terms
allowed."19 The election herein contemplated is a special election thus this Constitutional intent does not apply to a recall election
which involves only elective local officials. The Record bear this out, viz:
"MR. SUAREZ. . . May we ask a clarificatory question regarding the interpretation of the provisions in Sections 3
and 6 in relation to Section 9 regarding the disqualification on the part of the Senator to run for two consecutive
terms, and in the case of the Members of the House of Representatives, for three consecutive terms. For
example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already
considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the
Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, because we speak of "term" and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two terms for the Members of the
Lower House."20
As we ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is considered service of a full term only with respect to
Representatives (and Senators) because unlike local government officials, Representatives cannot be recalled. It is continuous
prolonged stay in office that breeds political dynasties. Understandably therefore, insofar as Representatives who cannot be
recalled are concerned, service of an unexpired term is strictly counted as service of a full term because the purpose of the
ConCom was to limit the right to run and be elected in Congress.21
In allowing Hagedorn to participate in the September 24 recall election, we are not unmindful of the intent of the ConCom to
broaden the people's choice of leaders. The three term limit was adopted to allow the electorate to choose from other candidates
in the regular election succeeding the incumbent's third consecutive term. This is clear in the Commissioners' alternatives for
voting on the term limit for Representatives and the outcome of their voting where 17 voted for "no further election after a total of
three terms" and 26 voted for "no immediate reelection after three successive terms." A reelection is immediate if a local official
wins in the election succeeding the third consecutive term.22 This is not the case with Hagedorn who did not run in the 2001
regular mayoralty election and left that political arena to other contenders, thereby upholding the intent of the ConCom to
broaden the choice of the electorate.
The intent of the ConCom to create a hiatus in the service of elective local officials after three consecutive full terms cannot be
undermined through abuse of the power of recall. The Local Government Code of 1991 provides limitations on recall in Section
74, viz:
"Section 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term
of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year

immediately preceding a regular local election." (emphasis supplied)

Thus, an elective local official cannot perpetually hold on to his office through the mechanism of recall as at the very least, there
will be a hiatus of one year after an unbroken service of three terms. He could not simply create, in the words of Commissioner
Monsod, "structures that will perpetuate him (them)" in power with the assurance that they will not be exposed because after
serving three consecutive full terms, he will certainly be replaced. Within the one-year period under Sec. 74, his successor could
discover and begin to dismantle these manipulative structures. This one year period also provides a reasonable basis for the
electorate to judge the performance of the incumbent successor, thus obviating fear of political maneuvering through initiation of
recall proceedings by a Preparatory Recall Assembly dominated by minions of the previous local official. 23 In Claudio v.
COMELEC, et al.,24 we held, viz:
"In the Bower case (in re Bower 41 I11. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 [1968]) cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC (269 SCRA
245, 256 [1997]), it was held that 'The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before
petitioning for recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having
had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions.'" 25
If, after one year in office, the incumbent proves himself to be worthy of his position, then his constituents will confirm this should
a recall election be called, as in the case of Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City. If, on the other hand, the incumbent turns
out to be an ineffective leader, there is no reason why the electorate should not be allowed to make a Cincinnatus of their past
leader.
The imagined fear of abuse of the power of recall does not suffice to disqualify private respondent Hagedorn and should not
prevail over the resounding voice of the people of Puerto Princesa City. They have spoken and there is no mistaking that
Hagedorn is their overwhelming choice. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' position and allow an overly literal reading of the
law to mute the electorate's cry and curtail their freedom to choose their leaders. This freedom was as much a concern of the
ConCom as was the prevention of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the people. This Court has not just once
admonished against a too literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention
of the authors.26
In sum, private respondent Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election as the
disqualification under Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty election succeeding the third consecutive
term served. Nor is he precluded from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term as this is not service of a
prohibited fourth consecutive full term.
I vote to deny the petition, giving due consideration to the tenet of representative democracy that the people should be allowed to
choose whom they wish to govern them.27 In the end, ". . . more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of
the people is final for 'sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.'" 28

Footnotes

Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with prayers for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining orders.
1

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, Chapter 5, Sections 69
to 75.

Composed of Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as Chairman with Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B.
Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
3

With Mehol K. Sadain as Presiding Commissioner and Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Resurreccion Z. Borra as
Commissioners.
4

269 SCRA 380 (1997).

Ricardo J. Romulo, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Convention.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 236.

Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 420.

"MR. ROMULO: Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the schemes
are as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the second scheme is, no immediate
reelection after two successive terms. Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the
same as those for the House of Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further
discussions.
9

THE PRESIDENT: Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators. Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT: Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT: The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme
No. II is approved." (Emphasis supplied) Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 244-245.
10

"MR. GASCON: Is this voting just for Congressmen?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the
counting.

Alternative No. 1 no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//

Alternative No. 2 no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT: The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. I and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2;
Alternative No. 2 is approved." (Emphasis supplied) Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp.
243-244.
11

Second paragraph of Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution.

12

Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and now Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
13

14

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 590.

15

Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 341 (1995).

16

Hagedorn instead ran for Governor of Palawan in the 2001 elections but lost.

17

311 SCRA 602 (1999).

18

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.

19

295 SCRA 157 (1998).

20

Jose E. Suarez, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

21

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 592.

PUNO,
1

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996).

Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (Petition), pp. 9-10. The Petition-in-Intervention of Mayor Socrates raises similar issues.
2

1 L. Taada and F. Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 95-96 (1961).

R. Martin, Philippine Political Law 27 (New ed. 1998).

J. Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers 699 (1995); Record of the Constitutional Commission
("Record"), vol. III, pp. 406-408, 451.
5

Record, vol. II, pp. 236-237, 239-240, 243.

295 SCRA 157 (1998).

Id., pp. 163, 165.

311 SCRA 602 (1999).

10

Lonzanida v. COMELEC, et al., 311 SCRA 602 (1999), pp. 612-613.

11

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.

12

Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 6.

Petition, p. 23, citing Martin and Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers and Election Law, Revised
Edition, p. 173.
13

14

Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 44(d).

15

See Schardein v. Harrison, et al., 18 S.W. 2d 316 (1929).

16

Section 71 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in relevant part, viz:
"Section 71....The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly
registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to
be voted upon."

17

Petition, p. 18, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec, supra, p. 609.

18

Osmena, et al. v. Del Mar, et al., 199 SCRA 750 (1991).

19

II J. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 96 (first ed. 1988).

20

Record, vol. II, p. 592.

21

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 167.

22

Id., p. 163.

23

Section 70 of the Local Government Code provides, viz:

"Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly
or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such
recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality
which shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial level. All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in the city;
(3) Legislative district level. In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are
elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where
sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials
in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the
municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public
place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local government unit
concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a
resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned
during its session called for the purpose."
24

331 SCRA 388 (2000).

25

Claudio v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 406.

26

Paras v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 491 (1996).

27

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1995).

28

Garcia v. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

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