Salandanan v.

Spouses Mendez (Salandanan intervenor; Mendez TCT owner,

Fernandez family to be ejected)
The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by Spouses Bayani and Isabel
Mendez against Spouses Fernandez before the MeTC. They alleged that they are the owners
of the property as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title. That Spouses Fernandez and
their families were occupying the subject property for free through the generosity of
respondent Isabels father; and That respondents brought the matter to the Barangay
Lupon for possible settlement but the same failed.
Spouses Fernandez denied such and averred that Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan are
the registered owners of the property and that they have continuously occupied the said
property with the permission of Spouses Salandanan; Spouses Fernandez claimed that
Mendezs were able to transfer the subject property to their name through fraud; that they
went to the house of Spouses Salandanan and asked them to sign n SPA that was in fact a
deed of donation.
The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Spouses MEndez. Spouses Fernandez
appealed to the RTC. Spouses Mendez then filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal with
the RTC, which it granted. Spouses Fernandez filed an MR- Denied.
RTC affirmed the Metc, the RTC also issued an Order authorizing the sheriff to employ the
necessary force to enable him to enter the property and get possession of such, since when
he tried to do it the first time around it was pad-locked and the only person therein was a old
woman who he took pity on. Spouses Fernandez filed before the CA a petition for review
which they rendered its Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
Sofia Salandanan filed a Motion for Clarification and Intervention and attached a Motion for
Reconsideration. She alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real owners of the
subject property; that she was not a party to the case for ejectment and did not
receive any notice therefrom; and that by virtue of the said decision, she was about to
be evicted from her property without having participated in the entire process of the
ejectment proceeding. CA DENIED MOTION for lack of merit, (as to the intervention) since
she filed a different suit for the annulment of said title with the RTC.
Salandanan asserts that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, according to her, she
was constrained to file a motion for clarification and intervention because the CA included

her in its decision in spite of the fact that she was not impleaded as a party to the unlawful
detainer case,
ISSUE: can the petitioner intervene? NO
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention
shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore because intervention
is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the
Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same, but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are
nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether or not to allow
intervention. The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the
intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Moreover, Sofia Salandanans intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a
complete adjudication of her rights. The issue raised is mainly that of ownership, claiming
that the property in dispute was registered and titled in the name of the Spouses Mendez
through the use of fraud. Such issue cannot even be properly threshed out in an action for
ejectment, as Section 18, Rule 70 provides that the judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
Hence, a just and complete determination of petitioner's rights could actually be had in the
action for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title that she had previously filed, not

in the instant action for ejectment. It is likewise for this reason that petitioner is not
an indispensable party in the instant case.

Jowel Sales v. Sabin

Cyril Sabino filed with the RTC an amended complaint for damages against, among
others, Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately
caused the death of Sabinos son, Elbert. Before any responsive pleading could be
filed, Sabino, notified the defendants that he will take the deposition of one
Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC- Pasig City.
The deposition on oral examination of Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of
Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of Sales counsel, Atty.
Villacorta, who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of
trial, Sabino had the deposition of Corral marked as her Exhibits DD and EE with
submarkings. Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, Sabino made a
Formal Offer of Exhibits, among which are Exhibits DD and EE. Corral then left
the country.
Sales opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and asked that they be
expunged from the records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for
their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the ROC were not complied with.
The RTC admitted, among other evidence, Sabinos Exhibits DD& EE. Sales
MR was denied, so he went on certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in admitting in evidence the deposition (Exhibits
DD and EE).
CA affirmed the RTC and effectively denied due course to and dismissed Sales
recourse, explaining that Sales active participation, through counsel,
during the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his own
exhibits, has thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof
as part of Sabinos evidence. Sales filed this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 (now Sec. 3) ROC were
satisfied by Sabino when it presented a certification attesting to the fact that
deponent has left the country but silent as to WoN at the time his deposition was
offered in evidence deponent is in the Philippines

(2) Whether or not Sales in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of
his deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith
Held:
(1) YES. Sales contends that none of the conditions in Sec. 4, Rule 23 ROC exists to
justify the admission in evidence of Sabinos Exhibits DD and EE. Hence, it was
error for the appellate court to have upheld their admission. Sales argues that
said certification merely proves the fact of Corral having left the country on the date
mentioned. It does not establish that he has not returned since then and is
unavailable to be present in court to personally testify.
While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally
not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is
at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts
therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in
open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to
the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain
conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5 exceptions for the admissibility
of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23. Among these is when the witness is
out of the Philippines.
RTC determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer
of his deposition was made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of
witness to testify deserves respect, having been adequately substantiated.
The certification by the Bureau of Immigration provides that evidentiary support. It
is customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a
witness as a predicate to the use of depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral
indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his departure via Flight No. PR
658, Sales could have presented evidence to show such.
(2) NO. As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is
anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party
against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But it matters not that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of
the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be
accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against
him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the

deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be

considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence
in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of
the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence,
petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped
from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just because he
participated in the taking thereof.
Certiorari will not lie against an order admitting or rejecting a deposition in
evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final judgment. For this reason, the
CA could have dismissed Sales invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.
Hacienda Bigaa Inc v. Chavez (sorry so many other cases included so it is really
long)
Petitioner Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. filed with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas a
complaint for ejectment and damages with application for writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent Epifanio V. Chavez. The complaint alleged that
Chavez, by force, strategy and/or stealth, entered into the premises of Hacienda
Bigaa's properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 44695 and
56120 by cutting through a section of the barbed wire fence surrounding the
properties and destroying the lock of one of its gates, subsequently building a house
on the property, and occupying the lots without the prior consent and against the
will of Hacienda Bigaa.
The records show that the lots were originally covered by TCT No. 722 owned by
Ayala y Cia and/or

Alfonso,

Jacobo

and

Enrique

Zobel,

known

as

Hacienda

Calatagan. They later acquired excess lands under same title. The Ayalas and/or
the Zobels then later ordered the subdivision of the hacienda, including these
excess areas, and sold the subdivided lots to third parties. Among the buyers or
transferees of the expanded and subdivided areas was Hacienda Bigaa.
Portions of the same lands were leased out by the Republic, through the Bureau of
Fisheries, to qualified applicants in whose favor fishpond permits were issued. The
government-issued fishpond permits pertaining to lands covered by titles derived
from TCT No. 722. Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for the recovery of
the areas in excess of the area originally covered by TCT No. 722, which suits

ultimately reached the Supreme Court. In the Court's 1965 decisions in Dizon v.
Rodriguez (for quieting of title) and Republic v. Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda
Calatagan, et al. (for annulment of titles), the excess areas of TCT No. 722 were
categorically declared as unregisterable lands of the public domain such that
any title covering these excess areas are necessarily null and void. In these
cases, the Ayalas and the Zobels were found to be mere usurpers of public domain
areas, and all subdivision titles issued to them or their privies and covering these
areas were invalidated; the wrongfully registered public domain areas reverted to
the Republic.
To return to the forcible entry case, then Chavez alleged in his answer before
the MTC of Calatagan that his mother, Zoila de Chavez (who died intestate on
September 14, 1979) was a fishpond permittee/lessee under a Fishpond Permit
issued by the Bureau of Fisheries; that the areas covered by the permits are the
same parcels of land which he presently occupies as Zoila's successor-in-interest
and which Hacienda Bigaa also claims.
Chavez argued that the suit is barred by prior judgment in two prior cases (1) Civil
Case No. 78, a suit for unlawful detainer filed by the Zobels against Chavezs
predecessor-in-interest, Zoila de Chavez, before the then Justice of the Peace Court
(now Municipal Trial Court) of Calatagan and (2) Civil Case No. 653, a case of accion
reinvindicatoria with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction filed by the
Republic, Zoila de Chavez, and other lessees or fishpond permittees of the Republic,
against Enrique Zobel (Hacienda Bigaa's predecessor-in-interest) before the then
Court of First Instance of Batangas. This case reached the SC, entitled Republic of
the Philippines v. De los Angeles, Enrique Zobel, et al. and was decided in
1988. Chavez asserts that the subject matter and the issues involved in these cases
are squarely similar and/or identical to the subject matter and issues involved in
the present forcible entry suit; the rulings in these two cases, therefore
constitute res judicata with respect to the present case.
The MTC rendered a decision dismissing Hacienda Bigaa's complaint,
holding that the disputed lots form part of the areas illegally expanded and made to
appear to be covered by TCT No. 722 of Hacienda Bigaa's predecessors-in-interest
hence, the Hacienda's title are null and void. In so ruling, the MTC applied this
Court's pronouncements in the antecedent cases of Dizon v. Rodriguez, Republic v.

Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda Calatagan, Zobel, et al., and Republic v. De los
Angeles. MTC also ruled that the identity of the parties, subject, issues and cause of
action are the same.
RTC and the CA affirmed in toto the appealed decision.
ISSUE: Is there Res Judicata? YES
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which in its relevant part reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by
former

judgment and

(2) conclusiveness of judgment.

Under

the

first

concept, res judicata absolutely bars any subsequent action when the following
requisites concur: (a) the former judgment or order was final; (b) it adjudged the
pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it was rendered by a court that had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first and
the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.[39]
Where

no

identity

of

causes

issues exists, res judicata comes

of

under

action
the

but
second

only identity
concept

of
i.e.,

under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this concept, the rule bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised
under different claims

or

causes

of

action. Conclusiveness of judgment

finds

application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed
upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or
question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper
authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question
furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the
same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of
action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation
of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect
as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions,
the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the
issues

or

points

that

were

raised

and

controverted,

and

were

determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid
down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be
binding between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long
as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case or incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and
enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case
since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.
SC rejected, Hacienda Bigaa's position that there could be no res
judicata in this case because the present suit is for forcible entry while the
antecedent cases adverted were based on different causes of action i.e.,
quieting of title, annulment of titles and accion reinvindicatoria. For, res
judicata, under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, operates even
if no absolute identity of causes of action exists. Res judicata, in its
conclusiveness of judgment concept, merely requires identity of issues. We
thus agree with the uniform view of the lower courts the MTC, RTC and the CA on
the application of res judicata to the present case.

Yutingco v. CA
Private respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) filed a complaint
against petitioners for the collection of a sum of money with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. DBP alleged
that it granted a credit accommodation for One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos
(P150,000,000) to Nikon Industrial Corporation (Nikon) under the terms and
conditions of the Credit Line Agreement.
In consideration of the credit accommodation, petitioners, as the controlling
stockholders of Nikon, bound themselves as primary obligors on any availment
thereon. Nikon executed promissory notes as guarantees. Nikon defaulted on the
payment of the interest.
Nikon with other corporations, filed a petition for suspension of payments with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Among the controlling stockholders were
petitioners, known together as the EYCO Group of Companies (EYCO). Also, DBP
claims that the filing of the petition for suspension of payments with the SEC
constituted another default as stipulated in paragraph (c) of Section 5 of the

agreement. Thus, private respondent sought petitioners payment of the obligation

by virtue of the Continuing Suretyship Agreement by filing the collection suit before
the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Salvador Tensuan granted private respondents motion and issued a writ of
attachment. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, they contended that they could
not be held liable under the promissory notes and credit line agreement since EYCO
had not yet defaulted on their obligations. They averred that the mere filing of the
petition for suspension of payments before the SEC did not constitute default and
that even assuming that Nikon was in default, there was yet no extra-judicial
demand, a condition precedent to the filing of the suit before the RTC against
petitioners. RTC Denied the motion, being the issue of default raised by the
defendants is a factual one which must await trial. MR, DENIED.
On July 7, 1998, petitioners received a copy of the aforementioned Order dated 7
May 1998. On September 7, 1998, petitioners filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, for an additional period of fifteen (15) days, or until 22
September 1998. On September 22, 1998, petitioners filed their Petition for
Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction dated September 21, 1998. On November 18, 1998,
petitioners received a copy of the Resolution dated November 9, 1998,
denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file petition for
certiorari. It held that:
CONSIDERING that Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fixed the
period for filing a petition for certiorari at 60 days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed, petitioners motion for extension of time of
15 days is hereby DENIED. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied by
the Court of Appeals.
In their motion for reconsideration petitioners invoked substantial justice over
technical rules of procedure.
ISSUE: Should the Court of Appeals have admitted, as a matter of substantial
justice, the Petition for Certiorari?
The general rule is that rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and
should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit. The rule, however, is not absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, on the
ground of justice and equity, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused.
The New Rules on Civil Procedure, Section 4, Rule 65, prescribes a period of 60 days
within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable
and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave
abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a

speedy disposition of their case. For these reasons, the 60-day-period ought to be
considered inextendible.
Fundamental rule that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading is best
left to the sound discretion of the court and an extension will not be allowed except
for good and sufficient reason and only if the motion is filed before the expiration of
the time sought to be extended. Petitioners previous counsel filed the Petition for
Certiorari on September 22, 1998, thinking that the Court of Appeals would grant
their motion for extension for 15 days. They gave as reason for this assumption of
leniency the heavy workload of the law firm. Patently, however, this circumstance
alone does not provide the court sufficient reason to merit allowance of an
extension of the 60-day period to file the petition for certiorari. Heavy workload,
which is relative and often self-serving, ought to be coupled with more compelling
reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated
by affidavits of merit. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason to
deviate from the 60-day rule. Thus, we are constrained to state that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for having been filed late.
Of course, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule. Among them are: (a)
when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction,
(b) when there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, or (c)
when appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as
when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious
effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless
action and compelling the defendants to needlessly go through a
protracted trial and clogging the court dockets with another futile case. In
the present case, however, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss since it
perceived the issue therein was one of default, a factual issue which must await
trial. Clearly, petitioners cause is not covered by any of the recognized
exceptions. They should proceed to trial and if the result is unfavorable to them,
then their recourse is to elevate the entire case on appeal in accordance with the
rules. For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest
for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to
which all courts are devoted.