G.R. No.

84464
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 84464, June 21, 1991 ]
SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
CATALINA I. SANCHEZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Cavite dismissed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale, holding that it was not spurious. It
was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which found that the vendor's signature on the questioned document had indeed been
forged. The petitioners are now before us and urge that the decision of the trial court be reinstated.
In her complaint below, herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that
her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her
knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late
husband on February 7, 1968. Invoking the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the document was written by another person, she prayed that the deed of
sale be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the name of the petitioners be canceled, and that the lot be reconveyed to
her.[1]
In their answer, the petitioners questioned the personality of the private respondent to file the complaint, contending that the late
Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a common-law wife by whom he had two children. On the merits, they claimed that
Roberto Sanchez had deeded over the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial settlement of a judgment they had
obtained against him. They had sued him after he had failed to pay a P1,300.00 loan they had secured for him and which they
had been forced to settle themselves to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage on their property. [2]
On the petitioner's motion, the trial court required the examination of the deed of sale by the National Bureau of Investigation to
determine if it was a forgery. Trial proceeded in due time, with the presentation by the parties of their testimonial and
documentary evidence. On June 25, 1986, Judge Alejandro C. Silapan rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
In his decision,[3] the trial judge rejected the testimony of the handwriting experts from the PC and the NBI, who had both testified
that the standard signature of the late Roberto Sanchez and the one written on the alleged deed of sale "were written by two
different people. He cited Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, [4] in support of his action. Explaining the supposed
differences between the signatures, he said that Roberto Sanchez was "under serious emotional stress and intensely angry"
when he reluctantly signed the document after he had lost the case to them, "with the added fact that they only wanted to accept
his lot for P500.00 and not for the settlement of the entire obligation of P1,300.00." At that, he said there were really no
fundamental differences between the signatures compared. Moreover, the signatures examined were from 1970 to 1982 and did
not include those written by Roberto Sanchez in 1968.
The decision also noted that Roberto Sanchez did not take any step to annul the deed of sale although he had knowledge
thereof as early as 1968. He thus allowed his action to prescribe under Article 1431 of the Civil Code. As for the contract of a
marriage submitted by the private respondent, this should also be rejected because although the document was dated
September 21, 1964, the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land on August 25, 1965, described his
civil status as "single." It was also doubtful if she could bring the action for reconveyance alone, even assuming she was the

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, considering that he left illegitimate children and collateral relatives who were also entitled
to share in his estate.
As earlier stated, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, [5] which held that the trial court did err, as contended by the
appellant, in holding that the deed of sale was not spurious; that the action to annul it had already prescribed; that Catalina
Sanchez was not the widow of Roberto Sanchez; and that she had no capacity to institute the complaint.
Before us now, the petitioners fault the respondent court for: a) upholding the testimony of the expert witnesses against the
findings of fact of the trial court; b) annulling the deed of sale; c) declaring that the action to annul the deed of sale had not yet
prescribed; d) not declaring the private respondent guilty of estoppel; and e) not sustaining the decision of the trial court.
We see no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is consonant with the evidence of record and the applicable
law and jurisprudence.
The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her
submission of the marriage contract denominated as Exhibit "A." [6] That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that "a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" and may also
explain why Roberto Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two illegitimate children, assuming these
persons did exist. It is strange that the trial court should reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title describing
Roberto Sanchez as "single,"[7] disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the civil status of the
owner.
As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the private respondent could validly file the complaint for the recovery of her late
husband's property, without prejudice to the successional rights of his other heirs. Parenthetically, (and curiously), although the
supposed common-law wife and her illegitimate children were never presented at the trial, their existence was readily accepted
by the trial court on the basis alone of the petitioner's unsupported statements.
Coming now to the questioned signature, we find it significant that the examination by the NBI was requested by the petitioners
themselves but in the end it was the private respondent who presented the NBI handwriting expert as her own witness. [8] The
explanation is obvious. The petitioners hoped to refute the findings of the PC handwriting expert with the findings of the NBI
handwriting expert, but as it turned out the findings of the two witnesses coincided. Both PC Examiner Corazon Salvador and
NBI Examiner Zenaida J. Torres expressed the informed view that the signature on the deed of sale was not written by Roberto
Sanchez.[9]
They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but supported it with knowledgeable testimony extensively given on direct and
cross-examination on the various characteristics and differences of the signatures they had examined and compared. [10] The trial
judge said the testimony of PC Examiner Salvador was not reliable because her examination of the document was done under
circumstance not so trustworthy before the action was instituted." But he did not consider the fact that her findings were
corroborated by NBI Examiner Torres, who conducted her own examination at the instance of the petitioners themselves and
after the action was instituted. It is worth noting that the competence of the two expert witnesses was never assailed by the
petitioners nor was it questioned by the trial judge. The petitioners also did not present their own handwriting expert to refute the
findings of the government handwriting experts.
The Court has itself examined the signatures of Roberto Sanchez in the several instruments among the records of this case,
including those dating back to before 1968[11] and is inclined to accept the findings of the handwriting experts. The case invoked

[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]

by the petitioners is not applicable because the differences in the signatures compared in the case at bar were, as the trial judge
found, caused not by time but by the tension gripping Roberto Sanchez when he signed the deed of sale.
Incidentally, the petitioners have not sufficiently established the reason for such tension, which appears to be a mere conjecture
of the trial judge. No proof was submitted about their filing of the complaint against Roberto Sanchez. Petitioner Jaime
Villanueva himself admitted under oath that he did not read the decision in the case nor did he ask his lawyer how much had
been awarded against the defendant.[12] Nobody testified about Roberto's state of mind when he allegedly signed the document,
and in Manila at that although the persons were residing in Cavite. Even the witnesses to the Bilihan were not presented nor
was any explanation for their absence offered.
The explanation given by the petitioners for their delay in registering the deed of sale is not convincing. That delay lasted for all
of thirteen years. The petitioners suggest they are simple peasants and did not appreciate the need for the immediate transfer of
the property in their name. They also say that they forgot. The evidence shows, however, that they understood the need for
registering their property for purposes of using it as collateral in case they wanted to borrow money. It would appear that they
thought of simulating the sale registering the subject lot when their own lands were insufficient to secure a P100,000.00 loan
their daughter wanted to borrow.
Concerning the question of prescription, we find that the applicable rule is not Article 1391 of the Civil Code but Article 1410.
Article 1391 provides that the action for annulment of a contract prescribes in four years in cases where the vice consists of
intimidation, violence, undue influence, mistake, fraud or lack capacity. The deed of sale in question does not suffer from any of
these defects. The supposed vendee's signature having been proved to he a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent
as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."
Finally, petitioners invoke Article 1431 of the Civil Code and contend that the respondent court erred in not declaring the private
respondent and her late husband estopped from questioning the deed of sale until after fourteen years from its execution. The
inference that Roberto Sanchez and the private respondent knew about the instrument from that date has not been proved by
the evidence of record. Moreover, we fail to see the applicability of Article 1431, which provides that "through estoppel an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon." Neither the private respondent nor her late husband has made any admission or representation to the
petitioners regarding the subject land that they are supposed to have relied upon.
Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the deed of sale or even the circumstances
that supposedly led to its execution by the late Roberto Sanchez. On the contrary, we are convinced from the testimonies of the
handwriting experts that his signature had been forged on the questioned document and that he had not conveyed the subject
land to the petitioners. The deed of sale being a forgery, it was totally void or inexistent and so could be challenged at any time,
the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. The private respondent, as the widow of Roberto Sanchez, has the capacity
to sue for the recovery of the land in question and is not estopped from doing so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave.

[11]
[12]

260 Phil. 14
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 59731, January 11, 1990 ]
ALFREDO CHING, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of Appeals (penned by Hon.
Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo
Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial
Court (penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex-parte the cancellation
of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching
Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case
No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga, Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfecta, Constancio and
Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit
"8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137
was issued on September 18, 1961 and T. C. T. No. 78633 was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of
deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily
Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at the
hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed
administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53,
Rollo). The land covered by T. C. T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent
Pedro Asedillo with the Court First Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for
reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.).
Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T. C. T. No. 91137 (not No.
441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An
amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979
alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether
the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication"; (p. 38,
Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979.
The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer
defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order

dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the
decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding plaintiff's causes of action in the complaint to be duly substantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute
owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff;
sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is
hereby cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer
certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street,
Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules
of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza
Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition on November 10,
1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon.
Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered and set aside, the decision dated
June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.).
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but the same was denied by the trial
court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.).
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed on September 30, 1981.
His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.).
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the pendency of the case with the Court
of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p.
109, Ibid.). Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982 (p. 159, Ibid.) and the Court gave due course to the petition in
the resolution of June 28, 1982 (p. 191, Ibid.).
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND
DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
II

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM,
AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY
PUBLICATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELD EXPARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the court a quo never acquired
jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of service of summons by publication in accordance with
the ruling laid down in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem, for while the judgment that
may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that
extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng
who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69
Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole
world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein
is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and
actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are
directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen
(13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the
decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and
he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to
be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate as co-defendant. It is a
well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr.
872). Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in
his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III

commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts
demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal,
sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in
CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the
summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The
ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-resident defendant
sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem, summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement
of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the amended complaint of private
respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as
shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the
decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one
year from the date of the decree is not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer
open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 66742; Teoville Development Corporation v.
IAC, et al., G. R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the
private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 41508, June 27,
1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens systems is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su
casa", to avoid the possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
"information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v.
Cruz, G. R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980
reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., no part; was former counsel of Ching Leng.

G.R. No. 107930

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 107930, October 07, 1994 ]
HEIRS OF GEORGE BOFILL, IGNACIO BOFILL, VICTORIA B. ANASTACIO, REGINA FRANCISCA B. CHUACHINGCO,
EVELYN B. SERRA, MANUELITA B. VIZCONDE, LAGRIMAS B. DULLANO, LOURDES B. DASAL, MANUEL BOFILL, JR.,
HEIRS OF PLARIDEL BOFILL, EDUARDO BOFILL, MARIA LUISA BOFILL, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, SPS. ENRIQUE BEGALAN AND FLORDELIZA BEGALAN, SPS. JOSE CATALAN AND BERNARDITA CATALAN,
AND HEIRS OF MANUEL BARREDO, NAMELY, NORMA B. ALEJAGA, LEONY BARREDO, MAGILYN BARREDO, MARIA
BARREDO, RAMY BARREDO, RELLY BARREDO, ENRIQUETA B. SARTORIO, REPRESENTED BY VILMA BARREDO
BALATAYO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case arose from an action for declaration of ownership over Lot No. 2954-A of the Panay Cadastre, situated in Bo. Linatiran,
Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19894, filed by petitioners against the Sps. Enrique and Flordeliza
Begalan and Sps. Jose and Bernardita Catalan, two (2) of private respondents herein. Joining their cause, the heirs of Manuel
Barredo, claiming also to be owners of the lot in litigation, filed a complaint in intervention against the petitioners herein, heirs of
Manuel Bofill.
On 12 August 1988, the trial court rendered a decision declaring petitioners the owners of the lot in question and entitled to the
possession thereof, ordering respondents as defendants therein to vacate the premises, and to pay petitioners P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The counterclaim as well as the complaint in intervention was dismissed. [1]
The rationale for the foregoing disposition of the trial court is that x x x the claim of the plaintiff-intervenors and defendants over this land mainly anchored on the supposed Deed of Exchange of
March 8, 1944, executed between Manuel Bofill and Cornelio Barriatos, was a mere exchange of collateral(s) from Lot 526 to Lot
2954-A for a loan of P450.00 obtained by Manuel Bofill. The said loan having been paid one year thereafter, said deed of
exchange as collateral for said loan was rendered without legal force and effect, hence no entry in the title covering the lot was
made regarding said loan, nor was the title in the name of Manuel Bofill transferred to anybody else up to the present time.
The case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill x x x on November 17, 1975 for the registration of the Deed of Exchange of
1944 and for the surrender of the original title was done thirty-one (31) years after its execution, considering laches and
prescription, is also without force and effect x x x x Moreover, the order in said case has become moot and academic upon the
death of Sotera Bofill and the surrender of RO-1456 by her heirs and the cancellation of the same upon the execution of an
Extra-Judicial Partition by the heirs of Manuel Bofill and Sotera Bofill and the issuance of the present Certificate of Title No.
19894 in the name of the plaintiffs.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 31 August 1992 reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court.
It directed the Register of Deeds of Capiz "x x x to divide TCT No. 19894 into two titles: one in the name of the plaintiffs without
including the portion covered by Lot No. 2954-A; the other title covering Lot No. 2954-A in the name of the heirs of Manuel
Barredo (herein intervenor-appellants), after payment of the required taxes and fees."
In this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, we reverse the appellate court and reinstate the judgment of the
court a quo.
First. The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the findings of the trial court which we find to be supported by the evidence on
record. Specifically, it discarded the testimonial evidence proving that the Casugot[2] involves an exchange of collaterals securing
the P450-loan of Bofill to a certain Cornelio Barriatos without citing any contrary proof nor explaining why such factual finding

should be thrown out or ignored. In the same fashion, it casually brushed aside the factual finding of the trial court that the loan of
Bofill was paid one year after the execution of the Casugot thereby rendering it without further effect.[3]
We note that this Casugot written in Hiligaynon is ambiguous as the exchange can refer to ownership, possession, collateral, etc.
It does not necessarily apply to ownership alone as understood by the Court of Appeals. Apparently, the error of the appellate
court lies in the interpretation of the Casugot when it stated in its decision that the document "speaks eloquently of Manuel
Bofill's intention to transfer" Lot 2954-A to Barriatos and concluded that it was an exchange of ownership of two (2) lots. This
error is not surprising as the appellate court not only adopted the English translation of the Casugot offered by private
respondents, which was obviously tailored to suit their purpose, but also because it omitted a material phrase stipulating that
Barriatos was returning Lot 526 to Bofill. Without that phrase on the return of Lot 526 it would appear, as it does, that Bofill
donated Lot 2954-A to Barriatos which, in effect, would render the deed of exchange an absurdity. Had the Court of Appeals
been more accurate and precise in quoting data from the records, perhaps it would have arrived at the right conclusion.
Second. Admittedly, the Casugot clearly reflects the agreement of Bofill and Barriatos with regard to the ownership of Lot 2954,
now comprising Lot 2954-A, which is the lot in controversy, and Lot 2954-B. Therein is their clear and categorical covenant:
"MANUEL F. BOFILL is the real and absolute owner of two (2) parcels of land, Lot 2954 and Lot 526." This declaration is decisive
in the disposition of this case as it contains an express stipulation by the signatories thereto on the ownership of Bofill of the lot in
question binding upon them and their successors in interest.
Private respondents attempt to crush this overwhelming evidence by giving certain portions of the Casugot a connotation
contrary to the agreement and intention of the parties. Private respondents allege that the 1939 plan subdividing Lot 2954 into
Lot 2954-A in the name of Barriatos and Lot 2954-B in the name of Bofill reveals the extent of ownership of the parties over Lot
2954. But the plan reflecting this subdivision is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to the delineation of their
possession. The best proof of the ownership of Manuel Bofill is the certificate of title in his name. Moreover, the parties to the
agreement apparently did not consider the placing of Lot 2954-A in the name of Barriatos as a transfer of ownership because
when they executed the Casugot in 1944 they still acknowledged Bofill as the real and absolute owner of the entire Lot 2954.
Private respondents call our attention to the statement in the Casugot to the effect that Barriatos was already in possession of
Lot 2954-A before the subdivision of the lot. This argument is based on an erroneous premise since nowhere in the Casugot is
the word "possession" or its equivalent in Hiligaynon mentioned. It is only in the English translation proposed by intervenors,
which the Court of Appeals injudiciously adopted, where that word appears. In any case, the exchange of lots as used in the
Casugot can refer to exchange of ownership, of possession, of collaterals, or of any other attribute of ownership. Definitely,
exchange of lands does not necessarily refer to exchange of ownership. Besides, possession is not a definitive proof of
ownership, nor is non-possession inconsistent therewith. Hence, the claim that Barriatos was the possessor of Lot 2954-A is not
incompatible with Bofill's claim of ownership.
Private respondents next point us to the crux of the Casugot whereby Barriatos returns his interest in Lot 526 to Bofill in
exchange for Lot 2954-A. However, it is not clear from the provision what interest was being traded by the parties. Consequently,
we are constrained to lean on the premise they themselves established in the first part of the Casugot, i.e., that Bofill is the real
and absolute owner of Lot 526 and Lot 2954. Barriatos not being the owner of either lot, there could not have been a transfer of
ownership between them.
As regards the clause creating a right of way on Lot 2954-A in favor of Lot 2954-B undisputably belonging to Bofill, private
respondents argue that Bofill would not have required such easement if he were the owner of Lot 2954-A, the latter being
considered a servient estate. This argument is fallacious; it is non sequitur. Bofill did not lose ownership of his lot by imposing on
it a right of way in favor of another lot belonging to him. Besides, we cannot ignore the practice in the provinces that in giving a
realty for a collateral, possession usually goes with it. At the time the Casugot was entered into between the parties, this was a
common practice. This further explains the real transaction between them and why Bofill had to demand a right of way over his
own land, so that when possession thereof should be transferred to a third person he could still pass through it, otherwise, he
may have no ingress to or egress from his estate.
Private respondents focus on the stipulation that if a certificate of title over Lot 2954-A would be issued to Barriatos the abovementioned right of way would be annotated thereon. While the signatories expressed the possibility of transferring Lot 2954-A to

Barriatos in the future, it is quite clear that the provision cited does not forthwith effect such transfer. The records do not reveal
that the transfer was eventually carried out by the parties or their successors in interest.
Third. As regards the case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill for the surrender of the duplicate certificate of title, the
appellate court stated that x x x the CFI is also convinced of the strength of Juana Brillo's claim of ownership (which herein appellant-intervenors
subsequently acquired) based originally on the aforequoted Deed of Exchange. The above decision does not appear to have
been appealed. Thus it is already the law of the case between therein parties and their successors in interest. The CFI's Decision
being against plaintiff's mother is binding against the plaintiffs (see Sec. 49, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).
We cannot agree with this conclusion. For, it was error for the Court of Appeals to assume that the issue of ownership over Lot
2954-A was already determined in Special Case No. 1828 as to bar the present action for declaration of ownership. In that case,
the CFI simply directed the mother of petitioners, Sotera Vda. de Bofill, to surrender the duplicate certificate of title over Lot 2954
so that the Casugot and the subsequent instruments of sale covering Lot 2954-A could be annotated thereon. Definitely, that
court did not declare Juana Brillo owner of the lot in question. The sole issue resolved by the CFI was whether Juana Brillo was
entitled to have the Casugot as well as the documents of sale conveying the rights of Barriatos to her thereunder recorded in the
Certificate of Title No. RO-1456 in the name of Manuel Bofill. The ownership of Lot 2954-A and Lot 526 was never raised, hence,
was not determined therein in Special Case No. 1828.
Although Juana Brillo prayed for the cancellation of RO-1456 and the issuance of a separate certificate of title in her name which
would effectively divest Bofill of his title over Lot 2954-A, this was not granted by the CFI. The CFI merely directed the annotation
of the deeds on RO-1456 apparently because there was not enough evidence to negate the title of Bofill over Lot 2954-A.
Besides, this was not the appropriate proceeding to adjudicate the ownership of the property. The evidence adduced by Brillo
was only sufficient to compel Sotera Vda. de Bofill to surrender certificate of title No. RO-1456. It was not adequate to settle the
issue of ownership.
The factual finding of the CFI in Special Case No. 1828 that Lot 526 was owned by Barriatos was, to say the least, erroneous
considering that the Casugot, apparently the same document from which the CFI drew its conclusion, expressly stipulates that
Bofill was the owner thereof. In asserting that Barriatos was the real owner of Lot 2954-A and therefore implying that Bofill was
the owner of Lot 526, respondents are assailing albeit unwittingly the very decision in Special Case No. 1828 which they now set
up as res judicata in this case. Thus, in adopting a theory contrary to that maintained in a former decision, a party is now
precluded from raising that case as a bar to a subsequent one. Incidentally, the error was adopted by the Court of Appeals.
We emphasize that the decision in Special Case No. 1828 could not bind petitioners herein as they were not parties thereto. The
order directing their mother to surrender RO-1456 that was supposed to be in her possession was only personal to her and could
not bind anybody else, particularly petitioners herein who were not parties thereto nor notified thereof.
Fourth. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals also reasoned out that x x x there is no evidence that plaintiffs religiously paid the taxes due thereon from 1947 up to the filing of their complaint. What
appears to have been paid by the plaintiffs were only for the period from 1972 to 1987. However, the same were paid by the
plaintiffs belatedly in 1986 and 1987, evidently in anticipation of this controversy. Besides, the receipts of this period do not show
whether the taxes paid were also for Lot No. 2954-A considering that they (plaintiffs) own Lot 2954-B. Moreover, payments of
realty taxes, more so if not regularly made, are not conclusive evidence of ownership (see Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393).
This again is error. The issue as to who of the parties paid the property taxes in good faith is not really paramount in the
determination of ownership considering that generally municipal treasurers simply accept payments regardless of conflicting
claims of ownership. After all, statements in the tax receipts showing such payment are far inferior to the recitals in the certificate
of title. With the Casugot and the certificate of title against them, private respondents miserably failed to carry their burden to a
successful conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 16, in favor of petitioners in Civil Case No. V-5374 is REITERATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

326 Phil. 982

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-24864, May 30, 1996 ]
FORTUNATO HALILI, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE HALILI TRANSIT
[SUBSTITUTED BY EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI], PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND
HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. L-27773. MAY 30, 1996]
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND HALILI BUS DRIVERS
AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. L-30110. MAY 30, 1996]
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, PETITIONER, VS. HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION-PTGWO, AND
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. L-38655. MAY 30, 1996]
FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF FORTUNATO F. HALILI,PETITIONER, VS. COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HALILI BUS DRIVERS & CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The herein petition was filed by the Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO), under the caption of the original
case/cases,[1] as it may in fact be considered an incident thereto.
The above-captioned cases were claims for unpaid overtime pay of 897 union members against Fortunato Halili, then doing
business under the name and style, Halili Transit which were initially commenced as a complaint [2] with the defunct Court of
Industrial Relations on August 20, 1958.
After Fortunato Halilis demise, said cases were settled amicably. The Union and the Administratrix of Fortunato F. Halilis estate
reached an Agreement on December 23, 1974, the pertinent portions of which read:
"xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREAS, in the face of this strong urging on the part of the Supreme Court Justices upon the parties to put an immediate end
to this case by amicable settlement, the parties repeatedly came to conference, conscientiously explored all avenues of
settlement, and finally arrived at the tentative agreement (tentative because of the condition that the same be sanctioned by the
court in the estate case) whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to that tract of land, covered by TCT
No. 36389, containing an area of approximately 33,952 square meters, situated in the Barrio of San Bartolome, Municipality of
Caloocan, Province of Rizal, and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000.00 in full and final satisfaction of all the claims and
causes of action of all of the employees against the estate of Fortunato F. Halili, subject of CIR Case No. 1099-V.
xxx

xxx

xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing and of the covenants, stipulations and undertakings hereinafter
contained, the parties have agreed as follows:

1. The UNION, its officers and members-claimants relative to CIR Case No. 1099-V. shall withdraw and dismiss with prejudice
Case No. 1099-V filed by the UNION in behalf of its members-claimants before the Court of Industrial Relations and all its
incidents thereto.
2. The ESTATE shall deliver or cause to be delivered, to the UNION the following:
(a) Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Bartolome, Caloocan City, containing an area of THIRTY-THREE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO (33,952) Square Meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of title No.
35389 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, to be made, upon authority and approval granted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV, at Quezon City, in Proc. No. Q-10852 in the name of the Halili Bus Drivers & Conductors Union (PTGWO), free from
any and all liens, encumbrances, and any and all claims whatsoever.
(b) Negotiable Check for TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS in the name of Domingo D. Cabading, President of
the UNION.
3. The transfer of the above-described parcel of land and receipt of the amount of P25,000.00 constitute the full and final
satisfaction of the claims and award in said CIR Case No. 1099-V, as well as any and all attorneys liens in said case, for and in
consideration of which the UNION members- claimants in CIR Case No. 1099-V by these presents now and forever release and
quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili Transit, Fortunato F. Halili, his estate, heirs and successors by reason of CIR Case No. 1099-V,
it being their intention that they be absolutely, completely and finally absolved and released from any and all liability in said case,
including attorneys liens, the transfer of the property and payment of the amount hereinabove stated constituting for all intents
and purposes a full, final and complete settlement and satisfaction of the award in CIR Case No. 1099-V and all incidents
thereto.
4. The UNION and its undersigned officers hereby warrant that the UNION is a duly registered labor organization and that in a
special meeting called for the purpose they were duly authorized on December 22, 1974, by all the members-claimants in CIR
Case No. 1099-V to sign this Memorandum of Agreement with Release and Quitclaim which was unanimously approved and
ratified by said members-claimants as evidenced by a Resolution dated December 22, 1974, a copy of which is attached hereto
and made a part hereof as Annex B, and hereby jointly and severally hold the estate and heirs of Fortunato F. Halili free and
harmless from, and undertake to indemnify them for any and all liability for any claims by members of the UNION, their heirs,
assigns and agents relating to CIR Case No. 1099-V or attorneys liens in connection therewith (69 SCRA 509- 510)."[3]
On January 6, 1975, pursuant to the abovementioned Agreement, the Administratrix of the Estate of Fortunato F. Halili executed
a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the aforementioned parcel of land to the Halili Bus and Conductors Union
(PTGWO) in trust for the individual members of the Union claimants.
The parcel of land covered by the said Deed of Conveyance was registered without encumbrance in the name of the said Union
on February 14, 1975 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 205755. [4]
On August 9, 1982, the said Union, through its legal counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting that authority be granted to sell and dispose of the property.
On September 23, 1982, the MOLE acting through Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, granted the Unions motion to sell the
subject property.
Thereafter, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda filed a motion with the Supreme Court on December 1, 1982, requesting authority to sell the
property. This Court, however, merely noted the motion in a Resolution dated December 8, 1982.
Relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, Atty. Pineda subsequently filed another urgent motion with the
MOLE, this time praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot to the respondent herein Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. (MMPCI, for brevity).
In an Order, dated February 9, 1983, Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, for the MOLE, likewise granted the motion to sell the subject
property to MMPCI.

The sale of the property held in trust by the seller-Union to the buyer-MMPCI was finally consummated on June 7, 1983.
On the basis of the Order of Arbiter Valenzuela and the Deed of Sale between the Union and MMPCI, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 205755 in the name of the Union was canceled and said property was registered in the name of respondent MMPCI, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 301151 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 14, 1983.
Significantly, however, the Orders, dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983, issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela which
granted the two motions of the Unions former counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, for an authority to sell the real property
awarded to the Union, were set aside by this Court in a Resolution, dated October 18, 1983, to wit:
"[A]nd considering that, as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the challenged orders of Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela dated
September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983, were issued without due process of law, the COURT RESOLVED (1) to set aside as
null and void said orders of September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela x x x. [5]
On the basis of this Resolution nullifying the above orders of the Labor Arbiter, the Union filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) seeking to compel the buyer, private respondent Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., to
reconvey the Unions property bought by MMPCI from Atty. Pineda upon the ground that the latter sold it without proper authority
from the Supreme Court.
The Chief of the Legal and Enforcement Division of the NLRC, tasked to act on the complaint, refused to take cognizance of the
case for lack of jurisdiction, viz:
"The instant complaint does not fall under the jurisdictional ambit of this Commission (NLRC) or any labor forum. It is our
considered view that the cause of action raised herein is a proper subject of the regular courts." [6]
Hence, the Union filed this Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification, through which it seeks, among others, the recovery of
subject real property comprising of 33,952 square meters sold to respondent MMPCI, to wit:
"3. That the Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification in this subject complaint claim for recovery of the Union Real Property in
trust as provided in the provisions in the Union General Resolution dated January 21, 1986, was a valid and verified cause of
action of the union-members/co-owners of the said union real property in trust to be recovered and take possession due to the
ground that the sale of said union real property was sold by persons without authority to sell from the owners of said property or
acquired authority to sell from the Supreme Court or Court of jurisdiction being that this union real property in trust was sold in a
means of purely illegal sale."[7]
The petition has no merit.
I
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act 6715 delineates the scope ofjurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work

and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to
the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements."
The subject matter of the instant petition, which is the reconveyance of the disputed real property to the Union by the respondent
MMPCI does not fall under any of the issues cognizable by the NLRC as enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code. Hence,
the public respondent NLRC committed no error in dismissing the complaint brought before them by the petitioner Union for the
simple reason that said Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
II
The fact that the subject real property was registered under the Torrens System of registration in the name of respondent MMPCI
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 301151 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 14, 1983, makes the instant
petition all the more dismissible, considering that the best proof of ownership of a piece of land is the Certificate of Title. [8]
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
"SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner.
The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished,
except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. [9]
In the present petition, the Union seeks from respondent MMPCI the recovery of the subject property. It is evident that the
objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondent to the property in question, which thereby challenges the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle
of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. It is well settled that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence,
whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant
proceeding.[10]
III
Furthermore, all portions of said land, now known as Holy Cross Memorial Park, have already been sold out to individual lot
buyers, who are innocent purchasers for value, and contain the interred remains of the lot owners and/or their relatives. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the Certificate of Title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would

be to impair public confidence in the Certificate of Title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens System
would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the Court. And this is
contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
Certificate of Title issued there for and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of
the property.[11]
IV
As adverted to earlier, ownership of the lot in question had already been vested in the Union upon sale to it by the Heirs of Halili.
Considering this, the Union had every right to dispose of the property. After the termination of the above-entitled cases, judgment
therefor having become final and executory, even as of 1982, neither the NLRC nor this Court will have any authority to look into
the validity of the disposal by the Union of the property so acquired by the Union in the proceedings. Under the circumstances,
therefore, it is to be assumed that the sale by the Union, as virtual owner of the property, to the respondent MMPCI would not
need any authority to sell from the NLRC or from this Court and we hereby write finis to these cases in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and considering that these cases were instituted as early as 1958.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

354 Phil. 556

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998 ]
LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, AND LEE TEK SHENG,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mothers death, petitioner[1] filed a complaint against his father, herein private respondent, to partition the conjugal
properties of his parents.[2] In his answer with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered
solely in petitioners name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends
that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in petitioners name only as a trustee considering that at that
time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, private respondent caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by
the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the
property within the power of the court pending litigation. [3] Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. [4]
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon
in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues
that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a
separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not
a probate or land registration proceedings when the courts jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily for private respondent, petitioners claim is
not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked [5] but that rule is not
material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as
equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on
Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. [6] (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of
the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. [7] Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.[8] Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may
only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat,
registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary
to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent. [9] What the latter disputes is the formers
claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance,
[10]
yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership. [11]
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But

whether as a matter of procedure[12] or substance,[13] a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to
concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that such
annotation amounts to a collateral attack of petitioners certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a partition
case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does
so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. [14] Here, the parties are still locked in a
legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the
purpose of giving information to the public that that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is
forewarned of such fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property. [15] For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. [16] Besides, an
action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper. [17]
Further, contrary to petitioners argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the
properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage. [18] In addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim
prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant
must present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective allegations. [19] Considering that this is a partition case, the
court is required to inquire into the nature and extent of title of the supposed claimant. [20] The title referred to by the rule is the
purported ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may
be considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

345 Phil. 582

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 98328, October 09, 1997 ]
JUAN C. CARVAJAL, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SOLID HOMES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land registration is unable to testify? May a land registration court, after it is
convinced that the property subject of an application for registration under the torrens system is already covered by an existing
certificate, dismiss such application and thus ignore petitioners insistence on submitting further evidence of his alleged title?
What constitutes sufficient evidence to show identity of the land applied for with the land already titled in favor of private
respondent?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this petition for review assailing the November 29, 1990 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 18318, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this petition be, as it is hereby DISMISSED. [3]
This petition also impugns the April 25, 1991 Court of Appeals Resolution [4] which denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts found by public respondent are as follows:[5]
Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region
stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be brought by petitioner under the operation of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is a
96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-D. Copies of the application were ordered by
respondent Court to be furnished (to) the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) which on March
18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be order[ed] to amend his petition by including the names and
complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners and correcting the discrepancy regarding the boundary lot number along line
2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-005516-D. On order of respondent Court [trial court], the petition was accordingly amended.
After the NLTDRA was notified that the case is [sic] initially set for hearing on December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief, Docket
Division of the NLRDRA [sic] submitted another report recommending that petitioner be ordered to refer to the Bureau of Lands
for corrections of the discrepancy existing in the directional bearing and area of Lot 6846-D, Csd-04-005516-D. The technical
descriptions as corrected by the Bureau of Lands was [sic] submitted and the application was initially set for hearing on April 26,
1988. The Notice of Initial Hearing stating that the application was set forbe [sic] heard on April 26, 1988 was thereafter issued
by the NLTDRA.
On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued by respondent Court. Exempted from the order was one Annie Jimenez
who filed an opposition to the application. On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that
a land registered in its name under the Torrens System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the property
subject of the application by petitioner. The opposition was not admitted considering that no motion to set aside the order of
general default was filed by private respondent.
On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit its opposition on the ground
that its right would be adversely affected by the application. Acting on the motion and in order to avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was
directed to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N7873 and to submit its plotting to the Court for its guidance. In the same order dated July 1, 1988, respondent Court in the
interest of justice set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent was concerned and admitted private

respondents opposition.
On January 10, 1989, petitioner filed a motion praying that the opposition of private respondent be dismissed for the reason that
the order issued by respondent court directing the NLRTDA [sic] to make a plotting of the land in question on the basis of the title
submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch Manila released the private respondent from the duty and obligation of
presenting evidence to prove that the land applied for is private and that there is apparent lack of interest on the part of private
respondent to pursue its claim on account of its non-appearance despite the lapse of more than six months or to introduce
evidence that will show that the land in question is covered by the alleged torrens certificate of title.
During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October 18,
1988, November 22, 1988, December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on the question as to whether or not he had a
registrable right over the land in question.
Pursuant to the court order dated July 1, 1988 directing the NLTDRA to make the plotting of the relative position of the property
covered by LRC Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873, the Land Registration Authority submitted a report dated
December 22, 1986 [should be 1988] recommending that, after due hearing, the application for registration of petitioner be
dismissed. The application was thus dismissed by respondent court in an order dated January 2, 1989. Considering, however,
that the recommendation is [sic] for dismissal after due hearing, respondent judge issued an order dated January 10, 1989
setting for hearing on January 24, 1989 the Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority. The hearing proceeded on
February 8, 1989 with Engr. Silverio G. Perez, Chief, Department on Registration, Land Registration Authority being presented in
connection with his Report recommending the dismissal of the application after due hearing. On February 28, 1989, the
petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.
On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the February 28, 1989 dismissal of the application for registration to
which private respondent filed an opposition dated March 20, 1989. The motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated
March 4, 1989.
On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the dismissal of his petition. On May 8, 1989, respondent judge
issued an order requiring the parties as well as the engineers from the Land Registration Commission and the DENR to appear
before respondent Court on June 5, 1989. The engineer from the Land Registration Commission was likewise directed to inform
the court whether the property applied for by petitioner is indeed inside the titled property of private respondent.
After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing that there was indeed an overlapping of the four (4) parcels of
land applied for by petitioner and the properties of Solid Homes under TCT 7873 and considering that the properties applied for
are [sic] within the titled property and could not be the subject of an application for registration, the second motion to reconsider
the dismissal of the application for registration was denied in an order dated July 5, 1989.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for registration, and denied the subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues:[6]
1. Whether or not an actual ground verification survey is required to establish the identity of the two parcels of land or whether
TCT No. 7873 under Plan FP-1540 of Solid Homes Inc., situated in Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal is identical or similar to
Lots 6846-A to 6846-D inclusive Cad. 585, Lungsod Silangan, Cadastre, situated in Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal applied for under
LRC Case No. 414 (-A), LRC Record No. N-60084;
2. Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity to be heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence
in the (proceeding) for Land Registration and (to) rest (his) case;
3. Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is reversible.

Petitioner alleges that the table survey made by the Land Registration Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land
Management Bureau cannot serve as basis for identifying his land. On the other hand, petitioner was able to establish the
identity of the land he applied for by actual ground survey which was approved by the Director of Lands and reprocessed by the
Land Registration Authority. He claims that if said land is covered by private respondents title, the Director of Lands and/or
Regional Director will no(t) approve the survey. Petitioner also argues that the land in question is situated in Mambogan,
Antipolo, Rizal while that of private respondent is in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. Survey Plan FP-1540, which served as basis
of private respondents certificate of title, cannot be found; hence, according to petitioner, the table survey was anomalous.
Petitioner adds that the matter entirely wanting in this case (is) the identity or similarity of the realties. [7] Petitioner concludes
that the trial court should have ordered actual ocular inspection and ground verification survey of the properties involved.
Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an applicant in a land registration case, was not able to
take the witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly participated in the proceeding except to propound
clarificatory questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority. [8]
Public respondent justified its dismissal of the appeal in this wise: [9]
Land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding cannot again be subject of adjudication or
settlement in a subsequent conducted proceeding (Land Titles and Deeds by Noblejas, 1968 Revised Edition, page 96). The
Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority (Annex B) and the Survey Division of the DENR (Annex RR) both indicate
an overlapping of the lot applied for by petitioner and the lot covered by TCT N-7873 owned by private respondent Solid Homes,
Inc. Even if petitioner were allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, the end result would still be the dismissal of
his application for registration. Respondent Judge was therefore justified in cutting short the proceeding as the time to be spent
in hearing petitioners application could be used disposing the other cases pending with respondent court.
Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not actively participate in the trials conducted to hear his evidence,
suffice it to state that it is counsels prerogative to determine how he intends to pursue his case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Identity of the Property Applied For
We are not persuaded that the land petitioner applied for was not identical to private respondents land which was already
covered by a torrens certificate of title. The two reports prepared by the Land Registration Authority and the DENR Survey
Division clearly showed that there was an overlapping between the two properties. Because the futility of petitioners application
was apparent, the trial court deemed it unnecessary to hear further evidence. We agree.
At the outset, we stress that there was nothing irregular in the order given by the trial court to the Land Registration Authority and
the Survey Division of the DENR to submit reports on the location of the land covered by petitioners application and private
respondents certificate of title. The authority of the land registration court to require the filing of additional papers to aid it in its
determination of the propriety of the application was based on Section 21 of PD 1529: [10]
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. -- The court may require facts to be stated in the
application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional
papers. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary.
From the above provision, it is also clear that ocular inspection of the property applied for was only discretionary, not mandatory.
Likewise, the land registration court was not obliged to order the survey of the contested lot, especially when another
government agency had already submitted a report finding that the contested lot was identical with that described in private
respondents certificate of title and recommending the dismissal of the application for registration.
Further, the order of the land registration court for the LRA and DENR to submit reports was in accordance with the purposes of
the Land Registration Law:[11]

The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed
property; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such
title; to quiet title to the land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality to a title; and to decree that land title to be final,
irrevocable and, undisputable. (citing Benen vs. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531.)
It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration court has limited and special jurisdiction. It can not be denied,
however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such jurisdiction to make it effective. (citing Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388, 391.) The purpose of the applicant is to prove
that he has an absolute or simple title over the property sought to be registered, otherwise his application will be denied. An
absolute oppositor claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicant. If successful, registration will be decreed in
favor of the oppositor. As to whether or not private respondents have absolute or fee simple title over the property sought to be
registered necessarily requires a resolution of the question as to whether or not the oppositors had a dominical right totally
adverse to that of the applicants. x x x
Based on the reports submitted, the land registration court correctly dismissed the application for original land registration. An
application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. It behooves a land
registration court to determine the veracity of any and all adverse claims, bearing in mind Section 46 of Act No. 496 which
provides that (n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. The trial courts order to the LRA and DENR was a mere cautionary measure in cognizance of the wellsettled rule that a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. In other words, the title may be challenged only in a proceeding for
that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in the name of another person. After one year from
its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open to review. The remedy of the landowner, whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, is to institute an ordinary action for reconveyance or -- if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value -- for damages. [12] In view of the nature of a torrens title, a
land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate alters a valid and existing certificate of
title.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the approval by the assistant chief of the Bureau of Lands Survey Division of the survey
conducted on the land applied for by petitioner did not prove that the said land was not covered by any title. It merely showed
that such land has been surveyed and its boundaries have been determined.
Also noteworthy is the finding of public respondent that "the same order (issued by the land registration court) [which set] aside
the order (of) general default insofar as private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. was concerned, directed the NLTDRA to make the
plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and [that which was] embraced in TCT No. N7873.[13] The intention of the land registration court was to avoid duplicity, [14] that is, to rule out the possibility that the land he
sought to register was already covered by a certificate of title. In this case, the land he applied for was found to be within the land
described in private respondents transfer certificate of title.
Petitioner also alleges that the land he applied for was located in Barangay Mambogan, while the registered land of private
respondent was in Barangay Mayamot. In his reply filed with public respondent, however, he himself admitted that Barangay
Mambogan is a part of Barangay Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in Antipolo, Rizal, and Mayamot covers a big parcel of land
running from Antipolo up to Marikina. [15] In view of petitioners declaration, it was not impossible for the land owned by private
respondent to be located in Barangay Mayamot and in Barangay Mambogan. At any rate, whether the two lands are located in
Mambogan or Mayamot or both is a factual question, and its resolution by the trial and the appellate courts is binding on this
Court. Petitioner failed to provide a reason, let alone an adequate one, to justify the reversal of such finding of the lower courts.
Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was anomalous because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which private
respondents title was based, could not be located. This argument lacks merit. The law does not require resorting to a survey
plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of title; the title itself is the conclusive proof of the
realtys metes and bounds. Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, provides that (t)he original certificates in the
registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or city
where the land is situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in
all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise
provided in this Act. It has been held that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land

described therein and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. [16] Thus, this Court in
Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals[17] ruled:
x x x. Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the property sought to be recovered as required by Art.
434 of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba,
Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner maintains, the parcel of land he is occupying
is located in Barangay May-Iba. He claims that the technical description in the title does not sufficiently identify the property of
private respondent and that a geodetic survey to determine which of his improvements should be demolished should first have
been conducted by the private respondent. x x x.
But private respondents title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the
certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding
at Barangay Lagundi.
For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred
but also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners required to
demolish only whatever is constructed within its boundaries. (Underscoring supplied.)
The old case of Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby[18] explains the nature of a torrens certificate of title, as follows:
x x x. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already
have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in
the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period
prescribed by law.
All in all, the land registration court did not err in relying on the certificate of title instead of the survey plan; likewise, the appellate
court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision.
Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was unable to take the witness stand. We disagree. The essence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. [19] In this case,
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right
to take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission of the parties memoranda which signified the
termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness
stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel hardly participated in the proceedings. The records show
that said counsel did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In any event, the
client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner has not shown at all that his previous counsel had acted in such
grossly negligent manner as to deprive him of effective representation, or of due process. [20]
In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs. Naawa [21] which held:
We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the dismissal of the registration case over the
objection of the oppositors; and when he refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and reinstate the case he had neglected to
perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to
which they are entitled.

Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land
registration case) nor Petitioner Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a holder of any certificate of title over
the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the land registration court was ordered to act in accordance with Section
37 of Act No. 496[22] either by dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title, or by entering
a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

183 Phil. 426

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING
CORPORATION, FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA AND REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are existing and whose
reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four hectares, respectively,
located at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of deeds of Rizal both
dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not destroyed during the war. Even the
originals of the preceding cancelled titles for those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the
name of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street,
Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the
reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915. She alleged that she was the owner of the lot
and that the title covering it, the number of which she could not specify, was "N. A." or not available (Civil Case No. C677). The petition was sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of
hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan
City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.
4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada
presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968
granted the petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was issued to Maria
Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The
plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable
action on the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of
Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (N. A.) 3-(R). Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting
Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan. The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N. A.)

3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59, 61-83,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisca S. Bombasi, single, residing at 2021
San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution
of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N. A." or not available. She claimed to be the owner
of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on
the same date, November 16, 1967, before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with
Laborada's petition was not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for
Bombasi's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies
thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners (22, Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and
notice of hearing were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be interested in the
reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of the title was really missing.
9. Bombasi's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and
Conrado de Leon. Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the
land to petitioner Bombasi. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for
that land by Gollez and Bombasi. The technical description of the land and the plan were approved by the Commissioner of
Land Registration who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record on
Appeal).
10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombasi.
Acting on that directive, the register of deeds issued to Bombasi Transfer Certificate of Title No. N. A. 4(R) dated
August 27, 1969 (pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca Bombasi, now identified as
(R.C. Aquino 10/6/80) a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, which was the same address used by
Fructuosa Laborada (Bombasi used first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M.
Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34146-R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and
the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, who had ordered the
reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970
restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from
accepting or recording any transaction regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate answers containing mere denials. The
Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of the
preliminary injunction sought by the State.
After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the
defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.

14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the two cases holding
that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that
Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently,
their titles are not cancellable and annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in conformity with law, could not be
attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the
originals before the reconstitution" (pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The State appealed.
15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders of reconstitution dated July 6, 1968
and April 3, 1969 could no longer be set aside on May 26, 1970, when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of
the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two
innocent parties, the State, as the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of
Appeals cited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the registration
of any other person as owner of such land".
The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial court grievously erred in
sustaining the validity of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and
forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763, were simply devices
employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombasi for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of
State-owned urban land with considerable value.
The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court and the Fifth Division of the Court of
Appeals (Reyes, L. B., Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombasi on the false or perjurious assumption
that the two titles were destroyed during the war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification of the judicial
process. One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the
cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings
and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombasi cannot be given
any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot
be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not
fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and
available in the registry of deeds.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26
and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require
reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an
instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453,
480, per J. G. S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the
stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration.
The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because
the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That circumstance should have

alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have
found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside. The reconstitution
proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. N. A. 3-(R) and N. A. 4-(R), and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to
30263 and the survey plans and subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared void. The register of deeds is
directed to cancel the said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby declared the registered
owner of Lots 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of
deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., (Chairman), concurs with a separate opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurs. His vocabulary is inadequate to express his disgust and indignation at this brazen landgrabbing.
Antonio, J., did not take part.

29 Phil. 31
[ G. R. No. 8539, December 24, 1914 ]
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ ET AL.,
OBJECTORS AND APPELLANTS.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system,
four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The
only one of said parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.
From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.
"I. General description.It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city
between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle
Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for
66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square
meters as set forth in the attached plan.
"II. Technical description.The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for
preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria
del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos.- 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta
and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan with the letter 'X,' located at the vertex of the angle
formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point,
whence S. 49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the topographical operations, the
result whereof is as follows:
Points or stations
A to B
B to C
C to D
D to E
E to F
F to G
G to H
H to I
I to J
J toK
K to A

Directions in
degrees
S. 4430'W
S. 46 15' E
S. 42 00' E
S. 40 50' E
N. 49 45' E
N. 52 00' E
N. 3710' W
N. 3545' W
N. 5030' E
N. 3500' W
N. 4215' W

Distances
in meters
31.08
16.15
32.75
13.20
14.25
10.94
24.90
6.56
1.92
7.60
25.50

Boundaries
Calle Escolta.
Heirs of Antonio
Enriquez .
Pasig River.

Pedro P. Roxas.

"The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings
are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro
P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez."
The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the petition is as follows and is
marked "Exhibit A."

(see image page 35 )

By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that the line A-B in the
technical description runs S. 44, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B
runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called to this difference between the technical description and the
plan at this time, but its importance to the questions presented will be discussed below.
Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in question. The petition gives
the names of said persons, as follows:
"The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land conterminous with this estate are,
according to my information:
"The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda,
Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San Miguel."
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was
referred to the examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the title of the
petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he
sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, and recommends the registration of said
Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in
accordance with the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the following notice:
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
"[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
"Case No. 1895.]
"To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No.
90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92;
Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28; Messrs. Sal- gado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32;
Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy
Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim,
Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of
Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and
Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel; Francisco
Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and Gervasia Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. Ill,
these three of the district of Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the city of Manila, P.
I., and to all whom it may concern:
"Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her
attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her
title in the following described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon, situated in the
district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as follows:
"Parcel A.- Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked 'A' on plan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W.
end of the chaflan at the S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE.
line of the Escolta, to pt. 'B'; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. 'C; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. 'D'; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt. 'E'; N.
49 45' EM 14.25 m. to pt. 'F'; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. 'G'; N. 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. 'H'; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. T;
N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. T; N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. 'K'; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. 'L'; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. 'M'; N.

44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. of beg.; containing 1,817.03 sq. m. Lines from pt. 'E' to 'G' follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.
"Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio
Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.
"Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
"You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of
Manila, P. I., on the 25th day, or April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you
have, why the prayer of said application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and place
aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as confessed, and you will be forever barred from
contesting said application or.any decree entered thereon.
"Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year nineteen hundred and six.
"Attest:

"A. K. JONES,
"Clerk of said Court."

In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a
copy of said order to each of the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons
received a copy of said notice, including the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The
record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the
land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila,
The Manila Times and La Democracia
On the 17th day of April, 1906, "A"K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the following certificate relating to the
notices and to the publication of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496.
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
"COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
"Case No. 1895.
"Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant. "I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice referring to the application for registry No. 1895,
presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once only in the
daily newspapers of this city, The Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and
year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the
Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano;
Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams &
Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de
Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes,
a copy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of
the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April, 1906.
"A. K. JONES,
"Clerk of the Court"
On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented
a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel
A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said attorney also called the attention of the court to the fact that other errors
existed with reference to the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the original petition. Our attention has not
been called to any order made by the lower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.

In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought on for trial on the
25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At that hearing the petitioner was represented.
No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez"
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas
appeared for the petitioner and Mr. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes
called the attention of the court again to the fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the
plan presented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be corrected.
So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge,
dictated the following order or judgment in default against all persons:
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
, "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
"COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
"No. 1895.
"Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real estate described herein,
"vs.
'The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler;
F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo &
Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim;
Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui;
Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants.
"The present case having been duly tried, and
''Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due form referring to the application mentioned,
in two newspapers of general circulation, one printed in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The
Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice was
effected;
"Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the publication of the said notice, a copy
thereof in the Spanish language to each one of the persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein;
"Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land included in the application a
certified copy of the notice in Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila,
before the fourteen days preceding that set for the termination of the period fixed;
"Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the application, within the period fixed by the
law;
"This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who may be concerned in opposing the
application, which is granted.
"Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of LarJ Registration, in Manila, this 21st day of July 1906.
"Attest:
"A. K. JONES,
"Clerk of the Court"

Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of land, A, be registered as the
absolute property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows:
"Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands,
applicant, spinster, is the absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the
description whereof is hereinafter set forth:
"A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen
Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez ; and on the NW. by
Calle Escolta.
"Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at
the intersection S. of Calle Escolta and Pasage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S.,
46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N., 49
45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38
40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N.,. 53
30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to point of beginning; having an
area of 1,817.03 square meters.
"All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey, December 26, 1905.
"Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration
Act in the name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set
forth in section 39 of said Act that may be in force and effect.
"Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July,
nineteen hundred and six, at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian,
"Attest:
"[SEAL.]

(Sgd.) "A. K. JONES,

"Clerk of the Court."

"A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906."
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the
owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have
been done in the Court of Land Registration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half
after said land had been registered, when we find that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
"COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
"Case No. 1895.
"Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.
"MOTION.
'The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and respectfully represents.;

"I. That the plan of the property with which the present ease deals is affected by an error of closure greater than 1/1500;
"II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a portion of said land tor use as a
public street;
'Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in the plan filed in this ease.
"Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911."
It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the
other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were included in the petition of the petitioner.
On the 23d day of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, referred the
petition of the city of Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor
reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans,
in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 187S, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for
the correction of the certificate issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands
included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
"COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:
"Case No. 1895.
"Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant. "Comes now the applicant into the honorable Court of Land
Registration and represents:
"1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the applicant, sought the legalization of
property title to four estates, among them the following:
" (a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
"(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
"(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal,
district of Binondo.
"2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the buildings erected thereon, located
at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of
November of the year just past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.
"3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars
and 50 cents United States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate
designated by the letter (b) was assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at
15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars
United States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States currency.
"4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical descriptions thereof which accompany said

application and are annexed to the above- entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates
under consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind the other, in the
estate designated by the letter (a) ; a house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (b) ; and another house of
stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (c).
"5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said estates, it appears that they consist
of the parcels of land and the buildings stated.
"6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners conterminous with the estates
referred to therein, the buildings erected on them likewise mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set
forth in the application; but in the certificate of the decree or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the
description of the parcel of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each was omitted,
and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which accompany this application.
"8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit,
as assurance fund, the rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70
Philippine currency, the receipts and vouchers wherefor do not accompany this application because the applicant destroyed
them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but averring that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in
the accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the office oi the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a
person delegated therefor by the applicant.
"9. That when the applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the omission in the corresponding
certificate of title of the building existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates;
and as it is to be supposed that said omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects the
applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the correction of said omission, especially
as there at present exist on the said parcels of land, without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when
legalization of title thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-entitled case,
reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.
"10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but
also in the building erected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said
estates, wherein are stated the two points mentioned.
"11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable court to decree, after the
necessary legal proceedings, correction of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to
each of the said estates, wherein record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third
paragraph of this application.
"MANILA, February 28, 1912.
"MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN."
On the 9th day of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H.
Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria
del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her right, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to
the said Masonic Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of the Land
Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.
On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was
presented, in accordance with the order of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose
of correcting the errors in closure in the original plan presented by the petitioner ^^n the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new
plan is as follows (see page 48) :
After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;
(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the buildings located upon
the lands registered in accordance with her original petition; and
(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance with its contract of
purchase of said lands from Maria del Consuelo
(see image page 48 )
Felisa Roxas y Chuidianafter notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down for hearing. For one reason
or another, the hearings on said motions were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of
August, 1912. During said various hearings, in addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof
was taken upon the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During said
hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some objection to the granting of said motions.
They presented no written statement in which their specific objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific
statement of their objections appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears
that their objection to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic
Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the
question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, and his associates, the
Honorable James A. Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in bane, on the 24th
day of August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new trial, basing it upon the ground
that the conclusions of the lower court were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a
new trial and after hearing the respective parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in bane, composed of Charles H.
Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In this court
the respondents presented the following assignments of error:
"1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land Registration were valid in entering
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.
"2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.
"3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence."
After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments of error, we are of the
opinion that they may be discussed together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument against the decision of the
court rendered on the 24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that
the original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, For the reason that "the appellants had no notice of
the pendency of the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the pendency of
the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now allege that it affirmatively
appears that neither this firm/nor any of its members represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record
shows, as we have pointed out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the
representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the record now
in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the representatives of said heirs, even though one of said attorneys
represented them, or at least some of them, in the present proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a
suggestion found in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said attorneys were not
the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show
any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original action. The appellants assert in
their argument that "personal notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of

the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to show,
not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate (No. 742) was void, because they
had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons
interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of
said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had
been given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act
No. 496. After the expiration of the period during which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The
record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and published in
accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed
by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such
service."
On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of the prayer which it contained.
Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application (petition)
be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made parties
defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles,
but may require other and further proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the
requirement of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every
decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or includes in the general description 'To all whom it may
concern.' "
There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title
under the Torrens system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require
proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land
included in the application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give any notice
to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that
"the court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may
deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give
notice to any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true,
upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or delay or additional expense, because some person claims
that he did not receive actual personal notice? Sections 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons
who have suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law. (Noble State Bank vs. Haskell,
219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions of
section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the
decree of registration and the granting of the certificate, that he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by
fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest." In the present case five years and a half
had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is no intimation
that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightest degree.
While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, it has been adopted in many States and its provisions have been attacked
at almost every point. The requirement relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law
has been attacked many times, because of the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the
question has been presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la
Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that fraud existed, simply because
personal notice had not been given!) The existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure%f actual personal notice. In
passing upon that question, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus) :
"In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a party-defendant by
publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive
against him as well as all the world."

"The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing
with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or
notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would
be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass.,
71.)"
In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian)
was guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registration of her land,
in her petition. The applicant is not charged even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to
do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration of the title which the
applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just qr unjust, against it. The Torrens system of
land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It
is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner
has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever character, except those which shall be
noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.
If there exist known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the
simplicity of subsequent transfers of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims,
absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and to make there a record, so that there- after there may be no
uncertainty concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit foreclosure
of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants" The great difficulty in land
titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid
impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles.
Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal
with and to dispose of the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land
Company vs Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47.) This rule was first established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very
necessities of the case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant ports of the
earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its business necessitated
the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might
also, perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible
obligations, to continue its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a
person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently there came into existence this action
in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally
considered that the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the State of
Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71),
in discussing this question, said:
"Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem, dealing with
a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by
name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or the United
States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be
impossible were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were
known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714, 727;
The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 144.)"
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights, without personal notice of the
proceedings in which that may occur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by
publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against
estates of deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also unknown claimants
or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the condemnation of private property for public
use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.

The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quieted "by notice by publication to all
persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U. S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U. S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman,
18 Howard (N. Y.) 137; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U. S., 316; Perkins vs.
Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title
to real estate. The state had control over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state,
whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations,
private or public, and the modes of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these questions, it (the state)
may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U. S., 481; Mitchell
vs. Furman, 180 U. S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U. S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U. S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134
U. S., 316; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47.)
The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its
legislative competency to establish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor,
87 111., 235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
The state, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem, or in the
nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233;
81 Am. Dec, 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am. St. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St.
Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 111., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs.
Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St.
Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L. R. A., 433; State vs. Westfall, 85 Minn., 437; 89 Am. St. Rep., 571; 57 L. R.
A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N. Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.
S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against an unknown resident, it may
provide a reasonable method for securing substituted service against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of
quieting title should not be limited to known persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it
is necessary that it be made to operate on all interests and persons known or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said: "If it (the procedure) does
not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of
such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claimsindeed certainty against the unknown may be said to be its
chief endand unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."
Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219
U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because
a case may be conceived where rights in and to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually
conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the
possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject
with which the statute deals."
The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N. Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the
right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are made with
respect to these remedies but it may possibly happen, notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing,
and has done none of the acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the
process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this legislation, that the Constitution
does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceeding due process of law, it then belongs to the
legislature to determine in the particular instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what
manner of constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the legal steps which
are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150
CaL, 289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U.

S., 47). In view of the facts and the decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how
it is authority in support of the contention of the appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows :
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the county of San Francisco, alleging in
substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of the county
recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the
filing of the complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that
his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all
encumbrances, liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss,
prayed that he be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple,
and that no one else had any estate, right, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable,
present or future, vested or contingent.
Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeiss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency of the action was published in
certain newspapers, as was required by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute. No one
having appeared and opposed the granting of the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property
described in the complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th day of December, 1906, a decree
was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the possession of the
land described in the complaint and that no other person had any right,title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part
thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one
year and five months after the entry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco. On that date
(the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which
the plaintiffs claimed title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss.
The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco was void and of no
force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law, and that said superior court, in said action and
proceeding, never had any jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such proceeding, and that said court did not
have or obtain jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff. The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right
whatever in said parcels of land, other than his right of possession and occupation." The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs
had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and
easily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon them nor did they in any way receive
notice of the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein
described) ; nor did they gain any knowledge of the existence of the decree until more than a year after its entry. To the
complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the questions involved to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the
law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47), decided each of the questions submitted by the Circuit Court of
Appeals against the contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land and for the purpose of registering his title to the
same under an act of the legislature of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment and quieting of
title to real property in case of loss or destruction of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended
by said act to provide a method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such an
extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a decree in the courts which would furnish public,
authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that practically all of the public records of title in
several counties in the State of California ha4 recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said
law provided that whenever the public records in the office of the county recorder had been, or shall hereafter be lost or
destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an estate of inheritance or have
title in, and who has by himself or his tenants, or other persons holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any
real property in said county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court for the county in
which said real property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in which he shall name the
defendants as "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." He was

required to give in his complaint a particular description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint,
a summons or notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the county in which the action was
brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved, which notice was directed to "all persons
claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
where the action was brought, at least once a week for a period of two months.
The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in the property or a lien thereon
adverse to the plaintiff.
The law also provided that said summons or notice should be posted in a conspicuous place on each parcel of property
described in the complaint, within fifteen days after the first publication of the summons or notice.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service upon and mailing to the
person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the
plaintiff and said property and of the person and every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said
property, or any part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for the
purposes of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is provided for in the law.
In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the validity of said law was
attacked and the legality of the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and
because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of the application of Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The
Supreme Court of the United States (219 U. S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and that a
compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the res
and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to
support the contention of the appellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for
the registration of the title of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law; and
Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties connected with said action,
we are forced to the conclusion that the appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and
certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we deem of importance. It is
the question of the right of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A
plan is prepared and is presented with the petition for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition
is presented to the registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It is
then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the plan, said plan will not close
that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corners of the wall would not meet. We believe that an
error of that character may be corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the
original petition. Upon the question whether the amended plan (p. 252, record) included more or different lands than were
included in the original petition, we find the following statement made by one of the judges who ordered said plan amended.
The statement is:
"At this stage of the proceedings and on this particular point nothing further is incumbent upon the court than to determine the
property as it was adjudicated in this case.
"Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should be the holding on this particular
point." We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to the same question,
in an answer presented by him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by some of the appellants herein, to the Supreme
Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved practically the same questions presented by the appellants here now.
Upon the question whether or not additional lands had been included in the new plan (p. 252, record), Judge Smith, in

answering for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:
"Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of the plaintiff and appellant) was
determined and established by an order of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary,
respondents charge the truth to be that the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so
indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties beginning on the south side of the Escolta is
exactly at the same point indicated in the original description and approved by the court; in other words, the premises in
question of the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged ; the boundary lines thereof have not
been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners is
undiminished, except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roofs of
the petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered prpperty of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly by the provisions
of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of
31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a
distance of 31.08 meters.
An examination of the certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W.,
for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no explanation why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not
conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real
difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in
ordering the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and that is the right of Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she
was the owner of the buildings located upon the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented
January 12, 1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with the buildings thereon.
No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the land as described in her petition. The record
shows no reason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been
an error on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors.
Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or
mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We think the petition
presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be
claimed, and we believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless the record
contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not
mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby
ordered that the original certificate be amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the
buildings located thereon as well. With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record
contains no sufficient reason for not granting the same.
Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be and it is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

31 Phil. 590
[ G. R. No. 8936, October 02, 1915 ]
CONSUELO LEGARDA, WITH HER HUSBAND MAURO PRIETO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. N. M. SALEEBY,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed for a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the
lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration
of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said
registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the
lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also
included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included
in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant.
They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed
by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they
failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a
joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a
judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other
words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was
situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be the correct
one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors,
then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever
right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having
thus lost his right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that
question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration
must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it

can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. Director of
Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It
is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez,
29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties,
including the government. After the registra tion is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government
itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and
they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title,
would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law.. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any
better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of'registra- tion accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of
its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be
lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a
direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system
affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is
nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different
persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation
over the same between the same parties. In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation
over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action.
This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be discussed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open,
and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No.
496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in
other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express
statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens
System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q. S. C. R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N. Z. R., 155; Lloyd vs. May- field, 7 A. L. T. (V.)
48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V. L. R., 152; Register of Titles vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W. A. R., 118.)" Hogg adds however
that, "if it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the
land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of
title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian Torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two
certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. * * * In successive registrations, where more than
one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide
that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include
the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the

absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest."
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except
for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any
reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration ? We do not believe the law
contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title In that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is
registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two different persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other
things, that when one piece of real property has been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title
to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet
we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing
the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and* so decree that in case land has been registered
under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other
things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of others, to the parcel of land
described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bouncf by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in
court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. - To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts."
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate
cannot rest secure in his registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely
upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If
the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within
the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the
position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage
done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them.
In the present case, the appellee was first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he
can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the
registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as
the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was
the owner of the land upon which the walk is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more
reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the
owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of
such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to
an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he
acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the
interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be
protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which
are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in
land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by
virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections?
May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of
their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall,
to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said
sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, if said sections are to be applied.
Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the
provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the
phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first
original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record is notice to all the world.
All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of
it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses. This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to
cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U. S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections
710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs.
International Bank, 78 111., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N. Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7
House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or
good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he
was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains
is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet
there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art. 1-875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not
been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of
land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land
released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no
knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record
contains is just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the
law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do
not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the plea
of ignorance of the law affecting a contract as to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be
an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the
phrase "innocent purchaser" should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchased
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a
parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in no sense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the

record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land
included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the
difficulties we think this is the safer rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections,
should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system.
When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is
notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even be regarded as the holder in good faith of that part of the land
included in his certificate which had theretofore been included in the original certificate of the appellants? We think not.
Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the
appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the
original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of
the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the
question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act
No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and
his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to
molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his
successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of
the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should
suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of
any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the
torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding
it, that the record under the torrens system must, by the very nature and purposes of that system, supersede all other
registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded under the torrens system,
to examine that record alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the
one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is
hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to
make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in question in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C. J. Torres, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson J., with whom concurs

220 Phil. 103

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 67284, March 18, 1985 ]
TEOFISTO, FELICISIMO AND MAXIMO, ALL SURNAMED UMBAY, AND FILOMENA, FRANCISCO, SUSANA, CELERINA
AND JOSEFA, ALL SURNAMED ENANORIA, PETITIONERS, VS. PLACIDO ALECHA, NICOLASA LABAJO AND
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the right of the heirs of the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,265 square meters to recover
a portion thereof with an area of 500 square meters allegedly usurped by the adjoining owner.
Natalio Enanoria was the owner of Lot No. 5280 located in the mountain of Barrio Valencia, Carcar, Cebu. His title is OCT No.
10933 issued in 1922 (Exh. A). He died in 1924. In 1963 his heirs asked a surveyor to relocate the lot. They discovered that its
500-square-meter portion was occupied by Placido Alecha, the owner of the adjoining Lot No. 5281 which is its southeastern
boundary (Exh. B).
Alecha refused to vacate the disputed portion. He removed the concrete monuments (Exh. B-3). The heirs sued Alecha.
Another relocation made by a surveyor from the Bureau of Lands appointed by the trial court confirmed the usurpation of 500
square meters (p. 42, Rollo).
The trial court ordered Alecha and his wife to vacate the said 500-square-meter portion. The Appellate Court reversed that
decision and dismissed the complaint of the Enanoria heirs. They appealed to this Court. Alecha did not file any appellee's brief.
We hold that the action of the heirs of Enanoria to recover the 500 square meters portion of their registered land does not
prescribe and cannot be barred by laches. Nor can Alecha, the adjacent owner, acquire that 500-square-meter area by
prescription because it is covered by a Torrens title.
Section 46 of the Land Registration Law, now section 47 of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529 effective June 11,
1978), provides that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession" (Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil. 427, 439; Estella vs. Register of Deeds
of Rizal, 106 Phil. 911, 914; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason, & Co., Inc., 110 Phil. 16, 22; Manila Electric Co. and Sheriff of Quezon
City vs. Enriquez and Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499, 504).
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors because the latter
merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor-in-interest (Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257).
As stated by Justice Johnson in the 1915 case of Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 the real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the 'mirador de su casa', to avoid the possibility of losing his land."
Thus, a registered owner of land who lost possession thereof in 1925, when it was taken by the municipality of Pasay for road
purposes, is not barred from recovering compensation for said land in 1958 or 33 years later. The reason is that registered lands
are not subject to prescription. It was an error to dismiss the landowner's complaint on the ground of laches and prescription
(Alfonso vs. Pasay City, 106 Phil. 1017; Herrera vs. Auditor General, 102 Phil. 875).
Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a
Torrens title (Tuason vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106, 111; Vda. de Recinto vs. Inciong, L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23480, September 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 146).

"Una posesion adversa, exclusiva, publica y continuada a titulo de dueo por el tiempo fijado por la ley es ineficaz contra un
titulo Torrens. El titulo de propiedad expedido de acuerdo con la Ley del Registro de la Propiedad es imprescriptible." (Valiente
vs. Court of First Instance, 80 Phil. 415, 417; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615.)
Title to land can no longer be acquired by prescription after a Torrens title has been issued for it (Dimson vs. Rural Progress
Administration, 90 Phil. 714, 717; Fernandez vs. Aboratigue, L-25313, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 476).
The right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership
(Atun vs. Nuez, 97 Phil. 762; Manlapas and Tolentino vs. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298, 308; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117
Phil. 110, 113-114).
In this case, the petitioners' action to recover the 500 square meters cannot be barred by the equitable defense of laches or
delay because they became aware of the encroachment only after they hired a surveyor in 1963 to ascertain the true area and
boundaries of Lot No. 5280.
Laches presupposes waiver of one's right. There was no waiver in this case. The petitioners, poor, ignorant rustics, never
intended to renounce their right to the 500 square meters.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. That of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, (Chairman), and Abad Santos, JJ., in the result.

241 Phil. 391

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 68741, January 28, 1988 ]
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO
MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO AND EMELITA MAGCAMIT, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court* (now Court of Appeals) dated January 31,
1984, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III, and of
the resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court are as follows:
On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San
Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of
spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan
Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli". This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on
December 6, 1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31, 1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in
favor of the private respondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the instrument,
entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan", after being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling
Muli", and the balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title, is issued. From the execution of said
Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in question was issued to and in the name
of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the
petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this
case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property in question, scheduling the
public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself.
By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the
name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that private respondents learned that a title in the name of the
Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of the
petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance
of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the
payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply
with their obligation under the terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the offer to pay the
balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel of
private respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but
the former refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but

the case was dismissed.

On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City,
Branch III, San Pablo City, against the petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be
declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the petitioner is
declared the owner of the said property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and
conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises. (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that it was never a privy to any transaction between
the private respondents (plaintiffs therein) and the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo; that it is a purchases in good
faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, private
respondents' cause of action has already prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).
After due hearing, the trial court* rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of said
judgment reading as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to
the same;
(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains Authority;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay plaintiffs the sum of P56,000.00 representing the
amount paid pursuant to the Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan marked Exhibit '3', with legal interest thereon from January 31, 1972
until the amount is paid, to pay an additional amount of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, an additional amount of P10,000.00
as moral damages, another amount of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit." (Rollo, p. 35).
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 1984, reversing and setting aside the decision
of the trial court as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered ordering the
National Grains Authority to execute a deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the names of plaintiffs-appellants, and ordering
defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh. 3)
within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the writ of execution. No damages and costs." (Rollo, p. 19).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied. (Rollo, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit simultaneous
memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The memorandum for the petitioner was filed on July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the memorandum
for the private respondents was filed on August 26, 1985 (Rollo, p. 192).
The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the
sellers, and private respondents, the buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a breach
of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.
It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of private respondents, namely: (a) the conditional
sale with right to repurchase or the "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and (b) the
deed of absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not registered; (2) the condition that the Certificate of Title
will be delivered to the buyers upon its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is contained in the deed of
absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of the execution of both sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System
of registration.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by
provision of law "understood to be without prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code,

as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens
System and has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive
condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.
In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among others, for two alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to
be declared the owners of the property in question or (b) to order the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the
property in their favor.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of
Absolute Sale which although unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the
possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that they have been and are still in possession of the same openly,
continuously, publicly under a claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December 2, 1971 (Rollo, p.
165). It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the plaintiff learn that a title had been issued covering the property in
question (Rollo, p. 15).
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens System is an
action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may
have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or
title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the
adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all
persons, known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil.
324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs.
Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred by res judicata when the decree
of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizardo. It does not matter that they may have had some right even the right of
ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be
subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by
law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and
the certificate so issue binds the whole world, including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209
[1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who
appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed by law
to be the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529
which can be enforced against petitioner herein.
Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to
stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting
in the portals of the court, or sitting on the 'mirador su casa', to avoid the possibility of losing his land'." An indirect or collateral
attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs. Manila Railroad, 62 Phil. 467).
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full
knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land
to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Angeles vs.
Samia, 66 Phil. 444 [1938], underscoring supplied).
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in procuring the registration of the property in
question. On the contrary, their application for registration which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with the complete
knowledge and implied authority of private respondents who retained a portion of the consideration until the issuance to said
spouses of a certificate of title applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to them. The question
therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the breach of contract between private respondents and the Vivas
spouses. Petitioner NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the

execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of absolute sale, much less of its violation.
Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of the
mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent
purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgages under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in
the public auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land which was not even in the possession of the
supposed mortgagors, nor present any witness to prove its allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE to
show its being a mortgagee in good faith and for value (Rollo, p. 110).
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of
title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a mortgage to make an investigation of the title
of the property being given as security (Phil. National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and
where innocent third persons like mortgagees relying on the certificate of title acquire rights over the property, their rights cannot
be disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 [1985]).
Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that plaintiffs' (private respondents herein)
complaint insofar as it prays that they be declared owners of the land in question can not prosper in view of the doctrine of
indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System, because it is an established principle that a petition for review of the decree of
registration will not prosper even if filed within one year from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The setting aside of the decree of registration issued in land
registration proceedings is operative only between the parties to the fraud and the parties defrauded and their privies, but not
against acquirers in good faith and for value and the successors in interest of the latter; as to them the decree shall remain in full
force and effect forever (Domingo vs. The Mayon Realty Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [1957]). Assuming, therefore, that there was
fraud committed by the sellers against the buyers in the instant case, petitioner NGA who was not privy therein cannot be made
to suffer the consequences thereof. As correctly declared by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful owner of
the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.
As to private respondents alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the
property in their favor, it is clear that there is absolutely no reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should
reconvey the land to the private respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, now Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

106 Phil. 477

[ G. R. No. L-13479, October 31, 1959 ]
MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL., PLANTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION,
ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an area of about 430 hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City alleging that for many years
prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and
continuous possession as owners of the land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits
exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955
defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1356 embraces practically all of plaintiffs' property, while the other defendant University of the Philippines began also
asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the remaining portion; that defendants are
not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice of plaintiffs' actual possession and claim of ownership thereof; and that
the inclusion of plaintiffs' property within the technical boundaries set out in defendants' titles was a clear mistake and that at no
time had defendants' predecessors-in-interest exercised dominical rights over plaintiffs' property.
On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint states no cause
of action; that it is barred by the statute of limitations; that the court has no jurisdiction over the ease; and that in the event the
motion is not granted, defendant be separated from the case and be impleaded in a separate action. To this motion plaintiffs
filed a reply alleging that the complaint on its face alleges a valid and sufficient cause of action upon which the court could render
a valid judgment. Defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the other hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars
to which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On November 20, 1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose Pearanda filed a motion for
intervention which was likewise opposed by plaintiffs. On December 11, 1957, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action and that it is already barred by the statute of limitations, leaving
unresolved the other points raised in the pleadings for being unnecessary. From this order plaintiffs took the present appeal.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of sufficient cause of action for
the reason that on its face said complaint alleges sufficient facts on which a valid judgment could be rendered against
defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint alleges the following facts: that plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio
who died intestate in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon
City; that said plaintiffs have always been in actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land as owners pro indiviso;
that sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is embraced and covered by their
respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim
of ownership of plantiffs and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens system I since 1914 when it
has been originally registered in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955
defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all
of plaintiffs' property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant University of the
Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of land which embraces the remainder of the property for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. It is, therefore, clear that the land in question has been
registered in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest since 1914 under the Torrens system and that notwithstanding
what they now claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they have never
taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the present action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43
years before they woke up to invoke what they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the
land in the name of defendants' predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and jurisprudence,
a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided no innocent

purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Salmon vs.
Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. 1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within which to review the decree of
registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38, Act No. 496. The
purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within
which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the one-year
period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be
defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520).
Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the
actual possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for
such averment is sufficient to establish a cause ot action against defendants. This contention overlooks the fact that the land in
question is covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation bought the
portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955 for which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1356 was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property said defendant knew
of any defect in the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to
defendant University of the Philippines. It likewise acquire the portion of the property in question sometime in 1955 from its
predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. There is also nothing in the
complaint to show that when it acquired the property it knew of any defect in the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien
or incumbrance. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are
entitled to protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property
which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary
objects of the Torrens system" (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil, 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622; Paraiso vs.
Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as contended, their right however to bring the
instant action may be considered barred by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after title to the property had been
issued under the Torrens system. It appears' that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was
only on October 11,1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the present action. In the recent case of
Domingo vs. Mayon Realty Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz., 4954), September 30, 1957, this Court said: "Like Ciriaco
Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein could have raised the issue of the validity of the Certificate of Title issued to
Valle Cruz since 1928, when the foreclosure sale in her favor was confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years afterwards,
and their action (if any) now should be held barred by their own laches and negligence."
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial
notice of its own records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court
cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases had been tried by the same
court arid notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is
considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute, There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as noted by former Chief
Justice Moran:
"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with the
matter in controversy. Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator of an estate arising from an appeal against the
report of the committee on claims appointed in the administration proceedings of said estate, to determine whether or not the
appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the record of the administration proceedings. Courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling
is applicable in the case under consideration." (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., pp. 36-37)
Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely technical because they do not dispute the
fact that appellant Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land
Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration of the same parcel of land which application was denied by the court. It appears
that in that registration case the oppositors were the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and the
Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in effect it was represented by
its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two cases

there is not only identity of subject-matter but identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

117 Phil. 59
[ G. R. No. L-16257, January 31, 1963 ]
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, DEFENDANT
AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of Negros Occidental , the possession of Lot
378 of the cadastral survey of Bacolod , Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said
lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935 , in addition to attorney's fees and costs. On June 28, 1951 , the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal taken by the defendant, this judgment was,
however, set aside by the Supreme Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise, ordered the case
remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after which another decision was rendered by said court of first instance dismissing
plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case is, once again, before
us, this time on appeal by the plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205,
1452 and 1641 of the aforementioned cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares, originally registered ill the
name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued on August 25, 1916 , in the name of the Amenabars. On November 30,
1920 , the latter sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents as Jose Benares
Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable in instalments, as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8, 1924 ,
said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 6295 in his name. Meanwhile, or on March 12, 1921 , the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose
Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On December 6, 1926 , Jose Benares again
mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, to the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental and annotated on the corresponding certificates of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295, covering
Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental dated September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17166which, owing to its subsequent loss, had to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT1371in the name of the Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on November 8, 1935 , the Bank
agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual instalments,
subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain in the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares
transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the instalments due to
the Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949 , the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff
(Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering Lot 378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-1371), in plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take
possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the
deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon
the execution of the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the Bank, on September 29, 1949 , plaintiff took steps to take
possession of the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on October 4, 1949 , plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the

status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on
June 10, 1950 .
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378 in the year 1924-1925, through
expropriation proceedings; that immediately after the commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot
and began the construction thereon of the provincial hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said
lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner thereof; that, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond
comprehension of the defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of said defendant"; that said lot had been placed
in defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No. 16269 (dated December 31, 1937) ; and that plaintiff
had acted in bad faith in purchasing said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the provincial hospital was where it
is up to the present, and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo
Montelibano, the controlling stockholder, president and general manager of plaintiff corporation, was the first City Mayor of
Bacolod, which contributed to the support, operation and maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November
8, 1950, defendant alleged, also, that the aforementioned expropriation ease was "amicably settled as between the parties
herein, in the sense that tho * * * Province of Negros Occidental would pay * * * and did in fact pay to Jose Benares the assessed
value of Lot 378 * * * and whatever consideration pertaining to said lot in excess of its assessed value which was paid by the
Province would be donated and was in fact donated by said * * * Jose Benares in favor of the Province purposely for Hospital
site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned
expropriation proceedings. The decision appealed from in effect decided this question in the affirmative and declared that plaintiff
merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in view of which it ordered the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is
predicated, substantially, upon the following premises, namely; that case No. 3041 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, for the expropriation of the hospital site of said province, was actually commenced on January 26,
1924; that, among the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the aforementioned cadastral survey,
belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding
transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2) was issued on July 12, 1S26; that, according to the testimony of Jose Benares, the
expropriation of Lot 378 was settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of PI2,000; and that defendant's failure to secure
the corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot 378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of Lot No.
405-B" in the plan Exhibit X.
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence, because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff and its president, for the former believes that
the latter had "manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been four (4) litigations between Jose
Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been finally decided against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he testified to having been paid P12,000 by the
Government, although, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to sell Lot 378, he should
have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters; (b) he claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year
1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days" after the Government had taken possession of the land, and to have sent the money the next
day to Pilar Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have received said sum of P12,000 on November 7, 1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco, former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental,
for: (a) Jose Benares asserted that there was a written compromise agreement between him and the Government, whereas
Marco averred that agreement was merely oral; and (b) Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for
Lot 378, the assessed value thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the Government the difference between this sum and the
true value of the property, but Benares affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare which he rejected, and that he later
demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the Government, agreed to pay, although, subsequently, he said that Rafael Alunan and
Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept P1.000 per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros
Occidental' at the time of the expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case "was not yet terminated"

and that "negotiations were still pending" for the acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in
1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise agreement for the acquisition of the land by
the Government had been reached and that the expropriation had not been consumated. For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the
corresponding notices (Exhibit 1);
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the Government, followed by the cancellation of the
certificate of title in her name and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the Province, when contrasted with
the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of a transfer certificate of title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378,
strongly suggest that no such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had been made or reached;
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March 12, 1921 , and this mortgage, duly registered and
annotated, inter alia, on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was not cancelled until September
28, 1935, Moreover, Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Go. Yet, the latter was not
made a party in the expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926 , Jose Benares constituted a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which would not have accepted
the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated subsequently
thereto without the Bank's knowledge and participation. What is more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935
(Exhibit R), promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos P. Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405,
407 and 410, forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A, 407-B and 410-A, had been expropriated by
the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been
expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
* * * it is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the expropriation case and the chances are that the
case was dismissed. The Court had to examine carefully and minutely every single piece of evidence adduced by both parties in
order to arrive at the correct solution of the mystery. The Court believes that the failure of the government to secure the
corresponding transfer of title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms a part of Lot 405B. This
conclusion was arrived at after examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the subdivided lots were
properly identified by lot numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the plan encircled with red pencil, marked Exhibit
X1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot number and that portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where the
hospital building"' was constructed. This plan was prepared for the government on May 12, 1927 by public land surveyor, Mr.
Formento, embracing lots covering over 22 hectares for the Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular portion was not
labelled with the corresponding lot number might have misled the authorities to believe that it formed a part of lot 405-B, which
adjoins it, altho separated by the creek. This lack of reasonable explanation why the government failed to secure the
corresponding certificate of title to lot 378, when there is sufficient proof that Jose Benares was paid and he executed the deed of
sale in favor of the government."
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness and moral courage that account for the well
earned reputation and prestige of the Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to concur in the foregoing view. To begin with,
there is no evidence, and defendant has not even tried to prove, that the expropriation case had ever been dismissed insofar as
Lot 378 is concerned. Hence, the lower court merely speculated about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was
dismissed." By the way, the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela, for he testified that the
expropriation case was still pending in 1934, when he ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and the record before us suggests
that since the Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925 and completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there
were no further proceedings in said case.
With respect to the plan Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that the authorities had been 'misled * * * to
believe" that the portion at the lower corner of said planwhich was enclosed, during the trial, within a circle in red pencil, and

marked as Exhibit X-1formed part of Lot 405-B, which had been expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact,
said portion Exhibit X-1 is not part of the land covered by the plan Exhibit X. A close examination of the latter shows that the
boundaries of said portion are not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the right hand side of Exhibit X, the following
appears in bold letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403, 405, 406, 407 and 410 Bacolod Cadastre
as surveyed for the Provincial Government of Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said
enumeration and the explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to the "Capitol Site", negates the possibility of its
being mistaken by any body, much less by government engineers, as including the hospital site, and, hence, said Lot 378. Lastly,
the very evidence for the defendant herein, specially the assessor's field sheets and declarations of real property for tax
purposes (Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the Government had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the
Provincial Hospital Site. In any event, said possibility of mistake, if any which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrantin the
face of documentary evidence to the contrary the conclusion that Lot 378 has already been acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and applied by him to the payment of his debt to Pilar
Amenabar? Said amount could not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly agreed therefor,
its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00 in this connection, it should be noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings
for the hospital site, another expropriation case for the Capitol site, affecting another property of Jose Benares, appears to have
been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have mistaken the payment for his land
included in the Capitol Site, as one intended for Lot 378, which was affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may amount
to a probability when we consider that he erroneously believed that there had been only one expropriation case, instead of two
cases, against him, and that Lot 378 was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in favor of the Philippine National
Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an accurate recollection of the events or transactions affecting his. properties, and,
hence, his testimony may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be
held, therefore, to be the exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of plaintiff's president to the effect that he did not know
until 1949 that the land on which the Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held that plaintiff was "not a purchaser
in good faith for having constructive knowledge of defendant's possession of the property at the time it was bought by the
plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benareswhose right to buy the Hacienda Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff"is
a part owner of the Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein", because "the hospital was already constructed
in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot was declared in the name of the Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in 1935, the
purchaser should have inquired as to its location and improvements"; because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over their
supposed rights to take possession of Lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that Lot No. 378 was erroneously or
inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q & R) executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiff
subdivision and that same lot was occupied by the defendant government for the provincial hospital for the last 34 years, as
owner thereof."
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did not know until 1949 that Lot 378 was the very
land occupied by the provincial hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known to Carlos P.
Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced from the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner,
Jose Benares, for even the latter appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose Benares did not
apparently know that there were two (2) expropriation proceedings affecting said properties; that the P12,000 received by him
from the Government was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties mortgaged by him to the Bank.
Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959;
Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March 30, 1960 ; Maacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13971, February 27, 1961 ). In
the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land
on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the
hospital site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly registered, as well as
annotated on the corresponding, certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on
December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru

foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935 , to sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and
the latter, subsequently, conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as well as when the Bank executed the deed of absolute sale in
plaintiff's favor on September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that sugar centrals as
well as banks are known to have an array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified
in assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were satisfied that the same belonged to the
mortgagor when said mortgages were constituted, and to the. Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In short, we find that
plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value.
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the
latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due by reason
of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent of Lot 378, as
of the time when possession thereof, was actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential damagesincluding attorney's
feesfrom which consequential damages the consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted, with interest, at the legal rate,
on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking. The case should be remanded, therefor,
to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the amount of compensation collectible from
the defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, as above stated, with costs against the defendant. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador , Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

373 Phil. 817

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 114299, September 24, 1999 ]
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO,
CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, ALL SURNAMED CAPAY AND RAMON A. GONZALES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 118862. SEPTEMBER 24, 1999]
PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, ALL SURNAMED CAPAY, AND RAMON A.
GONZALES, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS AND MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE
AND JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II AND LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS.
DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO AND LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND TRADERS ROYAL BANK, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The present controversy has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and Patria Capay in favor of Traders
Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered several properties, including a
parcel of land, the subject of the present dispute. [1] The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained
unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.
To prevent the propertys sale by public auction, the Capays, on September 22, 1966, filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was
void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the
disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays certificate of title.
Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure
proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction
sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name on the same day. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in
the name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new
one, TCT No. T-16272,[2] was entered in the banks name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in the
certificate of title issued in the name of TRB.
Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of the property with damages and
attorneys fees. Trial in Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and, on October 3, 1977, the CFI rendered its decision declaring the
mortgage void for want of consideration. The CFI ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the name
of TRB and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses.
TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the
land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774, [3] was issued, also, without any notice of lis
pendens annotated thereon. Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz
and Artemio Sanchez, who became co-owners thereof. [4] Alcantara and his co-owners developed the property and thereafter sold
the six (6) lots to separate buyers who were issued separate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens.[5]
On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the decision of the trial court as to the award of damages
but affirming the same in all other respects.

For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court [6] was denied in a
Resolution dated September 12,1983. TRBs motion for reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated October 12,
1983. The Courts September 12, 1983 Resolution having become final and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial court
issued a writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to cancel TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB, and to
issue a new one in the name of the Capay spouses.
Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the successive subsequent transfers of the subdivided property to
buyers who obtained separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for recovery of possession/ownership dated 8 June 1985 was
filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the respondents in
G.R. No. 118862 (hereinafter, the non-bank respondents). Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay, her children by Maximo [7]
who succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon Gonzales, counsel of the spouses in Civil Case No. Q10453 who became co-owner of the property to the extent of 35% thereof as his attorneys fees (collectively, the Capays). On
March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants and ordering the Register of Deeds
for Baguio to cancel TCT No. T-36177, Books 198, Page 177 in the names of defendants Spouses Honorato D. Santos and
Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT No. 36707, Book 201, Page 107 in the names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and
Josefina L. Pe; to cancel TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind
Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel TCT No. T-36147, Book 198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo P. Alfelor II and
Liza R. Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730, Book 201, Page 130 in the names of Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and Laarni
Magdamo Fernando; to cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37 in the name of Remedios Oca, and issue new ones free from
all liens and encumbrances, together with all the improvements therein in the names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as follows:
35% to Ramon A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age, with postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila,
Quezon City; 37.92% to Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to Ruby Ann Capay, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen; Chona Margarita Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Waldo Flores; Rosario Capay,
of legal age, Filipino, married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Raul Flores; Linda Joy
Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all with postal address at 37 Sampaguita St., Capitolville Subd., Bacolod
City, ordering said defendants to vacate the premises in question and restoring plaintiffs thereto and for defendant Traders Royal
Bank to pay each of the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in exemplary damages and
P40,000.00 as attorneys fees, all with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, with costs against defendants.
SO ORDERED.[8]
TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated on February 24, 1994 in CAG.R. CV No. 33920, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.[9] It ruled that the non-bank respondents
cannot be considered as purchasers for value and in good faith, having purchased the property subsequent to the action in Civil
Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to TRBs certificate of title, as well as to the
subsequent transferees titles, it was entered in the Day Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to all
persons of such adverse claim, citing the cases of Villasor vs. Camon,[10] Levin vs. Bass[11] and Director of Lands vs. Reyes.[12]
As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when it sold the property knowing that it was under
litigation and without informing the buyer of that fact.
On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside the CA decision, docketed herein as G.R. No.
114299, invoking the following grounds:
I.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION AND THEREBY DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY
CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
II.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW
IN SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF REVIEW BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously, with grave abuse of discretion, in
excess of jurisdiction tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

xxx
b) The public respondent erred in not finding that it was not the fault of petitioner when the notice of lis pendens was not carried
over to its new title.
xxx
c) The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had legally caused the invalidation of the Capays property and
the subsequent validation of TRBs title over the same property was effective even as against the Capays. [13]
Meanwhile, the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. Convinced of the movants
arguments, the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on August 10, 1994 granted the motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the complaint as against them. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for reconsideration, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court, promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The
complaint filed against defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate of titles
originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby ordered restored and duly respected. We make no pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 118862, to set aside the resolution of the Court
of Appeals raising the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48
PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48 PHIL. 836 ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 198 SCRA 436, IS APPLICABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97
PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA 34, ARE NOT APPLICABLE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL.
419 VILLASOR VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404 AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE
HEREOF.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
GUILTY OF LACHES.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO
DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS VIS--VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO
ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS AND WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED
FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM REGISTRATION.
VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH REGARDS TO TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTER-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT:
B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-10453.
Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was consolidated with G. R. No. 114299, pursuant to this Courts Resolution dated July 3, 1996.
[15]

The consolidated cases primarily involve two issues: (1) who, as between the Capays and the non-bank respondents, has a
better right to the disputed property, and (2) whether or not TRB is liable to the Capays for damages.
On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.
I
First, when TRB purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that the Capays caused to be
annotated on their certificate of title was not carried over to the new one issued to TRB. Neither did the certificate of title of
Emelita Santiago, who purchased the property from TRB, contain any such notice. When Santiago caused the property to be
divided, six (6) new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the
lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank
respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired
their respective portions of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title of their respective predecessors-in-interest
that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title
of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of
the principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.
The main purpose of the torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative
thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate.
The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions
laid down by the law are satisfied.[16]
Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected the properties and
inquired from the Register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the property they were purchasing-an
exercise of diligence above that required by law.
Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son Dean, testified:
Q How did you come to live in Baguio City, particularly in Km. 2.5 San Luis, Baguio City?

A In one of my visits to my sister who has been residing here for twelve (12) years now, I got interested in buying a property
here.
Q

How did you come to know of this property at Asin Road where you now reside?

My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.

When this particular property was bought by you, when was that?

I do not remember the exact date, but it was in early 1984, sir.

At the time when you went to see the place where you now reside, how did it look?

A This particular property that I bought was then a small one (1)-room structure, it is a two (2)-storey one (1) bedroom
structure.
Q

What kind of structure with regards to material?

It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.

And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room structure, how did the surrounding area look like at the time you visited?

There were stone walls from the road and there were stone walls in front of the property and beside the property.

Q At the time you went to see the property with your agent, rather, your sister Ruth Ann Valdez, did you come to know the
owner?
A

We did because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there supervising the workers.

And who?

Amado Cruz, sir.

After you saw this property, what else did you do?

My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title.

In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this concern of yours?

At first, I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.

What was his answer?

That it was a property with a clean title, that he has shown me the mother title and it is a clean title.

Aside from being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you do anything to answer your question?

Yes, sir.

What did you do?

Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration Office.

Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?

Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.

And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds?

We looked for the title, the original title, sir.

When you say we, who was your companion?

Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir.

The three (3) of you?

Yes, sir.

What title did you see there?

We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado Cruz, sir.

And what was the result of your looking up for this title in the name of Amado Cruz?

A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty. Diomampo who heads the office. We showed him a
copy of that title and we were also reassured by him that anything that was signed by him was as good as it is.
Q

Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good?

He did.

After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you do?

The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend from RCBC Binondo, Manila, this is Atty. Nelson Waje.

What is your purpose in going to this lawyer?

We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case we think of buying the property.

What was the result of your conference with this lawyer?

He was absolutely certain that that was a valid title.

Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds, looking at the title and seeing your lawyer friend,
what decision did you finally make regarding the property?
A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as advised by that same lawyer, there is another office of the
Bureau of Lands. I cannot recall the office but it has something to do with registration of the old.
Q

What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?

I wanted more reassurances that I was getting a valid title.

What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?

A We found the title of this property and there was reassurance that it was a clean title and we saw the mother title under the
Hilario family.
Q

Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this Banaue?

It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.

Q And when you saw the title to this property and the mother title, what was the result of your investigation, the investigation
that you made?
A

We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a genuine title.

When you were able to determine that you had a valid, authentic or genuine title, what did you do?

A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. [17]

Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar routine:
Q How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are presently residing?
A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who is presently the Branch Manager of CocoBank. She informed my wife that
there is a property for sale at Asin road, and she was the one who introduced to us Mr. Alcantara, sir.
Q When you were informed by Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr. Alcantara, did you see the property that was being
offered for sale?
A

Yes, sir.

When did you specifically see the property, if you can recall?

I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.

When you went to see the place, could you please describe what you saw at that time?

A When we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara. As a matter of fact the road leading to the property is
still not passable considering that during that time it was rainy season and it was muddy, we fell on our way going to the property
and walked to have an ocular inspection and physical check on the area, sir.
xxx
Q

What was the improvement, if any, that was in that parcel which you are going to purchase?

During that time, the riprap of the property is already there, the one-half of the riprap sir.

Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that you went there?

I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir.

Q After you saw the place and you saw the riprap and you were in the course of deciding to purchase this property, what else
did you do?
A

First, I have to consider that the property is clean.

How did you go about determining whether the title of the property is clean?

A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his office and checked the documents he has regarding
the property.
Q

And what was the result of your checking as to whether the title of the property is clean?

He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir.

Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to check up the title of the property, what else did you do?

Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the Bureau of Lands or rather the Registry of Deeds, sir.

What registry of Deeds are you referring to?

The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir.

And were you able to see the Register of Deeds regarding what you would like to know?

Yes, and we were given a certification regarding this particular area that it was clean, sir.

What Certification are you referring to?

It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of Deeds Adelina Tabangin, sir.

Do you have a copy of that Certification?

A Yes, I have, sir.[18]

The testimonies of Honorato Santos[19] and Josefina Pe[20] were to the same effect.
The non-bank respondents predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was no less thorough:
Q And will you give a brief description of what you do?
A

I normally acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into smaller lots and sold it to some interested parties.

Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara, will you please inform the Court in what place in Baguio have you acquired and subdivided and
sold lots?
A

Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill, Crystal Cave and Asin Road, sir.

You mentioned Asin Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you referring?

That property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir.

Q When you say you bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come to know that Emelita Santiago is disposing of the
property?
A

Because of the father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir, Armando Gabriel.

Is he also a resident of Baguio?

He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad, sir.

How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a property in Asin?

He approached me in the house, sir. He has acquired a title from the Traders Royal Bank.

Q Can you inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation with Armando Gabriel on the sale of the property at
Asin Road?
A

Later part of March, 1983, sir.

Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed you that he wants his property to be sold, what did you do?

I went to the place with the agent, sir.

When you say you went to the place with the agent, what place?

Kilometer 2, Asin Road, sir.

And when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to see the place?

By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir.

Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there were no roads?

None, sir.

xxx
Q Mr. Alcantara, when you went to see this place at Asin Road last week of March, 1983, will you please briefly describe how
this place looked like at that time?
A The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of the roads were eroding already, so we cannot
possibly enter the property, sir.
Q

At the time you entered the place, was there any visible sign of claim by anyone?

None, sir.

In terms of fence in the area?

There is no such, sir.

xxx
Aside from looking or going to the property, what else did you do to this property prior to your purchase?

I investigated it with the Register of Deeds, sir.

What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of Deeds?

To see if the paper is clean and there are no encumbrances, sir.

To whom did you talk?

To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.

And when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check, did you have occasion to talk with Atty. Diomampo?

Yes, sir.

And what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo?

The papers are clean except to the annotation at the back with the road right of way, sir.

After making this investigation with the Register of Deeds and talking with Atty. Diomampo, what else transpired?

We bought the property, sir.

Q After purchasing the property from Emelita Santiago, could you please tell the Honorable Court what you did with that deed
of sale?
A We registered it with the Register of Deeds for the Certificate of Title because at that time when we bought the property,
Emelita Santiago had it subdivided into six (6) lots, sir.
Q

Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase the property was subdivided into six (6) parcels?

Yes, sir.

Q Could you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers in the subdivision of this property prior to your
purchase?
A

Yes, I have.

This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought for action?

Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir.

Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided by the owner, could you please inform the Court if
there was any claim by any other party opposing the subdivision or claiming the property?
A

None, sir.

Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you said that you presented it to the Register of Deeds and after the subdivision
already, what action did the Register of Deeds have regarding the matter?
A

They approved it and registered it already in six (6) titles, sir.

In whose names?

One (1) title under my name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.

Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said that you are the sole purchaser of this entire area of One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety
One (1,591) Square Meters. Now, you are informing this Honorable Court that one Amado Cruz and one Dr. Sanchez were also
issued two (2) titles. Could you explain how these titles came into their possession?
A

Actually, two (2) are our co-owners, sir.

Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale from Emelita Santiago is in favor of these two (2) Atty. Cruz and Dr.
Sanchez?
A Yes, sir.[21]
Third, between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the
resulting loss.[22] The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not annotated in
TRBs title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the
property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the banks name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in
the next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother to find out the status of their title or whether the liens noted on the original
certificate of title were still existing considering that the property had already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject
property had undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good faith and for value. It was not until after the land was subdivided
and developed with the buyers building their houses on the other lots when the Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the
occupants titles. At the very least, the Capays are guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[23]
Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover situations such as the case at bar, where there have been a
series of transfers to innocent purchasers for value. To set aside these transactions only to accommodate a party who has slept
on his rights is anathema to good order.
Independently of the principle of prescription of actions working against petitioners, the doctrine of laches may further be counted
against them, which latter tenet finds application even to imprescriptible actions. x x x. [24]
In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:

While it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey
the land registered under the Torrens System (Davao Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612), the
petitioners cannot invoke said dictum because their action to recover Lot 4362 is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
The act of registering the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance
(Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253).
But the petitioners complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362 was filed only on July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years
after the registration of the sale to Rosendo. The petitioners failed and neglected for an unreasonably long time to assert their
right, if any, to the property in Rosendos possession.
Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs. Camon, Levin vs. Bass and Director of Lands vs.
Reyes[26] to the effect that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute
registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim. Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after
sleeping on their rights for fifteen years, to assert ownership over the property that has undergone several transfers made in
good faith and for value and already subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their owners.
In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in their first two (2) assignment of errors do not help them any, as the
transferees In said cases were not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. In Tuazon vs. Reyes and Siochi,[27] where the
land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to Vicente Tuazon, it was with a deed containing the recital that the land was in
dispute between the vendor and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon, who was merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of
the dispute and, furthermore, David did not warrant the title to the same. In Rivera vs. Moran,[28] Rivera acquired interest in the
land before the final decree was entered in the cadastral proceedings. Rivera, the transferee, was aware of the pending litigation
and, consequently, could not have been considered a purchaser in good faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs. Nunez, et al.[29] and
Laroza vs. Guia,[30] the buyers of the property at the time of their acquisition knew of the existence of the notice of lis pendens. In
contrast to the cited cases, the non-bank respondents in the case at bar acquired their respective portions of the land with clean
title from their predecessors-in-interest.
II
We come now to TRBs liability towards the Capays.
The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash its hands off the present controversy, and attempts to shift the blame on the Capays, thus:
xxx
23. The petitioner Bank, during all the time that it was holding the title for over fourteen (14) years that there was no legal
impediment for it to sell said property, Central Bank regulations require that real properties of banks should not be held for more
than five (5) years;
24. The fault of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis Pendens to the new title of the petitioner Bank should
not be absorbed by the latter considering that in all good faith, it was not aware of the existence of said annotation during all the
time that said title was in its possession for almost fourteen (14) years before the property was sold to Emelita G. Santiago xxx. [31]
TRB concludes that (t)he inaction and negligence of private respondents, allowing ownership to pass for almost 15 years
constitute prescription of action and/or laches.[32]
Section 25 of the General Banking Act,[33] provides that no bank shall hold the possession of any real estate under mortgage or
trust, deed, or the title and possession of any real estate purchased to secure any debt due to it, for a longer period than five
years. TRB, however, admits holding on to the foreclosed property for twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its name. The
bank is, therefore, estopped from invoking banking laws and regulations to justify its belated disposition of the property. It cannot
be allowed to hide behind the law which it itself violated.
TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens because when the property was foreclosed by it, the notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the title. But when TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was cancelled after the
foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was issued in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice of lis pendens.
We do not find the Capays guilty of inaction and negligence as against TRB. It may be recalled that upon the commencement

of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an action for prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the TRB before the
CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that attempt, the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the
property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or laches could not have worked against the Capays because they had
persistently pursued their suit against TRB to recover their property.
On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRBs assertion that after holding on to the property for more than ten (10) years, it
suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the General Bank Act. What is apparent is that TRB took advantage of the
absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of their certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser. This
notwithstanding the adverse decision of the trial court and the pendency of its appeal. TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad
faith, thus transferred caused the property without the lis pendens annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays' reach.
Clearly, the bank acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and should be held liable for damages.
[34]

Considering, however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null and void for want of consideration and,
consequently, the foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of
their property. Nevertheless, this remedy is not now available to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has passed into
the hands of third parties who acquired the same in good faith and for value. Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the
Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago, the transferee of TRB.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, as modified by its
Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair
market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the Register of Deeds and/or his
assistants that may be taken by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens
to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

400 Phil. 904

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 135385, December 06, 2000 ]
ISAGANI CRUZ AND CESAR EUROPA, PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, RESPONDENTS.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO
WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNGANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAWCRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN,
MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO
APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR.,
SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO,
MINORS MARICEL MALID, REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, REPRESENTED
BY HER FATHER MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. AND GREEN FORUMWESTERN VISAYAS, INTERVENORS.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENOR.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., INTERVENOR.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. [1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson
and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA
to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of
the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary

of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor
General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA
and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention.
They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition
and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which
they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1)

Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;

"(2)

Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;

"(3)

Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(4)

Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

"(5)

Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6)

Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the
right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources
therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7)

Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." [2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. [3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. [4] These provisions are:
"(1)

Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2)

Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3)

Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first
with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that
any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4)

Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous
peoples; and

"(5)

Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President's power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. [6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1)

A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2)

The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist
from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3)

The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
2, series of 1998;

"(4)

The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from

disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5)

The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources." [7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which
he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition
solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on
the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those
whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

[1]

Rollo, p. 114.

[2]

Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

[3]

Id. at 23-25.

[4]

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
[5]

Rollo, pp. 25-27.

[6]

Id. at 27-28.

[7]

Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:
PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner [1] wrote:[2]
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It
venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom,
seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who
wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms
with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal
system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural
resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the
labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After
all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous
people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I.

II.

The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A.

The Laws of the Indies

B.

Valenton v. Murciano

C.

The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D.

The Philippine Constitutions

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A.

Indigenous Peoples
1.

Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2.

III.

The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A.

IV.

Their Concept of Land

Legislative History

The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A.

Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute
part of the land of the public domain.
1.

The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2.

The concept of native title

(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique

3.

B.

The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1.

C.

The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1.

The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2.

The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their
development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section
7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under
Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized
with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V.

The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.[3] This was the foundation for the early
Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept
that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The
Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the
policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by
our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all
what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons
in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what
they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose
of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to them
seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them
and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue
of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be
disposed of at our will."[4]
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony
and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and
concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.[5] Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by
purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown. [6]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.[7] The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax
lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the
Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees. [8] This was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights,
interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through
the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.[9]
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs

had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that
they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their
30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to
the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which from earliest time have
regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." [10] The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws
recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it
was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed.
Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities
of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal
Cedula of 1754.[11]
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not
been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might
be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all
ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law
all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them,
their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that
it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land
possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities." [12]
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him, belonged to the Crown.[13] For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such
lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored
to the Crown.[14]
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a
general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication of
said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said
subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time
warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and
valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others." [15]
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive
interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed
it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of
time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."[16]
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs
could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the State." [17] Valenton had no rights other than

those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the
grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from earliest times,
requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American
Government in Act No. 926."[18]
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; [19] and that the government's title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. [20] The term "public land" referred to
all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement,[21] and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. [22]
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed under the Jones
Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. [23] After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was
amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is
essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of
American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations. [24]
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land Registration
Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the
Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898, [25] which, in
turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned
it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. [26] The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible
and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance
and negotiation.[27]
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. [28] There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine.[29] State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. [30] The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by
the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. [31]
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their

disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of
the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x

x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public or
private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/
Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997"
or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct
sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;[32]
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the
community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the
ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration. [33]
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and empowerment, [34]
social justice and human rights,[35] the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies. [36]
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an
independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from
each of the ethnographic areas-- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro,
Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and
Central Mindanao.[37] The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. [38]
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still unresolved, the matter may
be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. [39] The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon
ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years
and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages. [40]
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous
Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 [41] and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.[42]
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples-- refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and
utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the
time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains
or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They
share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political,
social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been
displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar,
Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region-- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or
Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang
of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III-- Aetas.
3. In Region IV-- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or
Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V-- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and
Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI-- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII-- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX-- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal,
Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X-- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of
Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis
Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI-- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte;
B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao
provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of
Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South
Cotabato.
10. In Region XII-- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon. [43]
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.
[44]
The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in
ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C.
augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and
traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society. [45]
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary activities as reliance
on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil. [46] From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our
ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary factor.
Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical
climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences. [47] Life was essentially subsistence but not
harsh.[48]
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages that traced their origin
to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression
of their literary moods.[49] They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to
be part of their lives.[50] They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after
death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in
the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they
seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to
their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature. [51]
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat,
which transported them to these shores.[52] The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one
hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and
govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of
government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war. [53]
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to generation and
constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder
persons in the community.[54] The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the
necessity arose.[55] The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other
old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. [56] Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with
various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations
and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge"
and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which
a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters. [57]
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs merely administered
the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of
the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production
as a member of the barangay.[58] This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of
resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or
unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of lands. [59] Marine resources and fishing
grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing
concept similar to those in land communities.[60] Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions
of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to
their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. [61]
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was
established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.[62] The Sultanate of

Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. [63]
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but was private in use.
This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It,
however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land. [64]
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most production was geared to
the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and profit. [65]
Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of
the islands into numerous small and separate communities. [66]
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in barangay
settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the
encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.[67] As early as 1551, the Spanish government
assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. [68] The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material
advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." [69]
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be constructed. All the new
Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. [70]
With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the
convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos
law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization. [71]
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to them and
the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the
realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.[72]
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public domain were the
most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. [73] The concept that the Spanish king was the
owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of
their ancestral rights to land.[74]
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos according to their
religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who
generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles
or the indigenous communities.[75]
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and was allowed certain
status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.[76]
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to
Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland
societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were
difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.[77] Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating
themselves from the newly evolved Christian community.[78] Their own political, economic and social systems were kept
constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility
between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise
culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos. [79]

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of the
infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government,
and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs."[80]
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the American government
chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." [81]
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "nonChristian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." [82]
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253 creating the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct
ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining
the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after
the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities
and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them. [83]
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then was the
conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the
economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real,
complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on
National Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the
Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).[84] The CNI was given,
more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like
the colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship. [85]
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and Americans, government
attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao. [86] Knowledge by the settlers of the Public
Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With
government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these
peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national development. [87]
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and
implementation of State policies."[88]
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were addressed by the
highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their
"uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by
the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its

functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic
groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to
preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community." [89] In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the
decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. [90]
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided
for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to
register their claims.[91] In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which
provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos. [92]
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera
region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw
their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development
Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie
plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. [93] Timber concessions, water projects,
plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the
indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment. [94]
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking her powers
under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural
Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President. [95]
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of
life.[96] This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos
to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the
State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They
live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of
the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different
from those of the rest of the population.[97] The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked
well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles
societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of
archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and
authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social
structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and
forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. [98]
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual,
land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial
control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses
his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the
concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.
[99]

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits, and that those who
work the land are its mere stewards.[100] Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could
either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, [101] or ownership by residents of

the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws
draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who
are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas,
swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. [102] For the Kalingas, everybody has a
common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual ownership. The
residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while
the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full
owner as defined under our Civil Code.[103] Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly
discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family,
or loss of crops.[104] Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can
purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.[105]
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land
ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental
policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not
inexistent.[106]

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines,
by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a
consolidation of two Bills-- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,[107] Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four proposed measures
referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six
regional consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide. [108] At the Second Regular
Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous
peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the dominance and neglect of
government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and
many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with
the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And
the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the
Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by
Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale
landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs." [109]
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long before any central
government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes.
These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is
their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political,

economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall
cease to exist as distinct peoples."[110]
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the
concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This
exception was first laid down in the case of Cario v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of private
ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in
subsequent cases."[111]
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively,
recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws,
however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was
more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and
the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the
land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared
also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal
tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position
of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and none against, with
no abstention.[112]
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Communities. It was originally
authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.[113]
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would promote, recognize the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain that these rights shall be wellpreserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall
be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the
substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." [114]
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the Constitution. He also
emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that
they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes. [115]

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was approved on Second
Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA

DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part
of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands
are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. -- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising
lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which
are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home
ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and
clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private
forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly
the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. [116]
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to
lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.[117]
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in Department Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Angel Alcala.[118] DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of
Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA on the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). [119] The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation. [120] This
means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent
thereto.[121]
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The
identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the
application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
concerned.[122] The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan)
claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions. [123] With respect to ancestral
lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). [124]
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the place where the
property is situated.[125]
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title
over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act
with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title-- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been
held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." [126]
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as
memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral
lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. [127] Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned,
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs
over the territories identified and delineated.[128]
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private
ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral
lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are,
therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

(a) Cario v. Insular Government[129]

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cario v. Insular Government.[130] Cario firmly
established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of land in Baguio
Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time

immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some
parts of the land. Cario inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. [131] In 1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land
under the Spanish Mortgage Law.[132] The North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a
public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was
pending, a U.S. military reservation[133] was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed
on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cario, off the land. [134]
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the Government of the
Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and
dismissed Cario's application. The Philippine Supreme Court[135] affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cario
took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.[136] On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and
contended that Cario failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of
land claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure
gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and
perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against
foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty
is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide." [137]
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the
matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced
policy "to do justice to the natives."[138] It was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902
that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States. Whatever consideration
may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is
obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that,
so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the
natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at
Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law
shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard
to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of
Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,-- of
the profoundest factors in human thought,-- regarded as their own." [139]
The Court went further:

"[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to
give the applicant the benefit of the doubt." [140]
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a
claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904 decision of Valenton v.
Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the
decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The
Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles
were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law
as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the
plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of
any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or
even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a
contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to
call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors.
That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain
beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).[141]
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered territories. The wording
of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always
been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it
was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit
the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of
the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity
and of the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. [142] This title was
sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes
explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a
legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the
opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by
the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten
law of Spain."[143]
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his
name.[144]
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized as a savage
tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not
certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly
the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever
may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and
was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial
of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce." [145]
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of the Cario decision. It is
observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting
Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch
published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.[146] This article was
made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development
of Philippine land laws.[147] He discussed Cario extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cario's title as discussed
and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario
"is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. [148] This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering
that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans.
[149]
This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.[150]
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from
their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply
was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation,
filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground
of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for
educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in
which they roamed.[151] Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian
Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people
is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian
tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The
recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and
ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to
the plenary authority of the United States.[152]
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting
similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from
different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and
that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the
legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to

upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the
Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States." [153]
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the public
domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians. [154] It may be set apart by an act of
Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription. [155]
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal right of
possession or occupancy."[156] The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by
the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the
particular tribe or nation.[157] It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their
occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries. [158]
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and occupied before
the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the
nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.[159]
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S.
Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of
the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in
order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession. [160] The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the
natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights
thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate
dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to
grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."[161]
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian land and extinguish
Indian titles. Only to the discoverer-- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland-- did this right belong and not to any other
nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the
discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied
by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer
purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted
by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title paramount to the title of the
United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been
questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and
to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."[162]
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal recognition of this
principle.[163]
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having to invalidate
conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens. [164]
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.[165] In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all
white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation
of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were
thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established between the United
States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the
relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply of their essential
wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their
protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their
neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the
Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the
United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning
their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." [166]
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial boundaries and recognize their right
of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians;
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All
these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all
the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast
of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as
on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.[167]
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the

Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United
States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." [168]
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all other European
governments. Designated as the naked fee,[169] this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian
title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians
being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession-- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could
extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected
the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves. [170]
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied by the Indians
when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign-- first the discovering European nation and later the original
13 States and the United States-- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal
Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the
protection of complete ownership.[171] But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy
the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. [172] It is clear that this right of
occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. [173] It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will. [174] Thus, aboriginal title
is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. [175] It
entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to
another sovereign government nor to any citizen.[176] Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and
not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership,
the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership. [177]
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject
to sale or other disposal under general laws.[178] Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.
[179]
On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of
Indians.[180] Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished,
no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them. [181]
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous Americans. [182]
And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From
a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans. [183] Despite the
similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on
American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over
their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of
ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. [184] The protection of aboriginal title
merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal Government. [185] Although there are criticisms against
the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands, [186] the power of the State to extinguish these titles has
remained firmly entrenched.[187]
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains and ancestral lands. [188]
The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis--vis American
Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.

(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited
form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cario is the only case

that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cario did not touch on native
title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the
concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public
Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the
Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant
of the land.[189] The land ceases to be part of the public domain, [190] ipso jure,[191] and is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands[192] that the court declared that the rule that all lands that were not
acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would
be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.
It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. [193] Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the
Public Land Act and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the
concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of
thirty years both for ordinary citizens[194] and members of the national cultural minorities[195] that converts the land from public into
private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to
individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act
and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be
disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first
converted to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496-Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner
since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this Act." [196]
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is
limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial [197] or
for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered
under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided,
they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These
lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain. [198] Its provisions
apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public
purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased
to be so."[199] Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since
ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA
itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over, [200] from
private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option
must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and
belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands
of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5
of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four
categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity.
The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major
problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. [201]
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent
of ancestral domain."[202] It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains
and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under the civil law. This
ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on
administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July
fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the
same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to
him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be
entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent
application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.
[203]

x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."[204]
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but because of adverse
possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open,
adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The
possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil
law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law
which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be
exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right
to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, [205] the right to consume the thing
by its use,[206] the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, [207] and the right to exclude from the
possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. [208]
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all
resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and
therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept
of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The
ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that
areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. [209] These communal
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code. [210] Co-ownership gives any coowner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "[n]o co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar
as his share is concerned.[211] To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the
community but of the very community itself.[212]
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate condominium
rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single
instance.[213] Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation. [214] Moreover, the corporation itself may

be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily. [215]

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all generations of
the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the
ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a
community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal. These lands,
however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with
customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was
transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains,"[216] the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept
that has long existed under customary law.[217]
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law. [218] Some
articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. [219] In
other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and
liabilities.[220]
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition
does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling
and land registration.[221]
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal
recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.-- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title
shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being people of the land-- by
sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's
brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land-- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and
the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. [222]
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights
over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.-- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be
recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop, control and use
lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive
just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures
by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.-- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be
relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.-- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to
resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.-- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.--For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems for the
management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.-- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been reserved for various
purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.-- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is
located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.-- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be
recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.-- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights to/among members of the
same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.-- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or
devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right
to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement;
(d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the
ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs
also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping
with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the
State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution."[223]
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources-- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources-- are owned by the State.
The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full
control and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1.

The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2.

The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
qualified corporations;

3.

Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;

4.

For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development
by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production, [224] joint venture,[225] or production-sharing
agreements.[226] These agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through

Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these
resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and
financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three
types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale [227] and small-scale
mining.[228] "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and
methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." [229]
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is
expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership-- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It
will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora
and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and
all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not
cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is
Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA[230] in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural resources and all
improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the
right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and
the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through
fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and natural resources." The term
"natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence
clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the
natural resources found on or under the land.[231] The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources.
Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57
of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs
the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and categorically challenged by
petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general. [232] Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II,
Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the
right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use
lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for
the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which
they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these
rights.[233]
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely
granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their
allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring
ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms
and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship. For the
ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the
same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future
generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and
customary laws.[234]
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of
natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in
the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners,

marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." [235]
Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs
concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding
twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is
entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to
allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the
rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains"
and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for
subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor. [236] The law recognizes
the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural
resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This
may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law
only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having
priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that
there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to
whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources
found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that
the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution[237] in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly
undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said
agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with
the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement
shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these
resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such
development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or
juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the

ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization
of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does
not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its
discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such
endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the
resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual
occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and
survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.-- All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined
from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without
prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only
be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned:
Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new
concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally,
That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the
requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources shall not be issued,
renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of
the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based
investigation shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Noncompliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any
department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or agreement over
natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any
ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine
whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification
applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found
within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to prehistoric times. The
movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought
into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined
in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.[238] The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North
American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and
freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, [239] and during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the
international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous
movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River
Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world. [240]
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result of the increased

publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples'
environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation. [241] Indigenous rights came as a result of
both human rights and environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda. [242]
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and specific rules concerning IPs
in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in
Latin America.[243] The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has
provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank. [244]
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the promotion of
their rights within the framework of national unity and development. [245] The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs
with the international category of IPs,[246] and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. [247]
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries" [248] and
was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international
instruments on the prevention of discrimination.[249] ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on
June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous
peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development." [250]

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences
were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly
foreign in origin or derivation.[251] Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of
society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of
Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. [252] It is through the IPRA that an attempt was
made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the
course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the
evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to
participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, [253] it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and
customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

[1]

Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.

[2]

The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, Summer 2000, No. 3, p. 573.

[3]

Dominium is distinguished from imperium which is the government authority possessed by the state expressed in the concept
of sovereignty-- Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372, 377 [1972].
[4]

Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 543 [1904]; See also Florencio D.R. Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, p. 13 [1964].

[5]

Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; these grants were better known as repartimientos and encomiendas.

Repartimientos were handouts to the military as fitting reward for their services to the Spanish crown. The encomiendas were
given to Spaniards to administer and develop with the right to receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of the natives
assigned to them.-- Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, History of the Philippines, pp. 125-126.
[6]

Narciso Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 2 [1994].

[7]

The Mortgage Law is a misnomer because it is primarily a law on registration of property and secondarily a mortgage law-Ponce, supra, at 16.
[8]

Ponce, supra, at 15.

[9]

3 Phil. 537 [1904].

[10]

Id. at 540.

[11]

Id. at 548.

[12]

Id. at 543-544.

[13]

Id. at 543.

[14]

Id. at 542-543. These comments by the court are clear expressions of the concept that Crown holdings embraced both
imperium and dominium--Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface Between National Land Law and Kalinga
Land Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 423 [1983].
[15]

Id. at 545-546.

[16]

Id. at 543.

[17]

Id. at 557.

[18]

Id. at 553-554; Valenton was applied in Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. 320 [1906]; Tiglao v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 80 [1906];
and Cario v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 [1906]; all decided by the Philippine Supreme Court.
[19]

Please see Section 70, Act 926.

[20]

Ponce, supra, at 33.

[21]

Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 [1909]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.

[22]

Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 [1914]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.

[23]

Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 250 [1961].

[24]

Ponce, supra, at 32.

[25]

Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 26 [1982]; Noblejas, supra, at 32.

[26]

Noblejas, supra, at 32.

[27]

Ponce, supra, at 123-124; Noblejas, supra, at 33.

[28]

2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592 [1937].

[29]

Id. at 600.

[30]

Id. at 600-601.

[31]

Ibid.

[32]

Section 7.

[33]

Section 8.

[34]

Sections 13 to 20.

[35]

Sections 21 to 28.

[36]

Sections 29 to 37.

[37]

Sections 38 and 40.

[38]

Sections 74 to 77.

[39]

Section 69.

[40]

Section 73.

[41]

Convention Conerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989.

[42]

Guide to R.A. 8371, published by the Coalition for Ips Rights and ancestral Domains in cooperation with the ILO and BilanceAsia Department, p. 4 [1999]--hereinafter referred to as Guide to R.A. 8371.
[43]

Taken from the list of IPs sbmitted by Rep. Andolana to the house of Representatives during the deliberations on H.B. No.
9125--Interpellations of Aug. 20, 1997, pp. 00086-00095. "lost tribes" such as the Lutangan and Tatang have not been included.
[44]

How these people came to the Philippines may be explained by two theories. One view, generally linked to Professor Otley H.
Beyer, suggests the "wave theory"--a series of arrivals in the archipelago bringing in different types and levels of culture. The
Negritos, dark-skinned pygmies, came between 25,000 to 30,000 B.C. Their cultural remains are preserved by the Negrito-type
Filipinos found in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Their relatively inferior culture did not enable them to overcome the pressures
from the second wave of people, the Indonesians A and B who came in 5,000 and 3,500 B.C. They are represented today by the
Kalinga, Gaddang, Isneg, Mangyan, Tagbanua, Manobo, Mandaya, Subanon, and Sama. The first group was pushed inland as
the second occupied the coastal and downriver settlements. The last wave involved Malay migrations between 500 B.C. and
1,500 A.D. they had a more advanced culture based on metal age technology. They are represented by the Christianized and
Islamized Filipinos who pushed the Indonesian groups inland and occupied much of the coastal, lowland and downstream areas.
A second view is postulated by Robert Fox, F. Landa Jocana, Alfredo Evangelista, and Jesus Peralta. Jocano maintains that the
Negritos, Indonesians and Malays stand co-equal as ethnic groups without any one being dominant, racially or culturally. The
geographic distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups, which shows overlapping of otherwise similar racial strains in both upland
and lowland cultures or coastal and inland communities, suggests a random and unstructured advent of different kinds of groups
in the archipelago--Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the
Philippine National Historical society, Inc., pp. 33-34 [1997]; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 21 [1990].
[45]

Tan, supra, at 35-36.

[46]

Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Edition, vol. 1, p. 13, Aklahi foundation,
Inc. [1989]. It was in 800-1,000 A.D. that the Ifugaos of Northern Luzon built the rice terraces--Id. at 37.
[47]

Id. at 5-6.

[48]

Id. at 13.

[49]

Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 54 [1990].

[50]

Corpuz, supra, at 5.

[51]

Id. at 44-45.

[52]

Agoncillo, supra, at 40.

[53]

Id. at 40-41.

[54]

Rafael Iriarte, History of the Judicial System, the Philippine Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished work submitted as entry
to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997, p.
103, citing Perfecto V. Fernandez, Customs Laws in Pre-Conquest Philippines, UP Law Center, p. 10 [1976].
[55]

Agoncillo, supra, at 41.

[56]

Amelia Alonzo, The History of the Judicial System in the Philippines, Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished work
submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial Commission and the Supreme
Court in 1997.
[57]

Agoncillo, supra, at 42.

[58]

Renato Constantino, A Past Revisited , p. 38 [1975].

[59]

Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Ass'n., Inc. and the Phil. National Historical
Society, Inc., p. 43 [1997].
[60]

Id.

[61]

Id. at 43-44.

[62]

Tan, supra, at 47-48.

[63]

Id. at 48-49.

[64]

Cacho v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil. 616, 625-627 [1914]; see also Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, pp. 11-12
[1964]. In Philippine pre-colonial history, there was only one recorded transaction on the purchase of land. The Maragtas Code
tells us of the purchase of Panay Island by ten Bornean datus led by Datu Puti from the Atis under Marikudo in the 13 th century.
The purchase price for the island was a gold salakot and a long gold necklace - Agoncillo, supra, at 25.
[65]

Constantino, supra, at 38.

[66]

Corpuz, supra, at 39.

[67]

Resettlement-- "bajo el son de la campana" (under the sound of the bell) or "bajo el toque de la campana" (Under the peal of
the bell).
[68]

People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].

[69]

Id. at 17, citing the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.

[70]

Agoncillo, supra, at 80.

[71]

Id. at 80.

[72]

Corpuz, supra, at 277-278.

[73]

Id. at 277.

[74]

Id., N.B. But see discussion in Cario v. Insular Government, infra, where the United States Supreme Court found that the
Spanish decrees in the Philippines appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land. Whether in the implementation
of these decrees the natives' ancestral rights to land were actually respected was not discussed by the U.S. Supreme
Court; see also Note 131, infra.
[75]

Tan, supra, at 49-50.

[76]

Id. at 67.

[77]

Id. at 52-53.

[78]

Id. at 53.

[79]

Id. at 55.

[80]

People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].

[81]

Memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 714 [1919]; also
cited in People v. Cayat, supra, at 17-18.
[82]

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, at 693.

[83]

Charles Macdonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of
Asia, p. 348, ed. by R.H. Barnes, A. Gray and B. Kingsburry, pub. by Association for Asian Studies [1995]. The BNCT made a
Bontok and subanon ethnography, a history of Sulu genealogy, and a compilation on unhispanized peoples in northern Luzon.-Owen J. Lynch, Jr., The Philippine Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P. L. J. 139-140 [1988].
[84]

R.A. No. 1888 of 1957.

[85]

See People v. Cayat, supra, at 21; See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 694 [1919]

[86]

MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 351.

[87]

The construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dams in the 1950's resulted in the eviction of hundreds of Ibaloi families - Cerilo
Rico S. Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights: Issues, Responses, and Recommendations, Ateneo Law Journal, vol. 38, No. 1, p.
92 [1993].

[88]

Section 11, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution.

[89]

Presidential Decrees Nos. 1017 and 1414.

[90]

The PANAMIN, however, concentrated funds and resources on image-building, publicity, and impact projects. In Mindanao,
the agency resorted to a policy of forced resettlement on reservations, militarization and intimidation-- MacDonald, Indigenous
Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 349-350.
[91]

No occupancy certificates were issued, however, because the government failed to release the decree's implementing rules
and regulations-- Abelardo, supra, at 120-121.
[92]

Id., Note 177.

[93]

Id., at 93-94.

[94]

MacDonald, Indigenous People of the Philippines, supra, at 351.

[95]

E.O. Nos. 122-A, 122-B and 122-C. The preamble of E.O. No. 122-B states:

"Believing that the new government is committed to formulate more vigorous policies, plans, programs, and projects for tribal
Filipinos, otherwise known as Indigenous Cultural Communities, taking into consideration their communal aspirations, customs,
traditions, beliefs, and interests, in order to promote and preserve their rich cultural heritage and insure their participation in the
country's development for national unity; xxx"
[96]

Article II, sec. 22; Article VI, sec. 5, par. 2; Article XII, sec. 5; Article XIII, sec. 6; Article XIV, sec. 17; and Article XVI, sec. 12.

[97]

MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 345.

[98]

Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, p. 54 [1997].

[99]

Cordillera Studies Program, Land Use and Ownership and Public Policy in the Cordillera, 29-30 [n.d.]; also cited in Dante B.
Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No.
1, pp. 47-48 [1992].
[100]

Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights, supra, at 98-99, citing Ponciano L. Bennagen, Indigenous Attitudes Toward Land and
Natural Resources of Tribal Filipinos, 31 National Council of Churches in the Philippines Newsletter, Oct.-Dec. 1991, at 4-9.
[101]

Id. at 99, citing June Prill-Brett, Bontok Land Tenure (UP Law library, mimeographed).

[102]

Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface of National Land Law and Kalinga Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 440-441
[1983].
[103]

Ibid.

[104]

Ibid.

[105]

Ibid.

[106]

Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface, supra, at 420.

[107]

Senate Bill No. 1728 was co-sponsored by Senator Macapagal-Arroyo and co-authored by Senators Alvarez, Magsaysay,
Revilla, Mercado, Enrile, Honasan, Tatad, Maceda, Shahani, Osmena and Romulo.

The Eighth Congress, through Senators Rasul, Estrada and Romulo filed a bill to operationalize the mandate of the 1987
Constitution on indigenous peoples. The bill was reported out, sponsored an interpellated but never enacted into law. In the
Ninth Congress, the bill filed by Senators Rasul and Macapagal-Arroyo was never sponsored and deliberated upon in the floor.
[108]

Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second Regular Session, Senate,
Oct. 16, 1996, pp. 15-16.
[109]

Id. at 12.

[110]

Id. at 17-18.

[111]

Id. at 13.

[112]

Journal of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, Senate, Session No. 5, Aug. 5-6, 1997, pp. 86-87.

[113]

Co-authors of the bill were Reps. Ermita, Teves, Plaza, Calalay, Recto, Fua, Luciano, Abad, Cosalan, Aumentado, de la Cruz,
Bautista, Singson, Damasing, Romualdo, Montilla, Germino, Verceles--Proceedings of Sept. 4, 1997, pp. 00107-00108.
[114]

Sponsorship speech of Rep. Andolana of House Bill No. 9125, March 20, 1997.

[115]

Interpellation of Aug. 20, 1997, 6:16 p.m., p. 00061.

[116]

Section 3 [a], IPRA.

[117]

Section 3 [b], IPRA.

[118]

Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 14.

[119]

Section 44 [e], IPRA.

[120]

Section 51, IPRA.

[121]

Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 15.

[122]

A CADT refers to a title formally recognizing the right of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains
identified and delineated in acordance with the IPRA--Rule II [c], Rules & Regulations Implementing the IPRA, NCIP Admin.
Order No. 1.
[123]

Section 53 [a], IPRA.

[124]

A CALT refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands-- Rule II [d], Implementing
Rules, NCIP A.O. No. 1.
[125]

Section 52 [k], IPRA.

[126]

Section 3 [l], IPRA.

[127]

Section 11, IPRA.

[128]

Ibid.

[129]

41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594.

[130]

Sponsorship Speech of Senator Juan Flavier, Leg. History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second Regular Session, Oct. 16,
1996, p. 13.
[131]

It was the practice of the Spanish colonial government not to issue titles to Igorots--Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and
a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249, 288 [1988], citing the
testimony of Benguet Provincial Governnor William F. Pack, Records at 47, Cario.
[132]

Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894.

[133]

Later named Camp John Hay.

[134]

Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 288-289.

[135]

7 Phil. 132 [1906].

[136]

In 1901, Cario had entered into a promissory agreement with a U.S. merchant in Manila. The note obliged Cario to sell the
land at issue "as soon as he obtains from the Government of the United States, or its representatives in the Philippines, real and
definitive title." See Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 290, citing Government's Exhibit G, Records, at 137-138, Cario.
[137]

Cario v. Insular Government, supra, at 939.

[138]

Ibid.

[139]

Id. at 940.

[140]

Id. at 941.

[141]

Id. at 941-942.

[142]

Aranal-Sereno and Libarios, The Interface Between Kalinga Land Law, supra at 428--This artcile was one of those circulated
among the Constitutional Commissioners in the formulation of Sec. 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (4 Record of the
Constitutional Commission 33).
[143]

Id. at 944.

[144]

Certificate of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was issued not in the name of Cario who died on
June 6, 1908, but to his lawyers John Hausserman and Charles Cohn and his attorney-in-fact Metcalf Clarke. Hausserman,
Cohn and Clarke sold the land to the U.S. Government in a Deed of Quitclaim--Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants Claim
Rights to Camp John Hay, Manila Times, p. 1, Jan. 12, 1998.
[145]

Id. at 939.

[146]

57 P.L.J. 268, 293-296 [1982].

[147]

From 1987 to 1988, Prof. Lynch allowed the P.L.J. to publish parts of his doctoral dissertation at the Yale Law School entitled
"Invisible Peoples: A History of Philippine Land Law." Please see the Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An
Inquiry, 62 P.L.J. 279 [1987]; Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The Spanish Era (1568-1898), 63 P.L.J. 82 [1988];
The Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P.L.J. 112; Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins
of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249.

[148]

"Native title" is a common law recognition of pre-existing aboriginal land interests in Autsralia-- Maureen Tehan, Customary
Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 Pacific Rim
Law & Policy Journal, No. 3, p. 765 [June 1998].
[149]

Lynch, Native Titles, supra, Note 164, p. 293.

[150]

39 Phil. 660 [1919].

[151]

Id. at 712-713.

[152]

Id. at 694.

[153]

Id. at 700.

[154]

42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.].

[155]

There are 3 kinds of Indian reservations: (a) those created by treaties prior to 1871; (b) those created by acts of Congress
since 1871; and (c) those made by Executive Orders where the President has set apart public lands for the use of the Indians in
order to keep them within a certain territory-- 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S. 94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170,
certiorari granted 62 S. Ct. 631, 315 U.S. 790, 86 L. Ed. 1194, affirmed 62 S. Ct. 1095, 316 U.S. 317, 86 L. Ed. 1501. It is
observed that the first two kinds may include lands possessed by aboriginal title. The last kind covers Indian
reservations proper.
Until 1871, Indian tribes were recognized by the United States as possessing the attributes of nations to the extent that treaties
were made with them. In that year, however, Congress, by statute, declared its intention thereafter to make the Indian tribes
amenable directly to the power and authority of the United States by the immediate exercise of its legislative power over them,
instead of by treaty. Since then, Indian affairs have been regulated by acts if Congress and by contracts with the Indian tribes
practically amounting to treaties-- 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 55 [1995 ed].
[156]

42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].

[157]

Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., Ariz., 62 S. Ct. 248, 314 U.S. 339, 86 L. Ed. 260 [1941].

[158]

Ibid.

[159]

8 Wheat 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 [1823].

[160]

Id. at 680.

[161]

Id. at 689.

[162]

Id. at 696; see also 41 ALR Fed 425, Annotation: Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, Sec. 2[a]
[1979].
[163]

Buttz v. Northern Pac.R. Co., Dak., 7 S. Ct. 100, 119 U.S. 55, 30 L. Ed. 330, 335 [1886].

[164]

Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293-294; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L.R. 48-49 [1947].

[165]

6 Pet 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832].

[166]

Id. at 499.

[167]

Id. at 500.

[168]

Id. at 501.

[169]

The title of the government to Indian lands, the naked fee, is a sovereign title, the government having no landlord from whom
it holds the fee-- Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v. U.S., 85 Ct. Cl. 331, certiorari granted U.S.
v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 58 S. Ct. 609, 303 U.S. 629, 82 L. Ed. 1090, affirmed 58 S. Ct. 794, 304 U.S. 111, 82 L. Ed. 1213,
1218-1219 [1938].
[170]

Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., at 30 L. Ed. 330, 335; Beecher v. Wetherby, Wis., 95 U.S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440, 441
[1877]; see also 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
[171]

Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal title to Indian Lands, 41 ALR Fed 425, Sec. 2 [b] [1979]-- hereinafter cited
as Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands.
[172]

Ibid.; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 99 L. Ed. 314, 320, 75 S. Ct. 313 [1955], reh den 348 U.S. 965, 99
L. Ed. 753, 75 S. Ct. 521.
[173]

Ibid.; Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., at 99 L. Ed. 320.

[174]

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73, 94 S Ct. 772 [1974]; U.S. v. Alcea Bank of
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 91 L. Ed. 29. 67 S. Ct. 167 [1946].
[175]

For compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act, the proof of aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and
continuous use and occupancy for a long time prior to the loss of the property. (The Indian Claims Commission Act awards
compensation to Indians whose aboriginal titles were extinguished by the government through military conquest, creation of a
reservation, forced confinement of Indians and removal of Indians from certain portions of the land an the designation of Indian
land into forest preserve, grazing district, etc.) -- Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Secs. 2[a], 3[a], pp. 431, 433, 437.
[176]

Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[b], p. 435.

[177]

41 Am Jr 2d, Indians, Sec. 59 [1995 ed.].

[178]

An allotment of Indian land contains restrictions on alienation of the land. These restrictions extend to a devise of the land by
will-- Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. U.S., 235 U.S. 37, 59 L. Ed. 116,. 35 S. Ct. 6 [1914]; A railroad land grant that falls within Indian
land is null and void-- Northern P. R. Co. v. U.S., 227 U.S. 355, 57 L.Ed. 544,33 S. Ct. 368 [1913]; Portions of Indian land
necessary for a railroad right of way were, by the terms of the treaty, declared "public land," implying that land beyond the right of
way was private-- Kindred v. Union P.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 56 L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780 [1912]; see also 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians,
Sec. 58 [1995 ed].
[179]

Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[a], p. 433.

[180]

42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.]

[181]

Ibid.

[182]

North American Indians have made much progress in establishing a relationship with the national government and developing
their own laws. Some have their own government-recognized constitutions. Usually the recognition of Indian tribes depends on
whether the tribe has a reservation. North American tribes have reached such an advanced stage that the main issues today
evolve around complex jurisdictional and litigation matters. Tribes have acquired the status of sovereign nations within another
nation, possessing the right to change and grow-- Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the
Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 32: 97, 104 [1997].

[183]

Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293.

[184]

Dante Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat.
Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 43, 40 [Aug. 1992]; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., supra, at 320.
[185]

Ibid.

[186]

D. Gatmaytan, supra, citing Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother: Struggles for American Indian Land and Liberation in the
Contemporary United States, The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization and Resistance 139 (M. Jaimes 1992); and
Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial
Discrimination, Rethinking Indian Law 15 (National Lawyers Guild, Committee on Native American Struggles 1982).
[187]

Id., Note 28, stating that some earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that Congress is subject to the
strictures of the Constitution in dealing with Indians. When an Indian property is taken for non-Indian use, the U.S. government
is liable for payment of compensation, and an uncompensated taking may be enjoined. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 217 [1982], citing Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. 299 U.S. 476 [1937]; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 [1912]; and Lane v. Pueblo of
Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 [1919].
[188]

See Discussion, infra, Part IV (c) (2).

[189]

Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437 [1980].

[190]

Ibid.

[191]

Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 [1986]; Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992];
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina, 235 SCRA 567 [1994].
[192]

75 Phil. 890 [1946].

[193]

Id. at 892.

[194]

Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141.

[195]

Sec. 48 [c], C.A. 141, as amended. This provision was added in 1964 by R.A. 3872.

[196]

Section 12, IPRA.

[197]

"Time immemorial" refers "to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/Ips are known to have
occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or
inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions." (Sec. 3 [p], IPRA).
[198]

Section 2, C.A. 141.

[199]

Section 8, C.A. 141.

[200]

The classification of ancestral lands 18% in slope or over as alienable in the IPRA is an exception to Section 15, P.D. 705, the
Revised Forestry Code.
[201]

Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of
Asia, supra, at pp. 345, 350.

[202]

Section 5, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.

[203]

Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 in 1964.

[204]

Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 on June 18, 1964. On January 25, 1977, however, Sec. 48 [b] and
48 [c] were further amended by P.D. 1073 stating that these provisions on cultural minorities apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain-- Please see Republic v. CA and Paran, 201 SCRA 1, 10-11 [1991].
[205]

Jus utendi, jus fruendi.

[206]

Jus abutendi.

[207]

Jus disponendi.

[208]

Jus vindicandi. Please see Tolentino, Civil Code, vol. II, pp. 45-46 [1992]; see also Tolentino, vol. I, pp. 12-14.

[209]

Sec. 55, IPRA provides:

"Sec. 55. Communal rights.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, shall
be presumed to be communally held: provided, That communal rights under this Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as
provided in Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the New Civil Code."
[210]

Ibid.

[211]

Article 494, Civil Code.

[212]

Antonio M. La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, 2 Phil. Nat. Res. L. J. 23 [Dec. 1989].

[213]

Section 11, Corporation Code.

[214]

Sections 60-72, Corporation Code.

[215]

Section 117, Corporation Code. Please see also La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, supra, at 23.

[216]

Section 5, par. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.

[217]

Customary law is recognized by the Local Government Code of 1991 in solving disputes among members of the indigenous
communities, viz:
"Sec. 412 (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.-- The customs and traditions of
indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities."
[218]

Law writes custom into contract-Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284 [1910].

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced."
"Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence."
[219]

Article 78 on marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces-- this is now Art. 33 of the
Family Code; Art. 118, now Art. 74 of the Family Code on property relations between spouses; Art. 577 on the usufructuary of

woodland; Art. 657 on easement of right of way for passage of livestock; Arts. 678, 1315, 1376, 1522, 1564 and 1577. Please
see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 25.
[220]

Castle Bros. v. Gutierrez Hermanos, 11 Phil. 629 [1908]; In Re: Firm Name of Ozaeta Romulo, 92 SCRA 1 [1979]; Yao Kee v.
Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 [1988]; Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 26 for a list of other cases.
[221]

This situation is analogous to the Muslim code or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D. 1083) which took effect on
February 4, 1977 despite the effectivity of the Civil Code and the Family Code. P.D. 1083 governs persons, family relations and
succession among Muslims, the adjudication and settlement of disputes, the organization of the Shari'a courts, etc.
[222]

Mariflor P. Pagusara, The Kalinga Ili: Cultural-Ecological Reflections on Indigenous Theora and Praxis of Man-Nature
Relationship, Dakami Ya Nan Dagami, p. 36, Papers and Proceedings of the 1 st Cordillera Muti-Sectoral Land Congress, 11-14
March 1983, Cordillera Consultative Committee [1984].
[223]

Section 2, Article XII.

[224]

A "co-production agreement" is defined as one wherein the government provides input to the mining operation other than the
mineral resource-- Section 26 (b), R.A. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
[225]

A "joint venture agreement" is one where a joint-venture company is organized by the government and the contractor with
both parties having equity shares, and the government entitled to a share in the gross output-- Section 26 (c), R.A. 7942.
[226]

A mineral "production-sharing agreement" is one where the government grants to the contractor the exclusive right to conduct
mining operations within a contract area and shares in the gross output. The contractor provides the financing, technology,
management and personnel necessary for the implementation of the agreement-- Section 26 (a), R.A. 7942.
[227]

Section 26, R.A. 7942.

[228]

Section 3 [d], People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) provides:

"Sec. 3 [d] 'Small-scale mining contract' refers to co-production, joint venture or mineral production sharing agreement between
the State and a small-scale mining contractor for the small-scale utilization of a plot of mineral land."
[229]

Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.

[230]

NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.

[231]

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228, 239 [1988], Cruz, J., ponente, it was declared that if a person is the owner of
a piece of agricultural land on which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or
utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong-- also cited in H. de Leon, Phil.
Constitutional Law, Principles and Cases, vol. 2, pp. 800-801 [1999].
[232]

See Ground I, Grounds to Issue Writ of Prohibition, Petition, p. 14.

[233]

Section 7 (b) is subject to Section 56 of the same law which provides:

"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.-- Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected."
The law took effect 15 days upon publication in the O.G. or in any 2 newspapers of general circulation (Sec. 84, IPRA). The IPRA
was published in the Chronicle and Malaya on Nov. 7, 1997.

[234]

Section 9 of the IPRA also gives the ICCs/IPs the ff. responsibilities over their ancestral domains:

(a) Maintain Ecological Balance-- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting
the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
(b) Restore Denuded Areas.-- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded areas and other
development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable renumeration;
(c) Observe Laws.-- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations for its effective
implementation."
Section 58 of the same law also mandates that ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined by
appropriate agencies with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such
purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with
the full and effective assistance of government agencies.
[235]

Hector S. de Leon, Textbook on the New Philippine Constitution pp. 473-474 [1987] citing the 1986 UP Law Constitution
Project, The National Economy and Patrimony, p. 11.
[236]

Under the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, "small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor
using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment"-- Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.
[237]

See infra., pp. 77-79?.

[238]

Andrew Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, ed. By Barnes, Gray and Kingsbury, pub. By
Ass'n. for Asian Studies, at 35, 42 [1995].
[239]

E.g. International Indian Treaty Council, World Council of IPs.

[240]

Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, supra, at 44, citing the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1988.

[241]

Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32
Texas International Law Journal 97, 102 [1997].
[242]

Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, The
American Journal of International Law, vol. 92: 414, 429 [1998].
[243]

The World Bank supported the Chico Dam project. Due to the Kalingas' opposition, the WB pulled out of the project but the
conflict between the Philippine government and the natives endured long after-- Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Peoples' Rights
and Sustainable Resource Use in South and Southeast Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, pp. 59, 71-72.
[244]

Kingsbury, supra, at 417.

[245]

Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

[246]

Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second Reading, November 20, 1996, p. 20.

[247]

Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains, the International Labor Organization, and the ILOBilance- Asia Dep't, p. 3 [1999].
[248]

Also referred to as the "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989."

[249]

See Introduction to ILO Convention No. 169, par. 4.

[250]

Id., pars. 5 and 6.

[251]

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Towards a Definition of National Policy on Recognition of Ethnic Law within the Philippine Legal
Order, 55 P.L.J. 383, 385 [1980].
[252]

Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the Phil. National Historical Society, Inc., p.
6 [1997].
[253]

Fernandez, supra, at 385, 391.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it shows itself in a given
judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the specific remedy invoked, or the
principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived as good and
inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the Court.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court's adjudication must have a personal and substantial
interest in the dispute;[1] indeed, the developing trend would require a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. [2] The rule
requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Court's jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the
Court's remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy by its
sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and
consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance and paramount
interest to the nation,[3] the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs,
such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. [4] This Court thus did so in a case[5] that involves
the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until and exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic
notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be
considered to be of overriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, a law that
obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation and its people now and in the generations yet to
come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"), enacted into law in
1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution
which recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and development" [6] and
commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs," to
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.[7]

Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to embrace "all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources" including "ancestral
lands, forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise," over which indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual
ownership and control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally millions of
hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some
forms of self-governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states that
the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed
under which would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands and
natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in
the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned lands in case
of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains
previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with customary law (par. h).
Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my
view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable
abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It ordains that the
"exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State."[8]
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates in the 1935 Constitution,
forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources", were derived largely from the report of the
Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources. [9] According to the Committee report,
among the principles upon which these provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forest and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be preserved for those under the sovereign authority
of the Nation and for their posterity." [10] The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view that the
"policy on natural resources, being fundamental to the nation's survival should not be left to the changing mood of the lawmaking
body."[11]
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus expresses this regalian doctrine of
the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and natural resources belong to the state other than those which it
recognizes to be of private ownership. Except for agricultural lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated,
forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the
exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to
enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization. [12]
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cario vs. Insular Government,[13] holding that a parcel of land held since
time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to
downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the
Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates. [14] It is not then for a
court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and
it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this
statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it
there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr.
Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention,
thus:
"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be
submitted to Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these
customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We
leave it to Congress to determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to whatever may have
been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the horse." [15]
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with specificity
and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due process clause," as I so
understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera[16] would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take
force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that
publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the law. Indeed, the
State is exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would
entail a balancing of interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

[1]

People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 244.

[2]

Am Jur 189, p. 591, S. vD., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.

[3]

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Taada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, 36, 37.

[4]

Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11; see also Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., on the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Ed., pp. 336-337.
[5]

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792.

[6]

Art. 11, Sec. 22.

[7]

Art. XII, Sec. 5.

[8]

Sec. 2.

[9]

II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 594.

[10]

Ibid., p. 595.

[11]

Ibid., p. 600.

[12]

CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 2; Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., vs. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100.

[13]

41 Phil. 935.

[14]

CONST., Art. II, Sec. 1.

[15]

4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.

[16]

146 SCRA 446.

SEPARATE OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the land because only the race
lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much more man?
Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we
obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is
a grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian to all his children.
Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs ...life.
- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos" in Indigenous View of Land
and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the
Constitution.[1] The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no
further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. [2]
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of such presumption of
constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into account the purpose of the law, which is to give
life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples be recognized and protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore, their heritage, is not unique.
It is one that they share with the red-skinned "Indians" of the United States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New
Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted
measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community
realized the injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment among the family of nations is
expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and most comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of
lands, territories and even the resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used,
and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples.

A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples

The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the sense the term has come to be used,

it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means "native."[3] "Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has
been produced naturally in a particular land, and has not been introduced from the outside. [4] In international law, the definition of
what constitutes "indigenous peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term "indigenous peoples" has
been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of
UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:[5]
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now prevailing in
those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sections of society and are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the present, of one or more of the
following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous
community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of communication at home or in the
family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
(f) Other relevant facts.[6]
In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of Filipinos who have retained a high
degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture. [7] Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples,
characterized them as "uncivilized,"[8] "backward people,"[9] with "barbarous practices"[10] and "a low order of intelligence."[11]
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the politically-correct conjunctive
term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.-- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by selfascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories,
sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from
the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of nonindigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing our soil and hunting in our

forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing
a native culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American regime, [12] these native inhabitants
resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan,
Mindoro and Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands, the lands of their
forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture exhibits only the last
vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible distinction
between the cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities. [13] The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the
majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. [14] While
the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has retained its essentially native
character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve million Filipinos are members of the
one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural communities, [15] accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated
seventy million Filipinos[16] in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of Philippine society. The
incidence of poverty and malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples are
also among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of law and power, they have been
relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in national politics and enjoy the least protection from economic
exploitation.

The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic
opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized
sectors of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing
and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
development.[17]
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains.[18]
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments. [19]
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in
the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. [20]
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop
their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. [21]

Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural
communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities. [22]
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among others, that the State shall
recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development, protect their
rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights
or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains. [23] Moreover, IPRA enumerates the civil and
political rights of the indigenous peoples;[24] spells out their social and cultural rights;[25] acknowledges a general concept of
indigenous property right and recognizes title thereto; [26] and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the
President.[27]

Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.

The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. [28]
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. [29] The threshold issue, therefore, is whether
an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case.
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial
determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, [30] or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned
constitutional problems.[31] A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a
legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the presence
of opposing views or contentions.[32] Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they
lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring
every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. [33] The controversy must also be
justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. [34]
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to
implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order
to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on
its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural
resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court
possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. [35]
Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of
which may result only in a "generalized grievance".[36] Yet, in a sense, all citizen's and taxpayer's suits are efforts to air
generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power. [37]
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing. [38] The proper party requirement is considered
as merely procedural,[39] and the Court has ample discretion with regard thereto. [40] As early as 1910, the Court in the case of
Severino vs. Governor General [41] held:

x x x [W]hen the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some personal or special
interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the other
hand, when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and
as such interested in the execution of the laws.[42]
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also be the subject of an actual
case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined
therein that:
... [T]he right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other qualified elector in the
municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be
greater or different from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private
right. The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right
and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining a petition
whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted. [43]
In Taada v. Tuvera,[44] the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be informed of matters of public concern.
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,[45] the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or consulted on matters of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran,[46] the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." [47] Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice)
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuationaptly and fittingly stressed by petitionersthe advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. [48]
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in
violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all
Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any
grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the
preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen's suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds
through the implementation of an unconstitutional statute, [49] and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating
public funds.[50] The taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by
which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose of administering an invalid
law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[51]
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79 authorizes for the
expenditure of public funds by providing that "the amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged
against the current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the "ONCC") and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC"),"[52] which were merged as organic offices of the NCIP. [53] Thus, the IPRA is a valid
subject of a taxpayer's suit.

C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are
without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [54] Mandamus, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to
do the act required to be done, when said entity or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. [55]
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be
compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned provisions of the IPRA and from
disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the
Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
the country's natural resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for the relief
sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the petition in
view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the issues of a case.
That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of
first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience
and adopted to improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction,[56] such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this
Court's primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation. [57] We held in People v.
Cuaresma[58] that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket x x x. [59] (Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the lives not only of the
indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by the Court at the
earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to allow petitioners'
invocation of this Court's jurisdiction in the first instance.

Substantive Issues

Primary Issue

The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the constitutionality of certain
provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership [60] over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains by virtue of native title.[61] The term "ancestral lands" under the statute refers to lands occupied by individuals, families
and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private
forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are required to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or
through their ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the present". [62] On the other hand, "ancestral domains" is
defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential
and agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural
communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of indigenous cultural communities who are
still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein. [63]
Again, the same are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves
or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present". [64] Under Section 56,
property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and
respected."
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands, ancestral domains, and
natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who, between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the
rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the fundamental law. [65] The reason
is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered to the constitutional

limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law
and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. [66]
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain and, thus, owned by the State,
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion over the Philippines by
virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into
Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State. They
invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the original source of
all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any asserted
right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cario doctrine exists. However, petitioners maintain that the
doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part,
argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the
public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral domains existed by
virtue of the Cario doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to protect that rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to
Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and protection
under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power
and constitutional mandate of Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners posit that R.A. 8371
violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public domain and
other natural resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is understandable. Not only is the theory
well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land
law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court. [67]
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the
Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the
Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some
source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere.[68]
In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,[69] or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives.
[70]
In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or
propriedad.[71] These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted

out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. [72] By fiction of
law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands
were held.[73] The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. [74]
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the
landmark case of Cario vs. Insular Government[75] the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision[76]of the pre-war
Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper
and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. x x x.[77] (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue
of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cario, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cario applied for registration in his name of an ancestral land located in Benguet.
The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as far they could
remember. He also proved that they had all been recognized as owners, the land having been passed on by inheritance
according to native custom. However, neither he nor his ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The
government opposed the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to their ancestral land.
Cario was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as precedent in
our jurisdiction.[78] We applied the Cario doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,[79] where we stated that "[a]ll
lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n
exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest." [80]
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Cario was premised on the fact that the applicant had
complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by
Cario was transferred from the State, as original owner, to Cario by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine
cannot be the basis for decreeing "by mere legislative fiat...that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous peoples]
without judicial confirmation."[81]
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cario doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, as
such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cario would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which have always been
considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made
between ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of
native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner
since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States and
the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in
character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from
the State to a private person. Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to

have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title under Cario applies only to lands of the
public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution [82] is irrelevant to the application of the Cario doctrine because the
Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral
domains.
Legal history supports the Cario doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation thereof in the 16th century and
the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal,[83] the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were
considered as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples.[84] The discovery and occupation by the European
States, who were then considered as the only members of the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said
continents were deemed sufficient to create title under international law. [85]
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that it acquired title to all lands
in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only
over the unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands. [86]
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their property. Miguel Lopez de
Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority
on the early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity to avoid a repetition of the
sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the
expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could have been lifted
almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca.
The King instructed Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons or to their
property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and "to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ
by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if attacked, the royal instructions
admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might arouse native hostility. [87]
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land occupancy. [88] Thus, the Recopilacin
de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands already held by the natives.[89] The royal decrees of 1880 and
1894 did not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all
those in "unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize their possession by means of adjustment proceedings, [90] and within
the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared that titles
that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited.
Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it was held in the case of Cario that the royal decree of 1894 should not be
construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such title. [91]
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States, contrary to petitioners' assertion
that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the latter's rights over lands of the public domain. [92] Under the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to property existing at the time. [93]
During the American colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that
property and rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for the benefit of the Filipinos. [94] In
obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley's Instructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights
embodying the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every division
and branch of the American colonial government in the Philippines, [95] was that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."[96] These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly
protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over their
ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly established in law.

Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
domains were "abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935 Constitution." [97] He advances the
following arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the consolidation of rights
inherent in ownership in the State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has wrested
control of those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been
held that the State may impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but determinative of social welfare and
existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the established social system. x x x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that have been found from
generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State. [98]
Stated simply, the Solicitor General's argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land, had the power to re-vest in
itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor
General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of ownership
over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General, while embodying the theory of
jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of
the Philippines belong to the State."[99] Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare
and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any
room for constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or
extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean
that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise
of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare
and existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of existing rights by expressly
providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of
ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law should be given their ordinary
or usual meaning,[100] and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution [101]to protect the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and
protection under IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are far in
excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the Congress, [102] since such recognition and protection amount to
the alienation of lands of the public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right" refers to any legally enforceable claim. [103] It is a power,
privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another. [104] When used in relation to property, "right"
includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it. [105] Said provision in the
Constitution cannot, by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over
such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional mandate and power in
enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral lands.
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision,

does Congress have the power to decide whether ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public domain?
Also, does Congress have the power to determine whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources
found therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not intend Congress to decide
whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be
treated as private property, and that customary laws shall merely determine whether such private ownership is by the entire
indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the community. The discussion below between Messrs.
Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either Commissioner Bennagen or
Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY
LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain,"
because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising
therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights or relations which
shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain. I assume there must be a certain
difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws on property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to make the necessary exception
to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a customary law wherein it is the
property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule
that it is the ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and relations arising therefrom and
consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that we could make the
corresponding suggestions also by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be ownership based on individuals,
on clan or lineage, or on community. And the thinking expressed in the consultation is that this should be codified and should
be recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the concept. [106] (Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following exchange between Messrs.
Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent
of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or community ownership or of private ownership within
the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by private individuals, clans and
even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside the ancestral domain and
there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept more specific ownership in terms of individuals
within the ancestral lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. [107] (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly mentioned Cario in their

deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that they were unaware of native title as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.[108] The framers of the Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be
aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these
doctrines into consideration in construing the Constitution. [109]
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private property of indigenous peoples,
the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional
mandate and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs" in
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as subject to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which
vests in the State ownership of all lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this
interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the public domain and natural resources, and is of paramount
importance to our national economy and patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly to prevent
the impairment of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral
domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How does this affect the Torrens
title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in cases where due process is
clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio City are considered as
ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the publications that I provided
the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in
relation to certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral land?
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos can speak of the Philippine
archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. [110]
Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the framers of the Constitution as a reiteration of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the
State. The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is
examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision. That construction should be used which would give effect to the
entire instrument.[111]

Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other natural resources should be
read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth
hereinbefore,[112] include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
peoples within the framework of national unity and development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being, and for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains; Section 1, Article XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities and
inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the
application of the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17,
Article XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing the Congress to create
a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth.[113] Equity is given prominence as the first objective of national economic development. [114]
The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs," intend to establish a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief
Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or to create absolute
limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide's formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The State, SUBJECT TO THE
provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of
cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural well-being." There are at least
two concepts here which receive different weights very often. They are the concepts of national development policies and
programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to ask: When the
Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural
minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest of national development policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know
which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national development
policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount. The concept introduced here
is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests taking into account the
specific needs and the specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we did so in the autonomous
regions.[115] (Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral
domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and other natural
resources,[116] as well as the State's full control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources.[117] Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a), [118] 5,[119] and 7[120] of IPRA as violative of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State."[121] They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA
because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State
ownership over these resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral
domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and

within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within
the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous
peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure that no unnecessary
encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process. The mere fact that
Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character
of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot
be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it recognizes
ancestral domains as their "private but community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples' concept of ownership as
distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership" is the "independent and general power of a person
over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby." [122] The civil law concept of ownership has
the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to
consume the thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which is
owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing owned. [123] In contrast, the indigenous
peoples' concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal
character of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed" [124] because it was meant to benefit
the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member. [125]
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from the
deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their
ancestral domains, to wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8[126] rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred the other provision but
here itself --HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided
to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the
rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not
also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done
in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our people especially in
the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that
maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already considered in subsequent sections
which we are now looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people where they are. Number two, in
terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you
want to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is already there and I will make
sure that they cross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version you do not have and if you
agree we will adopt that.[127] (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources. In fact,

Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples' rights and welfare in relation to the natural resources found
within their ancestral domains,[128] including the preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the
indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural resources located therein
are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been recognized in the Philippines.
NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza[129] in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources
has been upheld in this jurisdiction.[130] They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural resources to vest on a private (as
opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935 Constitution." [131] However, a judicious examination of Reavies
reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to natural resources.
Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of time immemorial
possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the
Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The unique value of natural resources has
been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over
said natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the present.[132] Natural resources, especially minerals, were considered by
Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its
ownership over minerals wherever these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the separability of
title over lands and that over minerals which may be found therein. [133]
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals. As the owner of natural
resources over the Philippines after the latter's cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and
American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. A person who
acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even
the State, from exploiting minerals within his property. [134] Although the United States made a distinction between minerals found
in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of
the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to maintain the State's ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for
future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through economic domination; and to avoid situations
whereby the Philippines would become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security and
independence.[135]
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated
in both the 1973[136] and 1987 Constitutions.[137]
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to the State, the Court deems it
necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only
to the lands and not to the natural resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. -- The Chairperson of the NCIP shall
certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of Justice, the
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area
shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed.

Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the administration of other agencies of the
Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral
domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies
concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural
resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under
existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting
the State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources within the ancestral domains
would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural resources are owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural resources found on the
ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources. [138] The statute also grants them priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. [139] Before the NCIP
can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the perfection of any productionsharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples concerned must be obtained. [140] In return, the
indigenous peoples are given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains or portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover, or reforestation.[141]
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the utilization of our country's
natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the Constitution the exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources may only be undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements.[142] To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit that by
vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives them control over
the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the State. [143]
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the State, which may directly undertake such activities or
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in
isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the foregoing are
prohibited. The Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout. [144] No constitutional provision is to be
separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law. [145]
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources stated in paragraph 1,
Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens.[146] Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition
and utilization of natural resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. [147] Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII
mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources.[148]
Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in
harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement, [149] cannot be construed as a
prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the State's direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the natural
resources under existing laws,[150] the State retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale basis[151] or
otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under Sections 7(b) and 57 of

IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a
people's small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the
awarding of small-scale mining contracts.[152] R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining
operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned [153] and in the event that the
members of such indigenous cultural community give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties
shall be paid to them by the parties to the mining to the contract. [154]
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed.
These rights are limited only to the following: "to manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for
future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; to an informed
and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a
result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment of these rights."
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains only to the exploration of
natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for
the purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit. [155] The exploration, which is merely a
preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources
which under the Constitution belong to the State.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of natural resources and not
absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of preference or
first consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare
of indigenous peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of concessions. Nor does
the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. Several factors still have to be considered. For
example, the extent and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the environment and on the indigenous peoples' way
of life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in
the best position to undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent
laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with
existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking activities, or entering into coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be
located within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a
hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the interests of the State for national development and those of the
indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same
activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit
the ownership rights of the State over the natural resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of natural resources is nothing
new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of
subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both

inland and offshore."

Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources within the ancestral
domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the
need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before any search for or utilization of the natural resources within
their ancestral domains is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires that the prior informed
consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples
in accordance with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that national development policies and programs should involve a
systematic consultation to balance local needs as well as national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the
framers of the Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the region after
thorough consultation.[156] To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent participation
in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom without
their free and prior informed consent.[157] As to non-members, the prior informed consent takes the form of a formal and written
agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into
a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not
peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy, [158] the Environmental Impact
System,[159] the Local Government Code[160] and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995[161]already require increased consultation and
participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be procured before the NCIP
can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any
production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The
clear intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely affected by the
operation of such entities or licensees.

Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal
protection of the laws."
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA
includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the
due process clause.[162] Petitioners' contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56,"
which reads:
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not those who are
not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same communities to such
ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.

The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous
peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus
recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. [163] What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already
exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral
lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member
of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of
Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. [164] With regard to ancestral domains, the
following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second,
investigation and census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth,
posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the final report of the ADO. [165] With regard to
ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements:
first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly,
evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO. [166] Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners
that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP [167] and the application of
customary law,[168] violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of indigenous peoples, [169] and
that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples, [170] including even disputes
between a member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral
domains.[171] Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial
judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a member of an
indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is] before judges who are all members of
[indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." [172]
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in disputes involving property,
succession and land,[173] and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples.[174] They assert
that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a
dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous
peoples] do not know what these customary laws are." [175]
Petitioners' concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not mean
that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person's
possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the
indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly
of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states
that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies under
our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is
allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.[176] The
IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who

are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules
which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not
limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of
customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the dispute
could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domains,[177] where all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples, [178]
specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an
indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not
required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning ancestral lands and
domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the
constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of
customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence, [179] and it is not contrary to law,
public order or public policy.[180] Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of
customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary
laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of
indigenous peoples.[181]
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President's power of control over the
Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency
under the Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This
relationship shall be carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those

pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief Executive
Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President over the NCIP by
characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral but autonomous...for purposes of policy and
program coordination."
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules characterize the NCIP as an
independent agency under the Office of the President, such characterization does not remove said body from the President's
control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and
the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto. [182] It has been granted administrative,[183] quasilegislative[184] and quasi-judicial powers[185] to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP's functions renders it
impossible to place said agency entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason
for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent agency" is defined as an administrative
body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a
"subordinate agency" or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision. [186]
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA itself,
which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals,[187] like those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the
President" and, as such, is still subject to the President's power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution[188] with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must
secure the President's approval in obtaining loans to finance its projects; [189] (2) it must obtain the President's approval for any
negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from and from whatever source; [190] (3) the
NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating
to the indigenous peoples;[191] and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President. [192] The President
is also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP[193] as well as to remove them from office for cause motu
proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community. [194]
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming the ownership by the
indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title do not diminish the State's ownership of lands of
the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the
public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cario vs. Insular Government;[195]
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural resources in the State is not
violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of
the same, as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control
over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the indigenous
peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such
as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991[196]and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.[197] Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous
peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to
them under the aforesaid laws;
(3)
While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands and domains, it also
protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of

ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the ancestral lands and domains; [198]
(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the
IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary law in certain
disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is
incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President
does not infringe upon the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, since said provision as
well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President's
control and supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the
SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

[1]

Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979); Phil. Long Distance
Telephone Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 (1952).
[2]

In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).

[3]

In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout the vast Spanish empire. India was a synonym
for all of Asia east of the Indus River. Even after it became apparent that the explorer Christopher Columbus was not able to
reach territories lying off the east coast of Asia, the Spanish persisted in referring to all natives within their empire as los Indios.
(Owen J. Lynch, Jr., THE PHILIPPINE COLONIAL DICHOTOMY: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing
R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE
PRESIDENT 5 [1979].
[4]

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976), p. 1151.

[5]

Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 The
American Journal of International Law 414, 419 (1998) citing Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against
indigenous population, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1986/ 7/ Add. 4, paras. 379-80.
[6]

Ibid. This definition is criticized for taking the potentially limited, and controversial view of indigenous peoples by requiring
"historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories."
[7]

4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 34.

[8]

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 680 (1919).

[9]

Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-Third Congress, Third Session on HR 18459, pp.
346, 351. Quoted in Rubi at 686.
[10]

United States President McKinleys' Instruction to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900, quoted in Rubi at 680.

[11]

US v. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434, 436 (1915).

[12]

See Owen J. Lynch, Jr., INVISIBLE PEOPLES AND A HIDDEN AGENDA: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws
(1900-1913), 63 PLJ 249 (1988).

[13]

For an introduction to the chasm that exists between Philippine Law and Indigenous Custom Law, see Owen J. Lynch, Jr.,
Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey 52 PLJ 268 (1982); and the Philippine Indigenous Law
Collection: An Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58 PLJ 457 (1983), by the same author.
[14]

See RENATO CONSTANTINO, THE PHILIPPINES: A PAST REVISITED (1975), pp. 26-41; TEODORO AGONCILLO, A
HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, 8th ed., pp. 5, 74-75.
[15]

Response of Rep. Gregorio A. Andolana to the interpellation of Rep. John Henry R. Osmea on ouse Bill No. 9125, Journal
of August 20 and 21, 1997 of the House of Representatives, p.20.
[16]

Philippines Yearbook (1998 ed.), p. 366.

[17]

Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies.

[18]

Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony.

[19]

Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.

[20]

Ibid.

[21]

Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports.

[22]

Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions.

[23]

SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies . - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development;
b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well
being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human
rights and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect
for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and
opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring
maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such
services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization
of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and
implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains.

[24]

See Sections 13-20, R.A. 8371.

[25]

See Sections 21-37, R.A. 8371.

[26]

See Sections 4-12, R.A. 8371.

[27]

See Sections 38-50, R.A. 8371.

[28]

Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, 400 (1980), citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

[29]

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492, 513 (1996).

[30]

Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 104 (1996).

[31]

Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 362 (1913).

[32]

WEBSTERS'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1976, p. 497.

[33]

United States v. Freuhauf, 365 US 146 (1961).

[34]

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364 (1989); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568
(1993).
[35]

People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).

[36]

Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, 342 (1983).

[37]

US v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 194 S Ct 2940, 41 L Ed 2d 678 (1974).

[38]

Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 135 (1994), citing, among others, Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); CLU
V. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA
750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).
In Kilosbayan v. Morato (250 SCRA 130 [1995]) the Court discoursed on the rule on standing as follows: taxpayers may sue on
the claim of illegal disbursement of funds, or to assail the constitutionality of a tax measure; voters may question the validity of
election laws; citizens may raise constitutional questions of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and,
legislators may question the validity of official acts which infringe their prerogatives.
[39]

Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).

[40]

Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364-365 (1989).

[41]

16 Phil. 366 (1910), citing HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES.

[42]

Id., at 371.

[43]

Id., at 374-375.

[44]

136 SCRA 27, 37 (1985).

[45]

177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989).

[46]

224 SCRA 792 (1993).

[47]

Id., at 805.

[48]

Ibid.

[49]

Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).

[50]

Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479, 487 (1965), citing 11 Am Jur 761.

[51]

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 (1976); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Tan v.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
[52]

Section 79. Appropriations.-- The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against
the current year's appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its continued
implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
[53]

Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC.--The Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and the Office for Southern
Cultural Communities (OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are hereby merged as
organic offices of the NCIP and shall continue to function under a revitalized and strengthened structure to achieve the objectives
of the NCIP x x x.
[54]

Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

[55]

Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

[56]

Article VIII of the Constitution states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
xxx
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended, provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.--The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs
or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
x x x.
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
[57]
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 173-174 (1997).

[58]

172 SCRA 415 (1989).

[59]

Id., at 424.

[60]

Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.--The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall
be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
(a) Right of Ownership. - The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional
(b) hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
xxx
[61]
Section 3(l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have
been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest; x x x
Section 3(p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to
have occupied, possessed in the concept of owners, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary
law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.
[62]

Section 3(b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;
[63]

Section 3(a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising
lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by Indigenous peoples, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources,
and lands which may no longer be exclusively be occupied by Indigenous peoples but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators.
[64]

Ibid.

[65]

Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979).

[66]

In re Guarina, 24 Phil 37 (1913).

[67]

See Lee Hong Hok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972).

[68]

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15.

[69]

1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd revision, p. 1759.

[70]

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 1282.

[71]

76 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.

[72]

WASHBURN, p. 44; see also WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW ON REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed. (1886), p.2; BIGELOW,
p. 2.
[73]

WARVELLE, ABSTRACTS AND EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY (1907), p.18.

[74]

1 DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (Jowitt, ed.), p. 797.

[75]

41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L Ed. 594 (1909).

[76]

Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906). The Philippine Supreme Court in this case held that in the Philippines,
there is no conclusive presumption of a grant of title to land from the Government founded merely upon long possession of the
same by the applicant.
[77]

Cario vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941.

[78]

Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902.

[79]

75 Phil 890 (1946).

[80]

Id., at 892.

[81]

Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, p. 861.

[82]

Section 3, Article XII, CONSTITUTION.

[83]

Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain and Portugal, with the former having exclusive power to
claim all lands and territories west of the Atlantic Ocean demarcation line (Lynch, The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial
Sovereignty, 62 Phil L J 279, 283 [1987]).
[84]

See AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed., 142-143.

[85]

See CRUZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1996 ed., pp. 106-107.

[86]

Cario v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 939.

This point finds significance in light of the distinction between sovereignty and dominion. Sovereignty is the right to exercise the
functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State (Case Concerning the Island of Las Palmas [1928], UNRIAA II 829, 838).
It is often referred to as the power of imperium, which is defined as the government authority possessed by the State
(BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY Vol. 2, p. 419). On the other
hand, dominion, or dominium, is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and natural resources.
Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The declaration in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is likewise founded on dominium (Ibid.). If
dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 16th century were
limited to non-private lands, because it could only acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the Filipinos.
Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands.
[87]

PHELAN, THE HISPANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES: SPANISH AIMS AND FILIPINOS RESPONSES, 1565-1700 (1959),

pp. 8-9.
[88]

Cario vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 943.

[89]

Book 4, Title 12, Law 9, decreed by Philip II, 1 June 1594. We order that grants of farms and lands to Spaniards be without
injury to the Indians and that those which have been granted to their loss and injury, be returned to the lawful owners.
Book 4, Title 12, Law 14. We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining the royal crown and patrimony, it is
our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in
order that x x x after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasteurage, confirming them in what they
now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we wish. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542-543 (1904).] (Emphasis supplied.)
Book 6, Title 1, Law 15, decreed by King Philip II, at Madrid, 7 November 1574. We command that in the Philippine Islands the
Indians not be removed from one to another settlement by force and against their will.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 23, otherwise known as Ordinance 10 of 1609 decreed by Philip III. It is right that time should be allowed
the Indians to work their own individual lands and those of the community.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 32, decreed by Philip II, 16 April 1580. We command the Viceroys, Presidents, and Audiencias that they see
to it that the Indians have complete liberty in their dispositions.
Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754. Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; x x x. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra, at 546.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
[90]

Article 6 of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra note 89 at 549.

[91]

Cario v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 944.

[92]

Memorandum of Petitioners, par. 3.4, Rollo, pp. 845-846.

[93]

The Treaty of Paris reads in part:

Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, x x x.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars, within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of
the present treaty.
xxx
Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and Three of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and
cedes in Porto Rico and other islands of the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law,
belong to the public domain and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can
not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds,
of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever
nationality such individuals may be.

[94]

The statute reads in part:

Section 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands under the treaty of peace
with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be
designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are
hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof,
except as provided by this Act.
[95]
McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, in MENDOZA, FROM MCKINLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1978) p. 71.
[96]

Id., at 65-75; Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.

[97]

Solicitor General's Memorandum, Rollo, p. 668-669.

[98]

Id, at 668.

[99]

Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution reads:

All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
[100]
Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil 598 (1954).
[101]

Sec. 5, Article XII. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,
shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains.
[102]

See Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 863-864.

[103]

SIBAL, PHILIPPINE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, p. 893.

[104]

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed., p. 1189.

[105]

Ibid.

[106]

4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 32.

[107]

Id., at 37.

[108]

Solicitor General's Memorandum, Rollo, p. 665.

[109]

Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 518 (1940); CIR v.Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967).

[110]

4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 36.

[111]

See 1 COOLEY, CONST., LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., pp. 127-129.

[112]

See pp. 8-9 of this Opinion for the full text of the constitutional provisions mentioned.

[113]

Section 1, Article XII provides:

The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained
increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity
as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to
develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to
broaden the base of their ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
[114]
BERNAS, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, p. 800, citing the sponsorship speech of Dr. Bernardo
Villegas, Chairman of the Committee on National Economy and Patrimony.
[115]

4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 34.

[116]

Petition, Rollo, pp.18-19.

[117]

Id., at 20.

[118]

Section 3. Definition of Terms. --For Purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains. --Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure
their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands, individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies
of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who
are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
[119]

Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership-- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and
all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and
therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.
[120]

Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.--The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
(a) Right of Ownership. - The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains;

(b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose
of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the
right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that
will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may
sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
[121]

Section 2, Article XII, CONSTITUTION.

[122]

TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. II, p. 42 (1983);
see also Articles 427 and 428, Civil Code.
[123]

Id., at 43.

[124]

Section 5, R.A. 8371.

[125]

Ibid.

[126]

Should be Section 7. The Transcript of Session Proceedings of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
National Cultural Communities regarding House Bill No. 9125 refers to Section 8 but the Committee was actually discussing
Section 7 on Rights to Ancestral Domains.
[127]

Transcript of Session Proceedings, Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural Communities, October 9, 1997,
XIV-2.
[128]

Sections 7 (b) and Section 57, R.A. 8371.

[129]

40 Phil. 1017 (1909), 215 US 16, 54 L Ed 72.

[130]

Ibid. The facts of the case were discussed in Fianza vs. Reavies, (7 Phil. 610 [1909]) thus: Jose Fianza, et al., members of
the Igorot tribe, claimed that he and his predecessors had, for more than fifty years prior to 1901, possessed a certain parcel of
mineral land on which were found two gold mines. The same parcel of land was also claimed by an American, J.F. Reavies, who
entered the land in 1901 and proceeded to locate mining claims according to the mining laws of the United States. The
Philippine Supreme Court held that Fianza, et al. were the rightful owners of the mineral lands pursuant to Section 45 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which in sum states that where a person have held or worked on their mining claims for a period
equivalent to ten years, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a
right to a patent thereto. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court and
held that the indigenous peoples were the rightful owners of the contested parcel of land, stating that the possession and working
by Fianza, et al. of the mining claim in the Philippine Islands for the time required under the Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 to establish the right to a patent, need not have been under a claim of title.
[131]

[132]

Memorandum of Intervenors Flavier, et al., Rollo, p. 918.

Article I of the Decree of Superior Civil Government of January 29, 1864 provided that "The supreme ownership of mines
throughout the kingdom belong to the crown and the king. They shall not be exploited except by persons who obtained special
grant from this superior government and by those who may secure it thereafter, subject to this regulation." (FRANCISCO,
PHILIPPINE LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 2nd ed. [1956], p. 14, citing the unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduno,
G.R. No. 19042.)

Article 2 of the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (the Spanish Mining Law), the law in force at the time of the cession of the
Philippines to the United States contained a similar declaration, thus:
The ownership of the substances enumerated in the preceding article (among them those of inflammable nature) belongs to the
state, and they cannot be disposed of without an authorization issued by the Superior Civil Governor.
The Spanish Civil Code contained the following analogous provisions affirming the State's ownership over minerals:
Art. 339. Property of public dominium is-xxx
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public service, or in
the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines,
until granted to private individuals.
Art. 350. The proprietor of land is the owner of the surface and of everything under it and may build, plant or excavate thereon,
as he may see fit, subject to any existing easements and to the provisions of the Laws on Mines and Waters and to police
regulations.
After the Philippines was ceded to Spain, the Americans continued to adhere to the concept of State-ownership of natural
resources. However, the open and free exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits and the land where they may
be found were allowed under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Section 21 thereof stated:
Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found, to occupation and
purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and
occupied as agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working
of such mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is
occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total
amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government
for the same as mineral claims.
Other natural resources such as water and forests were similarly regarded as belonging to the State during both the Spanish and
American rule in the Philippines, viz:
Article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defined waters of public ownership as (1) the waters springing continuously or
intermittently from lands of the public domain; (2) the waters of rivers; and (3) the continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
creeks running through their natural channels.
Article 1 of the same law states:
The following are also part of the national domain open to public use:
1.

The coasts or maritime frontiers of the Philippine territory with their coves, inlets, creeks, roadsteads, bays and ports

2.
The coast of the sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by international law.
The state provides for and regulates the police supervision and the uses of this zone as well as the right of refuge and immunity
therein, in accordance with law and international treaties.
With respect to forests, there are references made regarding State-ownership of forest lands in Supreme Court decisions (See

Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198-1199 [1968]; Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5, 11 [1975]; Mapa
vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, 184 [1908]; Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil 572, 584 [1909]).
The State's ownership over natural resources was embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Section 1, Article XII of
the 1935 Constitution declared:
All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty -five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provided:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
[133]
NOBLEJAS, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 1961 Revised Ed., p. 6
[134]

See LAUREL (ED.), PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VOL. VI, pp. 494-495.

[135]

Explanatory Note of the Committee on Nationalization of Lands and Natural Resources, September 14, 1934, reproduced in
LAUREL (ED.), PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VOL. VII, pp. 464-468; see also DE
LEON AND DE LEON, JR., PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES, VOL. 2, pp. 801-802.
[136]

Section 8, Article XIV, see note 139 for the full text of the provision.

[137]

Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. with the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations and associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
[138]
Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.--The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall
be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
xxx
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold

the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the
areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
[139]

Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.--The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned
may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five
(25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with
the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation:
Provided, finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs
under the same contract.
[140]

Section 59. Certification Precondition - All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined
from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without
prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only
be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of Indigenous
peoples concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT:
Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not
satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.
[141]

Section 58. Environmental Considerations.- Ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to be necessary for
critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined by
appropriate agencies with the full participation of the Indigenous peoples concerned shall be maintained, managed and
developed for such purposes. The Indigenous peoples concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve such areas with the full and effective assistance of government agencies. Should the Indigenous
peoples decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in writing. The consent of the
Indigenous peoples should be arrived at in accordance with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic requirements of
existing laws on free and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately revert to the
Indigenous peoples in accordance with the program for technology transfer; Provided, further, That no Indigenous peoples shall
be displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section without the written consent of the specific persons
authorized to give consent.
[142]

Citing Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

[143]

Memorandum of Petitioners, Id., at 840-841.

[144]

State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St 79, 112 NE 209, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 100.

[145]

Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 US 8, 51 L Ed 345, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, 100.

[146]

Third paragraph, Section 2, Article XII, Constitution -

The Congress may, by law, allow small scale-utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
[147]

Section 6, Article XIII, Constitution -

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of the indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the
manner provided by law.
[148]
Section 7, Article XIII, Constitution The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
[149]
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Assn. (Wyo) 307 P2d 593, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, 100.
[150]

Republic Act No. 7076 (the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991), Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).

[151]

Section 3(b) of R.A. 7076 defines "small-scale mining" as referring to mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor
using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment.
[152]

Section 7, R.A. 7076 provides:

Ancestral lands. - No ancestral land may be declared as a people's small-scale mining area without the prior consent of the
cultural communities concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as peole's small-scale mining areas, the
members of the cultural communities therein shall be given priority for the awarding of a people's small-scale mining contract.
[153]
Section 16, R.A. 7492.
[154]

Section 17, R.A. 7942.

[155]

Sec. 3(q), Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).

[156]

4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 37.

[157]

Sections 7(a) and (b), R.A. 8371.

[158]

Presidential Decree No. 1151 (1971).

[159]

Presidential Decree No. 1586 (1978) and DENR Administrative Order No. 37 (1996).

[160]

Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

[161]

Republic Act No. 7942.

[162]

Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.

[163]

Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).

[164]

Section 53 (f), R.A. 8371.

[165]

Section 52, R.A. 8371.

[166]

Section 53, R.A. 8371.

[167]

Sections 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62 and 66, R.A. No. 8371.

[168]

Sections 63 and 65, R.A. No. 8371.

[169]

Section 40. Composition.- The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President and shall be
composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to the ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the Chairperson. The
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a list of recommendees submitted by authentic
ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7) Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the following ethnographic
areas, Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II, the rest of Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay
and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao:
Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be women.
[170]

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.- The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties
have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
[171]

Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts.- In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral
domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the
proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between
and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be
followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided,
further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of
Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
[172]

Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo ,pp. 873-874.

[173]

Section 3 (f). Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally
and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;
xxx
Sec. 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes.
Any doubt or ambiguity in the application and interpretation of laws shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.
[174]

Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall
be used to resolve the dispute.
[175]

Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp.875-876.

[176]

R.A. 8371 states:

Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. -- When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve the dispute.
[177]
See Secs. 62 and 63, R.A. 8371.
[178]

Sec. 65, R.A. 8371.

[179]

The Civil Code provides:

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
[180]

The Civil Code provides:

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.180
[181]

R.A. No. 7160 reads:

Sec. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. xxx

(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples, local systems of settling disputes of
indigenous peoples, local systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without
prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.
[182]

Sec. 38, R.A. 8371.

[183]

Secs. 44 (a), (b), (c),(d), (f), (g), (h), (I), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (p), (q), R.A. 8371.

[184]

Sec. 44 (o), R.A. 8371.

[185]

Secs. 44 (e), 51-54, 62, R.A. 8371.

[186]

1 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, 55.

[187]

Sec. 62, R.A. 8371.

[188]

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
[189]

Sec. 44 (f), R.A. 8371.

[190]

Sec. 44 (g), R.A, 8371.

[191]

Sec. 44 (j), R.A. 8371.

[192]

Sec. 44 (p), R.A. 8371.

[193]

Sec. 40, R.A. 8371.

[194]

Sec. 42, R.A. 8371.

[195]

Supra note 75.

[196]

R.A. 7076.

[197]

R.A. 7942.

[198]

Section 56, R.A. 8371.

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them.
They assert a right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions
raised are of "transcendental importance."
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends only to cases and controversies for the determination of such
proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of
wrongs.[1] In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and other
respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle
what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case will thus not
conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such
legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the
provisions of the law in question.[2]
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to determine in the abstract whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and
executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, 5
can fail to note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all
cases. . . ."
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion was
inserted in Art. VIII, 1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts
from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties
are alleged.
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,[3] in which this Court, adopting the submission of the
Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's
decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
That is why Art. VII, 18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting
the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the
Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is
exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity
of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is

unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.

The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In
such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is
not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on
freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree
only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial
invalidity is not possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act without jurisdiction but also to
run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather than
experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate questions of
constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it
cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.
Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be a "galling cop out" [4] or an
"advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism."[5] To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign
of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison[6] to hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of
his commission as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie,
because 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the United States Supreme Court to issue the
writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the court's jurisdiction is mainly appellate.
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so that there can be no doubt of
this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII, 1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can
result either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating functions of judicial
review so well mentioned in the decisions[7] of this Court.
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show timidity but respect for the
judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are
presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he
said that "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented."[8] For the
exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital
controversy between individuals.[9] Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the
presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General,[10] reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,[11]
that "when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of
the laws." On the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to bring these proceedings. [12]
In Severino v. Governor General,[13] the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor General to call a special
election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although
mandamus was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit, because the public has a
right to know and the failure of respondents to publish all decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed
petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to
enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.

[1]

Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).

[2]

Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).

[3]

42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).

[4]

Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.

[5]

Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.

[6]

1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

[7]

Occea v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104 SCRA 1 (1981); Mitra v. Commission on
Elections, 104 SCRA 59 (1981).
[8]

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

[9]

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955).

[10]

16 Phil. 366 (1913).

[11]

136 SCRA 27 (1985).

[12]

Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.

[13]

Supra note 10.

SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)

PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the procedural or preliminary
issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two constitutional
questions of transcendental importance,[1] which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the
land.[2] Further, I am satisfied that the various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by
the parties. Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies [3] to address the problems raised by petitioners. In
any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral arguments and required the submission of memoranda.
Indeed, it would then be a galling copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.
Protection of Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Must Be Within the
Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia's resolution of the two main substantive issues, which constitute the core
of this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources"
which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I respectfully reject
the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such
sweeping statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond
the collective reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire
Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural wealth.
2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources," which the Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the State."
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral lands, but such
mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." [4] I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in its wisdom may grant
preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution
must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to
empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of
access to the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very
authority of this Court -- the Constitution of the Philippines.
The Constitution
Is a Compact
My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must conform. [5] It is the
people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the State and the government are founded. [6]
Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for
the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern
themselves in a certain manner.[7] Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern
themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable
intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." [8] Though laudable and well-meaning,
this statute, however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority. More
specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine -- the basic
foundation of the State's property regime.
Public Domains and Natural Resources
Are Owned by the State and
Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our country in the sixteenth
century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of
Spain. The King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and
other natural resources. By royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a
title deed; or (2) ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained by prescription. [9]

Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment or waiver of ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The latter assumed
administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of
1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x exploration,
occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they are found." [10] To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled
to own, exploit and dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and ratified our first Constitution.
Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging to the State all
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources. [11] Although respecting mining patentees under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might
be entitled to undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:
"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution, state:
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to
enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for
the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service
contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,

beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from
its execution."
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the desire to preserve the
nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers
decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation of the national patrimony was
deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows:
"[T]he natural resources, particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not only to the
generation then but also to the succeeding generation and consequently should be conserved for them." [12]
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of energy and other natural
resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural resources.
Their disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60
percent Filipino-owned. The present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly states that only agricultural
lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision:[13]
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral domains and lands are outside
the coverage of public domain; and that these properties -- including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein -are private and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged to the indigenous people's ancestors
since time immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its
all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State's implementation of policies considered to be for
the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land, the State may intervene to
enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not
be used by any private person, including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would impede the mining operations.
Such owner would be entitled to just compensation for the loss sustained.
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,[15] the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and patentees have the

exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of ownership.
Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be set aside or ignored by
IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by
conceding the nation's resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply because they have
chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now
maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It would be plain injustice to
the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country's
resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant ownership of public domains and
natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their
ancestral lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain." [16] I say, however, that such claim finds no legal
support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the
contrary, it declares that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State"; and "with the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,[17] the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all lands not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by
possessory information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.[18] differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from that which is defined in
Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera,
but a fair synthesis of these refers to `x x x the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control x x x, a collective right to freely
use the particular territory x x x [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the property for the common but
nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept,
however, still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the
Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of private respondents' claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness
and equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the pre-Spanish conquest. I
should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors
were agriculture-based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups' ownership claims: limited to land, excluding
the natural resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use -- not ownership -- of ancestral domains, then I have no
disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA's Section 57 [19]-- without the too-broad definitions under Section 3
(a) and (b) -- insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within
ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our Constitution vests the
ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution, this
Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution -- not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.
Cario v. Insular Government
Was Modified by the Constitution
In this connection, I submit that Cario v. Insular Government[20] has been modified or superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by

citizens. I must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cario refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources
underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,[21] a Decision handed down after our three Constitutions had
taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c). [22] The reason was
that the property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor general's following
statements:
"3.
The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as to include even
forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and
present Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states
that `with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated.' The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that `with the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated'."
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of registration, and its inclusion
in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasiblity of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does
not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a
forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio."
RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability
of Natural Resources and of
Public Domains
The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources found within ancestral
domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies this statement.
Section 3 (a)[24] defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the natural resources found
therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply
put, the law declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot
be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual
exclusivity. This means that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not indigenous
can never own any part thereof.
On the other hand, Section 3 (b)[25] of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x x, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, x x x including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such
ownership need not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more specifically the declaration
that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural resources - none of which, except agricultural lands, can

be alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. [26] Mere possession or utilization
thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties. [27] The presumption is that "all lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or
any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The
applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or
mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title." [28]
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely definitions and should not be
construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or
word group."[29] It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined. [30] Thus, after defining a term as encompassing
several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated
items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371
defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral
domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.
In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains, with no specific limits, likewise
belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards
international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land. [31]
No Land Area Limits Are
Specified by RA 8371
Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land,
whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere definitions, they could
cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed
"by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which
may no longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have used up the resources of a
certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy
and use enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring
title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land, several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their
private property.
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or consolidated title, but "on a
collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our country." [32] They trace
their right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in
many islands that have become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral
lands.[33]
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral domains; and over 10
thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.[34] Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains
cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country. [35] This
means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos
constituting 110 ICCs,[36] while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the

remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth" among Filipinos.
RA 8371 Abdicates the
State Duty to Take Full Control
and Supervision of Natural Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into
co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is
owned by Filipinos.[37] Such agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms
and conditions as may be provided by law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found
within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the
natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof.[38] And they may
exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for a like period.[39] Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural
resources must also be limited to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources, [40] a
right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group
the State's power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most
fundamental law.
I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural resources and cooperative
fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 - (1) ownership of ancestral lands and
domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and utilization of such
resources - I believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue deprivation of private
property
2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants
3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of exaction
4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of disputes over their rights and
claims
5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate the due
process and equal protection clauses
6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least, no longer of "transcendental
importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other
hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured
by specific provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well being.
"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain."
Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.
Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not, however, give Congress
any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving
them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and domains. [41] But to grant perpetual
ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to
live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of the rule of law.
In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating "reverse discrimination." In
seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and
misplaced generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national
proportions.
Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few, however disadvantaged
they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured.
Nor can the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open to all
and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice - empowering and
enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6,
7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.

[1]

Kilosbayan v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130, 140, November 16, 1995; Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 365, July 14, 1989; Antonio v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949).
[2]

Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 46, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106, 123-24, March 19, 1997; Basco v.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, 60, May 14, 1991.
[3]

Tanada v. Angara, ibid.

[4]

5, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

[5]

16 CJS 3.

[6]

16 Am Jur 2d 2.

[7]

Ibid.

[8]

22, Art. II of the Constitution.

[9]

Abaoag v. Director of Lands, 45 Phil 518 (1923), cited in petitioners' Memorandum.

[10]

Soledad M. Cagampang-de Castro, "The Economic Policies on Natural Resources Under the 1987 Constitution Revisited,"
Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Vol. XXV, Nos. 3 & 4 (1999), p. 51.
[11]

In a republican system of government, the concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones; ownership is vested in the
State, instead. (Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 10091010.)
[12]

II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 603, quoted in Bernas, supra, p. 1010.

[13]

3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

[14]

160 SCRA 228, 239, April 15, 1988.

[15]

261 SCRA 528, September 9, 1996.

[16]

NCIP's Memorandum, p. 24.

[17]

75 Phil 890, 892, August 31, 1946.

[18]

Intervenors' Memorandum, pp. 33 et seq.

[19]

"SEC. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. - The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. x x x."
[20]

41 Phil 935, February 23, 1909.

[21]

172 SCRA 455, 463, April 18, 1989, per Gutierrez Jr., J.

[22]

"(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18, 1964)."
[23]

[24]

284 SCRA 617, 633, January 22, 1998, per Puno, J.

"a) Ancestral Domains -- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which
are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators."

[25]

"b) Ancestral Lands -- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families
and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings
entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
[26]

Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate Court, March 2, 1993; Director of Lands v.
Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, December 17, 1990; Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, January 29, 1990.
[27]

Ibid., Margolles v. Court of Appeals, February 14, 1994; Gordula v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[28]

Republic v. Sayo, October 31, 1990, per Narvasa, J. (later CJ). See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[29]

Webster's Third New International Dictionary; Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 41.

[30]

Ibid.

[31]

2, Art. II of the Constitution.

[32]

Cecilio R. Laurente, "The King's Hand: The Regalian Doctrine as a Contributing Factor in the Mindanao Conflict," Human
Rights Agenda, Vol. 5, Issue No. 7, July & August 2000, pp. 6-7.
[33]

Ibid.

[34]

Solicitor General's Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 651.

[35]

Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[36]

Ibid. See also Datu Vic Saway, "Indigenous Peoples and the Uplands: A Situationer," Proceedings of the 6th Upland NGO
Consultative Conference, 23-27 August 1998, p. 30.
[37]

Or (3) in case of large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, enter - through the President - into
"agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance." (Miners Association of the
Philippines v. Factoran Jr., 240 SCRA 100, January 16, 1995.)
[38]

7(b), RA 7381.

[39]

57, ibid.

[40]

7(b), ibid.

[41]

As stated earlier, Sec. 57 of IPRA, insofar as it grants them such priority, is constitutional.

150-C Phil. 542

[ G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972 ]
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK AND LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK,
PETITIONERS, VS. ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioners[1] in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court
judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title [2] of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes
the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through
accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory,
which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government through
the appropriate public officials[3] exercising the competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise,
unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an
assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification for
nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials.
As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereto pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in
accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18,
1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the
basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August
26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga
City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales
application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the
sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the
land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein
* * *. Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible
* * *. In this case the land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation. * * * The only
remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see
any fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land involved through his
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry
No. V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the
actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the
Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land
since 1938."[4]
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The first
error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would
seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It
does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its
holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant and the
recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth
at the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the exhaustive
opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal

defect of parties to this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102
Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by said officers but
by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are
not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands or
public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently
granted patents to public land applicants."[5] Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable to attack.
It is a restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang vs. Consolacion,[6] a 1908 decision. As was there categorically
stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or
not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government." [7] The above citation was repeated
ipsissimisverbis in Salazar vs. Court of Appeals.[8] Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with the
findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes vs. Rodriguez,[9] "question the [title] legally issued."[10] The
second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between
the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity
to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium
and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era
between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium.[11] As far as the Philippines
was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario vs. Insular Government,[12] a case of Philippine origin, that
"Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown * * *." [13] That was a
manifestation of the concept of juraregalia,[14] which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested
in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive
discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton vs. Murciano,[15] decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias[16] in these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies,
and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias,
and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking
into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the
natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish." [17]
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano vs. Insular Government[18] that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the
public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, * * *." [19] They continue to possess that character until severed
therefrom by state grant.[20] Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of
reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. [21] What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director
of Lands[22] finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any
other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." [23] For it is well-settled "that no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." [24] It is indispensable
then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. [25] The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: [26] "The applicant, having failed to establish his
right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the
same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains
part of the public domain."[27] To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.

3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of
Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application,
up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim
thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based
on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein * * *. Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title
based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title
based thereon becomes indefeasible * * *."[28] Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they failed to accord deference to controlling
precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino vs. Director of Lands,[29] Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in
that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued
is conclusive and final."[30] Such a view has been followed since then.[31] The latest case in point is Cabacug vs. Lao.[32] There is
this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent
is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a
Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of
five years."[33] It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Esguerra, J., took no part.

239 Phil. 393

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 71285, November 05, 1987 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA AND
LEON PASAHOL, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review by way of certiorari questions the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Bataan granting the private respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral
registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its registration in the names of the respondents.
The facts are undisputed. As found by the appellate court, they are as follows:
"On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First Instance of
Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners (Annex "A") and
thereafter, actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by them tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period
exceeding 30 years.
"Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an ongoing
cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was declared public land. Notwithstanding, admittedly it has not been
alienated, reserved, leased or otherwise disposed of by the government. Basic petition reopens cadastral proceedings insofar as
this lot is concerned and prays for issuance of a decree/title in petitioners' name.
"Traversing the foregoing, Solicitor General opposed denying adequate basis for grant of prayer; that neither documentary
evidence nor nature of possession would warrant; that lot 444 is of public domain.
"Evidence of ownership and possession show petitioner Esteban Mendoza and his co-petitioner, his brother-in-law Leon
Pasahol, bought Lot 444 from the heirs of Maria Nunez and Feliciano Ignacio on December 1, 1957 as shown by a deed of sale
(Exhibit "A"); that after acquiring the land, they planted it to various fruit-bearing trees; that from December 1, 1957, petitioners
had possessed the land peacefully, openly and continuously under claim of ownership, as had their predecessors-in-interest
before them; that before the purchase of the land, it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maria Nunez since
1932 (Exhibit "E"); that in 1962, he and Leon Pasahol had agreed that the property was to be declared for taxation in Pasahol's
name only (Exhibit "F"); that petitioners were informed before the sale by their vendors that the latter did not claim the land in the
cadastral proceedings Rec. No. 1097, Cad. Case No. 19 because they were totally ignorant of said proceedings, not having
been notified of the same; and that the land subject of the petition was not covered by any government or forest reservation.
"Mendoza's testimony was corroborated by witnesses Arsenio Amante, Eliseo Reyes (one of the vendors), and Cresencio
Abuzman.
"Petitioners likewise presented other documentary evidence namely:
"Exhibit "B" -Certification of the Land Registration Commission dated December 23, 1968 that the lot in question had been
declared public land.
"Exhibit "C" Plan of Lot 444 of the Mariveles Cadastre prepared by Geodetic Engineer Victor Clamor, Jr. and certified by
Carlos G. Reyes, Chief of the Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands.
"Exhibit "D" Technical description of Lot 444 certified as correct by the Surveys Division Chief acting for the Director of
Lands.
"Exhibit "G" Certification dated December 10, 1968 by the Municipal Treasurer of Mariveles, Bataan that payment of land
taxes for Lot 444 was up to date.
"Exhibit H Certification by the Acting District Land Officer dated April 15, 1969 that the land had been cadastrally
surveyed for the heirs of Feliciano Iglesia, predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners.
"Exhibit "J" Report of the District Forester, Bureau of Forestry, Balanga, Bataan recommending approval of the petition
considering that the land being applied for was not needed for forestry purposes.
"On the part of the State, the Solicitor General did not present evidence of any kind but relied only on the petitioners' own
evidence.

"Initially, the court a quo denied registration observing, that Exhibit "C", the plan of the property sought to be registered, does not
appear to have been approved by the Director of Lands. Furthermore, although Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol were the
petitioners in the case, the latter had not appeared 'to corroborate the oral testimony of Mendoza that Pasahol has agreed with
him to have the land declared for taxation purposes only in the latter's name.
"On motion for reconsideration, the court a quo reconsidered and ordered a new hearing on the petition.
"In the new trial, the previous deficiencies were rectified by the petitioners. Leon Pasahol took the witness stand to corroborate
Esteban Mendoza's testimony; Exhibit "C" was presented anew in evidence, this time with the required approval of the Director
of Lands. As a consequence, the court a quo granted the petition for registration of Lot 444." (pp. 1-3, Decision?Intermediate
Appellate Court)
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision and held:
"In this appeal, the Solicitor General contests, alleging Exhibit ":A" shows that petitioners' possession began only in 1957, they
could not tack their possession to their predecessors-in-interest because of the failure of the latter to lay claim to the property in
question either during the cadastral survey of the area in 1927 or in the original cadastral proceedings held thereafter.
"We do not agree.
"Record shows Feliciano Iglesia, original owner of the property, died before herein cadastral proceedings were instituted. His
heirs who succeeded to his rights over the land lived in a remote part thereof and only infrequently visited the provincial capital
where the courts were located. Under these circumstances, it is quite credible petitioners' predecessors-in-interest did not
receive any notice of the cadastral proceedings. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that either the petitioners'
possession or that of their predecessors was ever disrupted or interrupted by third-parties, much less by the government.
Petitioners after the sale had zealously cultivated the property and religiously paid the taxes thereon for a good number of years.
We find possession of the land by both parties was in good faith and that petitioners herein should not, as a consequence, be
held strictly accountable for the lapse of their predecessors to file a cadastral claim to the property. Petitioners may tack their
period of possession with that of their vendors totalling to more than thirty years.
"The Solicitor General points out, however, that under Section 1 of Republic Act 391, as amended by Republic Act 2061, reopening cadastral proceedings is allowable only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government.' Applying said provision to the lot in
question, it is claimed that registration is not possible as said land is actually already forest land and/or part of a military
reservation. In support of this contention, the Solicitor General cites the Report Of Forest Guard Crescensio Abuzman to the
District Forester (Exhibit J) which states that the area involved is a portion of former Military Reservation (U S) turned over to
Philippine Government. Hence, not disposable under any circumstances.
"We disagree.
"The land may have been a military reservation in the past, but no longer. The same report Exhibit "J" relied upon by the
Solicitor General goes on to state that this 'former Military Reservation' had already been delimited and classified by our bureau
(Forestry) as alienable and disposable block under the Proposed Land Classification Project No. 4-C of Mariveles, Bataan.'
Additionally, the Report in fact recommended the titling of the property in the petitioners' name as the same was no longer
needed for forestry purposes and the government would not be adversely affected.
"Contributing to the view as to the disposable character of the land is the approval by the Director of Lands himself of Exhibit "C",
the plan of the land to be registered. Such approval would hardly be forthcoming were the property really non?disposable as
claimed by the State.
"Finally, We note from the record as well that all the other adjoining lots (Nos. 443, 447, 446, 438, etc.) were already registered
and titled in the names of private individuals, a circumstance hard to reconcile with the position of the Solicitor General that
registration of the area was simply not possible." (pp. 4-6, Decision-Intermediate Appellate Court).
In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the decision of the appellate court as being contrary to law on the ground that it
held that the subject land is agricultural and alienable land of the public domain and that the same can be subject to acquisitive
prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and uninterrupted possession under a bona fide claim of ownership by the
private respondents as to entitle them to registration and title over the land.
The petitioner maintains that Exhibit "J" which is the report of the District Forester recommending approval of the private
respondents' petition is a mere proposal contained in the Proposed land Classification Project No. 4 of Mariveles, Bataan, which
has not yet been approved by the President of the Philippines; and that unless the President upon the recommendation of the
Minister (Secretary) of Natural Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable, its status as

military reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change it
to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the Public Land Act. Therefore, it was error on the part of the appellate
court to rule that the land in dispute has been in the open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the private respondents
for more than thirty years as to entitle them to register the same and procure a title thereto because possession of an inalienable
land, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
On the other hand, the private respondents argue that even though Exhibit "J" was a mere proposal, such proposal had been
honored and implemented when the land in dispute had been recommended for titling in their favor. Furthermore, the
recommendation for such titling was made by the same office or branch of the government authorized and empowered to classify
and dispose of the property. Moreover, the subject property has no more use for any government purpose and for which reason,
the Bureau did not object but instead recommended that it be titled in favor of the private respondents. In fact, the Director of
Lands himself approved the plan Exhibit "C" covering the land sought to be registered.
We find merit in the instant petition.
While it may be true that as ruled by the appellate court, the private respondents could tack their possession of the land to that of
their predecessors-in-interest as a result of which they now have more than thirty (30) years possession of the same, the fact
remains that the subject land has not yet been released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and still has
to be reclassified as alienable public land with the approval of the President of the Philippines as required by the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275. As we have ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (148 SCRA 480,
489):
"Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant
under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9
months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in
sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267, which includes the lots claimed by
respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence,
neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30)
years as disposable agricultural land." (Emphasis supplied).
We, therefore, cannot sustain the appellate court's ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the military reservation on
the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A proposal cannot take
the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling
would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the public
domain. We ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, (129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that:
"In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended: Yngson v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 123 SCRA 441 [1983]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]). This should be
so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).
"The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word
on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified
region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under
the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]) if omission there was, in fact.
"While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all lands
comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is

within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it
under the Torrens System.
"Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicant may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership."
We are not unmindful, however of the plight of the private respondents who have in good faith possessed and occupied the
disputed land for more than (30) years. If what is needed is only the formal release of the property from its classification as a
military reservation and its reclassification to disposable agricultural land, the petitioner should, for equitable reasons, take the
necessary steps towards the declassification of the same. As we have held in the same case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals (supra):
"The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its
present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property,
petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question."
The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not
only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy be encouraged. (Director of Lands v. Funtillar,
142 SCRA 57, 69). Apart from strongly opposing an obviously improper method of securing title to public land, the Solicitor
General should also take positive steps to help the private respondents remedy the situation in which they find themselves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent appellate court is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
application for cadastral registration of title of the private respondents is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to their recourse
to the proper administrative remedy.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.

258-A Phil. 475

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 77243, October 26, 1989 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ASSOCIACION BENEVOLA DE CEBU, ENGRACIA UROT, HIPOLITO
BOLABOLA, BASILIO BOLABOLA, HONORATO RUBEN BOLABOLA, PORFERIO BOLABOLA, FILOMENA BOLABOLA
GENTAPA, SPOUSES TORIBIO CARRACIO AND JUANITA LONDRES, SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA CABALLERO AND
ADORACION LONDRES, CONSTANCIA BOLABOLA, CARLOS BOLABOLA, JUAN BOLABOLA, SULPICIO AVES, VICTORINO
VDA. DE RAMOS, SEBASTIAN YAP, ANA DONDOYANO, OSMUNDO NOVELA, PABLO ENOLPE, MELCHOR NOVELA,
ALFONSO LONDRES, JUANITA HERICO, CONCEPCION GUIVELONDO, EMILIA GUIVELONDO VDA. DE PACADA,
TEODORICO RAMOS, CARLOTA RAMOS DE MERCADO, JUANITA RAMOS DE SUESMITH, SIMON RAMOS, LYDIA RAMOS
DE ALQUITAS, JUANITA RAMOS, CONCEPCION RAMOS AND HONORABLE RAMON A.M. TORRES (IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH VI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a special civil action for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, seeking to set aside as null and
void the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch VI, dated September 16, 1986 and
January 20, 1987, disallowing the appeal of the government, and enjoining the respondent judge from executing the decisions
dated October 29, 1973 and July 10, 1975 and/or from taking further proceedings in LRC Case N-633, LRC Record N-29324,
entitled "Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Applicant v. Pablo Enolpe, et. al., Oppositors."
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
On October 8, 1965, a petition was filed by the Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Inc. before the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Land Registration Case No. N-633) praying that a parcel of land situated in Cebu City, specifically Lot 108 of the Banilad Estate,
be registered in its name.
On June 21, 1966, the court, entered an order of general default as against the whole world, except for the several groups of
oppositors who filed their opposition to the petition.
On July 22, 1966, or more than one month after the order of general default was entered, the court received a letter from the
Solicitor General, accompanied by a mimeographed opposition of the Director of Lands. There also appears in the records of
the case, a copy of the letter of the Solicitor General to the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu requesting the latter to represent the Office
of the Solicitor General at the hearing of the registration case. However, it appears that the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu never
entered his appearance for the government.
On October 29, 1973, the court rendered a partial decision awarding to the applicant Associacion Benevola de Cebu Lots 108-C
and 108-D, and to oppositor Engracia Urot the ownership of Lots 108-F, 108-I, 108-G, 108-H-I and 108-B-I.
On July 10, 1975, the court rendered a follow-up decision adjudicating to Bolabola and company certain other specific portions of
Lot 108, and to the heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, the remaining portion of the land subject matter of the case. The court further
declared the other oppositors-claimants Victorino Vda. de Ramos, Sebastian Yap, Ana Dondoyano, Osmundo Novela, Melchor
Novela, Pablo Enolpe, Alfonso Londres and Juanita Herico owners of their family houses erected on the respective lots. The
claims of the rest of the oppositors were ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the land registration court, the oppositors-appellants Pablo Enolpe, et. al., appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals. On March 30, 1984, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which states, inter alia:

"This may well explain the government's disinterest to pursue the case after filing an initial opposition to the petition for
registration. Be that as it may, in the absence of any gross or patent error committed by the court a quo in the appreciation of the
evidence submitted, We can only uphold its judgment.
"WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision supported by law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto with costs
against the appellants.
"SO ORDERED (p. 62, Rollo).
The aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated on appeal to this Court thru a Petition for Review on Certiorari by
appellants Pablo Enolpe, et al. in G.R. No. 67692, entitled "Pablo Enolpe, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.." In a
Resolution dated June 27, 1984, in said case, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The decision became final and
executory as per entry of judgment dated September 14, 1984.
On July 31, 1985, the court a quo granted the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Guivelondo heirs, and ordered the
Provincial Sheriff of Cebu on October 23, 1985 to proceed with the writ of possession.
In the meantime, other oppositors to the registration case in the trial court filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 72568, entitled, "Monena Almendras, et al. v. Judge Ramon AM. Torres, etc., et al." This
Court required the respondent Guivelondo heirs, who were among the awardees of the land in the trial court, to file their
comment on the petition. On January 22, 1986, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit in view of the previous denial of
a similar petition in G.R. No. 67692.
On May 8, 1986, the trial court ordered the Land Registration Commission to issue the decrees of registration and the certificates
of title to private respondents. It appears, however, that such documents have not yet been issued to private respondents at
present.
On July 1, 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General was furnished by the Branch Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, copies of the decisions in the registration case N-633 dated October 29, 1973 and July 10, 1975.
On July 16, 1986, the Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. This was opposed by private respondents and
the Guivelondo heirs, who were among the adjudicatees in the registration case.
On September 16, 1986, the respondent judge issued an Order denying the government's appeal, the dispositive portion of
which states:
"WHEREFORE, finding that the decisions of the court sought to be appealed from have long become final and executory, and in
fact, have already been executed, and, therefore, are no longer subject to any appeal, the court hereby declares that the Notice
of Appeal filed by the Solicitor General cannot and should not be given due course. Accordingly, the same is hereby ordered
disregarded and stricken out from the records.
"SO ORDERED" (pp. 35-36, Rollo).
From these orders, the Solicitor General moved to reconsider. On January 20, 1987, respondent judge denied the said motion
for reconsideration.
On February 5, 1987, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed, assailing respondent judge's Orders dated September
16, 1986 and January 20, 1987. On February 18, 1987, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
respondent judge from executing the said decisions and/or from taking further proceedings thereon.
The only issue in this case is whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal of
the government.
The government thru the Solicitor General alleges that its appeal on July 16, 1986 was filed on time, which is within the
prescribed period of fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the copies of the decisions; and that insofar as the government is

concerned, the decisions have not yet become final and executory. The petition also argues that the property in question is
public land and therefore, substantial justice requires that such appeal be allowed.
The foregoing contentions of the petitioner are impressed with merit.
Section 39 of BP Blg. 129 provides:
"Sec. 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed from; x x x.
(Emphasis ours)
There is no question that it was only on July 1, 1986 or more than ten (10) years from the date of judgments that the Solicitor
General became cognizant of the decisions of the lower court when it was furnished by the Branch Clerk of Court copies of the
two decisions dated October 29, 1973 and July 10, 1975. This fact was not denied nor refuted by respondents herein. Thus,
when the Solicitor General filed its notice of appeal on July 16, 1986, the appeal was perfected well within the fifteen (15)-day
mandatory period to file an appeal.
Moreover, Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules of Court provides that in "case where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall
be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party." As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the
court does not lose jurisdiction over the case (Associated Bank v. Gonong, G.R. No. 77353, July 30, 1987, 152 SCRA 478).
The respondents contend that appeal is no longer possible as the judgments appealed from, having been rendered more than
ten (10) years ago, are already final and executory.
It has been held that a judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of
judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected (Munez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-46010, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 197). If ever there was an entry of judgment in this case dated September
14, 1984, this had the effect of finally disposing and putting an end to the controversy with regard to the private respondents
herein as among themselves and not insofar as the government's interest on the land is concerned. As to it, the judgments have
not yet attained finality because its appeal was perfected on time, before the lapse of the period within which to appeal.
It is also worthy to note at this point that the adjudication of the land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and
the one year within which it may be revised has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another
party (Afalla v. Rosauro, G.R. No. L-42315, Sept. 19, 1934, 60 Phil. 622; Capio v. Capio G.R. No. L-5761, December 21, 1953,
94 Phil 113; emphasis ours).
The argument of respondents that the appeal should not be allowed because the judgments granting the registration have
already been executed thru the writ of possession and the order for the issuance of the title, has no legal basis. In the case of
Republic v. Mendoza, GR. No. L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539, We ordered the land registration court to give due
course to the appeal of the government notwithstanding the fact that a decree of registration was already issued by the Land
Registration Commission and a Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds. Such circumstances were not
considered to be a bar to the government's right to appeal.
In his order denying the appeal, the respondent judge pointed out that an order of general default which was issued in the initial
hearing of the registration case, barred all other persons including the government from pursuing their claims.
The rule is established that in land registration cases, the appellant must show that his rights or interests have been prejudiced
by the decision appealed from; and that he challenged the application for registration, or participated in the proceedings before
his appeal may be properly entertained (Cabanas v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-4205, March 16, 1908, 10 Phil. 393). This has
been complied with in this case.

Records disclose, and this is admitted by respondent judge in his order, that there was a written opposition from the government
thru the Solicitor General and the Director of Lands (p. 33, Rollo). Although this was received by the trial court one month after
the order of general default was entered, there was no evidence showing when the opposition by the government was filed. In
the absence of such evidence, it is presumed that the opposition was filed on time and was not covered by the order of general
default. It is clear that the government has challenged the application for registration since the very start of the proceedings.
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the opposition was not filed on time, nevertheless, an oppositor is still allowed to present
evidence to prove ownership of the disputed land despite the declaration of general default against him provided that a decision
has not been rendered or that a decree of registration has not been issued in this case. (Lee v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 50236,
August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 567; emphasis ours).
Furthermore, the private respondents also argue in their Comment that the Provincial Fiscal which represents the Office of the
Solicitor General in land registration cases, had official notice of the decisions as early as May 28, 1985 when the Asst.
Provincial Fiscal filed a "Manifestation/Omnibus Motion" in court whereby she admitted the existence of said decisions; and that
this fact should now bar the Solicitor General from filing a late appeal.
We disagree. Section 1 (e) of PD 478, defining the powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General provides:
"Section 1. Functions and Organizations. x x x.
e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. Institute actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution."
In one case, it was held that, strictly speaking, the city fiscal did not directly represent the Government. He was merely a
surrogate of the Solicitor General whose office, "as the law office of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines", is the
entity that is empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings" (Republic v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539; Republic v. Polo, G.R. No. L-49247, March 13, 1979, 89 SCRA 33).
Thus, the request of the Solicitor General for the fiscal to represent the former and to appeal did not make the fiscal counsel of
the Republic. We have held in many cases that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal (now 15 days) should be reckoned
from the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the decision or order and not from the time the special counsel or
fiscal was served with the decision. These representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide whether an appeal
should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor General (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077,
February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156; Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539; Republic v. dela
Cruz, G.R. No. L-35718, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 409).
Lastly, the admission of petitioner government's appeal is more in keeping with the ends of substantial justice. To dismiss the
Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the appeal. The Solicitor
General alleges the existence of indubitable evidence of official records showing that the property subject of the registration is
public land, which was covered by decree 4666 previously issued in favor of the government on October 4, 1910. To ignore the
importance of this alleged document would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71285, November 5, 1987,
155 SCRA 412).
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed orders of the respondent judge dated September 16,
1986 and January 20, 1987 disallowing the petitioner's appeal is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed
to certify the appeal and transmit the records to the appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

269 Phil. 74
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 60413, October 31, 1990 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, JUDGE, BR. I, CFI, NUEVA VIZCAYA,
HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, AND PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM
PRODUCTS, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo
rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise
agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot
No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land
was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of
Republic Act No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including
the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.[1] In due course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against
the whole world except the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and
among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the
Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm
Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and
ceded 1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by
the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also
mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title
and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of
March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The
Solicitor General contends that 1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration;

2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise
agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise
accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial
measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot
7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the
land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be publc land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that the Estadistica de Propiedades of
Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be
confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the
land involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine,[2] all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. [3] Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must
be held to be part of the public domain.[4] The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim;
he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. [5]
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their applicant, was a photocopy of a certification of the National
Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's Estadistica de
Propiedades of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as
private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the
Estadistica de Propiedades, cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish
regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. [6] It is an inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of
private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private
which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration Act,
Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant
is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties.
But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over

the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had
presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to
ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
The assent of the Directors of Land and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage
Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the
Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later
reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot
be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of possession.[7]
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the
Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our
holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are
not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." [8]
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and
void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the
private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No.
N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein,
receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

439 Phil. 149

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 107764, October 04, 2002 ]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C.
TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G.
TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES AND FIDELITO ECO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THRU THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, RESPONDENTS,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ AND
CALOMA MOISES, RESPONDENTS/INTERVERNORS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition[1] seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, [2] dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which
declared null and void the Decision[3] dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC
No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land
with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay
San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application
was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner
Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants. [4] Subsequently, more applicants joined
(collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity).[5]
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the land registration court issued an
order of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious
and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as
early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings,
petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-ininterest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and
continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22 March 1902
(Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had the property resurveyed in his
name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).

3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
during World War II. He owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax purposes, the latest of
which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958
(Exhibit H). During the ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the
previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name
under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax
Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985
(Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ
TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS,
MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE
MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of
Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares
to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed
of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9). [6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For
failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case submitted for
decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991
for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due
notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient
evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title
of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property
applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose
Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names of the previous owners and
the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing
trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied for
by them.

On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential
Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 private rights is proof of acquisition through
(sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights means that applicant should show clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx
(underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the
Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of
the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21,
1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K). [7]
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated
January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February
18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree
in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had
already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration courts decision dated January
30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section
9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable
and disposable making it subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry
Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is
inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the
DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the
preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was
whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain. [8]
The Court of Appeals Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated
January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution
(Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for
registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part
of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in
Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land
Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents
readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collados application that said parcel of land known as Psu162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8,
Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents which are
binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They
should have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has
jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and
not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to
be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more
reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the
same into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs.
Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio
vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time
(Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339). [9]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;

III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
INTERVENORS PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated July 26, 1904 [10] established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described
as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim over the
Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to
private rights. They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, if
any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-ininterest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva
before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.[11] The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias [12] which laid the foundation that all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [13] Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.[14]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law
partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated
in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the
state.[15]
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of
the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through
the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term

public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. [16]
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.[17]
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1,
1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. [18] The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. [19] PD 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978, [20] amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the
owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. [21] Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,[22] explained thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of
the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of
state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was
seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of
land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII[23] of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV [24] on the National Economy and the Patrimony of
the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII [25] on National Economy and
Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being
thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes. [26]
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[27] the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed
areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(CARL for brevity).[28] The Court defined watershed as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also recognized that:
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water
which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the
Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to
prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays
proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation
practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On
the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On
the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs.
Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less
even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly
and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth
disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the
Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the
irreversible damage finally happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine
the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed reservations
which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment.
Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations.
Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of
land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of
CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he

has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have
been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion
con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.[29] Or, that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894.
This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985.
[30]
As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the
following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by
law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.[31]
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon
continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required
period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the
amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed
or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had
only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number
of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the
Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners
application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation,
the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court declared that inalienable public lands x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove

possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State.
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals[33] is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted
that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable.
The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to
the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government;
it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to
the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973,
more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve
for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a
title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared
the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his]
occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this
premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the
30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula
the private rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of
private rights to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law
requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The
rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants
and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the
Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he
issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of
3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered alienable and
disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED
IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law,
I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33
dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed

Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein
and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions
of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with
the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community Development,
which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30 E,
8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50
m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to
point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point
9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24;
thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27;
thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780)
Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain)
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan being N
74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00
m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to
point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point
12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15;
thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18;
thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand
two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637
revised the area and location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No.
1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage. [34]
Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637

AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE
AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT
SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established the
townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area
and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land
is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the
Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal,
Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-2930 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by
the Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is
the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is
hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier
classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. [35]
Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [36]
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of
Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification
reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City

MAR 18 1986

VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square
meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C.
Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the
Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated March
18, 1986.

Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd)

LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section

The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the
reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report [37] dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro
G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states:
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court
respectfully reports that:
1.

A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the case at bar.

2.

After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described as
Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC
Record No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia,
et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6,
1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x

WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the
recommendation that the application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied).
Likewise, in a letter[38] dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is within
the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
x x x
That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not
subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A
is recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral
part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant] application is the
technical description[39] of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of
Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially
released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We
hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the
instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR
upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April
25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change
even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904.
Petitioners case falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then
DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is
supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners.
The following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [40]

Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment

should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed
long after the decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land registration court
rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991. [41]
Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129[42] only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover,
petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued its
order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over
the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision
was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the principle of res
judicata. They insist that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also argue
that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated
in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the
petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area
classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court
never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[43] as follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts
of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be
attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the
Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court
rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or
asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res
judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and which are
not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR
under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.

According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of
land which their forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then
President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned
area from the MWR for development under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the
DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED
THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33,
which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein situated in
Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
beginning at point 1 on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation,
shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region
IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the
barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors.
The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under
its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. [45] The DENR awarded
contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the
Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted. [46]
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in
Intervention before the land registration court to assert their rights and to protect their interests.

However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land registration court had already rendered a
decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the decision on
August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before the land registration court. According
to intervenors, the land registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals
on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its
petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of
Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[47] provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides.
However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals[48]
reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when
the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had
already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari
to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the
period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and
object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are
always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means
to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue.
Neither was the validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into
considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot
in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if
only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least five lives due
to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It
also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict
application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the
Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Vitug and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

453 Phil. 189

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 150413, July 01, 2003 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ALEXANDRA LAO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment [2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application
for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770,
consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land
from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessor's open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the
ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondent's purchase of the property from
Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for registration.
Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale [3] dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and
Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent
as well as her predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in
1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in
the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel
was declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land involved in this case is
not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well
as technical description and other documents presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any
forest zone or public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interest's possession to hers, applicant appears to be in
continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years. [4]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing
an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to
NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. [6]
Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors:

THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.[7]
A.

RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS OF
POSSESSION.[8]

B.

THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF

THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.[9]

C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT

AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[10]
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence
mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an
owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application
was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073,
provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the required period of
possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law became effective on April 15, 1990. However,
petitioner maintains that the required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions
amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from
June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Public Estates
Authority v. Court of Appeals,[11] we held that:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic
Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty
(30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the
provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[12] thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which

provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." As amended
Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
According to petitioner, respondent's witnesses did not state the exact period when respondent's predecessors-in-interest started
occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping statements to the effect that respondent had been in possession of the
property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively determined whether respondent and her predecessors-ininterest have truly been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore, respondent failed to show how
the property was transferred from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial
settlement of property was established. Consequently, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina
and her predecessors-in-interest.
There is merit in the petition.
Candido Amoroso, respondent's first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it was owned by a
certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent submitted the tax declarations in
the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained to the
year 1948 only, three years short of the required period. Respondent's other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had
known about the property since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On
cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his information on Edilberto's ownership of the land on the fact that the
latter used to greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did not know with
certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of the property. [13]
Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer of the land from
Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the relationship between
these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma.
Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa and her
predecessors-in-interest. At most, respondent's possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria
claimed possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land commenced on June 12,
1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, [14] all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. [15] All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. [17] To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. [18]
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,[19] it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public
domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land as
alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical
descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These documents are not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that the land is open for disposition because no
opposition to her application was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. She claims that in the absence of any
proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private ownership.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the property involved is
agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered is indeed alienable or
disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain.
[20]
Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,[21] we held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts
totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State cannot be estopped by
the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. [22]
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from the government. [23] It cannot be presumed; but must be
established by convincing proof.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

451 Phil. 368

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 149679, May 30, 2003 ]
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, NAMELY: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO, INES E. MIOZA, SOLEDAD E.
CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC AND AMELITA E. BASUBAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC, NAMELY:
BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO, AS HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO; BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA,
FLORAME AND FE, ALL SURNAMED ERMAC, AS HEIRS OF CLIMACO ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO
DIONSON, VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO BUSTILLO AND LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL CASTILLO, *
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest
title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 16, 2001 Decision [2]
and the August 6, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59564. The dispositive part of the Decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed [D]ecision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City is hereby AFFIRMED."[5]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:
"In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part of Lot No.
666, (plan II-5121 Amd.2) situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac. Upon the
latter's death, the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely, Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings
Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered. Esteban, however, was unable
to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son, Clemente. Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own
name, and did not include his father's brother and sister, nor his cousins. Despite having registered the lot in his name,
Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to the time of
his death. Among the occupants of Lot No. 666 are the [respondents] in this case. [Respondents]-heirs of Vicente Ermac claim
ownership over the portions of Lot No. 666 now occupied by them by right of succession as direct descendants of the original
owner, Claudio Ermac. [Respondents] Luisa Del Castillo and Estaneslao Dionson allegedly derived their title by purchase from
the children of Claudio Ermac. [Respondent] Vicente Dionson, on the other hand, bought his land from the heirs of Pedro
Ermac, while [Respondents] Emigdio Bustillo and Liza Parajele derived their ownership from the Heirs of Balbina Ermac-Dabon.
[respondents'] ownership and possession had been peaceful and undisturbed, until recently when the [petitioners]-heirs of
Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment against them. The filing of the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the
[respondents'] ownership over their respective parcels of land, prompting them to file this action for quieting of title.
"[Petitioners], on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the [respondents], and claimed that the [respondents] have no
cause of action against them. It is essentially claimed that it was Clemente Ermac and not his grandfather Claudio Ermac who is
the original claimant of dominion over Lot No. 666. During his lifetime, Clemente Ermac was in actual, peaceful, adverse and
continuous possession in the concept of an owner of the entire Lot No. 666. With the help of his children, he cultivated the said
lot, and planted corn, peanuts, cassava and fruit products. Clemente also effected the registration of the subject lot in his name.
Upon Clemente's death, [petitioners] inherited Lot No. 666, and they constructed their residential houses thereon. [Petitioners]

claim that [respondents'] recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. 666 was only tolerated by Clemente Ermac and the
[petitioners]. [Petitioners] in fact had never surrendered ownership or possession of the property to the [respondents].
[Petitioners] also set up the defense of prescription and laches.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"After trial, the lower [court] rendered its [D]ecision, finding that the original owner of the lot in question was Claudio Ermac, and
therefore, the property was inherited upon his death by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. All the heirs of Claudio Ermac,
therefore, should share in the ownership over Lot No. 666, by right of succession. The ruling [was] supported by the admissions
of Irene[a] Seno, witness for the [petitioners] and daughter of Clemente Ermac, establishing facts which show that [petitioners]
and their predecessor Clemente did not own the entire property, but that the other heirs of Claudio Ermac are entitled to twothirds (2/3) of the lot. Since the entire lot is now registered in the name of Clemente Ermac, the shares belonging to the other
heirs of Claudio Ermac, some of which have already been purchased by some of the [respondents], are being held in trust by the
[petitioners] in favor of their actual occupants."[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the factual finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [7] should not be disturbed on appeal. The latter found that
Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children Esteban, Balbina and
Pedro. It ruled that respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they as well as their predecessorsin-interests had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
According to the appellate court, "[t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of title which apparently bear out
that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs'
claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose
title by succession were effectively disregarded."[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues
In their Memorandum,[10] petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"I. The validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 5, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
28, directing the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, to cease and desist from conducting further proceedings in
Civil Case No. 2401[;]
"II. Whether or not O.C.T. No. RO-752 issued in the names of [Spouses] Clemente Ermac [and] Anunciacion Suyco is
indefeasible and incontrovertible under the Torrens System[;]
"III. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in the
names of petitioner's predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco[;]
"[IV]. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666[.]" [11]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Preliminary Injunction
Petitioners assail the validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC to restrain the ejectment proceedings they
had filed earlier.

This question is not only late, but also moot. If petitioners truly believed that the issuance of the Writ was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, they should have challenged it by a special civil action for certiorari within the reglementary period. Any
ruling by the Court at this point would be moot and academic, as the resolution of the issue would not involve the merits of the
case, which this appeal as it is now touches upon.
Second Issue:
Indefeasibility and Incontrovertibility of Title
Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of title issued in favor
of their predecessor-in-interest, Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance. Hence, it
can no longer be challengedence, it can no longer be challenged.
We clarify. While it is true that Section 32[12] of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a
year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy [13] in law.[14] The acceptability of the Torrens System would be
impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. [15]
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. [16] A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein. [17] Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.[18]
Third Issue:
Ownership of the Disputed Lot
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on tax
declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.
We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed
upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court's findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.[19]
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong
evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. [20] Considering that respondents
have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty
tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.
Fourth Issue:
Prescription and Laches
Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57
years to bring the present action. We disagree.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the
defrauded party.[21] Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the
registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since
respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet
title thereto, does not prescribe.[22]
Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. [23] It cannot be used to defeat
justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.[24] Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what

has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., on leave.

239 Phil. 475

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987 ]
FORTUNATO BOLLOZOS, ANDREA BOLLOZOS VDA. DE RAPANOT, PABLO B. CALAM, EPIFANIA B. BEVERA, SERGIO B.
CALAM, GUALBERTO B. CALAM, IGNACIO B. CALAM, JOSE B. CALAM, JR. AND CAROLINA B. CALAM, PLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES, VS. YU TIENG SU, ALIAS SISO YU, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The original protagonists in this controversy have long since passed away into "the tongueless silence of the dreamless dust"
and are now but mute witnesses to this litigation. We can now go only by the musty records that will take us back to more than
half a century ago, before the period of the Commonwealth.
This case was formally commenced on January 20, 1968, with the filing of a complaint for the recovery of a 1.2 hectare parcel of
land and accounting for its use from defendant Yu, the herein appellant. The plaintiffs claimed that the said land had been
delivered to him only for administration so he could apply the produce thereof to the indebtedness of Paulino Bollozos, their
predecessor?in-interest. It was alleged that Yu had refused to return the land despite demand and to make the required
accounting although the debt had long been paid. [1]
In his answer, the defendant averred that he had acquired ownership of the land in question by virtue of two documents executed
in his favor by Paulino Bollozos, to wit, a deed of sale with right of repurchase dated September 1, 1934, and a deed of absolute
sale dated September 21, 1936. He therefore had no obligation to return it. Additionally, Yu claimed that the suit was barred by
prescription, the complaint having been filed only after all of 26 years. [2]
Issues having been joined, the parties later entered into a stipulation of facts before the trial court, reading in full as follows:
1.That both parties hereby agree on the identity of the parcel of land in litigation as described in paragraph II of the amended
complaint, which parcel of land is covered by OCT No. 5033 in the name of Paulino Bollozos;
2.
That plaintiffs Fortunato Bollozos and Andrea Bollozos are the only surviving children of the late Paulino Bollozos while
the rest of the above-named plaintiffs are the grandchildren of said Paulino Bollozos;
3.
That sometime on September 1, 1934, the late Paulino Bollozos executed a document entitled 'Escritura de Compra y
Venta Con Pacto de Retro,' the original of which is hereto attached as Annex A to form part hereof and another document was
executed by the late Paulino Bollozos entitled 'A Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale' dated September 21, 1936, the
original copy of which is hereto attached to form an integral part of this complete stipulation of facts;
4.
That the parties agree to submit the entitled case for decision on the basis of the following issue or issues:
"(a) Whether a valid conveyance of ownership was made of the parcel of land in litigation on September 1, 1934 as appearing in
Annex A, entitled 'Escritura de Compra y Venta Con Pacto de Retro,' or on September 21, 1936 as appearing in Annex B,
entitled A Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale of the parcel of land in litigation, and for the Honorable Court to determine
the legality or nullity of the above-mentioned documents." [3]
On the basis of this agreement and of the memoranda filed subsequently by the parties, the lower court, * without receiving further
evidence, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. [4] It held, first, that the deed of sale with pacto de retro executed on
September 1, 1934, was in reality an equitable mortgage and did not transfer ownership of the land to the defendant; and
second, that the subsequent sale executed in 1936 was null and void ab initio because by that time the transfer of agricultural

[1]
[2]
[3]
*
[4]

lands to aliens was already prohibited by the Commonwealth Constitution, which became effective on November 15, 1935. Yu
was a Chinese national.
The above rulings are the subject of this appeal, ** which we find meritorious. We shall reverse.
It is important to note at the outset that there is nothing in the record to show that the disputed property had merely been
entrusted to Yu for administration in connection with Paulino Bollozos' indebtedness to him, as claimed by the plaintiff. Neither is
there any evidence of such indebtedness. This allegation, which was the very basis of the complaint, was not among those
admitted in the stipulation of facts and indeed had been categorically denied in the answer. It thus remained a bare averment
without any actual or presumptive support.
It should also be noted that, by contrast, the defendant, to substantiate his answer, produced the two above-cited documents
Annexes "A" and "B", which clearly indicate the intention of the parties regarding the ownership and disposition of the land in
question. These documents are the best and, as it happens, the only evidence adduced of such intention.
Annex "A" reads as follows:
"ESCRITURA DE COMPRA Y VENTA CON PACTO DE RETRO
"Nosotros, PAULINO BOLLOZOS, de 71 anos de edad y FAUSTINA LILOC, de 58 anos de edad, marido y mujer
respectivamente, filipinos y vecinos y residentes del barrio de Bonbon, Municipio de Catarman, Provincia de Misamis Oriental,
Islas Filipinas, por la presente hacemos constar que consideracion a la suma de SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS PESOS
(P636.00), en moneda filipina que nos ha pagado y hemos recibido a nuestra entera satisfaccion del SR. YU TIENG SU, de 34
anos de edad, chino, casado de la SRA. SIA PUTE, de 29 anos de edad, china y residente de este Municipio de Catarman,
Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas, VENDEMOS, CEDEMOS ENTREGAMOS y TRASPASAMOS al referido SR. YU
TIENG SU, sus herederos y causahabientes una parcela de terreno con todas sus mejoras existentes situada en el distrito de
Quilambon, barrio de Bonbon, Municipio de Catarman, Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas bajo el numero del Lote
Cadastral de este Municipio Catarman, Misamis Oriental, Caso No. 9m y cuya descripcion tecnica es como sigue: ?
(Technical Description)
"Hacemos constar tambien que queda pacto y convenido con el referrido SR. YU TIENG SUR; que si nosotros devolvieramos o
mandamos devolver dentro del termino de SIETE (7) ANOS contados desde esta fecha la suma de SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y
SEIS PESOS (P636.00) en moneda filipina, y le abonaremos ademas los gastos que ocasione el presente contrato, nos
otorgaran el comprador o sus representantes escritura de retroventa; pero si transcurre dicho plazo sin haberse utilizado el
derecho de redencion, adquirira la presente el caracter de absolutamente consumada, y entretanto solo podra el comprador
disponer la finca con las limitaciones presritas en la Ley Hipotecaria.
"En testimiento de rado lo cual firmamos la presente en este Municipio de Catarman, Provincia de Misamis Oriental hoy 1, o-de
Septiembre, 1934, A.D.
"(Sgd.) PAULINO BOLLOZOS y
"(Sgd.) FAUSTINA LILOC
"Firmada en presencia de:
"(Sgd.) JOSE LIM PATUNGAN y
"(Sgd.) EUFROSINO LIMBACO"
The second instrument, Annex "B", declared the following:
"DEFINITE AND ABSOLUTE PURCHASE AND SALE
"That I, PAULINO BOLLOZOS, 72 years of age, filipino, married to Faustina Liloc, 60 years of age, and resident of the barrio of
Bonbon, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Oriental Misamis, P.I. do hereby declare and say: "1st. That I am the lawful owner of one parcel of land together with all existing improvements thereon, located in the sitio of
Kilambon, barrio of Bonbon, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Oriental Misamis, P.I., particularly described as follows:
(Technical Description)

**

"2nd. That the said parcel of land together with all existing improvements thereon is registered in my name in the Office of the
Register of deeds of the Province of Oriental Misamis, as evidenced by the ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE number FIVE
THOUSAND THIRTY THREE (5033).
"3rd. That the said parcel of land, together with all existing improvements thereon was sold by me to Mr. YU TIENG SU, married
Sia Pute on September 1, 1934 for the sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY SIX (P636.00) under the instrument of purchase with
right or repurchase (Compra venta con pacto de retro) and said document is ratified before Notary Public Mr. Eufrosino Limbaco,
of Mambajao, Misamis Oriental, on the 1st day of September 1934, Not. Reg. No. 149-Page No. 97-Book No. 8-Series of 1934.
"4th. That by these presents I do hereby declare and say that I will forever renounce and repudiate my rights and privileges to
repurchase the said parcel of land together with all its existing improvements thereon and for and in consideration of an
additional sum of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P295.00), Philippine Currency to me in hand paid and the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged by Mr. YU TIENG SU, 36 years of age, Chinese, married to Sia Pute, 31 years of age, Chinese
and resident of this Municipality of Catarman, Misamis Oriental, P.I., by these presents I do hereby sell, transfer and forever
convey a deliver unto said Mr. YU TIENG SU, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns that parcel of land together with all
its existing improvements thereon, particularly described above (Lot No. 473). Original Certificate of Title number Five Thousand
Thirty-three.
"5th. Lastly, I do hereby declare and say that I will forever warrant and defend unto said Mr. YU TIENG SU, his heirs, executors,
administrator and assigns all lawful claims of all persons whomsoever of his right of ownership of the said parcel of land together
with its existing improvements thereon described above.
"IN WITNESSETH WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name in this Municipality of Catarman, Province of Misamis Oriental,
P.I., on this 21st day of September 1936.
"(Sgd.) PAULINO BOLLOZOS
"Signed in the presence of:
"(Sgd.) JOSE LIM PATUNGAN and
"(Sgd.) JOSE L. RIVERA"
It is clear from the first document that Paulino Bollozos actually sold the land in question to Yu for the sum of P636.00, subject
only to the former's right to repurchase it within a period of seven years. There is nothing in this instrument suggesting a different
arrangement such as that alleged by the plaintiffs-appellees in their complaint, nor have they submitted any evidence in proof of
such arrangement.
The intention clearly embodied in Annex "A" was affirmed in the second transaction between the same parties as reduced to
writing in Annex "B", denominated as "A Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale." Concluded two years later, it specifically
referred to the first sale made in 1934 by virtue of which, as Paulino Bollozos declared, the land in question and its improvements
were "sold by me to Mr. Yu Tieng Su" for the agreed consideration of P636.00. He further stated in Annex "B" that "by these
presents I do hereby declare and say that I will forever renounce and repudiate my right and privilege to repurchase" the said
property as reserved by him in the first instrument. For such renunciation, Bollozos acknowledged receipt of an additional sum of
P295.00, thus increasing the total purchase price of the land to P931.00.
The Court holds that the first transaction was a valid sale with right of repurchase and effectively transferred ownership of the
land in dispute to the defendant-appellant. All the elements of a valid contract were present, and in any case the plaintiffsappellees themselves have stipulated on its authenticity. As it was concluded in 1934, the prohibition against the acquisition of
agricultural lands by aliens was not yet applicable, having become effective only from November 15, 1935, under the
Commonwealth Constitution. Moreover, the title acquired by Yu was recognized in the said Constitution as a vested right that
could no longer be disturbed under the new provisions of that charter reserving ownership of such lands to Filipino citizens. [5]
The plaintiffs-appellees err in suggesting that the first transaction, being conditional, did not effectively transfer the ownership of
the land to the vendee. It did, certainly, subject only to the right of the vendor to redeem it within the period specified. As we said
in an earlier case:
"In the deed of pacto de retro sale executed by Ignacio Reyes in favor of Lim Kiam on May 30, 1932, covering Lot 9203, the
period of repurchase was not fixed. The Court of Appeals correctly held that in accordance with Article 1508 of the old Civil Code

[5]

the right could be exercised within four years from the date of execution of the conveyance in this case up to May 30, 1936.
The fact, however, that on this date the Constitution was already in force did not affect the right acquired by Lim Kiam. We have
held in a number of cases decided under the provisions of the old Civil Code that the nature of a sale with the right of repurchase
is such that the ownership over the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon execution of the contract, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the vendor exercise his right of repurchase within the period agreed upon. Manalansan v. Manalang, L13646, July 26, 1960; Almiranez v. Devera, L-19496, February 27, 1965; Rosario v. Rosario, L-13018, December 29, 1960." [6]
"A sale with pacto de retro transfers the legal title to the vendee and this, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, carries
with it the right of possession. In the case of Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil. 342), this court, in discussing
the nature of sale with pacto de retro, said: 'x x x It is our opinion, however, that the insertion of a stipulation for repurchase by
the vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create any right inconsistent with the right of ownership in the purchaser.
Such a stipulation is in the nature of an option, and the possible exercise of it rests upon contingency.' x x x."[7]
To be sure, Paulino Bollozos could have repurchased the property within seven years pursuant to the first contract. However, he
did not choose to do so and in fact "renounced and repudiated" this right two years later in the second contract. It is noted that
this contract also purported to convey the same property to Yu but this was merely an affirmation or reiteration of the parties
intention in the first transaction. It was not really necessary to repeat the sale because the first contract had already been
perfected and consummated. Indeed, the sale could not have been made for the first time then for it would have been illegal
under the provisions of the new Constitution that had come into force in 1935. Actually, the real purpose of the second contract
was to manifest Paulino Bollozos' waiver of his right to repurchase, for which he received the additional sum of P295.00.
The plaintiffs-appellees make such of the admitted fact that the disputed property is still in the name of Paulino Bollozos as so
too are the tax declarations. This circumstance, it is argued, proves that ownership of the land was retained by Bollozos and
later transferred to his heirs, besides being an indication as well that the first contract was really only an equitable mortgage and
not a deed of sale. The contention is that as long as the land had not yet been registered in the name of the defendantappellant, title hereto remained with Bollozos.
This is not correct. The first deed of sale took effect on September 1, 1934, and legally transferred ownership of the land subject
thereof from the vendor to Yu on the said date. Failure to register the sale did not vitiate it or render it unenforceable. As we
have held in several cases, an unrecorded deed of sale is binding between the parties and their privies because actual notice is
equivalent to registration. The real purpose of registration being to give notice to third persons, deed of sale that has not been
registered does not lose its efficacy insofar as the parties thereto and their heirs are concerned. [8]
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Thus:
"Registrationdoes not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large."[9]
And with particular reference to problems such as the one at bar, we have ruled that:
"Title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition, dates back to the time
of their purchase, not later. Any other ruling would be illegal and unjust, and would operate to dispossess alien owners who had
acquired their lands in good faith before the prohibition was established, but either failed wholly to register them or registered
them only after the Constitution was adopted."[10]
As for the finding of the trial court that the deed of sale with the right of repurchase was an equitable mortgage, we hold it has no
basis in fact and law. All that is invoked in its support is that the land continued to be registered, and all the tax declarations
thereon were made, in the name of Paulino Bollozos. That may well be, but that circumstance would not change the nature of
the contract concluded in 1934. At best, it may demonstrate neglect on the part of the vendee, who had a right to transfer the

[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]

registration in his name, but that would not signify that Paulino Bollozos retained or recovered ownership of the land he had
already sold.
The defendant-appellant cites Article 1602 of the Civil Code and argues that none of the indications mentioned therein of an
equitable mortgage are present in this case. While we are inclined to agree, it should be noted that the said article is not
applicable because it was not embodied in the old Civil Code which was in force in 1934. This is an innovation in the present
Code. In any event, it is worth stressing that one of the indicia mentioned in the said article is that the vendor remains in
possession of the property in question, which is not the situation here. The complaint, in fact, asks for recovery of possession of
the land from defendant Yu.
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in disregarding the sale with right of repurchase concluded on September 1, 1934, and
in considering it an equitable mortgage. The second contract executed on September 21, 1936, could not have validly conveyed
the land in question to defendant Yu, who was an alien, as this was already prohibited by the Commonwealth Constitution.
Nevertheless, it was effective in affirming the earlier contract of September 1, 1934, and, more importantly, in making it absolute
with the renunciation by the vendor of his right to repurchase the property. Accordingly, Yu should be recognized as the lawful
owner of the land in dispute, acquired by him by virtue of a legitimate contract of sale with pacto de retro which became absolute
when the vendor waived his right of repurchase.
The fact that the defendant in this case was an alien cannot be taken against him for he was not disqualified from acquiring the
land in question when the sale was concluded in 1934. It should not deter us from ruling in his favor now.
This Court dispenses equal justice to the citizen and the alien and judges them on the merits of their cause and not the color of
their skin. Having admitted him into our territory, the State is committed to the recognition of all the rights of the stranger in our
midst save only where they unduly clash with the higher interests of our own nation. There is no such collision here. On the
contrary, we see here an opportunity to prove, as we do now, that respect for the foreign guest is ingrained in the law of the land
and in the nature of our people.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. The complaint and the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 66-C are
DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur

390 Phil. 1041

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 130174, July 14, 2000 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TABANGAO REALTY, INC., REPRESENTED
BY RODOLFO PEREZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal[1] via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
07, Batangas City decreeing the registration under the Property Registration Decree, P. D. No. 1529, of three (3) parcels of land
situated in Tabangao, Batangas City in favor of respondent corporation. [3]
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Registration of Title over three parcels of land, more
particularly described as follows:
"Lot 9895 - Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas;
"Lot 10155 - Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas;
"Lot 10171 - Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of
Batangas.
"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous
owners as evidenced by the corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual
possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession
and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the
whole world and in the concept of an owner.
"The applicant further alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is partly erected on the subject lots
which improvements are owned by it (applicant). It also claims that the subject lots are not subject of any lien or encumbrance;
that no adverse interests exist with respect to the subject lots; and that there are no military or forest reservation or any pending
litigation affecting said subject lots.
"Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant in the alternative applied for the benefits under CA
No. 141 as amended and thus alleged that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years. It also declared that the lots are not tenanted nor
subject of an agricultural leasehold relationship.
"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Incorporation, the tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print
copies of said plan, technical descriptions of the lots, Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax Declarations for the three lots
and Tax Clearances.
"On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial Court for the applicant's failure to comply with
the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22, 1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority. On June 2,
1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to set the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by the
Regional Trial Court on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994.
"At the hearing, only the Assistant City Prosecutor appeared to oppose the application on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Counsel for the applicant thereupon presented all the necessary evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.
Thereafter, upon motion of the application, the Regional Trial Court issued an order of special default against the whole world
with the exception of the government. The court also issued an order designating and authorizing Mr. Rodolfo G. Serrano, Legal

Researcher of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, to receive evidence.

"At the reception of evidence, the applicant presented Romeo Geron, the Consultant and Project Controller of applicant
Tabangao Realty, Inc. Geron testified that he is a resident of Tabangao and was a member of the Task Force responsible for
negotiating with the numerous landowners and the subsequent acquisition by sale of the properties of Tabangao Realty, Inc. in
Tabangao and Libjo, Batangas. He testified that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange,
lease and hold for investment or otherwise, real estate of all kinds.
"He also testified that Lot 9895 was acquired by the applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in its favor by the previous owners; the spouses Santiago and Cristina Dimaano (Exh. "L"); that Lot 10155 was
acquired by applicant-corporation by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on April 25, 1980 in its favor by the former owner Mr.
Perpetuo Almario married to Felisa Magpantay who owned the lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-1"); and that Lot 10171 was purchased by
applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 from Anita Clear de Jesus who had been the owner of said lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-2").
"The witness presented the tax declarations for the three parcels of land and tax receipts showing full payment of all taxes due.
(Exh. "P, P-1, P-2" and "Q") He testified that there is no pending litigation involving the subject properties or any adverse claims
filed against the applicants; that they are free from any liens or encumbrances; that there are no tenants or agricultural leasehold
contracts involving the subject properties; and that there are no mineral deposits in said lots.
"Geron also testified that the properties are presently under Lease Contract with Shell Gas Philippines for 25 years from 1981 up
to 2006 as evidenced by a Lease Contract executed on May 18, 1991 (Exh. "M").
"The applicants also presented Crecencio Marasigan. He is an employee at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas
since June 1971. He testified that he has been a resident of Barangay Malitan, Batangas City even before 1937 up to the present
and that he knew the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and the areas surrounding the lots subject of the application. He mentioned
that he was the Chairman of the Task Force that was responsible for the negotiations that were done with the previous owners of
the subject lots, and was therefore personally aware of the specific dealing regarding the lots subject of the application. He said
that he knew the previous owners since he started residing in Batangas; and that their possessions had been open, public,
peaceful, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners.
"Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the ownership, possession and the status of the lots
subject of the application.
"In opposition, the City Prosecutor of Batangas offered the testimonies of Rodolfo Fernandez of the Bureau of Lands and Loida
Maglinao of the Bureau of Forest Development.
"Rodolfo Fernandez testified that the three parcels of land subject of the application are not covered by any kind of public land
application or patent; that they are not within the reservation area nor within the forest zone; that they are not reserved for any
government purposes; and that the entire areas are within the Alienable and Disposable Zone as Classified under Project No. 13,
Map No. 718 and certified on March 26, 1928. Fernandez presented the Investigation Report made by the Bureau of Lands
dated April 24, 1991 (Exh. "1" to "1-b").
"Loida Maglinao testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain and no
forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest Development.
"On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on March 31, 1995 granting the
application for registration. It held:
"From the credible testimony and documentary evidence adduced establishing applicant-corporation that the latter and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possessions of the parcels
of land applied for up to the present, for the requisite period of time, under bona fide claim of ownership, and considering, that no
evidence has been presented by the government in support of its Opposition, and even presented the favorable testimonies of

Mr. Rodolfo Fernandez, of the Bureau of Lands and Miss Loida Y. Maglinao, of the Bureau of Forest Development, both CENRO,
Batangas City Branch, Batangas City, supported by their respective official Reports, the Court is convinced that the applicantcorporation Tabangao Realty Incorporated had sufficiently established its rights to the grant of title over the three (3) parcels of
land subject of this case."
In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. [4]
On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the appealed decision. [5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over three (3) parcels of land situated in
Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration of title over the three (3) parcels of
land applied for. The ruling is erroneous.
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, [7] for the
standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by
purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest.[8]
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on
possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. [9] Such being the
case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 [10] is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The
land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the
subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by resjudicata.[11] As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire
one under the Torrens System of registration."[12]
Nonetheless, applicant anchors its application for registration of title on the provisions of P. D. No. 1529 or in the alternative Com.
Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation and registration of title. [13]
However, the evidence is inconclusive that applicant and its predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land in question, en concepto de dueo, or a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application, [14] or since June 12, 1945,[15] or earlier,[16] or since time
immemorial.[17]
Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of possession by itself and its predecessors
in interest for at least thirty (30) years before the filing of the application.
Witness Romeo Geron, a consultant of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. testified that in the year 1945, he knew that the land
designated as Lot 9895, with an area of 4,596 square meters was owned by Santiago Dimaano, who sold the lot to applicant
corporation on March 31, 1980 and that the parcel of land designated as Lot 10155 with an area of 4,031 square meters was
owned by Perpetuo Almario way back in 1945, and that he possessed the lot up to the time he sold the same to applicant
corporation on April 25, 1980 because he was in charge of negotiation with the numerous landowners for acquisition of their
property by Tabangao Realty, Inc.[18] However, in 1945, witness Geron was only seven (7) years old, and obviously could not
competently testify on the ownership and possession of the subject land.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest. [19] "The
applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession." [20] "Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts
of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property." [21]
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the
property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. [22] In other
words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence.
Consequently, the lower court gravely erred in granting the application.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the application for registration of title filed by
applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

336 Phil. 154

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 123361, March 03, 1997 ]
TEOFILO CACHO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL
STEEL CORPORATION AND THE CITY OF ILIGAN, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land situated in what was then Lanao, Moro
Province. Both parcels were within the limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on
December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914])
the trial court made the following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel
Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his favor, executed and signed by a Moro woman named
Alanga, who acted for her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet
and before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented, renouncing all his rights in
the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered that the applicant present the corresponding deed from
Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more
than 90 acres. This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the
balance by his own possession and cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of
thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court
doubts very much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all
the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the
limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to
have been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the
costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for
reconstitution of two original certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO Record No. 6908
and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of
Iligan.

Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the
petition because it found the evidence inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The same order
stated further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and
6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court specifically found that since the
decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent
upon some conditions, must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner
elevated the matter to this Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved
to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of
decrees under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA
315 (1968), and the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard
as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their
opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the amended petition subject to the private respondents
being given the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already on record shall be allowed to stand
but opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the parties.
(p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for re-issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition, respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC
raised the defenses that the petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real party in interest; that
petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees
covering the properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and
irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its decision decreeing the reconstitution and reissuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959 were issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909,
respectively, and that the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had already become final. Oppositors never
disputed the cited pronouncements and therefore these should now be considered final and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA),
through its then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the
Chief of Registration, all certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No.
18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits "C", "D",
"E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this
Court, confirmed that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for reconstitution have been regularly and
properly done based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued and recorded in LRC's Record Book
of Decrees; that the plan and technical description of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by the LRC and
transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and 63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees
Nos. 10364 and 18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A. Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and
validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition, (Exh. "M"), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had
recorded the fact and date of issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of
the plans and corresponding technical descriptions of the lots involved in the aforesaid record numbers and decrees (Exh. "T").

It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel, Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of
Ordinary Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing that Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in
Case No. 6908 and Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs. "T", "P" and "19").
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the existence of the decrees have been established sufficiently and
indubitably by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore, said amended petition has to be granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration
Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in
the name of Demetria Cacho upon payment by the petitioner of the required legal fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their joint brief assigned the following errors:
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended petition for reconstitution of decrees of registration
purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Notwithstanding that
I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;
II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final
decision in LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been reserved pending compliance by the applicant
therein of certain conditions albeit, as of Date, No competent evidence exists showing compliance
with the imposed conditions and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the issuance of decrees
pursuant thereto;
III.The petition is barred by laches; and
IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a party who does not have a lawful interest
in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
1.

In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for reconstitution of titles when the same is
already barred by laches.

2.

In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no proof that Teofilo Cacho
actually exists and is a real party in interest.

3.

In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence of sufficient proof to the
effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969 were indeed issued to Demetria
Cacho.

4.

In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April 1979 dismissing the original
petition for reconstitution of title.

5.

In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by appellant City of Iligan pursuant
to Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October 1965) which ownership was affirmed by
the Supreme Court on 26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al., 158
SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)

The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and brushed aside respondents' claim of jurisdictional
infirmities. It also acknowledged the issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No.
6908 and GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively, according to the Record Book of Decrees for
Ordinary Land Registration Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now
Justice of the Supreme Court), submitted a Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at the lower
court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are
decreed properties, and that all the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were regularly done based on existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of
Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with prejudice, for the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing
in 28 Phil. 617, regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted in part the application for adjudication
and registration of the two parcels of land of Demetria Cacho, appellee's predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on the cases
was reserved pending compliance with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, "x x x before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from
Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil.
629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two
parcels and contains 37.87 hectares . . . (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria
Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of
the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said
case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular
inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with previous notice to the
applicant and her husband and representative Seor Vidal. Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did not assist in the
ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land
found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is ordered that the new survey be
made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting
Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho in Case No. 6909 are the same
as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares, and as to the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court
decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned"; that applicant
Demetria Cacho is owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog; and that her
application as to all the rest of the land solicited in case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if it was made, must
have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made
in the absence of the "new survey" on which to base the area and technical description of the parcel of land in Case No. 6909.

Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the
title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such
property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that appellee would not assert the right on which he bases his
suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to them in the event that relief is accorded to the appellee or
that the suit is not held barred; and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property covered by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification belong to the
state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public
lands, under the principle that all "lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the King), or in his name, or by the
kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he is a real party interest. To qualify a person to be a real
party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to
be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals
decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9,
1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of compliance with conditions for their issuance. These conditions are
conclusively presumed to have been complied with before the original decrees were issued and can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA
1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this Honorable Court when it applied laches despite the total
absence of proof to establish the requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian doctrine" to dispense with proof of the essential
elements of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to uphold the stability and integrity of the Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the identity and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to
be swayed by wild and gratuitous allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the
case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all
persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of
the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually
contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. With
the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration

Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member of this
Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of
Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise
beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to
once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the
decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]).
Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S.
would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a
prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission
(now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not
have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the
corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on
May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10,
1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the
Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment
and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of
proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens
System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a
decree. The reason therefor may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases
can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated in Vda. De Barroga vs.
Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real party in interest, records show that petitioner
has sufficiently established his existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner
under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of adjudication of
the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul
Stephen V. David of the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this case.

The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and
proof is required to assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary and
respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in the case of the Special
Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of
the administering oath being of itself a performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional
Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and
6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.