1

11. G.R. Nos. 147578-85

January 28, 2008

ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA, petitioner,

vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, respondents
Facts:
Rolando L. Balderama, and Rolando D. Nagal, were employed with the Land
Transportation Commission (LTO)assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law
Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent in both cases, operates a taxi
business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.
Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on
a "contract" basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints.
the team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned by respondent. The team
impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon
inspection and testing by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary
to the report of the team, the meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not
defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was released to respondent.
respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended,2 against herein petitioners as well as
Lubrica and de Jesus. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO
officers had been collecting "protection money" from him
Issue:
whether the guilt of the accused, now petitioners, in these cases has been proved by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains
the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received
directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift,
present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or
any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official
duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a
public officer.4
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly
established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as "protection money"
from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecutions evidence, all that the
accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses.
To hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the
following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:

(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3)
that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. 5 The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and
Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi
unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.6
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

petition.

The

challenged

Decision

of

the

12. MERENCILLO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:
The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 in Criminal
Case No. 9482 read:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being then a public official connected with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal
gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles
Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in
exchange for the release of the certification of her payment of the capital
gains tax for the land purchased by the Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from
one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a transaction wherein the aforesaid
accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said
Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed but upon prior
consultation with the military authorities particularly the elements of the
702nd Criminal Investigation Command [CIC] who set up the accused for
a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of
receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked
one hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in
particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to
be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019. [7]
On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483 charged:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995 in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused being then a public official connected with the performance
of official duty as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain,
demand, extort and agree to perform an act constituting a crime, an act
which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, that is that
the certification for payment of the capital gains tax relative to the land
purchased by the Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine
Corpus Enerio be released by him only upon payment of an additional
under the table transaction in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, which Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola
Cesar reluctantly agreed, but upon prior consultation with the military
authorities particularly the elements of the 702 nd Criminal [Investigation]
Command (CIC) who set up the accused for a possible entrapment
resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope
supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred pesos
bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, an act performed by the
accused in his official capacity as Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR,
to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in
particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be
proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines.[8]
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PLACED UNDER DOUBLE JEOPARY
WHEN A CRIME OF DIRECT BRIBERY AND SEC OF RA 3019 WERE FILED
AGAINST HIM
RULING: NO.
Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following [acts] shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under
the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. [27] There is
no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of
Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.

The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.[28] The test is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.[29] An offense charged necessarily includes that which is
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.[30]
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished
under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA
3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two
offenses.
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between
the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage
or benefit;
(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other
person;
(4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or
transaction with the government and
(5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in
connection with a contract or transaction has the right to intervene. [31]

On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present
by himself or through another;
(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by
the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do and
(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties. [32]

Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor

necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the
essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated
in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage
or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a
promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the
ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene
under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope:
(a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does
not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is
his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction,
the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy
attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged.
[33]
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a second
prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. [34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the
Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO AND ISRAEL B. HARON
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN,

Facts:
Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria of the Commission on Audit (COA) constituted a team of
auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the
Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORG-ARMM). State
Auditors Heidi L. Mendoza (Team Leader) and Jaime Roxas (Member) were directed to
conduct the said audit under the supervision of Jaime P. Naranjo (State Auditor V). The
expanded audit was thus conducted on the financial transactions and operations of
ORG-ARMM for the period July 1992 to March 1993.
As stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) Report, it was found that illegal withdrawals
were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks
payable to the order of petitioner Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II) without the
required disbursement vouchers.
Chairman Banaria demanded from petitioner Haron to produce and restitute to the
ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full amount ofP21,045,570.64 and submit
his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours together with the official receipt issued by
the ARMM Regional Treasurer in acknowledgment of such restitution.
Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed in the
Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds against the following
ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao (Regional Governor), Israel B.
Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao (Executive Secretary) and Pandical M.
Santiago (Cashier). They were charged with violation of Article 217 of theRevised Penal
Code, as amended, under the following informations with identical allegations except for
the varying date, number and amount of the check involved in each case.
the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A.
Candao. Petitioners however assert that their convictions were based solely on the
Sandiganbayans conclusion that the vouchers submitted by the defense were illegal or
irregular, whereas the informations simply alleged their absence or non-existence. They
contend that said court could not have validly assessed the disbursement vouchers as
to their legality because that duty pertains to the COA which refused and failed to
examine the same. Had the court allowed the COA to evaluate and make a ruling on the
validity of the vouchers, the result would have been different and most probably they
would have been acquitted of the crime charged.
Issue:
WON the SB erred in convicting the accused for the crime of malversation of public
funds.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.

The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases:

1.
That the offender is a public officer;
2.
That he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
3.
That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and
4.
That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.[23]
All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this
case. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that with the Disbursing
Officers (Haron) failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the
subject checks when demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said
funds for their personal benefit.
The Sandiganbayan categorically ruled that the disbursement vouchers were inexistent
at the time of the issuance of the subject checks and expanded special audit based on
its findings that: (1) petitioner Haron could not produce the vouchers upon demand by
the COA in August 1993; (2) Resident Auditor Gagwis certified at about the same time
that to date she has not received the vouchers mentioned in the supposed transmittal
letters of March 4 and March 30, 1993; (3) the entries in the duly certified Report of
Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO) of the late Pandical M.
Santiago, Cashier of ORG-ARMM, showed that for the months of January, February
and March 1993, there were indeed entries of checks issued with Haron as payee
but no disbursement voucher numbers as these were either lacking, detached or
missing, and which were verified by the audit team as corresponding to the subject 52
checks issued and signed by petitioners and encashed by petitioner Haron who
received the money withdrawn from the government depositary accounts; (4) FBMS
Chief Corpus testified that he discovered the supposed vouchers still there at his office
filing cabinet in May 1993 when these supposedly have already been submitted to the
COA Resident Auditor as reflected in the March 4 and March 30, 1993 transmittal
letters; and (5) the supposed original disbursement vouchers belatedly submitted to the
COA central office last week of October 1993, were undated and unnumbered with no
supporting documents as required by COA Circular No. 78-79 (April 5, 1978).
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in holding that the testimonial
and documentary evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima
facie evidence of misappropriation arising from Harons failure to give a satisfactory
explanation for the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM funds under his custody and
control. Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire
amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time thereafter.
14. ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN [369 SCRA 394 (2001)]
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law

that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged
vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, these terms are: combination,
series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.
Issues:
1.
WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of
law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is
vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however
bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of
his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
2.
WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes
of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the

accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
chargedthe element of the offense.
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission
that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is
two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime,
such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder
We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d).
Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of
a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define
or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in
furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
3.
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention that the statute
eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is
void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the
deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal
act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be
shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code
to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an
element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se
must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in
1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an

10

animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished
are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter
that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as
the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
G.R. No. 171359 July 18, 2012
BENJAMIN A. UMIPIG, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
National Maritime Polytechnic (NMP) is an attached agency of the Department of Labor
and Employment tasked to provide necessary training to seafarers in order to qualify
them for employment.
Sometime in 1995, NMP undertook an expansion program. Thus, NMP dispatched a
team to look for a site in Cavite, and a suitable location consisting of two parcels of land
was found at Sta. Cruz de Malabon.
Petitioner Palomo, then NMP Executive Director, presented for approval to the NMP
Board of Trustees the two parcels of land they identified. the Board approved the
proposal in principle and authorized Palomo "to start negotiations for the acquisition of
the site in Cavite and if necessary to pay the earnest money.
Palomo,in a handwritten memorandum to petitioners Umipig, Fontanilla and Mabitad
requested them to "cause the release of the sum of (P500,000) x x x [as] EARNEST
MONEY for the purchase/acquisition of [a] 5-hectare lot for NMP extension to Luzonin
favor of MR. GLEN[N] SOLIS, holder of authority documents of the lot owners.
Disbursement Voucher was prepared for P3,303,600 with Solis as payee. Of said
amount, P1,303,600 was for the full payment of the lots under the first purchase while
the remaining P2,000,000 was partial payment of the balance for Lots 1731 and
1732.25 Fontanilla-Payabyab stamped the words "FUND AVAILABILITY" and signed the
voucher. Umipig signed Box A. Mabitad signed Box B, while Palomo signed Box C as
approving officer. On even date, NMP issued DBP Check No. 0001752005 26 in the
amount of P3,303,600 payable to Solis. The signatories to the check were Umipig 27 and
Palomo.28

11

The total payments made for the "second purchase" covering Lots 1731 and 1732
was P8,910,260.00, which is the subject of the present controversy. After receiving
these payments, Solis disappeared and never showed up again at the NMP
.
As no reply was received from Solis,Palomo sought the assistance of the Office of the
Solicitor General(OSG) and informed the latter of the inability to locate Solis. petitioners
were charged with violation of Section 3(e),R.A. No. 3019 by the Sandigandabayan.
Issue:
Whether or not all of the accused conspired and violated Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as
amended.47
Ruling:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act,
The essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A.No. 3019, as amended, are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.56
The Court finds it no longer necessary to discuss at length the first element as it is not
disputed, having been stipulated by the parties during pre-trial that during the material
time and date alleged in the Information, Palomo was the Executive Director, Umipig
was the Administrative Officer, Mabitad was Chief Accountant and Fontanilla-Payabyab
was the Budget Officer of NMP.The third element of undue injury to the Government is
likewise a non-issue since it was likewise stipulated during pre-trial that after payments
totaling P8,910,260 were made to Solis for the subject lots, the latter disappeared and
the SPAs he showed to NMP were found to be fake. Clearly, this is a quantifiable loss
for the Government since NMP was not able to acquire title over the subject lots. Thus,
the controversy lies in the second element of the crime charged.
Palomo acted with evident bad faithand gross inexcusable negligence;Umipig
and Mabitad were grosslynegligent in the performance of their duties
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross
inexcusable negligence." There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious,
or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. 57
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive or ill will.58 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or
for ulterior purposes.59

12

"Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even

the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected.60 These three modes are distinct and different
from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes would suffice. 61
We sustain the Sandiganbayans finding of evident bad faith on the part of Palomo who
had no authority to effect substantial payments -- P8,910,260.00 out of the total
consideration of P11,517,100.00 -- for the lots to be purchased by NMP.
Palomo requested for the release of down payment in the amount of P6,910,260.00
notwithstanding that no contract of sale had yet been consummated, as only a contract
to sell was executed by the supposed attorney-in-fact of the vendors, Solis. This clearly
indicates that the parties agreed to execute the contract of sale only after the full
payment of the purchase price by the buyer and the corresponding submission by the
seller of the documents necessary for the transfer of registration of the lots sold. We
have held that where the vendor promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the
completion by the vendee of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to
sell. Such stipulation shows that the vendor reserved title to the subject property until
full payment of the purchase price.64
There being no perfected contract of sale, Palomo had no authority to effect substantial
payments for the second purchase. That partial payments on the first purchase was
similarly made upon a mere contract to sell, is of no moment; it must be noted that such
contract to sell (first purchase) eventually ripened into a consummated sale and titles
over Lots 1730-C and 1730-D have been actually transferred in the name of NMP. The
second purchase transaction, however, was not consummated despite the unauthorized
down payment of P6,910,260.00. Even worse, funds were disbursed to pay for the
balance despite non-receipt of the specified transfer documents.
Palomos bad faith was evident not only in the disbursement of substantial payment
upon a mere contract to sell -- whereas the NMP Board granted him express authority
only to start negotiations and pay earnest money if needed -- but also in the
disbursement of P1,000,000.00 partial balance despite non-submission by Solis of the
specified transfer documents.
In this case, the evidence on record clearly supports the finding of conspiracy among
petitioners Umipig, Mabitad and Palomo who all authorized the payments on the second
purchase in utter disregard of the requirement in Section 449 of the GAAM, and with
gross negligence in failing to ascertain the authority of Solis to sell the same.
As to Fontanilla-Payabyab, her signature appears on the questioned vouchers above
her name which was stamped on the vouchers together with the statement "FUND
AVAILABILITY," and not in Boxes A, B or C. Such signature, however, neither validates
nor invalidates the vouchers and this was not disputed by Mabitad who testified that
Fontanilla-Payabyabs signature as budget officer on the disbursement vouchers is not
considered part of standard operating procedure.
Although Fontanilla-Payabyab was the Head of Finance with Mabitad as one of her
subordinates, the prosecution failed to establish that her responsibilities include

13

reviewing her subordinates certifications in disbursement vouchers.As FontanillaPayabyabs signature on the voucher was a mere superfluity, it is unnecessary for this
Court to make a determination of negligence on her part. Her purpose in doing so,i.e., to
monitor the budget allocated and utilized/disbursed, is likewise immaterial considering
that her act of signing the voucher did not directly cause the damage or injury.
Consequently, there is no basis to hold her liable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Wherefore, The conviction of petitioners Benjamin A. Umipig, Margie C. Mabitad and
Renato B. Palomo under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 is UPHELD while the conviction
of petitioner Carmencita Fontanilla-Payabyab is REVERSED as she is hereby
ACQUITTED of the said charge.
16.
PEOPLE VS ABAYA
FACTS:
That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
[appellant] by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her
breast and whole body, lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her
vagina, thus succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will
and consent thereafter threatening to kill her should she report the
incident, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal growth and
development, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].
CONTRARY TO LAW
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR SIMPLE RAPE AND NOT
STATUTORY RAPE
RULING:
THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR SIMPLE RAPE. Under Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610[12] in relation to RA 8353,[13] if the victim of sexual abuse [14] is below 12 years
of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code [15] and penalized with reclusion
perpetua.[16] On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse[17] under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article
266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender

14

cannot be accused of both crimes[18] for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a
single criminal act.[19] Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section
5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), [20] a
felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.[21]

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was
committed against her. The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years
old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for
violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d])
of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of
both crimes, the prosecutions evidence only established that appellant sexually violated
the person of AAA through force and intimidation [22] by threatening her with a bladed
instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
[23]

Indeed, the records are replete with evidence establishing that appellant forced
AAA to engage in sexual intercourse with him on December 25, 1999. Appellant is
therefore found guilty of rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
17. GEORGE BONGALON
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
Facts:
The case began as a simple altercation between the daughter of accused George
Bongalon, Mary Rose Ann, and the son of private complainant Rolando Dela Cruz,
Jayson, both minor children.
During a religious procession in Legazpi City, Mary Rose Ann threw stones at Jayson
and called him sissy as he and his brother passed by the front of the Bongalon

15

residence. In the belief however that it was his daughter who was being harmed, the
accused confronted Jayson and struck him on the back and slapped him on the face.
Outraged by the acts committed against his son, Jaysons father filed a criminal
complaint against Bongalon and the latter was eventually tried and convicted for the
crime of child abuse, which carried a minimum penalty of six years imprisonment. The
Court, on appeal, modified the conviction to Slight Physical Injuries.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that
he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect
her two minor daughters
Ruling:
the Supreme Court held that not every instance of laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. The Court explained that a
person can only be punished for child abuse when the laying of hands on the minor is
shown, beyond reasonable doubt, to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being. Otherwise, such
acts are punishable only as an offense under the Revised Penal Code.
the harm inflicted by Bongalon on the person of Jayson did not amount to child abuse.
When Bongalon struck and slapped Jayson, the accused did not do so with the intention
to debase the childs intrinsic worth and dignity or to humiliate or embarrass him.
Rather, said the Court, the accused did so at the spur of the moment and in anger which
only indicated his being overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of
his own minor daughter.
In deciding this case, the Court referred to the legal definition of child abuse, which
means the maltreatment of the child, whether habitual or not, including any of the
following: (1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) unreasonable
deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to
immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
The Court reduced the penalty of imprisonment to ten days and ordered the accused to
pay moral damages of P5,000 to Jayson.
18. ANG VS CA
FACTS:
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,

16

unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish
Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.
ISSUE:
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone
message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting
anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262
RULING:
YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or
acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and
these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxxx

17

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following
acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered
a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a
very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of
acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to
protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications
that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her
substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged
obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was
not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself
(Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not
clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent,
except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not
know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later,

18

however, she said that she did not have time to delete them. 11 And, if she thought that
she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to
keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she
knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything
connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on
Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene
and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread
open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a
revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography
trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What
makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat
to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
19. PEOPLE VS MONTANIR
FACTS:
Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch 171),
with the following allegations:
Criminal Case No. 123-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA REYES against her will and detained
her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a period of two days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 124-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then a private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL MENDOZA against his will and detained
him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the
death of the victim resulted.

19

CONTRARY TO LAW.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
OF KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE
RULING: YES.
Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is conceded that
the said accused was nowhere in the actual scene of the incident, this
Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of
the conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by
furnishing the vehicle used in abducting the victims and the house where
they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that evidence to be
believed must come from the mouth of a credible witness which accused
Chua is not. Indeed, this Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation of
accused Chua that he knew nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is simply too
good to be true that he allowed Mangelin and accused Montanir to stay at
his house to guard it and attend to his store while his caretakers were
having a vacation. Neither could this Court find cogent reason why
accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle and house
totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of accused Uy. Nor is it
credible that accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle just
to follow up his loan application and then after the same had been
released he (accused Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria,
Bulacan or to Ciudad Grande, instead, he went straight to the residence of
accused Uy, waited for him until the wee hours of the morning of the
following day, 18 February 1998, only to tell accused Uy he was going
home.
It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the
money he borrowed, he would spend it in going to Davao with his
daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous plan whatsoever and
suspiciously, upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that
one of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of the kidnapping.
Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with the testimonies of
Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally indicate accused Chua's
complicity with the criminal design of accused Uy and dissolves the said
accused's plea of innocence.[40]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.

20

[41]

Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular

purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.[42] Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily
and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged
with intending the result.[43] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they
intended to commit.[44]
Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that conspiracy existed in the
perpetration of the crime. Thus, all of the appellants, having been proven that they each
took part in the accomplishment of the original design, are all equally liable for the crime
of Kidnapping with Homicide.
20. PEOPLE VS CASTRO
FACTS:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses Dante Castro, Oscar Castro, Rito
Castro, Joel Castro, George Castro alias Jong, Caridad Menor y Castro alias Caring,
and Genisia Garcia y Castro alias Jining of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22, 1991, in the Municipality of Amulung, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Dante Castro,
Oscar Castro, Rito Castro, Joel Castro, Caring and Genesia Garcia y Castro alias
Jining, armed with long handled bolos (tabas), spear and gun, conspiring together and
helping one another with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, stab, hack and shoot one, Alfonso Sosia, inflicting upon him several
injuries on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PERPETRATORS CONSPIRED IN KILLING THE VICTIM
RULING:
YES. The trial court found that conspiracy was attendant in the incident. To
establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to

21

commit a crime. It is sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant
to the same objective.
As aptly observed by the trial court:
There is proof that the Castros are very closely knit family. They live in the same
barangay and their houses are almost adjacent to each other. Although it may be true
that only Escobar and Oscar Castro are wrangling or quarelling over Lot 30, and this
involves also Alfonso Sosia due to his closeness to Escobar, with the latter intending to
transfer the possession of Lot 30 to Alfonso Socia, nevertheless, the oft-repeated
saying: that blood is thicker than water applies. In the tagalog adage: Ang sakit ng
kalingkingan ay sakit ng buong katawan, equally applies. Simply stated, the problem of
Oscar Castro is the problem of the whole Castro Clan. [8]
In conclusion, the court below declared:
Was there conspiracy in the killing of Alfonso Socia? Art. 8, par. 2 of the Penal Code,
defines conspiracy, as when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient
that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. (PP. vs
San Luis, 86 Phil. 485; PP. vs. Timbol, GR No. 47473; PP. vs. Tian, 77 Phil. 1090). In
the following cases there was implied conspiracy where four brothers attacked a victim
(PP. vs Khaw Dy, 109 Phil. 649). Where five defendants converged upon the scene of
the crime at the same time (PP. vs. Licuana, 88 Phil. 789) where the five defendants
were closely related to one another and had a common grievance to redress.
In the case at bar, brothers, nephews and sons converged in one place attacked,
stabbed, hacked and shot Alfonso Socia are clear evidence of implied conspiracy.[9]