SECOND DIVISION

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 169144

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL
OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 26, 2011
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by
a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will
and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C.

Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of
Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition
for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas
(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in
the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added
that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not
qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were
on separate occasions in thePhilippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April,
13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in
the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: [2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last
will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters
of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA),[3]arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in thePhilippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the
RTC,[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which
refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin
came to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in thePhilippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners
abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it
can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal
formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only
allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to
probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of
a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law
of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.[6]
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the
province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so
far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the
person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it.Jurisdictional facts refer to the
fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province.[7]The rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-

authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is

different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate
of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local
court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided
its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not
have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving
them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the
proper court.[8]
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial
ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas
will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator
of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the
will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance
with the formalities required of wills by the laws ofCalifornia. This explains the
trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas
will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of
California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as
Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twentyfive (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church,
in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he
visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was
living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child
was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2,
1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all
other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended;
(2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial
proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute
Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to
separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and
Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of
San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated
in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and
issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.

Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
[13]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.
Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
[15]

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares,
all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,
Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both
of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my

Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of
my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should
served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in
the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my
wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal
properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this
Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the
testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22] for letters
of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she
was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during
their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia
and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.[23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial
court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper
Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted
to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore
the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of
letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share
from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo
having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner
and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory
heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining
free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration
issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall
at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her,
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the
same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to

render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this
court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could
not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente
are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared
Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third
(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming
with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she
and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of
merit.

Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case
to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the
fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated
in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and
in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the
State of which the decedent was a resident. [39] Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one
half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine
law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity.Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the
will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left
the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the
parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18,
RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings
No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A.
The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York,
with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing
to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his
death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife,
he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his
will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her,
and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will
and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me,
and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York.
On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan,
and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of
the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that

she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple
consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by
Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of
special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond.
The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special
administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the
Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the
amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The
trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said
company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the
proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in
savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total
amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the
heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan
Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan
Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's
motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate
case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of
the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the
motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that
the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F.

Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and
"no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the
solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this
jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code";
(3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband
predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees,
legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a
will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983.
However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings
and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special
administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan.
The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and
surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in
the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby
misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the
spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process
in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise
not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation
and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special
administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified
power of attorney, authorized his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan,
Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate
in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and
void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside;
and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the
estate of the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an
inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.

In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of
her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan
collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not
entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only
in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the
rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the
allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2
of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the
same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this
country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his
brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully
disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for
himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer
(Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner
and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle
and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall
fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case
of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for
failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of
the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the
agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New
York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are
payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanans executor to be then distributed pursuant to
EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming
that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted
that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors,

devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that
the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special
administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels
and monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4)
that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision
of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized
disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231).
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to
attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New
York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a
manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the
Surrogates Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of
November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate
of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by
her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and
academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of
New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling
whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the
absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the
foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that
there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the
Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each
and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of
New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of
petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival
in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day.

Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the
discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would
conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that
"(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was
terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The
same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn
over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all
intents and purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the
final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later,
petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30,
1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15
days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the
wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion
and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad,
filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey,
U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the
counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the
wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate
the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and
admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all
procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate"
(Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of
August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.

On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner
proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed,
genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and
proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and
circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to
probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents
did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills
(Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence
on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent
Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove
the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional
evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence,
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no
compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to
"file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records,
p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for
reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law
obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the
opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on
the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate
of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and
established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed
out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for
probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).

On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order
of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She
pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain
basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in
their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy
determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time
and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her
compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the
counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her
supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate
wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be
undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at
the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York
on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need
not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn
and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and
"G");

(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan
is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of
record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the
Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of
Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore
stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which
were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and
Exh. "G-3" "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two
wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the
Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters
testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge
Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued
and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3"
and
"I-10");

(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings
were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly
executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were
admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and
personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the
genuineness and authenticity of each others signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and
proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 1316).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November
29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will
only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of
the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York
laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will
in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of
a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries

on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500
[1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in
the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56
SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request
respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393
[1978]).
There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on
allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted
to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that
the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the
delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155
SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed
separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and
pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical

considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times,
it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving
no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187
SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the
will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that
is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the
"known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and
to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of
Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the
notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall
allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the
joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three

illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid
for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of
stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the
project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal

portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings,
the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine
of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January
31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result
in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on
the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their

arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is
not correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions
of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.

It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10
now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.