MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION/EXEMPTION
JOSE REYES y VACIO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 177106-06
AUGUST 4, 2010
BERSAMIN J
REFERENCE: RPC ART 13
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances;
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of
the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
1. FACTS
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of agricultural
land located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan. On March 19, 1975, Belens son, Carlos de Guia
(Carlos), forged a deed of sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold the land to him.
On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). On the same date, Ricardo
registered the deed of sale in the Registry of of Bulacan. Subsequently, Ricardo mortgaged the land
to Simeon Yangco (Simeon).
Upon learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed on December 20, 1975 an adverse claim in
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. She also filed in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baliwag,
Bulacan a civil action for cancellation of sale, reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo
and Simeon.
The CFI dismissed Belens complaint and affirming the validity of the deeds of sale between Belen
and Carlos and between Carlos and Ricardo. Belen filed a motion for reconsideration but her motion
was denied.
Belen appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) but the IAC dismissed Belens appeal due
to non-payment of docket fees. The dismissal became final and entry of judgment was issued on
June 21, 1983. The records were remanded to the CFI.
Thereafter, the tenants of the land, namely, Paulino Sacdalan, Leonardo Sacdalan, Santiago
Sacdalan, Numeriano Bautista and Romeo Garcia (tenants), invoked their right to redeem pursuant
to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. Acting thereon, Ricardo executed a deed of
reconveyance in favor of the tenants on October 24, 1983. The land was subdivided into several
lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the tenants.
In the meanwhile, Belen discovered for the first time through a letter-inquiry to the IAC Clerk of
Court that her appeal had been dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. She thus filed in the IAC
a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted her motion.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered:
(1) declaring as null and void and without any effect whatsoever the deed of sale executed by and
between appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de Guia, Exhibit A;
(2) declaring defendant-appellant Ricardo San Juan as a purchaser in bad faith and ordering him to
reconvey to appellant the two (2) parcels of land described in the complaint;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 in the name of
defendant-appellee Ricardo San Juan as well as TCT No. 210108 in the name of defendant-appellee
Carlos de Guia for being null and void and to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name of appellant as
the true and valid title over the lands described therein; and

(4) ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Belen filed in the RTC a motion for execution vis--vis the decision of IAC. The RTC granted her
motion. However, when the writ of execution was about to be executed, Belen learned that Ricardo
had sold the land to the tenants through a deed of reconveyance. Thus, Belen filed in the RTC a
motion to declare Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for circumventing the final and
executory judgment OF IAC.
RTC held Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court and ordered each of them to pay a fine of
P200.00. It directed Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen and to deliver to her the
share in the harvest.
Ricardo and the tenants appealed the RTC order to the Court of Appeals (CA). Belen, through her
daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the
tenants.(Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela vs. Paulino
Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan)
CA rendered its decision affirming the RTC order with modification. It ruled that the RTC correctly
ordered Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen, but held that the RTC erred in
finding Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court. This decision became final and executory.
The petitioner, as Provincial Adjudicator, rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88
dismissing Belens complaint for ejectment and collection of rents and affirming the respective TCTs
of the tenants, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the instant case wanting of merit, the same is
hereby dismissed. Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of titles Nos. T-307845, T-307846, T307856, T-307857, T-307869, T-307870, T-307871, T-307873 and T-307874 issued in the name of
Numeriano Bautista, Romeo Garcia, Leonardo Sacdalan, Paulino Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan
respectively are hereby AFFIRMED. The plaintiff and all other persons acting in their behalf are
hereby ordered to permanently cease and desist from committing any acts tending to oust or eject
the defendants or their heirs or assigns from the landholding in question.
SO ORDERED.
Belen filed a notice of appeal in the DARAB. But the petitioner granted the tenants motion for
execution. Aggrieved, Belen, through Melba, filed an urgent motion to set aside the writ of
execution but her motion was denied.
The DARAB Central Office affirmed the petitioners ruling.
After her motion for reconsideration was denied, Belen lodged an appeal to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No.
39315).
In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB Central Office, and ordered
the tenants: (a) to vacate the land; (b) to deliver its possession to Belen; and (c) to pay to Belen the
rents on the land corresponding to the period from 1981 until they would have vacated.
The tenants filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion.
Thus, the tenants appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 128967), which affirmed the CAs decision in CAG.R. SP No. 39315.
2.HOW ELEVATED TO SC

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging the
petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.
After trial,Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, finding the petitioner guilty of both
charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019), an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from six years and one month, as
minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office; and
(b) in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised
Penal Code), imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
3. ISSUES
a) Whether the petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in
DARAB CASE NO. 034 BUL88; and
b) Whether the petitioner was guilty of usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code.
4. SC DECISION
The petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in
rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, but his conviction for usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code is reversed and set aside.
A.Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, established herein
RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike that
constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead thereto.[26] The law enumerates the punishable
acts or omissions and provides their corresponding penalties.
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged and found guilty, relevantly provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx
The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
1.

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;

2.
He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The first element was established. The petitioner was a public officer when he rendered his decision
in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, being then a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the
duty of adjudicating the conflicting claims of parties.
The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the IAC decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 prior to his
promulgation of the decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. Indeed, he actually admitted having
read and examined the following documents (adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his rendition of
the decision.
Yet, the petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88 that completely
contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 0288. He thereby exhibited manifest
partiality, for such decision of his was a total and willful disregard of the final decision in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883. His granting the tenants motion for execution made his partiality towards the tenants
and bias against Belen that much more apparent.
Correctly did the Sandiganbayan find that the petitioner had displayed manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.
Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and to incur other expenses in order to
protect and prosecute her interest in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. In all, her expenses were in the
substantial sum of P990,000.00.[43] Moreover, the petitioners stubborn refusal to recognize and
obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 forced a further but needless prejudicial delay in the
prompt termination of the cases. The delay proved very costly to Belen, for, in that length of time
(that is, from March 16, 1993 up to the present), Belen has been unduly deprived of her exclusive
ownership and undisturbed possession of the land, and the fruits thereof. The injury and prejudice
surely equated to undue injury for Belen.
Likewise, the petitioners ruling in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88 gave unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference to the tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of the land and to
enjoy the fruits.
B. Usurpation of judicial functions
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:
xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the government who shall assume
judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within
his jurisdiction.
In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act the
authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.[44] However, the petitioners task as
Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88 was to adjudicate
the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasi-judicial function, closely akin to
the function of a judge of a court of law. He could not be held liable under Article 241 of the Revised
Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were
lacking herein.
C. Penalties
The Sandiganbayan appreciated the mitigating circumstance of old age in favor of the petitioner by
virtue of his being already over 70 years old.
The Sandiganbayan thereby erred. The mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. The petitioner, being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses
charged, was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance.

Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment for
not less than six years and one month nor more than 15 years, and perpetual disqualification from
public office. Pursuant to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by
a special law, the accused is punished with an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which does
not exceed the maximum fixed by the law violated, and the minimum is not less than the minimum
term prescribed by the law violated.
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 24655, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed on the petitioner the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one month, as minimum, to 10
years as maximum. The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office was also correctly
imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for
violation of section 3 (e) of RA 3019), but reverses and sets aside his conviction in Criminal Case No.
24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions as defined and penalized under Article 241 of the Revised
Penal Code).
No pronouncement on costs of suit.

NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG

[G.R. No.L-30801. March 27, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant .
Solicitor General Felix Q . Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonlo A. Torres and
Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and EmelianoDeleverio for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand
pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).The judgment of conviction was based on the
testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug,
Zamboangadel Sur. He hadbeen accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after
posting bail.
Alberto went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966,he intended
to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided
to sleep in the Buug municipal building where therewould be more security. Upon arrival in the
municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw
Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the
detention prisoner, Felix Napola. Asa consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor.
Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body. Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval,
he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it
with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to
succorhim.Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal
building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what Ihave done" (sic)
Alberio did not sleep anymore that night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing,
where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in atruck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom
she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and onehalf of the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were

burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus
infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would "cause death", she said. She
explained that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or
there would be complications. Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a
certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by
Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the
prosecution's failure to present as witnesses Juanito de laSerna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention
prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one of the
bases of the information for murder.
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who
should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements
which were part of the res gestae.

Issue:
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Ural in his defense, he heard a scream for help from Napola then he entered the cell and found
Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed
Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not
serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building. Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's commonlaw wife, whom the trial court branded "as acomplete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream
for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be
burned. Shesaid that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the
evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14,
Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty.
Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined The prisoner was
under his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private
citizen, merits nojudicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely
notappropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in
the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual
from the abuse of the police." (U. S. vs. Pabalan, 37Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal code). It is
manifest from the proven facts that appellant Uralhad no intent to kill Napola. His design was only
to maltreat him may be because inhis drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside
the detention cell.When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed
Napolato secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of
his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the
medium period of the penalty for murder. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is
affirmed with costs against the appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29066 March 25, 1970
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELO AMIT, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiros for
plaintiff-appellee.
Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing as counsel de officio for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Marcelo Amit was charged in the court below with the complex crime of rape with homicide
described and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Arraigned with the
assistance of a counsel de officio, he pleaded guilty.
Facts/ Script of events:
In the case at bar, the following excerpts taken from appellant's extrajudicial confession (Exhibit A1, translation) give us an idea of the acts committed by him in executing the crime:
Q: And what did Rufina Arellano do to you when you made her lay
down and you immediately place yourself on top of her?
A: She resisted a little, nevertheless I was able to do sexual
intercourse with her, sir.
Q: In her act of resisting you, what did Rufina Arellano do to you?
A: She bit me and scratched me, sir.
Q: What part of your body did Rufina Arellano bit and scratched?
A: She bit me on a place a little below my shoulder and scratched me
on my breast, sir.
Q: When Rufina Arellano put up a little resistance when you placed
yourself on top of her, what did you do also?
A: I held her on the neck and pressed it downward, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: The left cheek of Rufina Arellano even swelled, do you know how
she sustained it that caused it to swell?
A: I boxed her when she resisted, sir.
Q: What hand of yours boxed the left cheek of Rufina Arellano?
A: My left hand, sir, for my right hand was holding her neck.
Q: So what was the position of Rufina Arellano when your right hand
was holding her neck as you boxed her on the cheek with your left
hand?
A: Rufina Arellano was lying down on her back and I was on top of her,
sir. (pp. 23-24, rec.)

Elevation to SC
On the basis of appellant's plea of guilty and the abovementioned evidence, the trial court rendered
judgment sentencing him "to suffer the supreme penalty of death, with the accessories prescribed
by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rufina Arellano in the amount of P6,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs." Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 9, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, said judgment was elevated to us for review.

Issue:
W/N the should have applied the mitigating circumstances upon the giving of sanction to the
commission of crime.
While appellant does not question the correctness of the decision under review in so far as it finds
him guilty of the crime charged, he claims, through his counsel de officio, that the penalty of death
imposed upon him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the presence of three
mitigating circumstances which the trial court should have considered in his favor, namely: (1) plea
of guilty; (2) voluntary surrender, and (3) lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed.

Held:
The Solicitor General admits that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender have been proven, but denies that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed was similarly established. We agree with
this latter contention.
Appellant's contention because of its nature, must necessarily be judged in the light of the acts
committed by him and the circumstances under which they were committed. Should they show a
great disproportion between the means employed to accomplish the criminal act on the one hand
and its consequences on the other the mitigating circumstance under consideration must be
considered in favor of the accused (U.S. vs. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904, 906-907). Otherwise, it should not.

At the time of the commission of the crime, appellant was 32 years of age, while his victim was 25
years his senior; his victim resisted his attempt to rape her by biting and scratching him; to subdue
her, appellant boxed her and then "held her on the neck and pressed it down" while she was lying
on her back and he was on top of her. These acts, We believe, were reasonably sufficient to produce
the result that they actually produced the death of appellant's victim. Consequently, what we
said in People vs. Yu, G.R. L-13780, promulgated on January 28, 1961, would seem to apply:
The lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed cannot be
appreciated in favor of an accused who employed brute force choking a 6-year old
girl to death, who tried to shout while he was raping her intention being gathered
from and determined only by the conduct and external acts of the offender, and the
results of the acts themselves.

Penalty:
The penalty of Death prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2632 and 4111 being an indivisible penalty, it has to be imposed
regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstances, especially in a case like the present where,
according to the evidence of record, the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime and abuse of superior strength (first paragraph, Article 63, Revised Penal Code).
Moreover, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court must be increased to P12,000.00.
MODIFIED AS ABOVE INDICATED, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. With
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Title: People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

Salceda, Defendants-Appellants.
GR No.: L-36750
Date: January 31, 1984
Ponente: J. Relova
Reference RPC Article: Art. 13

vs.

Miguel

Regato

and

Jose

Facts:
For automatic review is the death sentence imposed on accused-appellants Miguel Regato and Jose
Salceda by the RTC of Leyte for robbery with homicide.
Prosecution evidence shows that about nine o'clock in the evening of November 22, 1969, three
persons called at the house of Victor Flores in Leyte asking if they could buy cigarettes. Felicisima
Flores, wife of Victor, was then maintaining a small sari-sari store inside their house. Upon hearing
them, she stood up and, after lighting a small kerosene lamp, opened the door of the house and
extended the lamp out to recognize the persons outside. She saw accused Regato who was then at
the porch and Salceda. As she kept on exposing the light at them, Regato approached Felicisima
and struck her hand holding the lamp, causing it to fall. Regato then pointed a gun at Felicisima who
moved backwards, towards the kitchen after which she jumped out and ran to the house of
FilomenoPilmaco, a neighbor. She told Pilmaco about the three persons who went up their house
and pointed a gun at her. She asked for help and she was told to simply stay in the house while he
and companions would rush to the poblacion of Palo, Leyte to inform the police of the incident

happening at sitioMacarinas. After Pilmaco and companions had left for the poblacion, Felicisima
heard a gun explosion from the direction of their house.
In the meantime, Godofredo Flores, the 12-year old son of Felicisima, who was sleeping in the sala
was awakened by the voice of the robbers asking the occupants to come down. Godofredo observed
that his mother was not in the house but saw his father, Victor Flores, being dragged down the
stairway by Ramirez and Regato. He saw also Salceda take hold of Florencio (brother of Godofredo)
who was at the stairs, being brought inside the house. Salceda then lighted the lamp which was
then on the floor of the sala of the house and then he brought Florencio inside the bedroom where
Godofredo was then hiding. Ramirez and Regato in turn, brought Victor inside the sala. Thereafter,
Regato hit Victor with the butt of his gun and said: "Where is your money? Where is your money?
When Victor answered that they did not have any, Ramirez boxed Victor at the mouth breaking one
of his teeth.

The three Ramirez, Regato and Salceda, did not notice Godofredo in his hiding place by the door
of the bedroom, and the latter saw everything that transpired inside the house because of the
lighted lamp on the floor about a meter away.

While Victor was being maltreated by Ramirez and Regato to force him to reveal where their money
was, Salceda was busy ransacking a trunk inside the bedroom where he found a small box
containing P870.00. Salceda took the money, put out the light and went to the kitchen. Ramirez
then asked Salceda whether he was able to find the money and upon being told that he did,
Ramirez rebuked Victor: "You old man you are telling a he. You said you have no money. " Victor
retorted: "You robbers with this remark, Ramirez shot Victor following which the three Regato,
Salceda and Ramirez rushed out of the house and fled.

After some minutes, Felicisima went back to the house and found her husband, Victor, bleeding.
Things inside the bedroom were scattered and their trunk opened. She found the money inside the
trunk gone. With the help of a nephew, they brought Victor to the poblacion of Palo. On the way,
they were met by the police patrol which proceeded to the scene of the robbery.

The following morning, Victor was admitted at the Leyte Provincial Hospital but due to severe
hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, he died the same day.
The case was tried against Regato and Salceda only because Rito Ramirez has remained at large.
Regato and Salcedo denied participation in the crim; both claimed to be somewhere else at the time
of the incident.
In this appeal , appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) when it denied Salceda's motion for
new trial and did not acquit him of the crime charged; (2) in convicting Regato of robbery with
homicide and not with simple robbery; (3) in not considering in their favor the mitigating instance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, (4) in consider the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity against them; and (5) in failing to consider that the aggravating
circumstance of craft is absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the Regato and Salceda guilty of complex crime of
robbery with homicide and imposing upon them death penalty.

10

Ruling:
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, except as to the penalty, which is hereby modified to
reclusion perpetua.
For lack of necessary votes, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
Ratio:
Basis of the motion for new trial is the affidavit of Regato that his two companions in the
commission of the crime were Loreto Ramirez and Ernesto Mutsamuel (not Jose Salceda). On this
point, suffice it to say that this affidavit of a convicted co-accused is a forgotten evidence and not a
newly discovered one. Regato and Salceda were duly represented by counsel from arraignment until
the promulgation of judgment and all the while this proffered evidence (affidavit of Regato) was
already in existence and available to the defense. After their conviction by the trial court, Regato
would now want to free Salceda. At any rate, the statement of Regato in the affidavit is highly
unbelievable and bears no earmark of sincerity. It is belied by the positive declarations of
eyewitnesses to the crime.
The Court found no merit in the second assigned error. Appellants, with Ramirez, arrived together at
the house of Victor and pretended to buy cigarettes. When Felicisima opened the door, they went
inside the house and demanded of Victor to bring out their money. When he refused, and Regato
maltreated him, while went inside the bedroom and ransacked the trunk where the money was
kept. Ramirez then inquired whether he found the money and he answered in the affirmative.
It is true that the shooting of Victor took place after the money had been taken and it was only
when Flores called them "robbers" that Ramirez shot him. As aptly stated by the lower court, "it is
clear that the killing was done by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, so that the accused are
guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide." (p. 18, Decision of lower court).
The Court also found no merit in the contention that there was lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed. Intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind. The
intention must be judged by the action, conduct and external acts of the accused. What men do is
the best index of their intention. In the case at bar, the aforesaid mitigating instance cannot be
appreciated consider that the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce
the result that they actually made the death of the victim.
With to the fourth and fifth errors: nighttime and craft, the evidence is clear that the crime was
committed past 9:00 in the evening which "the culprits had sought the hiding mantle of the night in
order to facilitate its commission."
Craft involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused. Herein appellants, in order
to enter the house of Flores, shouted from the outside that they wanted to buy cigarettes which
induced the inmates to open the door for them. Gaining entrance by pretending to buy cigarettes or
drink water constitutes craft.
By and large, the conspiracy among appellants and Ramirez in the commission of the crime is
evident upon the facts as proven. Their acts, collectively and individually executed, have
demonstrated the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of unlawful purpose
and objective. The shooting and death of Victor bear as direct relation and intimate connection
between the robbery and killing which occurred during and on the occasion of the robbery. Whether
the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, there is no doubt that the complex crime of robbery
with homicide has been committed.
Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. v. ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL
GR No.: 135701
Date: May 9, 2002
Ponente: Justice Puno

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Reference RPC Article: Art. 13

Doctrine: No intention to commit so grave a wrong
FACTS: On September 15, 1996, at 5:00 p.m., the victim, Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old son,
Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater were at the flea market of barangay Tambulan, Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. There were many people in the vicinity. Some were playing cara y cruz while others
were playing volleyball. Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a
cara y cruz game. Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy
and Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively. Out of nowhere, the accused,
Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the base of
the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few
meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo
died shortly thereafter. Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. At 5:00 p.m., he
saw people running away from the place where there was a cara y cruz game. Next, he saw Alfredo
and the accused. Alfredo was soaked in blood while the accused was running towards the basketball
court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him. Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The
accused was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry
Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of bringing Alfredo to the hospital when he saw blood
oozing from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died.
The defense gave a different account of the stabbing incident. Allegedly, at 3:00 p.m., the accused,
Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After two (2) games, he stopped playing. It was
past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played volleyball. While
watching the game, he was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredos elbow. He asked Alfredo why
he hit him. Alfredo retorted, Are you angry? Next, Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it.
He pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his third victim if
he would get angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out a hunting knife from his waist, he (the
accused) managed to stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal hall to surrender.
Dominador Calijan, the Barangay Captain of Tayasan, happened to be at the basketball court near
the scene of the crime. He encountered Alfredo along the road after the stabbing incident. Alfredo
had a stab wound on the lower nape. Calijan asked Alfredo who stabbed him and the latter gave the
name of the accused. He directed his barangay tanods to arrest the accused.
Barangay tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog were able to catch up with the accused three (3)
kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He was still holding the hunting knife and refused to
surrender it for fear that the relatives of Alfredo would retaliate. The barangay tanods escorted him
to the municipal hall. Along the way, they asked him why he stabbed Alfredo. The accused replied
that he could not help it and that everything happened too fast. Upon reaching the municipal hall,
the accused surrendered the hunting knife. He was turned over to PO3 Roy Balasbas for
investigation.
After the trial, the lower court found Callet guilty of murder.
HOW IT WAS ELEVATED TO THE SC: Accused appealed to the SC and in relation to the topic at
hand, one of his contentions is that: THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT INTEND TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG.
DISPUTE AND LEGAL ISSUE: Whether there exists the mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong in the instant case.
SC DECISION AND RATIONALE USED: The SC is not persuaded. The lack of intent to commit a
wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body
injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch
hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend

12

himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible
therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
PENALTIES: As the killing was attended by treachery, the accused is liable for the crime of murder.
The prescribed penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua against the accused. The civil indemnity awarded in favor of the legal heirs of
the victim, Alfredo Senador, in the amount of P50,000.00 is in accord with the Courts current policy.
Hence, the decision appealed from, finding the accused, ELBERT CALLET, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12995, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to
pay the legal heirs of the victim, ALFREDO SENADOR, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED.
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT
People v. Pagal
G.R. No. L-32040
October 25, 1977
Concepcion JR., J
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-5 (70) of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, the accused,
Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazowere charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide, committed. December 26, 1969, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain, and by
means of violence, take away from the person of one Gau Guan, cash amounting P 1,281.00 also
with intent to kill e Gau Guan, by then and there stabbing him with an icepick and clubbing him with
an iron pipe on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.When the case was called for affaigmnent,
counsel de oficio for the accused informed said court of their intention to enter a plea of guilty
provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.Afterwhich the
accused were informed by the that pleing guilty means admission to the crime of Roberry with
Homicide for it will be mitigated
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in appreciating in their favor the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation.
RATIO: The appellants'contention is devoid of merit. Firstly, since the alleged provocation which
caused the obfuscation of the appellants arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged
maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of the appellants by the deceased, these two mitigating
circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances but should be
treated as one. Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a
crime which as in the case at bar is planned and calmly meditated before its execution. Thus,
in People vs. Daos, 12 a case of robbery with homicide, this Court rejected the claim of the
appellants therein that passion and obfuscation should have been estimated in their favor, because
the death of the victim therein took place on the occasion of a robbery, which, before its execution,
had been planned and calmly meditated by the appellants. Thirdly, the maltreatment that
appellants claim the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of
the commission of the crime. Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be
sufficient and immediately proceeding the act. We hold that the trial court did not commit any error
in not appreciating the said mitigating circumstances in favor of the appellants.Robbery with
homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident
of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal. It must be aggravated.

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RULING: The judgment of the trial court is modified and the appellants Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and
Jose Torcefino y Torazo are hereby sentenced to suffer each the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed
Separate Opinions
MUOZ PALMA, J., concuring:
I would state however that the rulings in People vs. Parete and People vs. Santos, et al., cited in
page 7 of the Opinion must be taken in conjunction with recent jurisprudence that extra solicitous
care is required in the admission of a plea of guilty and that the taking of testimony and other
evidence notwithstanding a plea of guilty is the prudent and proper course to follow by trial judges.
(People vs. Villafuerte, March 28, 1974, citing numerous cases; People vs. Hondolero, August 25,
1976). These safeguards appear to have been taken in the instant case.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
While I am not fully satisfied that appellants were entirely aware of the meaning of their plea of
guilty, I find that the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution proved their guilt, which evidence the
appellants did not dispute.

ROMERA V. PP
GR No. 151978
July 14, 2004
Quisumbing, J.
Art 13. Mitigating circumstance/ sufficient provocation or threat
FACTS:
This is a review on certiorari for the decisions rendered by CA affirming RTC Cagayan De Oro
for convicting Arturo Romera of the crime frustrated homicide.
Facts summarized by the CA are, in one afternoon, Romera was with the Mangay-ay the
victim and 5 other men Eligario, Dennis, Ric, Bebing and Franklin heading to play volleyball, when
they reached their destination it was raining hard and they decided to stay at someones house,
Franklin hung a string to Bebings pants and said Theres a monkey before us., everybody
laughed except Roy(victim) who got angry and chided to franklin to stop lest he makes enymies,
Bebing also got angry and pointed a finger at Franklin and said evein if you are stronger and older,
if you will be hit by my fist, you will crawl. Arturo Romera then stood up and warned everyone,
together with Franklin, he left the group.
Later on, Roy and his companions on their way home passed by the house of Antonio which
was 1km away from Arturo Romera where they saw Arturo Romera with a bolo, Romera raised his
bolo as Roy and companions ran away but roy slipped and fell. Roy was approached by Romera and
held up by the collar and stabbed him in the stomach, Roy fell unconscious and as he woke up he
was in the hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for more than 3weeks.
Antonio Romera voluntarily surrendered to a CAFGU and was accompanied to a police
station.
But according to Arturo Romera what happened is when Arturo and his wife went to bed,
they heard Roy call Arturo Romero and his wife asking for a beer and a fighter for sale. Romero went
down the house and asked who was at the door, just when Romero opened the door for Roy, Roy
thrust his bolo to Romero bu Romero was able to parry the blow, Roy continued hacking the walls of
Romeross house, Romero exit another door and hurled roy a stone who was able to dodge it. Roy
again hacked him but Romero parried the blow, Romero grappled for the bolo and stabbed roy in
the stomach.
RTC discounted self-defense for the reason that when Romero got hold of the bolo there was
no more danger to his life, convicted of frustrated homicide.
Arturo Romero guilty of frustrated homicide taking into consideration of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
Title: US v. Clemente Ampar

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GR No.: L-12883
Date: November 26, 1917
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Reference RPC Article: Art. 13 (5)
Doctrine: Vindication of a Grave Offense
There was a Fiesta in the barrio of Magbaboy, San Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pigs
were served. Clemente Ampar went to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some delicacy.
Patobo answered Theres no more, come here and Ill make a roast pig for you. The effect of the
statement on Ampar as he explained in his confession was Why was he doing like that? I am not a
child. He felt like he was being played/joked upon with Patobos statement. With that, as his
provocation, when Patobo squatted down, he came behind him and struck him on the head with an
axe causing the death of Patobo the following day. Ampar was charged with murder.
Case turns to the witnesses. The court took in the consideration of the qualifying circumstances of
alevosia. The court gave Ampar the benefit of mitigating circumstance which on the cursory
examination was not justified. The mitigating circumstance is that the act was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony.
The authorities gave the court assistance in arriving at the conclusion on why this circumstance was
rightly applied. there was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo
to the accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is
more uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que araaba a todo el
mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of
this mitigating circumstance. But the same court has held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu
padre" to be a grave offense. The authorities hardly put the facts of the present case in the proper
light. The offense which Ampar was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be
considered as a mere trifle. But to him, it was a serious thing to be made the butt of a joke in the
presence of so many guests. it is believed that the lower court very properly gave defendant the
benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the
penalty provided for the crime of murder.
The Judgment of the trial court sentenced Ampar to seventeen years four months and one day
of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, indemnify the heirs of Patobo, in
the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay thecosts.
Separate Opinion:
Carson, J. the extenuating circumstances attending the commission of the crime fall under the
provisions of section 7 of the Penal Code rather than under the provisions of section 5 of that Code
as indicated in the opinion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DIOKNO
G.R No. L-45100
October 26, 1936
VILLAREAL, J.
RPC 13. Mitigating Circumstances Vindication of a Grave Offense
FACTS
At around 7am in January 4, 1935 Salome Diokno asked her lover, Yu Hiong (a Chinese
vendor of Sundry goods) to take her with him and in the afternoon of the same day, the couple took
an automobile and headed to Pagbilao where one of Salomes cousins lived. When the relative was
not home, Salome and Yu Hiong went to San Pabli, Laguna where they stayed at the house of one
Antonio Layco.
After a day or two, Epifanio Diokno (father of Salome) was informed by his son, Ramon
Diokno through a telegraph that his daughter was missing. The two then got worried and searched
for Salome. When they learned that Salome was staying at Laguna, the two proceeded to the house
of Antonio Layco and immediately saw Yu Hiong coming down the stairs. They ran up to him and

15

caught him. Yu Hiong sank to his knees asking for forgiveness but Ramon Diokno stabbed him with
a balisong in the back and later in the left side. Epifanio also stabbed him once and Yu hiong fell
landing on the stairs in the balcony and there he was stabbed again, repeatedly. Epifanio would
have killed Yu Hiong but Ramon intervened and said enough father.
Yu Hiong lost consciousness and when Antonio Layco saw him, he called the police and was
brought to the provincial hospital of San Pablo. He was examined by Dr. David Evangelista and Dr.
Manuel Quisumbing and found that the victim had five incised wounds, one at the back piercing the
pleura and penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung, which was mortal and caused the death of
the victim.
The accused testifying as witness in their own behalf stated that they had not gone to San
Pablo together. That when Ramon Diokno arrived, his father was coming down the stairs of Antonio
Laycos house with a knife in his hand and told him to go home and tell their relatives what had
happened. When Epifanio overtook Yu Hiong, he asked the latter if he is willing to marry his
daughter and Yu Hiong answered negatively and at the same time tried to take something in his
pocket, knowing that the latter carried a revolver and on the fear of getting harmed, Epifanio
became obfuscated and drew his knife.
The Dioknos were found guilty of crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua by the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the Dioknos of murder aggravated by
evident premeditation
2. Whether or not the Dioknos are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a
grave offense
HELD
1. Yes, the Dioknos are guilty only of homicide. There was no aggravating circumstances
attendant to the commission of the killing. For evident premeditation to be appreciated the
intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender
and carefully meditated. It is enough that it arose at the moment of aggression.
2. Yes, the Dioknos are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave
offense. It can be considered for the following reasons:
a. Although the law requires that the vindication of a grave offense be done proximately,
the case at hand dealt with a continuing offense. The whereabouts of Salome were
unknown to the Dioknos prior to their discovery that she was in Laguna. In the course of
the days after, the Dioknos were subjected to mental and emotional tortures that lasted
until they came face to face with Yu Hiong therefore having no interruption between the
offense against the honor of the Dioknos and the vindication. They had no sufficient time
to recover their serenity, they constantly suffered from wrong.
b. The determination of the gravity of offense may be ascertained from (1) the social
standing of the person or his social, economic, educational, and cultural background, (2)
the time when the offense against him was made, and (3) the place where the offense
was made.
In this case, the SC considered the family or cultural background of the Dioknos, being traditionally
where the elopement of an unmarried couple is considered immoral and an attack against the
family name and honor.
PENALTY
The court declares the accused Epifanio Diokno and Ramon Diokno guilty of the crime of
homicide and sentences each to an indeterminate penalty from 2 years and 1 day of prision
correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu
Hiong the sum of P1,000.
People v. Torpio
(People Of The Philippines V . Dennis Torpio Y Estrera)
G.R. No. 138984
June 4, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J
Article 13 Revised Penal Code
Mitigating Circumstances Vindication of Grave Offense

16

Facts: Dennis Torpio, together with his father Manuel Torpio, was charged with murder. But the trial
court acquitted Manuel and convicted only Dennis for killing Anthony Rapas.
On the evening of October 11, 1997, after Dennis had his dinner at their home, Anthony
Rapas invited Dennis for a drinking session. After consuming half gallon of tuba, followed by a series
of Red Horse beer, they went to another location for another session. At that time, Dennis refused
Anthonys offer of gin to him, which caused Anthony to get mad. Anthony poured the gin onto
Dennis, he also tried to stab and mauled Dennis, but the latter managed to get back home to get a
knife. Dennis was being hindered by his father but failed and caused the latter an incision in the
hand trying to subdue the accused. Dennis got back and ran after Anthony, until he stabbed the
victim to death. The morning after, he surrendered voluntarily to the authorities.
Issue: Is murder a proper charged against Dennis? What are the mitigating circumstances?
Held: No. Dennis should be charged only with Homicide.
Treachery was not present. The act of stabbing was brought by a quarrel between them.
There was no evident premeditation as there was no planning or plot to kill the victim. There must
be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted by the culprit
to make it impossible or difficult for the person attack to defend himself or retaliate. Therefore,
murder is not the right charged, Dennis must be charged with Homicide.
Dennis acted to avenge Anthonys felonious act of mauling and stabbing him.
Mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and vindication of grave offense, but not
sufficient provocation, are merited in favor to Dennis. Vindication of grave offense when the
accused committed such act because he was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the
deceased, although the unlawful aggression had ceased when he stabbed Anthony. Sufficient
provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of grave offense.
These two circumstances arose from one the same incident which is the attack of Dennis by
Anthony.
Dennis is found guilty of Homicide, with aforementioned two mitigating circumstances.

PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
People of the Philippines v. Delfin Muit
G.R. No. L-48875
October 21, 1982
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Article 13
Mitigating Circumstance; Passion of Obfuscation

Facts:
Mrs. Muit was the Barangay Zone President while Rodolfo Torrero was the Zone Auditor 2
they used to meet frequently. These meetings spawned rumors around the barrio that they were
having an affair, which eventually reached the ear of the accused, DelfinMuit, sometime in
December of 1975.DelfinMuit is a retired PC 2nd Lieutenant.
At about 2:45 p.m., 26 February 1976, the late Rodolfo Torrero, accompanied by his wife,
Purificacion Nidea-Torrero, Benigno Gubatan, Frances Tresvalles, and his mother, Maria Bataller, had

17

come from a picnic when they passed by the house of Muit. Muit was at the door of his house,
because he was about to leave to visit his farm and had tucked his 45-caliber pistol in his front
waistline, under his T-shirt. Muit invited Torrero and his companions to drop by. The invitation was
accepted. Muit was alone in his house, because his wife and children were in Naga City at that time.
The Muit then confronted Torrero why the latter always visits his wife even during nighttime
and why he often invites her out, why Torrero even gave food and money to his (Muits) children if
he had no bad intention at all on his wife. Torrero answered the questions and took offense at what
Muit brought up and, in a huff, stood up and walked toward the door. When Torrero was already
outside, Muit followed him, asking him not to leave because they were not done, then, at that
instant, a shot was fired. Other shots were fired and Torrero fell. Gubatan (witness) embraced Muit
from behind before or after the second shot.
Torrero suffered from 3 gunshot wounds: 1) on the left arm; 2) on the chest, the fatal one,
the bullet entering from the front and exiting at the back; and 3) a superficial one on the nape. The
evidence discloses that the Muit surrendered himself and turned in the pistol he had used to the
Detachment Commander of the Tamban Police Patrol Base soon after the incident.
How it was elevated to SC:
CFI found Muit Guilty of Murder. Muit Appealed from the decision of the CFI.
Dispute and Legal Issue:
WON the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation can be invoked

SC Decision and Rationale Used:

SC said that there can be no question that the accused was driven strongly by jealousy
because of the rumors regarding the amorous relationship between his wife and the victim. The
feeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful
stimulant to jealousy and is sufficient to produce loss of reason and self-control. In other words, it is
a powerful instigator of jealousy and prone to produce anger and obfuscation.
Penalties:
The crime of Murder, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Considering the two mitigating circumstances present,
without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, the penalty next lower to that prescribed is
imposable, or, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period,
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment appealed from, the accused DelfinMuit, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the judgment
being affirmed in an other respects.
G.R. No. 4971
September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
TORRES, J.:
OBFUSCATION

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Facts: For about five years, from September 1902 to November1907, Augustus Hicks, an AfroAmerican, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of
Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province. A trouble arises between Hicks and Sola. Afterwards, Sola the
deceased, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new
relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then went to live in
the said house. The accused enraged by such conduct, drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola
who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast. She fell
to the ground and died in a little more than an hour later.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder.
Proceedings were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment
on the 10th of September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be
executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.
Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating
circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings, and not
those which arise from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions.

19