Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1988

February 24, 1948

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against the Commanding General PhilippineRyukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a General
Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines, who has been charged
with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of
War of the United States. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried
and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still
subject to review.
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within
its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise
jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases,
and Article XIII thereof is as follows:
JURISDICTION
1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following
offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and offended parties
are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the
offense is against the security of the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States in
which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States
against the security of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside the bases
by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in
paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in
such case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in
paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province where the offense has been
committed shall so notify the officer holding the offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a
case the United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this article
is committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or

(b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer holding the offender in
custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
finds that the offense was not committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty, the
offender's commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice
within ten days from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice
shall be final.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial and final
judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge
in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the
Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when required by it.
The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the information
against the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court.
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that in time of war the United States shall have
the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by members of the armed
forces of the United States in the Philippines.
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any person fleeing from the lawful
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the
competent authorities of the Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States, the offended party may
institute a separate civil action against the offender in the proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil
liability which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from the offense.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal case against petitioner if the
offense had been committed within a base. Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still
the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member of the armed forces of
the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is the United States. It is not necessary
therefore, to consider whether the offense is against "the security of the United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether
petitioner committed it in "the actual performance of a specific military duty" or in time of a declared "national
emergency" under paragraph 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for in all these instances the
military jurisdiction depends also upon whether the offender is a member of the armed forces of the United States. We
shall then determine in this case (1) whether the offense has been committed within or without a base, and, in the second
instance, (2) whether the offender is or is not a member of the armed forces of the United States.
As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those area named in Annex A and Annex
B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the
areas specified in Annexes A and B, there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has
allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that "army communications system" is included, but
with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila Area."
Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole article is as follows:
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations
now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two
years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities within the bases for the United States armed forces. If
circumstances require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two
Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing temporary quarters and installations within the
limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of three years.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with boundaries as
of 1941 will be available for use to the United States armed forces until such time as other arrangements can be
made for the supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States;
provided, that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits
of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions
of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the
Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that the United States shall have full use and full
control of all these quarters and installations while they are occupied by the armed forces of the United States,

including the exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the security of the
personnel and property therein.
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is "Temporary Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary
quarters and installations existing outside the bases specified in Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the
United States armed forces for such reasonable time as may be necessary not exceeding two years in duration, extendible
fro not more than three years, the extension not being applicable to existing temporary quarters and installations within the
limits of the City of Manila.
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which will be available for use to the United States
armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but
"until such time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing the Port of Manila
Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located
within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed
by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed
within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases
mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the
City of Manila.
The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a member of the armed forces of the United States
under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated, petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United
States Army in the Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member
of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian
employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under
said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian employees.
Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United States, which enumerates, among the persons subject
to military law, persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States. But this case should be decided not
under the Articles of War, but under the terms of the Base Agreement between the United States and the Philippines. And
not because a person is subject to military law under the Articles of War does he become, for that reason alone, a member
of the armed forces under the Base Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a civilian employee
is in the service of the United States Army does not make him a member of the armed forces of the United States.
Otherwise, it would have been necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian employees separately from members of the
armed forces of the United States.
Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer
holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph
3, of the Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this connection that in cases like the present where the
offender is a civilian employee and not a member of the Unites States armed forces, no waiver can be made either by the
prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph
3 of Article XXI, of the Agreement.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction
to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court
sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any criminal action which may be
instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable, Secretary of Justice.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
One of the attributes of national sovereignty is the power to try and punish offenses, criminal and otherwise. The exercise
of that power is, by virtue of express provision of our Constitution, vested in the Supreme Court and in inferior courts
established by law. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII) The fundamental law refers to inferior courts created by an enactment of a national
legislature, Assembly or Congress, not to foreign courts martial, created by foreign countries.

All this is in accordance with elemental principles of political law.

If petitioner is liable for a criminal offense, according to our laws, the jurisdiction to try him belongs to a justice of the
peace or municipal court or to a court of first instance.
The jurisdiction can be transferred to other courts by virtue of a law that may be enacted to said effect. The law, to be
effective, must not violate the constitutional Bill of Rights, among them the guarantee of fair trial in favor of an accused,
the equal protection of the law, the due process of law, the guarantees against illegal detentions and searches, and others.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the U. S. Army, rendering services in the Philippines. He attacks
the power of the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukus Command, U.S. Army, to have him under military custody and
tried by a general court-martial of said army. Respondent invokes, in opposing the petition, the provisions of the
agreement on military Bases entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and the government of the United States of
America on March 14, 1947.
The agreement appears to be a concession to two weaknesses: the American distrust in Philippine tribunals and Filipino
yielding to much distrust; on one hand, undisguised prejudice, national, racial, or otherwise, on the other, meek
submission to the natural consequences of an unreasonable prejudice; on one side, the haughtiness of a powerful nation,
proud in the consciousness of its power, on the other, the moral surrender of a new nation, not yet so sure in the exercise
to their fullness of sovereign prerogatives. Extra-territoriality is wrong per se.
It is, therefore, assailable on two opposing fronts. On constitutional ground, it is hardly defensible.
The Bill of Rights has been embodied in the Constitution for the protection of all human beings within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. All persons covered by the waivers made in the agreement, whether Americans or
Filipinos, whether citizens or aliens, are denied the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the law. Their
fundamental rights are safeguarded by the Constitution, and the agreement places them outside the Constitution.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the agreement in question, so far as it stipulates waiver of the jurisdiction of our courts
of justice on the class of persons mentioned therein, is null and void, being in open conflict with clear provisions of our
fundamental law.
Upon this ground, petitioner is entitled to be released by respondent and by the court martial which tried him.
Even in the erroneous hypothesis that the waiver clauses of the agreement are valid, we concur in the reasoning of the
Chief Justice in support of the position that petitioner is not comprehended in said waiver clauses. With more reason,
respondent has no power nor jurisdiction to hold petitioner in confinement, nor to have him tried by a U.S. army courtmartial.
Notice must be served to the whole world that, in rendering the decision in this case, the Supreme Court, in the fullness of
judicial maturity, acted not as a mere agency of national sovereignty, but in the consciousness that the administration of
justice, more than national, is a human function, untethered by the narrow provincialism of the points of view of a
country, but founded on the universal and permanent interests of mankind, as expressed in principles with equal value
regardless of the hemisphere of the latitude where a person may be placed.
There is a suggestion that, because it has not found articulate expression in this case, it should be ignored, when it is
boiling in many minds, and it is that respondent, shielded by his military power and the overwhelming national power of
his country, may ignore our decision, and we will be powerless to enforce it. The fact that respondent appeared before us,
through counsel, without any reservation, answers the suggestion, and gives full justice to the sense of moral values of the
respondent.
Besides, in the present state of international affairs, when America is engaged in the noble task of making a reality the
ideal of one world, it can not compromise its moral leadership by any showing of reckless disregard to the decision of a
court of justice. The cry that there must be one world or none can receive but one satisfactory answer; the reality of world
justice. Only in justice hinges the salvation of humanity. Only justice can give real peace and provide the basis for
contentment and happiness.
We concur in the decision, ordering the immediate release of the petitioner.