Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ON
TORTS & DAMAGES
PROFESSOR: ATTY. JUN DE GRANO
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THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS
OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
Facts:
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The
complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant
spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the
animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of action,
and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any
damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure
or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
Issue:
Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.
Ruling:
NO.
The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil
Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and
that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he
had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the
lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does not
distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether
or not he has been negligent or at fault.
The distinction is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious
reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business
to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself.
And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial situation of the appellant.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court misapplied Article 2177 of the New
Civil Code.
HELD:
When the Court of Appeals ordered the petitioner to pay the private
respondents not only the expected total amount of profits the latter would have
derived from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or over 11
years, from the half hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of
P5.00 per square meter of their said entire landholdings it misapplied Article
2177. What Article 2177 says is that no damages can be twice from the same act
or omission.
However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error of law in increasing the amount of damages
awarded to private respondents by the court a quo.
Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the
judgment of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of private
respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose an appeal therefrom. This
being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication made by
the lower court.
The procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself
appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
those granted in the decision of the lower court.
The evidence on record indubitably support the findings of the trial and
appellate courts that petitioner company is liable for the destruction of the
property of herein private respondents and consequently entitle the latter to an
award of the damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby MODIFIED with regard to the amount of damages awarded to private
respondents and the awards of the trial court on this matter are hereby reinstated
for that purpose. In all other respects, the decision of respondent court is
AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
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by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. But the complaint
here was filed only on after the lapse of more than five years.
An action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150
of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four
years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) maybe brought"
which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
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allowed the train to go through its course. Having failed to do this, the victim is
considered negligent, and plaintiff was not allowed to recover damages.
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The act of throwing the head band was deemed to be a childish prank,
and was in fact not an act contemplated by 2176 of the civil code. Being a
childish prank, the court declared that there was no way that any parent could
ever anticipate such prank. The said act also did not reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
The burning of the boat resulted from an accident but this accident
was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It should not have occurred if
he observed the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do. When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work,
which he attempts to do. The defendant was held liable for the value of the
vessel.
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its president and his wife as one of the incorporators and a member of the board
of directors. This company is engaged in the same line of business and has the
same clients as that of the dissolved AMAL.
NLRC held petitioner jointly and severally liable with AMAL
ISSUE:
Whether or not de Guzman can be held jointly and severally liable with
AMAL.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the petitioner, while admittedly the highest ranking local
representative of AMAL in the Philippines, is nevertheless not a stockholder and
much less a member of the board of directors or an officer thereof. He is at most
only a managerial employee.
Petitioner cannot be held directly responsible for the decision to close the
business that resulted in his separation and that of the private respondents. That
decision came directly and exclusively from AMAL. The petitioner's participation
was limited to the enforcement of this decision in line with his duties as general
manager of the company.
We hold that although the petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with
AMAL for the monetary demand of its employees, he is nevertheless directly
liable to them for his questionable conduct in attempting to deprive them of their
just share in the assets of AMAL.
Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
This is supplemented by Article 21 of the same Code thus:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Although the question of damages arising from the petitioner's bad faith
has not directly sprung from the illegal dismissal, it is clearly intertwined
therewith. The predicament of the private respondents caused by their dismissal
was aggravated by the petitioner's act in the arrogating to himself all of AMAL's
assets to the exclusion of its other creditors, including its employees. The issue
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of bad faith is incidental to the main action for illegal dismissal and is thus
properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.
It is stressed that the petitioner's liability to the private respondents is a
direct liability in the form of moral and exemplary damages and not a solidary
liability with AMAL for the claims of its employees against the company. He is
being held liable not because he is the general manager of AMAL but because he
took advantage of his position by applying the properties of AMAL to the payment
exclusively of his own claims to the detriment of other employees.
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was inside his property. Sometime in 1962 Ramos, with a constabulary soldier
and two policemen, allegedly seized the produce of the land consisting of 50
cavans of palay from petitioners tenant. In retaliation, petitioner brought with him
a constabulary soldier and appropriated 6 cavans of the produce.
On December 1967, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title over
the Riceland before the CFI of Camarines SUr. It rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in requiring petitioner to deliver 40 cavans annually to
respondent despite its finding that only 1/3 of the produce went to Ramos.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner alleged that since respondents share of the harvest is
only 1/3, only the 1/3 of the annual harvest must be awarded to him. Ramos
contention that his tenant will be deprived of his share if only 1/3 was awarded to
him. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but
must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of
the actual amount thereof. In view of his dispossession from 1964 and the fact
that his tenant has vacated the land the same year, he cannot allege that his
tenant is entitled to his 2/3 share.
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discovered later during the one-year period of the guaranty. The defects
complained against were hidden and UP was not expected to recognize them at
the time the work was accepted. Moreover, there was an express reservation by
UP of its right to hold the petitioner liable for the defects during a period of one
year.
Decision Affirmed.
Submitted by: Lopez, John
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957
Facts:
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a
student of Balintawak Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by
the schools supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From
school, Dante and other students boarded the jeep that was going to take them
to the parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side. They
have not gone too far when the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of
its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi.
Issue:
Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with
his son Dante Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act?
Held:
Although at the time of the accident the father was not present, plaintiff
contends that at the time of the accident Dante was a minor who was living with
his parents. The court thus found that Delfin Capuno should be held solidarily
liable for the tortuous act of his son Dante, for his failure to exercise proper
parental authority.
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basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was
dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC
of Makati, Metro Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from
paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial
she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding
the cost of her treatment and therapy.
The trial court found that no convincing evidence was shown that the
minibus was properly checked for travel to a long distance trip and that the driver
was properly screened and tested before being admitted for
employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of
the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case.
The trial court ordered herein petitioners to pay Word for the World
Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline Antonio for they were the only ones
who adduced evidence for their claim for damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to
Amyline Antonio but dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground
that they failed to prove their respective claims.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners, jointly or solidarily, were negligent and if
they are liable for damages and to what extent.
HELD:
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the
Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by
the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we regard as
final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was
admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a
consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts to
justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is
undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and
only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. By
then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given the conditions of
the road and considering that the trip was Cabils first one outside of Manila,
Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony
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that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20
kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very
high speed.
Considering the foregoing, the fact that it was raining and the road was
slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when
even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that
he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be
held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave
rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves
negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the
applicant possessed a professional drivers license. The employer should also
examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service.
Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules
and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with the rules.
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La
Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school
children only, from their homes to the St. Scholasticas College in Metro Manila.
They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him
for certain matters, such as whether he could remember the names of the
children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to
drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union
was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot
be casually invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an
employer.
Petitioners argue that they are not a common carrier, hence, ordinary
diligence or diligence of a good father of a family is only the degree of diligence
due of them. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage.
Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to
them. The article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This
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duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
The liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification as to the
award of damages. Petitioners are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
private respondent Amyline Antonio.
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FACTS:
A pick-up owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation
Administration, a government agency driven by Hugo Garcia, an employee of
said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of petitioners along Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact,
Francisco Fontanilla and his companion were injured and brought to the San
Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment.Fontanilla was later transferred to
the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
The trial court rendered judgment, which directed National Irrigation
Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to
petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not National Irrigation Administration is liable for the negligent
act of Hugo Garcia.
HELD:
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is a government corporation with
juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for
the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driveremployee(Hugo Garcia).In this particular case, the NIA assumes responsibility of
an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.
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Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. The registered owner of a
public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the
passengers therein. If the property covered by a franchise is transferred or
leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval of the Public Service
Commission, such as what happened in this case, the transfer is not binding
upon the public and third persons. However, the petitioner has the right to be
indemnified by Espiritu for the amount which he may be required to pay as
damages.
Petition Denied.
Submitted by: Pador, Reo Arlan B.
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FACTS:
The plaintiff, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on
said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof,
she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, for a period of 16 days. She also incurred
hospitalization, medication and other expenses.
Hence, a cilvil action was filed by plaintiff Frorentina Guilatco for recovery
of damages against the City of Dagupan.
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located,
is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is
actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through
the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the
same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists.
RULING:
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(2) Whether ZHIENETH, a six year old child and CRISELDA can be held
liable for contributory negligence?
HELD:
Petitioners omission and failure to act on the previous observation of an
employee of the counters unsafe structure belies the claim of the petitioners that
what had happened is an accident.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. Negligence, on the other hand, is "the
failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree
of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
As to the second issue, In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability.
Further, CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory
negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's
hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when
she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the
gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and
distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter
as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor
who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell
on her.
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sustained. A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed
against Tano.
A civil suit was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola
against Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the
recovery of damages. The trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the
proximate cause of the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio
Monterola.
Private respondent appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court reversed the court a quo.
Issue:
Whether or not LBC may invoke the doctrine of Last Clear Chance in
order to refute its liability.
Held:
Affirmed. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a
left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust
to settle.
It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van)
directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that
almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required
him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from
and clear of any oncoming vehicle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred
to, at times, as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine,
in essence, is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar
a defense against the liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair
chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was
rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time
had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that
could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence
in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following.
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We, therefore, agree with the appellate court that there indeed was
contributory negligence on the victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of
petitioners liability for damages.
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HELD:
The defendant failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision of its employees. In fact, the flagman or watchman arrived after
the collision, and there was no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing,
nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. The diligence of
a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not
confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but
included inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
Manila Railroad is adjudged liable for its negligence and that of its employees.
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Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan on
November 19, 1962 a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees
Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962,
Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and
there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffsappellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of
the motor launch was unlawful.
Held:
Defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiff-appellants. To be liable
under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of
the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. A person whose constitutional rights have
been impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded.
In the instant case, Delfin Lims claims were amply supported by evidence
that he should be awarded damages. However, with respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha,
he is not entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered from
the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had already transferred
the ownership and possession of the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was
seized and therefore, he has no legal standing to question the validity of the
seizure.
Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison
MANUEL vs. CA
G. R. No. 96781 October 1, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondents were passengers of an International Harvester Scout
Car owned by respondent Ramos, which left Manila for Camarines Norte in the
morning of December 27, 1971 With respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the
driver of the vehicle.
There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the Scout car was hit on its
left side by a bus. The bus was was driven by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. Due to
the impact, the Scout car was thrown backwards against a protective railing. All
its ten occupants, which included four children, were injured, seven of the victims
sustained serious physical injuries.
The Lower Court and the Court of Appeals finds for the respondent.
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loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was
travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the
right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back
and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided
with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge (lasque, mervins digest).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the herein truck driver can be held liable under the doctrine
of last clear chance.
RULING:
The court ruled that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. The court had the occasion to apply the doctrine of the last clear
chance which expound that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine applies
only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence
but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. The subsequent negligence
of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff
becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes
between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus
making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally, the last clear chance
doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages. The court herein also imposed liability
on the private respondents as employers of the truck driver under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code are directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
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result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of
the chauffeur.
Issue:
Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands may be held
liable for the act done by the chauffeur.
Held:
The Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable.
The substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts
of its officers, agents, and employees can be found in paragraph 5 of article 1903
of the civil Code, which reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable."
The state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its
agents.
Submitted by: Ciara Agonoy
MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
236 SCRA 227
Facts:
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute
official Boy scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their
Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to
undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal
sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.
Sometime in October 25, 1983, petitioner corporation received information
that private respondents Agnes Villacruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes
Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority.
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Held:
Yes. Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from
unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bar, the seizure was made
without any warrant.
The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents.
Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigate the
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59
forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious
condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored up by
United Construction, Inc.
A pre-trial was conducted on March 7, 1969, during which among others,
the parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a
Commissioner. Mr. Andres O. Hizon, who was ultimately appointed by the trial
court.
The Commissioner eventually submitted his report on September 25, 1970
with the findings that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was
caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake whose magnitude was
estimated at 7.3 they were also caused by the defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by the third-party defendants' architects, deviations from
said plans and specifications by the defendant contractors and failure of the latter
to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the building and of
the contractors, architects and even the owners to exercise the requisite degree
of supervision in the construction of subject building.
United Construction Co., Inc. and the Nakpils claimed that it was an act of
God that caused the failure of the building which should exempt them from
responsibility and not the defective construction, poor workmanship, deviations
from plans and specifications and other imperfections in the case of United
Construction Co., Inc. or the deficiencies in the design, plans and specifications
prepared by petitioners in the case of the Nakpils.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-which
caused the failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are
otherwise liable because of their negligence.
RULING:
The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein
is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the
completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason of a defect in
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those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The
contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within the
same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of
inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the
contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be
solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any
of the causes of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the
building.
On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible
for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable
(Article 1174, New Civil Code).
An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and
exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of
foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been
prevented. There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a
fortuitous event or an act of God.
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for
a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur:
The cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the
debtor;
The event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable;
The event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner; and
The debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the
injury to the creditor.
Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with
an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been
occasioned.
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prevent an overflow of water from the dam, since the water level had reached the
danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the corporation caused the opening
of the spillway gates.
Due to the manner with which the spillway gates of the Angat Dam were
opened, an extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit
the installations and construction works of ECI at the lpo site with terrific impact,
as a result of which the latter's stockpile of materials and supplies, camp facilities
and permanent structures and accessories either washed away, lost or
destroyed.
NPC asserts that the destruction and loss of the ECI's equipment and
facilities were due to force majeure. It argues that the rapid rise of the water level
in the reservoir of its Angat Dam due to heavy rains brought about by the typhoon
was an extraordinary occurrence that could not have been foreseen.
Issue:
Whether or not the NPC can be held liable for the destruction of ECIs
structures and equipments.
Held:
The NPC is Liable. Based on the findings of fact, petitioner NPC was
undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam
only at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that it was safer
to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that
NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And
even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure,
NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage.
Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with
an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been
occasioned.
Submitted by: Leon, David Martin L.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
May 21,1993
161 SCRA 384
FACTS:
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When typhoon Welming hit Luzon in 1967 heavy rains fell and, to
prevent an overflow of water at the Angat Hydro Electric Project and Dam at Ipo,
Bulacan, NPC opened the spillway gates. An extraordinarily large volume of
water rushed out of the gatesand hit the installations and construction works of
ECI at Ipo site with terrific impact as a result pf which the latters stock pile of
materials and supplies, camp facilities, and permanent structures including its
accessories were either washed way, lost or destroyed. An action for damages
was filed. NPC raised force majeure as a defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC should be held liable for damages as a result of its
negligence act.
HELD:
NPC is liable. The negligent manner with which the spillway gates were
opened caused the extraordinarily large volume of water to rush out of the gates.
If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God there occurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay, or contravention of the tenor of the
obligation which resulted in loss or damages, the obligor cannot escape liability.
To be exempt from such, he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct which occasioned the loss.
Thus, under Art.1174, NCC, for breach of an obligation due to an act of
God, the following must concur:
1. the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent
of the will of the obligor;
2. the event must either be unforeseeable or unavoidable;
3. the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
4. the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
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The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim,
Marceline and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their
son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on
their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela
The jeepney, while going towards MAlalam River, collided with a speeding
Pantranco bus while the latter was negotiating a turn, which had encroached on
the jeepneys lane. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa
and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died
while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively
damaged. The driver of the bus went in hiding after.
Pantranco contended that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence of the driver David Ico. Furthermore, Pantranco raised the defense
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.
The lower court rendered a decision against Pantranco, which was
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, Pantranco filed a case in the Supreme Court, contending that the
Court of Appeals erred in not applying the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance.
Issue
Whether or not the doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable
Held:
The Court found no merit in the claim of Pantranco that the negligence of
the driver of the jeepney was the proximate cause of the collision. Neither did the
Court find merit in the claim of Pantranco that the jeepney driver could have
avoided the collision. It stated that even if the jeepney driver saw from a distance
the approaching bus, he could not have had seen the impending danger, since it
was safe to assume that the bus would go back to its lane. Moreover, the bus in
this case was speeding, so much so that it might have been too late for the
jeepney driver to do anything by the time he realized that the bus was not going
back to its lane. Hence, the jeepney driver had no chance to avoid the bus.
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Facts:
Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias
Street. Quezon City on which he built a four (4) door two- storey apartment
building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00, the lot was
sold to the Spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid.
Pedro Pecson filed a complaint on the validity of the auction sale before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City but RTC dismissed the complaint,
however, private respondent would like to include the building and praying that
a writ of possession must be issued. RTC ruled that petitioner is a builder in
good faith and that a public auction of the building was not included as appealed
tax payer. Private respondent appealed to Court of Appeals and CA affirmed
the decision of RTC in toto and ordered Nuguid to pay the construction cost.
Petitioner move for MR but it was not acted upon, Hence, it ordered the sheriff to
place movant Juan Nuguid in possession of the subject property. Petitioner
Pecson aggrieved by the decision of the CA hence, he filed a petition to Supreme
Court that he be restored in possession.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue here is that the petitioner is a good faith?
Held:
It was ruled that the petitioner be reinstated to possession until
after the respondent has indemnified the petitioner to the cost of the land and
building to its market value, in order that respondent shall not unjustly enrich at
the expense of the petitioner.
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As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew
pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was
any found in his car. As to the second, the testimony of the patrolman present
immediately after the accident was given credence by the court, hence leading to
the conclusion that the volkswagon was moving fast. As to the third issue, the
court believes that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that
offered by private respondent Dionisio. Finally, as to the fourth issue, the court
finds there simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact
taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or
mental alertness. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances
outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the
accident.
Nonetheless, the supreme court agrees with the Intermediate Appellate
Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in
other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable
relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. The collision
of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the truck driver's negligence.
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and
that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Phoenix also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
It is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to
play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
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FACTS:
Plaintiff Picart was riding a pony in a bridge. He saw an approaching
automobile and he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing in the right, the
wrong side of the bridge. The driver of the automobile sounded his horn but
Picart made no move to go to the right side. The driver guided his car to the right
without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He turned to the
right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped
around and was killed by the passing car.
Picart was thrown off his horse and suffered contusions, he sued Smith for
the value of his animal, medical expenses and damage to his apparel.
ISSUE:
Who is at fault?
HELD:
Plaintiff Picart was originally at fault but defendant Smith has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm by merely swerving his automobile. Smith
failed to do this and he should therefore be chargeable for the consequences of
his acts, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. It is enough
to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and
determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
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Facts:
The jeep which spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into
an open trench, thereby sustaining injuries. The trench was an excavation was
allegedly undertaken for the installation of conduit systems of PLDT. Antonio
Esteban also alleges that he failed to notice the mound of earth and the trench
since there were no adequate warning signs and it was dark at that time. Having
sustained injuries, they filed a claim for damages against PLDT.
PLDT for its part, denies liability contending that the injuries were caused
by the negligence of Antonio Esteban. Furthermore, PLDT contends that if an
entity should be held responsible, it should be L.R. Barte and Co., an
independent contractor who undertook the construction of the trench and the
installation of the conduit system. As such, PLDT filed a third-party complaint
against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in
no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence
or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.
In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the
accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its
contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the
vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red
lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.
Issue:
Whether or not the accident was imputable to the negligence of PLDT or
to that of Antonio Esteban.
Held:
The accident was imputable to the negligence of Antonio Esteban. First,
Antonio Esteban knew of the excavations, as he regularly passes by the route.
Secondly, the Court sustained the findings of the trial court that the jeep could not
have had been running for only 25 km/hour since, if it was doing so, it could have
stopped before it reached the mound, or at least before it went airborne. Also, if
Antonio Esteban could not have seen the mound which was fairly big and visible,
he also could not have seen the warning devices, given the fact that he had his
dim lights on.
SUBMITTED BY: SAYO, RICHARD EMMANUEL L.
PONCE VS. LEGASPI
208 SCRA 377
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FACTS:
Spouses Ponce, petitioners herein, owned 43% of the stockholdings of
LNOR Corporation. Spouses filed a disbarment case against Atty. Legaspi,
herein defendant, on the ground that Atty. Legaspi in his dual capacity as legal
counsel of LNOR and YRASPORT (corporation which was incorporated by some
of the officers of LNOR to compete with the latter with aid and assistance of Atty.
Legaspi who happens to be the retaining counsel of LNOR), facilitated, assisted
and aided in the fraudulent manipulations, anomalous management and
prejudicial operations by certain officers of LNOR which caused great damage
and prejudice to LNOR. The disbarment proceeding was dismissed. Thus, Atty.
Legaspi filed a complaint for damages against the spouses Ponce on the ground
of malicious prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not filing of disbarment case makes out a case of malicious
prosecution
HELD:
Yes
RATIO:
Generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and
has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and humiliate the
defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause. The
foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding,
judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in
character and therefore may be basis for a subsequent action for malicious
prosecution.
An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on
the provisions of Articles 21, 2217 and 2219 of the New Civil Code.
Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious
prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary damages. Malice and
want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify action. The general rule
is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting
a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie
only in cases where a legal prosecution had been carried on without probable
cause.
Submitted by: Carlos, Mary Maizie C.
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
No. 1719, January 23, 1907
FACTS:
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The plaintiff, one of the laborers in the employment of the defendant, was
at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the companys yard in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that only one car was used in this work. The defendant,
however, has proved that they were two immediately following one another, upon
which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the
ends of the rails projected beyond the cars both in front and behind. The rails lay
upon two crosspieces secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to
prevent them from slipping off.
According to the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the waters edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught
the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff broke his leg which was afterwards
amputated at about the knee.
The trial court found that the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under
the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon was the cause of
the sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate
occasion of the accident. A fellow-worker of the plaintiff testified that a day
before the accident, he called the attention of the foreman and asked the latter to
have it repaired. It has not been proved that the company inspected the track
after the typhoon or had any proper system of inspection. It is upon the failure of
the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the
trial court based its judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal action is the proper remedy for injuries through
negligence.
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff which caused his injury.
Whether or not the plaintiff may recover damages if he is guilty of
contributory negligence.
HELD:
NO. The Civil Code provides that obligations arising from faults or
negligence not punished by the law, shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter
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II of Title XVI. Since nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized
for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen, his obligation
therefore is one not punished by law and falls under civil rather than criminal
jurisprudence.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not
required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable
whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.
Under the Penal Code, the responsibility of an employer may be regarded
as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they
are in the process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of
the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law
and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election
of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted,
growing out of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code cannot
affect this action.
YES. The plaintiff is charged with carelessness in two particulars: a) that
having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and b) that he
walked on the ends of the ties at the side of car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.
As to the first point, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the
plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper. While the
method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped build
the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at his job less than
two days. Although the plaintiff perceived the sagging of the track, his lack of
caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail
was not so gross as to constitute negligence which would bar him to recover from
the defendant.
With regard to the second, while the plaintiff and his witnesses testified
that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly
directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of
the workmen testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known
to all against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof, the preponderance is in favor of the defendants contention
to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some
degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
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ISSUE:
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Is RCPI guilty of negligence? Is RCPI guilty of bad faith, fraud and malice?
RULING:
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company can choose to
send his message in the ordinary form or a social form. In the ordinary form, the
text of the message is typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a
social telegram is placed in a special form with the proper decorations and
embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and delivered in an
envelope matching the pupose of the occasion and the words and intent of the
message. The sender pays a higher amount for the social telegram than for the
ordinary form. Hence, when RCPI typed the message of condolence in a birthday
and delivered the same in a colorful Christmas envelope, it committed a breach
of contract as well as gross negligence. Its excuse that it had run out of social
condolence cards and envelope is flimsy and unacceptable.
It could not have been faulted had it delivered the message in ordinary
form and reimbursed the difference in the cost of the sender. But by transmitting
it unfittingly, through other special forms, clearly, albeit outwardly, portraying the
opposite feelings of joy and happiness and thanksgiving, RCPI only exacerbated
the sorrowful situation of the addressees and the senders. This botchery
exposed not only RCPIs gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard
for the sentiments of its clientele, which is tantamount to wanton misconduct, for
which it must be held liable for damages
It is not surprising that when the Timans telegraphic message reached
their cousin, it became the joke of the Midorandas friends, relative, and
associates who thought that the unpardonable mix-up was a mockery of the
death of the mother-in-law of the senders cousin. Thus, it was not unexpected
that because of this unusual incident, which caused much embarrassment and
distress to Timan, he suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his
confinement for 3 days at the hospital.
Under the circumstances, defendants plea of good faith predicated on the
exhaustion of social condolence forms cannot be accepted, gross negligence or
carelessness can be attributed to defendant in not supplying its various stations
with such sufficient and adequate social condolence forms when it held out to the
public the availability of such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the
transmission of message on said forms. Knowing that there is no such forms as
testified to by its material control manager, and entering into a contract for the
transmission of message in such forms, defendant committed acts of bad faith,
fraud, and malice.
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remain in their custody. The rationale of such liability is that so long as the
student remains in the custody of the teacher, the latter stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student. Likewise, the phrase
used in Article 2180 so long as the [students] remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time.
The Court held that Jimmy Abon cannot be considered to have been at
attendance in school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro.
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however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison
SOLIMAN vs. TUAZON
G. R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
FACTS:
On 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the
campus ground and premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL
COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled student of said school
taking his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on
said date and hour in the premises of said school performing his duties and
obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment,
supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack,
assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver,
a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused
plaintiffs death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The
plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and,
as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular
classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely
healed."
Issue:
Whether or not the RCC may be held liable for the action of the security
guard who is an employee of the security agency?
Held:
Supreme Court held that as a general rule a client or customer of a
security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it. The duty to observe
due diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its security guard is the
agency. While it is true that the school was not the employer of the guard its
liability is not only based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court must
have read the case of PSBA vs. CA in dismissing its judgment, for it should have
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86
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The Court held that the evidence of the childs hydrophobia (based on the
medical report and testimony under oath of Dr. Tautjo) is sufficient to convince it
that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate
stated a different cause of death.
The Court further held that the petitioners contention that they could not
be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact,
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal
should escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. And it does not
matter either that, as the petitioners contend, the dog was tame and was merely
provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious
animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forgot that Theness was only three years old
at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal.
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addition to the actual damages incurred, was deemed proper under the
circumstances. On appeal, the CA modified the award of damages, ordering
defendant to pay to said plaintiff: (1) 1,914 German Marks in its equivalent in
Philippine peso at prevailing rate of exchange as actual damages, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; (2) P
500,000.00, as moral damages; (3) P 150,000.00, as exemplary damages; and
(4) 5% of the amount of actual, moral and exemplary damages which are
recoverable, as attorney's fees.
Issue:
WON there was a breach of contract of carriage on the part of the
petitioner, as to justify the award to private respondent of actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
Ruling:
NO. Private respondent wanted a rerouting to Hamburg, Geneva, Rome,
Hong Kong and Manilas which shortened the original itinerary on the ticket
issued by AF Manila through ASPAC. Considering the original restrictions on the
ticket, it was not unreasonable for Air France to deny the request. Besides, a
recurring ear infection was pleaded as reason necessitating urgent return to
Manila. Assuming arguendo a worsening pain or discomfort, private respondent
appears to have still proceeded to 4 other cities covering a period of at least 6
days and leaving open his date of departure from Hong Kong to Manila. And
even if he claimed to have undergone medical examination upon arrival in
Manila, no medical certificate was presented. He failed to even remember his
date of arrival in Manila. With a claim for a large amount of damages, the Court
finds it unusual for respondent, a lawyer, to easily forget vital information to
substantiate his plea. It is also essential before an award of damages that the
claimant must satisfactorily prove during the trial the existence of the factual
basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. Air France
employees in Hamburg informed private respondent that his tickets were partly
stamped "non-endorsable" and "valid on Air France only." Mere refusal to accede
to the passenger's wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in the
absence of bad faith. Respondent has failed to show wanton, malevolent or
reckless misconduct imputable to petitioner in its refusal to re-route.
Air France Manila acted upon the advise of ASPAC in denying private
respondent's request. There was no evident bad faith when it followed the advise
not to authorize rerouting. At worst, the situation can be considered a case of
inadvertence on the part of ASPAC in not explaining the non-endorsable
character of the ticket. Of importance, however, is the fact that private
90
respondent is a lawyer, and the restriction box clearly indicated the nonendorsable character of the ticket.
91
92
Sy, through counsel, filed the present action for reformation of the lease
agreement, damages and injunction late in the afternoon of the same day.
Sy prayed for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction to
enjoin OVEC and all persons employed by it from entering and taking possession
of the Three theaters, conditioned upon Sys filing of a P500,000.00 bond
supplied by Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBISCO).
The trial court ruled that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of the lease
agreement and that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in his favor after the commencement of the action and that the injunction bond
filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages OVEC may have suffered by reason of
the injunction.
From this decision of the trial court, Sy and CBISCO appealed it to the
respondent court. The latter found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease
agreement. It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore,
should be respected and enforced as the law between the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the awarding of damages to the respondents constitutes
unjust enrichment at the expense of the petitioners.
Held:
No. the forfeiture clause stipulated in the lease agreement does not
unjustly enrich the respondent OVEC at the expense of Sy and CBISCO. A
provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the
possession of the lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in
the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the
lessees violation of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement is a penal
clause that may be validly entered into. A penal clause is an accessory obligation
which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the
performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation in case the
obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled.
As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall
substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interest in case of noncompliance. This is specifically provided for in Article 1226 (1), New Civil Code.
However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance
with the principal obligation. They are first, when there is a stipulation to the
contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed penally;
and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud. It is evident that in all said cases, the
purpose of the penalty is to punish the obligor. Therefore, the obligee can recover
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from the obligor not only the penalty but also the damages resulting from the
non-fulfillment or defective performance of the principal obligation.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent court correctly sustained the trial
court in holding that the bond shall and may answer only for damages which
OVEC may suffer as a result of the injunction. The arrears in rental, the
unmeritted amounts of the amusement tax delinquency and attorneys fees which
were all charged against Sy were correctly considered by the respondent court
as Damages which the OVEC sustained not as a result of the injunction.
Submitted by: Legasto, Vanessa G.
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Both parties appealed from the judgment herefrom, the plaintiffs seeking
for an increase in said amounts, while the defendant asks for a complete
exoneration from, or at least mitigation of liability.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the defendant is liable for breach of contract of carriage
2. Whether or not the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiffs by the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo are deemed proper.
Held:
1.The provisions of the Civil code on this substantive question of liability
are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them, by
reason of the nature of their business and public policy. Article 1755 establishes
the standard of care required of common carrier, which is, to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by creating the
presumption that common carriers are at fault or negligent in case of death or
injuries to passengers. Lastly, Article 1757 states that the responsibility of a
common carrier for the safety of passengerscannot be dispensed with or
lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements of tickets, or
otherwise.
It is undisputed that the pilot of the defendant plane did not follow the
prescribed route for his flight to which a reasonable conclusion could be made
that his failure to do so was intentional and that he probably wanted to fly on a
straight line to Manila, and that a clear violation of air-traffic rules therefore
amounts to a breach of contract of carriage for failure to observe extraordinary
diligence required of it.
2. Pursuant to the current jurisprudence, the indemnity for Pedro T.
Davilas death fixed by the trial court should be increased from P6,000.00 to
P12,000.00. As to the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
the latter having a gross income of P15,000.00 a year but with P7,800.00 as his
net yearly income must be multiplied by his life expectancy which is fixed to 25
years founded on the basis of his medical history showing that he suffered from
certain ailments during his lifetime, thereby amounting to a total of P195,000.00
which should be the amount to be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular
respect. The amount of actual damages was however sustained as well as that
with respect to the moral damages for the long period of uncertainty and suffering
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underwent by the plaintiffs from November 23, when the plane crashed to
December 19, when the death of their son was confirmed. The court, on the
other hand eliminated the award for exemplary damages since that the defendant
has not been found to have acted fraudulently or in a wanton, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner which would have warrant the award of
exemplary damages under Article 2232 of the Civil Code in contracts and quasicontracts. Lastly, the award of Attorneys fees made by the trial court in the
P10,000.00 was sustained since that the same has not been found to be
groundless.
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The Lower Court dismissed the complaint filed by De Leon and ordered
him to pay the private respondent attorneys fees as well as moral and exemplary
damages.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the CA. The latter affirmed the
decision of the Lower Court, hence the present petition.
Petitioner questions the award of moral and exemplary damages to private
respondents, inter alia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award for damages is proper.
HELD:
Yes.
The Court ruled that the filing of the case against respondent being
unfounded and maliciously prosecuted satisfactorily proves the existence of the
factual basis for moral damages and the causal relation to petitioners' acts.
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98
defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to
pay the same.
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the
consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it
became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against
defendants (per "Form of Subrogation", "Release" and Philbanking check).
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods
can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre
operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the payment of legal interest on an
award for loss or damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed
or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered; and (c) whether the
applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or six
percent (6%).
RULING:
The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with
the obligation of properly delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been
passed upon by the Court. In Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Services
(182 SCRA 455),the court have explained, in holding the carrier and the arrastre
operator liable in solidum, thus:
The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is
akin to that of a depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co.,
19 SCRA 5 [1967]. The relationship between the consignee and the common
carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator (Northern
Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the
ARRASTRE to take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver
them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon
the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore charged
with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee.
The court do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the
arrastre operator and the customs broker are themselves always and necessarily
liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that attendant facts in a given
case may not vary the rule. The instant petition has been brought solely by
Eastern Shipping Lines, which, being the carrier and not having been able to
rebut the presumption of fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular
case. A factual finding of both the court a quo and the appellate court, we take
note, is that "there is sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage
while in the successive possession of appellants" (the herein petitioner among
them). Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole
petitioner in this case, is inevitable regardless of whether there are others
solidarily liable with it.
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lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of
this decision until the payment thereof.
Submitted by: De Chavez, Faith
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and NESTOR B. SUGA JR.
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988
FACTS:
Nestor Sunga purchased a passenger Mazda minibus from Motor Center,
Inc. He executed a promissory not in lieu of the amount of the vehicle. A chattel
mortgage was likewise executed in favor Motor Center. The Chattel Mortgage
and assignment was assigned to Filinvest Credit Corp (FCC).
On 21 October 1978, Sunga claims that the minibus was seized by 2 employees
without any receipt. The taking was because of alleged delinquency in payments.
It was later found out that there was a mistake on the part of FCC and the vehicle
was returned to him.
Sunga filed a claim for moral damages in the trial court. Trial Court awarded
damages amounting to P 30,000. FCC appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA
affirmed decision and increased amount of damages to P50,000.
FCC filed a Petition for Certiorari saying that there was grave abuse of discretion
in the ascertainment of the amount of damages.
ISSUE:
Is the amount of moral damages awarded valid?
HELD:
Yes, the award is valid however it is exorbitant.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and
in granting litigation expenses.
Although, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would
be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its
own peculiar circumstances, the SC set the criterion that "in the case of moral
damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount awarded should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
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The SC reiterated the caveat to lower courts to guard against the award of
exorbitant damages that are way out of proportion circumstances of a case.
Submitted by: Dacanay, Jan Jacob
Jison v. CA 164 SCRA 399
Facts:
In a contract to sell, Robert O. Phillips and Sons (ROPSI) agreed to sell a
lot in Antipolo for P55,000.00 to the spouses Jison, with the interest of 8%
payable on installment basis. The contract also provided that a house be built on
the lot. When the spouses Jison failed to build a house, a penalty of P5 per sq/m.
the Jison spouses failed to pay the monthly installments for January, February,
and March 1966 on their due dates, but ROPSI accepted their subsequent
payments. Afterwards, the Jison spouses failed to pay again, this time for their
October, November, and December 1966 and January 1967. ROPSI reminded
the spouses to settle their accounts and of the automatic rescission clause of
their contract to sell. The Jison spouses eventually paid. However, the Jison
spouses again failed to pay their February, March, and April 1967 payments.
When the Spouses Jison tried to tender payments, ROPSI refused, prompting
the Jison spouses to file an action for specific performance.
Issue:
Whether or not the automatic rescission clause as well as the forfeiture
clause was valid
Held:
The Court ruled that the automatic rescission clause was valid, citing the
fact that while the Jison spouses had substantial compliance, there was also a
substantial breach on their part, as evidenced by their failure to tender their
monthly installment payments. Furthermore, the forfeiture of the amounts already
paid was valid. In this case, the Court ruled the forfeiture of the amounts paid is
to be treated as liquidated damages.
However, the Court found that the forfeiture of the accumulated fines due to the
non-construction of a house as stipulated in the contract was iniquitous, and thus lowered
the amount which was to be forfeited. The Code provides that liquidated damages,
whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable [Art. 2227.]
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Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision and motion for new
trial was denied by the trial court. Appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise
denied, thus the filing of a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to
partially annul the appellate court's decision and to enjoin the execution of said
decision against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lao together with his employer is liable for damages for
malicious prosecution?
Whether the damages awarded to the defaulting debtor may be satisfied by
execution against the employee's property since his employer's business has
already folded up?
HELD:
Lao had a valid defense to the action for malicious prosecution (Civil Case
No. 84-M) because it was his employer, St. Joseph Lumber, not himself, that was
the complainant in the estafa case against Espiritu. It was Chan Tong, the owner
of the St. Joseph Lumber, who, upon advice of his counsel, filed the criminal
complaint against Espiritu. Lao was only a witness in the case. He had no
personal interest in the prosecution of Espiritu for he was not the party defrauded
by Espiritu. He executed the affidavit which was used as basis of the criminal
charge against Espiritu because he was the salesman who sold the construction
materials to Espiritu. He was only an agent of St. Joseph Lumber, hence, not
personally liable to the party with whom he contracted (Art. 1897, Civil Code;
Philippine Products Co. vs. Primateria Societe Anonyme, 122 Phil. 698).
To maintain an action for damages based on malicious prosecution, three
elements must be present: First, the fact of the prosecution and the further fact
that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally
terminated with an acquittal; second, that in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and third, the prosecutor was actuated or impelled
by legal malice (Ferrer vs. Vergara, 52 O.G. 291).
Lao was not motivated by malice in making the affidavit upon which the
fiscal based the filing of the information against Espiritu. He executed it as an
employee, a salesman of the St. Joseph Lumber from whom Espiritu made his
purchases of construction materials and who, therefore, had personal knowledge
of the transaction. Although the prosecution of Espiritu for estafa did not prosper,
the unsuccessful prosecution may not be labelled as malicious. "Sound principles
of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the
courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights without later having to
stand trial for instituting prosecutions in good faith" (Buenaventura vs. Sto.
Domingo, 103 Phil. 239).
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105
106
107
108
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to his claim for backwages from the
date of his dismissal in 1975 up to the date of reinstatement and damages.
HELD:
In the absence of Proof that respondent Regional Director acted in bad
faith and with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner is not entitled to backwages
and consequently cannot claim for damages. The record manifests that
respondents officials were not motivated by ill will or personal malice in
dismissing petitioner but only by their desire to comply with the mandates of
Presidential Decree No. 6.
The Court likewise denies petitioner's claim for moral damages, because if
there was any delay in his reinstatement, it was attributed to his own fault and
negligence. It is clear that since the separation of petitioner from the government
service had not been shown to be in bad faith, an award for damages under the
circumstances would not be just and proper. Neither is it among the cases
mentioned in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages
may be recovered.
Thus, our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages
may be awarded, as follows:
First:
They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,
among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant. 6
Second:
The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.
Third:
The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, 8 and the award
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
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shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by
a common carrier.
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
Submitted by: Carlos, Mary Maizie C.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. JOSEFINO
MIRANDA and LUISA MIRANDA
G.R. No. 119641 May 17, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent spouses went to the United States of America. For
their trip back to the country, they obtained confirmed bookings from PAL for a
flight from San Francisco to Manila via Honolulu on June 21, 1988; then from
Manila to Cebu on June 24, 1988; and finally from Cebu to Surigao also on June
24, 1988.
On June 21, 1988, private respondents boarded the flight in San
Francisco with five pieces of baggage. After a stopover at Honolulu, and upon
arrival in Manila on June 23, 1988, they were told by the PAL personnel that all
their baggage were off-loaded at Honolulu due to weight limitations. As a result,
private respondents missed their connecting flight from Manila to Cebu City,
since they had to wait for their baggage which arrived the following day, June 24,
1988, after their connecting flight had left. They also missed their other
connecting flight from Cebu City to Surigao City.
On June 25, 1988, they departed for Cebu City and therefrom for Surigao
City. On the way to Surigao City, their flight had to return to Mactan Airport due
to some mechanical problem. The passengers were then booked for the
afternoon flight to Surigao City. However, said flight was also canceled.
Since there were no more flights for Surigao City that day, private
respondents asked to be billeted at the Cebu Plaza Hotel. But they were told by
PAL employees that they could not be accommodated at said hotel because it
111
was fully booked. However, when Dr. Miranda called the hotel, he was informed
that he and his wife could be accommodated there.
By the time private respondents were ready to go to the hotel, the shuttle
bus had already left. PAL offered them P150.00. Dr. Miranda asked for P150.00
more as they could not be accommodated in just one taxi, also for tipping money
for hotel boys. PAL refused the said request. Thus, Dr. Miranda decided that he
would not avail of the amenities offered by PAL.
When private respondents tried to retrieve their baggage, they were told
this time that the same were loaded on another earlier flight to Surigao City.
Private respondents were finally able to leave to Surigao City only on June 26,
1988. Thereafter, they instituted an action for damages which, after trial as well
as on appeal, was decided in their favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAL acted in bad faith warranting the award of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees to the private respondents.
HELD:
YES. A contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public
duty and any discourteous conduct on the part of a carrier's employee toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is
bad faith.
In the present case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that
there was breach of contract committed in bad faith by petitioner airline. The
private respondents had a confirmed booking on a PAL flight from San Francisco
to Manila. Therefore they were entitled to an assured passage not only for
themselves but for their baggage as well. It was shown that the private
respondents baggage were properly loaded and stowed in the plane when it left
San Francisco for Honolulu. The off-loading by PAL of their baggage to give way
to other passengers or cargo was an arbitrary and oppressive act which clearly
amounted to a breach of contract committed in bad faith and with malice.
The situation was aggravated by the poor treatment of the Mirandas by
the PAL employees during the stopover at Mactan Airport in Cebu; the denial of
petitioner's personnel to the Miranda spouses' request to be billeted at the Cebu
Plaza Hotel by saying that it was fully booked, which was disproven by the fact
that Dr. Miranda was able to arrange for accommodations thereat; and, the PAL
employees' negligent act of sending off the baggage of private respondents to
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Surigao City, while they were still in Cebu, without any explanation for this gross
oversight.
Moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract
of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith.
What amounts to bad faith which would entitle a carriers passenger to an award
of moral damages is inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration. What the law considers
as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would
be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in
the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit. Such unprofessional
and proscribed conduct is attributable to petitioner airline in the case at bar.
In a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary damages
may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorney's fees in the concept of
damages may be awarded where there is a finding of bad faith. The evidence on
record adequately sustains that the awards assessed against petitioner on the
said items of damages are justified and reasonable.
It is PAL's duty to provide assistance to private respondents and any other
passenger similarly inconvenienced due to delay in the completion of the
transport and the receipt of their baggage. Therefore, its unilateral and voluntary
act of providing cash assistance is deemed part of its obligation as an air carrier.
Likewise, arrangements for and verification of requested hotel accommodations
for private respondents could and should have been done by PAL employees
themselves.
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RULING:
In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
The court neither sustains the award of exemplary damages. The
prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasicontract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the
characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorneys fee must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to
stand on. The fact that private respondent was compelled to litigate and incur
expenses to protect and enforce his claim did not justify the award of attorneys
fee. Petitioner is willing to pay the just claim of $200.00 as result of the delay in
the transportation of the luggage in accord with the Warsaw Convention.
Needless to say, the award of attorneys fee must be deleted where the awards
of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
Submitted by: AURE, GARY C.
G.R. No. L-51832 April 26, 1989
RAFAEL PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE,
JUDGE, CFI CAPIZ, BRANCH II and BIENVENIDO BACALOCOS,
respondents.
FACTS:
On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while a benefit
dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta,
petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public
auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent
Bienvenido Bacalocos who is the President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a
state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his
companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand
which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and
asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could
respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's face with his
bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion ensued and private respondent
was brought by the policemen to the municipal building.
As a result of the incident, a criminal complaint for Slander by Deed was
flied by petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Pilar, Capiz, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2228, but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint
for damages was filed by petitioner with the court.
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Rolando Manahan followed the appellant in order to ascertain that the latter had
in fact left the premises. Lamberto Abugan had also went out to look after the two
and saw them at the provincial road where Rolando Manahan kicked appellants
shoes which were lying on the road, and that a heated altercation between the
two continued. Thereafter, appellant pulled a fan knife from his right hip and told
Rolando Manahan that hes going to kill him. Lamberto Abugan left to proceed to
the police headquarters in order to seek help, and when he, in the company of
Pfc. Yambao, returned to the provincial road, they saw Rolando Manahan already
dead.
Thereafter, appellant was arrested. He admitted that he indeed killed
Rolando Manahan but interposed self-defense as a justifying circumstance. The
contention of self-defense was, however, rejected by the trial court since that it
has only been based on the appellants own testimony and without corroborative
evidence to support the same.
The trial court convicted the appellant for the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court further
sentences him to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the sum of
P100,000.00 for the death of Rolando Manahan, P26,445.00 for actual damages
incurred for burial and other expenses of the deceased, and, P250,000.00 for
moral damages, with costs against the appellant.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Gurmecindo
Quilaton for the crime of murder.
2.
Whether or not the trial court arrived at a sound determination with
regard to the award of damages.
Held:
1.
The appellant should be convicted of homicide only. The findings of
the trial court that the stabbing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery could not be sustained. Treachery cannot be presumed and must be
proven positively and that there must be evidence as to the mode of attack used
by the offender. This is so because treachery exists only when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make. Lamberto Ambugan did not witness the actual stabbing by
appellant of Rolando Manahan as he ran away in order to seek help, therefore,
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his testimony in this respect affords no sufficient basis for reasonably inferring
that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
2. Actual damages awarded in favor of the heirs of Rolando Manahan in
the amount of P26,445.00 representing interment and related expenses incurred,
was sustained since that the same has been supported by various receipts
submitted by the brother of Rolando Manahan and that the same has not been
controverted in any way by the appellant. The amount of P100,000.00 as
indemnity for death must, however, be reduced to P50,000.00 in conformity with
the prevailing jurisprudence on this matter. Aside from this ordinary indemnity for
death, appellant is obliged, in accordance with Article 2206 of the Civil Code: 1.
to compensate the heirs of Rolando Manahan for the latters loss of earning
capacity; 2. to give support in the form of expenses for education to the sisters of
Rolando Manahan who had been dependent on him therefore; and 3. to pay the
heirs of Rolando Manahan moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by
them. In the instant case, the trial court lumped these monetary obligations into
what it called moral damages, which therefore needs some analysis. As to the
loss of earning capacity, life expectancy and net compensable earnings should
be taken into account. Considering that Rolando Manahan was 26 years of age
at the time of death, he was expected to live for another 46 years as determined
from the generally accepted formula in computing for life expectancy, based on
the 1980 CSO table. However, a man does not normally continue working to earn
money up to the final month or year of his life; hence, 46 years could be
reasonably reduced to 39 years. Besides, Rolando Manahan is a government
employee who is expected to retire at the age of 65. If there are 261 working
days in a year and that Rolando Manahan is receiving P23.00 a day, his gross
earnings would be approximately P234,000.00, wherein a reasonable amount
representing his necessary expenses had he been living, which in this case is
P120,000.00, should be deducted, thereby fixes the amount to P114,000.00 for
his net or compensable earnings lost. Finally, the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, considers it appropriate to award the amount of P20,000.00 by way of
moral damages, having the same based also on the testimony of Ruben, brother
of Rolando Manahan, that their mother suffered a mild stroke upon learning of
Rolando Manahans slaying, which resulted in the mothers semi-paralysis.
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performance of all the terms and conditions of the US$ 28,150.00 Letter of Credit
issued by Kangyo Bank Ltd. and had not guaranteed the performance of Lanuza
Lumber's obligation under its P 25,000.00 loan from PNB. CFI and CA ruled in
favor of PNB and moreso, awarded interest and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not interest and attorneys fees should have been granted
despite the clause limiting the liability of Utassco.
RULING:
Creditors suing on a suretyship bond may recover from the surety as part
of their damages, interest at the legal rate even if the surety would thereby
become liable to pay more than the total amount stipulated in the bond. The
theory is that interest is allowed only by way of damages for delay upon the part
of the sureties in making payment after they should have done.
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of twelve (12%) percent per annum pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 416
dated July 29, 1974.
On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the trial court's judgment was
modified, the rest of the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The defendantsappellants shall pay costs in favor of the plaintiffs.
The said decision having become final on October 24, 1980, the case was
remanded to the lower court for execution and this is where the controversy
started. In the computation of the "legal interest" decreed in the judgment sought
to be executed, petitioners claim that the "legal interest" should be at the rate of
twelve (12%) percent per annum, invoking in support of their aforesaid
submission, Central Bank of the Philippines Circular No. 416. Upon the other
hand, private respondents insist that said legal interest should be at the rate of
six (6%) percent per annum only, pursuant to and by authority of Article 2209 of
the New Civil Code in relation to Articles 2210 and 2211 thereof.
ISSUE:
How much, by way of legal interest, should a judgment debtor pay the
judgment creditor?
RULING:
Central Bank Circular No. 416 provides:
otherwise known as the "Usury Law" the Monetary Board in its Resolution
No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be
twelve (12%) per cent per annum.
The judgments spoken of and referred to are Judgments in litigations
involving loans or forbearance of any 'money, goods or credits. Any other kind of
monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of
the said law for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central
Bank.
Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is
one rendered in an Action for Damages for injury to persons and loss of property
and does not involve any loan, much less forbearances of any money, goods or
credits. As correctly argued by the private respondents, the law applicable to the
said case is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code which reads:
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Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and
the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation
to the contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence
of stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per annum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding the
instant petition to be without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs
against petitioners.
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breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was
overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about
these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would
have the choice to ride with another airline.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its
passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While
the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet,
only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure
time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over
discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of
respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets
represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent
TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling
respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to
bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of
petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of
petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter
breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we
adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
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HELD:
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NO. Before private respondent was dismissed from the service, petitioner
created a committee to investigate the charges against him. The committee was
composed of highly respectable members of the community. Private respondent
was given an opportunity to answer all the charges against him, which he did.
After almost one year of investigation, the committee recommended that private
respondent be dismissed from service.
Private respondent's dismissal from the service based on loss of trust and
confidence had basis. Therefore, his dismissal was not attended by bad faith.
Private respondent is not entitled to the recovery of moral damages since
these are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
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