2006 Idga - Simulation in Airline Manpads Protection

The Roles of Dynamic Simulation
in Airliner MANPADS Protection

IDGA MANPADS Seminar
March 2006
Dr. T.W. Tucker

Tactical Technologies Inc.
356 Woodroffe Ave.
Ottawa, Ontario, K2A 3V6
Tel: (613) 828-0775, e-mail: info@tti.on.ca URL: www.tti.on.ca
3/9/2009 Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 1

2009, All Rights Reserved
Presentation Outline
• Self Protection Evaluation
– Static Analysis of Threat Parameters
– Missile Miss Distance as a Primary MOE
– Impact of Non-Linear Interactions (Chaotic
Behavior) on Missile Miss Distance
• Dynamic Simulation of Tactical
Engagements
– Several Classes (Generations) of Missiles
– Vs Jammer and Flare Airliner Protection Options
• The Roles of Dynamic Software Simulation

Evaluation Methodology
• Was stimulated by the need to understand the
effectiveness of “off the shelf” self protection (ECM)
systems - in relation to specific threat weapons and
engagement geometries
• Was stimulated by the high cost of field trials and the

availability of airliners
• Was stimulated by the need for a systematic &

repeatable analytical approach resulting in a
documented self protection effectiveness audit trail

ECM Effectiveness Evaluation
At End Game:
What is the Miss Distance?
Airframe
Aircraft Mass, Length,
Flare Signature vs Aspect Autopilot Wing Config.
Signature vs Time Pos’n vs Time PN Coeff.
Pos’n vs Time
Seeker
Detector, ECCMs,
Tracker

Focus On Missile Miss Distance
• Survivability of the airliner is assured if the miss
distance is sufficiently large that the missile does
not impact the target or trigger the fuse - the
warhead does not detonate
• Avoids the complex characterization of target
hardness and missile warhead fragmentation
• The probability of survival is based on a simple
characterization of target hardness and missile
warhead as a relative measure only - not an
absolute measure

The Determination Of Miss Distance
Miss Distance is determined by
integrating incremental flight path
errors over the entire missile’s flight
Countermeasure May
Generate Angle Track Error
In Seeker
Angle Track Error May

Generate Steering Error
In Autopilot
Steering Error May
Generate Flight Path
Error
In Missile Flight

Evaluation Methodology
• Step 1- Static Analysis:
– Characterize the threat weapon system using a
standardized parameter set - EWIRDB
• Step 2 - Static Analysis:
– Determine optimum electronic countermeasure
parameters based on weapon system parameters
• Step 3 - Dynamic Engagement
Simulation:
– Determine over-all effectiveness of the self protection
in tactical engagements - Missile miss distance or
probability of survival

Engagement Characterization
• Target Platform - Signature and Maneuver
• Threat Weapon - Guidance and Dynamics
• Countermeasures - Techniques and Tactics
• Propagation - Attenuation vs Wavelength
• Background Clutter
• Engagement Geometry
• Characterizing all systems involves more
than 250 parameters

Threat Weapon System Analysis
• For self protection (ECM) effectiveness
evaluation, the weapon system analysis must
focus on the system’s aerodynamic, guidance,
tracking & control subsystems
• The most important weapon parameters describe
the time response and target discrimination
characteristics of various missile subsystems (eg.
servo bandwidths and ECCMs)
• Using standardized weapon parameters such as
EWIRDB facilitate this process
• Analysis methods are available for computing
estimated values for parameters unavailable from
EW Databases or exploitation reports
IR Seeker Basic Characteristics
• Passive infra-red angle only tracking
• Many angular scanning/tracking techniques
– Spin scan, conscan, rosette, FPA
• Some possible ECCM discrimination techniques
– Narrow optical field-of-view
– Spectral filtering (two or more color/bands)
– Sudden increase in signal power/intensity
– Sudden change in rate of line of sight (angle)
• Angle servo electronics determine tracking and
maneuver responsive of threat missile

Threat Evolution
Threats Exceed
500,000 Missiles
World-wide
2010
2nd Generation
2005 Spectral Imagers
1st Generation
Imagers
2000
Scanning
Imagers
1980s/90s
Cross Array/Rosette
Flare CCMs
1970/80
Cooled
Con Scan
1960s
Uncooled Spin Scan Courtesy LAIRCM SPO, AFRL
Spinning Reticle AM Tracker – 1st Gen
AKA Spin Scan
Graphic: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt

Spinning Optics FM Tracker – 2nd Gen
AKA Con Scan
Graphic: “Surface Based Air Defense System Analysis” By. H.M. Macfadzeqn

Multiple Spinning Optics - 3rd Gen
Aka Rosette Scans
Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis

Angle Tracking Servo Loop Reticule
Detector
IR Radiation
Light Tracker
Telescope
Collector Electronics
Error Signal
Position
Drive
Detector Preamp
Band- Band- Error Signal
AGC Phase
Pass Demod Pass
Detector
Filter Filter
Scanning Phase Reference
• Seeker field-of-view determined by optics and reticule

• Tracking (Servo) loop response determined by filter
bandwidths and amplifier gains
Sample SA-7 Parameter Data
Track Technique Spin Scan
Data From “Soviet Air Defence Missiles” by S. Zaloga

Analyzed SA-7 Parameters
• Physical Parameters • Response Parameters
– Airframe Natural Frequency:
– Mass: 5.5 to 9.2 kg
14.9 to 21.6 rad/sec
– Length: 1.42 m
– Airframe Damping Coefficient:
– Diameter: 0.07 m
.06 to .09
– Altitude: 0 to 4.5 km Analytic
– Airframe Maximum Latax:
– Velocity: 580 m/sec Models
12.1 to 30.3 g’s
– Wing Span: 0.14 m
– Autopilot PN Constant (Tail-on):
– Mean Chord: .08 m
1.7
– Configuration: Cruciform
– Seeker Servo Bandwidth:
1.1 to 1.9 Hz
• Other (Zaloga)
Graphic: “High-Tech Warfare” – Field Of View : 1.9 degrees
by D. Richardson, et al. – Spectral Band : 1.7 to 2.8
microns
MANPADS/ECM Expectations
• ECM Characteristics - Tactics, Maneuvers and
Timing - will all affect engagement outcomes as
measured by missile miss distance
• Virtually an infinite number of threat parameter,
ECM parameter and engagement geometry
combinations are possible - only select
combinations result in aircraft survivability - Miss
Distance >> Warhead Fuse Distance
• Threat characterization, parameter certification and
data management may have major impact on
outcomes
• Management of each engagement’s results, in
relation to the associated input parameter
combinations, is essential
• Calls for database management

Data Management Complexity
(Seeker Search and Track Parameters)

Aerodynamic and Autopilot Parameters
Zipfel’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters
Zarchan’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters

Typical Jet A/C & Flare Signatures
Turbo-Jet Aircraft Radiant Intensity,

Military Power, 150 o Aspect at 300 m
Typical Flare Radiant Intensity
From:”Sources Of Radiation” Vol 1

IR/EO Systems Handbook, Ed G. Zissis

Aircraft & Flare Signatures
Radiant Intensity
vs Wavelength
vs Aspect Angle

Target & Flare Signatures
Flare
IR Radiant Intensities In 1.7 to 2.8 Micron Band Radiant Flare
(dBw/sr)
Intensity Radiant Intensity
vs Aspect Angle (dBw/sr) Vs Time
25
30
20
20
15
10 10
5
1 2 3 4
Aircraft 0
Time (sec)
Flare Peak

Flare Signature Control
The Dark Flare
A Standard Flare
The Dark Flare By Aircraft Protections Systems

Atmospheric Transmission
IR IR IR
Visible
40.0
30.0
Attentuation (dB/Km) 20.0
10.0
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Wavelength (micrometers)

Jammer & DIRCM Parameters
Modulation Scheme
Radiant Intensity
Vs Wavelength Time Sequence
IR Seeking Missile Reality
AN/AIM 9 Sidewinder Characteristics

Length: 2.89 meters
Diameter: 0.13 meters
Fin Span: 0.63 meters
Speed: Supersonic
Warhead: 9.36 kg blast fragmentation
Launch Weight: 85.5 kg
Range: 16+ km
Guidance System: Solid-state infrared homing
From: “Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability & Design”

R. E. Ball, AIAA Press, Second Edition (CD-ROM)

DHL A300 vs Igla (SA-14) in Baghdad,
Nov 22, 2003
As Filmed by French Reporters

Claimed to be a picture of the actual attack on the DH
DHL A300 On Fire
The second
missile missed

DHL A300 Aftermath

Key ECM Effectiveness Issues
• Countermeasure effectiveness measured by
missile miss distance at end game
– Large missile miss distance = effective countermeasure
– Successful velocity or range deception does not normally
cause a large missile miss distance
– Successful steady angle error deception against
proportional navigation guidance does not normally cause a
large missile miss distance
• Missile miss distance measurement requires
complete closed-loop dynamic missile fly-out,
including:
– Missile and target aerodynamics and kinematics
– Threat missile guidance and control including non-linearities
– Threat radar/seeker and electronic countermeasure
interactions

Repeat: Miss Distance Determination
Miss Distance Is Determined By
Integrating Incremental Flight Path
Errors Over Entire Missile Flight
Countermeasure May
Generate Angle Track Error
In Seeker
Angle Track Error May

Generate Steering Error
In Autopilot
Steering Error May
Generate Flight Path
Error
In Missile Flight

Required Simulation Features
• Dynamic closed-loop missile fly-out engagements
• Various missile seeker tracking types required
– Spin Scan, Con Scan, Rosette, Quadrant,
Array
• Various countermeasure types required
– On-Board Omni-directional and Directed
(DIRCM)
– Off-Board Flares and Towed Decoys
• Non-linear interactions between seeker and ECM
• IR signatures vs aspect angle and wavelength
• Atmospheric propagation and background
• Engagement geometry and target aircraft tactics
• Output result includes missile miss distance
Simulation Engagement Control
Systems’ Data Management
Engagement Scenario Management

Miss Distance vs IR Flares

Non-linear interactions & miss distance
• Missile miss distance occurs after extended dynamic
interactions between ECM and Missile’s Seeker
• Seeker contains many non-linear functions and
components, such as steering surface limits, saturating
amplifiers and S-shaped tracking discriminators
• ECM signals inherently cause seekers to operate in non-
linear regions and with non-linear logic and functions
• Extended dynamic interactions between non-linear
systems inherently gives rise to chaotic behavior
• Chaotic behavior means a small change in an input
condition or parameter can lead to a large change in
missile miss distance

What Is Chaotic Behavior?
• Noticed By Lorenz In Weather Prediction Studies
• Plot Trajectory Depends On
Initial Conditions
• May Possess “Quasi- Stable
Regions
• Plot Trajectory Is Not
Repetitive
• May Possess Multiple
“Strange Attractors”
• Final Result Depends On
Duration Of Interaction
• Caused By Non-Linearities In Extended Dynamic Interactions

Simulating Chaotic Behavior
For realistic and valid simulation the threat subsystems must
include appropriate non-linearities and narrow threat
parameter ranges
Simulation models and input parameter values must be
validated to confirm they include key non-linear interactions
and models and parameters together generate realistic
chaotic behavior
Multiple simulation runs (Batch Runs) of engagements,
using Monte Carlo selection of expected threat, ECM and
engagement parameter values, should be performed
The chaotic scatter results from individual runs in the batch
should be collected to establish statistical distributions

Sample MANPADS Batch Result:
Miss Distance vs Missile Launch Azimuth
Miss distance scatter vs missile launch azimuth for a particular flare deployment pattern
1000
Fixed Parameters
900
A/C IR Rad Int
800 800 w/str
700 Flare IR Rad Int

Distance (m)
4000 w/str
600
Distance
Flare Deployment
500 6 flares
0.5 sec spacing
MissMiss
400
Random Parameters
300 (Monte Carlo Selection)
200 Launch Distance

2000 to 4000 m
100
Missile Velocity
0
600 to 1000 m/s
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Missile Launch Angle

Launch Angle (deg) (deg)

Probability Miss Exceeds Threshold
Probability Miss Distance Exceeds Indicated Thresholds
100% Fixed Parameters

90%
80% A/C IR Rad Int
100 m
70% 800 w/str
60%
200 m
50% Flare IR Rad Int
40% 4000 w/str
300 m
30%
20% Flare Deployment
10% 100 m6 flares
0% 0.5msec spacing
200
300 m
Random Parameters
(Monte Carlo Selection)
Launch Distance
• 2000 to 4000 m
Missile Velocity
• 600 to 1000 m/s

Plotting CM Effectiveness
• Plot miss distance scatter data so that the
probability (Percentage Of Runs) miss distance
exceeds pre-selected thresholds as a function of
missile azimuth launch angle.
• Provides a means to:
 Develop Effectiveness Requirements Specifications
 Develop Equipment Test Procedures Based on
Effectiveness Specifications
 Develop Countermeasure Deployment Tactics
 Develop Aircraft Maneuver Timings And Strategies

MANPADS/Airliner/CM Engagements
• Wide Body Aircraft
– Four Engines
– In Take-off, Climbing at 100
– Speed 100 m/sec,
– AC Altitude at Missile Launch: 400 m
– Demos Of Both Flare and DIRCM Protection
• Missile Launch
– Launch Range 1.5 Km
– Demos Of First (One Color, Spin Scan Tracking) and
Third Generation (Two Colour, Rosette Tracking)
Missiles
MANPADS Characteristics
Threat Wave Band Tracking Reference
(microns) Technique
SA-7 1.9-2.8 Spin Scan Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04

Grail (uncooled) (AM) Zaloga, Janes Pub, 1988
SA-14 1.9-4.1 Con Scan Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04

Gremlin (cooled) (FM) http://encyclopedia.thefreedictio
nary.com/SA-14
SA-18 2-3 & 3-5 Con Scan? Grossman et al, Rand Study,
Grouse (two colour (FM) #1713
discrimination)
Stinger IR/UV dual Rosette http://www.redstone.army.mil/
Post (ECCM - colour Systems/STINGER.html
discrimination)

Countering A Spin Scan Tracker
Target Detection and Tracking
Spinning Reticle
Graphics: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt

Relative Phase Determines Target Angle
Counter-Phase ECM Amplitude Modulation Causes Angle Error Sweeping
ECM AM Frequency Can Ensure Counter-Phasing
Directed IR CM Protection
• Miss Distance Created By Anti-Phase Amplitude
Modulated Jamming That Introduces:
– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout
The Missile’s Flight, Or
– Rapid Angle Track Error Sufficiently Large To Cause
Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-Acquisition
• Directed Jammer Beam Offers Large Jam to
Signal Ratio and Large Angle Track Error
Normally (vs Omni-Directional Shuttered Heat
Sources)
• Requires Detection and Closed Loop Tracking Of
Attacking Missile Signature (Body/Plume) To
Direct The Focused IR Beam

DIRCM Simulation Features
• Directed Jamming Beam
– Laser or High Intensity Lamp
– Radiant Intensity vs Beamwidth & Wavelength
– Programmable Amplitude Modulation
Sequences
• Closed-loop Servo Controlled Beam
Steering
– Quadrant Array, Two Color Missile Tracking
• Missile IR/UV Signatures vs Time, Aspect
Angle and Wavelengths

DIRCM Swept AM vs Spin Scan

Role Of Dynamic Simulation
• Provides scopes of primary seeker
subsystem responses to ECM stimuli
enabling analysts to understand key
interactions
• Provides graphics of missile and aircraft
trajectories and end-game miss distance
• Batch simulation runs collect statistics of
engagement outcomes (miss distance) for
a wide range of engagement scenarios

Swept AM vs Spin Scan
Batch Run Effectiveness Results
Average Miss Distance (m)
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0

Miss distance dependence on relative AM & Spin Scan Phase
(by varying missile launch range in a tail chase geometry)
100.0
90.0
Missile Miss Distance (m)
80.0
70.0 Miss Distance:
60.0 Average = 57.9 m
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
Outboard
10.0
Inboard Last Mode:
0.0 100% In Search
1200 1250 1300 1350 1400
Missile Launch Range (m)
Miss Distance Depends Somewhat on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Spin Scan Phase)
Typical Rosette Scans (Multiple Spinning Optics)
• Scans While Tracks

• Digital Tracking
• Spatial Sampling
• Quasi-Imaging
• ECM Generation Of
Angle Error May Be
Difficult
Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis

Swept AM vs Rosette Engagement

Rosette AM Deception Analysis
13
13 10 Rosette Characteristics
10
2 7 • Two Counter-Rotating
Mirrors
5 5 7 4
• Rotation Rates =15 & 27 Hz
15 •
2
8 Petal Frequency = 42 Hz
4
•
8 1 1
Rosette Frequency = 3 Hz
11
3
• Number of Petals = 14
11 12
12
• Sequence As Shown
6
14 9 9
14 3 6
AM ECM Characteristics
• AM Center Frequency = 43.5 Hz

Angle Error vs AM Frequency
AM Freq 1.000
0.500
42.0 Hz 0.000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.500
-1.000
1.000
0.500 Angle Errors
43.5 Hz 0.000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.500
-1.000
1.000
0.500
45.0 Hz 0.000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.500
-1.000
Time (Sec)
Swept AM vs Rosette
Miss distance dependence on missile launch range in tail chase geometry
Swept AM vs Rosette
160.0
140.0
Missile Miss Distance (m)
120.0
100.0 Miss Distance:

Average = 27.5 m
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
Outboard Last Mode:
Inboard
0.0 50% In Search
1200 1250 1300 1350 1400
-20.0
Missile Launch Range (m)
Miss Distance Depends Substantially on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Rosette Phase)
Swept AM vs Rosette Effectiveness
Average Missile Miss Distance (m)
350.0
300.0
250.0
200.0
150.0
100.0
50.0
0.0

IR Jammer Protection
• Directional AM Jamming Offers Large A Jam to
Signal Ratio That Is Normally Required To
Generate A Large Angle Track Error
• Anti-Phase Amplitude Modulated Jamming May
Create A Large Missile Miss Distance By :
– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout
Missile Flight, Or
– Introducing a Sufficiently Rapid Large Angle Track
Error Causing Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-
Acquisition (ie Missile Flies and Unguided, Ballistic
Trajectory for a Portion of Its Flight)

Flares vs Rosette Engagement

Flares vs Rosette Effectiveness

Flares vs Spin Scan Effectiveness

Flare Protection
• Factors Affecting Missile Miss Distance:
– Ejection Time Relative To Missile End Game
– Ignition and Burn Out Times
– Ejection Velocity, Direction, Kinematics
» Flare Velocity Dynamics Seeker
Discrimination
– IR Signature (Radiant Intensity)
» Two Colour Seeker Discrimination
– Physical Extent Of Flare Cluster
» Spatial Seeker Discrimination (Imaging)

Airliner MANPADS Protection
• On-Board (DIRCM) • Off-Board (Flares)
– Modulation’s Success – Deployment Sequence
Depends on Threat’s Tracking Relative to End Game
Technique (Timing) Is Important For
– Requires Threat Analysis Success
Capabilities – Success Is Engagement
• Defeat of Advanced Trackers Geometry Dependent
May Be Difficult if DIRCM • Success Is Relatively
Power Is Not Sufficient to Independent Of Threat’s
Cause Damage Tracking Technique

The Roles Of Dynamic Simulation In
• Single simulation runs enable the analyst to

understand the countermeasure characteristics
required to produce large miss distances in various
missiles and engagement geometries by viewing
embedded seeker scopes
• Batch simulation runs produce operationally
significant statistical effectiveness data and plots
• Simulations are critical for planning, conducting and
analyzing expensive and limited field trials

Dynamic Simulation Properties
Required to Fulfill this Role
• Simulations must be high fidelity and replicate the seeker’s responsiveness
and primary non-linearities - tracking discriminators, amplifiers, ECCM logic,
and gimbal and control surface limits and physics based interactions with
countermeasures
• Simulations must compute miss distance for effectiveness evaluations by
integration of incremental flight path errors, including the influence of non-
linearities
• Simulations must run batches quickly for efficient statistical data collection
• Simulations should possess one-for-one mapping of hardware seeker
subsystems to software subsystems for validation - hierarchical system of
systems
• Simulations must possess scopes and graphics embedded at various test
points for engineering analysis
The Role of Dynamic Simulation In
IDGA MANPADS Seminar
March 2006
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The Roles of Dynamic Simulation

in Airliner MANPADS Protection

Dr. T.W. Tucker

3/9/2009 Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 1

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• Was stimulated by the high cost of field trials and the

• Was stimulated by the need for a systematic &

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Angle Track Error May

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Graphic: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt

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Scanning Phase Reference

• Seeker field-of-view determined by optics and reticule

Track Technique Spin Scan

Data From “Soviet Air Defence Missiles” by S. Zaloga

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Zarchan’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters

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Turbo-Jet Aircraft Radiant Intensity,

Typical Flare Radiant Intensity

From:”Sources Of Radiation” Vol 1

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The Dark Flare

The Dark Flare By Aircraft Protections Systems

Attentuation (dB/Km) 20.0

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AN/AIM 9 Sidewinder Characteristics

From: “Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability & Design”

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As Filmed by French Reporters

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Angle Track Error May

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Systems’ Data Management

Engagement Scenario Management

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700 Flare IR Rad Int

200 Launch Distance

Missile Launch Angle

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100% Fixed Parameters

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SA-7 1.9-2.8 Spin Scan Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04

SA-14 1.9-4.1 Con Scan Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04

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