North Korea National Intelligence Estimate - Nukes, Famine, Missiles and The Dear Leader

National Intelligence Estimate
North Korea
2
PROSPECTS FOR REGIME CHANGE AND REUNIFICATION

IN NORTH KOREA:
A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
TEAM B
Branch Chiefs
Josh Johnson—Leadership and Economy
Dan Saarinen—Military and Reunification
dsaarinen@charter.net
General Editor
Sarah Boman
Section Chiefs
Silas Molino—Leadership
Danielle Jones—Life Expectancy
Keri Johnson—Economy and Infrastructure
Nick Kelley—Conventional Military
John Nydam—WMD
Mathias Wakefield—Reunification
Jason Lee—International Response to Reunification
California State University, San Bernardino

March 29, 2009
3
CONTENTS
KEY WORDS………………………………………………………………………………….....3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………...4
KEY JUDGMENTS……………………………………………………………………………..8
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………...11
APPROACH…………………………………………………………………………………….13
CHAPTER 1: Leadership and Succession………………………………………………..…...15
CHAPTER 2: Economy and Infrastructure…………………………………………………..25
CHAPTER 3: Military…………………………………………………………………...…….49
CHAPTER 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction…………………………………………………57
CHAPTER 5: Reunification……………………………………………………………………67
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………........81
ANNEX
APPENDIX A: Kim Jong-Il’s Life Expectancy.……………………………………...86
APPENDIX B: Population Growth and Food Supply in North Korea…..…………87
APPENDIX C: Aid to North Korea……………………………………………...……88
APPENDIX D: Production and Transportation in North Korea…………………....89
APPENDIX E: North Korean Trade……………………………………………….....90
APPENDIX F: Energy and Fuel in North Korea………………………………….....91
APPENDIX G: Military Comparison Between South and North Korea…………...92
APPENDIX H: North Korean Missile Ranges………………………………………..94

4
KEY WORDS
Air Force, Army, ballistic missile, capital, capital consumption, capital

goods, civil war, China, collapse, coup, counterfeiting, current
expenditure, demilitarized zone (DMZ), Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK), doctrine, economy, factors of production, famine,
foreign aid, heir, ideology, infrastructure, investment, Japan, Juche, Kim
Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong-Un, Kim Jong Woon, Korean War,
land, labor, market, material productive forces, military, National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Navy, North Korea, nuclear weapon,
occupation, proletariat, proliferation, propaganda, regime change,
Russia, saving, six party talks, Songun, South Korea, succession, test,
regime change, reunification, United States, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)
5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a totalitarian dictatorship under the
personal control of Kim Jong-Il. Kim’s ultimate goal is regime survival, and he manipulates
North Korea’s military, foreign policy, and his own people to ensure his survival as head of state.
Although Kim’s health has begun to decline, he has not yet named an heir. This purposeful
oversight may lead to serious instability, or even a total North Korean collapse if Kim dies
without preparing for an orderly transfer of power to a son, another relative, or to high-ranking
officers within the North Korean military. Since the United States has little control over Kim’s
leadership style, American policymakers must prepare for the possibility that North Korea will
become a failed state upon the death of Kim Jong-Il, with all the economic, military, and
humanitarian issues that such a collapse will entail.
To maintain personal control over North Korea, Kim Jong-Il must keep his health intact,
his society closed, his people submissive, and his military well-nourished. Unfortunately for
Kim, he is failing at each of these goals. Since his purported stroke in August 2008, Kim has had
to cede much of his personal control over the country to members of his inner circle. He is also
losing his informational hold over the North Korean people, as South Korean soap operas and
Chinese cell phones are beginning to pervade North Korean society. Pyongyang’s inability to
quash farmers’ markets around the country suggests that the DPRK’s internal security forces are
losing the ability or will to police the population. Finally, even the military has begun to go
hungry in the wake of North Korea’s ongoing food crisis—there are accounts of soldiers too
malnourished to leave their barracks, and military units seizing seed rice meant for next year’s
6
crop in order to feed themselves now. In short, Kim’s personal hold over North Korea is
beginning to weaken.
Despite these facts, we believe that the Kim regime may still survive for many more
years, due to Kim’s military backing and the lack of a viable alternative within the North Korean
government. If Kim is able to designate a successor and give that successor the opportunity to
ingratiate himself with North Korea’s military and political elites, it is possible that his policies
will live on after his death. This kind of peaceful and orderly succession would effectively
perpetuate the status quo: North Korea’s economy would continue to degrade; its people would
continue to suffer from famine; its government would continue to export rocket and nuclear
technology to provide the hard currency for its elites’ extravagant lifestyle; and its constant
nuclear saber-rattling would deter its neighbors and placate its military. It is our judgment that
this is the most likely outcome for North Korea over the next fifteen years.
However, American policymakers should also prepare for the possibility that the Kim
regime will fail sometime in the next five to ten years—possibly within a year or two. Although
many North Korea observers have predicted imminent collapse and been proven wrong, the
situation in North Korea at present is more serious than it was during the famines of the 1990s.
This time, Kim Jong-Il himself is not healthy, and may not be completely in charge of North
Korea’s government. The DPRK’s unusually aggressive behavior over the past two months
suggests that either Kim himself has become more hard-line since his illness, or that another
person or group is influencing North Korea’s foreign policy. Moreover, the food shortage in
North Korea is now affecting not only the farmers and poorer citizens, but also the military. As a
government that depends on military backing to enforce its decrees, the Kim regime’s inability to
meet the basic nutritional needs of its soldiers may prove fatal, as it will likely lose the military’s
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support, or worse, face the threat of a military coup, if the crisis continues. The food crisis shows
no sign of abating any time soon. The fact that North Korean soldiers are beginning to eat seed
rice meant for next year’s harvest means that the famine can only get worse next year. At some
point, the North Korean military will probably reach a breaking point, and it will remove the
regime whose policies are leading to the ongoing food shortage. Although we do not believe that
this is the most likely outcome for North Korea, the ramifications of such a regime collapse are
far-reaching enough that the United States must take this scenario into account as part of its long-
range projections.
To stave off collapse, the Kim regime will continue to invest in its missile program and
nuclear program, and will attempt to use its nuclear program to exact concessions from its
neighbors. It will also continue to export its missile technology to other powers in exchange for
hard currency, which it can use to import vital goods and to support the elites’ lavish lifestyle.
North Korea’s economy will continue to deteriorate, since North Korea lacks the ability to fix its
crumbling road and rail infrastructure, expand its power grid, or motivate its underfed and
technologically backward workforce. Famines will continue, unless the Kim regime makes
foreign policy concessions in order to restart international food donations to the DPRK—an
action that Kim is unlikely to take. North Korea’s military capabilities will continue to
deteriorate, since North Korea does not have the hard currency to modernize or expand its
conventional forces. This means that North Korea will have little chance of holding its own, let
alone prevailing, in the event of a second Korean War.
We believe that the possibility of reunification between North and South Korea is remote,
especially while the Kim regime remains in control of the DPRK. No country in the region has
the incentive to support reunification at this time—North Korea for the sake of regime
8
preservation; South Korea for financial reasons (the sheer cost of rebuilding the North would
bankrupt even South Korea’s robust economy); and China for geopolitical reasons (it does not
want to face a unified, American-backed Korea along its border). Despite Pyongyang’s nuclear
saber-rattling and harsh rhetoric, the Kim regime poses less risk to its neighbors than the
prospect of a hard-line military government, or worse, the utter collapse of North Korea’s
government, which would lead to a military, economic, and humanitarian crisis of epic
proportions. Because of this, North Korea’s partners in the Six Party Talks will continue to offer
the DPRK food and economic aid in exchange for nuclear concessions. Unfortunately, a
weakened Kim Jong-Il, facing threats to his leadership from the military or others within his
inner circle, may be unable to make these concessions without losing his credibility as supreme
leader of the DPRK.
If the Kim regime does collapse, reunification could happen in one of the following three
ways: forcible occupation by the South after a second Korean War; cooperative reunification
under a new, reformist regime (i.e. a “North Korean Gorbachev”); or in the aftermath of a
complete collapse of North Korea’s government (which would likely involve South Korea and
China, as well as substantial food and economic aid from the world community). In any one of
these scenarios, the United States will be asked to shoulder a significant share of the economic
and military burdens associated with reunification. In the event that one of these scenarios
occurs, American policymakers will have to decide how much they are willing to sacrifice to
make Korean reunification possible.

9
KEY JUDGMENTS
LEADERSHIP
Five years:
 High confidence that Kim Jong-Il’s personal influence in North Korea’s government is
waning.
 Medium confidence that there will be regime change.
 Low confidence that Kim Jong-Il will be able to prepare a son to succeed him
Ten years:
 High confidence that Kim Jong-Il (or his family-line successor) will exercise only partial
control over the DPRK.
Fifteen years:
 High confidence that this regime change will involve collective military leadership.
 High confidence that the DPRK will survive as a state following regime change.
ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Five years:
 High confidence that North Korea’s economy will continue to deteriorate.
 High confidence that the DPRK will need foreign aid to avoid famine.
 High confidence that black market activity and corruption will undermine the
government’s totalitarian control.
Ten years:
 High confidence that the DPRK will remain dependent on foreign aid for food and fuel.
 Medium confidence that famines will continue to occur.
 Low confidence that the DPRK will allow substantial foreign investment and aid.
Fifteen years:
 Medium confidence that the successor or the new regime will allow substantial foreign
investment and aid.
 Medium confidence the economy will start to grow.
 Medium confidence that the famines will cease.
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MILITARY AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Five years:
 High confidence that conventional military capabilities will degrade compared to the
ROK.
 High confidence that ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development will continue.
 High confidence that the conventional military forces will not modernize.
 High confidence that the KPA cannot defeat ROK forces in the event of a second Korean
War.
 High confidence that the DPRK will continue to proliferate ballistic missile and nuclear
technology.
 Medium confidence that the nuclear reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon will be
completed.
Ten years:
 High confidence that defense spending will consume higher proportion of GDP.
 High confidence that WMD and ballistic missile programs will consume higher % of
military budget.
 High confidence that conventional military will not modernize.
 High confidence that the KPA cannot defeat ROK forces in the event of a second Korean
War.
 High confidence that the nuclear reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon will be completed.
 Medium confidence that the DPRK will continue to proliferate ballistic missiles, nuclear
material and technology.
 Low confidence that the DPRK will denuclearize.
Fifteen Years:
 High confidence that DPRK forces will continue to lag behind their ROK counterparts.
 High confidence that DPRK will continue to proliferate ballistic missiles and nuclear
technology.
 High confidence that the ROK will be able to defeat the DPRK without American help.
 High confidence that the DPRK will continue to increase its nuclear weapons stockpile.
 Medium confidence that the DPRK will develop a solid-fuel ICBM.
 Low confidence that DPRK will sell nuclear weapons.
 Low confidence that there could be a nuclear war in Northeast Asia
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REUNIFICATION
Five Years:
 High confidence that reunification will not occur.
 High confidence that reunification would economically devastate the South.
Ten Years:
 High confidence that China (linking this issue to the Taiwan issue) will prop-up the Kim
regime to avoid reunification.
 High confidence that reunification will not occur.
Fifteen Years:
 High confidence that China will exert influence over new regime to prevent reunification
on unfavorable terms.
 Medium confidence that reunification will not occur.
 Low confidence that reunification could occur as a result of a second Korean War.
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INTRODUCTION
Because the DPRK maintains tight control over its media and people, the Kim Jong-Il
regime is almost opaque. This makes the analyst’s task especially difficult. We derived our
conclusions from propaganda analysis, reports from defectors and missionaries, East Asian news
services, and the past history of the Kim regime’s behavior and characteristics. Two factors that
mitigated our difficulty include North Korea’s small size and its centralized government. Highly
centralized power structures allow us to give more weight to anecdotal information that manages
to escape the country. Unfortunately, these factors also give the Kim regime the ability to
deceive us. Despite this risk, our NIE will attempt to answer the tough questions about North
Korea (DPRK).
We have decided to focus on what the Kim regime must do to survive. By first assessing
the Kim regime’s long-term viability, we can better predict the direction that the country will go
over the next fifteen years. Survival drives the decision-making process within the Kim regime.
Kim Jong-Il and his inner circle believe that sheer, brutal force has kept them alive and in power.
They live in fear of OPLAN 5027, which calls for the U.S. and R.O.K. forces to destroy the
regime in the event of war. North Korea represented the hardest target in the so-called
”Axis of Evil,” which probably kept them from being overthrown by the Bush Administration
after 9/11. This fact motivates the Kim regime’s strategic thinking, and leads to its conclusion
that nuclear armaments are necessary to deter the U.S.-RO.K. Alliance.
The sections below describe what the Kim regime must do to survive, as well as what it
cannot do if it wants to remain in power. Based on these assumptions, we have predicted where
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North Korea will go, militarily and economically, and what circumstances could possibly lead to
reunification of the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately for Kim Jong-Il, the range of choices at his
disposal right now is as bleak and barren as the rest of his country. There are few actions that the
Kim regime can take to ensure its long-term survival. Instead, all the regime can do is attempt to
postpone its inevitable collapse.

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APPROACH
Terms of Reference:
1) What is the likelihood of regime change in North Korea?
2) Under what circumstances could reunification of North and South Korea occur, and
how would this affect East Asian security?
We approach these questions at 5, 10, and 15-Year intervals. To answer these questions, we
studied four specific areas pertaining to North Korea’s future prospects:
1. Leadership and succession
2. Economy and infrastructure
3. Military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
4. Prospects for reunification
We believe that North Korea’s leadership will determine the path that the DPRK follows
over the next fifteen years. If Kim survives as head of state for five to ten more years, and he
appoints a successor who follows a similar leadership style, then North Korea will continue to do
what it has done for the past fifteen years. If North Korea undergoes a relatively peaceful regime
change (like the USSR in 1991), then it is possible that it will open up to foreign investment.
This would be a break from North Korea’s current Juche pseudo-religion, centered on the Kim
dynasty. If a peaceful regime change occurs, the National Defense Commission would most
likely carry it out. New leaders could begin to revive the DPRK’s failing economy and repair its
crumbling infrastructure, while improving relations with North Korea’s neighbors and other
major powers. This could eventually lead to peaceful reunification with the South. On the other
hand, if North Korea undergoes a violent regime change, then it is possible that it could launch a
15
second Korean War, or that it could fall into anarchy and become a failed state like Somalia. Our
purpose is to determine who will be in charge of North Korea over the next five, ten, and fifteen
years, and to lay out the most likely scenarios for reunification during that time period.
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Chapter 1
Leadership and Succession
Leadership plays a prominent role in our judgments. Most information on North Korean
leadership trends comes from second-hand sources, which makes it difficult to assess its
reliability. Despite this challenge, we have provided the following key judgments, based on what
we believe to be the most credible information available.
Five-Year Judgments
We have medium confidence that there will be regime change. In the case of North
Korea, it is important to differentiate between succession and regime change. Succession
describes a peaceful transition of power between individual leaders, without a fundamental
change in the regime’s ideology or policies. North Korea has undergone a succession before,
when Kim Jong-Il took his father’s place as leader of the DPRK in 1994. Regime change, by
contrast, involves a transfer of power that leads to new ideology and policies, as well as new
leadership. Thus, if Kim Jong-Il appoints one of his sons or another member of his inner circle to
the positions of General Secretary of the Korean Workers Party, Supreme Commander of the
Korean People’s Army, and Chairman of the National Defense Commission, we would consider
this to be a succession. For the purposes of this NIE, the issue of succession is essentially
irrelevant—regardless of who calls the shots, if North Korea’s ideology and actions remain the
same, then the United States response can remain the same, as well. However, if any of those
17
three primary positions of responsibility are split, or there is a general change in North Korea’s
mode of government, we will consider it to be a regime change.
A study of life expectancy trends1 suggests that Kim Jong-Il will still be alive after five
years, and will probably be vigorous enough to continue serving as head of state. Kim Jong-Il
relies heavily on military leaders from his father’s generation, many of whom served with Kim
Il-Sung himself. By surrounding himself with members of the “old guard,” Kim effectively
ensures that the DPRK will continue its hostility towards the South and follow in the Juche
tradition established by the Eternal President, Kim Il-Sung. Kim’s recent promotion of older,
hard-line generals also affirms that the Songun policy started in 1998 is still in effect. Gen. O
Kuk-Ryol (age 78) was recently appointed Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission.2
Vice-Marshal Kim Yong Chun (age 73) was named minister of the People's Armed Forces, and
Gen. Ri Yong Ho (early 60’s) has been appointed Chief of the Army's General Staff.3 This
ongoing reorganization of the military suggests that the Kim regime will continue to promote
hostility towards South Korea. This may also indicate that Kim Jong-Il feels the need to have key
supporters in place in order to ensure his own survival. It is possible that his individual power
base is not strong enough to rule without consent from North Korea’s military leadership.
We have evidence that Kim Jong-Il has relied increasingly on assistance from long-time
secretary and consort Kim Ok to manage his affairs since his purported stroke in August 2008.
Kim Ok manages many projects important to Kim’s inner circle, including Department 39—a
government organization that oversees criminal activities such as industrial-scale

1
See Appendix C.
2
“ NKorea’s Kim Picks Hawk for Top Military Post,” AFP, February 19, 2009;
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gGET8Vjr6rXCOUKkAbmHIP72kY_Q (accessed March
10, 2009).
3
Lee Jong-Heon, “Analysis: N. Korea Promotes Military Hawks,” United Press International, February 12,
2009;http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_N_Korea_promotes_military_hawks_999.html (accessed March
18 2009).
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methamphetamine production, counterfeiting, and duplication of bootlegged movies and
computer software. Kim Ok’s responsibilities put her in a powerful political position because
these operations generate the hard currency that the Kim regime uses to purchase luxury items
for the North Korean elite.4 She may also have the most up-to-date information on Kim Jong-Il’s
health and whereabouts. There is evidence that she even signed documents on his behalf while he
was incapacitated in the fall of 2008, and she may still be doing so to some extent.5 This places
Kim Ok in position to manipulate North Korea’s decision-making process and even the Kim
regime’s line of succession.
We have low confidence that Kim Jong-Il will adequately prepare one of his sons to
succeed him. During the North Korean election on March 8, 2009, Kim Jong-Un, the youngest
son of Kim Jong-Il and reputed to be his most likely successor, was not selected for any positions
within the Supreme People’s Assembly. 6 This is important because membership in the SPA only
changes every five years. By comparison, when Kim Jong-Il was chosen by Kim Il Sung to be
his successor, he was put into the SPA in 1980, and did not take full power in North Korea until
1998. This gave the younger Kim enough time to learn how to operate within the system, and to
gain allies and prove himself to the court establishment. By not naming one of his sons to the
SPA, Kim Jong-Il missed a crucial opportunity to ensure an orderly transfer of power following
his death or medically induced retirement. This oversight also means that even if a son is chosen
in the next SPA session in five years, the heir-apparent will have precious little time to assert
control over the country’s instruments of power before Kim Jong-Il leaves the North Korean
4
Park In-Ho, “Kim Ok’s Influence on the Succession of Kim Jong-Il,” The Daily NK, June 3, 2008, available from
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02300&num=3352, accessed March 16, 2009.
5
Hyung-Jin Kim, “Kim’s Consort: A Key Player in North Korea?” Associated Press, USA Today, September 18,
2008, available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-18-3187721398_x.htm, accessed March 16,
2009.
6
Hyung-Jin Kim, “Kim Jong-Il’s Son Not Included on List of North Korean Legislators to New Parliament”, Star
Tribune.com, March 9, 2009; available from http://www.startribune.com/world/40957937.html (March 10, 2009).
19
political scene. Because none of Kim’s three sons were placed into a leadership position within
the SPA, there is no evidence that Kim Jong-Un or any of his brothers are currently being
groomed as a successor to Kim Jong-Il.
We have high confidence that Kim Jong-Il’s influence is waning. After the Korean
Central News Agency (KCNA) announcement in February that Kim’s third son would stand for
election, his name did not appear on the results of the March 8th Supreme People’s Assembly
election. The KCNA is the official mouthpiece of the regime, which means that its
pronouncements often indicate the regime’s intentions and motivations, or suggest decisions that
have already been made at the highest levels of the DPRK’s government. The discrepancy
between the KCNA’s February announcement (Kim Jong-un’s notable absence from the ballot
on March 8) suggests that there may be an ongoing power struggle within North Korea’s
government, or at least that Kim Jong-Il cannot rule by fiat the way he did in years past. Without
a designated heir-apparent, the Kim dynasty cannot continue after the death of Kim Jong-Il.
There are three possible explanations for this turn of events. The first would suggest that
the Kim regime’s grip on power is precarious—perhaps Kim fears that naming one of his sons as
successor would allow for the possibility of a military coup, with his successor serving as a
puppet for the new regime after Kim Jong-Il’s demise. A second explanation holds that the son
did something to embarrass his father or otherwise cast doubt on his ability to lead the country.
However, so far there is no evidence to support this second explanation. If the first explanation in
fact holds true, it would indicate that Kim Jong-Il’s hold on power is weaker than anyone
previously thought.
A third, more sinister possibility, is that a faction of the National Defense Commission
vetoed the continuation of the Kim dynasty. Although Kim Jong-Il has shored up his position on
20
the NDC by appointing close associates and supporters to the NDC, there are probably others
within the NDC who don’t share the hard-liners’ loyalty to the Kim family. If Kim did not
personally decide to remove his son’s name from the SPA ballot, then other members of the
NDC are the only ones with the power to do so. Each of these three explanations indicates that
Kim Jong-Il’s personal position is weaker now than it was several years ago.
Ten-Year Judgments
We have medium confidence that there will be a succession in North Korean
leadership. Due to Kim Jong-Il’s declining health, he may not be capable of leading the DPRK
in 10 years, even if he is still alive. Although Kim is currently not preparing a successor, he will
probably attempt to do so as his health continues to fail. In the event that a successor is chosen,
recent statements from the military suggest that the Korean People’s Army will support a
successor who has a direct familial relation to Kim Jong-Il. However, it would be unwise to
assume that the entire North Korean military, or even its entire senior leadership, agrees with this
sentiment. North Korea’s pervasive propaganda machine makes it impossible for any propaganda
to appear that does not wholeheartedly support Kim Jong-Il. At a recent rally for Kim Jong-Il’s
birthday, a general promised the army’s loyalty to the Kim “bloodline.” Pak Jae Kyong, a senior
general of the North Korean Defense Ministry, stated, “We will firmly carry on the blood-line of
Mangyongdae and Mount Paektu with our guns, faithfully upholding the leadership of our
supreme commander.”7 On Sunday, March 8th 2009, an election-day poem was published urging
7
Richard Lloyd Parry. “Kim Jong-Il Anoints Next Leader of North Korea-His Youngest Son,” Times Online,
February 20, 2009; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5766802.ece (accessed March 10,
2009).
21
North Koreans to rally around the "bloodline of Mount Paektu," a common reference to
Kim's family.8 Such evidence supports the idea that a blood relative to Kim Jong-Il would be
supported as a legitimate heir to lead the DPRK. However, these propaganda pronouncements
may not represent the opinions of other power centers within the DPRK.
We have high confidence that Kim Jong-Il (or his family-line successor) will exercise
only partial control over the DPRK. Unless Kim Jong-Il acts quickly to appoint a successor
and allows that successor to begin exercising power under the elder Kim’s watchful tutelage, the
person who succeeds Kim Jong-Il will be beholden to the powerful National Defense
Commission. If Kim Jong-Il is still alive in 10 years, his power will have decreased significantly.
He will be 77 years old, and his staunchest allies—the elderly senior military leaders who served
with his father—will have died off by then. Replacing them in the NDC will be a third
generation of military officers, all of whom are too young to have served under Kim Il-Sung.
They will show less loyalty to the Kim dynasty, especially as Kim’s inner circle becomes
increasingly unable to deliver the basic foodstuffs and other supplies to keep the army fed and in
fighting condition. Since the military has taken powers unto itself that were formerly allotted to
the Korean Workers Party, it is in a position to counter arbitrary, tyrannical decisions from Kim
Jong-Il to some extent. Whoever becomes head of state after the Dear Leader will find himself in
a much weaker position than Kim Jong-Il, because the powerful barons of the DPRK’s National
Defense Commission cannot risk being purged arbitrarily by a new, inexperienced leader. This
would lead North Korea to move into a post-totalitarian form of government, and would
constitute a regime change.
8
Choe-Sang Hun. “Portents of Future Sought in North Korean Election,” International Herald Tribune, March 8,
2009; http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/03/08/asia/north.php (accessed March 10, 2009).
22
Fifteen-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that Kim Jong-Il will no longer be in power. We have
medium confidence that there will be a regime change within fifteen years. As mentioned
earlier, Kim Jong-Il’s life expectancy, based on his current health and risk factors, does not give
him more than 5-10 additional years. We have high confidence that a regime change will lead to
a collective leadership, because Kim has not prepared any of his sons to be his successor. This
will force other members of North Korea’s ruling elite, including most likely a sizeable military
component, to run the country.
When Kim dies, his third son, Kim Jong-Un, is the only realistic dynastic successor on
the horizon. However, his inexperience will likely relegate him to playing a minor role in leading
the DPRK; collective leadership would be necessary. Chang Seong-Taek, Kim Jong-Il’s brother-
in-law, is highly favored by Kim Jong-Il, and has significant influence within North Korea
because of his responsibilities over North Korea’s internal security forces.9 Due to his experience
and longevity in leadership, he may serve as an assistant or mentor to Kim Jong-Un in the event
of a family-line succession.
Vice-Marshal (Chasu) Jo Myong-rok (age 73), a high profile general who is considered to
be Kim Jong-Il’s right hand man, could serve as an interim leader. However, his age will not
permit him to lead for very long. The venerable General O Kuk-Ryol (age 78) could also serve as
an interim leader. Placing a high-level military official within the leadership circle would be an
effective way to maintain North Korea’s military-first policy and continue the Juche tradition.10
9
Becky Branford. “Who Will Succeed North Korea’s Kim Jung-Il,” BBC News, January 16, 2009;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7720345.stm (accessed March 11, 2009).
10
Alexander V. Voronstov, North Korea’s Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing,” Brookings Institute, May
26, 2006; http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0526northkorea_vorontsov.aspx (accessed March 12, 2009).
23
However, both of these generals are already old, and may not even outlive Kim himself. If the
Kim regime persists into the 10-15 year time frame, it will not have the services of loyal aides
like these men any longer. Kim’s successor will have to contend with the next generation of
generals, many of them unknown to the outside world at this time.
There is a remote possibility that Kim Jong-Il’s secretary and consort, Kim Ok, may have
a place within the DPRK’s collective leadership circle in the event that Kim Jong-Un is allowed
to succeed his father. There is some evidence that she has been backing Kim Jong-Un as a
successor, and having Kim Jong-Un in a place of power may ensure her political survival in a
post-Kim Jong-Il North Korea.11
Conclusion
We have moderate confidence that there will be no regime change in five to ten
years. There is evidence that Kim Jong-Il’s health will not permit him to live much longer.
However, if Kim does manage to live another five to ten years, we are confident there will be no
regime change. Kim has created a structure of top military and political confidants to ensure his
political survival as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and dictator of the DPRK.
History has proven that even overwhelming starvation and military unrest has not been able to
knock him out of his position. He quelled unrest during the 1990’s famine through public
executions and military force.12 He also discovered a coup in 1992 planned by top military
leaders. Those that did not escape were executed.

11
Yank Jung A. “Kim Jong-Il’s Wife Kim Ok pursues ‘Kim Jong Woon as Successor,’” The Daily NK, February 6,
2008; http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02300&num=3672 (accessed March 16, 2009).
12
Andreas Lorenz, Joyful Dancing, Spiegel Online, October 30, 2004;
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,325971,00.html (accessed March 18, 2009).
24
Kim Jong-Il personally oversees the Ministry for Protection of State Security, a counter
intelligence agency tasked with internal espionage. Kim surrounds himself with long-time
friends and old military personnel who still hold to the Juche and military-first ideologies.
Amongst the overwhelming majority of North Koreans, Kim has successfully legitimized his
position as heir to Kim Il-Sung and leader of North Korea. Whether from fear or successful
indoctrination, Kim Jong-Il has been elected to the same position in every election with 100% of
the vote.13 As has been often observed, it is not who votes that matters, but who counts the votes.
In the event that there is a regime change in five, ten, or fifteen years, collective
leadership will be established. The sooner the regime changes, the more powerful the military
will be within this leadership. This is due to Kim Jong-Il’s failure to select an heir, and the
significant need for strong leadership over a powerful military. However, if Kim Jong-Il lives
long enough to appoint a successor and ingratiate that successor with North Korea’s elites
(especially the military), then the military may play a smaller role within a future North Korean
collective leadership government structure. Unfortunately, Kim ignored, or was coerced into
ignoring, a golden opportunity to appoint a successor, when his third son was not named to the
Supreme People’s Assembly during the March 8 election.
In the event that regime change occurs, the military has stated that it would support Kim
Jong-Il’s family-line heir. Although this may just be empty rhetoric to impress Kim Jong-Il, the
cult of personality surrounding Kim and his family may force the military to accept a son, at least
as a figurehead, in order to please the masses. In short, although the Kim dynasty’s influence is
13
Hyung-Jin Kim, “Kim Jung-Il Unanimously Re-Elected to Parliament with 99.98 Percent Turnout:State Media”
Huffington Post, March 9, 2009; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/09/kim-jong-il-unanimously-
r_n_172975.html (accessed March 18, 2009).
25
definitely on the decline, it is likely that it will continue to exert at least some influence over the
DPRK’s government for many years to come.

26
Chapter 2
Economy and Infrastructure
Five-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that North Korea’s economy will continue to deteriorate.
North Korea continues to tighten control over its economy, placing emphasis on the self-reliance
or Juche. Because of North Korea’s strained diplomatic relations with many of its most logical
trading partners, and as well as its general lack of exportable goods, the DPRK has been
increasingly forced to survive off of its own resources. Pyongyang continues to crack down on
the inflow of foreign goods and culture, and is attempting to solve its perpetual food problems by
rebuilding its crumbling infrastructure.14 However, these efforts will not help North Korea to
avoid the effects of yet another severe famine. The question remains: how long can this failing
state sustain its elite and its military-first policy while maintaining its failing economic policies?
The immediate future of North Korea’s economy and infrastructure depends on Kim
Jong-Il’s willingness to cooperate with the international community on denuclearization and
opening his borders. Despite a few years of positive growth after 1999, the nuclear crisis and
resulting sanctions against North Korea have again thrown the economy back into negative
growth since 2006. As scholar Robert Litwak argues, “The country’s status as a failed state has
created strong pressure for expanding economic contact with the outside world. The nuclear
program is an impediment to that process, but it is also the Kim regime’s sole source of
14
Yonhap News Agency, “Can Their Economy Sustain The Middle Class?” Yonhap News Agency, February 19, ,2009,
Thursday; http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/02/19/59/0401000000AEN20090219004300315F.HTML (accessed
March 6, 2009).
27
bargaining leverage.”15 If the food shortage and economic crisis are not properly addressed, they
will eventually destabilize the regime. This section examines the current state of North Korea’s
economy, and gives predictions for the economy in five, ten, and fifteen years.
Five-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that the DPRK will need foreign aid to avoid famine. The
biggest economic and health concern facing North Korea today is the ongoing food crisis. Low
crop yields and diminished aid from foreign countries are pushing North Korea to the brink of
another major famine. One key difference between the current crisis and the famine of the 1990s
is that the elites and military are also suffering its effects this time around. The Kim regime’s
inability to meet the basic nutritional needs of the military could be a catalyst for regime change.
In short, the current food crisis has the potential to severely destabilize Kim’s regime.
Current trends indicate that North Korea is facing the probability of another devastating
famine. Rising grain prices inside North Korea, compared to world grain prices as a whole, are
evidence that food is again in short supply. Estimates for 2009 project that North Korea’s food
supply will be 1.17 million tons short of demand.16 Last year, North Korea produced 4.31 million
tons of grain, which is actually a 7 percent increase from the previous year, but this still does not
come close to the 5.48 million tons of food needed to sustain its 24 million population. Since a
record harvest of 4.5 million tons in 2005, there has been a downward trend in food production.
15
Robert Litwak, Regime Change (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 246.
16
March 6, 2009).
28
Even with commercial imports, the country still faces a cereal deficit of 836,000 tons.17 In
addition to the existing food shortage, the World Food Program expects that North Korea will
need further aid in the coming months due to a projected low crop yield this year.18 Despite good
weather and hard work by farmers, North Korea cannot overcome the food shortage due to
“critical shortages of fertilizer and fuel.”19 The World Food Program estimates that North Korea
will fall back into famine unless it is given about $500 million in aid in the next 15 months.20
Within the last year, there have been increasing reports of farmers and others of the
general population suffering and dying from malnutrition. In North Korea, the general population
is the first to suffer during times of famine because the military takes its share of the grain
harvest first, and the rest is left for the state to distribute as food rations. This year, however, the
remaining grain stockpile is so low that mass starvation is practically guaranteed. For instance,
in November 2008, after the military took its share of the harvest from Kaesong City, the
remaining grain was not enough for even four months’ worth of food.21 If the army continues to
take its full share of provisions, North Korean farmers will be left starvation rations this year and
no seed for next year.
Due to the food shortage, North Korean elites have begun to hoard grain, while cracking
down on the general population’s ability to do the same. According to a source inside the South
Hwanghae Province, hoarding grain by general farmers was almost impossible in the latter half
of 2008 due to an increase in the number of security guards on farms, monthly house searches,
17
Ibid.
18
Shim Sun-ah, “U.N. Says N. Korea Faces 836,000, Ton Food Shortfall,” Yonhap News Agency, December 8, 2008, Saturday,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2008/12/08/93/0401000000AEN200812
08006100315F.HTML (accessed March 6, 2009).
19
Ibid
20
Ibid
21
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 253, November 2008”, Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and
Refugees, November 26, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/YSAR-7LRQQH?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk
(accessed on March 6, 2009).
29
and increased punishment for hoarding grain.22 Hoarding grain has been a main tool of survival
for many who have not being getting sufficient public provisions. The recent crackdown on grain
hoarding is another indication that food stockpiles are low. Moreover, rice is not the only
commodity that is disappearing from North Korean markets. The wealthy are also buying up
stockpiles of corn and tofu peas in anticipation of a worsening famine.23 Because of this, the food
supply in North Korea is even more constricted than the famine alone would dictate.
One significant difference between this food shortage and the food crisis in the 1990s is
that the military is now being affected. Currently, many North Korean military officers subsist on
porridge with maize meal twice a day,24 while in some provinces, officers’ families go without
rations altogether.25 One official stated, “this [is] the first time in the history of our country that
the military is eating porridge.”26 In January 2009, reports stated that some military units cannot
secure 100% of their allotted food provisions. This shortage has led to frequent quarrels between
military collectors and local Korean Workers Party officials.27 There have also been reports of
soldiers not being able to participate in military training due to malnutrition.28 As a short-term
22
Jung Kwon Ho, “No More Hoarding Grain,” The Daily NK, February 26, 2009, Thursday,
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=4645 (accessed on February 26, 2009).
23
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 253, November 2008”, Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and
Refugees, November 26, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/YSAR-7LRQQH?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk
24
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 142, June 2008” Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees, June
11, 2008 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-7FJ3EC?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed on March 6,
2009)
25
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 176, July 2008” Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees, July
30, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SHIG-7H2HS6?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed on March 6,
2009)
26
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 142, June 2008” Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees, June
11, 2008 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-7FJ3EC?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed on March 6,
2009)
27
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 264, February 2009” Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees,
February 12, 2009 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/CJAL-7P7MH5?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed
March 6, 2009)
28
Good Friends, “North Korea Today, No. 262, January 2009,” Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees,
February 3, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7NW3LT?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed
March 6, 2009).
30
solution to the food shortage, many wives and families of military officials have been sent to
their extended families’ homes. This, in turn, has led to a loss of morale among front-line
soldiers who are separated from their families for long periods of time. In short, the food
shortage is causing not only physical harm, but also contributing to serious morale and discipline
problems among members of the North Korean military.
In the coming months, the food crisis will only get worse. In addition to depleting
civilian food stockpiles, starvation has led soldiers and other officials to begin using emergency
rations meant for times of war. Even more alarmingly, some military commanders have been
given rice seed to eat that is meant for next year’s crop, because local food distribution officials
could not ignore the military’s request for food and had nothing else to give them.29 If this
continues, the North Korean people will have no seed to plant for the upcoming year. Already,
the Ministry of the People’s Army Forces has ordered the release of food stockpiled for the
wartime.30 One officer stated, “Because this country does not have any reserved food or foreign
countries do not give enough food aid, we are compelled to use temporarily the army provisions
for wartime.”31 The officer also added that this emergency food could be the last supply, and
when all of this food is gone, the army’s “next meal will be when people give [them] food for
patriotic purposes.”32 If the army is relying on patriotic donations from people who themselves
are starving, there is little hope that mass starvation and dramatic societal instability can be
averted. Furthermore, if the military class does not receive even basic foodstuffs and other
essential supplies, Kim Jong-Il’s regime may become threatened. As famine begins to take its
29
Good Friends, ”North Korea Today No. 218, September 2008”, Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees,
October 2, 2008 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-7K377V?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed
March 6, 2009)
30
Ibid
31
Ibid
32
Ibid
31
toll on the military itself, Kim Jong-Il will need to open his borders or accede to conditions that
allow aid to his country. If Kim Jong-Il does not find an outside source to appease the food crisis,
at least enough to meet the basic needs of the elites and the military, his power will be threatened
from within.
North Korea currently faces tremendous pressure from its neighbors to open up
economically. Chinese officials have demonstrated the benefits of opening up to foreign
investment and trade, and have lobbied Kim Jong-Il to make significant changes to alleviate the
DPRK’s economic crisis.33 In January 2006, Kim Jong-Il traveled by train to Shenzhen China,
which is the special economic zone where China first experimented with capitalism. This visit
allowed Kim to see that, like China, he can open up economically while still maintaining
political control of his regime.34 However, despite pressure from foreign countries, Kim Jong-Il
remains reluctant to open the DPRK’s economy to the rest of the world.
Recent strained relations with the North have led South Korea and the United States to
practically halt all aid donations to the North. North Korea has continued to warn the South that
the two Koreas are on a path toward war, and that sour relations has been brought on by South
Korea’s President Lee Myung-bok.35 President Lee Myung-bok in turn has taken a harsher stance
with North Korea, and the South’s previous sunshine policy has been replaced by the aid-for-
denuclearization policy.36 As a result, North Korea did not request its annual humanitarian
shipments of 400,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer from the South this year.37 This is
33
Litwak, 275.
34
Ritter
35
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, “NK Brief Monthly Recap: February,” The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, March 3,
2009, Tuesday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=266&GoP=1 (accessed on March 6, 2009).
36
Ibid
37
Shim Sun-ah, “U.N. Says N. Korea Faces 836,000 Ton Food Shortfall,” Yonhap News Agency, December 8, 2008, Saturday,
08006100315F.HTML (accessed March 6, 2009)
32
significant because more than 65 percent of the fertilizer used by the North in the last ten years
came from South Korea38. South Korean fertilizer donations have helped to boost grain
production by 600,000 tons annually39. In anticipation of declining South Korean aid, the DPRK
has been buying up stockpiles of chemical fertilizer from China. In fact, from November 2008 to
January 2009, North Korea has bought about 40 times the amount of chemical fertilizer that they
bought from China during the same period the year before.40 Unfortunately, the amount of
fertilizer that the DPRK has bought from China is not enough to sustain its grain harvest at
previous levels. Ironically, North Korea’s hostility towards the South comes at the exact time
when the North desperately needs to promote friendlier relations with its food donors.
In addition, North Korea recently rejected food aid from the United States, and told five
American NGOs operating in North Korea to leave41. In May 2008, the United States said it
would give 500,000 tons of food aid to the DPRK, but so far only 169,000 tons have been
delivered.42 North Korea decided in the meantime to reject the remaining food aid and expel
current NGO workers. The consequences of this decision on North Korea’s general population
will be devastating.
In marked contrast to North Korea’s relationship with South Korea and the United States,
2009 marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and
North Korea, and both countries have designated the year as a “year of friendship.”43 Not only is
38
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, “DPRK Preparing for Spring Fertilizer Shortage,” The Institute for Far Eastern Studies,
march 17, 2009, Tuesday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=259&GoP=1 (accessed March 19,
2009)
39
Ibid
40
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, “DPRK Preparing for Spring Fertilizer Shortage,” The Institute for Far Eastern Studies,
march 17, 2009, Tuesday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=259&GoP=1 (accessed March 19,
2009)
41
Associated Press, “North Korea Rejects U.S. Food Aid,” The International Herald Tribune, March 18, 2009, Wednesday,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/03/18/asia/north.php (accessed March 19, 2009)
42
Ibid
The Korea Times, “NK Premier to Visit China in March,” The Korea Times, Feb 28, 2009, Saturday,
43
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/113_40442.html (accessed on March 2, 2009)

33
China the DPRK’s largest trading partner, but it is also a key contributor of international aid
given to North Korea. China wants stability in North Korea because it knows that a total North
Korean collapse, with or without war, will lead to hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding the
border, and a possible spillover conflict that could affect China’s economy and destabilize its
society.44
In order to revitalize North Korea’s roads, ports, and electrical grid, it will take billions of
dollars – money that other countries are currently unwilling to lend.45 Because of this fact, Kim
Jong-Il is attempting to modernize his economy without international support. However, this
effort to revitalize internally cannot overcome North Korea’s failed economy and deteriorating
infrastructure. Thus, we have high confidence that the economy continue its downward trend
over the next five years.
In the past several months, Kim has stridently emphasized the need to revitalize,
modernize, and improve economic conditions within the DPRK.46 In March 2009, for example,
the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party circulated a secret document called the “red letter”
that urges party members to build a strong and prosperous state by 2012.47 The red letter asserts
that by 2012 electrical power production will reach 7.76 million kilowatts, metal production will
top 33 million tons annually, agricultural products will reach 7 million tons annually, and the
volume of freight distribution will remain at about 7.2 million tons.48 The party is currently
44
William H. Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 165.
45
Peter Ritter, “The World’s Most Dangerous Investment,” Time, September 20, 2007, Thursday,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1663635,00.html (accessed on March 6, 2009).
46
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, “DPRK Outlines Region-Specific Economic Growth Plans,” The Institute for Far
Eastern Studies, January 23, 2009, Friday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=259&GoP=1
(accessed March 11, 2009)
47
Lee Sang Yong, “Top Secret Goal: Reach 1980s Production Targets,” The Daily NK, March 12, 2009, Thursday,
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=4691 (accessed on March 18, 2009)
48
Ibid
34
stressing reforms in steel, power, coal, railway, and other areas that are considered “priority
sectors of the people’s economy.”49 In addition, North Korea is calling for increased organic
fertilizer production to help with the food crisis.50 In the beginning of 2009, Kim Jong-Il made
several public appearances at factories and companies in part to monitor their production and
improvements.51 Kim has been publicly giving field advice on how to increase production and
stimulate the economy.52 Because of tense relations with his aid donators, the public appearances
appear to be a propaganda stunt to reinforce the Juche ideology—North Korea’s ability to
overcome its economic woes through its own efforts.
In addition to the food crisis, North Korea’s transportation and electrical infrastructure
continues to deteriorate. Since 2005, the production of fertilizer, grain, rice, and steel has fallen.53
Over the last ten years, North Korea’s railroads, roads, and harbor capacities have remained
about the same, thus indicating no substantial increase in transport ability.54 In the last couple
years growth rates for agriculture, forestry, and fishery have severely dropped and were -9.4% in
2007.55 Growth rates for mining and manufacturing have also gone down since 2005.56 Since
production fell even in years when North Korea received significant foreign aid and imports,
production rates will only worsen as the DPRK becomes increasingly isolated from the outside
world.
49
“DPRK Outlines Region-Specific Economic Growth Plans,” The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, January 23, 2009, Friday,
http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=259&GoP=1 (accessed March 11, 2009)
50
Ibid
51
Jeong Jae Sung, “Kim Jong-Il Focuses on On-site Inspections in Economics,” The Daily NK, February 10, 2009, Tuesday,
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=4536 (accessed on February 15, 2009)
52
Ibid
53
Ministry of Unification, “Tables and Charts,” From North Korea Section, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?
pgname=NORtables (accessed February 20, 2009)
54
Ibid
55
56
Ibid
35
North Korea’s power generation capabilities continue to decline, while coal production
has steadily increased in the last ten years, but is still short of demand. There are frequent
blackouts, and the electrical shortages in the last year have supposedly been the worst since the
mid-1990s.57 In parts of North Korea, up to 70 percent of electricity is hydroelectrically
generated. Unfortunately, due to low water levels, especially during the winter, pumping
facilities and turbines cannot operate properly, which leads to low electrical output and even
fresh water shortages.58 The North Korean government often cuts off residential water access in
order to keep hydroelectric plants running, and citizens are then left to find their own sources of
water from local rivers59. In addition, petroleum imports have slowly decreased over the last
several years.60 Only iron ore and cement have continued to show growth in the past decade.
Because of these deficiencies, North Korea lacks the power generation capability and the mineral
resources to repair its infrastructure and expand its economy.
Foreign direct investment continues to be limited by the current political situation.
However, there have been some recent international attempts to invest in North Korea. For
example, Orascom (an Egyptian telecommunications company) recently signed a $115 million
deal to buy a stake in a North Korean cement company61 and Chinese Tianjin Digital invested
$650,000 to open a joint-venture bicycle plant in Pyongyang.62 Unfortunately, despite these and
other similar attempts to invest in North Korea, most joint economic ventures with the DPRK
tend to fall apart.63 For instance, Orascom Telecom got permission from the North Korean
57
Lee Sung Jin, “Now Even Drinking Water is a Festival Ration,” The Daily NK, February 10, 2009
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=4532 (accessed February 11, 2009)
58
Ibid
59
Ibid
60
61
Ritter
62
Ibid
63
Ibid
36
government to begin offering cell phone service to North Korea’s general population.64 However,
as soon as local citizens attempted to purchase a cell phone, the North Korean government
expanded its regulations on cell phones. Through a combined effort from the North Korean
National Security Agency and the North Pyongan Provincial Security Agency, the government
has made far-reaching efforts to monitor and regulate cell phone use, distribution, and
transmission. In addition, the government only offered cell phones at the rate of US$200-235,
which is too expensive for the general population.65 Foreign investments, like Orascom Telecom,
are hindered by the government’s own policies. Many foreigners have stayed away from
investing in North Korea due to its 2006 nuclear test, and the United States’ listing of North
Korea as a terror-sponsoring state.66 Thus, desperately needed foreign investments cannot thrive
within North Korea’s current political climate.
The hurdle that North Korea cannot overcome alone is, as Robert Litwak puts it, “two
decades of mismanagement and decline [that] have left few resources and little unused capacity
to exploit in order to jump start the economy.”67 In recent months, North Korean companies have
had to close or claim bankruptcy due to the lack of raw materials, lack of fuel, and/or lack of
financial backing to run operations.68 In addition, many companies inflate numbers in order to
meet the unrealistic goals set by DPRK policymakers. In February 2009, Kim Jong-Il inspected
the Heungnam Fertilizer Factory and discovered that the plant had inflated its numbers. Instead
of reaching its goal of 600,000 tons of fertilizer, the plant is only capable of producing 120,000
64
65

66
Ritter
67
Litwak, 277.
68
Good Friends, “North Korea Today No. 267, March 2009,” Good Friends: Center for Peace, Human Rigths, and Refugees,
March 9, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7PY2V7?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk (accessed on
March 19, 2009)
37
tons.69 In truth, North Korea’s unrealistic economic goals push many factories and other state-run
industries to report wildly inflated numbers in order to please Pyongyang. Ironically, these goals
are not nearly as high as production goals that North Korea actually reached in the 1980s. The
DPRK’s infrastructure will continue to deteriorate unless Kim Jong-Il further opens his borders
and allows for more foreign direct investment. Otherwise, the infrastructure and economy are too
weak to effectively bring about revitalization from within. North Korea needs years of trade and
aid to help revitalize its economy and infrastructure.
We have high confidence that black market activity and corruption will undermine
the government’s totalitarian control. Some North Korean corruption is government-
sponsored. For instance, the efforts of Bureau 39, which oversees North Korea’s counterfeiting
and illicit export activities, will not only continue, but will be expanded as much as possible in
the next five years. In order to compensate for its limited exports, North Korea has sold military
hardware, drugs, and counterfeit products to get some hard cash. The earnings from these
criminal activities are essential to helping sustain the lavish lifestyles of the Kim family as well
as government and military elites. Some Western experts estimate that the sale of these illegal
products may net Kim's regime up to $1 billion a year, which would be equivalent to one-fourth
of the country’s legitimate exports.70
Kim Jong-Il created Bureau 39 to direct the operations of his criminal activities. Bureau
39’s counterfeiting operations include currency, such as the US $100 “super-note,” US cigarette
brands, and pharmaceutical drugs.71 It also conducts drug trafficking, including distribution of
69
Moon Sung Hwee, “Kim Jong-Il: Traitorous Lies!” The Daily NK, February 17, 2009,
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=4576 (accessed on February 17, 2009)
70
Ritter
71
Robert, 278.
38
opium, heroin, and methamphetamines.72 Despite violating the Vienna Convention laws
governing diplomatic relations between states, North Korea has used its foreign embassies as a
front for criminal activities, including drug smuggling to Asia and Europe.73 According to Asian
Intelligence, Bureau 39 has accumulated a hard currency reserve of $5 billion.74 Bureau 39 uses
its funds to oversee the purchase of luxury goods for party and military elite as well as high tech
components for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.75 By doing so, Bureau 39 helps
Kim Jong-Il to sustain his power both internally and externally. The cash earned through Bureau
39’s illicit activities is crucial to the survival of the Kim regime, and will continue to be
exploited in the next five years.
Wehave medium confidence that North Korea will keep international trade and
foreign direct investment at current levels. North Korea will continue to trade with its current
partners over the next five years. Despite strained relations in 2009 with some of its trading
partners, North Korea needs the goods and income it gets from trading with China, South Korea,
and other countries. Also, since North Korean citizens are dependent on local markets, the
markets will continue to flourish. Historically, South Korea has been a significant trade partner
with North Korea. Between 1989 and 2007 the aggregate volume of inter-Korean trade was
$9.195 billion.76 According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean trade for
the first half of 2008 was 880.79 million dollars, which is a 22 percent increase over the same
period in 2007.”77 However, inter-Korean trade has slowed recently, and only amounted to US$
72
Ibid
73
Ibid
74
Ibid
75
Ibid
76
Ministry of Unification, “Exchanges of People & Goods,” From Inter-Korean Affairs,
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFexchanges_economic (accessed February 20, 2009)
77
Ibid
39
1.82 billion in the past year.78 This slowing of trade comes due to the deteriorated relations
between the two Koreas.
North Korea continues to rely on Chinese trade to boost its own economy. China is North
Korea’s largest trading partner. By 2009, North Korea’s trade with China increased 41.2 percent
to a total of US $ 2.78 billion.79 In 2008, DPRK exports to China amounted to US$750 million
while imports from China totaled US$ 2.03 billion. This led to a record trade deficit of US $1.28
billion.80 Mineral resources, such as coal, accounted for 54.7 percent of North Korea’s exports to
China while the majority of its imports consisted of electronic goods and machinery.81 In
exchange for mining rights, China is helping North Korea construct roads, repair ports, and build
factories using Chinese-supplied oil, food, and equipment.82 North Korea has seen its trade
deficit with China continue to grow over the past five years. The trade deficit’s sudden jump
appears to be from the rising cost of raw materials and the North’s isolation that gives it little
option but to take Chinese prices.83 In March, China exported 5 tons of beef to North Korea, 84
and will ship 60,000 tons of flour to North Korea in the summer of 2009 as part of an
international trade agreement. 85 North Korea relies on trade with its neighbors to provide goods
78
March 6, 2009)
79
Ibid
80
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, “DPRK Trade Deficit with China Nears 1.3 Billion USD,” The Institute for Far Eastern
Studies, March 5, 2009, Thursday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=267&GoP=1 (accessed
March 10, 2009)
81
Ibid
82
Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches,” Washington Post Foreign Service, February
24, 2008, Sunday http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/23/AR2008022300695.html (accessed on
March 18, 2009)
83
The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, “DPRK Trade Deficit with China Nears 1.3 Billion USD,” The Institute for Far
Eastern Studies, March 5, 2009, Thursday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=267&GoP=1
(accessed March 10, 2009)
84
Michael Rank, “China Exports Beef, Flour to North Korea, Trade Grows 41% in 2008,” North Korean Economy Watch,
March 9, 2009, Monday, http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/statistics/trade-statistics/ (accessed on March 11, 2009)
85
Ibid
40
that it does not produce. Besides its fishing, mining, and cement production, the DPRK only has
a hodgepodge of small functional industries such as its animation studios.86 North Korea’s
infrastructure continues to deteriorate, and international trade will continue to be necessary in
order to overcome the North’s own material deficiencies.
In addition to trade, North Korea will continue to let the Kaesong Industrial Complex
(KIC) expand and produce. The Kaesong Industrial Complex is a vital source of income, jobs,
and infrastructure for North Korea. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, he
Kaesong Industrial Complex (GIC) project “combines the South’s capital and technology with
the North’s land and labor to bring economic benefits to both Koreas.87 There have been recent
conflicts in which North Korea blocks South Korean access to Kaesong for several days.88
Despite these skirmishes, shutting down of Kaesong is currently not under consideration.89 The
Kaesong Industrial Complex is too vital to North Korea to shut down and will continue to
produce over the next five years.
The first phase of the Kaesong project, June 2003 to December 2007, brought much-
needed infrastructure improvements to North Korea.90 The project included a telecommunication
network with 303 lines, which has expanded to 700 lines for telephones and facsimile machines
since May 2008.91 Also in May 2007, the Pyeonghwa or “peace” electrical substation was
completed. It supplies Kaesong with up to 100,000 kW of electricity that comes from the
South.92 Remaining infrastructure projects, including water supply, sewage, and waste treatment
86
Ritter
87
Ministry of Unification, “GIC,” From Inter-Korean Affairs, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?
pgname=AFFexchanges_economic (accessed February 20, 2009)
88
Jeong Jae Sung, “Not Shutdown of Kaesong….Yet” The Daily NK, March 18, 2009, Wednesday,
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00600&num=4714 (accessed on March 20, 2009)
89
Ibid
90
Ibid
91
Ibid
92
Ibid
41
facilities, were completed in October 2007.93 South Korea has also helped to reconnect inter-
Korean roads and rail.94 These roads and rail lines have been used to support the development of
the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. Keumgang tours.95 In effect, the Kaesong project
has served to rebuild infrastructure within Kaesong City, North Korea.
The KIC also provides jobs and income for North Korean citizens. By the end of June
2008, there were 72 factories within the KIC, which together employ approximately 30,000
North Korean workers and 1,000 South Korean staff.96 Between December 2004 and May 2008,
the KIC output $370 million dollars’ worth of products.97 In 2008, the Kaesong Industrial
Complex production levels reached a value of $241 million, which is a 36% increase over
2007.98 As of May 2008, exports totaled US$80 million, or 21 percent of their aggregate
production.99 The success of the Kaesong Industrial Complex demonstrates that with direct
foreign investment, North Korea has the potential to again have a thriving economy. We have
high confidence that North Korea will continue to allow the KIC to operate since it brings jobs,
infrastructure, and income to the North.
In addition, the farmers markets will not be defeated, but will continue to grow within the
country. When the state cannot provide adequate food rations, the local markets provide the only
way for North Koreans to access food. Despite efforts by the government to stop these markets,
these efforts will fail because the government’s own food rationing system cannot feed the entire
93
Ibid
94
Ministry of Unification, “Economic Cooperation,” From Inter-Korean Affairs, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?
95
Ibid
96
Ministry of Unification, “GIC,” From Inter-Korean Affairs, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?
97
Ibid
98

99
Ministry of Unification, “KIC,” From Inter-Korean Affairs, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?
42
country. If the government’s food rations become adequate enough to feed the entire population,
then the government may have enough leverage to stop local farmers’ markets. However, current
trends continue to demonstrate an increasing food shortage and call into doubt the ability of the
government to provide food for its subjects.
The North’s failure to provide food for its citizens has led to the appearance of market
behavior. In response to the failure of the state food distribution system, the price system has
reemerged. The price system is the most efficient system of resource distribution, and this is how
the poor people are surviving. The price system acknowledges scarcity, and prices increase in
response to shortages. This draws resources in from other regions, or out of the hands of hoarders
and back into the marketplace. There is no economic education in the DPRK, so people engage
in proper economic behavior naturally when they are able to do so. In 2002, North Korea decided
to deregulate in an attempt to jump-start the economy, and in 2003, the regime legalized the
small farmers’ markets that had been unofficially flourishing.100 These markets allow farmers to
sell food they raise and give locals access to a food source.
North Korea is currently attempting to abolish the markets, but its attempt to regain
control over the local markets has not succeeded. In January 2009, North Korea decided to force
“reforms” on farmers markets that would restrict their ability to meet the needs of the North’s
citizens.101 However, due to immediate backlash from local officials, enforcement of these
regulations has been pushed back 6 months.102 If local markets shut down, then there will be no
avenue for people who are not getting food rations from the government to access food. One
local official stated, “If we eliminate general market at this time, it could cause internal
100
Litwak, 277.
101
Good Friends, “North Korea Today Number 261, January, 2009”, Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and
Refugees, January 27, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/CJAL-7NPMU3?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk
102
Ibid
43
disturbance.”103 The fact that the government gave in to the desires of the farmers demonstrates
that either the Kim regime has lost some of its power to control the people, or that the food
situation has grown so desperate that the government is willing to concede some of its control to
appease the locals. Even though the central party plans to abolish the general market in the
future,104 we have moderate confidence that farmers markets will continue to survive because
they serve as a vital, if unofficial, part of North Korea’s food distribution system. As long as
government rations are scarce, farmers markets will exist and thrive.
103
Ibid
104
Good Friends, “North Korea Today Number 261, January, 2009”, Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and
Refugees, January 27, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/CJAL-7NPMU3?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=prk
44
Ten-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that the DPRK will remain dependent on foreign aid for
food and fuel. Given our stated moderate confidence of regime change, there will be a
continuation of many of the predictions stated for 5-Years. With the Kim regime’s continued
emphasis on Juche and isolation from the outside world, little will change until regime change
occurs. Kim Jong-Il has demonstrated in the past how resilient his regime has been in times of
economic failure and severe famine. North Korea will continue to exploit illicit activities to get
hard currency, and the infrastructure will continue to deteriorate without foreign direct
investment.
Over the next ten years, North Korea will continue to cannibalize itself in the form of
capital consumption. The primary reason that North Korea has decayed into a generally
dilapidated condition is not due simply to mismanagement or criminality. Rather, the fault lies in
the foundations of Marxian economics. Marxism calls for total consumption of the economic
output. It views profit, savings and investment as institutionalized bourgeois theft. The
consequence of this is that current consumption dominates all economic output, and the internal
security apparatus aggressively enforces it. Marxist doctrine only involves taking over the means
of production after the material productive forces have evolved to a great enough extent to
change the social superstructure to allow the proletarian revolution. It never discusses how the
capital goods appear in the first place. Capital goods appear through savings and investment of
the surplus production, beyond what is needed for current consumption. If there is ever a
situation where there is no savings and investment, or even worse, a negative rate of real savings,
there will of necessity be capital consumption. We see this in the real world in the form of
45
rusting, worn out power plants, broken equipment in the fertilizer factories, broken roads, and
worn out farm equipment. This pattern replayed itself all over the communist world, but was
hidden for a long time by their propaganda. The end of the USSR exposed the failure of Marxist
economic policies to the rest of the world, and other collapsed communist regimes have followed
suit.
Another important consequence of the institutionalized absence of savings and
investment in North Korea is the lack of sufficient factors of production (land, labor and capital)
for any state project. The way this manifests itself in policy is in the removal of resources from
one sector that is already using them. After every project is completed, all investment is directed
away from it and to the new mania of the day. In short, everything built in North Korea tends to
wear out long before the state takes action to replace it.
We have low confidence that in the next ten years, the DPRK will allow substantial
foreign investment and aid. Kim Jong-Il and his inner circle can see the cracks forming in their
totalitarian system of internal control. To maintain the intense Stalinist personality cult around
the Dear Leader, information control is necessary. Only constant control of all forms of political
thought and economic activity will suffice. Allowing foreign investment and uncontrolled,
unscripted contact with foreigners subverts the psychological conditioning of the people. If the
Kim regime loses information control over the North Korean people, it will likely lose power to
a cabal of military officials, which would represent the transition from totalitarianism to a post-
totalitarian state like the USSR in the post-Stalin years. The Kim regime makes careful use of
propaganda and disinformation in order to maintain its lock on information within the country.
When distributing foreign food aid, for example, the DPRK conceals the source so it appears that
46
the regime is supplying it. Otherwise, even foreign humanitarian aid could become a liability to
Kim.
We have medium confidence that famines will continue to occur. There will probably
not be enough capital investment in North Korean agriculture to increase crop yields to the point
where they meet the needs of the North Korean people. Already, the Party is instructing farmers
to chip frozen feces out of the latrines and make fertilizer from it in order to grow food. This
absurd order is perfectly in line with Juche, but not with reality. Songun policies will continue to
the greatest extent possible, and all excess production will serve the KPA, rather than be invested
back into the economy. The nations that are dealing with the DPRK will only provide a bare
minimum of supplies to keep the population alive on a year-to-year basis. It will be up to the
North Korean government to decide whether the people starve to death in any given year.
We have medium confidence that the DPRK will allow substantial foreign
investment and aid, and that a new regime will open up economically. The new regime may
not let go of its political control, but it will have a high incentive to open North Korea
economically. North Korea has modest attractions for foreign investors, including a highly
literate workforces whose average daily wages are about half of what the Chinese earn.105 In
addition, there is an abundance of natural recourses, especially mineral resources such as coal,
105
Ritter
47
iron ore, zinc, uranium, magnetite, and gold.106 North Korea’s economy and infrastructure
cannot begin to recover until the economy opens.
Many countries, such as China, Russia, and South Korea are interested in investing in
North Korea. Russia would like to build a rail line through North Korea that could connect the
Trans-Korean Railway and Asia to the Trans-Siberian Railway and Europe.107 If North Korea
allows a railroad to be built, and allows Russia to design train cars capable of adjusting to the
different track widths of Korea and Russia, then a container could travel by rail from South
Korea to Europe in 15 days, which is half the time it takes by ship.108 Russia also wants to export
electricity to North Korea.109 The only hurdle involved in exporting electricity is that Russian and
North Korean electricity operate on different frequencies. In September 2008, Russia and South
Korea agreed to build a gas pipeline that would bring gas from Siberian gas fields to South
Korea.110 The proposed pipeline would pass through North Korea, and could bring in more than
US$100 million per year for transit costs111.
We have medium confidence that the economy will start to grow. Russia and South
Korea want to complete the gas project by 2015, and are currently seeking cooperation from
North Korea. South Korea has seen success from the Kaesong Industrial Complex as well as the
106
Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches,” Washington Post Foreign Service,
February 24, 2008, Sunday http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/23/AR2008022300695.html
(accessed on March 18, 2009)
107
The Hankyoreh, “S. Korea and Russia Agree to Pursue Natural Gas Pipeline,” The Hankyoreh, September 30, 2008,
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/313141.html (accessed on March 18, 2009)
108
James Brooke, “Observation Post Dora Journal; This Train Is Bound for Nowhere, For the Moment,” The New York Times,
September 12, 2001, Wednesday, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/world/observation-post-dora-journal-this-train-is-bound-
for-nowhere-for-the-moment.html (accessed on March 18, 2009)
109
James Brooke, “Russia Wants to Supply Energy to North Korea,” The New York Times, July 4, 2004, Sunday,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/04/world/russia-wants-to-supply-energy-to-north-korea.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
110
The Hankyoreh, “S. Korea and Russia Agree to Pursue Natural Gas Pipeline,” The Hankyoreh, September 30, 2008,
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/313141.html (accessed on March 18, 2009)
111
Ibid
48
Mt. Keumgang tourist park, and has interest in further investment in the North. China has
continuing economic interests in North Korea, and it would like North Korea to remain
politically stable.112 China has also been buying up mineral rights within North Korea, although it
has faced difficulties in exploiting these mineral resources because of corruption and DPRK-
imposed delays.113 If political conditions improve, China will capitalize on its mining rights in
North Korea. Other countries may follow China’s example, but like China, they will not be able
to do so until the North Korean government begins to cooperate more fully with its neighbors.
One additional obstacle to North Korea’s economic development is the damage done to
the populace by continuous mass mobilizations. China was devastated by the Great Leap
Forward (1958-61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), where the vigor and spirit of the
people wwas dissipated in destructive, worthless schemes planned by Mao and enforced by those
loyal to his personality cult. The North Korean people have suffered much longer, and the power
of mass mobilization is dead within the DPRK. The youngest generation of North Koreans
suffers from high rates of stunted growth and mental retardation due to malnutrition. We are
concerned that even if there is a succession to more reasonable leadership, or a regime change,
there will not be enough human capital left in the country to be able to rebuild on its own.
In order to have a growing economy, the factors of production must be allocated
efficiently. This can only be done in a market economy or under a regime dedicated to finance
capital, as was the case in Germany and Japan during the 19th century. It is impossible to
accomplish this in any country where market forces do not have free reign. Furthermore, there is
an additional problem facing North Korea that may prevent the revival of its economy. Although
112
Overholt, 165.
113
Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches,” Washington Post Foreign Service,
February 24, 2008, Sunday http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/23/AR2008022300695.html
49
land and labor are present in sufficient amounts to allow prosperity within the country, North
Korea’s Stalinists efforts to discourage savings and investment mean that there is precious little
capital to fund large-scale economic projects. Kim Jong-Il and his inner circle have responded to
this in the past by instituting mass mobilizations instead of focusing on savings and investment.
This may leave North Korea helpless to improve its economy without significant investiture of
foreign funds—an uncertain proposition during today’s global economic downturn.
If North Korea opens up to significant foreign investment, China is in the best position to
take advantage of such an opening. Chinese investment in North Korea could lead to a situation
where North Korea’s own resources are sold out from under the people to the finance capital
oligarchs of China. In such a scenario, unifying the Korean Peninsula becomes untenable
because the ROK will not incur the costs of rebuilding the country while China scoops out the
resources. This would lead to the DPRK effectively becoming a mere department of the Chinese
economy
We have medium confidence that famine will continue to be a problem. It will take a
difficult series of reforms for North Korea to get back on track economically, and to be able to
feed its people. In particular, North Korean agriculture will require significant investment in
order to get crop yields high enough to meet the basic needs of the country. The most logical
way for North Korea to accomplish this is to exploit its mineral wealth, and export it. This
would allow the DPRK to import foodstuffs the way many industrially rich, but agriculturally
poor countries do. This would also mean that the factors of production would have to be
allocated rationally, and the producers would have to be responsive to market demands on price
and quality of goods. This is currently impossible, but in the future may become feasible under
50
new government. If it does not happen, food shortages will remain a constant part of North
Korean life.
51
Chapter 3
Conventional Military
Despite its weak economy, North Korea is the most militarized country in the world. The
DPRK has 1.1 million active duty soldiers, which is roughly 4% of its population114. The Korean
People’s Army (KPA) consists of Ground Forces, a Navy, an Air Force, and civil security forces.
Healthy males begin compulsory military service at age 17, with nearly 200,000 North Koreans
reaching this age annually.115 North Korea has difficulty supplying enough energy and food to
meet the basic needs of its people, and even its army is beginning to suffer shortages. Since 1995
(formalized in the 1998 Songun Constitution), the country has followed a military-first policy,
which currently diverts about 25 percent of North Korea’s GDP to support its military.116
However, military modernization has slowed significantly in recent years, and much of the
KPA’s equipment is outdated. This trend stems largely from Russia’s refusal to help after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
Ground Forces
The KPA has over a million active-duty personnel. These forces are broken down into
twelve conventional infantry corps, four mechanized corps, two armored corps, two artillery
corps, and a Capital Defense Corps that provides defense for Pyongyang during wartime
114
Center For Strategic and International Studies, “Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula. CSIS
International Security Program, (August 1, 2002)
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,1014/type,1/ (accessed 9 March 2009).
115
Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea”, The World Fact book (March 5, 2009)
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed 10 March 2009).
116
Ibid
52
operations117. They are equipped with tanks, self-propelled artillery, armored personnel carriers,
and cargo trucks. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea has some 3,500
medium and light tanks, which include about 2,200 T-54/55-class main battle tanks.118 The T-54
was produced in the Soviet Union from l947 to l981, and has a100-mm rifled cannon. Since the
late l970s, North Korea has produced an estimated 600 T-62 tanks, which equipped front-line
Soviet forces in the 1960s. North Korea also has fielded several light tank variants of its own,
including the M-1985, and copies of the Soviet P-76 and the Chinese Type 62 and 63 variants.
Navy
The Korean People’s Army Navy is headquartered at Pyongyang, about as far inland as
one can get in North Korea. The KPA Navy is divided into two separate fleets119. The East Sea
Fleet has ten squadrons, with approximately 470 vessels. Its headquarters lies at Tbejo-dong.
The Yellow Sea Fleet is made up of just six squadrons and only has 300 vessels. It should be
noted that these are not the fighting ships of a blue water navy, but coastal defense craft and
elderly diesel submarines. Its headquarters is at Pip’a-got and Sagot. North Korea keeps 60% of
its naval force deployed close to the demarcation line with the South. The forces arrayed along
the demarcation line include 430 combat vessels, such as missile boats, torpedo boats and fire
support vessels; 35 submarines, including 9 mini-subs; and 335 support vessels, including
117
Global Security, “Military”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm (accessed 10 March
2009)
118
Ibid
119
Global Security.org, “Korean People’s Army Navy”, Military, (2005)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/navy.htm (accessed 10 March 2009)
53
landing craft, air cushion vehicles, and minesweepers. These support vessels are not capable of
long-range operations.
To protect its coast, North Korea operates 4 Whiskey-class submarines. These
submarines were built by the Soviets in the 1950s, and North Korea is one of the few countries
still using them. North Korea also has 19 Romeo-class submarines—a Soviet-designed sub that
North Korea imported from China. By today’s standards, the Romeo-class submarine is woefully
inadequate as a combat vessel, but they still have some value in training and surveillance
missions.120 The DPRK has also built its own class of submarines, known as the Sang-O-class.
These subs were built in the 1980s, and over 30 remain active today. The class is based on the
Yugoslavian Heroj-class submarines, albeit much stripped down, with older remote sensing
systems121. Besides submarines, North Korea also has 39 missile attack boats and 200 World War
II-style torpedo boats, used to patrol North Korea’s coastline and along the demarcation line with
the South.
Air Force
The DPRK operates a wide variety of combat aircraft, although most of them are
obsolete. Many of them are kept in underground facilities, which make it difficult to keep track
of their aircraft inventory. The North Korean Air Force has over 500 fighter jets, of which only
20 Mig-29s pose any real threat to US or South Korean forces. The rest of North Korea’s fighter
120
Ibid
121
University of Military Intelligence, “North Korean Special Operations Forces: 1996 Kangnung Submarine
Infiltration” (October 2004) http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb/article.asp?
articleID=68&issueID=4 (accessed 10 March 2009).
54
force was procured in the 1960s and 70s, and includes Mig-17s, 19s, 21s, and 23s.122 None of
these aircraft represents any credible threat to South Korean or American forces
North Korea also has 24 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. They also have several hundred
scout and transport helicopters, and approximately 300 An-2/Y-2 Colt biplane transport planes,
which the DPRK uses to insert commandos into South Korea.123 North Korean air defenses
include several dozen Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries, most of which operate Vietnam
War-era SA-2 Guideline SAMs, as well as a wide variety of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)
pieces.
Five-Year Judgments
High confidence that conventional military capabilities will degrade compared to
the ROK. The North Korean military has substantial manpower, but they are running out of
money and food with which they can train and maintain their manpower-intensive forces. They
have a large inventory of weapons and equipment, most of which are obsolete, and in the case of
heavy capital equipment like submarines and aircraft, is likely poorly maintained. Because of
North Korea’s chronic fuel and hard currency shortages, the North Korean military cannot train
its forces adequately, which will inhibit its effectiveness in the event of a second Korean War.
The R.O.K policy of maintaining units at 70% strength will allow them to bring over
300,000 more men into established units within a short period of time. This gives them parity in
terms of numbers of men under arms. All forms of equipment in the ROK forces inventories are
122
Global Secruity.org, “Korean People’s Army Air Force” Military, (2005)
http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb/article.asp?articleID=68&issueID=4 (accessed 11 March
2009).
123
Ibid
55
newer and better. The ROK possesses the American Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS),
which allows them to hold Pyongyang at risk via MLRS launchers. They equip their F-15K
aircraft with the SLAM-ER (Standoff Land Attack Missile – Expanded Response) weapon
system, which is a highly modified Harpoon anti-shipping missile that acts as a short-range land-
attack cruise missile. These missiles can put any aboveground target in the DPRK at risk.
Although a full outline of South Korea’s military capabilities lies beyond the scope of this paper,
these brief examples illustrate the fact that the DPRK no longer has the Korean peninsula
monopoly on terror and mass destruction, and would do well to avoid a second Korean War.
We have high confidence that North Korea’s conventional military forces will not
modernize. The imploding economy of the DPRK cannot support improvements of the
conventional forces while also supporting cutting edge (for them) research and development
efforts into ICBM and nuclear weapons technology. The leadership has demonstrated its decision
to follow this route by allowing the military to suffer from starvation while pouring money into
advanced weapons programs.
We have high confidence that the KPA cannot defeat ROK forces in the event of a
second Korean War. The KPA is currently the beneficiary of a bigger and bigger piece of a
smaller and smaller pie. They lack the fuel, food and ammunition to conduct comprehensive
training exercises for a conscript army of over 1 million men. An increasing number of North
Korean youth are too small or too mentally impaired (due to chronic malnutrition) to be allowed
into the army. The KPA is built on a doctrine of almost pure offense, and counts on its skill in
combined arms operations to carry the day against the ROK. Constant training is mandatory, or
these abilities will quickly wither away in a military force. The KPA does not teach its forces
how to break contact with the enemy, conduct fighting withdrawals, or put up an elastic defense.
56
If their one, single-minded offensive plan bogs down, they are not prepared to try anything
except frontal assaults on South Korea’s superior, dug-in, and highly motivated forces.
In order to prevent collusion between generals, the Kim regime has instituted vertically
integrated communications for the front armies and corps. They have very weak communications
links to each other, and rely on the National Defense Commission for directions. In a dynamic
situation, they would not be able to cooperate properly to exploit breakthroughs or reinforce
success without direction from Pyongyang. This is a serious liability when the stakes are this
high, and puts them at a serious disadvantage against an ROK military that is based on combat-
proven American joint operations doctrine.
Ten-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that defense spending will consume an increasing
proportion of GDP. In order to make good on the military-first policy, resources will have to be
directed away from the productive sectors of the economy and into the military. This means that
less production will take place, and the military will continue to suffer along with the rest of the
country. Kim Jong-Il has no choice but to continue this policy, because if he stopped supporting
the military, it could imperil his survival. If there is a successor to the Kim dynasty, he will be a
prisoner of this policy as well. If there is a regime change and the military takes over, they will
continue to give the military a generous proportion of North Korea’s total national resources.
We have high confidence that the KPA will not be able to modernize. Consuming a
bigger piece of a dwindling pie will only allow North Korea to tread water, so to speak. In the
long run, this means that the needs of the military will eventually overwhelm the capabilities of
57
North Korea’s failing economy. The only way for the KPA to experience real progress is for the
NDC to eliminate obsolete units and redirect resources into modernizing the mechanized forces.
However, this would mean that some generals would lose their commands, and this may not be
institutionally possible considering North Korea’s court politics and family connections between
Kim and many of his military associates.
We have high confidence that the KPA cannot defeat ROK forces in the event of a
second Korean War. The downward trajectory of readiness will continue from the Five-Year
predictions. The NDC will maintain force levels far above what they can sustain, and these
forces will face an increasingly daunting task in trying to match ROK forces. By this time, the
ROK military will be strong enough that the United States would not need to intervene in order
to beat the DPRK. Pyongyang would be going into a situation where it would be forced to
employ its limited nuclear capability. This would lead to the liquidation of the regime, and a
violent unification of the peninsula.
We have high confidence that the DPRK will continue to lag behind the ROK in
military capability. What is apparent to interested experts today will be well known to the lay
public in fifteen years. The DPRK propaganda machine will no longer be able to put up a
convincing façade of strength for the conventional KPA. The survival strategy of the Pyongyang
leadership will continue to have nuclear weapons as its centerpiece. If there is not a significant
downsizing of the KPA, it will become visibly dilapidated and run down. Skinny, tired soldiers
58
will be pictured in the press and the fearsome war machine of the Kim dynasty will appear
impotent.
We have high confidence that the ROK will be able to defeat the DPRK without US
assistance. The ROK will have an even more powerful and technologically advanced military by
this time, and will have greatly expanded its naval forces as well. Against a starving and
deteriorating military in the North, they will be able to handle the war on their own. It will be
apparent to the leading generals of the DPRK that they do not have the realistic capability to
defeat the ROK and unify the country by force of arms even if the US is not involved. Our
estimate is conservative, and other scholars believe that the ROK was capable of defeating the
DPRK as of the 1990’s. This was likely the case, and the situation will only favor the ROK
more in the future.

59
Chapter 4
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Kim Jong-Il’s long-held desire to possess viable nuclear weapons seems to have been
reached on October 9, 2006. On that date, the North Korean military conducted a low order
detonation of a nuclear device.124 Although American intelligence agencies had suspected the
DPRK of having the technology and ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon for quite some
time, the test in 2006 confirmed North Korea as a member of the nuclear club.
The series of events that led up to the 2006 nuclear test, as well as the rhetoric and
actions of the DPRK since that time, give some indications of what North Korea’s nuclear
situation may be like in the years ahead. From these past occurrences, some inferences about the
future may be drawn. This section will describe several possible scenarios regarding the state of
affairs of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons during the next five, ten, and fifteen years. The accuracy
of the following predictions is extremely difficult to assess, especially given that there are
myriad political, economic, leadership, and other factors – discussed at length elsewhere in this
report – that are likely to have a significant impact on the nuclear status of the DPRK.
Nevertheless, the subsequent paragraphs can serve as a useful tool for intelligence analysts and
policy makers when examining what North Korea will be like over the near-, mid-, and long-
term.
124
Siegfried S. Hecker, “Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,” Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University, (15 November 2006) http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/hecker1106.pdf
(accessed 9 March 2009).
60
Current Status
Before making a prediction about the future, a brief description of the present is
necessary. Because of a lack of readily available data, there are widely varying estimates of the
number of nuclear warheads in the DPRK’s arsenal. Some intelligence community sources place
the number of warheads at two or three, while others have claimed that North Korea possesses as
many as12 to 15 warheads.125 These figures represent the extremes of the intelligence
community’s estimates; a more likely number is somewhere in the range of eight to ten
warheads.126 The plutonium-239 necessary to produce these warheads likely came from the
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, where spent fuel rods are processed into weapons-grade
plutonium.127 North Korea has all of the facilities necessary to manufacture and produce high-
grade plutonium, as well as fuel-grade uranium for a nuclear reactor.128
It is less clear, however, whether the DPRK has the capacity to produce weapons-grade
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). It is known that Pyongyang purchased Pakistani-designed
centrifuges from scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and aluminum tubes from Germany, both of
which are essential in the production of HEU. Nevertheless, as of 2007 the US intelligence
community knew that North Korea had yet to acquire several additional components and
125
“Nuclear Weapons Program – North Korea,” Global Security, (28 April 2005)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ world/dprk/nuke.htm (accessed 10 March 2009).
126
“Status of World Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Federation of American Scientists, (27 February 2009) http://www.fas.
org/programs/ssp/nukes/nukestatus.html (accessed 7 March 2009).
127
Sharon Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments,” Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress, Order Code RS21391, (18 October 2006) http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21391.pdf
(accessed 10 March 2009) 1-2.
128
Ibid., 2-3.
61
techniques that would be needed to enrich uranium. Therefore, it seems likely that while the
DPRK is not currently producing HEU, they are moving in that direction.129
In addition to the warheads themselves, the DPRK is developing and improving the long-
range missile technology necessary to deliver a nuclear weapon. The Taepodong-II
intercontinental ballistic missile is currently North Korea’s most advanced rocket, with a range
of up to 5900 kilometers.130 Unfortunately, there is no way to know exactly how much money the
North Korean military currently expends on its missile and nuclear programs. Based on the
“Military-First” policy and the high visibility of these programs in the international intelligence
and media communities, it is likely that they receive a very large share of the military’s budget.
Indeed, as the present food crisis worsens and the economy of the DPRK continues its downward
spiral, the effectiveness of the conventional military will inevitably suffer additional decline as
well. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems, however, are less affected by these
negative trends. Thus they will likely play an ever-larger role in the deterrence and war-fighting
strategies of North Korea, and will subsequently receive consistent levels of funding to maintain,
if not improve, their associated technologies.131
The May 2009 test of a small atomic bomb is evidence of substantial progress in the
DPRK nuclear weapons program. The device had a yield of about 16-20kt, putting it into the
power range of the American WWII weapons used on Japan. It was a plutonium implosion
device and was likely quite large and heavy. This is a first generation atomic weapon for the
DPRK, and if it is anything like the Fat Man bomb of WWII, it will be over 4,500kg in weight.
129
Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
2008), 330-331.
130
Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1999), 123-124.
131
Ibid., 124.
62
This is important because the Taepodong-2 ICBM, assuming it functioned properly, only has a
throw weight of about 500kg at its effective range of 3,000 miles. For short range use, it only
has a throw weight of around 1,000kg. This means that the DPRK is able to put together a
science project and detonate it, but can not deliver a weapon of war on target in the near future.
Five-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that the DPRK will continue to improve its missile
technology, and nuclear weapons capability.132 North Korea will continue to increase its
stockpile of nuclear weapons, given that it already possesses all of the necessary facilities for
processing spent nuclear fuel into weapons-grade material. The combination of improved
missiles and additional warheads makes it very likely that the recent hostile rhetoric emanating
from Pyongyang will continue or increase over the next five years. It is also highly likely that the
DPRK may produce nuclear weapons that are small enough, tough enough, and light enough to
fit on its ballistic missiles.133 There are indications that the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan
provided the DPRK with the information to accomplish this feat. This development would
potentially allow the DPRK to deliver its nuclear weapons to targets in the western United States,
as well as much of Asia and the Pacific region, which would have a severe destabilizing effect on
some very strategic areas of the earth.134

132
“Taep’o-dong 2 (TD-2),” Federation of American Scientists, (30 May 2008) http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/
missile/td-2.htm (accessed 10 March 2009).
133
Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” 3.
134
Bona Kim, “North Korea Providing Missile Technology to Iran and Syria,” The Daily NK, (5 March 2009)
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=4665 (accessed 12 March 2009).
63
We have high confidence that North Korea will proliferate its nuclear and missile
technology. There is evidence that this has already occurred to some extent in the past decade, so
it seems very likely that it will continue in the next five years. According to some sources, North
Korea may have sold over 1,000 Scud missiles to the Middle East, may have helped Syria build a
nuclear reactor, and has offered Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) technologies to Iran
and Syria. The cash generated by such purchases, approximately $1.5 billion per year, is
desperately needed in North Korea, and will only become more sought after in the coming years,
thus increasing the chances that the DPRK will make its nuclear and missile technologies
available to any entity that can afford them.135
We have medium confident that the nuclear reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon will
be completed. North Korea currently has one reactor at Yongbyon capable of producing five
megawatts (MW) of power, and six kilograms of plutonium per year. In contrast, the new
Yongbyon reactor will produce 50 MW and the reactor at Taechon will produce 200 MW.
Together, these two reactors would generate 275 kilograms of plutonium per year. Although
DPRK officials have stated that these two new reactors will be completed soon, this seems only
moderately likely to happen within five years.136 North Korea will not denuclearize within the
next five years. The international attention and income generated by the possession of nuclear
weapons and a nuclear program is something that Kim Jong-Il is not likely to willingly give up
in the next five years.
135
Ibid.
136
Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” 1, 5.
64
Ten-Year Judgments
We have high confidence that the additional reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon will
be completed. The DPRK has the motivation to finish these reactors due to the high value of the
extra plutonium that will become available in the spent fuel rods. With these fuel rods, North
Korea will be able to manufacture increasing amounts of Plutonium-239. Also, it seems likely
that the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program will be operational within ten years, and that
North Korea will then possess significant amounts of HEU.137 With additional amounts of these
two materials available, we are highly confident that North Koreans will greatly increase their
stockpile of nuclear weapons. Multi-stage thermonuclear weapons are much more complicated,
but it would be unwise to discount the will power and tenacity of the DPRK.
We have high confidence that the ballistic missile and WMD programs will consume
an increasing proportion of the military budget. The economy will continue to deteriorate in
most sectors, and fewer resources will be available overall. The military-first policy will ensure
that the lion’s share of the resources go to the Korean People’s Army, controlled by the National
Defense Council. The NDC will continue to favor ICBM technology and nuclear weapons over
the modernization of the conventional forces. This means that the level of privation experienced
by the conventional units will increase as their so-called position of favor in the national power
structure becomes meaningless. The DPRK will be increasingly dependent on weapons exports
in order to keep its programs going.
We have medium confidence that the DPRK will continue to proliferate ballistic
missiles, nuclear material and technology. Any sale of actual nuclear weapons or fissile
137
Chinoy, Meltdown, 104, 331.
65
material is not likely to happen until the DPRK feels that its own arsenal of nuclear weapons is
large enough to meet its deterrence needs, and Pyongyang feels that it has nuclear weapons to
spare. Additionally, North Korea would likely hesitate to sell fissile material or completed
weapons to third parties due to fears of massive retaliation if the material was used in an attack
and it could be traced back to the DPRK. However, should the economic situation further
deteriorate to the point that a massive influx of currency could save the government from
collapse, the North Korean government might consider selling nuclear materials to be worth the
potential risks.138
We have low confidence that North Korea will denuclearize. By 2019, the DPRK will
have greatly increased its nuclear and missile technologies, and will have become accustomed to
the sense of protection and power that they provide. Thus, it is very unlikely that Pyongyang will
make any serious efforts to denuclearize within the next ten years. Only the wild card of regime
change and a radical shift in policy could produce this decision.
138
Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence,” (12 February 2009) http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf (accessed 11 March
2009).
66
We have high confidence that the DPRK will continue to increase its stockpile of
nuclear weapons. Many of the scenarios above are likely to have occurred within fifteen years,
so North Korea will likely have at least one, if not two, new nuclear reactors in production mode.
The spent fuel rods that would then become available would allow the DPRK to accelerate its
nuclear buildup. Should a new regime assume control in Pyongyang, and if this new government
desired normalized international relations, the possibility exists that North Korea may move
away from the policies of Kim Jong-Il and agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons and allow
international inspections. At the same time, the chance that the DPRK will continue selling
missiles, missile technology, and nuclear weapons technology to rogue states or possibly to
terrorist groups remains likely. The cash generated by such sales will always be highly sought
after and welcomed in North Korea, no matter what type of government is in control.139
We have high confidence that the DPRK will continue to proliferate ballistic missile
and nuclear technology. The DPRK is currently involved in these activities, and has suffered
few tangible repercussions from them. Ballistic missiles and nuclear technology are essentially
the only two things that North Korea has that anyone in the world would want. The DPRK sells
weapons and technology for economic reasons, not political reasons. North Korea will not be
able to stop its proliferation activities even if it wanted to, because it has nothing else to export
that can generate the same income. Even if a new regime opened up the country to some degree,
the DPRK would simply shift its proliferations to serve political ends rather than economic ends.
139
Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong-Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford: University Press,
2005), 188.
67
We have medium confidence that the DPRK will develop a solid fuel ICBM. North
Korea is working feverishly to increase its ballistic missile capability and recently (April 4th
2009) launched a Taepodong-2 missile to test new design modifications. However, the
Taepodong-2 is a liquid fuel missile, which means that it is vulnerable to attack while being
fueled on the launch pad. Other nuclear powers use solid fuel missiles, and the DPRK will work
to possess them as well. Solid fuel missiles are more difficult to develop and deploy, and
considering the limited industrial capability of the DPRK, it will be no mean feat to accomplish
this task. However, with fifteen years to research the problem, North Korea will probably be able
to pull it off.
We have low confidence that the DPRK will sell nuclear weapons. The regime and
power structure live in fear of being liquidated by the United States. All of North Korea’s actions
are calculated to serve the survival of the regime. To date, North Korea has suffered no serious
punishments for its proliferation activities. North Korea’s leaders are rational men, and they do
not wish to provoke the United States into a rage sufficient enough to destroy them. Ballistic
missiles and nuclear reactor technology may put the Kim regime at odds with American foreign
policy, but selling fully operational nuclear weapons for hard currency would lead to direct
military confrontation with the United States. Once the weapon is out of the hands of
Pyongyang, the DPRK will no longer be able to control its use. However, it would suffer
devastating consequences if a buyer chose to use it.
Furthermore, North Korea wants to ensure that it has enough nuclear weapons on hand to
provide a deterrent against an American-backed South Korean invasion. Although we do not
know how many nuclear weapons North Korea believes are necessary to provide this deterrence,
it is logical to conclude that North Korea will not sell any weapons to other parties until its own
68
deterrent force is complete. In fifteen years, assuming that North Korea’s new reactors are online
and producing plutonium, the DPRK may reach its deterrence goal and possess some weapons
that could be considered “surplus.” Only then would North Korea be able to consider selling
nuclear weapons to third parties.
We have low confidence that there could be a nuclear war in Northeast Asia.
Economic instability, internal strife, succession issues, power struggles, and other such
occurrences could lead a desperate regime in the DPRK to start a nuclear war.140 Japan would be
the most likely target for North Korean nuclear weapons, although American bases in South
Korea might be targeted as well. Regardless of how such the war starts, it would not end well for
North Korea, South Korea, or Japan.141 All the countries involved would be severely impacted
for decades to come. This is unlikely, and it would be akin to carrying out a national level
suicide bombing to initiate a nuclear war that is sure to be lost.
140
Ibid., 1-19.
141
“Japan Urged to Think Twice Over Consequences,” Korean Central News Agency, (30 January 2000)
http://www. kcna.co.jp/ (accessed 17 March 2009).
69
Chapter 5
Reunification
Reunification of Korea is not in the rational, long-term interest of any country in North
East Asia, despite the fact that reunification is a stated goal of both Koreas. Given what we know
about North Korean leadership, our high confidence that Korea will not reunify is tied directly to
the likelihood of a regime or leadership change in North Korea. This being said, the four most
likely ways for the two Koreas to reunify are as follows:
1. A military engagement.
2. Collapse of the North Korean government.
3. Cooperative unification under Kim Jong-Il’s administration.
4. Cooperative reunification under new North Korean leadership.
1. Military Engagement between North and South Korea
Despite North Korea’s aggressive posture towards the South, the chance of a military
conflict remains low, as South Korea has both a more advanced military and the support of the
United States. A military engagement between the two Koreas would almost certainly end with
North Korean defeat. Should this occur, South Korea would find itself in control of 20 million
additional citizens who do not have adequate food, water, or infrastructure. The figure of only
20 million is used because we assume millions would be killed in the course of this conflict.
70
2. Collapse of the North Korean government
If the North Korean government were to collapse, the result would be essentially the
same as that of a military engagement: 20 million North Koreans would find themselves
appealing to the South Korean and Chinese governments for humanitarian aid and basic
necessities. Under the South Korean constitution, all residents of the Korean Peninsula are South
Korean citizens.142 At reunification, the South Korean government would be constitutionally
obligated to provide North Koreans with the same level of aid, infrastructure, and development
as they do South Koreans. South Korea is not prepared to provide these services to the
population of the entire peninsula.
In order to prevent the collapse of North Korea, substantial and prolonged international
aid is required. Russia’s energy organizations are currently looking to develop their ties with
South Korea.143 Because it is South Korea’s largest trading partner, China would suffer
economically if reunification occurred.144 Should a collapse of North Korea occur, South Korea
would likely install an interim government to first develop the economy and infrastructure of the
North, after which they could gradually begin to implement a program designed for true
unification.145
142
Constitutional Court of Korea “Constitution of the Republic of Korea,”(17 July 1948, amended last 29 October
1987) http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/republic.jsp (accessed 10 March 2009).
143
Energy Today, “Moscow Turns East, Diversifying Away From Europe,” (8 October 2008)
http://www.energytoday.eu/articles/90096.php (accessed 7 March 2009).
144
James Brooke, “China ‘Looming Large’ in South Korea as Biggest Player, Replacing the U.S.,” The New York
Times, (3 January 2003) .http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9F05E2D7113FF930A35752C0A9659C8B63 (accessed 7 March 2009).
145
Michael Schuman, “Reunification,” Time, (25 August 2003) http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,501030901-477994,00.html (accessed 7 March 2009).
71
3. Cooperative Unification under Kim Jong-Il’s Administration
Bilateral, or cooperative unification, is an option for reunification in which both North
and South Korea actively participate in the unification process. Cooperative unification is the
most likely option for successful reunification of the two Koreas. However, under Kim Jong-Il’s
leadership, the chances for reunification are unlikely. In 2007, South Korea elected the
conservative Lee Myung-bak as its president. Myung-bak is more conservative than his two
immediate predecessors, under whose watch the “sunshine policy” was implemented. Lee
Myung-bak has vowed to strengthen South Korean-U.S. relations and to take a harsher stance
towards North Korea. In January 2008, President Lee ended the South’s sunshine policy. Instead,
he has implemented a policy of reciprocity and hard-line tactics.146 Kim Jong-Il has criticized the
Lee administration’s politics, and has labeled the abandonment of the sunshine policy, the
appointment of Hyun In-taek as South Korea’s Unification Minister, and South Korea’s ongoing
joint military exercises with the United States as “war-mongering.”147
Despite this bluster, the DPRK routinely violated principles of the sunshine policy,
particularly the first principle, which calls for no provocation by the North that would hamper the
peace process.148 The North’s continued pursuit of a nuclear arsenal and a ballistic missile
program were counter-productive to the peace process. Kim Jong-Il’s angry response to South
Korea’s abandonment of the sunshine policy belies his own failure to abide by his part of the
deal.
146
International Herald Tribune, “S. Korean President-Elect Indicates Tougher Stance on North,” (27 December
2007) http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/20/asia/AS-POL-SKorea-Presidential-Election.php (accessed 9 March
2009).
147
Jack Kim, Reuters, “N. Korea Accuses U.S. of War-Mongering,” (21 February 2009) http://uk.reuters.com/
article/UKNews1/idUKTRE51K12E20090221 (accessed 7 March 2009).
148
Federation of American Scientists, “The Government of the People’s Sunshine Policy Toward North Korea and
Plans for Implementation,” (12 April 1999) http://www.fas.org/news/skorea/1999/990412-sunshine.htm (accessed 8
March 2009).
72
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and death of Kim Il-Sung, North Korea’s international
policies have become more financially motivated and somewhat desperate. North Korea is not
self-sufficient, despite the principles of Juche. Unless North Korea is willing to take drastic
action to reverse its economic decline, the North will collapse without continuing aid from other
countries.149 Kim Jong-Il is less concerned about the possibility of reunification than he is with
the survival of his regime.
4. Cooperative Unification under New North Korean Leadership
Of the four options for reunification presented, it is our judgment that a cooperative
unification under new North Korean leadership is most likely to be successful. Once Kim Jong-Il
is no longer in power, the succeeding administration will carry the burden of North Korean
survival. Changes to Kim’s administration could occur by a coup d’état, either by military or
other factions, or through a successor who simply reverses the current policies. Cooperative
unification under a new North Korean government is the most likely path to reunification
because a new North Korean government will need to establish international and internal
legitimacy.
The new leadership must establish programs designed to stimulate the economy, develop
the infrastructure of the state, and improve the standard of living for its citizens. This is an
extremely difficult task, and will likely need to be implemented over an extended period of
time.150 During this adjustment period, the South Korean government would likely be willing to
work with a new North Korean leadership to improve economic and political conditions within
149
Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, North,” (last updated 5 March 2009) https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed 8 March 2009).
150
Greg Sheridan, The Australian, (5 March 2009) http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/
0,25197,25139587-7583,00.html (accessed 7 March 2009)
73
North Korea. By improving these conditions over time, the financial strain placed on South
Korea at the time of reunification would be reduced.
A stable, non-hostile Korea is essential to the long-term security of the region.151 Though
there are exceptions, the major goals of the South’s gradual reunification plan are shared by the
broader international community. Reunification would affect other members of the Six-Party
Talks in the following ways:
South Korea and Unification
As previously stated, most South Koreans favor reunification, but they are mindful of the
costs. A 2004 national public survey found that 65 percent of South Koreans viewed unification
as desirable. Another survey found that 69 percent believed that it should be accomplished
“cautiously.”152 Unification of North and South Korea will require South Korea to provide
extensive resources, despite any aid it would receive from international institutions or from other
nations. The South Korean population is aging, and this will have an effect on both what the
economy can afford to invest and what the government can obtain in tax revenue. South Korea’s
pension and long-term care plans for the elderly have only existed for the he past two decades.
Funding is not geared towards South Korea’s anticipated demographics over the coming quarter-
century. South Korea faces a rapidly aging society, a shrinking workforce, and a declining
population rate.153 The cost of unification to Korea has been estimated to be between 6 and 7
151
Christopher Preble, CATO Institute, “North Korean Nukes: Beyond the Blame Game,” (20 October 2006)
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6734 (accessed 7 March 2009)
152
“SOUTH KOREAN OPINION POLLS: MAJORITY FAVORS NUCLEAR WEAPONS; 1980s GENERATION
QUESTIONS U.S. TIES,” WMD Insights, (January 2006),
http://www.wmdinsights.com/Old_EastAsia/DecJan/I1_EA1_SouthKoreanOpinion.htm (accessed March
18, 2009).
153
“The Odd Couple,” The Economist, (September 28, 2008).
74
trillion dollars, which is five or six times South Korea’s GDP.154 South Korea is apprehensive of
a potentially devastating and expensive reunification process.
The first step toward unification is closing the development gap between the North and
South. Current inter-Korean economic cooperation is insufficient. South Korea wants to avoid
any North Korean development that comes attached to Chinese influence.155 However, without
Chinese assistance, North Korea would face total collapse. Though it is not openly recognized, it
is clear that South Korean government agencies have secret files with short-term contingency
plans in case of a power collapse in the North.156 A short term or rapid reunification is not in the
interests of South Korea. The South needs sufficient time to plan for a gradual unification.
Rather than actively working to precipitate North Korea’s collapse, the United States and its
allies should instead work toward what might be called a soft landing: managing the North’s
decline in the short-term, while preparing the way for eventual reunification with South Korea in
the long-term.157
Japan and Korean Unification
Japan’s policy toward Korea does not seek Korean unification as a long-term goal. The
Japanese government focuses on the North Korean nuclear threat and on Japanese citizens who
were kidnapped by North Korea. The Japanese, as with most other nations, do not want to see
any sudden change on the Korean peninsula.158 By not providing economic assistance to North
154
“MANAGING THE COSTS OF KOREANREUNIFICATION—IF IT OCCURS,” Rand, (October, 2008),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1571/MR1571.ch38.pdf (accessed March 11, 2009).
155
Leif-Eric Easley, “ Prudence for Peace: South Korea-U.S. coordination must come before talks to end Korean
War,” Pacific Forum CSIS, (August, 16, 2007),
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0732a.pdf (accessed March 12, 2009).
156
Andrei Lankov, “Working Through Korean Unification Blues,” Asia Times Online, (November 15, 2007),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IK15Dg03.html (accessed March 18, 2009).
157
Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 264.
158
Joungwong Kim and Myungshin Hong, “The Koreas, Unification and the Great Powers,” Current History,
(2006):188.
75
Korea unless the country fully accounts for the abducted Japanese citizens, Japan is attempting to
gain a short-term goal. However, this remains a negative policy instrument in the long-term, as
this tactic results in much-needed aid being withheld from North Korea.159 This policy restricts
Japanese assistance to North Korea and hinders North Korea’s ability to have a “soft landing”
that leads to reunification. As a result of this policy, any progress towards integration will take
place without an important partner in North East Asia.
Another obstacle that keeps Japan from supporting reunification is North Korea’s pursuit
of nuclear weapons. A nuclear armed and increasingly hostile North Korea could lead to an arms
race in the region, which could potentially result in Japan developing its own nuclear weapons.
The history of brutal Japanese colonial rule in Korea is also a major problem to Japanese support
of reunification. The distrust between the two nations leads Japan to focus primarily on the
removal of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula and with the postponement of unification,
rather than with supporting unification as a long-term goal.
Although it is the wealthiest nation in Asia, Japan does not have the influence that it once
had across the continent. Japan acknowledges that if relations were to be normalized, the promise
of economic compensation represents Tokyo’s best chance to exercise power not only over
North Korea, but also over the other actors involved in the process.160 Still, significant obstacles
remain before Japan will actively support unification.
159
Linus Hagström, “Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea
Policy,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, 7 no. 1, (2008): 131-134.
160
Ibid.
76
Russia and Korean Unification
Russia has significant economic and security interests in reunification. The Korean
Peninsula functions as a launch pad from which Russia intends to regain regional influence in
Northeast Asia and promote its economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.161 Improved
relations with North Korea would allow Russia to participate in future infrastructure projects
linking Russia with the two Koreas. For Seoul, connecting pipelines from Russia's Irkhutsk
region to South Korea via North Korea could lower current import prices by as much as 25
percent, by eliminating the need for expensive maritime transportation.162
Russia also has long-term security interests on the Korean Peninsula. Russia continues to
advocate for the formation of a cooperative, multi-party security body to discuss stability and
peace in Northeast Asia. Moscow maintains two separate alliances in Asia: one between China
and India, the other, an economic relationship involving both Koreas. These relationships allow
Russia not only to maintain influence over each country, but also to pursue a new balance of
power that keeps the United States and Japan in check.163 Russia is also concerned with China
becoming closely aligned with a unified Korea. In fact, it is safe to say that Russia would favor a
unified Korea, if it kept the U.S. in and China out of the peninsula.164 For the moment, Russia
will keep the status quo to ensure that its economic and security interests are fulfilled.
161
Seung Kim Yang, Woosang Ham, and Yongho Kim, “Russo-North Korean Relations in the 2000S: Moscow's
Continuing Search for Regional Influence,” Asian Survey 44, no. 6 (2004).
162
Ibid.
163
Kim and Hong.
164
Col. David Coghlan, “Prospect from Korean Unification,” Strategic Studies Institute, (2008).
77
The United States and Unification
In the transition between presidents, the U.S. position towards North Korea is currently
being revised. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. demanded that before it could expect any
rewards, North Korea must take the first step towards complete, verifiable and irreversible
nuclear dismantlement, and that it must accept international inspections. The Bush
administration was unwilling to discuss alternative solutions or to engage in the kind of bilateral
talks requested by Pyongyang. Towards the end of the Bush administration, North Korea was
taken off the list of state sponsored terrorism in return for concessions on nuclear disarmament.
This upset the Japanese, who felt somewhat betrayed by the United States because of the
unresolved kidnappings issue. It remains unlikely that the U.S. will sacrifice the opportunity for
real progress on North Korean denuclearization to satisfy Japanese demands.165 The Obama
administration has asserted its commitment to South Korea, and to ensuring the denuclearization
of North Korea. Though this statement was not surprising, it was reassuring to the South Korean
government, given its concern that the Obama administration might be too willing to make
concessions with North Korea at the South's expense.
The U.S. view on Korean unification has two components. First, during and after
reunification, the United States does not want to see the Korean Peninsula fall under the
influence of China, Japan, or Russia. This is a view held by both Koreas. At a summit in 2000,
Kim Jong-Il and South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung agreed that a U.S. military presence
would be necessary in the turbulent period after reunification in case the Chinese, Japanese, or
any other power attempted to exert influence on the peninsula.166
165
Ralph Cossa, “Gauging Obama’s Asia Policy,” Asia Times, (March 11),
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/rss/eo20090311rc.html (accessed March 11, 2009).
166
Kim and Hong.
78
The second component of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula is a desire to see the
spread of democracy with unification. South Korea has served as an outpost of democracy in
Northeast Asia. In order to maintain this democracy, the U.S. would have to exert significant
amounts of influence during the reunification process. The U.S. will favor the status quo and
support gradual reunification so that democracy will be maintained in South Korea while it
spreads gradually to the North. An emergency reunification where the South attempted to extend
all the benefits of ROK citizenship to the people of the DPRK would immediately reduce the
standard of living of the ROK citizens by 33%. This would lead to the fall of the representative
government, or the return of military rule. Both of these outcomes are undesirable for everyone
involved.
China and Korean Unification
China does not favor the reunification of Korea. They have several significant economic
concerns regarding the sudden unification of Korea, or the collapse of North Korea. Because of
China’s proximity to North Korea, the Chinese government does not want a flood of refugees
entering its territory, so it has no interest in a North Korean collapse. In the event of a collapse,
Beijing would also have to deal with the loss of South Korean investments in China, which
would be shifted towards the reconstruction of North Korea.
Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin has noted, through “dialogues and negotiations…
[China] will, as always continue to work actively for the maintenance of peace and stability on
the Peninsula.”167 Total collapse of North Korea would be the worst unification option for China,
so China will likely continue to prop up the North Korean government to prevent this from
167
Coghlan.
79
occurring. China’s economic support of North Korea is strategically planned, and critical to
North Korean survival. It is also probably larger than some observers have previously
suggested.168 The amount of aid that China gives to North Korea is considered a national secret.
Through its economic support, China will continue to exert significant influence within the
Korean peninsula.
At the expense of the United States, China has positioned itself to profoundly influence
the nature of reunification, the political “tilt” of a unified Korea, and the future North East Asian
strategic environment.169 Because of their close political relations, Chinese investors are allowed
to invest in most parts of the North.170 In 2005, total Chinese investment totaled a record-
breaking $14.9 million, following the previous year’s $14.1 million.171 This seems like a small
amount, but it could represent vast amounts of resources if things are being handled like they
were in Russia in 1998. The Chinese have an advantage over the South Koreans, whose business
activities are limited to only two designated areas. In the event of the unification of the two
Koreas, China will have significant influence over the outcome and will move to protect its
strategic, economic, and security interests.
China does not want to see the emergence of an economically and militarily strong Korea
that has close ties to the United States. A unified Korea in alignment with the United States
would threaten China if tensions flared over Taiwan. As a result, Chinese consent to
reunification is linked to developments over Taiwan.172 Beijing is pursuing a two-Korea policy in
which it balances relations with both Pyongyang and Seoul, and maintains the two-nation status
168
Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China,”Asian Survey 48, 2 (2009).
169
Coghlan.
170
Choo.
171
Ibid.
172
William H. Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 165.
80
quo.173 If China considers a unification scenario unacceptable to its interests, or if the price of
supporting North Korea becomes too much, Beijing may decide to act to protect its interests and
secure its influence on the peninsula by force. By doing so, China would put itself in a strong
position to be able to shape the future of not only Korea, but also the wider strategic landscape in
Asia.174
Unified Germany as a Case Study for Korean Unification
South Korea’s position on reunification does not endorse immediate or short-term
unification. This position is based upon the potential political and economic stress that would
undoubtedly accompany unification. If the two Koreas eventually pursue a course of
reunification, several tremendous problems will need to be overcome. We can predict what the
most significant problems will be by looking at the example of German unification during the
early 1990’s. East and West Germany were separated for 40 years, while North and South Korea
have been separated for nearly 60 years. We can expect differences to be greater the longer the
two nations remain separate. Though the problems involved in Germany’s unification existed on
a smaller scale, the comparison is still valid because it provides us with an opportunity to
anticipate the most difficult aspect of unification: economics.
The economic disparity between the two nations will be the most significant hurdle to
successful reunification. In the reunification of East and West Germany, the cost of reunification
(based on conservative estimates) was around 600 billion dollars over a ten-year period.
Estimates for the reunification of North and South Korea, by contrast, range between one and
seven trillion dollars over the first ten years.175 In 1989, the population of East Germany was one
173
Coghlan.
174
Ibid.
175
Costs of reunification vary widely, no generally agreed upon values.
81
quarter that of West Germany. Today, North Korea’s population is roughly half that of the
South’s. In terms of per capita GDP, West Germany’s 1989 GDP was three times that of East
Germany. South Korean per capita GDP today is currently 14.5 times that of North Korea’s
population.176 The disparity between the two Koreas is far greater than it was between the two
Germanys, but the comparison at least provides us with a reference point for how much aid will
be required in order for unification to be successful.
A unified Korea should pay attention to the amount of time and money it will take for a
full recovery. Under German reunification, the application of universal wages and one central
currency hindered the development of business while simultaneously lowering labor costs. As a
result, West Germany experienced a serious recession while East Germany actually experienced
small economic expansion. After ten years, Germany had not yet fully recovered from
unification. South Korea currently has an unemployment rate of 3.2%, one of lowest globally,177
while a large percentage of the North’s population cannot maintain their subsistence farms.
North Korean consumer products are technologically inferior and of a poorer quality to those of
the South, thereby creating capital investment problems in North Korea. A unified Korea could
expect several years of economic disparity and change while the two sides attempt to equalize.
The main reason that such large amounts of international aid will be required to unify
Korea is because North Korean infrastructure is in a staggering state of disrepair. East Germany,
under the rule of the Soviets, still had running water, roads, and electricity. They even had
televisions and means for communication. North Korea has not experienced nearly the same
176
Population and GDP facts from Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, North,” (last updated 5 March 2009)
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed 8 March 2009)
177
Unemployment rates from Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, North,” (last updated 5 March 2009)
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed 8 March 2009)
82
level of development than East Germany had. East Germany really was a “workers paradise”
compared to the deprivation the peasants of the DPRK experience. Power generation under Kim
Jong-Il is estimated to be only a fraction of what it was under Kim Il-Sung.178 Ironically, some of
the power generators in use in North Korea today were constructed as far back as the Japanese
occupation in the early twentieth century.179
Political and cultural problems will also arise during the transition from a communist,
authoritarian state to a democratic state with a market system. A major problem during German
reunification was resentment between the two sides and ideological differences. Under
communism, privatization and ownership are not allowed. Similar to the situation in Russia after
the collapse of the USSR in 1991, policymakers will have to figure out how to implement free
market principles in a country that was dominated by Stalinist economic philosophy for over
sixty years. Furthermore, how can South Korea maintain order among the North’s newly freed
people without resorting to authoritarian leadership? The answer lies in significant amounts of
foreign aid and a significant amount of time.
Unification of the two Koreas is in the long-term interest of the two nations and the
international community, although there will be short-term pain while the reunification process is
accomplished. Once unification does eventually occur, international aid will be required in order
to rebuild North Korea’s infrastructure and economy. Significant ideological differences on both
sides will also have to be addressed in order for unification to be successful.
178
Federation of American Scientists, “Energy and Power,”(last updated 15 June 2000)
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/target/energy.htm (accessed 8 March 2009)
179
Ibid.
83
Summary: Prospects for Reunification
Unification Within Five Years

 Medium confidence that there will be no regime change
 Without regime change, high confidence that unification or any marked progress towards
unification will not occur.
Unification Within Ten Years

 Medium confidence that there will be no regime change, but new leadership will emerge.
 Medium confidence that reunification will not occur.
 Medium confidence that reunification-oriented policies will remain unchanged.
Unification Within Fifteen Years

 Moderate confidence that there is no regime change.
 Medium confidence against reunification.
 Medium to low confidence that reunification-oriented policies will remain unchanged.
84
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APPENDIX A: Kim Jong-Il’s Life Expectancy
By examining what we know of Kim Jong-Il’s family medical history, lifestyle, and
known medical problems, we can gain some insights into how long Kim could reasonably be
expected to live. Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-Il’s father, lived until his early eighties. Little is
known of his lifestyle. Kim Jong-Il reportedly suffers from diabetes, and had a stroke in August
2008. Kim lives an indulgent, unhealthy lifestyle: he smokes, drinks, does not exercise, and
enjoys fatty foods. Given his estimated height and weight, Kim is slightly overweight. It would
be likely for Kim to suffer from diseases of the heart, liver, and lung. Kim has likely done
permanent, irreversible damage to his body as a result of his lifestyle.
Although the life expectancy for a typical North Korean man is 61 years, Kim Jong-Il is
not a typical North Korean—his access to foreign doctors and quality health care would make a
comparison to South Korean male life expectancy more apt. South Korean men have a life
expectancy of seventy-one years. Given that Kim is in his late sixties and already has serious
health issues, we estimate that he is approaching the end of his life within the next five to ten
years.180
180
Central Intelligence Agency, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” CIA Factbook,
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90
APPENDIX B: Population Growth and Food Supply in North Korea
Population of South and North Korea in Thousands

South Korea North Korea
Food Situation in North Korea

Type/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Unit
Demand 538 591 606 613 626 632 639 645 651 650
10,000 tons
Production 349 389 422 359 395 413 425 431 454 448
Tables and Charts from the Ministry of Unification – South Korea, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=NORtables
91
APPENDIX C: Aid to North Korea
Food Loans to North Korea

/ Year '00 '02 '03 '04 '05 '07 Total
2.4 million
300,000 tons
100,000 tons 150,000 tons tons of ROK
of imported 400,000 400,000 tons of
400,000 of ROK rice of ROK rice and imported
rice and tons of ROK rice and
Type of Food tons of and 300,000 and 250,000 rice combined
200,000 tons ROK 100,000 tons of
ROK rice tons of tons of and 200,000
of Chinese rice imported rice
imported rice imported rice tons of Chinese
corn
corn
IKCF*
105.7 151.0 151.0 135.9 178.7 164.9*** 887.2
Disbursement**
Jul
Period of Oct 2000-Sep 2002- Jul 2004 Jul 2005 Jun
- Dec
Delivery Mar 2001 Jan 2003 - Feb 2005 - Feb 2006 - Dec 2007
2003
*Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IFCK)
** The unit of IKCF disbursement is billion won
*** 164.9 billion won in 2007 was based on an agreement made at the 186th Consultative Meeting on
Promotion of inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation
International Aid to North Korea

Unit: Hundreds of Millions of Won
Type / Year '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 ' 00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08.6 Total
Government 1,854 24 240 154 339 978 975 1,140 1,097 1313 1,360 2,296 2,159 103 14,032
Grant NGOs 2 12 182 275 223 387 782 576 766 1,558 779 709 909 263 7,423
Total 1,856 36 422 429 562 1,365 1,757 1,716 1,863 2,871 2,139 3,005 3,068 366 21,455
Food Loan 1,057 1,510 1,510 1,359 1,787 1,649 8,872
Total 1,856 36 422 429 562 2,422 1,757 3,226 3,373 4,230 3,926 3,005 4,717 366 30,327
*South Korean governmental support for NGO matching funds is included in government aid
Tables and Charts from Ministry of Unification – South Korea, Humanitarian Cooperation
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_assistance
Fertilizer Assistance to North Korea

/ Year '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 Total
Amount (in thousand tons) 155 300 200 300 300 300 350 350 300 2,555
Cost (in billion won) 46.2 94.4 63.8 83.2 81.1 94.0 120.7 120.0 95.1 799.5
Tables and Charts from Ministry of Unification – South Korea, Humanitarian Cooperation
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_assistance
APPENDIX D: Production and Transportation in North Korea
92
Production in North Korea

Type/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Unit
Iron Ore 2,890 3,786 3,793 4,208 4,078 4,433 4,579 4,913 5,041 5,126 1,000 M.T.
Grain 3,886 4,222 3,590 3,946 4,134 4,253 4,311 4,537 4,536 4,005 1,000 M.T.
Rice 1,461 1,629 1,424 1,680 1,734 1,720 1,795 2,024 1,895 1,527 1,000 M.T.
Fishery 627 664 698 746 805 835 1,169 909 923 930 1,000 M.T.
Fertilizer 392 572 539 546 503 416 434 450 454 405 1,000 M.T.
Cement 3,150 4,100 4,600 5,160 5,320 5,543 5,632 5,930 6,155 6,129 1,000 M.T.
Car 6.4 7.3 6.6 5.7 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 1,000
Steel 945 1,243 1,086 1,062 1,038 1,093 1,068 1,168 1,181 1,229 1,000 M.T.
Transportation Infrastructure within North Korea

Type/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Unit
Length of
5,214 5,214 5,214 5,224 5,235 5,235 5,235 5,235 5,235 5,242 Km
Railroad
Length of Road 23,407 23,479 23,633 23,963 24,449 24,879 25,185 25,495 25,544 25,621 Km
Harbor Loading 1,000
35,010 35,010 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 36,900 37,000 37,000 37,000
Capacity ton
Shipping 1,000
72 79 85 85 81 88 90 90 90 80
Capacity G.T.
 Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) as of July 2008 (As of December 2006)
93
APPENDIX E: North Korean Trade
North Korean Trade

Type/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Unit
External Trade 1,442 1,480 1,969 2,270 2,260 2,391 2,857 3,002 2,996 2,941 1,000,000 USD
Export 559 515 556 650 735 777 1,020 998 947 918 1,000,000 USD
Import 883 965 1,413 1,620 1,525 1,614 1,837 2,003 2,049 2,022 1,000,000 USD
Trade with China 413 370 488 737 738 1,022 1,385 1,580 1,699 1,974 1,000,000 USD
Intra-Korean Trade 221 333 425 402 641 724 697 1,055 1,349 1,797 1,000,000 USD
Volume of Inter-Korean Trade

Unit: Millions of Dollars
Tables and Charts from Ministry of Unification – South Korea, Exchanges and Cooperation
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFexchanges_goods
94
APPENDIX F: Energy and Fuel in North Korea
Energy Supply in North Korea

Type/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Unit
Power 100,000
170 186 194 202 190 196 206 215 225 220
Generation mWh
Petroleum
3,694 2,325 2,851 4,244 4,376 4,207 4,156 4,086 3,841 3,834 1,000 bbl.
Import
Coal Production 18,600 21,200 22,500 23,100 21,900 22,300 22,800 24,060 24,680 24,100 1,000 M.T.
Petroleum imports into North Korea (in thousands of barrels)
Coal Production in North Korea (in thousands of tons)
Appendix G: Military Comparison Between South and North Korea

95
Classification South Korea North Korea

More than
Total More than 1,170,000
674,000
Troops (Peace time) Army 541,000 1,000,000
Navy 68,000 60,000
Air Force 65,000 110,000
19 (including the Artillery corps,
12 (including
Missile guidance bureau and
Corps Special Warfare
light infantry instruction
Command)
guidance bureau)
Units
Divisions 50 75
Maneuver 69 (excluding 10 instruction
19
Brigade guidance brigades)
Army Tanks 2,300 3,700
Armored
2,500 2,100
vehicles
Field artillery 5,100 8,500
Equipment
MLRS 200 4,800
Surface-to-
surface guided 20 (launchers) 80 (launchers)
Principal weapons
Force
Warships 120 420
Capability
Landing
10 260
vessels
Surface
ships Mine warfare
Navy 10 30
ships
Support
20 30
vessels
Submarines 10 60
Fighters 500 820
80 (including
Special aircrafts 30
naval aircraft)
Air
Force Support aircrafts 190 510
680 (including all
Helicopters helicopters of the 310
3 services)
7,700,700 (including the
instruction guidance units,
Reserve Forces (troops) 3,040,000
Worker/Peasant red guard units
and Red youth guard)
Naval troops of South Korea include 25,000 troops of ROK Marine Corps and Ground Forces units
*
(Division/Brigade) and equipment include those of Marine Corps.
96
** The field artillery of the North does not include infantry regiment's 76.2mm guns.
Owning to limitation as for the expression of qualitative assessment, the above table indicates only quantitative
***
comparison at the level of opening to the public.
97
APPENDIX H: North Korea Missile Ranges
The graphic below illustrates the ranges of several of North Korea’s different types of
missiles. The No Dong missile, with a range of 1,000 kilometers, can easily reach much of
Northeast Asia, including all of Japan. The Taepodong 1, with a range greater than 1,500
kilometers, can reach much of the Asian continent, including large areas of Russia and China.
The Taepodong 2, with a range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers, can reach as far as Alaska.
However, most alarming for America is a proposed improved version of the Taepodong 2,
which, with a range of 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers, would easily reach much of the western
continental United States.
“North Korea Tests ICBM Engine … Designed To Reach California,” PatDollard.com (2007)
http://patdollard.com/2008/09/north-korea-tests-icbm-engine-that-could-reach-california/ (accessed 25 March 2009).

North Korea National Intelligence Estimate - Nukes, Famine, Missiles and The Dear Leader

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North Korea National Intelligence Estimate - Nukes, Famine, Missiles and The Dear Leader

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National Intelligence Estimate

PROSPECTS FOR REGIME CHANGE AND REUNIFICATION

A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

California State University, San Bernardino

CHAPTER 1: Leadership and Succession………………………………………………..…...15

CHAPTER 2: Economy and Infrastructure…………………………………………………..25

CHAPTER 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction…………………………………………………57

APPENDIX A: Kim Jong-Il’s Life Expectancy.……………………………………...86

APPENDIX B: Population Growth and Food Supply in North Korea…..…………87

APPENDIX C: Aid to North Korea……………………………………………...……88

APPENDIX D: Production and Transportation in North Korea…………………....89

APPENDIX E: North Korean Trade……………………………………………….....90

APPENDIX F: Energy and Fuel in North Korea………………………………….....91

APPENDIX G: Military Comparison Between South and North Korea…………...92

APPENDIX H: North Korean Missile Ranges………………………………………..94

Air Force, Army, ballistic missile, capital, capital consumption, capital

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a totalitarian dictatorship under the

humanitarian issues that such a collapse will entail.

alone prevailing, in the event of a second Korean War.

leader of the DPRK.

make Korean reunification possible.

ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

MILITARY AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

that nuclear armaments are necessary to deter the U.S.-RO.K. Alliance.

postpone its inevitable collapse.

1) What is the likelihood of regime change in North Korea?

studied four specific areas pertaining to North Korea’s future prospects:

1. Leadership and succession

2. Economy and infrastructure

3. Military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

4. Prospects for reunification

Leadership and Succession

we believe to be the most credible information available.

Korea, it is important to differentiate between succession and regime change. Succession

describes a peaceful transition of power between individual leaders, without a fundamental

mode of government, we will consider it to be a regime change.

government organization that oversees criminal activities such as industrial-scale

methamphetamine production, counterfeiting, and duplication of bootlegged movies and

regime’s line of succession.

groomed as a successor to Kim Jong-Il.

We have medium confidence that there will be a succession in North Korean

constitute a regime change.

component, to run the country.

generals, many of them unknown to the outside world at this time.

post-Kim Jong-Il North Korea.11

leaders. Those that did not escape were executed.

Supreme People’s Assembly during the March 8 election.

DPRK’s government for many years to come.

Economy and Infrastructure

Jong-Il’s willingness to cooperate with the international community on denuclearization and

no seed for next year.

problems among members of the North Korean military.

economically. Chinese officials have demonstrated the benefits of opening up to foreign

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/113_40442.html (accessed on March 2, 2009)

over the next five years.

appear to be a propaganda stunt to reinforce the Juche ideology—North Korea’s ability to

overcome its economic woes through its own efforts.

mid-1990s.57 In parts of North Korea, up to 70 percent of electricity is hydroelectrically

resources to repair its infrastructure and expand its economy.

Foreign direct investment continues to be limited by the current political situation.

within North Korea’s current political climate.

2009, Tuesday, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=266&GoP=1 (accessed on March 6, 2009).

aid to help revitalize its economy and infrastructure.