APRIL 11, 2014 BY EMIR MENDOZA

CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 205003,
205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172, 207563)
*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the Statesponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical
health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer
patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine
WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD AND RATIO:
A.
1. NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is
a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.
Ponentes view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life
begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they
did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn
child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this
intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but

also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State
has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the
IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2. NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of
all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by
using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray
that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale
and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives
are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law,
the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe,
legal, non-abortificient and effective.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or
wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
a.) NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon
the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law
even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
b.) YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the
Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients
to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of
penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the

freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to

it, a constitutionally-protected
right
must
prevail
over
the
effective
implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the
IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between
public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is
intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is
employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the
free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or
health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition,
the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive
means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other
secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The
Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
c.) NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government.
The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive
and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of
the State.
4. YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards
for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and
(b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon
this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in
cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in
this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has
not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as
the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care
institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as
provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)
(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that
it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8. NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono service.
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs
do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only
has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph
(c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services
are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by
the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions
cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.