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SEMANTIC
1~I-IEORY

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RU'TH M, KEMPSON
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I.INGUI~TICS
01'

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llistoricul

Linguisics

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Introduction
Aspects o/ the Theory o/ Synt ax ch. 1, hut Sl'C also C'ltolllsky {,all.t:/wgr
Mind (enlarged edition), and Ilach Syntactic TIrt'tJ,y ch. 11. 'I'he prohlelll

(/11I/

01'
the nature of linguistic evidence has not hccn :ivt"1l mucl, d('lailnl al/cnlion
hy
trans(ormational
Iinguists
hut sce Sampson
The '-O'III '1 LfllI.t:/w.t:r ch .. 1,
Labov
'Methodology',
Fillrnore
'On .;en<:rativity'
and I'!ouscholdl'f
'On

bctwcc.i compcrcncc and pcrformance

is discussed in Chomsky's
Aspects of the Tlreo,y 'if Syntax, ami in
more detail in Lyons and Wales [eds.) /'s)'dru/i1lKl/istir l'aper (Sl'C in particular
argumcnts

asterisks'.

The

distinction

Explanations

of word meaning

Fodor
and Garrctt
'Sorne rellections
on cUlllpctelln'
and IH:rfllflllanec').
Chomsky's
account
of this division
has hCCTl attuckcd
hy 1I yrncs 'On cummunicative
cornpetence',
and more n'el'ntly
hy (;. l.akofT amI nthcr s (scc t lurccommendcd
reading for chapter
.).

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1n the first chaptcr

of udcquucy
for scmantic theories by which particular theories could be tested, and
it rnight seem that we are now in a position to consider the detailed
mcchanism
of some proposed thcory. llut there was one large and
unwarrantcd assumption in the way that thcse cOllllitions wcre spccificd ;
it was assumcd that the rclationship hctwcen a word ami what it is uscd
to imply and that between a sentence nnd what it is uscd to imply
presented no problerns, ano were not a matter for debate. But, quite to
the contrary, an explanation of these rclationships - i.e. the problem of
what we mean when we rcfer to the rncaning that a word or scntence
has - is the classical problem of scmantics,
the problem indeed on
which scrnantics has traditionally [oundercd. Since any formal representation of sernantics will implicitly present one particular solution to this
problem, we cnnnot usefully consider the dctuils of such a theory except
in the light of a eoherent account 01 meaning.

There are three main ways in which linguists und pliilosophers have
attcrnpted to construct explanations of mcaning in naturallanguage:
(o)
by defining the nature of word rneaning, (h) by defining the nature of
sentence meaning, and (e) by explaining thc process of eommunication.
In the first wa}:, word meaning is taken as the eonstruet in terms of
which sentence meaning and communication
can be explained; in the
sccond, it is sentence meaning whieh is taken as basic, with words
characterised
in terms of the systernatic contribution
they make to
sentenee mcaning; and in the third, both sentence and word meaning are
explained in terms of the ways in which sentencs and words are used in
the act of communication.
It is no coincidence that there are these three
types of explanation. In the first place, thcre c1early is a relation between
words and objects. We use words lo refer to objccts, and to actions
(eonsider such words as ClIP, liorse, tooman, grodllate, cooking, noeeping,

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10

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from

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1 suggestcd

SOl/le prcliminury

conditions

11

o/ toord

Explanations

mcaning

Al

Ihinkinc), ami the explun.uion of this n-l.u ion is induhitabf y thc t ask of
semantics. Similarly scntcnces
are uscd lo dcscr ihc cvenrs, bc licfs,
opinions,
ami it is unquestionably
t he task of scmant ics lo cxplnin thc
nature of the rclation betwccn scntcnces ami the statcs of alfairs those
sentences describe. Finally, since lunguagc is the vchicl by mcuns of
which we effect cornmunication,
it is argllahle thut the intcrprct.uion
of
language should be explaincd in tcrrns 01' its rolc in communication.
Moreover these thrce nspects of Illeaning, word mcuning,
scntence
rneaning, and comrnunication,
are reflcctcd in diflercnt uses 01' the word
mean, Corrcsponding
to cxplanut ion (11) is :

(1) Supererogatory
(2) Spinster means

rncans 'supcrfluous'.
'unmurricd

woru.ur'.

Corresponding to (11) is :
\

sentenee Ja/lles murdcrrd ,HII,\' mcans t hat somcone

called [ames delibcrntely
killcd snmeonc called Mnx.

(3) The

In these two uses, the word mean has a lIleaning approximaling

lo
indica/f. Butthe word /IIf(lI/ is uscd in a ditlcrcnt
scnsc in the [nllowing
conversationbetwccn
two spcakcrs, A and Il, a sense which corrcspnnds
to ~xplanatidn (e):
(4) A: Are yOIl going lo bcd soou?
D: Whut d'you mcnn?
A: 1 rnean that I'm t ircd , and thc sooner yOIl go lo bcd, the
sooncr 1 can.

:
:.

In this case, mean is attributable

lo speukers und has the sume Illeanillg
as the expression intend /0 indicate. 'I'hus we have at least thrce possible
starting
points from whieh to construct
un explanation
of meaning - the
signification of words, the interprctarion
of scntcnces, or what a speaker
is intending to convey in ucts of conununicatiou.
Of thcse thrce uses,
most traditional explanations
of mcaning constitutc
u n nttcmpt lo cxplnin
meaning in terms of the naming rclurion which holds bct wcen a word
and its object, and it is this that wv shull hr conccrncd
with in this
chapter.
2.1

transparent
12

<

Meaning
and refer enc
Thc narning rclat ion hct wccu a word ami it~ ohjL'C! is most
with proper

narnes,

thc paradiglll

case of nallling.

llcre

2.1

I
I
I

Meaning and rejerence

there is a one-to-one
correspondence
hctwcen name and object: Ior
exarnple the name The j>arllu/I(;ll
rcfer s to thc objcct the Parthenon in
Athens, the name Ruth Kempsou refcrs lo th~ individual who wrote this
book. This rclationship betwccn word and objcct is called the rclationship of reference, and there is a long tradition of equating the problem of
meaning with the problem of rcference. According to this view, known
as extensionalism
beca use of its trcatmcnt of meuning in terms of the
objects, callcd extcnsions,
to which thc items of the language refer,'
the meaning of a word can be explained in tcrms of the relation bctween
that word ami ohject or objccts to which it refcrs. J ust as propcr narnes
rcfer to individuals,
it has hccn suid , common nouns rcfer to scts of
individuals,
verbs rcfer to aetions, adjcctives rcfer to properties -of
individuals, and udverbs refer lo propcr ties of actions. Thus, for exarnplc,
it would be said that thc rclation bctwccn the express ion Ruth Kempson
and the individual
Ruth Kcmpson is directly comparable
with the
relation betwccn the word mice and the scts of objects which can be
referred to by the use of that word; ami moreover both of these relations
are said lo be siruilarly comparable lo the relation which holds between,
say, the word red and the scts of objects which have the property of
redness, and too to the rclation which holds betwccn the word quickly
and the sets of actions which liavc the appropriatc propcrty of speed.
IIowever, assuming for the momcnt that we can acccpt the clnirn of
hornogeneity
in connection
with thcse difTerent relations, there are a
number of reasons to believe that any theory of meaning which attcmpts
to explain all aspects of word meaning in terms of rcferenee is mistaken.
1n the first place, there are a nurnbcr of ernbarrassing
counter-examplcs:
even if the relationship of refcrence can be said to hold between a word
such as imagination and sorne cluss of abstract objccts which constitute
acts of imagination,
therc is no .sense in which words such as and, not,
tohether rcfer to anything. And '0111 prepositions present a similar problern, Wliat does o/ rcfer to? What , in this very sentenee, docs the preposition in rcfer to - or indced uery or toltat] NOl only is there a large
and non-homogeneous
c1ass.i)f:exceptions,
but there are a number of
anornalies in explaining more straightforward
cases. The relationship of
reference which holds betwccn expressions and non-cxistcnt
objects will
be the sarne : it is therefore hard for a theory which explains rneaning in
I

T'he rnost
becn
bused

well-knowu.cxposu

expounJcJ
rheory

ion is Russcll

1I~lIin hy Duvidson
of meunj ng (cf. J,I

(ef.

I ()OZ.

Duvidson

hui chis view has rcccntly

196711) within

a trurh-

below).

13

R:~p'lallaliolls

01 uord

2.1

I/ltallillg

terms of rcference to uvuid prnlil'lillg

SyllOIl)'lIly betwccn ;111 of the
following: the pterodactyl, tlte unicoru tlu: [trs! 10(11I1//1/ 'o ///11/1 (J/I the
moon, And, for the sarne reason, 0111 cxprvssion SIIl'h ;IS tlte jirst /IUIII lo
land on thc moon will he prcclictcd 10 he quite dilercnt in k ind frorn the
expression the first tooman lo 1(/11/1011 1!tf./II1J1J/1, hccuusc only in t lie former
case is there a rcferent to which t he cxprcssion cm st.md in a referring
relationship.
Prohlerns arise cvcn in un .malys is of common nouns
which refer to a set of ohjccts. ror in what srnsc can t hc rc be s.rid lo be a
,consistent identifiable rclat ionsh ip of rcfcrcncl' bct wccn t hr wor d igunna
and a set of objects to whicl: it rcfcrs in C,) (7r
(5) Iguanas are not very COlll11Il111.
(6) Are iguanas cxt inct?

(7) .Professor

11ra ncst a \\'1

1I

is looking for igllallas,

In {S), the word might be suid to refcr to a class of objccts, viz. igu.mas ;
but in (6), the word either refers to a cluss of objccts or a null class,
apparently depending on the unswcr to the qucst iou.i And in (7), the
problem is no less acure: for on one intcrprct.uion
there lIlay be, say,
two specific iguanas that I'rofessor Hruncstuwm is Iuoking Ior, but on
another interpretation
he lIlay just be looking without thcrc ncccssarily
being any such objcct. On this intcrprct.uion,
it makes no sensc to
question whieh objects does thc word igual/a rcfcr to? This problern
arises in a large number of cases (culled 'opaque coutcxts'),
following
vcrbs such as beliet:e, soan] nnd /1Of>e; ami t hcse present a notor ious
problern to anyonc attelllpting
tu providc un .m.rlysis of rcfercnce.
. Furthermore,
iC we return to the paradiglll case of rcferring, propcr
names, we fino an important dilcrcncc bctwccn thcse and an)' uther
syntacric category. Thollgh
in proper n.uncs thcrc is a OIlC-tO-OIlC
correspondence
betwecn word ami ohjcct , it is 1101 ohvious t h at propcr
narncs have any meaning ut all, ror it m.rkcs no se nse lo ask '\Vhat is the
meaning of thc expression NIJIIIII C/IIl/lIsII.l'?':
nnc can nnly usk '\V11O docs
the cxpression NOIIIII C/lIJlIIshy
rcfer to?' Th is slIggesls al t hc very lcast
that a semantic account of prnpcr n.uncs should not be like that of other
words, Ilut if this is so, thcn the original ussumpt iun of homogcneity in
the semantie properties
of proper nouns uud thc other categories,
cornrnon nouns, vcrbs, udjectives, udvcrbs, and so 011, was a mistakc.
I

If
I

Sentences
reference,
subjrcl.

such as Ihese pose ,',,,asiderahle prohlcrns

as WilllCSS 11,, larg, a"'''"111 of pl.ilosophi<:al

fnr " rheory of

re 011 the

litcr.uu

Meaning aud reference

This is not lo dcny that thcre are problema in the nnalysis of refercncc.
On thc contrary. the solution tI; -thc prohlcm of opacity in particular
rcmains an opcn OI1C, and sonH:thing
of a n issue for philosophers.
But it <loes cast doubt on t hc 'assumption
thut any solution
to the'
problerns of reference autnrnnt ically provides a solution to thc problern
of meaning.
Thc imagc theor y of mcaning
Another solut ion to thc prohlcm of cxplaining the naturc of .
wurd rncaning, which has an cqunlly long 'tradition,
is to cxplain the
mcaning of a word in tcrms of rhc iougc in thc spcnkcr's (or hearcr's)
bruin. ''he problcm here is to know what form thc imagcs tuke, 'I'hc
most obvious point is that these'illlages
cannot be visual. For suppose
rny image of a triangle is an cquilatcrul:
'
2.2

Fig.

If this is said to constitute Cor me the meanmg oC the word triangle, then
eithcr triaugle has to mcan cquilatcrul triangles only, or triangle has tobe
said lo be arnbiguous according as the image is cquilateral, isosceles, or
scalenc. For cuch of thcse is nuitually exclusive. In a similar vein, an
owncr of an alsatian ma)' havc a radically different image of dogs from an
owncr of a miniaturc poodlc, but it is not obvious that they thereby'
spcak a diffcrent language. Thcrc is no image corrcsponding
to what i~.
sharcd betwccn dogs, ami none either which has just those fcaturcs
shnrcd by all triangles. Ancl this is just one of the m:1I1y problerns Iacing
a SImple illlage theory of mcuning. Furthcr problema are prescntcd by
the fact that (a) one Illay llave more than ore image for a single expresaion, and (b) two expressions may havc the sarne image. Thus the expression a tlred child may cvoke cithcr an irnage of a child (notice that
there is no visual image neutral as between a boy or a girl) curlcd up and
nearly aslecp, or an image of a child stamping its Coot and screaming.
According to an account of rneaning which cquates the meaning a word
has with an image, any word which relates to more than onc image is

;'

15

Ii

",

Explallafons

o/ word

meal/il/g

predicted to be ambiguous.
But despitl' t hc prcdict ion, t hc vxprcssinn
a tired child is not ambiguous. On the othcr hand, sliould t \\'0 cxpressions
bear the same irnagc, the image theory of ll1eanillg prcdicts that they will
be synonymous. Dut many cxpressions
hnve the same ill1age: (/ tired
child, an unliappy child, (/1/ tlngry cluld , (/ [uture tyrant maya" cvoke the
identical image of a child stamping its foot und screarning. Yct thcse
cxprcssions are by no mc.ins synOIl)'1I10US, /\s I huvc alrc.uly partly
indicated, an image thcory of meaning faces the ndclirional
problcm of
speaker variation. The ill1ages we havc of what might be rcferred to by
any word may not only v;lry fmlll occasioll to occ.isiou, hut since they
arcdepcndent
on our expericnce are certuin to dill'cr in lI1any dctuils, if
not radically in substance from those 01' othcr pcople. 'I'akc t hc wor d
lecture for example. To those who give lccturcs, t hc wnrd Illight call IIp
animage of an audience of bctwccn,
S;y, twenty and one hundrcd
people staring up at one wretchcd
individual who, per haps sclf-consciously, walks up and down in front of t hcm. Ilut ror t hosc who have
never lectured, the image is more likcly to be that of one pcrson droning
on, often boring, sometimos
incomprehensible,
with thc accoll1panying
sensation ofhaving to fight feclings of dro\\'siness, Such ditlercnt images
should, if they correspond
to the ll1eaning associatcd with the word
, lecture guarantee
that cornmunicarinn
bct wccn two such grollps of
people using the word lecture would be impossible beca use cnch group
. , has radically different illlages of Iecturing ami hcnce dilcrcnt concep" tions of the meaning of the word lert ure, Worst of al/, there are lIlany
words wit,h whieh it is irnpossible to nssociatc any image at all - and,
or, because, therefore, cte. Yet they are by no mcnns rncnninglcss.

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23 : Meaning and conccpts

The standard retrcat Irm thc extreme [orm of the image
view of maning is to say that thc ill1ages are not visual; but, if so, it is
not obvious what claim is being m.ulc. Considcr for cxample the suggestion that 'the speech clernent 'housc' is thc symbol, Iirst ami Iorcmost,
not of a single perception, rior cven of t hc notion of a particular objcct,
but of a 'concept', in other words, of a convenicnt capsuh; of thought
that embraces thousands of distinct cxpcr icnccs :11)(1 that is ready to
takc in thousands more' [Sapir 1921: IJ), \Vhat is involvcd in this clairn
that a word has as its Illeaning a 'eonvcnient eapsule of thought'? If this
.is a retraclion from nn im;ge theory nf ll1eaning, as it is. then it is ;
retraction fmm a specilic, fnlse clailll to one that is entirely untestable

2,3 Meaning
nnd hencc

ami concepts

\t docs no more than substituto

Ior the problem
opaque tcrm conrept . It dOl'~ not providc un
explanation
of the rcquircd kind (cf. p, I ubovc), If mcaning is to be
explained in terrns of conccpts,
it is cssewtial that the term (Ol/tf!>/
itself be given a rigorous dcfiuitiori.
'
Sapir's Swiss contcrnporary,
de Suussurc, goes sorne \Vay towards
providing such a charaeterisat ion, FOI" though, like Sapir, de Saussurc
talks freely of conccpts, he strcsscs that the concept (the word he uses is :
signiji) an clement .stnnds for is solcly due to its valuc in the systcrn:
'Language is a system of intcrdcpcmlcnt
terms in which the valuc of
cach terrn results solcly Iron: the simultancous
prcscncc of orhcrs'. Oh
this basis he would have said thnt thc word bachelor, for exumple, has the
mcaning
it docs solcly by virtue nf the ol,hl'r itcms in the systcm to
which it is rclatcd - spinster, tooman, huslmnd, boy, Similar/y,
right
across the vocabulary.
'J'hus eaeh of the mcrnbers of the following sets of
words stands in a ccrtain rclut ion one to another (Iabclled valeur), which
is itself a determinant
of the intcrprctution
of thc word:
tcrm

vucuous.

meaning

thc equally

have
glve
lend
borrow
rcnt
hirc

criticise
pralse
accuse
assess
blame
rcprirnand

angry
h;ppy
calm
' plcascd
annoycd
upset

mother
uncle
aunt

grandparent
nephcw
COUSIIl

It is not of eourse obvious that this observation saves the problem of

defining concept from vacuity, for it is not clear how the inter-relationship of value (valeur) ami mcuning (signifi) can itsclf be tcsted, In any
case, de Saussure's account is 01)CII to objections similar to those .raiscd
against both a refercnce theory of mcaning and an image theory of
rneaning. In particular, words such as and, because, or, etc., are counterexarnples lo this vicw, for it is not clear whether their intcrpretation
can
be analyscd in tenns of conccpts, 1t will not do to suggest that the
meaning of and is thc concept of co-ordination,
for what is co-ordination
other than by joining by and] Sirnilar/y with or: it is meaningless to
explain or as having the conccpt of d isjunction for its meaning, when in
order to explain disjunction one nCl'ds to rcfer to oro And the general
problern remains: to expbin meaning in terms only of concepts is
unempirical.

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i6

17

01 toord

Exfilallatiol/J

2.J.1

2. J

/l/eal/il/g

Componential

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The assuuipt inn 01' SYSll'III;ltit: rdatiollships

of Illcalling
-betwecn words is however indcpcnch-nt
orthe prohlcin of cxplaining the
basis ofthese relationships
; ami a considcruhl
.unuunt
nf dctailcd
work
on the structure of the vocabulary has hccu done in rcccnt ycars, Many
linguists have turned lo what has bccn cullcd componcnt ial unalysis to
giye an explicit representation
of thc systcmut ic rcL,t ions hct wecn words,
01\ this view the meanings of words are an.rlyscd
/lot as un itn rv concepts
but as complexes made \11' of componcnr 01' nll':lning wh ich are t hemselves semantic primitives.t
In this vvin, ,I/>/",I'/n 11Iight he a/lalysed as a
smantic complex rnnde \Ir of t hc Ic.uuns (vquivulent lv callcd components.! or markers) [FEMALE),
[!\!E\'I':I{ i'vl,\ IUUED). [A DUL'I'],
. [HUMAN). This form of analysis was uscd in par! icular hy anthropologiSts seeking to give an accuunt
of kiuship teflni/lology
in various
cultures. For exarnplc, the distinetion
hetwccn
mothrr ami aunt in
English might be made cxplicit if the tcrms wcre nnalvsed as contrasting
cornplexes of the componcnts
[rE 1\r\ LE], [1' \ rU~N'I' O F), [Crr [LD
OF].) Such componential
annlysis
is not nI' COIII'$e rcstr ictcd to k inship
terms: it can be applied in many arcas 01' thc vocahularv,
Fnr cx.unple,
the distinction
betwccn
murder and !lil/ can be stalcd cxplicitly
und
economically
if murder is anulyscd
as havillg :1 Illealling which is a
cornplex of components
rcprcscnring
intcntion , cnusution,
ami dcath,
and kill as having a cornplcx
of only t hc COlllpOllents representing
causation and death. In a similar \\'ay, g17'r and t alte can be shown
'to be distinct by virtue of their cO/ltrasting coruplcxcs
of components
representing
causation and change of owncrship.
By this mcuns, de
Saussure's
concept of valeur char;cterising
the rclationship
which a
word holds to other words in the svstcm can be stuted cxplicitly in terms
of related but distinct componcnt
cornplcxcs, ancl indccd thc main
value of cornponential analysis lies in t hc econoll1y of st.ucmcnt of thcsc
relationships which it allows,

" However

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in so stating the intcr-rclationships

hel\\'ecll

words in terms

"
)

1
t

I shall

to

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~
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~

For a more

dctuiled

diseussioll

01' 111<' sl"IIIS

,,1'

II11'S~

(()IllIHlI'~IlIS,

cf, 6.2

below.
use rhc rcrm

menn

rhc

sect

ion

srrnnntic ((JIII!UW,.", wit h syst cmut ir arllhiguity,

holh
of thc ovcr-u]
l grilllul1ar in ",hid.
t he
scrnunt
ic

generalisurions
are sturccl, :tnd to nll':ln
isolalcd
hy cOlllponcnl i,,1 '1I\"lysi"
J

Cf. Lehrcr
olher

1'8

kinship

1')74 ,,"d Ll'lTt.

lennillol,,!:il'S.

"175

tlH: (.'Il'flllntary

1'01' ,kl"iJc.d

"""I,'St's

sl'fl1:mlic

"r

En~lish

units
,,"d

M fa 11IIC

a/lll

(oIIa!'t,

of more primitive semantic cornponents,

one is transferring
the burdcn
of sernantic cxplanation
from word mcaning onto the componcnts
which together, in dilfercnt ccmbin.uions,
constitute
word 'mcnninga.
Indccd what rcrnuins to be cxplaincd in such .ornponcntial
analyses, as
we shall see bclow (6.J.2), is the relationship
bctwccn the words of :1
given language and the apparcntly
indepcndcnt
components.
Wc may
glibly say that thc word spil/sler has a meaning which is a cornplcx of the
sernantic componcnts
[FEMALE),
[HUMA'N],
[ADULT],
[NE,VER
MARIU ED], bUI the central problcrn is the relationship
betwcen the
word //11/1/(/1/ and the componcnt
[HUMAN],
and so on for the rcrnainder of the vocabular y. Unfortunately
thc account
of the sernantic
cornponcnts
themsclvcs
givcn by linguists using the methodology
of
componential
analysis is often no more substantial
than de Saussurc's-or
Sapir's charactcr isation of word mcaning. For cxample, it has been
clairncd that scmantic fcaturcs are not defined in terms of 'physical
properties and rclations outside the human organism' but are symbols
'for the interna] mechanisms
by rncuns of which such phcnornena are
conceived and conceptualised'
[Bierwisch 1970: 181). Katz, one ofthe
central exponcnts of scmantics within transforrnational
grammar, gives
a much more detailcd account, but with little more substnnce:
A semnntic murkcr is a thcorcticul cnnstruct which
concept that is part of the scnse M morphernes
natural languagcs, By a concept in this cnnncction
mental ideas or particular thou~hts. Concepts ...

...

..

is inrendcd tu rcpf'cscnt a
and othcr constitucnts: of,

we do not mcan irnages or

are abstract entities. They
do not bclong to the C(J/lSciOIl~cxpcricnce
of anyonc, though they' may he
thought about , as in our thinki/l~ ahout the concept of a cirelc. Thcy arenot
individuatcd
by pcrsons : yOIl and '1 Illay think about the same concepto .
(Katz 1972: J8)

Ncither characterisation
<loes more. than say that the meaning of a word
is a (complex) concept, and this wc rejected as. vacuous. Ye,t Katz
roundly dismisses this rejcction, inaintaining
that 'it is quite unreasonable to insist at the outsct ... on a cl.rrification of the ontological underpinnings of the notions of concept and proposition as a precondirion for
accepting the cxplanations
of semantic propertics and relations givcn by
a theory employing 'semantic markcr' .. .' (Katz 1972: 39). l lowever
Katz' mere disrnissal of the attack is not warranted.
In the first place, as
we have already secn in pnrt, difTering accounts of the nature of rneaning
make difTerent claims nbout what constitlltes
the proper don,"aiQ of
semantics.
And the setting up of a formal scmantic theory 'as one
19

...

-,

;;!:

E.\pla1/atiollS o/ uord /l/eol/llIg

~
x
.::'

component

of a gener:Jllinguistic

this

~
~
~
~

X
~
~
~
~
~
aQ
~~

:~

c1aim

is unfalsifiablc,
in defining

;,
"

l.

~~
,
~
,\

.~

thcn

the

me:Jning

'theory has no apparent

aword
and some object

pre:;upposes

place

:J solution

theory

itsclf

in tcrrns

hccorncs

of mental

for nn cxplunation

of the relation

that it may be uscd to rcfer

Katz'

betwecn

lo, or of thc relatian

a sentcncc
and the sta te of uluirs it describes.
Each of these
has.been mcrely reduced to un untcstahle
rclnt ion bctwecn an
cxpression and a mental construct.
And in the case of English worrls

-such as human where

word

that the rncnninp

by [HUMAN).

rneaning,

in componential

analysis

use of it in later

chaJlers

of this

In attempting
by considering

terrns

book),

the conccpt

the nature

of rneaning,
Illeaning

J s!t:J11 indeed
a definition

are not (hose

of an cmpiricnl

scicncc,

of menning
we sccm

merely

of

elllployed
be rnaking

unclcrpinnings
of sernantic

of a falsifiablc
such

repre-

as an account

the theoretical

incorporates

to unravel

characterising

(and

thc

al all other

So, while t hc mcthod

be uscful

which

in conceptual

sernantics
is to be part
rnade more substantial.

position:

unfnlsifiablt,.
may

by an account

between

of human is thc conccpt

'I'his is not only no! cxplanalory

but it is also quite

. provided

correspondence

wc are given no explanaton

component,

. than the bald staterncnt

sented

is a one-to-one

there

and a semantic

an account

thcory.

Jf

rnust

be

~.

:j

.'
~
,.i,

e
.::;

I~

. enter

and characterising

into toa many

course

to suggest

problerns
that

meaning

lo be in a paradoxicnl

in terrns

of conccpts
of rcference

is unex-

to be a convincing

problema

in thc

solution,

:Jnalysis

This

of rcfcrcncc

scerns
can

be

but merely that the rclationship

of reference
does not provide
'an adequate
basis for an explanation
uf word mcaning.
We rnust now
turn to the second of tire thrcc lIIain possibilitics
anaccount
of sentcnce
rncaning.

that

1 oullined

carlicr

..

RECOJ\1MENDED

HEADING

2.1
THe probJem of iuentifying
propcrrics
of IlIe~ning \\'itb properties
of
reference
is almost inv~riahly
includcd
in int roductions
to philosophy
of
language: see for c:-camplc Ihe introduction
lo I'~rkinson (ed.) Tlte Tlteory 11
: Mean;ng. and Alslon Philosophy of LOI1:lIogt! ch. I (which ~Iso gives a critical
cxposition of both behavioristic
thellries 01' lIle~ning :lnd idealional Ibeorics) .
Thc most famous attempt
to analyse IIlcanin/j in such terms is Hussell's
20

l'roblems

account
of semant ics, r,iven in Cours de Linguistique
remembered
for the emphasis he gave to structural
relationships
between lexical iterns. Two Iorrns of semantic description
can
be associated with his work: dcscription
in terms of so-called lexioal fields,
and, much later, description
in terrns of componential
analysis. An excellcnt .
account of work done on lexical fiells und of componential
analysis is 'given in
Lehrcr Semantic Fields and Le,\'ica/.~'/TIIrtl/re, and she summariscs
the work of
Trier who was the mast well-known
carly e.xponent of analyses in lcrms of
Icxical fields, For a uscful survey ,of work 0'1\ semantic
ficlds, se.e Vassilyev,
'Thc theory of sernalllic ficlds: a s\lrvcy'.
2,3

dismissed,

(ed.)

De Saussurc's

G1/rale, is now mainly

to

is not of

in Olslicwsky

The classic statcment

of an idcuiional thcory of rneaning is glvell. by
Lockc, whose exposition
is r epr iutcd in Lehrer ano Lchrer (eds.) Theory of
Meaning . The twentieth-ccntury
linguistic
represcntative
of this view is
Sapir: see Sapir's La I/gI/agt.
.

~.,

planatory,

(reprinted

2,2

in naturnllanguagcs

in tcrrns

denoting'

1,(/IIg/lage); hut this view was until .reel'.IItl)' thought

unclllpirical.

constructs,

rII/iIlC

;11 the I'hilosophy' 01

to he untcnnblc
Ior
rcasons brought [orward 1>)' Frcgt: seco Frt'gc '01>cr Sin n und Iledcutung'
(trunslarcd
as 'On sense and r efcrcnce"), and Dummetr's
detailcd
account of
Frcge in fo'rege: I'hiloso,"y 11/ 1.1I11.t:IIII,~I', Russcll's analysis has al so "bccn
auacked for indepcndcnt
rcasuns
hy Strawson : in this connection
see the
recommendcd
rcading for chaptcr 1). 1Iowever the rcduction of the problcm of
meaning to the problem of reference has becn re-introduced,
both by Davidson (see Davidson "Truth and mcaning') and within possible-world semantics
(sce Hintikka
'Scmantics for propositional
auitudes'
(reprinted
in .Linsky
(ed.) Reference and Modalily, On rhe prohlems of analysing sentenccs' such
as Are iguanas extincti , studunt s should r efer to the lirerature
on cxistcnce:
sce for exnmplc
Moorc 'Is cxistcnce
a prcdicatc!',
I'car s' and Thomson's
articles of thc sume name (rcprinred
in Strawson (ed.) I'hilosopltical'Logic),
Quine 'On what thcr e is' (in From a.Logical Point o/ Vietu). On the problema
prescnted
tu theories of rcfcr cnce hy opaq.!e contexts
sce Linsky (ed.]
Reference and Modality, For a linguislie npprouch to the problcm of opacity,
sce Hall-I'artce 'Opacity, corcfer cnce .and pronouns' and 'Opacity and scopc',
There is considerahle
disagreement
ovcr the scmanric
propcrties
01' propcr
names : [or a representativo
set of views sce Searlc .'-)'"eechActs ch. 7, Kripke '.
'Nam.ing and ncccssity',
Dummctr's
rt'ply to Kr ipke in Frege : I'hi/oso/,/'y o/
Language, and Mates '011 the scmant ics of proper namcs',

'On

to this

t hc one Katz providcs,

must
t lie nuture
of IlIeaning - and ir

between
.rclations

components
.;

theory,

question:
thus any such theory, as indccd
beirnplicitly
prcsenting
sorne clairn as to
.Secondly,

o,

Recommended

.:

A oetailed introduction
to lhe analysis of kinship terms is given in
Burling's Mal/'s Mal/y Voires, which incluoes an analysis of the set of English
kinship tcrrns, This hook is illciuelltaJl)' an excellent account of componential
analysis and the problcrns in its application.
Other refcrences inclutle ~9lfn~bury 'The stnlctural 'analysis of kinship semantics',
Goodenough
'Componential analy~is ami the study of mcaning',
and Conklin 'Lexicographical
treatment
of folk taxonomics'.
For an account of items such as give and /ake
and other relateu ilellls sec lIrndix Compol/en/ial Ana/ysis o/ Gel/eral Vocal/2.3.1

21

.,

'

.(~

..

-L'

Explanations

o/ word

meauing

lar)'. For general problems in thc meth"d"logy of componenrial unalysis see

Nida Componential l"alysis (1Mra1/i1/K. 'Th first application of the methods
of c.omponential analysis within the frarncwork of transforlllational
grammar
was Katz and Fodor 'The structure of a semantic theory' (rcprinted
in
Rosenberg and Travis [eds.] Readings in the Philosopliy 01 La1/guage). The
most complete discussion of problems in semantics hy Katz is arguably
Semanlic Theory, but for a further detailcd defence of his position that a
sernantic marker (equivalenl to a pr imirivc component of mt'aning) necds no
characterisation other than a conceptual onc sce Knt z 'Logic and language:
an exarnination of recenl criticisrns of intensionalism'
s. {o This pos it inn is
also defended, against a truth-hascd
rhcorv of IIlcaning, by ll ar mnn in
'Meaning and semantics'. For Iurrhcr rcfcr cnccs 011 CO/llpollt'ntial analysis,
see the recornmended reading Ior chapt cr (.

-,

'.

3
Meaning and truth

Tarski's truth definition

).1

The attempt
relationship

between

to cxplain

ano scntcnce

(he hasis of meaning

a word and the object

a long

tradition

starting

point for a theory

in philosophy.

work in logic by Tarski,

a logician

the characterisation

~
le~
'F
.'~

sentence
sation

of wht

of word

mcaning.
that

language
correctly

if for each sentence

the formula

a rather

of truth

thcory,

proposed

a definition

put forwardin
.that it is

of the rneaning

of

and not the characteri-

for formal

of truth

of the language!

'.'

different

In line with

it has been suggested

we mea n by talking

Tarski

by logicians,

however

whosc theory

that is the basis for a semantic

structed

in terrns of the

has bcen advocated.

1933 is now widely held by philosophers,

"

"

:t may be used to rcfcr to las

Recently

of mcaning

rncaning

languages

could

con- .
'

be given .for 'a

a rule schema

can predict
"

S is true if and only ir p

S is the name

where

sequence
which

guarantee

suggestion
been
truth

of the sentence

of symbols

making

the truth

claimed (Davidson
can also provide

languages.

The suggcstion

to know

under

what

Tarski's

classic

example,

making

of that

for logic is of course

sentence.

spelling

and
The

not our concern

1967a) that Tarski's

the basis of a theory
that sentence

lo know the meaning

SlIOW

is

?ut of the

the conditions

significance
here.

However

of this

would

...

it has

formula for a theory ol.

of meaning
for natural

is that to know the meaning

conditions

up the sentence

(i.e. a mere

the sentence)

IIp

0., ..:'

of a sentence-is
be true:

1'0 take

of the string' of words

tohite is to know what conditions-have

'.,

In fact he was referring not to sentences of natural Ianguage- but to

staternents fa formal logic. Cf. 3.4.1 below for a discussion of rhe distinction between sentence and statement,

"

22
23

..
"

'.