World Futures, 62: 411440, 2006

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN 0260-4027 print / 1556-1844 online
DOI: 10.1080/02604020600798619

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS: AN

OVERVIEW OF ACTOR-SYSTEM-DYNAMICS THEORY
TOM R. BURNS
Uppsala Theory Circle, Department of Sociology, University of Uppsala,
Uppsala, Sweden
This article illustrates the important scientific role that a systems approach might
play within the social sciences and humanities, above all through its contribution
to a common language, shared conceptualizations, and theoretical integration in
the face of the extreme (and growing) fragmentation among the social sciences
(and between the social sciences and the natural sciences). The article outlines a
systems theoretic approach, actor-system-dynamics (ASD), whose authors have
strived to re-establish systems theorizing in the social sciences (after a period
of marginalization since the late 1960s). This is done, in part, by showing how
key social science concepts are readily incorporated and applied in social system
analysis.
KEYWORDS: Actors, consciousness, evolution, interaction, social rule system.

1. INTRODUCTION
This article argues and illustrates that a systems approach can and should play
an important scientific role within the social sciences and humanities. Above all,
it can contribute a common language, shared conceptualizations, and theoretical
integration in the face of the extreme (and growing) fragmentation among the social
sciences and humanities and between the social sciences and the natural sciences.
The challenge that Talcott Parsons (1951) and others, including Walter Buckley
(1967), originally addressed still faces us: to overcome the fragmentation of the
social sciences, the lack of synergies, and the failure to develop a cumulative

This article has been prepared and finalized while the author was Visiting Scholar at the
Center for Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford University (20052006). Several
of the central ideas in this article were presented in the Theory and Methodology Session
of the Portuguese Sociology Congress, May 1216, 2004, Braga, Portugal. I am grateful
to those who provided comments and suggestions and, in particular, to Joe Berger, Mark
Jacobs, and Rui Pena Pires.
Dedicated to the memory of Walter Buckley: friend, colleague, collaborator, pioneer in
systems theory, jazz musician (deceased: January 27, 2006).
Address correspondence to Tom R. Burns, Sociologiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, Box 624, 75126 Uppsala, Sweden. E-mail: tom.burns@soc.uu.se
411

412

TOM R. BURNS

science. It aims to provide a common language and an integrative theoretical

framework to mediate, accumulate, and transmit knowledge among all branches
and sub-branches of the social sciences and allied humanities (Sciulli and Gerstein,
1985).
In spite of a promising start and some significant initial successes, systems
thinking has been marginalized in the social sciences since the late 1960s (Burns
2006a, b). The widespread rejection of the systems approach did not, however,
stem the incorporation of a number of systems concepts into other social science
theoretical traditions. Consequently, some of the language and conceptualization of
modern systems theories has become part of everyday contemporary social science:
for example, open and closed systems, loosely and tightly coupled systems, information and communication flows, reflexivity, self-referential systems, positive
and negative feedback loops, self-organization and self-regulation, reproduction,
emergence, nonlinear systems, and complexity, among others. Institutionalists and
organizational theorists in particular have adopted a number of key system concepts
without always pointing out their archaeology or their larger theoretical context
(Burns, 2006a).
This article outlines a systems theoretical approach, actor-system-dynamics
(abbreviated ASD) whose authors have strived to re-establish systems theorizing,
in part by showing how key social science concepts are readily incorporated and
applied in social system description and analysis: institutional, cultural, and normative conceptualizations; concepts of human agents and social movements; diverse
types of social relationships and roles; social systems in relation to one another
and in relation to the natural environment and material systems; and processes of
sustainability and transformation.
ASD emerged in the 1970s out of early social systems analysis (Baumgartner
et al., 1975, 1976, 1979, 1986; Buckley, 1998, 1967, Burns, 2006a, b; Burns et al.,
1985; Burns et al., 2003; Burns and Buckley, 1976).1 Social relations, groups,
organizations, and societies were conceptualized as sets of interrelated parts with
internal structures and processes. A key feature of the theory was its consideration
of social systems as open to, and interacting with, their social and physical environments. Through interaction with their environmentas well as through internal
processessuch systems acquire new properties and are transformed, resulting in
evolutionary developments. Another major feature entailed bringing into model
constructions human agents as creative (destructive) transforming forces. In ASD,
it has been axiomatic from the outset that human agents are creative as well as
moral agents. They have intentionality, they are self-reflective and consciously
self-organizing beings. They may choose to deviate, oppose, or act in innovative
and even perverse ways relative to the norms, values, and social structures of the
particular social systems within which they act and interact.
The formulation of ASD in such terms was particularly important in light of
the fact that system theories in the social sciences, particularly in sociology, were
heavily criticized for the excessive abstractness of their theoretical formulations,
for their failure to recognize or adequately conceptualize conflict in social life,
and for persistent tendencies to overlook the non-optimal, even destructive, characteristics of some social systems. Also, many system theorists were taken to task

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

413

for failing to recognize human agency, the fact that individuals and collectives are
purposive beings, have intentions, make choices, and participate in the construction (and destruction) of social systems. The individual, the historic personality, as
exemplified by Joseph Schumpeters entrepreneur or by Max Webers charismatic
leader, enjoys a freedomalways a bounded freedomto act within and on social
systems, and in this sense enjoys a certain autonomy from them. The results are
often changed institutional and material conditionsthe making of historybut
not always in the ways the agents have intended or decided.
A major aspect of bringing human agents back into the analytic picture has
been the stress on the fact that agents are cultural beings. As such, they and their
relationships are constituted and constrained by social rules and complexes of
such rules (Burns and Flam, 1987). These are the basis on which they organize
and regulate their interactions, interpret and predict their activities, and develop
and articulate accounts and critical discourses of their affairs. Social rule systems
are key constraining and enabling conditions for, as well as the products of, social
interaction (the duality principle).
The construction of ASD has entailed a number of key innovations: (1) the
conceptualization of human agents as creative (also destructive), self-reflective,
and self-transforming beings; (2) cultural and institutional formations constituting
the major environment of human behavior, an environment in part internalized in
social groups and organizations in the form of shared rules and systems of rules;
(3) interaction processes and games as embedded in cultural and institutional systems that constrain, facilitate, and, in general, influence action and interaction of
human agents; (4) a conceptualization of human consciousness in terms of selfrepresentation and self-reflectivity on collective and individual levels; (5) social
systems as open to, and interacting with, their environment; through interaction
with their environment and through internal processes, such systems acquire new
properties, and are transformed, resulting in their evolution and development;
(6) social systems as configurations of tensions and dissonance because of contradictions in institutional arrangements and cultural formations and related struggles
among groups; and (7) the evolution of rule systems as a function of (a) human
agency realized through interactions and games and (b) selective mechanisms that
are, in part, constructed by social agents in forming and reforming institutions and
also, in part, a function of physical and ecological environments.
2. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Here we identify a minimum set of concepts essential to description and modelbuilding in social system analysis (see Figure 1; the following roman numerals
are indicated in the Figure). (I) The diverse constraints and facilitators of the
actions and interactions of human agents, in particular: (IA) Social structures
(institutions and cultural formations based on socially shared rule systems) that
structure and regulate agents and their interactions, determining constraints as well
as facilitating opportunities for initiative and transformation. (IB) Physical systems that constrain as well as sustain human activities, providing, for instance,
resources necessary for life and material development. Included here are physical

414

TOM R. BURNS

Figure 1. General ASD Model: The structuring powers and sociocultural and material
embeddedness of interacting human agents.

and ecological factors (waters, land, forests, deserts, minerals, other resources).
(IA,IB) Sociotechnical systems combine material and social structural elements.
(1A-S) and (1B-S) in Figure 1 are, respectively, key social and material (or
natural) structuring and selection mechanisms that operate to constrain and
facilitate agents activities and their consequences; these mechanisms also allocate
resources, in some cases generating sufficient payoffs (quantity, quality, diversity) to reproduce or sustain social agents and their structures; in other cases not.
(II) Population(s) of interacting social agents, occupying positions and playing different roles vis-`a-vis one another in the context of their sociostructural,
sociotechnical, and material systems. Individual and collective agents are constituted and regulated through such social structures as institutions; at the same time,
they are not simply robots performing programs or implementing rules but are
adapting, filling in particulars, and innovating. (III) Social action and interaction
(or game) processes that are structured and regulated through established material
and social conditions.2 (IV) Interactions result in multiple consequences and developments, intended and unintended: productions, goods, wastes, and damages

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

415

as well as impacts on the very social and material structures that constrain and
facilitate action and interaction. That is, the actions IVA and IVB operate on
the structures IA and IB, respectively . Through their interactions, social agents
reproduce, elaborate, and transform social structures (for instance, institutional
arrangements and cultural formations based on rule systems) as well as material
and ecological conditions.
In sum, ASD systematically links agency and structure in describing and analyzing social system dynamics and developments. Multi-agent conceptualizations are
integrated with those of complex social systems in part through the development
and application of key mediating concepts, such as social rule system, institution,
cultural formation, and interaction patterns. In general, although human agents
individuals as well as organized groups, organizations, and nationsare subject
to institutional and cultural as well as material constraints on their actions and interactions, they are at the same time active, possibly radically creative/destructive
forces, shaping and reshaping cultural formations and institutions as well as their
material circumstances. In the process of strategic structuring, agents interact,
struggle, form alliances, exercise power, negotiate, and cooperate within the constraints and opportunities of existing structures. They change, intentionally and
unintentionally (often through mistakes and performance failures), the conditions
of their own activities and transactions, namely the physical and social systems
structuring and influencing their interactions. The results are institutional and material developments but not always as the agents have decided or intended.
3. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
ASD provides concepts and principles as a systematic basis on which to generate
particular empirically oriented models. These have been applied to a wide spectrum
of social phenomena and policy projects, several of which are briefly described
in what follows. Subsection (1) presents the very basic theory of rules and rule
systems that organize and regulate much of social life. This theory is a cornerstone
in the formulations of theories of institutions and cultural formations, outlined in
subsection (2). Subsection (3) presents the ASD theory of games and social interaction where games are structured and regulated by rule systems (institutional and
cultural arrangements) as well as are constrained by material conditions. Subsection (4) outlines the ASD theory of consciousness in the sense of self-reflectivity
based on human language, communication, and related forms of interaction. Subsections (5), (6), and (7) outline theories of particular institutions, their functioning,
structuring and restructuring: democratic political systems, systems of capitalism,
sociotechnical systems (the latter overlap of course with political [particularly military and police] as well as economic systems). Subsection (8) outlines the ASD
theory of materiality that constrains and facilitates human activities, and also selects for fitness particular patterns of action and interaction and indirectly the
institutions and cultural formations (i.e., rule systems) that pattern and regulate
these activities. Finally, in subsection 9, the article describes a theory of sociocultural evolution, which concerns the evolution of social structures as a function of
multiple selection mechanismsboth the mechanisms of human agents engaged

416

TOM R. BURNS

in directed problem-solving, mechanisms of social structural selection, as well as

mechanisms of material and ecological selection. Throughout ASD theorizing,
the role of human institutions and human agency, creativity, and destructivity is
emphasized.
(1) Social Rule Systems, Their Emergence and Evolution
In the ASD perspective, social rule systems and rule processes are universal in
human groups and organizations and are the building blocks of institutions and
cultural formations (Burns and Carson, 2002; Burns et al., 1985; Burns et al., 2003;
Burns and Flam, 1987) . Most human social activityin all of its extraordinary
varietyis organized and regulated by socially produced and reproduced rules and
systems of rules. Rule processesthe making, interpretation, and implementation
of social rules as well as their reformulation and transformationplay a fundamental role in conceptualizing human action and interaction. Such processes are
often accompanied by the mobilization and exercise of power, and by conflict and
struggle. Social rules and systems of rules are, therefore, not transcendental abstractions but are embodied in the practices of groups and collectivities of people:
language, customs and codes of conduct, norms, laws, and the social institutions
of family, community, state and its various agencies, and economic organization
such as business enterprises and markets.3
Human agents (individuals, groups, organizations, communities, and other collectivities) are the producers, carriers, and reformers of systems of social rules.
They interpret, adapt, implement, and transform rules, sometimes as cautiously as
possible, other times radically (Burns and Dietz, 2001). Such behavior explains
much cultural and institutional dynamics. Major struggles in human history revolve around the formation and reformation of core economic, administrative, and
political institutions of society, the particular rule regimes defining social relationships, roles, rights and authority, and obligations and duties as well as the general
rules of the game in these and related domains.
Social actors make and utilize rules and rule systems in order to coordinate and
organize their activities, to understand and to predict what goes on in a given social context, and to justify, explain, or criticize an action and/or its consequences
in terms of situationally appropriate rules. With experience (and practice), they
accumulate situational knowledge and skills useful in implementing as well as
adapting or reforming rules in concrete interaction settings. In opposing or deviating from established rules and rule systems, they are likely to encounter resistance
from others identifying with and committed to the rules. This sets the stage for
social struggle, the exercise of power to enforce or resist rules, and negotiation
about and change in rules. Thus, there is a situational politics to rule processes.
The actors may disagree about, and struggle over, the definition or interpretation
of the situation and which system(s) of rules apply, the priority of the rule system(s) that apply, or the interpretation and adaptation of the rule system applied
in the situation. Questions of power are central in ASD studies. This concerns
not only particular power relationships and the powers engendered in institutional
arrangements but also the powers to maintain or change social rule systems and

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

417

institutional arrangements. This is particularly important in the case of rule systems defining power relationships in major economic and political institutions
(see later).
Collective as well as individual actors play a central role in the formation and
evolution of social rule systems, although often not in the ways they expect or intend. ASD models of social transformation have been developed showing, among
other things, the particular (and finite ways) that agents solve collective action
problems such as prisoners dilemmaor are blocked from doing so by institutionalized conditions such as particular established competitive relationships,
by divide and rule strategies of powerful agents, or by material and ecological
conditions.
(2) Institutional Theory
A major part of ASD research has been devoted to developing and applying rule
system theory as a basis to conceptualize and analyze social institutions and organizations and their dynamics. A particular type of rule system central to any society
are authoritative rule complexes or rule regimes (Burns et al., 1985; Burns and
Flam, 1987). A rule regime organizes people in a complex of relationships, roles,
and normative orders that constitute and regulate recurring interaction processes
among participants. Such a regime is an organizing institution or an institutional
arrangement (i.e., a complex of institutions). It consists of a cluster of social relationships, roles, norms, rules of the game, and so on, specifying to a greater or
lesser extent who may or should participate, who is excluded, who may or should
do what, when, where, and how, and in relation to whom. In other words, it organizes specified actor categories or roles vis-`a-vis one another and defines their
rights and obligationsincluding rules of command and obedienceand their access to and control over available human and material resources.4 More precisely.
(1) An institution defines and constitutes a particular social order with positions
and relationships, defining in part the actors (individuals and collectives) that are
the legitimate or appropriate participants (who must, may, or might participate) in
the domain, their rights and obligations vis-`a-vis one another, and their access to
and control over resources. In this sense, it consists of a system of authority and
power relations. (2) It organizes, coordinates, and regulates social interaction in
a particular domain or domains, defining contextsspecific settings and times
for constituting the institutional activities. (3) It provides a normative basis for
appropriate behavior including the roles of the participants in that settingtheir
institutionalized games and interactionsthat take place in the institutional domain. (4) An institutional rule complex provides, among other things, a cognitive
scheme for knowledgeable participants to interpret, understand, and make sense
of what goes on in the institutional domain. In guiding and regulating interaction,
rule regimes give behavior recognizable, characteristic patterns, making the patterns understandable and meaningful for those sharing in the rule knowledge. (5) A
regime also specifies core values, norms, and beliefs that are referred to in normative discourses, the giving and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of
actions and outcomes in the institutional domain. Finally, (6) an institution defines

418

TOM R. BURNS

a complex of potential normative equilibria (see later discussion) that function as

focal points or coordinators in a given institutional domain (Schelling, 1963;
Burns et al., 2001).
Institutions are exemplified by, for instance, family, a business organization,
government agency, markets, democratic associations, educational and religious
communities. Each institution or institutional arrangement structures and regulates
social interactions in socially defined domains or fields of interaction. There is a
certain interaction logic for each distinct institution, as its rules provide a systematic, meaningful basis for actors to orient to one another and to organize and
regulate their interactions, to frame, interpret, and to analyze their performances in
inter-subjective ways, and to produce commentaries and discourses, criticisms, and
justifications about their actions and interactions. In general, institutions as social
rule-based systems play a role in, and are manifested on, the social organizational,
the cognitive-normative, and the discursive levels.
(3) The Structural Embeddedness of Social Interaction and Games
The ASD framework has been applied in generalizing game theory (Burns, 1990,
1994; Burns and Gomolinska, 1998, 2000a, 2001; Burns and Roszkowska, 2004,
2005, 2006). The work stresses the institutional and cultural embeddedness of
games and other forms of social interaction (Buckley et al., 1974; Granovetter,
1985). The ASD approach entails the extension and generalization of classical
game theory through the systematic development of the mathematical theory of
rules and rule complexes (the particular mathematics is based on contemporary
developments at the interface of mathematics, logic, and computer science)(Burns
and Gomolinska, 1998, 2000b, 2000c; Gomolinska, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2005) (1)
The approach provides a cultural and institutional basis for defining and analyzing
games in their social contextgame is reconceptualized as a social and often institutionalized form . The rule complex(es) of a game applied (and interpreted) in
a particular social context guide and regulate the participants in their actions and
interactions. (2) ASD formulates a general theory of judgment and action on the
basis of which actors either construct their actions or make choices among alternative actions in their interaction situations. They do this by making comparisons
and judging similarity (or dissimilarity) between their salient norms and values,
on the one hand, and the option or options considered in the game situation, on
the other hand. In general, players try to determine whether or not, and to what
degree a value, norm, or goal is expected to be realized or satisfied through one
or another courses of action (technically, they maximize goodness of fit [Burns
and Roszkowska, 2005]). (3) Human action and interaction is explained then as a
form of rule-application as well as rule-following action; this mechanism underlies diverse modalities such as instrumental, normative, and expressive as well as
playful modalities for determining choices and actions. The instrumental modality corresponds to outcome-oriented rational choice theory; normative modality
is characterized by a consideration of particular intrinsic qualities of the action,
which relate to and satisfy given norms. (4) ASD game theory distinguishes between open and closed games. The structure of a closed game is fixed as in classical

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

419

game theory. Open games are those in which the agents have the capacity on their
own initiative to restructure and to transform game components, either their individual role components, or the general rules of the game. Game rules and rule
complexes are seen then as human products. Rule formation and reformation are
described and analyzed as a function of meta-game interaction processes. (5) ASD
re-conceptualizes the notion of game solution, stressing first that any solution
is from a particular standpoint or perspective, for instance, the perspective of a
given player or group of players. Therefore, some of the solutions envisioned
or proposed by players with different frameworks and interests are likely to be
contradictory. Under some conditions, however, players may arrive at common
solutions that are the basis of game equilibria. Thus, in this perspective, actors
may propose multiple solutions, some of which possibly converge or diverge.
(6) ASD re-conceptualizes the concept of game equilibrium and distinguishes different types of game equilibria. Among these is a sociologically important type of
equilibrium, namely normative equilibrium, which is the basis of much social order (Burns and Roszkowska, 2001, 2004, 2006). In ASD game theory, an activity,
program, outcome, condition or state of the world is in a normative equilibrium
if it is judged by participants to realize or satisfy appropriate norm(s) or value(s)
in the given interaction situation. Although the concept of normative equilibria
may be applied to role performances and to individuals following norms, we have
been particularly interested in game normative equilibria in given institutional settings. This means that the participants judge interactions and/or outcomes in terms
of the degree they realize or satisfy a collective norm, normative procedure, or
institutional arrangement. Examples of particular procedures that are capable of
producing normative equilibria are adjudication, democratic voting, and negotiation as well as the exercise of legitimate authority.
Although the theory readily and systematically incorporates the principle that
human actors have bounded factual knowledge and computational capability
(Simon, 1969, p. 30), it emphasizes the high level of their social knowledge
and competence: in particular, actors extraordinary knowledge of diverse cultural forms and institutions such as family, market, government, business or work
organization, among others, and the variety of different roles that they regularly
perform in various domains of modern life.
(4) Toward a Theory of Collective Representations and Human Consciousness
ASD has also been applied in developing a theory with which to define and analyze a particular type of human consciousness. The theory (Burns and Engdahl,
1998a, b) emphasizes the importance of language, collective representations, selfconceptions, and self-reflectivity. It argues that the shape and feel of human
consciousness is heavily social, and this is no less true of our experiences of collective consciousness than it is of our experiences of individual consciousness. The
theory suggests that the problem of consciousness can be approached fruitfully by
beginning with the human group and collective phenomena: community, language,
language-based communication, institutional, and cultural arrangements (Wiley,
1986, 1994). A collective is a group or population of individuals that possesses

420

TOM R. BURNS

or develops through communication collective representations or models of we

as opposed to them: ones own group, community, organization, or nation is
contrasted to other(s); its values and goals, its structure and modes of operating,
its relation to its environment and other agents, its potentialities and weaknesses,
strategies and developments, and so on are components in these collective representations. A collective has the capacity in its collective representations and
communications about what characterizes it, or what (and how) this self perceives,
judges, or does, or what it can (and cannot) do, or should do (or should not do).
It monitors its activities, its achievements and failures, and also to a greater or
lesser extent, analyzes and discusses itself as a defined and developing collective
agent. This is what is meant by self-reflectivity. Such reflectivity is encoded in
language and developed in discourses about collective selves (as I discuss later,
there are also conversations about the selves of individuals, defining, justifying,
and stigmatizing them).
Human consciousness in at least one major sense is then a type of reflective
activity. It entails the capacity to observe, monitor, talk about, judge, and decide
about the collective self. This is a basis for maintaining a particular collective as it
is understood or represented; it is also a basis for re-orienting and re-organizing the
collective self in response to performance failings or profound crisis (economic,
political, cultural). Collective reflectivity emerges then as a function of a group or
organization producing and making use of collective representations of the self in
its discussions, critical reflections, planning, and actions.
Individual consciousness is the normal outcome of processes of collective naming, classifying, monitoring, judging, and reflecting but applied to individual members of the group or organization. The individual in a collective context learns to
participate in discussions and discourses about herself, that is, group reflections about her, her appearance, her orientations and attitudes, her strategies and
conduct. Thus, an individual learns (in line with George Herbert Meads earlier
formulations) a naming and classification of herself (self-description and identity)
and a characterization of her judgments, predispositions, and actions.
In acquiring a language and conceptual framework for this mode of activity
along with experience and skills in reflective discussion, she develops a capability
of inner reflection and inner dialog about her-self. These are characteristic features
of a particular type of individual consciousness. This conception points up the
socially constructed character of key aspects of the human mind, realized through
processes of social interaction and social construction. In sum, individual selfrepresentation, self-reference, self-reflectivity, and experiences of consciousness,
derive from collective experiences (Burns and Engdahl, 1998b; Wiley, 1986).
Self-reflectivity as a type of consciousness often facililtates critical examination and re-construction of selves, collective as well as individual. This plays an
essential role in human communities (as well as individual beings) in the face of
systematic or highly risky performance failures or new types of problems. Through
self-reflection, in the course of directed problem-solving, agents may manage to
develop more effective institutional arrangements, for instance, large-scale means
of social coordination such as military organization, administration, democratic
association, or global markets.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

421

Language-based collective representations of the past as well as of the future,

enable agents to escape the present, to enter into future as well as past imagined worlds, and to reflect together on these worlds. Moreover, in relation to the
past, present, and future, the agents may generate alternative representations.
These alternative constructions imagined, discussed, struggled over, and tested,
make for the generation of variety, a major input into evolutionary processes,
as discussed in (sub-section (9). Such variety may also lead to social conflicts, as
agents disagree about representations, or oppose the remedies to problems implied.
This opens the way for political struggles about alternative conceptions and solutions (well-developed democratic politics may entail collective self-reflectivity
par excellence). In general, such processes enhance the collective capacity to
deal with new challenges and crises. Thus, a collective has potentially a rich
basis not only for talking about, discussing, agreeing (or disagreeing) about a
variety of objects including the collective self as well as particular individual selves. But it also has a means to conceptualize and develop alternatives,
for instance, new types of social relationships, new normative orders and institutional arrangements, or more effective forms of leadership, coordination, and
control.
Collectives can even develop their potentialities for collective representation
and self-reflectivity, for instance through innovations in information and accounting systems and processes of deliberation and accountability. These potentialities
enable systematic, directed problem solving, and the generation of diverse and
complex strategies. In many selective environments, these make for major evolutionary advantages.
The powerful tool of collective reflectivity must be seen as a double-edged sword
in relation to expanding the freedom of opportunity and variability, on the one hand,
and on the imposition of particular constraints and limiting variability, on the other.
Collective representationsand reflectivity and directed problem-solving based
on themmay prevent human groups from experiencing or discovering the unrepresented and the un-named. Unrecognized or poorly defined problems cannot
be dealt with (as discussed elsewhere [Burns et al., 2003], for instance, in the case
of failures of accounting systems to recognize or take into account important social
and environmental conditions and developments). Reflective and problem-solving
powers may then be distorted, the generation of alternatives and varieties restricted
and largely ineffective, and social innovation and transformation misdirected and
possibly self-destructive. Thus, the presumed evolutionary advantages of human
reflectivity must be qualifiedit is conditional.
(5) Political Systems, Their Structures and Performances
The conceptualization and analysis of political systems and their transformation
has been an important area of application and development of ASD (Andersen
and Burns, 1992, 1996; Burns and Carson, 2002; Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns
et al., 2000; Burns and Kamali, 2003; Carson, 2004; Flam, 1994; Nylander,
2000; Woodward et al., 1994). Much of this work has focused on the structure,
functioning, and evolution of political systems and their policy frameworks.

422

TOM R. BURNS

On one level, ASD research has conceptualized the linkages between institutional arrangements, collective reflectivity, and directed problem solving; among
its research projects, it has distinguished in a comparative perspective those configurations that are conducive to relative effectiveness and stability from those that
are ineffective and/or unstable and likely to undergo paradigmatic and discursive
shifts and ultimately institutional transformation (Burns and Carson, 2002, 2005,
p. 27; Carson, 2004). Several ASD studies have entailed empirical investigations
of policy processes and policy research relating to chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
energy, natural resources, gender, anti-racism, health, welfare, democracy and
democratic development and, in general, governance and public administrative
orders (Andersen and Burns, 1992; Burns and Carson, 2002; Burns, Carson and
Nylander, 2001; Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns and Nylander, 2001; Burns and
Ueberhorst, 1988; Carson, 2004; Woodward et al., 1994; Machado, 1998, 2005;
Machado and Burns, 1998).
The ASD approach has been applied to a comparative institutional analysis
of different polities: pluralist systems such as the United States, neo-corporatist
systems5 such as those of the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and to some extent
Germany, and the EU as a new, uniquely open but highly complicated political
system. Each system is also a particular authoritative rule regime providing a systematic, meaningful basis for actors to orient to one another and to organize and
regulate their interactions, to frame, interpret, and to analyze their performances,
and to produce particular commentaries and discourses, critiques, and justifications. Any given governance system organizes specified actor categories or roles
vis-`a-vis one another and defines their rights and obligationsincluding rules of
command and obedienceand their access to and control over human and material
resources. Each specifies to a greater or lesser extent who may, should, or must
participate (and who is excluded), who may or should do what, when, where, and
how, and in relation to whom.
These ASD models show in what ways and to what degrees the different political
systems vary in their complex structures and in their functioning and development.
On the one hand, the EU, as a system of policymaking and legislation, is more
organized, more well-defined than typical pluralist systems. On the other hand,
the EU system is more open, flexible, and diversified than a neo-corporatist type
of system; it is also more unstable and less predictable. Pluralist systems in turn
are less stable and predictable than the EU. But such systems are likely to function
more effectively in a turbulent environment than either the neo-corporatist or the
EU-type system. This is because they are able to address in highly flexible ways
new problems and issues, in part because they are less formally institutionalized
and, therefore, more open and adaptable. Arguably, the EU might combine the best
of both systems. The EU modes of policymaking, like those of the neo-corporatist
system, stress the management of conflict and the use of technical knowledge and
cooptation in conflict resolution. But EU policy processes are highly fragmented
as in pluralist systems, although in general not to the same degree; neo-corporatist
systems, on the other hand, tend to generate greater overall coherence in policymaking. The proliferation of EU modes of governancewith highly diverse (and flexible) arrangementsresults in substantial incoherence and interference between

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

423

sector-specific policies. There are attempts to overcome this at the Commission

level by increasingly involving and coordinating multiple agencies in any given
policy area. But the success of these complex developments remains unclear.
Thus, each of the political systems is not only a different institutional complex
but an expression or embodiment of a distinct model or paradigm for governance,
public policymaking, and regulation (Burns and Carson 2002; Burns, Carson, and
Nylander, 2001; Carson, 2004). Each system has not only a certain interaction
logic and coherenceand pattern of evolutionbut also established expectations,
meanings, and symbols as well as normative discourses (for instance, in the giving
and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes
within the particular institutional arrangement).
The ASD approach considers then systemic properties such as the degree of
openness, flexibility, extent of predictability, and logics of policy production and
development of the different political systems. The EU system, which is in part
a type of organic or informal democracy, operates with flexible but relatively
well-organized procedures to engage interest groups from industry and civil society as sources of information and expertise; the EU Commission tries to act as
brokers in the comples EU policymaking. Deliberation and negotiation often lead
to consensus. Many of the advantages of the EU system with its flexibility and
adaptability to sectoral-specific issues and conditions are also the basis for the chorus of complaints in Europe about its non-transparency and democratic deficit.
There is an apparent dilemma between flexibility and transparency (Burns, 1999).
In sum, these social systems of governance operate in substantially different
ways and generate different policymaking patterns and developments; they entail
diverse ways of thinking about and collectively deciding matters of governance
and policy (public problems as well as their solutions).
(6) Socioeconomic Systems: Capitalism, Its Discontents, and Development
One application of ASD has entailed investigations and analyses of the functioning
and development of capitalist systems and several of their major institutions such as
money systems (Burns and DeVille, 2003), markets (Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns,
1990; Woodward et al., 1994), property regimes (Admassie, 2000; Bergstrom,
2005), production systems (Baumgartner, 1978; Baumgartner et al., 1979; Burns
et al., 1979), and regulatory arrangements (an overview of some of this work is provided in Burns, 2006b). Also, of interest has been issues of macrosocioeconomic
development and underdevelopment (Admassie, 2000; Baumgartner, Burns, and
DeVille, 1986; Burns, 2006b; Burns and DeVille, 2003; Burns and Flam, 1987;
Burns, DeVille, and Baumgartner, 2002). The research shows the technical and
social complexity and dynamics of capitalist systems and sub-systems, their modes
of functioning and evolution and the complex of problems involved in effectively
managing and regulating them.
This ASD research developed a number of theses relating to capitalist systems
(Burns, 2006b; Burns et al., 2002), among them: (I) Modern capitalismwhich
takes a variety of formsis a dynamic but highly unstable system; it also destabilizes other institutions and institutional arrangements; for instance, it is a force

424

TOM R. BURNS

evoking social and political instability as well as environmental destruction and

long-term unsustainability; (II) regulation is essential to stabilizing capitalist systems and to facilitating their effective functioning and sustainability in their social
and physical environments. Effective regulation depends on five basic factors: (1)
the development of a more or less accurate model of the functioning of a given
capitalist system in relation to its social and physical environments; (2) information and accounting systems to provide data for modeling, analysis, and regulatory
measures; (3) appropriate institutional arrangements to monitor, collect relevant
data, analyze performances and developments, and carry out regulatory actions; (4)
social agents who have the expertise and motivation to lead and practice effective
regulation; (5) effective adaptation and reform of the arrangements in response to
operational failures and changing environmental conditions; (6) political authority having the capacity to conduct critical reflection about system performances
and also possessing sufficient power and legitimacy to introduce, implement, and
enforce necessary regulative measures and innovation. This is a model of system
management and regulation (such models are also relevant to sociotechnical systems such as electrical systems, nuclear power plants, air transport systems, and
money systems).
The failure of Marxs prediction about the collapse of capitalismas the result of declining profits and the inability to sustain capital accumulationcan be
explained, in part, in terms of the robustness of the capitalist system, particularly
given proper regulatory mechanisms. This robustness was especially characteristic of those systems where, according to Marx, capitalism was apparently most
ripe for revolution, namely the advanced capitalist societies. One explanation of
Marxs failure is precisely that the successful establishment and elaboration of
regulatory regimes in many advanced (e.g., OECD) countries and some developing countries have served to stabilize capitalist functioning and development
to a greater or lesser extent and at the same time have mediated class and other
conflicts, to which capitalist systems are particularly prone (Burns, 2006b). The
complex of regulatory measures assured capital as well as other key accumulation
and development processes. One key component of the corrective adjustment has
been the establishment of modern welfare-state systems in the West.6
In general, the application of ASD to socioeconomic development issues has
drawn attention to the multiple systemic instabilities of capitalismboth as an economic system per se and as a force generating social and political instability as well
as environmental destruction. Appropriate regulation, essential to stabilizing capitalist systems and to facilitating their effective operation, requires not only appropriate institutional arrangements but also social agents who have the expertise and
motivation to lead and realize in practice the regulatory functions under varying circumstances. In addition, they must be able to effectively adapt and reform the regulatory arrangements in response to operational failures and environmental changes.
Modern societies have developed and continue to develop revolutionary productive powers at the same time that they have bounded knowledge about these
powers and their consequences. Unintended consequences are endemic: social as
well as ecological systems are disturbed, stressed, and transformed. At the same
time, emerging social agents and movements mobilize and react to some of these

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

425

conditions, developing new critical models and strategies to challenge and try
to bring about institutional innovation and transformation. Consequently, modern capitalist societiescharacterized by their core arrangements as well as by the
many and diverse proponents and opponents to aspects of capitalist development
are involved in local and global struggles. It is largely an uncontrolled experiment
(or, more precisely, a multitude of such experiments). The capacity to monitor and
to assess such experimentation is strictly bounded, as suggested earlier. Regulation
of global capitalism is, therefore, highly constrained (see Note 7). This consideration raises a number of critical questions: For instance, how is the powerful class
of global capitalists to be made responsible and accountable for their actions?
What political forms and procedures might link politics and policymaking to the
global capitalist economy? These are important research and policy questions.
Theories that analyze capitalism and its evolution in more holistic wayssuch
as ASDhave an important role to play in the investigation and explanation of
capitalist dynamics and in developing suitable regulatory regimes and policies (see
Burns, [2006b]) for a presentation of systems theories including ASD applied to
the analysis of capitalist dynamics and development).
(7) Technology and Sociotechnical Systems
Technologies and sociotechnical systems, technological innovation and development, risk research, and issues about natural resources and environment have
been key areas for ASD investigations (Andersen and Burns, 1992; Baumgartner
and Burns, 1984; Burns and Dietz, 1992b; Burns and Flam, 1987; Fowler, 1994;
Machado, 1998, 2005; Machado and Burns, 2001; Woodward et al., 1994). Technology, as a particular type of human construction, is defined in ASD as a complex
of physical artifacts along with rule systems employed by social actors to utilize and manage the artifacts. Thus, technology has both material and a cultural
institutional faces. Some of the rules considered are the instruction set for the
technology, the rules that guide its effective operation and management. These
rules have a hands on, immediate practical character and can be distinguished
from other rule systems such as the culture and institutional arrangements of the
larger sociotechnical system in which the technology is imbedded. These latter
rule systems include laws and normative principles, specifying the legitimate or
acceptable uses of the technology, the appropriate or legitimate owners and operators, the places and times of its use, the ways the gains and burdens (and risks) of
applying the technology should be distributed, and so on. The distinction between
the specific instruction set and the rules of the broader sociotechnical system are
not rigid, but the distinction is useful for many analytical purposes (Baumgartner
and Burns, 1984; Burns and Flam, 1987).
Such sociotechnical systems as, for example, a factory, a nuclear power plant, an
air transport or electricity system, organ transplantation system, money systems,
or telecommunication network consist of, on the one hand, complex technical
and physical structures that are designed to produce or transform certain things
(or to enable such production) and, on the other hand, institutions, norms, and
social organizing principles designed to regulate the activities of the actors who

426

TOM R. BURNS

operate and manage the technology. The diverse technical and physical structures
making up parts of a sociotechnical system may be owned and managed by different
agents. The knowledge including technical knowledge of these different structures
is typically dispersed among different agents in diverse professions. Thus, a variety
of groups, social networks, and organizations may be involved in the construction,
operation, and maintenance of complex sociotechnical systems such as electrical,
air transport, or communication systems, among the systems referred to earlier.
The diverse agents involved in operating and managing a given sociotechnical
system require coordination and communication. Barriers or distortions in these
linkages make for likely mal-performances or system failures. Thus, the human
factor explaining mis-performance or breakdown in a sociotechnical system often
has to do with organizational and communicative features difficult to analyze and
understand (Burns and Dietz, 1992b; Burns et al., 2003).
The application and effective use of any technology requires a more or less
shared sociocognitive and judgment model (Burns et al., 2003; Burns and Carson,
2002). This model includes principles specifying mechanisms that are understood
to enable the technology to interact properly and effectively with its physical, biological, and sociocultural environments. Included here are formal laws of science
as well as many ad-hoc rules of thumb that are incorporated into technology
design and use. The model of a technology includes also a social characterization
of the technology, its humanmachine interfaces, and its role in the larger society.
This part of the model is rarely as consciously perceived or as carefully articulated as the more technical elements of the model describing interaction with the
physical and biological environments.
Technologies are then more than bits of hardware; they function within elaborate social structures where their usefulness and effectiveness are dependent on
organizational structures, management skills, and the operation of incentive and
collective knowledge systems (Baumgartner and Burns, 1984; Burns and Dietz,
1992b). The concept of a sociotechnical system thus implies particular institutional
arrangements as well as culture. Knowledge of technology-in-operation presupposes knowledge of social organization (in particular, knowledge of the organizing
principles and institutional ruleswhether public authority, bureaucracy, private
property, contract law, regulative regime, professional skills and competencies,
etc. [Machado, 1998]). Arguably, a developed social systems approach can deal
with this complexity in an informed and systematic way.
(8) Physical and Ecosystem Structures
The feedback between social systems and the physical and biological environments is center stage with the ASD approach, expressed in the form of material
responsesin particular, resource accessibility and selective factorswith respect to the implementation of cultural and institutional rule complexes (this is
elaborated particularly in ASD evolutionary models discussed in the following
section). Geo-physical conditions, climate, and the accessibility and distribution
of natural resources such as energy, water, arable land, forests, minerals, and so
on obviously provide opportunities, for as well as constrain, certain patterns of

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

427

social action and interaction and overall social system development. The material
environmentincluding technologiesdetermine which rule systems can be realized in practice, or what changes in rule systems can be effectively introduced
with some likelihood of implementability and effectiveness. Human agents cannot enact rules and rule systems that violate the laws of physics, chemistry, and
biology, although technologies may of course enable them to alter the ways and
the extent to which such laws constrain or facilitate human activities.
Selective mechanisms in the material environment respond to human activities
and affect the frequency and distribution of the rule systems making up institutional arrangements and cultural formations (see next sub-section). The response
may be absolute in that a group or community using a given set of rules cannot
sustain itself and its social structure in a particular environment (the Easter Island
phenomenon7 ). Or, in a context of competition among groups, selection favors
certain types of productive or efficiency rules and selects against less productive
or efficient rules. Such competition in some social domains such as markets
drive resource exploitation and depletion as well as destruction of the physical
environment, unless systematically regulated.
In general, human groups impact on physical conditions, eco-systems, climate,
and so on in intended and unintended ways. For example, effective agricultural
techniques may cause soil erosion or leaching so that agricultural productivity declines over time or the spectrum of plants that can be cultivated is significantly reduced. Or, similarly, human activities impact on atmospheric conditionssuch as
ozone levels and greenhouse effects: these developments are likely to operate selectively on bio-regions and their populations. Many of the impactsand the risks they
entailare unanticipated and unintended material consequences of the functioning
of humanly constructed, complex social systems including sociotechnical systems.
In sum, the availability of natural resources and the circumstances of biological
and physical environments are major forces of constraint and operate selectivity
on human groups and their social structures, although human agency still plays a
substantial role. Of course, new technologies and sociotechnical systems may to
varying degrees offset or regulate some material conditions and forces.
(9) Sociocultural Evolutionary Theory
ASD has been developed into a theory of sociocultural evolutionbuilding on
theoretical concepts such as the social construction of systems and the restructuring and selection of institutional arrangements and cultural elements (Burns,
Baumgartner, Dietz, and Machado, 2003; Burns, 2001, 2000; Burns and Dietz,
1992a, b). By sociocultural evolutionary theory is meant a complex of models
conceptualizing social processes that explain the evolution of institutions and cultural forms: the generation of variety in rules and rule systems, the transmission or
reproduction of rules, and the operation of systems of selection and other processes
(migration, distorted or incorrect knowledge transmission, etc.) (for important parallel theoretical developments, see Boyd and Richerson (1985), Loye (1998), and
Richerson and Boyd [2005]). Selective processes determine that some of the practices of agents utilizing a particular rule or rule system obtain more resource gains

428

TOM R. BURNS

than others operating with different systems, gain greater collective support and legitimacy, and, in general, enjoy greater reproductive robustness than others. These
processes maintain and change the distribution of rules within and between populations over time. In such historical developments, human agents play a major but
bounded role.
A distinctive feature of this theory is that it stresses, on the one hand, material
constraints and selective processes and, on the other hand, the capability of human
agents to construct to a greater or lesser extent their selective environments, in
particular institutions and institutional arrangements, sociotechnical systems, and
cultural forms. Such bounded constructionism refers not only to the agential powers
of actors but also the constraints on agency and the limited capacities of actors in
any given context to adapt, reform, or transform social rule systems and, thereby,
to affect the evolution of the sociocultural systems. Depending on the pattern and
balance of selection, migration, innovation, recombination, and transmission, the
prevalence of various rules in the cultural system remain stable or change.
Reproduction usually occurs when the implementation of a rule system generates sufficient returns (quality, quantity, and diversity) to sustain and reproduce the
system. The reproductive success of any particular rule or rule system is measured
in terms of fitness based on its ability in a given social and physical environment
to compete successfully with alternative rule systems. Reproducible rules satisfy
multiple criteria of fitness including the requirement that they are understandable
and implementable. In other words, the rules work or appear to work effectively
in interaction processes and in the social and material developments they generate.
In this sense, fitness is largely a relative term. Rule systems that satisfy a set
of selection criteria internal to a group or collectivity may fail, however, in the
face of stringent external or environmental selection. For instance, established and
valued practices of a group, nation, or the entire global community can result over
the long run in ecological collapse or sociopolitical or economic disintegration.
Innovations that are regressive or non-adaptive within the collective context
may entail some improvements that, however, are inadequate in the face of other
selection criteria characteristic of, for instance, a highly demanding or competitive
environment. Many social innovations are experiments in this sense and may be regressive in terms of the criteria of reproductive success (in other words, numerous
innovations are tried, few succeed over the long-run).
Human agency plays a key role in each of the major mechanisms of sociocultural evolution, in particular.
Agency in the generation of variety. Evolutionary processes are based on variability in the rule systems of a culture. There are several possible sources of
variation in any given rule system. One is error, the miscopying of a rule from actor to actor, community to community. Another is migratory movement, where a
community acquires new rules introduced by agents from outside the community.
But while both of these mechanisms are certainly important, they do not capture
the full range of human creativity and the rapid, complex paths of sociocultural
change. Agency, in the form of human innovation and problem-solving processes,
provides a mechanism for generating change in rule systems that is often far more

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

429

powerful than error or migration, one that encompasses the dynamic, inventive,
and often playful, character of human activity. This is made particularly apparent
in many sociopolitical revolutionary developments; this is also apparent in directed
problem-solving activities such as the development of new theories, new technologies, and institutional reformshuman activities that are largely neglected by most
contemporary evolutionary theories. Such directed problem-solving and transformative processes obviously differentiate a sociocultural theory of evolution from
biological evolutionary theory.
Agency in selection processes. Actors structure the selective environment. They
introduce new institutional arrangements, technological systems, infrastructures,
and regulatory regimes, among other major formations, thus defining the conditions
for the operation of agency in the future. Such selective environments constrain
action possibilities, setting limits on agency. But the environments are not simply
constraining. They also provide opportunities and facilitate certain types of activity.
The selective environments allocate resources to actors, which they may use (decide
to use) in innovative ways, for instance, by restructuring particular social systems
or establishing new systems. Human agents thus play a direct role in societal
selection processes, for example, through recruitment processes, through directly
exercising power and control, and through dealing with problems and challenges in
contingent and ad hoc ways (rather than allowing institutionalized values, policies,
and practices to deal with the problems).
Role of agency in the replication and diffusion of rules. Replication is socially
organized through the institutionalization and reproduction of rule complexes, and
depends on establishing and sustaining not only the commitment of key actors
to, but also their level of knowledge of, the rules and the situations in which the
rules are to be implemented, maintained, and replicated. In other cases, a large
proportion of those involved must be committed and knowledgeable if successful
reproduction of social order(s) such as institutional arrangement(s) is to take place.
Reproduction also depends on the power and resource base that enable those
involved to effectively execute as well as enforce the rules. The social and physical
environments in which institutionalized activities are carried out operate selectively
so that, in a given time and place, the institutional arrangements tend to either
persist, or decline and possibly disappear.
The processes of establishing and maintaining a rule system may be organized
by a ruling elite that allocates resources and directs and enforces the activities
of maintenance and reproduction. Many formal institutions are maintained, at
least in part, through relatively well-defined and organized prescriptions and enforcement, as well as through systematic socialization and recruitment practices.
Institutional reproduction may also be organized with a broad spectrum of participants engaged in processes of knowledge transmission, socialization, and sanctioning as well as the fostering of institutional loyalties. Typically, institutional
reproduction takes place through both elite direction as well as the engagement of
non-elite members. Whenever elites and other participants (including peripheral
groups) stand in opposition to one another, this generates not only tensions but also

430

TOM R. BURNS

uncertainty about the effective maintenance or reproduction of institutional orders,

and raises the possibility of radical structural transformation or revolution (Burns
and Dietz, 2001). In general, power resources, knowledge, and commitment are
key factors in the consolidation and maintenance of rule systems or institutional
arrangements.
A new order will be institutionalizedthat is successfully established, maintained, and replicatedto the degree that the power-holders (and their policies and
rules) together with their supporters and allies (cf. Stinchcombe, 1968):

r effectively control the emergence and selection of leaders, successors to themselves;

r control socialization for elite positions as well as for key groups on which
r
r

the social order depends (the military, judiciary, and possibly religious and
educational groups as well as economic elites);
effectively control the conditions of incumbency and career patterns of participants in key governance structures;
inspire awe, respect, and a sense of legitimacy for the order and its elites.

Cultural transmission has a variety of properties that give a dynamic to social rules
independent of advantages (fitness) associated with their realization in practice.
This de-coupling of sociocultural developments from conditions or changes in the
material environment can operate, however, only for limited periods of time or
in particular contexts. Although there may be no immediate societal response to
changes in the physical or social environmentfor example, resource depletion,
climatic change, or geopolitical developmentsthe material environment still has
a direct impact on activities essential to the long-term sustainability of a set of
societal institutions. Collectivities may of course fail to adapt to physical or
social environmental changes, and instead are bypassed, absorbed, or eliminated by
other more successful collectivities. On the other hand, many changes in rules and
institutional arrangements take place without environmental stimuli or pressures.
Agents may take initiatives based on symbolic considerations, social competition,
or power struggles to alter rules, rule enforcement, and transmission processes that
affect performance levels and long-term sustainability. Such social processes may
lead to deviation from a previously successful match between the sociocultural
order and the social and material environments, a match that had enabled earlier
long-term successful performances and robust reproduction.
Thus, sociocultural evolutionary processes need not result in more advantageous or efficient social rule systems. Historically, a number of initially (or apparently) successful culturalinstitutional frames have ended in substantial maladjustments and even self-destruction, as, for instance, the histories of the Communist
and Nazi orders point up. Sociocultural innovation and dynamics can result in practices that alter the natural environment negatively, even self-destructively (as in the
Easter Island phenomenon [see note 7]). The theory implies then that institutional
arrangements and sociocultural formations are not necessarily optimally adaptive to their environment, nor is the direction of rule change necessarily toward
optimality.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

431

In sum, the ASD theory of sociocultural evolution, as opposed to earlier

developmental or evolutionist theories, allows considerable play for the creative/destructive action of individual and collective actors. It also recognizes and
conceptualizes the conditions under which such agency will be constrained by
the natural world, by the structural limitations of a sociocultural system, and by
the powers exerted by other agents. These relationships define, in part, the mix of
structural determinism and human agency or freedom that characterize human
history.
4. ASD AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
ASD provides theoretical and methodological tools with which to describe and
analyze social systems in their social and material environments, their functioning
and performance, and their evolution. The approach is grounded in mainstream
social science research (Burns, 2006a, b), a type of theorizing initiated by Walter
Buckley (1967, 1998) in the 1960s and followed up in later decades by Archer,
Baumgartner, Burns, DeVille, Geyer, and Zouwen, among others. Several of the
key ASD propositions relating to social systems analysis are the following:
1. Social systems can be fruitfully studied and analyzed as multiple (and diverse) types of interrelated social, material, and symbolic structures and their
mechanisms. The ASD approach enables the systematic study of the linkages
between these diverse structures, their interdependencies, and their dynamic
interplay. It also conceptualizes and analyzes the problems and instabilities to
which they give rise, for instance in the interplay between social and ecological structures. Incompatible structures cause performance failures, instability,
and disorder, which in turn often contribute to social conflict and struggle
between groups of societal agents or classes.
2. Among the specific subtypes of such problems are incompatibilities between
structures of the social system, on the one hand, and environmental or ecological structures, on the other hand. This is a particular type of inter-structural
problem. Social system structures and outputs may not fit, and be sustainable
in, the systems material environment. In general, complex feedback loops
between societal orders and their environments may generate uncontrollable
instability and conditions of non-sustainability.
3. ASD is a non-functionalist systems theory. It focuses attention on human
agents, individual and collective, and on the stabilizing (morphostasis) and
destabilizing mechanisms (morphogenesis) making up a complex, dynamic
system (see also Buckley, 1967, 1998). Social systems are self-organizing
in the sense that their membersespecially their elitesexercise their capacities to structure and restructure culturalinstitutional regimes and their
material environments. But self-organization and transformation are typically
conducted without complete knowledge or control of key conditions and potential developments.
4. The social constructing and restructuring of social systems through creative/destructive action and entrepreneurship are not only of central interest but

432

TOM R. BURNS

have a natural place in the ASD framework. A nexus of agency concepts such
as actor, action and interaction, and social construction and transformation
have been developed and applied in the formulation of ASD models. Human
agency is constrained cognitively, socially, and physically. ASD emphasizes
the capacity of human agents to constructwithin institutional, cultural, and
material constraintssocial systems such as sociotechnical systems and complex institutions without necessarily fully knowing or understanding how these
systems will perform and can be controlled (the Frankenstein phenomena).
Inevitably, there will be unintended and unanticipated consequences, that is,
unpredictable performance and failures in system regulation (Burns et al.,
2003). The theory combines then bounded constructionism (articulated in human agency and entrepreneurship) with structural constraint and selectivity
(articulated in terms of social as well as material constraints and selective
mechanisms).
5. Social agents, individuals as well as groups, occupy positions, play roles, and
interact. Their relationships and positions vis-`a-vis one another have causal
force. But such forces are not fully deterministic; this is not only because of
the capabilities of human agency and the complex, contradictory interplay of
multiple agents and the structures in which they are embedded; but it is also
because of the impact of contingencies and the substantial context dependency
of all social processes.
6. Actors, individuals, and collective agentsin their various positions embedded in complex structures (in particular, institutions)experience and identify problems or problem situations, while playing out their roles vis-`a-vis
one another. These may be coordination problems, escalating social conflict,
inter-structural problems, the failure or collapse of the institution or the institutional arrangements in which the agents are embedded. Such failures may
entail an inability to realize particular goals or values that their institution or
their particular positions in it motivate them to realize. Or, the failures might
entail the perceived need to increase the level of performance effectiveness,
or to exploit perceived opportunities for gain (value added or profit) or for
solving critical problems that cannot be realized under existing systemic conditions: For instance, a business enterprise is faced with declining or negative
profit margins or with a substantial reduction in market share; an electricity production system is subject to, or threatened by, blackouts; or, a global
market system is characterized by highly volatile market conditions or by
trade wars and countries raising trade barriers. Restructuring initiatives are
motivated and driven by interested agents. Typically, such initiatives are met
by opposition, and conflict and struggle ensues. Social systems are generally
characterized by contradictory institutional arrangements generating diverse
values and interests, which underlie the clashes and power struggles among
societal agents.
In general, particular agents, internal as well as external to an institution
or institutional arrangement, concern themselves with its performance and
development and try to regulate and possibly even restructure it (or its relationship to other systems) in order to deal with what some judge as performance

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

7.

8.

9.

10.

433

failures, instability, or crisis. ASD identifies and explains the systemic problems with which agents in their structural positions are likely to be concerned
and are oriented toward solving (Burns and Carson, 2005).
The social structural properties of society are carried and transmitted by agents
at the same time that these condition their actions and interactions. Structures
such as institutions and cultural formations are temporally prior, relatively
autonomous, and possessing causal powers, constraining and enabling peoples social actions and interaction (Archer, 1995). The latter in turn generate
structural elaboration (reproduction and transformation). Structural stability
(morphostasis) and change (morphogenesis) are explained through multiple
processes (e.g., positive and negative feedback loops in complex sociocultural systems). The social systems theorist is then not only concerned with the
identification and elaboration of social structures but with the specification of
the mechanismsincluding feedback processes that entail both stabilizing,
equilibrating features and structureelaborating or disorganizing features. In
such terms, institutional structures may be viewed as operating to create (as
well as transform) themselves in ongoing developmental processes, subject
to the judgments and responses of human agents.
ASD theorizes institutions and sociocultural formations in their own right,
identifying and explaining the real and variegated structures that have emerged
historically and are elaborated and developed in ongoing socioeconomic and
political processes. ASD drew, in particular, on a number of elements of
Weberian and Marxist theories (DeVille was at one time associated with Ernest
Mandel) redefiningthrough, for instance, institutional and cultural theorizing based on rule system theorykey concepts in modern sociological terms
such as the concepts of class, power, domination, exploitation, conflict and
struggle, and unequal exchange and accumulation; ASD also elaborated conceptions of production, reproduction, and transformation including revolution
(Burns, 2006b; Burns and Dietz, 2001).
The ASD systems approach enables one to identify and analyze the complex
mechanisms of stable reproduction as well as transformation of structures;
this includes the study of the genesis of new forms. Active agents with their
distinctive characteristics, motivations, and powers interact and contribute to
the reproduction and transformation of structure: establishing and reforming
institutions, sociotechnical systems, and other structures but doing so always
within given constraints and opportunities and not in precisely the ways they
intend. Internal structuring and selection processes that reproduce, modify, or
transform particular social systems are based on power distributions among
societal agents and on the models or paradigms that orient and guide these
agents in their structuring activities. There are also external structuring and
selection processes operating, which affect the sustainability and evolution of
social structures.
Complex social systems are only temporarily stable, if at all. System stability
must be explained in the face of ever-present tendencies for structures to be
changed, reformed, or to evolve. Existing institutional arrangements may be
transformed by intentional human action as well as the unintended spin-offs

434

TOM R. BURNS

and spill-overs of institutional activities and operations. ASD has identified

some of the potential problems and crises that agents fail to recognize or lack
the motivation or capability to deal with (Burns and Carson, 2005; Burns and
DeVille, 2003). Such problems might be ones of social tensions or technical
system instability (or both), which fail to be effectively addressed by those
with the power or authority to do so, setting the stage for crisis and system
transformation. These complex processes show up repeatedly in investigations
of major contemporary institutions such as government agencies, business
enterprises, markets, schools and universities, and sociotechnical systems.
In sum, social systems are dynamic and potentially unstable because (1) exogenous factors change and impact on them, evoking internal restructuring, and
(2) internal social processes and dynamics often entail conflicts and innovations,
which lead to initiatives and new intended and unintended developments. Agents
or configurations of agents in the system respond to some of negative developments and instabilities, not always in a coordinated or coherent manner. Through
their initiatives and interactions, sociocultural arrangements as well as the orientations and identities of social agents are maintained and changed. These structuring
consequences of action have been represented in Figure 1. The order and stability
of any social system depends then on an extensive network of institutional arrangements and regulatory mechanisms. An institutionally ordered social system
may be viewed then as the macroscopic resultant of multiple, often contradictory
structuring processes, including purposeful social action on the part of the agents
involved. ASDs theory of social stability and change focuses attention on the processes by which social rule systems, in particular cultural elements and institutional
arrangements, are generated, selected, and transmitted through human interaction.
Selective mechanismssome of which are exogenoushave important dynamics
of their own that influence the prevalence and persistence of various rules and,
thus, cultural and institutional orders (as pointed out earlier, these need not be
optimally adaptive to their environment, nor is the direction of change necessarily
toward optimality).
ASD represents a social systems approach to the challenge of developing knowledge for purposes of modeling, monitoring, and regulating complex dynamic social
systems. It also may contribute to the clarification of contentious issues and ultimately play a role in the design of institutions and policymaking. Such a systems
approach has a conceptual and methodological base that potentially would facilitate cooperation between social and natural, engineering, and medical scientists,
the linking of which is a major challenge of this century, both for theoretical and
methodological reasons as well as for policy and practical reasons. Recent method
development has contributed to the revitalization of social systems analysis in the
social sciences, for instance, the use of flow diagrams and other graphic techniques
to represent the complex interdependencies of systems and system mechanisms.
(Andersen and Burns, 1992; Baumgartner, 1978; Baumgartner et al., 1986; Burns
et al., 1985; Burns and Flam, 1987; Machado, 1998). Simulation methods are also
currently playing an increasingly important role. Simulation offers particularly
powerful tools to represent and analyze complex systemic processes (Burns et al.,

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

435

2005a, b). Collins (1988: 46) has pointed out rightly that, for most systems, a computer program can be written: . . . there is an affinity between the older system
models and the more general conceptions of systems which has become clearer now
that computer modelling, especially by personal computer, has become relatively
easy. A major contributing factor here is the emergence of complexity theory
(nonlinear dynamic systems associated with, for instance, the Sante Fe Institute)
and the growing interest among mathematicians, natural scientists, and some social
scientists in theoretical work and simulation of complex multi-agent systems.
NOTES
1. Elsewhere (Burns, 2006a, b) I identify and compares several system theories emerging in sociology
and the social sciences after the Second World War: Parsonian functionalism (1951), Marxist theory
and World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 2004), and the family of actor-oriented, transformative
systems theories (ASD, the work of Buckley (1967, 1998), and Archer (1995) as well as Geyer and
van der Zouwen (1978a, b).
2. Action is also constrained and facilitated by the responses of others who have the power to positively
or negatively sanction, to persuade, or inform. That is, the agency of some actors affects the ability
of other actors to exercise their own agency. In the extreme, powerful actors can severely restrict
the agency of others in selected domains of social life.
3. On the basis of a more or less shared or common rule system, actors can inter-subjectively and
collectively answer questions such as the following: What is going on in this situation? What
kind of activity is this? Who is who in this situation? What roles are they playing? What is being done? Why is this being done? Is there an inappropriate or improper activity taking place?
Should matters be conducted differently? The participating actorsas well as knowledgeable
observerscan understand in intersubjective ways the social processes and, in a certain sense,
predict on the basis of rule knowledge what will happen in the interactions; that is, actors make use
of common rule-based interpretative schemes. Social rules also play an important part in normative
and moral communications relating to social interaction: participants refer to the rules in giving
accounts, in justifying or criticizing what is being done (or what fails to be done, as the case may be)
and in the social attribution of who should be credited with successes or blamed for performance
failings.
4. Most modern institutions such as business enterprises, government agencies, democratic associations, religious congregations, scientific communities, or markets are organized and regulated in
relatively separate autonomous but interdependent spheres or domains, each distinguishable from
others on the basis of its distinctive rule complexes making up a specific moral order operating in
terms of its own social logic (or type of rationality).
5. Neo-corporatist arrangements organize government, business, and labor (iron triangles) for purposes of negotiating, determining, and enforcing/implementing economic and welfare policies. One
of their important accomplishments has been to regulate laborcapital tensions and conflicts during
a substantial part of the post-World War Two period.
6. Unfortunately, such regulation is almost totally lacking on the international level. Nor do such
regulative regimes exist within most third world countries to the same extent as within OECD
countries.
7. The indigenous population of Easter Island developed institutional arrangements and practices that
could not be sustained on the islands physical environment and led to an ecological and eventually
social order collapse and the disappearance of most of the population.

REFERENCES
Admassie, Y. 2000. Twenty years to nowhere: Property rights, land management and conservation in Ethiopia. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.

436

TOM R. BURNS

Andersen, Svein and Tom R. Burns. 1992. Societal decision-making: Democratic challenges
to state technocracy. Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth.
Andersen, S., and T. R. Burns. 1996. The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary
Democracy: A Study of Post-Parliamentary Governance. In: European UnionHow
democratic is it? Eds. S. Andersen and K. A. Eliassen. London: Sage Publications.
Archer, M. 1995. Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Baumgartner, T. 1978. An Actor-oriented Systems Model for the Analysis of Industrial
Democracy Measures. In: Geyer and van Der Zouwen (1978a).
Baumgartner, T., and T. R. Burns. (Eds.). 1984. Transitions to alternative energy systems:
Entrepreneurs, new technologies and social change. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
Baumgartner, T., W. Buckley, and T. R. Burns. 1975. Meta-power and relational control in
social life. Social Science Information, 14: 4978.
Baumgartner, T., W. Buckley, T. R. Burns, and Peter Schuster. 1976. Meta-Power and the
Structuring of Social Hierarchies. In: Burns and Buckley (Eds.). (1976).
Baumgartner, T., T. R. Burns, and P. DeVille. 1986. The shaping of socio-economic systems:
The application of the theory of actor-system-dynamics to conflict, social power, and
institutional innovation in economic life. New York/London: Gordon and Breach.
Baumgartner, T., T. R. Burns, and P. DeVille. 1979. Work, Politics, and Social Structuring
under Capitalism: Impact and Limitations of Industrial Democracy Reforms Under
Capitalist Relations of Production and Reproduction. In: Work and power. Eds. T. R.
Burns. L. E. Karlsson, and V. Rus. London: Sage.
Baumgartner, T., T. R. Burns, and P. DeVille. 1978. Actors, Games, and Systems: The
Dialectics of Social Action and System Restructuring. In: F. Geyer and Johann van
der Zouwen (1978a).
Baumgartner, T., T. R. Burns, and D. Sekulic. 1979. Self-management, Market and Political
Institutions in Conflict: Yugoslav Development Patterns and Dialectics. In Work and
power. Eds. T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson, and V. Rus. London: Sage.
Bergstrom, C. 2005. Claiming reindeer in Norway: Toward a theory of the dynamics of
property regime formation and change. Ph.D. Dissertation. Aas, Norway: Noragric,
Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
Boyd, R., and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Buckley, W. 1967. Sociology and modern systems theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.
Buckley, W. 1998. SocietyA complex adaptive system: essays in social theory. Amsterdam:
Gordon and Breach.
Buckley, W., T. R. Burns, and L. D. Meeker. 1974. Structural resolutions of collective action
problems. Behavioral Science, 19: 277297.
Burns, T. R. 1990. Models of Social and Market Exchange: Toward a Sociological Theory
of Games and Human Interaction. In: Structures of power and constraint: Essays in
honor of Peter M. Blau. Eds. C. Calhoun, M. W. Meyer, and W. R. Scott. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Burns, T. R. 1994. Two Conceptions of Agency: Rational Choice Theory and the Social
Theory of Action. In: Human agency and the reorientation of social theory. Ed. P.
Sztompka. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
Burns, T. R. 1999. The evolution of parliaments and societies in europe: Challenges and
prospects. European J. of Social Theory, 2: 167194.
Burns, T. R. 2000. Structuration: Economic and social change. (In Chinese). Beijing, China:
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Social Science Publishing House.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

437

Burns, T. R. 2001. Revolution: An evolutionary perspective. International Sociology,

16(4):531555.
Burns, T. R. 2006a. System Theories. In: The encyclopedia of sociology. Ed. G. Ritzer.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Burns, T. R. 2006b. Dynamic Approaches in Social System Theorizing. In: Handbook of
21st Century Sociology. Eds. C. D. Bryant and D. L. Peck. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Burns, T. R., P. DeVille, and T. Baumgartner. 2002. Actor-system dynamics theory and
its application to the analysis of modern capitalism. Canadian Journal of Sociology,
27(2): 211243.
Burns, T. R., T. Baumgartner, and DeVille, P. 1985. Man, decision and society. London:
Gordon and Breach.
Burns, T. R., T. Baumgartner, T. Dietz, and N. Machado. 2003. The Theory of Actor-System
Dynamics: Human Agency, Rule Systems, and Cultural Evolution. In: Encyclopedia
of life support systems. Paris: UNESCO.
Burns, T. R., and W. Buckley. 1976. Power and control: Social structures and their transformation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Burns, T. R., J. Castro Caldas, and E. Roszkowska. 2005a. Generalized Game Theorys Contribution to Multi-agent Modelling: Addressing Problems of Social Regulation, Social Order, and Effective Security. In: Monitoring, security and rescue
techniques in multiagent systems. Eds. Barbara Dunin-Keplicz, Andrzej Jankowski,
Andrzej Skowron, and Marcin Szczuka. Berlin/London: Springer Verlag.
Burns, T. R., J. C. Caldas, E. Roszkowska, and J. Wang. 2005b. Multi-Agent Modelling
of Institutional Mechanisms: The Approach Of Generalized Game Theory. Paper
presented at the World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Stockholm,
Sweden, July 2005.
Burns, T. R., and M. Carson. 2002. Actors, Paradigms, and Institutional Dynamics: The
Theory of Social Rule Systems Applied to Radical Reforms. In: Advancing socioEconomics: An institionalist perspective. Eds. J. R. Hollingsworth, K. H. Muller, and
E. J. Hollingsworth. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Burns, T. R., and M. Carson. 2002. European union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist governance arrangements: Lobbying and policy-making patterns in a comparative perspective. International Journal of Regulation and Governance, 2(2): 147.
Burns, T. R., and M. Carson. 2005. Social Order and Disorder: Institutions, Policy Paradigms and Discources. In: A new agenda in critical discourse analysis:
Theory and interdisciplinarity. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Johns Benjamin Publishing
Company.
Burns, T. R., M. Carson, and J. Nylander. 2001. EUs Social Dimension: From Market to
Welfare? The Emergence and Expansion of the Social Dimension in EU Policymaking.
International Journal of Regulation and Governance, 1(2): 129157.
Burns, T. R., and P. DeVille. 2003. The three faces of the coin: A socio-economic approach to the institution of money. European Journal of Economic and Social Systems,
16(2):149195.
Burns, T. R., and T. Dietz. 2001. Revolution: An evolutionary perspective. International
Sociology, 16: 531555.
Burns, T. R., and T. Dietz. 1997 Evolutionary Sociology: Selective Environments, Human
Agency and Institutional Dynamics. Paper presented at the Conference on Sociological Theory and the Environment, Zeist, The Netherlands, March 2023, 1997
(Research Committee 24, Environment and Society, the International Sociological
Association).

438

TOM R. BURNS

Burns, T. R., and T. Dietz. 1992a. Cultural evolution: Social rule systems, selection,
and human agency. International Sociology, 7: 259283. (In Chinese and German
also).
Burns, T. R., and T. Dietz. 1992b. Technology, Sociotechnical Systems, Technological
Development: An Evolutionary Perspective. In New technology at the outset: Social
forces in the shaping of technological innovations. Eds. M. Dierkes: U. Hoffman.
Frankfurt/Main: Campus.
Burns, T. R., and E. Engdahl. 1998a. The social construction of consciousness: Collective
consciousness and its socio-cultural foundations. Journal of Consciousness Studies,
5: 6785.
Burns, T. R., and E. Engdahl. 1998b. The social construction of consciousness: Individual
selves, self-awareness, and reflectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5: 166184.
Burns, T. R., and H. Flam. 1987. The shaping of social organization. London: Sage
Publications.
Burns, T. R., and A. Gomolinska. 2000a. The theory of socially embedded games: The
mathematics of social relationships, rule complexes, and action modalities. Quality
and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 34(4): 379406.
Burns, T. R., and A. Gomolinska. 2001. Socio-cognitive mechanisms of belief change:
Applications of generalized game theory to belief revision, social fabrication, and
self-fulfilling prophesy. Cognitive Systems Research, 2(1): 3954.
Burns, T. R., A. Gomolinska, and L. D. Meeker. 2001. The theory of socially embedded
games: Applications and extensions to open and closed games. Quality and Quantity:
International Journal of Methodology, 35: 132.
Burns, T. R., and A. Gomolinska. 2000b. The theory of socially embedded games: The
mathematics of social relationships, rule complexes, and action modalities. Quality
and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 34(4): 379406.
Burns, T. R., and A. Gomolinska. 2000c. The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: Norms,
Human Judgment, and Social Equilibria. Paper presented at the Joint Conference on
Rational Choice Theory organized by the American Sociological Association and the
International Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., August 2000. Available at
www.soc.uu.se/publications/fulltext/tb generalized-game-theory.doc.
Burns, T. R., and A. Gomolinska. 1998. Modelling Social Game Systems by Rule Complexes. In: Rough sets and current trends in computing. Eds. L. Polkowski and A.
Skowron. Berling/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Burns, T. R., C. Jaeger, M. Kamali, A. Liberatore, Y. Meny, and P. Nanz. 2000. The
Future of Parliamentary Democracy: Transition and Challenge in European Governance. Green Paper prepared for the Conference of the European Union Speakers
of Parliament, Rome, Italy, September 2224, 2000. Available at http://www.camera.
it/ cppueg/ing/conferenza odg Conclusioni gruppoesperti.asp.
Burns, T. R., and M. Kamali. 2003. The Evolution of Parliaments: A Comparative, Historical Perspective on Assemblies and Political Decision-making. In: Handbook
of historical sociology. Eds. G. Delanty, E. Isin, and M. Somers. London: Sage
Publications.
Burns, T. R. L. E. Karlsson, and V. Rus. Eds. 1979. Work and power. London: Sage.
Burns, T. R., and J. Nylander. 2001. The European Union: What is it Becoming? A CulturalInstitutional Perspective. In: Institutional approaches to the analysis of the European
Union. Ed. S. Andersen. Oslo, Norway: Arena Publications.
Burns, T. R., and E. Roszkowska. 2006. Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A SocietalInstitutional Approach. In: Procedural approaches to conflict resolution. Ed. M. Raith.
Berlin/London: Springer Press. (in press, 2007).

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

439

Burns, T. R., and E. Roszkowska. 2005. Generalized Game Theory: Assumptions, Principles and Elaborations Grounded in Social Theory. Studies in Logic, Grammar and
Rhetoric, 8(21): 740.
Burns, T. R., and E. Roszkowska. 2004. Fuzzy Games and Equilibria: The Perspective of
the General Theory of Games on Nash and Normative Equilibria. In: Rough-neural
computing: Techniques for computing with words. Eds. Sankar K. Pal, Lech Polkowski,
and Andrzej Skowron. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Burns, T. R., and E. Roszkowska. 2001. Rethinking the Nash Equilibrium: The
Perspective of Normative Equilibria in the General Theory of Games. Paper
presented at the Rational Choice/Group Processes Conference, August 17, 2001,
American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Anaheim, California. Available
at: www.soc.uu.se/publications/fulltext/tb rethinking-nash-equil.doc
Burns, T. R., and R. Ueberhorst. 1988. Creative democracy: Systematic conflict resolution and policymaking in a world of high science and technology. New York:
Praeger.
Carson, M. 2004. From common market to social Europe? Paradigm shift and institutional
change in European Union policy on food, asbestos and chemicals, and gender equality. Stockholm: Almqvist &Wiksell International.
Carson, M. 2000b. From the Peoples Home to the Market: Paradigm Shift to System Shift
in the Swedish Welfare State. Research Report 1/01, Gavle: Institute for Housing and
Urban Research, Uppsala University.
Collins, R. 1988. Theoretical sociology. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Flam, H. (Ed.). 1994. States and anti-nuclear movements. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Fowler, C. 1994. Unnatural selection: Technology, politics, and plant evolution. Amsterdam:
Gordon and Breach.
Geyer, R. F., and J. van der Zouwen. 1978a. Sociocybernetics: An actor-oriented social
systems approach. 1. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
Geyer, R. F. and J. van der Zouwen. 1978b. Sociocybernetics: An actor-oriented social
systems approach. 2. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
Gomolinska, A. 1999. Rule complexes for representing social actors and interactions. Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric, 3(16): 95108.
Gomolinska, A. 2002. Derivability of rules from rule complexes. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 10: 2144.
Gomolinska, A. 2004. Fundamental Mathematical Notions of the Theory of Socially Embedded Games: A Granular Computing Perspective. In: Rough-neural computing:
Techniques for computing with words. Eds. S. K. Pal, L. Polkowski, and A. Skowron.
pp. 411434. Berlin/London: Springer-Verlag.
Gomolinska, A. (2005). Toward Rough Applicability of Rules. In: Monitoring,
security, and rescue techniques in multiagent systems. Eds. B. Dunin-Keplicz,
A. Jankowski, A. Skowron, and M. Szczuka. pp. 203214. Berlin/London:
Springer-Verlag.
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness.
American Journal of Sociology, 50: 481510.
Loye, D. 1998. The evolutionary outrider: The impact of the human agent on evolution:
Essays honoring Ervin Laszlo. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Machado, N. 1998. Using the bodies of the dead: Legal, ethical, and organizational dimensions of organ transplantation. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.
Machado, N. 2005. Discretionary death: Cognitive and normative problems resulting from
boundary shifts between life and death. Death Studies, in press.

440

TOM R. BURNS

Machado, N., and T. R. Burns. 1998. Complex social organization: Multiple organizing
modes, structural incongruence, and mechanisms of integration. Public Administration: An International Quarterly, 76: 355386.
Machado, N., and T. R. Burns. 2001. The new genetics: A social science and humanities
research agenda. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 25(4): 495506.
Nylander, J. 2000. The Power of framing: A new-institutional approach to interest group
participation in the European Union. Doctoral Dissertation, Uppsala: Uppsala University.
Parsons, T. 1951. The social system. Glencoe, Il: Free Press.
Richerson, P. J., and R. Boyd. 2005. Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human
evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schelling, T. C. 1963. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sciulli, D., and D. Gerstein. 1985. Social theory and talcott parsons in the 1980s, Annutal
Review of Sociology, 11: 369387.
Simon, H. A. 1969. Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Stinchcombe, A. E. 1968. Constructing social theories. New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World.
Wallerstein, I. 2004. World-systems analysis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Wiley, N. 1986. History of the Self: From Primates to Present. Paper presented at the
German-American Theory Conference, August 1986, Berkeley, California.
Wiley, N. 1994. The semiotic self. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Woodward, W. E., J. Ellig, and T. R. Burns. 1994. Muncipal entrepreneurship and energy
policy: A five nation study of politics, innovation, and social change. New York: Gordon
and Breach.