State vs Muro

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Several state prosecutors charge Judge Muro of ignorance of the law and
grave misconduct
Judge issued an order (Aug 13, 1992) dismissing 11 criminal cases filed by
the prosecutors against Imelda Marcos for violation of Central Bank
Exchange Restrictions and RA 265
Such order was issued solely based on newspaper reports (that Pres.
Marcos announced the lifting of all foreign restrictions (repealed CB
Circular 960) (Aug. 10)
He did not even require the comment of the prosecutors, nor await the
motion to quash to be filed by the counsel of the accused
Judge argues that there is no need to await the Central Bank circular
repealing the law on foreign exchange because public announcement by
the Pres. was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately
effective
He cannot be blamed for dismissing because the erroneous statements of
the president which were only corrected on Aug. 18, 1992, and the proper
remedy for the prosecutors would have been to file an appeal not an
administrative complaint
Moreover, the prosecutors violated the Rules of Court, that complaints
against judges must be confidential and private, instead, the prosecutors
published such in newspapers
Prosec argues that the saving clause in the new Circular refers and
includes the old Circular- so pending cases are exempted from the repeal

WON he is liable
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YES, Dismissed from service

CA- judge erred. Because he issued the order without any motion from the
accused and newspapers are not the publication required by law; A cursory
reading of the provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the
regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as
there is a provision that with respect to violations of former regulations
that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be
governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose)
10. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court.
11. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way
of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known.
12. judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere
newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay

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evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of

foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be
considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took
cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when
the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial
notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective.
although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former
specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old
regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of the new
regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily
involves and affects Circular No. 960.
a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but
should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity.
respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal
mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect.
He dismissed the cases without a motion from the accused
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the
patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to
present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party.
It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have
seriously and substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the
accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the
dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said
accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay
in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of
Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in
the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in.

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Del Rosario vs Cedillo

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Del Rosario filed a BP 22

case against Estrella. He allegedly lent her 12M
pesos secured by 2 postdated checks and 2 real estate mortgages (where
the TCTs were fake so a falsification case is pending) and the 3 checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds
Estrella filed a Demurrer to Evidence because notices of dishonor were not
sent to her, the registry receipt with the signature A. Estrella was
insufficient and it was defective because it sought the payment of 13.68M
RTC dismissed the case; MR was filed because only the civil aspect of BP
22 was decided- denied and amended the decision to include the criminal
aspect (Neither does the prosecution adequately establish by
preponderance of evidence accused[s] civil liability as it appears that the
latter have executed two (2) Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the private
complainant as security or collateral for said loans; motion for inhibitiongranted
Del Rosario filed this admin complaint for dismissing the civil and crim
cases
Judge argues that he is under no compulsion to hold accused civilly liable
absent the preponderance of evidence. An admin complaint is not the
proper remedy, rather an MR or appeal
OCA found him guilty
BP 22 elements: (1)the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
As to the second element it must be shown that the issuer, at the time of
the checks issuance, had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or
credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment.- presumed to
exist
Judge correctly dismissed the criminal aspect of the BP 22 cases for failure
to establish that Estrella received the notice of dishonor in the form of a
demand letter. The presentation of the said letter and the registry receipt,
with an unauthenticated signature, do not meet the required proof beyond
reasonable doubt that Estrella received such notice, especially considering
that she denied receipt thereof. The rule is that receipts for registered

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letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the
demand letter- the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter
was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received
by petitioners
We cannot, however, rule on the administrative liability of respondent
Judge for dismissing the civil aspect of the BP 22 cases because said issue
is still the subject of complainants petition for relief from judgment with
motion to withdraw motion for reconsideration pending and awaiting the
designation of another Judge in view of respondent Judges inhibition
An administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by
an erroneous judgment. The administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait for the result thereof. For until complainants
appeal is resolved and the case finally is terminated, the Court will have no
basis to conclude whether or not respondent judge is indeed guilty of the
charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment.
Considering that the petition for relief challenging the validity of the July
22, 2003 order is still pending with the Municipal Trial Court, the instant
disciplinary action against respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law
and conduct prejudicial to the service in issuing said order is therefore
premature.
Case is dismissed

People vs Veneracion
1. On Aug 2 1994, Angel Alquiza was found in Manila, wrapped in sack and
table cloth. And she had bruises, lacerations on her genetalia and her head
bashed in
2. Jeoffrey Lagunday and Henry Petilla were charged for the crime of rape
with homicide, that they together with other unidentified persons
conspired to rape a 7-year old and later killed her
3. Subsequently, Cordero Booster, Manlangit Lando, Baltazar Curimao
and Yaon Joel were charged. Lagunday died. All pleaded not guilty
4. After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the
defense, the trial court rendered a decision finding Henry and Cordero
guilty, of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused
with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided
for by law."
5. Prosecutor filed an MR to modify the penalty to death- denied
WON the penalty should have been death
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YES

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides- When by reason or on the occasion

of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with
Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659
punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it
allows judges the discretion depending on the existence of

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circumstances modifying the offense committed to impose the penalty

of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death
sentence because of his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes
with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of
law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a
penalty in specific and well-defined instances.
as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions.
This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of
the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the
penalty of Death.

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Rodriguez vs Barro
1. Valeriano Osita filed a complaint of adultery against his wife Alicia &
Ariston Varquez
2. On the hearing day, it was found that Alicia had not yet been arrested so
an order for such was odered
3. Court granted the motion of counsel of Varquez for a preliminary
investigation- granted
4. Jul 29, 1976Special Counsel Downey C. Valdevilla of Gingoog City filed a
motion to dismiss the case, based upon the affidavit of desistance
executed by Valeriano Ostia
5. Court dismissed the case after hearing the parties on Aug 30, 1976
6. Rodriguez, a concerned citizen and allegedly acting at the behest of Alicia
Ostia filed a complaint with the President against the respondent judge for
neglect of duty and/or gross ignorance of the law for having failed to act
sooner upon the motion to dismiss filed by Special Counsel Downey C.
Valdevilla and as a consequence of which the accused Alicia Ostia
languished in jail for more than one (1) month
7. Judge argues that it was the clerk of court who has all pleadings and he
knows nothing of the pleadings filed unless the clerk of court invites his
attention thereto
8. when the attention of the Judge was called on the motion to dismiss filed
by the Special Counsel he directed his clerk of court, who incidentally is
still not well versed with what he should do being new in court, to set the

motion for hearing and to notify the complainant for tills to be personally
present during the hearing
While We find the action of the respondent Judge in setting the motion for
hearing to be laudable, in order to forestall a hasty and precipitate
dismissal of a criminal case, his explanation for not acting upon said
motion to dismiss earlier is not satisfactory. The respondent Judge cannot
plead in avoidance the negligence or ignorance of the clerk of court
It is the obligation of judges to see that the officers appointed by them
comply fairly and strictly with the duties that the law imposes upon them.
It is also the duty of judges to judiciously apportion the court's time to
achieve speedy dispatch of cases consistent with justice.
Judge had been previously "severely reprimanded for his carelessness and
negligence, and enjoined to exercise henceforth due care and diligence in
the discharge of his function, with a warning that a repetition of such
misconduct would be dealt with more severely." Notwithstanding such
admonition and warning, the respondent Judge has again been found to be
remiss in the performance of his duties. A more severe penalty than a
reprimand is, therefore, called for.
Fine equivalent to 1 month salary

Yu-Asensi vs Villanueva
1. Yu-Asensi charged Judge Villanueva with serious misconduct and/or
inefficiency particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on
promptness and punctuality.
2. That he was complainant in the case of People vs Santos for Reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries
3. That judge arrives 1 hr late during trials, and even arrived at 3:30pm in
one, and extended a trial until 5pm
4. Judge argues that Yu-Asensi and his lawyer were "harassing the respondent
Judge, for adverse rulings and resolutions rendered, due to the negligence
and omissions" of complainant's counsel. He denied that he arrives late
and said that she disposes 30-40 cases each session and was one of the
highest disposition of cases in the MTC
5. Yu attended 8 hearings, his counsel, Atty. Campanilla, attended 11-15, and
said hearings, according to the minutes were from 45- 1 hr late. A
witness, Dr. Patricio also said Judge was always late
6. The Court is convinced that respondent judge is guilty of habitual tardiness
which amounts to serious misconduct and inefficiency.
7. Circular No. 13: Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an
imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirements of
at lease (sic) eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should be
devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to
4:30 as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme
Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of B.P. 129.
8. The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canon of Judicial Ethics
which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial
duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys are
of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad
example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration
of justice.
9. The Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should administer justice
impartially and without delay. A judge should likewise be imbued with a

high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation

to promptly administer justice.
10. Fined P10,000 and suspended for 1 year
Moya vs Tensuan
1. Moya filed a complaint against Judge Tensuan, that during the months of
August, 1979, until March 1980, judge has issued a certificate that he has
no pending motions or incidence or decisions when in truth and in fact, the
case of People vs Ramirez, remained unresolved until April 1980
2. Judge averred that Moya was the complaining witness against his wife,
Ramirez, where a case of acquittal was rendered on Feb 4, 1980- it was
deemed submitted on Nov. 10, 1979, the 86th day after the case was
submitted for resolution - could be attributed to the fact that the docket of
Branch IV is burdened with more than 1,000 pending cases, but never
more than the 90th day
3. That Moya, when he heard of Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, he
thought of a way to get back at the Judge
4. Complainant asserted that even after Feb 4, 1980, no decision was yet
submitted after inquiring, that he was only notified of the promulgation of
his decision on April 28, 1980 but was reset to Apr 30, 1980
5. The decision is dated Feb 4, 1980; on May 12, 1980, the decision was reset
4 times, (last on May 12, 1980)
6. While the decision in said case is dated February 4, 1980, Complainant
Moya wants to imply that the same was rendered much later but antedated so that the same would appear to have been decided with the period
allowed by law. On the other hand, respondent Judge contends that at the
time he had more than 1,000 pending cases and yet he was able to render
the decision even before the 90-day period
7. the interest of justice would have been served and no complaint for delay
would have arisen had respondent Judge promptly set the promulgation of
his decision
8. While it is possible that because of the number of cases in his sala (1,000
pending cases) respondent failed to direct the Clerk of Court to set
immediately the case for the promulgation of the decision, nevertheless,
more care and punctuality in the performance of his duties is required
under the circumstances
9. Admonished

Salvadoor vs Salamanca
1. Salvador and others filed a complaint for forcible entry against Arreza,
Antonio Co, Domingo Co and Lucio Co
2. After 2 years of litigation the parties rested their case for final adjudication.
April 18, 1984 filed an urgent motion for prelim inj. And submitted their
memorandum on May 3, 1984
3. May 16, 1984- Judge issued an order: Inasmuch as this case has already
been submitted for decision, the court defers action on plaintiffs' motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction specially as it is based

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on factual allegations which the court still has to resolve in the decision on
the merits.
On June 25, 1984, when no memorandum was submitted by therein
defendants within the period agreed upon, complainant manifested such
failure to respondent judge and moved for the resolution of the case
without defendants' memorandum. On September 20, 1984, complainant
instituted the instant petition.
Judge stated that while the complaint contained a prayer for preliminary
injunction, the matter was not pressed by therein plaintiffs, who later
amended their complaint. When they moved for its issuance on May 16,
1983, he temporarily denied the motion in an order dated August 2, 1983
in view of the defendants' defense that plaintiffs did not have prior
possession of the premises under consideration. He further explained that
the resolution of plaintiffs' motion of April 16, 1984 was deferred as the
same was based on factual allegations which the court still had to resolve
in the decision on the merits. And although the parties rested their
evidence on April 5, 1984, the case was deemed submitted for decision
only upon the lapse of five (5) days from defendants' receipt of the court's
order of August 22, 1984 which granted them another period of five (5)
days within which to file their memorandum
The facts irrefutably establish that there was a delay in the resolution of
both the motions for preliminary injunction and the case itself. The urgency
of the relief sought through a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a
forcible entry case requires that an application therefor be resolved with
dispatch one way or another. This is the reason why the last sentence of
Section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for its
disposition within thirty days from the filing thereof. Evidently, respondent
judge failed to respond to the situation with the speed required by the
Rules.
On the argument that it was deemed submitted only after the receipt- elied
by his own order of May 16, 1984 wherein he stated inter alia that the case
has already been submitted for resolution.
Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature for they involve
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as
possible, and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may
cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided.
Reprimanded

Query of Judge Tenerife

1. Judge Tenerife assumed office as acting judge of MTCC, he caused a
physical inventory of all the cases pending and found that 82 cases all
have been submitted for decision and were left undecided Judge
Magallanes
2. Judge Tenerife inquired who shall decide such cases and SC decided that it
shall be re-raffled to the 7 branches of MTCC
3. Judge Magallanes claimed that the reason why these cases were left
undecided was due to the failure of the court stenographers, Mr. Leonardo
Yong and Mrs. Gloria Espinosa, both of whom were frequently ill and unable
to work, to complete the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)
4. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to
dispose of the Courts business promptly and decide cases within the

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period specified in the Constitution, that is, three (3) months or ninety (90)
days from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum
The explanation of Judge Magallanes is unsatisfactory and deserves scant
consideration
the delay in the transcription of stenographic notes by a stenographic
reporter under the judges supervision and control cannot be considered a
valid reason for the delay in rendering judgment in a case
the requirement that cases be decided within ninety (90) days from their
submission for decision is designed to prevent delay in the administration
of justice, for obviously justice delayed is justice denied, and delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute
In view of the foregoing circumstances and the fact that this is Judge
Magallanes first offense, a mitigating circumstance in his favor, a fine of
P10,000.00 would be reasonable.

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Report on Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 144, Makati City

1. OCA Report stated that out of six hundred sixty-five (665) active cases in 7.
the Branch, there were one hundred seventy-seven (177) cases submitted
for decision; in addition, motions in sixty-five (65) cases were unresolved,
in violation of the 90-day period mandated by the Constitution
2. Judge Villanueva explained that his case load had been unusually high. He
attributed this fact to the sending to his Branch of cases formerly 8.
cognizable by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts (JDRC). It was
also designated as one of the pioneer Family Courts.
3. that his failure to decide the cases within the required 90-day period was
also due to his pairing judges successive resignations, which had forced

him to act upon cases or incidents in another Branch until a successor was
appointed. Finally, he explained that he was hampered by the lack of
personnel and the many unfounded administrative cases filed against him
that he had to address
The Court finds merit in the explanation of Judge Villanueva.
A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the
time a case is submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the
Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient
justification for his non-compliance therewith.
Statistical Reports Division of the OCA show that from November 2002 to
January 2003, the average number of cases raffled to the two Family
Courts (Branches 140 and 144) was 98 or 19 percent of the total number
filed in Makati City. The voluminous cases prompted this Court to
designate two additional Family Courts
Judge Villanueva wrote to Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.,
through Executive Judge Sixto C. Marella Jr., a letter requesting permission
not to conduct court hearings to be able to devote more time to cases that
had been submitted for decision- virtual plea for assistance to address his
heavy case load
Prior to his retirement, Judge Villanueva was able to dispose of all his cases
submitted for decision, with the exception of only three -- two inherited
ones with incomplete transcripts, and another case whose records had
been ordered to be reconstituted.