Wyden Committee CP

Wyden Committee CP
Explanation for Negative

This is a generic counterplan that can be read against any intelligence agency affirmative. Instead of
enacting the plan, it proposes creating a new Church Committee to conduct a full, public investigation into
the domestic surveillance of Americans by United States intelligence agencies. This investigation will result
in a report to Congress outlining the committees recommendations for legislative and regulatory reform.
The negative argues that the result of this report will be the implementation of the plan (along with other
beneficial reforms, perhaps).
There are several net-benefits, but the do both permutation beats many of them.
1.
Terrorism the negative argues that the committee will be in the best position to determine
whether the program or authority curtailed by the plan is necessary for effective counterterrorism. If the committee determines that the program or authority is not necessary, it will
propose curtailing it. If the committee determines that the program or authority is necessary, it
will propose maintaining it. This allows the negative to argue that the counterplan results in the
plan only if the plan does not link to the terrorism DA. The permutation arguably still links to this
net-benefit.
2.
Politics the negative argues that the committee shifts political responsibility for surveillance
reform away from the President, saving his political capital. The negative can argue that the
process of creating a new Church Committee will be bipartisan and relatively insulated from
typical Congressional politics. The permutation arguably still links to this net-benefit.
3.
Circumvention the negative argues that investigation must precede legislation to ensure that
policy reforms arent circumvented by the intelligence agencies. The permutation resolves most
of this, but the negative can argue that circumvention applies more to the permutation than to
the counterplan alone.
4.
Trust the negative argues that the counterplan restores public trust in the federal government,
something that is necessary to address a host of important policy challenges. Again, the
permutation resolves most of this net-benefit. However, the negative can argue that the
permutation sends mixed messages to the public while the counterplan stays consistent.
5.
Secrecy the negative argues that the counterplan provides oversight review of the intelligence
agencies, lessening the risk of groupthink and its associated dangers. In this way, the counterplan
allows Congress to check overreach by the executive branch. The permutation resolves most of
this net-benefit.
When crafting a counterplan text, the negative should consider customizing it to use the language of the
plan. A version could be written which fiats that the plan be recommended as part of the committees
report, but this carries a lot of theoretical baggage. The blocks in this file assume that the negative has
read the counterplan text in the 1NC, not a version that fiats recommendation of the plan.
Explanation for Affirmative

In response to this counterplan, the affirmative should argue that the plan is necessary to solve the
advantages. If the counterplan might not result in the plan, it might not solve the advantages. To win that
the counterplan wouldnt result in the plan, the affirmative should argue that the committees
recommendations wont be adopted by Congress or that intelligence agencies will attempt to stall the
committees investigation.
The do both permutation is a powerful affirmative option. The affirmative can argue that this
permutation avoids the link to the net-benefits. If there is a chance that the counterplan doesnt result in
the plan, the affirmative can argue that the risk of a solvency deficit outweighs the risk of the net-benefits.
Negative
1NC
1NC Wyden Committee CP

The United States federal government should conduct a full,
public investigation into the domestic surveillance of
Americans by United States intelligence agencies. This
investigation should be modeled after the Church Committee,
headed by Senator Ron Wyden, and tasked with producing a
report to Congress outlining recommendations for appropriate
legislative and regulatory reforms.
The counterplan solves the case and is net-beneficial.
First, it results in sustainable reforms and rebuilds public trust
in government.
Church Committee Alums 14 Counsel, Advisers, and Professional Staff Members of
the Church Committee including Chief Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr., Loch Johnson, John T. Elliff, Burt
Wides, Jim Dick, Frederick Baron, Joseph Dennin, Peter Fenn, Anne Karalekas, Michael Madigan, Elliot
Maxwell, Gordon Rhea, Eric Richard, Athan Theoharis, and Christopher Pyle, 2014 (Open Letter to Congress
and the President, March 17th, Available Online at https://www.eff.org/files/2014/03/16/church_committee__march_17_2014__0.pdf, Accessed 07-08-2015, p. 1-2)
In 1975, the public learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) had been
collecting and analyzing international telegrams of American citizens
since the 1940s under secret agreements with all the major telegram companies. Years later, the NSA
instituted another "Watch List" program to intercept the international communications of key figures in the
Innocent
Americans were targeted by their government. These actions were only
uncoveredand stoppedbecause of a special Senate investigative committee known
civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements among other prominent citizens.
as the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
the Church Committee.

We are former members and staff of the committee and write today as
witnesses to history and as citizens with decades of collective
experience in Congress, the federal courts, the executive branch, and
the intelligence community. We write today to encourage Congress to create
a Church Committee for the 21st Centurya special investigatory
committee to undertake a thorough, and public, examination of current
intelligence community practices affecting the rights of Americans and
to make specific recommendations for future oversight and
reform. Such a committee would work in good faith with the president,
hold public and private hearings, and be empowered to obtain
documents. Such congressional action is urgently needed to restore
the faith of citizens in the intelligence community and, indeed, in our
federal government.
The actions uncovered by the Church Committee in the 1970s bear striking
similarities to the actions we've learned about over the past year. In the
Intelligence Activities, commonly known as
early 1970s, allegations of impropriety and illegal activity concerning the intelligence community spurred
Our committee, chaired by Senator

was charged with investigating illegal and unethical conduct
Congress to create committees to investigate those allegations.

Frank Church,
of the intelligence community and with making legislative

recommendations to govern the intelligence community's conduct. The
bipartisan committee's reports remain one of the most searching
reviews of intelligence agency practices in our nation's history.
Our findings were startling. Broadly speaking, we determined that sweeping domestic surveillance
programs, conducted under the guise of foreign intelligence collection, had repeatedly undermined the
A number of reforms were implemented as a result,

including the creation of permanent intelligence oversight committees
in Congress and the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
privacy rights of US citizens.
Even though our work was over 30 years ago, our conclusions seem eerily prescient today. For example,
our final report noted:
We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals, such as
preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses
characterized as "vacuum cleaners," [end page 1] sweeping in information about lawful activities
of American citizens. The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope is
a theme, which runs through every aspect of our investigative findings.
The need for another thorough, independent, and public congressional

investigation of intelligence activity practices that affect the rights of
Americans is apparent. There is a crisis of public confidence.
Misleading statements by agency officials to Congress, the courts, and
the public have undermined public trust in the intelligence community
and in the capacity for the branches of government to provide
meaningful oversight.
The scale of domestic communications surveillance the NSA engages
in today dwarfs the programs revealed by the Church Committee. Indeed,
30 years ago, the NSA's surveillance practices raised similar concerns as those today. For instance, Senator
Church explained:
In the case of the NSA, which is of particular concern to us today, the rapid development of
technology in this area of electronic surveillance has seriously aggravated present ambiguities in
the law. The broad sweep of communications interception by NSA takes us far beyond the
previous Fourth Amendment controversies where particular individuals and specific telephone
lines were the target.
As former members and staff of the Church Committee we can

authoritatively say: the erosion of public trust currently facing our
intelligence community is not novel, nor is its solution. A Church
Committee for the 21st Centurya special congressional investigatory
committee that undertakes a significant and public reexamination of
intelligence community practices that affect the rights of Americans
and the laws governing those actionsis urgently needed. Nothing
less than the confidence of the American public in our intelligence
agencies and, indeed, the federal government, is at stake.
Second, investigation before legislation is the only way to
avoid circumvention. The counterplan solves; the plan doesnt.
Bump 13 Philip Bump, Staff Writer at the Wirean Atlantic publication, former Writer for Grist,
former Senior Designer at Adobe Systems, 2013 (How Do You Solve a Problem Like NSA?, The Wirean
Atlantic publication, November 1st, Available Online at http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/11/how-doyou-solve-problem-nsa/71154/, Accessed 07-08-2015)
Legal roadblocks
Advocates of the NSA's surveillance, like Feinstein, are quick to point out that
what the NSA is doing is legal. It is overseen by (largely acquiescent)
intelligence committees in the House and Senate. It is approved by the Department
of Justice and White House. It is given a stamp of approval by the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court in a purposefully one-sided process. But, as American
history has repeatedly shown, "legal" doesn't always correlate to "appropriate."
And in this case, the assessment that the tools fall within the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment
essentially hasn't been challenged before the Supreme Court.
The NSA says it wants to collect metadata on every phone call in the United
States, and that the Patriot Act's Section 215 lets it do so. The FISC agrees.
Therefore, these activities are legal despite the author of the Patriot
Act asserting that the data collection exceeds the boundaries of the
law. Doesn't matter. The NSA and a secret court interpret the law to
allow the NSA to conduct all of the activity that's mentioned in this article. A majority
of members of Congress are not disposed to challenge this
interpretation. There exist proposals that, unlike Feinstein's, would actually block certain NSA
behavior, but they aren't likely to be make it into law without being watered down by amendments.
We reached out to staff attorneys from two of the organizations that have
been most fervent in their critiques of the NSA's surveillance tools,
asking them how, given the power, they'd revise the government's
surveillance tools to ensure that public privacy was maintained. The
question we posed: Knowing that the NSA is experienced at
massaging laws to meet their needs, what legislation might
prevent that?
Alex Abdo, staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union, advocated
transparency above all else. "Our country's founders believed that
tyranny could be prevented through checks and balances. I think the
same holds true today." For that to happen, though, people need to
know what's happening.
[I]t should mean that the public has access to significant or novel
legal interpretations issued by the FISC. That would have gone a
long way toward preventing the 215 program, because Congress
and the public would have been able to judge the lawfulness and
necessity of the government's programs for themselves.
"In short," Abdo said, "our privacy rights shouldn't be interpreted away in
secret. Secrecy has its place, but it should not be used as an excuse to
keep any branch of government or the public out of the debate entirely.
This type of solution is also key to long-term legitimacy."
In the 1970s, following revelations of domestic surveillance by the NSA and rampant abuses by
other intelligence services the Church Committee was formed in the Senate in an
effort to better determine the guidelines under which the agencies
should operate. There were eventually other steps: the 1978 Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act itself, which codified some of the committee's findings, and
President Ronald Reagan's 1981 executive order extending the agencies'
power while adding some new boundaries. (The vast majority of the NSA violations
revealed in the Snowden leaks were violations of this order.)
Opsahl, senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, suggested

revisiting the idea of forming a new Congressional commission to
tackle these issues. "If Congress has the political will," he told us, "it can
easily write language to stop bulk collection." But:
Kurt
[T]o really be sure that Congress can legislate well, we really need
a new Church Commission. The key idea behind a new Church Committee
would be to investigate first, and then legislate later with a
better understanding. It may not result in restrictions that will
be effective for all time, in light of technologies not dreamed
about now, but it's the right thing to do now.
Neither Opsahl nor Abdo, you'll notice, are advocating specific proposals
since without further exploration of what's actually happening,
it's difficult to draw policy. The most important part of Opsahl's statement, though, is the
first part. "If Congress has the political will." The Senate Intelligence Committee, in passing the tweaks
encompassed in the FISA Improvements Act has shown a lack of will to try and figure out how to create
new limits on the NSA's activity. But perhaps the most obvious example of a lack of will comes from
Feinstein's House counterpart, Rep. Mike Rogers of Michigan. In a hearing this week, he confronted
American University law professor Steve Vladeck, as reported by MSNBC.
Rogers: I would argue the fact that we havent had any complaints come forward with any
specificity arguing that their privacy has been violated, clearly indicates, in 10 years, clearly
indicates that something must be doing right. Somebody must be doing something exactly right.
Vladeck: But who would be complaining?
Rogers: Somebody whos privacy was violated. You cant have your privacy violated if you dont
know your privacy is violated.
This is a corollary to the Supreme Court's rejection, earlier this year, of a lawsuit targeting the NSA. The
Court ruled that the plaintiffs weren't affected by the surveillance and therefore couldn't sue; assured by
the government that those being watched would be told and so could knowingly bring a suit the Court
threw out the case. It then turned out that the government wasn't informing people that NSA surveillance
generated the evidence against them.
Rogers lacks the political will to figure out how to rein in the NSA so that the privacy of Americans using
The will to study the problem may emerge as

leaks continue and political pressure builds. As Rogers might note, you can't
fix your surveillance system until you know that your
surveillance system needs to be fixed. Assuming it can be fixed at all.
email or Google or Tor is ensured.
2NC/1NR Net-Benefits
Circumvention Net-Benefit
To avoid circumvention, investigation must precede legislation.
NSA relies on secret interpretations of statutory authority to
justify their activities. Unless these secret interpretations are
scrutinized by Congress, it is impossible to craft effective
policy language thats Bump.
Prefer our evidence: it quotes the ACLUs Abdo and the EFFs
Opsahl, two leading civil liberties attorneys. Both agree that a
new Church Committeenot a specific policy reformis the
best option for reigning in NSA. Heres more evidence.
Cohn and Jaycox 13 Cindy Cohn, Executive Director and former Legal Director and General
Counsel of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, holds a J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School, and
Mark Jaycox, Legislative Analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, former Contributor to ArsTechnica,
former Legislative Research Assistant for LexisNexis, holds a B.A. in Political History from Reed College,
2013 (Why A Special Congressional Committee Must Be Created To Investigate NSA's Unconstitutional
Domestic Spying, Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 19th, Available Online at
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/why-special-congressional-committee-must-be-created-investigatensas, Accessed 07-09-2015)
In the past couple of weeks, the NSA has, unsurprisingly, responded with a series of secret briefings to
Congress that have left the public in the dark and vulnerable to misstatements and word games.
Congress has many options at its disposal, but for true accountability any
response must start with a special investigative committee. A coalition
of over 100 civil liberties groups agrees. Such a committee is the
right way the American people can make informed decisions about
the level of transparency and the reform needed.
A Special Investigatory Committee is the Right Way to Shine the Light and Create True Accountability
A special investigatory committee should be bipartisan, consist of

selected Intelligence and Judiciary committee members on both sides
of the issue, and have full subpoena powers. After Watergate, Congress
created the Church Committee to investigate domestic spying and
other illegal actions committed by the intelligence community. What it found was staggering: in
one example of abuse, the NSA was reading and copying all telegrams entering and exiting the country. In
another, NSA had intercepted, opened and photographed more than 215,000 pieces of mailmass
The Church Committee brought these revelations to light,

informed the American people, and took steps to limit the broad nature
of the surveillance.
The contemporary Congress must create a similar, independent, and
empowered committee. The President and some members of Congress prefer an
surveillance circa 1970.
investigation by the Presidents appointed Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), but the
Board is not even empowered to issue subpoenas. And the two key committees that rubber-stamped the
expansion of the NSA spying from foreigners-only to ordinary Americans have proven themselves unable to
rein in the spying.
Obama says he welcomes a public debate on the programs. If

hes serious, he and Congress need to take the path of a modern day
Church Committee.
President
The PCLOB
Last week, Senators called for an investigation by the PCLOB. The PCLOB was one of the recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission and was set up to try to ensure that privacy and civil liberties played a role in the
enormous expansion of surveillance laws like the PATRIOT Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Amendments Act. Yet it has not. Instead, the PCLOB has lingered without a chairmanmaking it inoperable
for almost five years. It was only until this spring that the Senate finally confirmed David Medine as the
chair, however the PCLOB has done little, if anything, since then. Thats because it has no real power. If the
PCLOB asked the NSA for certain documents related to the spying, for instance, the NSA would not have to
hand the documents over or present testimony under oath. In a hearing this week, General Alexander, the
Director of the National Security Agency, committed to cooperating with any investigation by the PCLOB.
But given the NSAs history of gross misdirection, word games and limited answers to direct questions
including General Alexanders own falsehoods in Congressional testimonythis investigation should not
rely on the good will of the NSA. Yet, thats exactly what the PCLOB would have to rely upon.
Hearings in Front of the Judiciary or Intelligence Committees
Nor do the Judiciary or Intelligence committees hold great promise. These committees should serve as the
American peoples robust window intoand constitutional check onintelligence operations. For instance,
in 2005, when the New York Times first reported on the warrantless wiretapping, many hearings took place
in front of both the Senate and House Judiciary and Intelligence committees. The Committees certainly did
not reveal the full extent of the spying, even though they had the opportunity. Instead, politicians were
stonewalled, swallowed grossly misleading answers, and revealed few details.
Currently, the Senate Intelligence committee has met publicly only 2 times this year; from 2011 to 2012 it
only met 8 times. The House of Representatives is no different. The House Intelligence committee's
Subcommittee on Oversight has not met once this year. Yes, not once. And the full House Intelligence
committee has only met four times. History tells us a similar story about the Judiciary Committees.
The public demands for a robust debate require more transparency and tenacity than these committees
seem able to provide.
The Secret Veil Must Be Lifted
the standing Congressional committees are

unable to get at the bottom of the NSA spying and the PCLOB does not
have sufficient power to do so either. A special investigative committee
with full subpoena powers, the ability to force testimony under
oath, and the ability to issue sanctions for failure to cooperate is
the best hope that the American people have to ensure the NSA's
domestic spying isn't swept under the NSAs giant secrecy cloak once
again. Tell Congress now to act.
In short, the lessons of 2005 is that
Only the counterplan results in a complete audit of domestic

surveillance. Without it, circumvention is inevitable.
Friedersdorf 13 Conor Friedersdorf, Staff Writer for The Atlantic, 2013 (Lawbreaking at the
NSA: Bring On a New Church Committee, The Atlantic, August 16th, Available Online at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/lawbreaking-at-the-nsa-bring-on-a-new-churchcommittee/278750/, Accessed 07-08-2015)
The time is ripe for a new Church Committee, the surveillance oversight effort
named for Senator Frank Church, who oversaw a mid-1970s investigation into decades of jaw-dropping
abuses by U.S. intelligence agencies. If recent stories about the NSA don't alarm you, odds are that you've
never read the Church Committee findings, which ought to be part of the standard high-school curriculum.
Their lesson is clear: Under cover of secrecy, government agents will commit abuses with impunity for
years on end, and only intrusive Congressional snooping can stop them.
Why is another Church Committee needed now? For more than a

decade, the NSA has repeatedly engaged in activity that violated the
law and the Constitutional rights of many thousands or perhaps millions of
Americans.
Let's review the NSA's recent history of serial illegality. President George W. Bush presided over the first
wave. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, he signed a secret order that triggered a massive program
of warrantless wiretapping. NSA analysts believed they possessed the authority to spy on the phone calls
and emails of American citizens without a judge's permission. Circa October 2001, 90 NSA employees
knew about the illegal program, but the public didn't. Later that month, four members of Congress,
including Nancy Pelosi, were told of its existence, and subsequently discredited White House lawyer John
Yoo wrote the first analysis of its legality. By 2002, 500 people knew about it, at which point telecom
providers were participating.
The public didn't find out about warrantless wiretapping until December 2005, more than four years after it
started, when the New York Times published a story that they'd long been holding.
How effective was the illegal spying?
"In the anxious months after the Sept. 11 attacks, the National Security Agency began sending a steady
stream of telephone numbers, e-mail addresses and names to the FBI in search of terrorists. The stream
soon became a flood, requiring hundreds of agents to check out thousands of tips a month," The New York
Times reported in a January 2006 followup article. "But virtually all of them, current and former officials
say, led to dead ends or innocent Americans. FBI officials repeatedly complained to the spy agency, which
was collecting much of the data by eavesdropping on some Americans' international communications and
conducting computer searches of foreign-related phone and Internet traffic, that the unfiltered information
was swamping investigators. Some FBI officials and prosecutors also thought the checks, which sometimes
involved interviews by agents, were pointless intrusions on Americans' privacy."
On July 9, 2008, telecom companies that participated in illegal warrantless wiretapping were granted
retroactive immunity in a bill that Senator Barack Obama supported, despite a promise to oppose it.
Soon after, the Obama Administration took power.
On April 15, 2009, The New York Times reported on abuses in the NSA's surveillance activities (emphasis
added):
The National Security Agency intercepted private e-mail messages and phone calls of Americans
in recent months on a scale that went beyond the broad legal limits established by Congress last
year, government officials said in recent interviews. Several intelligence officials... said the N.S.A.
had been engaged in "overcollection" of domestic communications of Americans. They described
the practice as significant and systemic, although one official said it was believed to have been
unintentional... The Justice Department, in response to inquiries from The New York Times,
acknowledged Wednesday night that there had been problems with the N.S.A. surveillance
operation, but said they had been resolved.
That July, an unclassified report produced by the inspectors general of five federal agencies "had difficulty
citing specific instances when the National Security Agency's wiretapping program contributed to
successes against terrorists," and "found that other intelligence tools used in assessing security threats
posed by terrorists provided more timely and detailed information." The CIA found it "a useful tool but
could not link it directly to counterterrorism successes."
Team Obama pressed on anyway.
Skip ahead to Edward Snowden's revelations, which began earlier this summer. The Obama Administration
has insisted all along that Snowden wasn't able to document abuses because there aren't any. That claim
was always dubious. As I noted earlier this week, the Obama Administration itself had already admitted
that legal violations occurred, though it did so in the most vague terms. As of Monday, when I published
my article, there was already enough documented bad behavior and official dissembling about surveillance
to justify a sweeping investigation.
any member of Congress who doesn't press for an investigation is

behaving indefensibly, for the Washington Post has just reported that the NSA violated the law
Now
on a much larger scale than anyone admitted. Its report shows that current oversight is laughably
inadequate, and includes enough details to suggest that multiple NSA defenders have been lying in their
public statements.
What would justify a Congressional investigation if not all that? If you're still not persuaded, recall the
claims made by the Obama Administration alongside the latest scoops by Barton Gellman and Carol
Leonnig. Team Obama's case has been straightforward: there are not NSA abuses, and adequate oversight
is being conducted by all three branches of the U.S. government.
Now look at the facts reported Thursday evening:
* "The National Security Agency has broken privacy rules or overstepped its legal authority thousands of
times each year since Congress granted the agency broad new powers in 2008."
* "Most of the infractions involve unauthorized surveillance of Americans or foreign intelligence targets in
the United States, both of which are restricted by statute and executive order."
* "In one instance, the NSA decided that it need not report the unintended surveillance of Americans."
* "In another case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has authority over some NSA
operations, did not learn about a new collection method until it had been in operation for many months.
The court ruled it unconstitutional."
* "The NSA audit obtained by The Post, dated May 2012, counted 2,776 incidents in the preceding 12
months of unauthorized collection, storage, access to or distribution of legally protected communications.
Most were unintended. Many involved failures of due diligence or violations of standard operating
procedure. The most serious incidents included a violation of a court order and unauthorized use of data
about more than 3,000 Americans and green-card holders."
This is a good place to pause. Note that the 2,776 incidents of illegal surveillance don't mean that just
2,766 people had their rights violated -- in just a single one of those 2,776 incidents, 3,000 people had
their rights violated. As the story notes, "There
is no reliable way to calculate from

the number of recorded compliance issues how many Americans have
had their communications improperly collected, stored or distributed
by the NSA." And that is another reason an intrusive Congressional investigation
into these practices is urgently necessary.
What possible objection could there be to nailing down the number of Americans whose rights were
violated? I'd like someone to explain how that could possibly make us less safe from al-Qaeda.
Here's something else I'd like to see investigated:
The causes and severity of NSA infractions vary widely. One in 10 incidents is attributed to a
typographical error in which an analyst enters an incorrect query and retrieves data about U.S
phone calls or e-mails.
Does anyone else find it implausible that 10 percent of errors are due to typos? And even if that's true, are
you telling me there's no way to eliminate typos when the consequences are intrusive spying in violation of
the law and the Constitution? I find it hard to imagine how anyone isn't on board for a Congressional
investigation at this point, but just in case, get this next part (emphasis added):
The May 2012 audit, intended for the agency's top leaders, counts only incidents at the NSA's Fort
Meade headquarters and other facilities in the Washington area. Three government officials,
speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss classified matters, said the number would be
substantially higher if it included other NSA operating units and regional collection centers.
That brings us to the head of the Senate intelligence committee, who has sworn all along that she engages
in thorough oversight of NSA surveillance, and that large-scale abuses just don't happen:
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who did not receive a copy of
the 2012 audit until The Post asked her staff about it, said in a statement late Thursday that the
committee "can and should do more to independently verify that NSA's operations are
appropriate, and its reports of compliance incidents are accurate."
The newspaper got its hands on the audit -- more than a year after the fact -- before she did! And the
trend? "Despite the quadrupling of the NSA's oversight staff after a series of significant violations in 2009,"
Gellman reports, "the rate of infractions increased throughout 2011 and early 2012."
There is a lot more to his article, which everyone should read in full. I'll excerpt just one more passage:
The NSA uses the term "incidental" when it sweeps up the records of an American while targeting
a foreigner or a U.S. person who is believed to be involved in terrorism. Official guidelines for NSA
personnel say that kind of incident, pervasive under current practices, "does not constitute a ...
violation" and "does not have to be reported" to the NSA inspector general for inclusion in
quarterly reports to Congress. Once added to its databases, absent other restrictions, the
communications of Americans may be searched freely.
the scale of actual NSA abuses is substantially hidden.

An alarming number of communications are being illegally collected.
But the truth could turn out to be shocking even to people who've been
following this story closely. An investigation is the only way to find
out.
Suffice it to say that
The average member of Congress knows far less than Feinstein, and the only other check on the NSA,
the FISA court, also provides inadequate oversight, according to the

man in charge of it:
The leader of the secret court that is supposed to provide critical
oversight of the government's vast spying programs said that its ability do so is
limited and that it must trust the government to report when it
improperly spies on Americans.
The chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court said the court lacks
the tools to independently verify how often the government's
surveillance breaks the court's rules that aim to protect Americans'
privacy. Without taking drastic steps, it also cannot check the
veracity of the government's assertions that the violations its
staff members report are unintentional mistakes.
All told, it's an airtight case for dramatically more oversight. Senator Ron
Wyden has long led the lonely effort in his body to expose NSA abuses,
and he is the natural choice to lead both an investigation and a Wyden
Committee Report to Study Intelligence Activities in the War on Terror.
Were there any justice in the world, Feinstein would be kept far away from the effort.
Trust Net-Benefit
The counterplan rebuilds trust in government. Revelations of
illegal NSA spying has decimated overall public confidence in
the federal government. Only a comprehensive Congressional
investigation can rebuild trust thats the Church Committee
Alums.
Public trust in government is a prerequisite to solving all
global problems. Its an existential risk.
Small 6 Jonathan Small, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, 2006 (Moving
Forward, The Journal for Civic Commitment, Available Online via the Internet Archives Wayback Machine
at http://web.archive.org/web/
20060711184600/http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp, Accessed 0922-2009)
What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these
challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that
humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the
the new century will present

challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened
self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural
resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and
multinational corporations with no conscience and no
accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty,
compromise, and most of all solidarity ideals not exactly cultivated in the
twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of
our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective
fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends
upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a
more cohesive society.
capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility,
With humankinds next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism
We have two choices, work together in solidarity

or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the
noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global
super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations,
white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the
environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across
the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a
predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day
we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive
modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and
radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events.
backed us into a corner.
Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global,
interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in
schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to
prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading,
writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure,
exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of
rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we
impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will
require a radical transformation of our conception of education. Well need to trust a bit more, control a bit
less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world.
In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a
proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement
education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well
to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a
higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an
urban setting with a diverse student body.
Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in
Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning
in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward
explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study
and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we
should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study.
Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap
Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a goodsized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over
fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead
on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite
simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and
equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked
to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of
social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its
citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract
theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social
justice.
Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning,
Civic engagement is a
measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and
a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding
respectively. Once again, lets not get bogged down on subtleties.
dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that todays youth are less involved
politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates
among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a
hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and todays youth. But one thing is
todays youth no longer see government and politics as an

effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the
world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it.
for sure;
Author Kurt Vonnegut said, There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I dont know what can
be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president. Maybe the youths rejection of American
politics isnt a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience.
In order to foster
fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is
necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need
to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes
Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today.
convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have the
Civic engagement consequently takes on a more

specific and political meaning in this context.
potential for positive change.
Independently, public trust in government is key to

progressive public policies that address poverty and racism.
Hetherington 6 Marc J. Hetherington, Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt
University, 2006 (Why Political Trust Matters, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise
of American Liberalism, Published by Princeton University Press, ISBN, Available Online at
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7877.html, Accessed 04-30-2012)
declining political trust has played the central

role in the demise of progressive public policy in the United States
over the last several decades. My claim defies the conventional wisdom. In explaining why
public policy has grown more conservative since the 1960s, pundits and political scientists
Even more importantly,
tend to identify a conservative turn in public opinion as the cause. However,

little evidence exists to support this explanation. There remains
constant and widespread support for big government in areas
where most Americans benefit. For example, almost everyone wants to
maintain or increase investment in the vast majority of federal
programs, such as Medicare, Social Security, education, highways, environmental protection, and the
alike
like. Had public opinion truly grown more conservative, support for these initiatives would have decreased
because conservatives have a philosophical aversion to government.
Contemporary political rhetoric fuels this misunderstanding. By railing against "big government" in
general, conservative and moderate politicians imply that people want less government across the board.
public opposition to government is focused entirely on

programs that require political majorities to make sacrifices for
political minorities, such as antipoverty and race-targeted
initiatives. In short, Americans continue to support big government
when they benefit from it, but they want limited government when
they are asked to make sacrifices.
The massive deterioration in political trust that has occurred since the
1960s explains this disjuncture. Declining trust should not affect support for all things
However,
that government does. Indeed, people do not need to trust the government much when they benefit from
people need to trust the government when they pay the

costs but do not receive the benefits, which is exactly what
antipoverty and race-targeted programs require of most
Americans. When government programs require people to make
sacrifices, they need to trust that the result will be a better
future for everyone. Absent that trust, people will deem such
sacrifices as unfair, even punitive, and, thus, will not support the programs
that require them.
it. Instead,
Progressive policies are vital to reduce widespread suffering

and inequality. We have a moral obligation to collectively
address these injustices through state action.
West 99 Robin West, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, holds a J.D. from
the University of Maryland Law School and a J.S.M. from Stanford Law School, 1999 (Is American
Progressive Constitutionalism Dead?: I. Conceptual And Critical Themes In Normative Progressive
Constitutionalism: Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible?, Widener Law Symposium (4 Wid. L. Symp. J.
1), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
Progressivism is in part a particular moral and political response to the

sadness of lesser lives, lives unnecessarily diminished by economic,
psychic and physical insecurity in the midst of a society or world that offers plenty. This
insecurity is unjust and should end; the suffering should be
alleviated, and those lives should be enriched. To do so must be
one of the goals of a morally just or justifiable state. Not all suffering and not all
lesser lives, of course, give rise to such a response. The suffering attendant to accident, disease, war and
happenstance is neither entirely chargeable to our societal account, nor is it within our control. A "lesser
life" marred by the early loss of a parent, a parent's mourning occasioned by the accidental death of a
child, or an adult's ongoing trauma set off by a childhood disease, although cosmically unjust, is neither
the suffering
attendant to poverty or stunted opportunities for growth, the suffering
attendant to the absence of supportive communities, or the suffering
attendant to the desperate attempt to nurture children while unsure of
unjust in the ordinary sense, nor is it easily ameliorated through politics. In contrast,
one's own physical or economic safety is largely chargeable to our

moral account and may be ameliorated through politics--at least in a social
world like our own, marked by abundant natural resources, vast economic opportunity, thriving
neighborhoods, and competent police and security forces.
That such suffering exists on a shockingly widespread scale in our

world is a product of two states of affairs. First, it is the consequence of the decision to
allow not simply "property," but vast quantities of wealth to accumulate in a few
private hands, and social and sexual esteem as well as physical security and well-being to reside in
one race and sex. Second, the suffering is a product of our collective, political
and legal inattention to the suffering those distributions leave
in their wake. Progressivism, I will assume, is marked by a distinctive
moral response to that suffering. When brought on by collective
inattention to private maldistributions of wealth, security or privilege,
that suffering is unjust, and for that reason gives rise to a moral and
political imperative: the conditions which give rise to the [*2]
suffering must be changed, and changed through some form of
collective action, which in turn may (although often times may not) require the
coercive power of the state.
Secrecy Net-Benefit
Only the counterplan solves openness, preventing intelligence
community groupthink.
Benkler 13 Yochai Benkler, Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies at Harvard Law
School, Faculty Co-Director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, former
Professor at New York University School of Law, recipient of the Electronic Frontier Foundations Pioneer
Award and the Ford Foundation Visionaries Award, holds an LL.B. from Tel-Aviv University and a J.D. from
Harvard Law School, 2013 (We Need a New Church Committee, The New Republic, June 11th, Available
Online at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113433/nsa-scandal-requires-new-church-committee,
Accessed 07-08-2015)
Last week's groundbreaking reporting by The Guardian and The Washington Post exposed an NSA
surveillance system of breathtaking scale, breadth, and depth. Even if legal under some tortured
The sheer
audacity of the NSA surveillance and the complicity of segments of all
three branches of government and the private sector suggest that we
need a basic re-evaluation of intelligence operations on the scale of the
Church Committee in the post-Watergate era. On Sunday, The Guardian disclosedat his request
interpretation of the law, this system leaves the Fourth Amendment an empty vessel.
that the source of the leak was Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old former technical assistant at the CIA and
current employee of a defense contractor.
The president's defense of the surveillance programs last Friday depended

on our trust in congressional oversight and judicial process. These made the
program legitimate, he argued, as he doubled down on his aggressive denunciation of the whistle-blowing
The president's defense, however, merely underscores

the subversion of checks and balances by the post-September 11
constitution. It is precisely when traditional checks and balances fail
that the fourth estate is so crucial.
that exposed the abuses.
Secrecy breeds error
Secrecy undermines the foundation of learning: criticism. People on

the inside of the national security establishment cannot be trusted to
make reasonable judgmentsnot because they are bad people (one assumes that, for
the most part, they are deeply committed and well-intentioned)but because they inhabit a
deeply error-prone system that lacks the basic elements of selfcorrection. Saddam Hussein is dead today because he created a system in which no one could tell
him that if he kept obscuring the fact that he had no WMD, he would die.
Open societies thrive not because they have smarter people, or better armies, or perfect
markets. They thrive because, in their very imperfection, they enable
continuous learning. Open societies cant always act as effectively
as non-open societies. For a while, planned economies looked like they were better at putting
Sputnik in orbit, and spy agencies unfettered by democratic qualms, we feared, could foment revolution
But in the long run, openness made us learn, adapt, and

become better. That is why, eventually, either China will open up or America will continue to lead
from Korea to Cuba.
into the twenty-first century. But only if we stay an open society.
Secrecy has been allowed to metastasize under the Bush-Obama

national security system. As the FISA Court order to Verizon showed, even the
operation of the law is secret. The Department of Justice issues secret
memos; these become unchallenged interpretations of law that FISA
Court judges are asked to endorse without the benefit of an opponent's
criticism. Any good lawyer knows that if you read the briefs of one side
only, they seem overwhelmingly persuasiveuntil you read the other
side's brief. These decisions, in turn, remain secret, and thus immune to
criticism even after they have been issued. And that complete
immunity from criticism insulates them from good reason. They are, by
design, hobbled, incapable of embodying good judgment.
Congressional oversight suffers from similar information imbalances.
When Senators Feinstein and Chambliss tell us that the intelligence gathered is
invaluable and the civil rights violations minimal, we cannot trust their
judgment: Their honest judgments reflect information that is one side's
brief for its own perspective. Legislators can work their way out of this dynamic in
extraordinary cases, but such divergence is not the normal course. Congressional overseers
who come with a critical frame of reference and interpret the
information skepticallylike Senators Wyden and Udall, who obliquely raised the alarm
for yearsare caught in a Catch-22: They can only learn enough to
criticize knowledgeably by signing away their freedom to criticize
publicly.
Were told to trust the governments surveillance package as a whole,
as a black box. But when we see two products of that opaque system
that are so totally out of whack with the proper balance between
national security and constitutional rights, we can have no confidence
in the system. Asking us to simply trust the black box is a completely
inadequate response.
The torture program was enabled by spooks cooperating with national security types in
the executive manipulating the information available to the select few who
participated in congressional oversight and wildly overstating the value of their work. The
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the incompetence, dissimulation, and sheer futility of
there is
absolutely no reason to believe that the system of checks and balances
that failed so spectacularly there has performed impeccably here, or
that the self-affirming assertions of the spies about the critical value of
their work are systematically more credible.
Only a genuine, aggressive, independent, and transparent review
process can restore the confidence necessary to maintain
security under the American Constitution. We need a new Church
Committee to assess the NSA's work in this post-September 11, big
data moment.
that program remains a national security secret. But we know the basic storyline. And
Groupthink risks extinction. Decentralized, open decisionmaking is key.

Adler 96 David Gray Adler, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, 1996 (The
Judiciary and Presidential Power In Foreign Affairs: A Critique, Perspectives on Law and the Public Interest
(1 Persp. on L. & Pub. Int. 1), Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Hein Online, p. 1-9)
The Constitution envisions the conduct of foreign policy as a

partnership between the President and Congress. Perhaps surprisingly, the
Constitution assigns Congress the role of senior partner. This
assignment reflects, first, the overwhelming preference of both the framers
at the Constitutional Convention and the ratifiers in state conventions for collective decision{4}
making in both foreign and domestic affairs. Second, this assignment of powers reflects their equally
adamant opposition to unilateral executive control of U.S. foreign
policy. This constitutional arrangement is evidenced by specific, unambiguous textual language, almost
undisputed arguments by framers and ratifiers, and by logical-structural inferences from the doctrine of
separation of powers.[5]
The constitutional assignment of powers, moreover, is compelling and

relevant for twentieth century America for at least three reasons. First, separation of
{5}
powers issues are perennial, for they require consideration of the proper repository of power.
Contemporary questions about the allocation of power between the President and Congress in foreign
the logic of
collective decisionmaking in the realm of foreign relations is as sound
today as it was in the founding period. Third, although the world and the role of the
affairs are largely the same as those addressed two centuries ago. Second,
United States in international relations have changed considerably over the past 200 years, most questions
of foreign affairs still involve routine policy formulation and do not place a premium on immediate
responsive action.
The preference for collective, rather than individual, decisionmaking

runs throughout those provisions of the Constitution that govern the
conduct of foreign policy. Congress, as a collective governing body,
derives broad and exclusive powers from Article I to regulate foreign
commerce and to initiate all hostilities on behalf of the United States,
including war. As Article II indicates, the President shares with the Senate the treaty-making power
{6}
and the power to appoint ambassadors. Only two powers in foreign relations are assigned exclusively to
the President. First, he is commander-in-chief, but he acts in this capacity

by and under the authority of Congress. As Alexander Hamilton and James Iredell
argued, the President, in this capacity, is merely first admiral or general of the armed forces, after war has
been authorized by Congress or in the event of a sudden attack against the United States.[6] Secondly, the
President has the power to receive ambassadors. Hamilton, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson agreed
that this clerk-like function was purely ceremonial in character. Although this function has come to entail
recognition of states at international law, which carries with it certain legal implications, this founding trio
contended that the duty of recognizing states was more conveniently placed in the hands of the executive
than in the legislature.[7] These two powers exhaust the textual grant of authority to the President
The President's constitutional authority pales

in comparison to the powers of Congress.
regarding foreign affairs jurisdiction.
{7} This Constitutional preference for shared decisionmaking is emphasized again in the construction of
the shared treaty power: "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."[8] The compelling simplicity and clarity of
the plain words of this clause leave no room to doubt its meaning.[9] There is no other clause that even
intimates a presidential power to make agreements with foreign nations. Therefore, as Hamilton argued,
the treaty power constitutes the principal vehicle for conducting U.S. foreign relations.[10] In fact, there
was no hint at the Constitutional Convention of an exclusive Presidential power to make foreign policy. To
the contrary, all the arguments of the framers and ratifiers were to the effect that the Senate and
President, which Hamilton and Madison described as a "fourth branch of government" in their capacity as
treaty maker,[11] are to manage concerns with foreign nations.[12] While a number of factors contributed
to this decision,[13] the pervasive fear of unbridled executive power loomed largest.[14] Hamilton's
statement fairly represents these sentiments:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human nature which would make it
wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as
would be a President of the United States.[15]
{8} The widespread fear of executive power that precluded presidential control of foreign policy also
greatly influenced the Convention's design of the War Clause. Article I, section 8, paragraph 11 states:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War."[16] The plain meaning of the clause is buttressed by
the unanimous agreement among both framers and ratifiers that Congress was granted the sole and
exclusive authority to initiate war. The warmaking power, which was viewed as a legislative power by
Madison and Wilson, among others, was specifically withheld from the President.[17] James Wilson, second
only to Madison as an architect of the Constitution, summed up the values and concerns underlying the
war clause for the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a
single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the
legislature at large. This declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives;
from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw
us into war.[18]
No member of the Constitutional Convention and no member of any state ratifying convention ever
attributed a different meaning to the War Clause.[19]
{9} This undisputed interpretation draws further support from early judicial decisions, the views of
eminent treatise writers, and from nineteenth-century practice. I have discussed these factors elsewhere;
here the barest review must suffice.[20] The meaning of the War Clause was put beyond doubt by several
early judicial decisions. No court since has departed from this early view. In 1800, in Bas v. Tingy, the
Supreme Court held that it is for Congress alone to declare either an "imperfect" (limited) war or a
"perfect" (general) war.[21] In 1801, in Talbot v. Seeman, Chief Justice John Marshall, a member of the
Virginia Ratifying Convention, stated that the "whole powers of war [are], by the Constitution of the United
States, vested in [C]ongress. . . ."[22] In Little v. Barreme, decided in 1804, Marshall concluded that
President John Adams' instructions to seize ships were in conflict with an act of Congress and were
therefore illegal.[23] In 1806, in United States v. Smith, the question of whether the President may initiate
hostilities was decided by Justice William Paterson, riding circuit, who wrote for himself and District Judge
Tallmadge: "Does he [the President] possess the power of making war? That power is exclusively vested in
Congress . . . It is the exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of war."[24] In
1863, the Prize Cases presented the Court with its first opportunity to consider the power of the President
to respond to sudden attacks.[25] Justice Robert C. Grier delivered the opinion of the Court:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a natural or foreign war . . . If a war be made
by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force, by force. He
does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the
less a war, although the declaration of it be "unilateral."[26]
These judicial decisions established the constitutional fact that it is for Congress alone to initiate hostilities,
whether in the form of general or limited war; the President, in his capacity as commander-in-chief, is
granted only the power to repel sudden attacks against the United States.[27]
{10} The Convention's attachment to collective judgment and its decision to create a structure of shared
power in foreign affairs provided, in the words of Wilson, "a security to the people," for it was a cardinal
tenet of republican ideology that the conjoined wisdom of many is superior to that of one.[28] The
emphasis on group decisionmaking came, of course, at the expense of unilateral executive authority. This
hardly posed a difficult choice, however; for the framers and ratifiers held a pervasive distrust of executive
power, a deeply held suspicion that dated to colonial times.[29] As a result of this aversion to executive
authority, the Convention placed control of foreign policy beyond the unilateral capacity of the President.
Furthermore, as Madison said, the Convention "defined and confined" the authority of the President so that
a power not granted could not be assumed.[30]
The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter

abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational action, and
unaccountable behavior.[31] As a fundamental matter, emphasis on joint
policymaking permits the airing of sundry political, social, and
economic values and concerns. Such a structure wisely ensures that
the ultimate policies will not merely reflect the private preferences
or the short-term political interests of the President.[32]
{11}
{12} Of course, this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period on a number of policy
grounds. Some have argued, for example, that fundamental political and technological changes in the
character of international relations and the position of the United States in the world have rendered
obsolete an eighteenth century document designed for a peripheral, small state in the European system of
diplomatic relations. Moreover, it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative voice are
necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent, and technologically linked world capable
of almost instantaneous massive destruction. Extollers of presidential dominance also have contended that
only the President has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the capacity to act with the
necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign policy.[33]
{13} These policy arguments have been reviewed, and discredited, elsewhere; space limitations here
the implications of U.S. power and

action in the twentieth century have brought about an even greater
need for institutional accountability and collective judgment
than existed two hundred years ago. The devastating,
incomprehensible destruction of nuclear war and the possible
extermination of the human race demonstrate the need for joint
participation in any decision to initiate war. Moreover, most of the
disputes at stake between the executive and legislative branches in
permit only a brief commentary.[34] Above all else,
foreign affairs have virtually nothing to do with the need for rapid
response to crisis. Rather, they are concerned only with routine
policy formulation and execution, a classic example of the
authority exercised under the separation of powers doctrine.[35]
{14} Nevertheless, these joint functions have been fused by the executive
branch and have become increasingly unilateral, secretive,
insulated from public debate, and hence unaccountable.[36] In the
wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-contra scandal, unilateral
executive behavior has become ever more difficult to defend.
Scholarly appraisals have destroyed arguments about intrinsic
executive expertise and wisdom in foreign affairs and the alleged
superiority of information available to the President.[37] Moreover, the
inattentiveness of presidents to important details and the effects of
"groupthink" that have dramatized and exacerbated the relative
inexperience of various presidents in international relations have also
devalued the extollers' arguments. Finally, foreign policies, like domestic policies,
are reflections of values. Against the strength of democratic
principles, recent occupants of the White House have failed to
demonstrate the superiority of their values in comparison to those of
the American people and their representatives in Congress.
{15} The assumption of foreign affairs powers by recent presidents
represents a fundamental alteration of the Constitution that is both
imprudent and dangerous. We turn now to an examination of the judiciary's contribution
to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
The counterplan solves this impact it checks executive

overreach.
German et al. 15 Michael German, Fellow in the Liberty and National Security Program at the
Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, former Policy Counsel for National
Security and Privacy for the American Civil Liberties Union Washington Legislative Office, former Adjunct
Professor for Law Enforcement and Terrorism at the National Defense University, former Special Agent with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation specializing in domestic terrorism and covert operations, served as a
Counterterrorism Instructor at the FBI National Academy, et al., co-authored and endorsed by Counsel,
Advisers, and Professional Staff Members of the Church Committee including Chief Counsel Frederick A.O.
Schwarz Jr., Loch Johnson, John T. Elliff, Burt Wides, Jim Dick, Frederick Baron, Joseph Dennin, Peter Fenn,
Anne Karalekas, Michael Madigan, Elliot Maxwell, Gordon Rhea, Eric Richard, Athan Theoharis, and
Christopher Pyle, 2015 (Strengthening Intelligence Oversight, Report by the Brennan Center for Justice at
the New York University School of Law, Available Online at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Church_Committee_Web_REVISED.pdf,
Accessed 07-09-2015, p. 4)
Moreover, as important as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and Presidents Review Group
it is the constitutional responsibility of Congress, as a coequal branch of government and the direct representatives of the
people, to restore the public trust in U.S. intelligence programs. The Senate
investigations are,
Intelligence Committees five-year inquiry into the CIAs abusive detention and interrogation practices
provides a striking example of the diligence Congress can apply in meticulously scrutinizing covert
government activities, and preparing a report suitable for public release. But it also exposes its limits. The
summarized report details how the CIA successfully frustrated oversight of its torture program for several
years by refusing, delaying, or inappropriately limiting congressional briefings, and providing incomplete,
inaccurate, and misleading information to its overseers. The resources necessary to conduct such an
investigation of one program within one agency reveal the depth of the challenge Congress faces in
fulfilling its intelligence oversight responsibilities.
Congress needs to demonstrate its ability to check executive branch

overreach across the multiple programs and agencies, re-establish
democratic controls over intelligence policies, and ensure public
accountability of intelligence practices. As part of a comprehensive
review of the intelligence enterprise, Congress must examine its own
performance in overseeing all 17 intelligence community member
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, intelligence components of the Departments of Defense (including the
National Security Agency), State, Treasury, Energy, and particularly the more recently established
The purpose of such a review should be to

evaluate whether current legal controls and congressional oversight
structures and practices are effective in allocating intelligence
resources properly and efficiently; to check agency abuses; and to
adequately inform all members of Congress and the American public
about the scope, necessity, and effectiveness of all authorized
intelligence activities, to the greatest extent possible.
Department of Homeland Security.3
To their credit, both the House and Senate have periodically reviewed various aspects of their oversight
operations to assess how to improve them. But their day-to-day duties of monitoring burgeoning, complex
intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert action is extremely time consuming for committee
members, even apart from their other congressional responsibilities. It would not be realistic for them to
also undertake the kind of comprehensive and integrated review of the myriad intelligence oversight
issues we raise below.
The Church Committees work is perhaps best remembered for exposing significant
wrongdoing by the intelligence agencies, often secretly authorized by presidents of both political parties,
lasting legacy was

providing Congress with the factual foundation and legal
framework for crafting appropriate organizational structures and
constitutional controls to ensure that intelligence operations remain
effective, lawful, and consistent with our national interests. Examining
whether the controls and structures created four decades ago remain
an effective bulwark against error and abuse is necessary and
appropriate. And the growing mistrust of U.S. intelligence activities at
home and abroad make it essential.
which undermined American freedoms and democratic values. But its
Terrorism Net-Benefit
The terrorism DA is a net-benefit. If particular intelligence
programs are necessary to prevent terrorism, the committee
will recommend they be continued. Only programs that arent
necessary for counter-terrorism will be on the chopping block
figuring out which is which is the committees job.
The counterplan best protects national security a
comprehensive review of intelligence operations is vital.
Accessed 07-09-2015, p. 3-4)
Lawful, properly controlled intelligence activities are critical to our

national security. But they require public support, which can only
be achieved through sound governance, independent oversight, and
public accountability. To this end, several former Church Committee
staff members signed a letter last year requesting that Congress establish
a new special investigative committee to conduct a thorough
public re-examination of intelligence community authorities and
practices, and their impact on privacy and civil liberties. While recent
investigations by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and
the Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies are extraordinarily helpful and will undoubtedly inform this new committees work, they
focused on just a few intelligence collection programs.2 Only a
comprehensive examination of how the multitude of intelligence [end
page 3] programs, agencies, and authorities work in combination can
measure the cumulative effect on privacy and civil liberties, ensure
compliance with the law, and identify waste and redundancy that
undermines performance.
We dont need to win a decisive link. If theres any chance that
the plan imperils important counter-terrorism programs, the
counterplan is a better option: it results in effective reform
and oversight without jeopardizing national security.
Jaycox and Tien 14 Mark Jaycox, Legislative Analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
former Contributor to ArsTechnica, former Legislative Research Assistant for LexisNexis, holds a B.A. in
Political History from Reed College, and Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney and Adams Chair for Internet Rights
at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, holds a J.D. from the University of California-Berkeley School of Law,
2014 (Three Hearings, Nine Hours, and One Accurate Statement: Why Congress Must Begin a Full
Investigation into NSA Spying, Electronic Frontier Foundation, January 7 th, Available Online at
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/three-hearings-nine-hours-and-one-accurate-statement-whycongress-must-begin-full, Accessed 07-09-2015)
Regaining Congressional Oversight
Something is very wrong when Congress and the public learn more
about the NSA's activities from newspaper leaks than from the Senate and
House intelligence committees. The committees are supposed to oversee
the intelligence community activities on behalf of the public, but more
oftenas the New Yorker describes it"treat[] senior intelligence officials like
matine idols.
It's time for Congress to reassert its oversight role and begin a
full-scale investigation into the NSAs surveillance and analytic
activities. The current investigationswhich aren't led by Congress
are unable to fully investigate the revelations, Congressional
committees' hearings have added little, and Congress cannot rely
solely on mandating more reports from the NSA as a solution.
Hearings Inside Congress
So far, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Patrick Leahy is valiantly attempting to shine more light on the
NSA's activities, but the hearings have only served as venues for administration officials to parrot talking
points and provide non-answers to important questions. This is very similar to what happened after the
New York Times released the first reports of warrantless wiretapping in December 2005.
The hearings ineffectiveness are shown by the fact that it took three hearingsnine hoursfor Senator
Leahy to clarify just how many terrorist attacks the collection of all Americans' calling records stopped. In
the first hearing (July), government witnesses said the program stopped "54 terrorist attacks." By the third
hearing (October)and after much pressure by Senator LeahyGeneral Alexander corrected his
statement: it turns out the program had only stopped "one, perhaps two" terror plots, one of which
involved "material support." Aside from this, there are still two sets of questions from the hearings by
Senator Richard Blumenthal and Senator Ron Wyden that the intelligence community has still left
unanswered.
It shouldnt take three hearings over several months for a member of Congress to obtain accurate and
understandable information from the Director of the NSA.
A Congressional Investigation is Needed
Congress must initiate a full-scale, targeted, investigation outside

of its regular committees. Such an investigation would normally fall under Congress'
intelligence or other oversight committees. But any investigation into the NSA's
activities must include a review of the current Congressional oversight
regime. Since the creation of the intelligence committees in 1978, there
has been no external audit or examination of how the system has
performed.
A review is needed when the Senate intelligence committee's own chair, Senator Dianne
Feinstein, admits how extraordinary difficult it is to obtain information
from the intelligence community. Members of Congress have
complained that briefings are like "playing a game of 20 questions" and
other members have even noted how the House intelligence committee may have neglected to pass
information to members before a key vote.
Current members of Congress aren't the only ones complaining: former Vice President Walter Mondale and
Senator Gary Harttwo former members of Congress who were instrumental in creating the Senate
intelligence committeehave also said that the intelligence committees are not operating as they were
originally intended.
Increasing Reports is a Start
So far, Congress favors increasing reporting requirements or asking for an investigation by an Inspector
General (IG). Transparency billslike bills brought by both Senator Al Franken and Representative Zoe
Lofgrenare a fantastic start. But such reports won't uncover the secret law the NSA is using or the secret
collection of ordinary peoples information. It also won't tell us about the use of Executive Order 12333.
The bills will only provide a numerical range regarding the orders the government sends, companies
receive, and the number of users or accounts the orders impact.
Whats worse, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Communitywho reports directly to the very
officials who authorized the spyingtold Senators he is unable to carry out a review of the programs due
to a lack of resources. And even if such an investigation were to occur, the IG is unable to even request
documents without the approval of the Director of National Intelligence.
Time for a New Investigation
NSA leaks are ushering in a new day regarding Congressional

oversight of the intelligence community. And it's why Congress must
dedicate the resources to a full-scale investigation by a special
committee. Such a committee will allow Congress to delve into what
other data the NSA may be collecting en masse about Americans, to
learn about how the surveillance laws it passed are being used, and to
inform the American publicall while protecting national security.
It's a tough balancing act, but Congress was able to do it in the
1970s with the Church and Pike Committees. And it should have the
courage to do it again today.
The
Politics Net-Benefit
The counterplan avoids politics it is insulated from
partisanship.
Accessed 07-09-2015, p. 14)
The success of the Church Committee holds many lessons for those that
would attempt a similar undertaking today. It conducted a thorough public
examination of secret intelligence operations that revealed
unnecessary, flawed, and abusive activities. At the same time, it won
public support for reform while still protecting properly
classified information and retaining the trust of the intelligence
community.
Certainly, many of the Committees achievements can be attributed to the leadership of Sens. Frank
Defining the
scope of the investigation to include intelligence activities undertaken
under the authority of presidents of both parties helped to alleviate
any claims the Committees criticisms were partisan.
Since the intelligence activities now under public scrutiny have
spanned the terms of two presidents of different parties,
conducting a rigorous examination unaffected by party politics
should be similarly achievable.
Church and John Tower, who ran the investigation in a strictly bipartisan manner.
The counterplan removes Obama from the equation the

Committee will push the plan, not the President.
There is bipartisan support for a new Church Committee. It
avoids partisan fights.
Accessed 07-09-2015, p. 20-21)
A comprehensive evaluation of U.S. intelligence activities and the

effectiveness of congressional oversight is necessary to ensure
compliance with law and American values. This is not a partisan
matter. Members of both parties have expressed deep concerns
about recent revelations and joined to propose legislative
controls. Nor is it a matter of inevitable legislative-executive conflict.
Over the long term, the executive branch has a great interest in having
Congress, and, to the extent possible, the public, understand what intelligence
is all about and how it may affect Americans private lives as well as
our national security.
The Church Committee was formed by a newly elected Congress at a
moment when the public demanded answers. Four decades later, 2015
offers a similar opportunity for Congress to engage seriously with
the intelligence challenges of the 21st century.
This is empirically proven by the Church Committee.
German 14 Michael German, Fellow in the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, former Policy Counsel for National Security and
Privacy for the American Civil Liberties Union Washington Legislative Office, former Adjunct Professor for
Law Enforcement and Terrorism at the National Defense University, former Special Agent with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation specializing in domestic terrorism and covert operations, served as a
Counterterrorism Instructor at the FBI National Academy, 2014 (The US Needs a New Church Committee,
Defense One, December 11th, Available Online at http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/12/us-needsnew-church-committee/101046/, Accessed 07-08-2015)
The Church Committee protected legitimate secrets while exposing the

abusive intelligence activities that had taken place under the orders of
sequential presidential administrations. The committees caution
engendered cooperation with the agencies amid an already bipartisan consensus for reform.
In the years that followed, Congress established permanent select
intelligence committees to oversee intelligence activities and passed the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which placed domestic electronic
surveillance for national security purposes under judicial supervision
for the first time. A legislative charter limiting the investigative powers of the FBI failed, however,
after Attorney General Edward Levi issued Justice Department guidelines serving that same purpose.
While these reforms certainly didnt prevent every future intelligence

abuse and overreach, there can be no doubt that they made the
intelligence agencies more deliberative and accountable. The Church
Committee report warned that a new national security crisis would test its recommended reforms, and the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have done just that. The 2013 leaks by National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the intelligence committees and the FISA Court had been
complicit in expanding the intelligence agencies power to collect excessive amounts of information about
Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing, shocking even members of Congress who voted on these
authorities. New questions are now being asked not only about the conduct of the intelligence agencies,
but the competence of the post-Church Committee oversight structures to identify and curb abuses.
2NC/1NR Solvency
They Say: No Solvency CP Doesnt Pass

Plan
1. Yes, Results In Plan: if the plan is a good idea, the
committee will recommend it as part of its report. This will
result in a short delay, but the net-benefits outweigh.
2. Plan Doesnt Solve: investigation is needed before
legislation to avoid circumvention. Otherwise, policy language
will be lawyered thats Bump.
3. Counterplan Deters NSA: anticipated reaction prevents
future abuse even if the counterplan doesnt pass the plan.
Dr. John Elliff, the Church Committees domestic intelligence task force
leader, argued that while oversight doesnt prevent errant intelligence
activities it exposes them after the fact the resulting criticism
creates a lasting bureaucratic chilling effect that inhibits abuse.
In short, this phenomena, called anticipated reaction means that an
agency that gets in trouble will seek to avoid that trouble in the
future.
Elliff, who went on to serve on the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees as well as in intelligence
positions within the FBI, CIA and Defense Department, describes the current oversight
system as inadequate.
4. Process Trumps Policy: investigation is more important than
the policy outcome.
because so little is publicly known about how oversight by

intelligence committees and the FISA Court work in practice, it is
difficult to know whether fixing problems that lead to weaker
congressional oversight would really improve the results we
receive from our intelligence agencies. Asking the questions, then,
becomes just as important as finding solutions. It is more
However,
important than ever to start evaluating what is needed to create

meaningful and lasting intelligence oversight.
The U.S. has reinitiated military engagement in Iraq, and started a new one in Syria. The president and
intelligence officials have acknowledged this military intervention was necessary because the intelligence
Rigorous
oversight is essential to ensuring our intelligence agencies operate
at peak efficiency and effectiveness.
Last year, Schwarz and Elliff joined 13 other former Church Committee
staff members in calling for a new comprehensive examination of the
intelligence agencies. This examination must certainly include an
evaluation of how we can existing strengthen oversight structures or
whether new mechanisms need to be created.
agencies were slow to recognize the growing threat the Islamic State posed to the U.S.
They Say: No Solvency CP Doesnt Pass

Legislation
1. Committee Mandate: the counterplan results in specific
recommendations for legislative and regulatory changes this
is part of its mandate.
Cohn and Jaycox 13 Cindy Cohn, Executive Director and former Legal Director and General
Mark Jaycox, Legislative Analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, former Contributor to ArsTechnica,
former Legislative Research Assistant for LexisNexis, holds a B.A. in Political History from Reed College,
2013 (NSA Spying: The Three Pillars of Government Trust Have Fallen, Electronic Frontier Foundation,
August 15th, Available Online at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/nsa-spying-three-pillarsgovernment-trust-have-fallen, Accessed 07-09-2015)
With each new revelation the

government comes out with a new story for why things are really just
fine, only to have that assertion demolished by the next revelation. It's
time for those in government who want to rebuild the trust of the
American people and others all over the world to come clean and take
some actual steps to rein in the NSA. And if they don't, the American people and the
The pattern is now clear and it's getting old.
public, adversarial courts, must force change upon it.
the first step ought to be a truly independent

investigatory body that is assigned to look into the unconstitutional
spying. It must be empowered to search, read and compel documents
and testimony, must be required to give a public report that only
redacts sensitive operational details, and must suggest specific
legislation and regulatory changes to fix the problem
something like the Church Committee or maybe even the 9/11 Commission. The
We still think
President made a mockery of this idea recently, by initially handing control of the "independent"
investigation he announced in his press conference to the man who most famously lied to Congress and
the American people about the spying, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.
It's time to get a full reckoning and

build a new house from the wreckage, but it has to start with some
honesty.
The three pillars of American trust have fallen.
2. Church Committee Proves: it recommended a series of

reforms that Congress then implemented.
3. Trust Wyden: he will push through meaningful reforms. His
record of challenging the intelligence agencies is unmatched.
Peterson 13 Andrea Peterson, Technology Policy Reporter for the Washington Post covering
cybersecurity, consumer privacy, transparency, surveillance, and open government, 2013 (Wyden is
trying to tell us something about the opinion justifying the phone records program, The Switcha
Washington Post blog, October 14th, Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/10/14/wyden-is-trying-to-tell-us-something-about-the-opinion-justifying-the-phone-recordsprogram/, Accessed 07-09-2015)
As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Wyden has access

to more details about intelligence community activities than almost
anyone not part of them carrying them out. And for years he has asked very
pointed questions in public hearings, argued for declassification of
significant FISA Court opinions, and introduced legislation aimed at

curbing spying programs. You might remember that time just months before the NSA
documents came out that one of Wyden's questions caught Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper in what sounded an awful lot like a lie about if the U.S.
collected any sort of data on U.S. persons. If not, we've helpfully included the video below.
[Video of James Clapper lying omitted]
Amash (R-Mich.) recently called him a sort of "congressional

whistleblower." But because of the classified nature of many of the
things he is objecting to, often Wyden has been forced to keep his
warnings vague. For instance, he warned that "when the American people find out how their
Rep. Justin
government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry, on the
Senate floor in May 2011.
But there are other times his efforts have been more explicit for instance, his
repeated suggestions that Americans should be worried about the privacy of their geolocation data. Not
only did he bring it up during speeches and hearings, he's introduced legislation addressing the topic for
the past several years.
Wyden has been so dogged about geolocation that the NSA did finally give him some sort of on-the-record
response, admitting that they ran a test program a few years ago. But he has implied that that's not a full
answer, saying their response still leaves "most of the real story secret."
Considering Wyden's history of nudging the conversation toward meaningful disclosure, I'd be willing to bet
there's more for us to learn about geolocation programs. Just like I'm willing to bet there's something
interesting in the original FISA Court justification for the bulk collection of domestic phone records.
if the ongoing surveillance debate is a coal mine, Wyden is the

canary for privacy issues.
Because
4. Yes, Votes: Democrats will line up behind Wyden hell get

the votes.
Clift 14 Eleanor Clift, Political Correspondent for The Daily Beast, 2014 (Ron Wyden and Rand Paul,
the Senate's NSA-Busting Ben Franklin Caucus, The Daily Beast, June 14th, Available Online at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/ron-wyden-and-rand-paul-the-senate-s-nsa-busting-benfranklin-caucus.html, Accessed 07-09-2015)
Wydens assertiveness on the NSA

hasnt always been welcomed by fellow Democrats, notably Intelligence
Committee Chair Dianne Feinstein. The Snowden disclosures have moved
more colleagues into his camp.
If Democrats could choose between Wyden and Feinstein by a secret
ballot, he would win a substantial number of votes, maybe even
a majority, says William Galston with the Brookings Institution. Thats not true
Just as Pauls apostasy on some issues irks Republicans,
of Paul, who represents more of a dissident voice within Republican ranks. That could change after
November if the GOP gains control of the senate.
5. Meaningful Reform: the counterplan is the only way to push

through serious legislation.
Fenn 15 Peter Fenn, Democratic Political Strategist and Head of Fenn Communicationsa leading
political and public affairs media firm, Adjunct Professor in the Graduate School of Political Management at
George Washington University, holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern
California, 2015 ('No Place to Hide', U.S. News & World Report, June 3rd, Available Online at
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-fenn/2015/06/03/nsa-fbi-spying-excesses-underscore-need-fora-new-church-committee, Accessed 07-08-2015)
The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law are both calling for increased oversight, reform of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act legislation and serious examination of the impact of
the new technology on Americans' basic privacy. Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act allows for mass surveillance of online
communications, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation believes it should be
curtailed.
The House and the Senate passed the new USA Freedom Act and the president signed it, but
that is only a first step. If we are truly going to get a handle on everything
from drones to detention camps to torture, as well as NSA surveillance, we need a full
investigation of our intelligence agencies similar to the Church
Committee and serious legal and executive remedies.
They Say: No Solvency CP Doesnt Solve

Privacy
1. Yes, Privacy: the counterplan results in sustainable reform
that protects individual rights.
Ellsberg 13 Daniel Ellsberg, Whistleblower who leaked the Pentagon Papers in 1971, Co-Founder
of the Freedom of the Press Foundation, served as a Strategic Analyst for the RAND Corporation, holds a
Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, 2013 (Tell Congress: Investigate Nsa Abuses And Protect Our
Constitutional Rights, Petition to Congress, Available Online at
https://www.credomobilize.com/petitions/tell-congress-investigate-nsa-abuses-and-protect-ourconstitutional-rights, Accessed 07-09-2015)
We need a new Church Committee that is fully empowered to

investigate the abuses of the NSA and make public its findings, and that
is charged with recommending new laws to ensure the U.S.
government does not violate our constitutional rights.
Why is this important?
Church, who led a committee charged with investigating

and making public the abuses of American intelligence agencies, spoke of
In 1975, Senator Frank
the National Security Agency in these terms:

"I
know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and
we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this
technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so
that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there
is no return."
The dangerous prospect of which he warned was that America's
intelligence-gathering capability which is today beyond any comparison with what
existed in his pre-digital era "at any time could be turned around on the
American people and no American would have any privacy left ."
That has now happened. And so we need a new congressional
committee like the one Senator Church led to investigate the revelations
by Edward Snowden. The existing Intelligence Committees in House and Senate,
gagged by secrecy and co-opted by the intelligence community they
supposedly oversee, have failed to check dangerously excessive
surveillance of Americans communications.
Pressure by an informed public on Congress to form a select committee
to investigate these revelations might lead us to bring the NSA and the
rest of the intelligence community under real supervision and restraint
and restore the protections of the Bill of Rights.
2. Wyden Proves: hes the biggest privacy defender in
Congress. Hell steer the recommendations to protect civil
liberties.
3. Best Balancing Act: the counterplan results in effective costbenefit analysis that balances privacy and security. It solve the
case but avoids the DA.
Accessed 07-09-2015, p. 20-21)
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Boards report on the governments intelligence activities under the FISA
Amendments Act included a recommendation that the government should develop a comprehensive
It would
be improper for any government agency to operate major programs
without evaluating their effectiveness, much less agencies with such important security
missions. Congress must fill the void and, in consultation with the
agencies, develop metrics to measure the performance of all
intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security programs. In
conducting such an evaluation it is important to recognize, as the Presidents
Review Group suggested, that all risks must be considered and addressed.
methodology for assessing the efficacy and relative value of counterterrorism programs.60
a. Impact on individual rights

As the Church Committee reported, most intelligence activities take place in secret, and the victim of
The scope of
todays mass surveillance programs threaten everyones privacy rights
by their mere existence, and potentially chill free speech and association, particularly over the
abusive government activity may never know the source of his misfortune.61
Internet. The Presidents Review Group highlighted these concerns, identifying privacy as a central aspect
Legislators with responsibility over

intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security programs owe a
special obligation to ensure these activities do not infringe on
individual rights.
of liberty that must be protected.62
b. Impact on other interests
Other important interests to protect include our relations with foreign

nations. Treating allies with respect is essential, of course, but the rule of law should be our guide even
when dealing with adversaries. American values should not just be something we talk about. Our actions in
the international arena will set an example for other nations, so we must ensure that our actions match our
words.
financial costs
of the programs must be weighed against their effectiveness. Waste,
fraud, and abuse in these programs does real harm to our security,
not just the bottom line. And spending government resources on security
measures means other priorities cannot be addressed. There are also other
Congress is also responsible to ensure the taxpayers money is spent wisely, so the
ancillary economic consequences of intelligence activities, which U.S. tech companies are currently
experiencing as a result of the global response to NSA surveillance activities.63
Government officials working in the national security field have a

natural tendency to overestimate near-term threats and favor quick
and decisive action to address them. As policymakers responsible for a
broad range of national interests, Congress must be more
deliberative and compel these agencies to consider the long-term

impacts of their activities. [end page 20]
C. Cost-benefit analysis
these costs must be measured against the benefits, which are

often much harder to evaluate. If an agency overestimates a potential threat, then employs
Finally,
expensive and intrusive means to deter it, does the fact that the threat did not materialize mean the
methods were effective? After more than a dozen years of war, pervasive surveillance, infringements on
liberty, as well as trillions of dollars spent and thousands of soldiers lost, can we tell if Americans are any
Congress must develop its own ability to

independently evaluate the threats we face and the proper means
to address them to ensure all the interests of the American people are
being served, including the right to be free from unwarranted
government interference.
safer or more prosperous?
They Say: No Solvency CP Doesnt Solve X

* This is a blueprint for how to answer solvency deficit arguments about advantages other than
privacy/civil liberties. It requires editing to apply it to particular advantages.
1. Yes, [Advantage]: the committee will take into account the

importance of [the advantage] and propose recommendations
based on it in their report.
2. Best Cost-Benefit Analysis: the counterplan results in more
effective cost-benefit analysis that balances short- and longterm interests.
Accessed 07-09-2015, p. 8)
Congresss oversight responsibility includes assisting the

intelligence agencies in conducting this type of pre-operational costbenefit analysis. Members of Congress often have a much greater
awareness of and appreciation for the breadth of U.S. interests
involved in international relations, and the patience for taking a longterm approach that many working in the national security and
intelligence professions do not. Not surprisingly, given the nature of their
jobs, national security officials have a tendency to view potential
threats as imminent and favor action over deliberation, which is what
leads to a focus on resolving short-term problems without
appropriately considering the long-term impact.
Part of
They Say: No Solvency Delays

1. Plan Gets Delayed, Too: even if it isnt outright
circumvented, agencies will push back and delay reforms.
Section 215 proves despite the Freedom Act, NSA got a sixmonth extension from the FISC.
2. No Significant Delay: it wont take long to produce a report
the Church Committee proves.
Hartmann 14 The Thom Hartmann Programa progressive radio program, 2014 (Is It Time for
a New Church Committee?, Truthout, February 25th, Available Online at http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/22103-is-it-time-for-a-new-church-committee, Accessed 07-09-2015)
Once the Watergate scandal broke open and news of illegal intelligence
gathering by government agencies began to spread, Senator Frank Church, a
Democrat from Idaho, formed the Church Committee, which was tasked with
investigating illegal intelligence gathering activities by the FBI, NSA, and CIA.
Between 1975 and 1976, the Church Committee published fourteen
reports on intelligence gathering abuses by U.S. intelligence agencies.
In August of 1975, the Church Committee released its findings.
They Say: No Solvency Church Committee

Failed
The Church Committee didnt fail FISA worked until it was
gutted in 2008.
Cohn and Timm 13 Cindy Cohn, Executive Director and former Legal Director and General
Trevor Timm, Activist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, holds a J.D. from New York Law School, 2013
(In Response to the NSA, We Need A New Church Committee and We Need It Now, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, June 7th, Available Online at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/response-nsa-we-need-newchurch-commission-and-we-need-it-now, Accessed 07-09-2015)
Following on the heels of the Guardian reporting that the NSA is collecting all US call data records of
Verizon customers, the Guardian and Washington Post yesterday reported that nine of the biggest Internet
companies, including Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, are also working with the government in a
vast spying program, where a massive amount of online data flows to the NSA, all in secret.
The revelations not only confirmed what EFF has long alleged, they went even further and honestly, were
still reeling. EFF will, of course, be continuing its efforts to get this egregious situation addressed by the
courts.
Congress now has a responsibility to the American

people to conduct a full, public investigation into the domestic
surveillance of Americans by the intelligence communities, whether
done directly or in concert with the FBI. And it then has a duty to
make changes in the law to stop the spying and ensure that it does not
happen again.
In short, we need a new Church Committee.
In the mid-70s, in response to revelation that the government was engaging in systematic domestic
But one thing is clear.
surveillance on domestic targetsincluding anti-war activists, academics, and government critics like
Martin Luther King Jr., John Lennon and Daniel Ellsbergthe distinguished Senator from Idaho, Frank
Church, convened a Senate investigative committee that ultimately put

a stop to large scale domestic spying for decades.
The Church Committee report, which can be read in full here, led to the passage
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), setting up the secret FISA court that
put strict procedures in place for conducting surveillance for
intelligence activities. Most importantly, following a Supreme Court ruling in 1973, FISA
required an individualized, probable cause warrant for national security
spying, just as the Fourth Amendment requires.
While there is much to criticize in the original FISA, it did rein in the
government, and its system of checks and balances remained largely
in place until shortly after September 11, 2001, when President George W. Bush first
authorized a broad warrantless wiretapping program. The government
decided to illegally bypass the FISA court and started warrantlessly wiretapping the
communications, as well as collecting and data-mining the communications records of innocent Americans.
When a portion of the NSA warrantless surveillance was revealed by the New
York Times in 2005, there was widespread outrage among the American people.
Unfortunately, Congress reacted in the opposite way as the Church
Committee once did. Instead of fixing the problems, they institutionalized
most of them and swept the rest under the rug.
In 2008, Congress gutted the original balance of FISA with the FISA
Amendments Act, which allowed the government to get court orders
with less than probable cause that would target groups of peopleinstead
of individuals, like the Constitution requires. The law also allowed the NSA to collect information on
innocent Americans when they are talking to people outside the US who are targeted by the government.
But it gets worse.
EFF and others had long alleged that, despite the rhetoric surrounding the
the government was still vacuuming up the

records of the purely domestic communications of millions of Americans . And
Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act,
yesterday, of course, with the Verizon order, we got solid proof.. And it appears that the reach of this
vacuum goes much further, into the records of our Internet service providers as well.
Now its not as if these efforts havent been challenged. EFF has been seeking judicial review of the
dragnet surveillance, both wiretapping and records collection, since 2006, facing one procedural maneuver
after another by the government. The ACLU brought a strong constitutional challenge to the FISA
Amendments Act that was dismissed by the Supreme Court only two months ago for lack of standing.
The court ruled in a contentious 5-4 decision that because the ACLU couldnt prove for a certainty that
their clients were being surveilled, they couldnt challenge the law.
Well, it turns out, the new revelations prove everything the ACLU was arguing, in addition to confirming all
of the allegations in EFFs warrantless wiretapping case, Jewel v. NSA.
Of course, the evidence has been there all along. Even after the FISA Amendments Act passed, the New
York Times reported in 2009 the NSA was still collecting purely domestic communications in a significant
and systematic way after the original bill passed in 2008. And just last year, the government admitted,
the secret FISA court has ruled on at least one occasion that the governments surveillance under the law
had violated the Fourth Amendment.
That secret FISA court ruling is still classified, as are the OLC memos that supposedly give the
governments best case that all this purely domestic surveillance is legal. But one has to wonder, if the
FISA court routinely authorizes the collection of all US call data, what kind of surveillance was the NSA
conducting that they couldnt approve?
Shamefully, Congress has had a chance to add provisions to both the Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act
in the last two years. In 2011, the Obama administration opposed all transparency and accountability
amendments to the Patriot Act when key provisions were renewed for another five years. Just six months
ago in December 2012, the administration again opposed all oversight amendments, even those more
moderate than the ones he voted for as Senator in 2008.
So heres your wake up call Congress, and an opportunity to be a hero.

We need a Church Committee for a new era. It could be headed by Ron
Wyden and Mark Udall, the two Senators who have been trying to warn the American people about the
government dangerous interpretation of the Patriot Act for years. Udall said today, he did everything short
of leaking classified information to stop it.
But someone in Congress needs to step up and fill Frank Churchs shoes.
They are big ones, but EFF stands willing to help. And so, we suspect, will millions of innocent Americans
whose privacy has been violated and who are ready to have their constitutional rights back.
They Say: SQ Solves General

1. They cant make this argument. If oversight is effective,
there shouldnt be an inherent advantage.
2. Status Quo Oversight Fails: investigations are worthless.
Jaycox 13 Mark Jaycox, Legislative Analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, former
Contributor to ArsTechnica, former Legislative Research Assistant for LexisNexis, holds a B.A. in Political
History from Reed College, 2013 (Three Illusory Investigations of the NSA Spying Are Unable to
Succeed, Electronic Frontier Foundation, August 23rd, Available Online at
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/three-illusory-investigations-nsa-spying-are-unable-succeed,
Since the revelations of confirmed National Security Agency spying in June, three
different "investigations" have been announced. One by the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), another by the Director of National
Intelligence, Gen. James Clapper, and the third by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, formally called the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).
All three investigations are insufficient, because they are unable
to find out the full details needed to stop the government's abuse of
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The PCLOB can only requestnot requiredocuments from the NSA and
must rely on its goodwill, while the investigation led by Gen. Clapper is
led by a man who not only lied to Congress, but also oversees the
spying. And the Senate Intelligence Committeewhich was originally designed to
effectively oversee the intelligence communityhas failed time and time again. What's
needed is a new, independent, Congressional committee to fully
delve into the spying.
3. Counterplan Key: only the counterplan provides effective
oversight.
A New Church Committee
What's needed is a new, special,

investigatory committee to look into the abuses of by the NSA, its use
of spying powers, its legal justifications, and why the intelligence
committees were unable to rein in the spying. In short, we need a
contemporary Church Committee. It's time for Congress to reassert
its oversight capacity. The American public must be provided more
information about the NSA's unconstitutional actions and the NSA must be
held accountable. Tell your Congressperson now to join the effort.
All three of these investigations are destined to fail.
They Say: SQ Solves PCLOB

The PCLOB cant compel disclosure its toothless.
The PCLOB: Powerless to Obtain Documents
The PCLOB was created after a recommendation from the 9/11

Commission to ensure civil liberties and privacy were included in the government's surveillance and
spying policies and practices.
But it languished. From 2008 until May of this year, the board was without a Chair and unable to
hire staff or perform any work. It was only after the June revelations that the President asked the board to
even with the full board

constituted, it is unable to fulfill its mission as it has no choice but to
base its analysis on a steady diet of carefully crafted statements from
the intelligence community.
As we explained, the board must rely on the goodwill of the NSA's director, Gen. Keith
Alexander, and Gen. Clappertwo men who have repeatedly said the NSA
doesn't collect information on Americans.
In order to conduct a full investigation, the PCLOB will need access to
all relevant NSA, FBI, and DOJ files. But the PCLOB is unable to compel
testimony or documents because Congress did not give it the same
powers as a Congressional committee or independent agency. This is a
major problem. If the NSA won't hand over documents to Congress, then
it will certainly not give them to the PCLOB.
begin an investigation into the unconstitutional NSA spying. Yet
They Say: SQ Solves Clapper Task Force

The Clapper investigation is obviously a joke.
The Clapper Investigation: Overseen by a Man Accused of Lying to Congress
The second investigation was announced by President Obama in a Friday afternoon news conference.
The President called for the creation of an "independent" task force

with "outside experts" to make sure "there absolutely is no abuse in terms
of how these surveillance technologies are used." Less than two days later, the White House
followed up with a press release announcing the task force would be
led by Gen. Clapper and would also report to him. What's even worse:
the task force was not tasked with looking at any abuse. It was told to
focus on how to "protect our national security and advance our foreign
policy." And just this week, ABC News reported the task force will be full of
Washington insidersnot "outside experts." For instance, one has advocated the
Department of Homeland Security be allowed to scan all Internet traffic going in and out of the US. And
another, while a noted legal scholar on regulatory issues, has written a paper about government
campaigns to infiltrate online groups and activists. In one good act, the White House selected Peter Swire
to be on the task force. Swire is a professor at Georgia Tech and has served as the White House's first ever
Chief Privacy Officer. Recently, he signed an amicus brief in a case against the NSA spying by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center arguing that the NSA's telephony metadata program is illegal under
at the end of the day, a task force led

by General Clapper full of insidersand not directed to look at the
extensive abusewill never get at the bottom of the unconstitutional
spying.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Despite this, and
They Say: SQ Solves Intelligence

Committees
Oversight by the Senate Intelligence Committee has failed
the counterplan is needed.
The Senate Intelligence Committee Has Already Failed
The last "investigation" occurring is a "review" led by the Senate

Intelligence Committee overseeing the intelligence community. But time and time
again the committee has failed at providing any semblance of
oversight. First, the chair and ranking member of the committee, Senators
Dianne Feinstein (CA) and Saxby Chambliss (GA), respectively, are stalwart
defenders of the NSA and its spying activities. They have both justified the
spying, brushed aside any complaints, and denied any ideas of abuse
by the NSA.
Besides defending the intelligence community, the committee leadership have utterly
failed in oversightthe reason why the Senate Intelligence Committee was originally created by
the Church Committee. As was revealed last week, Senator Feinstein was not shown or
even told about the thousands of violations of the spying programs in
NSA audits of the programs. This is in direct contradiction to her
statements touting the "robust" oversight of the Intelligence
Committee. Lastly, the committee is prone to secrets and hiding behind
closed doors: this year, the Senate Intelligence Committee has met publicly only twice. What's clear
is that the Intelligence Committee has been unable to carry out its
oversight role and fresh eyes are needed to protect the American
people from the abuses of the NSA.
2NC/1NR Theory/Competition
They Say: Permute Do CP

1. This severs the whole plan. The counterplan establishes a
committee and tasks it with producing a report; it doesnt
implement the plan. The counterplan might eventually result
in the plan, but thats an effectnot a mandate.
2. Reject severance permutations they evade clash and
undermine comparative policy analysis. Requiring a stable
advocacy protects neg ground and creates more productive
debates.
They Say: Permute Do Both

( ) Links to Politics: the immediate fight over the plan drains
Obamas political capital. The Committee Report cant shield
the link before it exists.
( ) Links to Terrorism: immediate passage of the plan before
the Wyden Committees review jeopardizes national security.
Only comprehensive review of intelligence programs enables
holistic, informed legislative action. Even if theyre right that
the plan isnt key to counter-terrorism, dont take the risk:
waiting for the Committees report is a small price to pay for
national security.
( ) Doesnt Restore Trust: the counterplan alone is key to
rebuild public trust because it reassures the public that
Congress has the intelligence agencies under control. The
permutation creates the perception of confusion and chaos:
passing the plan before the Wyden Committee has a chance to
investigate doesnt make sense.
( ) Sequencing DA: investigation before legislation is crucial to
effective implementation of surveillance reforms. The plan and
permutation will be circumvented; the counterplan alone is the
only way to write policy language that sticks thats Bump. A
consensus of experts agrees.
Marczak 13 Trisha Marczak, Reporter for Mint Press News, 2013 (New Petition Website Calls For
Congressional Investigation Of NSA Surveillance Program, Mint Press News, June 11th, Available Online at
http://www.mintpressnews.com/petition-website-launches-calling-for-congressional-investigation-of-nsasurveillance-program/, Accessed 07-09-2015)
A coalition of 85 technology companies, organizations and

privacy advocates including the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation is launching a website Tuesday calling for a special
congressional committee to investigate the National Security Agencys secret
surveillance program.
Sina Khanifar, participating advocate and founder of FixtheDMCA.org, told Mint Press News in a statement
the Stop Watching Us movement is intended to push the

government to create an investigative Congressional body similar
to the Church Committee, which was formed to investigate the Watergate scandal in the
that
1970s.
As
it stands, we simply dont know the scope of the NSAs

surveillance programs, he said. Greater transparency is critical.
( ) No Net-Benefit: singular reforms like the plan dont solve

without a comprehensive overhaul.
Rumold 13 Mark Rumold, Staff Attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, quoted in an article
by Rainey Reitman, 2013 (86 Civil Liberties Groups and Internet Companies Demand an End to NSA
Spying, Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 10th, Available Online at
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/86-civil-liberties-groups-and-internet-companies-demand-end-nsaspying, Accessed 07-09-2015)
As Mark Rumold, a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation who focuses on government
transparency and national security, says, "Now
is the time for Congress to act. We

dont need a narrow fix to one part of the PATRIOT Act; we need
a full public accounting of how the United States is turning
sophisticated spying technology on its own citizens, we need
accountability from public officials, and we need an overhaul of the
laws to ensure these abuses can never happen again."
( ) Credibility DA: the permutation makes the Committee look
like a puppet by spoiling its report with preemptive legislation.
Westby 12 Jody Westby, Chief Executive Officer of Global Cyber Riska consulting firm
specializing in privacy, security, cybercrime, and IT governance, Adjunct Professor in the School of
Computer Science at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Distinguished Fellow for Carnegie Mellon
Universitys CyLab, Chair of the American Bar Associations Privacy & Computer Crime Committee, former
Co-Chair of the World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information Security, holds a
J.D. from Georgetown University Law School, 2012 (The Sheep Stop Here: Another Church Committee or
Full Review of Privacy Laws Needed?, Forbes, September 20th, Available Online at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/09/20/the-sheep-stop-here-another-church-committee-or-fullreview-of-privacy-laws-needed/2/, Accessed 07-09-2015)
A full Congressional review of privacy laws and intelligence community

practices is needed so informed decisions can be made going
forward and any violations of rights or laws can be addressed. Steven
Aftergood, head of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy notes that, Mr.
it is up to
Congress to assert itself and represent the public interest in getting to
the bottom of these tough questions. This is what we have oversight for. Of course,
the process by which such a review is conducted whether by
Congressional Committee or another less formal means of review is
critical. Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney for EFF, noted that, Such a review could not be
a whitewash; it cannot be conducted by puppets or so redacted
that it is meaningless.
Those who protest against such a review have a hard climb. If all is
proceeding according to law, then there is nothing to hide and prior
justifications will be vindicated. And we will not need to count sheep to get to sleep.
Binney and his colleagues raise compelling questions that deserve an answer;
They Say: CP Theoretically Illegitimate

( ) Not Plan-Inclusive: even if could result in the plan, the
counterplan doesnt steal the aff. Our evidence proves that
implementing the plan as a standalone policy and
recommending the plan as part of a Committee Report are
distinct policy options. The counterplan never fiats the plan.
( ) Core Neg Ground: its a core reform proposal with several
qualified solvency advocates. Even if some commission
counterplans are illegitimate, this one boosts topic knowledge,
tests the desirability of the plan, and is crucial to neg ground.
Affirmative
No Solvency Wont Enact Reform

The counterplan wont result in legislative action empirically
proven.
Lupo 14 Lindsey Lupo, Professor of Political Science at Point Loma Nazarene University, holds a
Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-Irvine, 2014 (What Happened to the 9/11
Commission? What a Century of Riot Commissions Teaches us about Americas Dependence on
Independent Commissions, Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs, Volume 3, Issue 1, Available Online at
http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=rbjpa, Accessed 07-10-2015, p.
22)
independent commissions? Herein lies the puzzle - they

are at once incredibly ineffective and effective. As problem-solving
entities that affect real change in the political system, they are
ineffective, as evidenced by the 9/11 Commissions own self-issued
failing report card on progress. One woman widowed by the 9/11 attacks expressed her
But, what is the efficacy of these
disappointment: If you were to tell me that two years after the murder of my husband on live television
However, as
mechanisms of evasion that allow the government to delay action or
elude responsibility altogether, they are incredibly effective. Both
sides of this paradox are harmful to the basic function of
democracy, a system of government reliant on government
responsiveness. Indeed, the U.S. government continues to depend on
independent commissions to provide answers and presumably affect
change, but neither is the typical outcome of these commissions.
Even if some clarity does emerge, it is often ignored. It has been over
two hundred years since Washingtons commission on the Whiskey
Rebellion and during that time, policy change through independent
commissions has been rare or non-existent. Why then does the American public
that we wouldn't have one question answered, I wouldn't believe it (Breitweiser 2003).
continue to be comforted and satiated when the government appoints a commission?
The plan enacts a meaningful reform. The counterplan enacts

the illusion of reform.
22)
This article looks at independent commissions in the United States and the role
they play as flak-catchers stopgaps for uncertain or unfavorable
judgments cast onto the political system. Because they work as
effective mechanisms of evasion, giving the appearance of
government action while at the same time dodging responsibility,
government bodies, particularly executives, have frequently and
readily turned to independent commissions. However, independent
commissions are typically riddled with inefficiencies that
inevitably hinder their work. This article will look at the obstacles faced by these
commissions as they deal with some of the most complex social and political issues of our time. Some
of the obstacles are a product of the bureaucratic nature of the
commission process, while others are created by the commission itself,

in order to preserve the status quo. Still others are the creation of
the instituting body who finds little incentive in implementing the
recommendations of a temporary, nonelected body that lacks any
real power. Thus, the central issue discussed here is the way in which
independent commissions are utilized as equivocal tools that both ease
public anxiety and allow public officials to claim credit for decisive
action. Independent commissions are an easy and effective go-to
for U.S. public officials because they act as deflectors, giving the
appearance of action and serving to satiate the publics demand for
explanation and answers, while at the same time evading actual
policy response. Government officials have therefore developed a
dependence on these commissions. This article specifically focuses on the barriers
commissions face, comparing the commissions that have often followed U.S. urban race riots to the 9/11
Commission. The riots that have occurred over the last century in America have typically been followed by
an investigative, blue-ribbon commission, and therefore provide us with a catalog of comparative cases for
the 9/11 Commission.
The counterplans report will never pass 9/11 Commission

proves.
22)
The 9/11 Commission
The 9/11 Commission (formally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States) was
born out of the intense and unrelenting lobbying of the families of the 9/11 victims. Its mandateto
investigate the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11
Commission Report 2004, xv)was sweeping. According to Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton,
the mandate was perhaps too broad, asking them to investigate the entire U.S. government in an effort to
understand an unprecedented event (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 14). The wide-ranging nature of the
Commission was likely a result of the hesitance of both the White House and Congress to institute the
Commission at all.i The Bush administration made clear from the beginning that the Commission not be a
runaway commission used as an institutionalized stage for public Bush-bashing. In those same early
meetings in which top White House officials expressed runaway commission concerns, they also
emphasized the limitations of time and money awarded to the Commission and warned not to ask for
more of either. It is therefore not surprising that two years after the 9/11 Commission report was released,
Kean and Hamilton declared: We were set up to fail (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 14).
The chief obstacle to the formation of the 9/11 Commission was the most likely
target of such an investigationthe White House. House Republicans were almost as
wary of the Commission and according to Kean and Hamilton, not inclined to help the
Commission succeed [and] holding the budget at $3 million was one way to
ensure that [it] did not (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 43). The Commission was indeed given just
$3 million to work with, far below what is normal for an independent commission, particularly one with
such an expansive mandate. In comparison, the commission set up twenty years earlier to investigate the
Challenger space shuttle disaster was given a budget of $40 million. Even early estimates of the 9/11
Commission projected it would run out of money a full year before its scheduled reporting date. In early
2003, the Commission pushed both Congress and the White House for more money but faced resistance
from both. The White House initially denied requests while House Republicans continued to stonewall. In
the end, both branches provided enough money to comfortably sustain the Commission for its duration.
[end page 29] Thus, despite dire concerns at the outset, funding would prove to be the least of the
problems for the 9/11 Commission. Even more troublesome issues would arise to hinder the Commission
from the beginning: lack of infrastructure, timing, and subpoena power. Each is discussed below.
From the beginning, the Commission lacked the infrastructure required

to run a proper investigation of such a huge crisis. Two months after its inception,
the commissioners still had no office, no schedule for work, no security clearance, and only one employee.
Staff interviews took place in executive director Philip Zelikows hotel room in Washington, DC. Lacking a
commission telephone, the cell phone of Zelikows assistant became the main commission telephone
number. Four months into the commission process, the commissioners finally held their first public hearing,
but found themselves with no gavel.
timing for the 9/11 Commission was also an obstacle. It

was given just a year and a half to conduct research, hold hearings,
and write the final report. Again, such timing restrictions illustrate that
appointing bodies often do not want commissions to delve too deeply
into the issues, preferring that they instead engage in a surface-level
investigation. Ultimately, the 9/11 Commission asked for only a two month extension, pushing its
As with the riot commissions above,
report release from May 2004 to July 2004. This did not please anyone, as it meant that the report would
be released at the height of the presidential election cycle and amidst the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions. With the help of Senators McCain and Lieberman, the extension was granted by
Congress but not without a fight from politicians from both parties.
Finally, the issue of subpoena power was a contentious one from the beginning,
both within the Commission and for the 9/11 families. The Commission was granted the power when it was
created, but it required the vote of 6 out of 10 commissioners to issue a subpoena. Partisanship crept in,
with Democratic commissioners generally favoring the wide use of subpoenas and Republican
commissioners favoring a more limited, if any, use of subpoena power. Vice Chairman Hamilton broke from
his Democratic colleagues on this issue and sided with Kean, thus ending debate on the possibility of the
aggressive use of the subpoena. Those who favored reserving the subpoenas for non-compliance felt that
blanket subpoenas would be unnecessarily antagonistic toward the White House; something they feared
would backfire and cause more non-compliance. The argument was that the Commission should make the
administration see the Commission as on its side, as part of the same team looking for answers. In the
subpoenas were used infrequently and only against noncompliant agencies like the FAA and the Pentagon. Two things seemed to work more effectively in
end, the
gaining compliance: threat of subpoena and public shaming. The latter was achieved through such
mechanisms as interim reports that mentioned slow starts and delays and through media interviews
that hinted at some executive branch recalcitrance. All of the tactics worked to some extent, with the
Commission eventually gaining access to the coveted Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs), but the 9/11
Commission process can generally be categorized as involving high levels of non-cooperation from
government agencies. It is the nature of the independent commission the appointing body has little
incentive to cooperate beyond the creation of the Commission, which lacks any true authority in holding
the appointing body accountable.
issues of funding, infrastructure, timing, and subpoena power

were overshadowed by the biggest obstacle of allgovernment
resistance in cooperating with the Commission. Many government officials
showed disdain for the Commission from the beginning, which seemed
to only foreshadow the eventual dismissal of the final [end page 30]
Commission report. Thus, while the commissioners publicly stated that they eventually got what
they needed from government officials, their frustration with regard to lack of
government compliance during the process was widely recognized as
media outlets continued to report on the stonewalling of many government agencies and branches. The
result was what many, particularly the 9/11 families, viewed as a watered-down final
report with weak recommendations that would likely never be
enacted.
Thus, these
No Solvency Wont Provide Oversight

The counterplan wont create effective oversight.
Setty 15 Sudha Setty, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and
Intellectual Life at Western New England University School of Law, holds a J.D. from Columbia Law School,
2015 (Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, Stanford Journal of
International Law (51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69), Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
Although Congress could launch a large-scale investigation into the

programs Snowden disclosed, like the Church Committee in its time, n176 its ability to
serve effectively as an ongoing accountability mechanism over
intelligence gathering in the manner of a parliament seems unlikely. For the
political and structural reasons discussed above, the apparatus of
national security policy-making is somewhat intentionally insulated
from Congress. On the one hand, the benefit of this structural arrangement is
that it may facilitate expertise and efficient decision-making, but a key
effect is also that this apparatus is not really accessible to the other
branches of government or the public. n177 This consolidation of
decision-making authority in the executive branch, plus the difference between
congressional and parliamentary access to executive branch information, accounts for a
different potential for legislative oversight in the United States as compared to
the United Kingdom and India. Further, the lack of widespread and sustained public
pressure [*100] on Congress n178 toward reform suggests that a
meaningful increase in legislative oversight of the intelligence
community will not occur in the near future.
Double-bind: either existing committees solve.
Sledge 14 Matt Sledge, Reporter for The Huffington Post, 2014 (John McCain Wants A Special
NSA Committee, And Dianne Feinstein Isn't Too Happy About That, The Huffington Post, February 5th,
Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/05/john-mccain-nsacommittee_n_4732759.html, Accessed 07-08-2015)
Feinstein (D-Calif.), who chairs the Intelligence Committee, threw

cold water on McCain's idea.
"There is no need for a select committee to review the Snowden leaks
or NSA collection," Feinstein told HuffPost in a statement Wednesday. "The Senate
Intelligence Committee has conducted and continues to conduct
thorough oversight of all intelligence collection activities by the National
Security Agency and other intelligence agencies."
Sen. Dianne
OR if existing committees fail, so will the counterplan.

Sledge 13 Matt Sledge, Reporter for The Huffington Post, 2013 (NSA Spying Sparks Calls For New
Senate Church Committee, The Huffington Post, November 7th, Available Online at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/06/nsa-senate-church-committee_n_4228614.html, Accessed 0708-2015)
Hart (D-Colo.) -- told HuffPost he did not

think much of McCain's call for a new select committee.
Another Church Committee member -- former Sen. Gary
"It seems to me that Senator McCain is in a way scoring political points here," Hart said. "He's poking the
Senate Intelligence Committee in the eye.
"If
established committees are not doing their job for whatever reason
you don't layer on top another committee, that is to compound
the problems of congressional oversight," Hart said. Instead, he
suggested reforms like "reconstituting" the committees with new
members and imposing term limits on committee memberships to
prevent so-called agency capture.
Links To Politics
The counterplan saps political capital.
Dalal 14 Anjali S. Dalal, Resident Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, holds
a J.D. from Yale Law School and a B.A. in Philosophy and B.S. in Economics from the University of
Pennsylvania, 2014 (Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism And The Creation Of Surveillance Culture,
Michigan State Law Review (2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 59), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via
Lexis-Nexis)
The solution to a lack of congressional oversight is conceptually easy

but practically difficult. It requires Congress to pass legislation
governing the FBI and regularly exercise its statutory oversight authority,
both of which require significant political capital and effort. However,
the Snowden scandal may have created the momentum necessary
to motivate congressional action in this area. Senator Ron Wyden recently
echoed this sentiment while imploring his colleagues to act stating, "'If
we do not seize this unique moment in out [sic] constitutional history to
reform our surveillance laws and practices we are all going to live to
regret it.'" n337
Theres minimal political support for the counterplan.
Sledge 13 Matt Sledge, Reporter for The Huffington Post, 2013 (NSA Spying Sparks Calls For New
Senate Church Committee, The Huffington Post, November 7th, Available Online at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/06/nsa-senate-church-committee_n_4228614.html, Accessed 0708-2015)
So far, said Trevor Timm of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, there has been
little momentum in Congress for a new Church Committee.
"Unfortunately, we haven't seen much legislative movement ," Timm
wrote in an email to HuffPost. "Better late than never though, and it seems with each revelation more and
more are calling for one."
Creating a new committee causes political backlash

empirically proven.
Politico 11 Politico, 2011 (Commissions grow on Obama, Byline MJ Lee, May 9 , Available
th
Online at http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=D1EAB8B1-F951-3C6F-6656270CEFFF3919, Accessed

10-13-2011)
When presidential candidate Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) proposed a

commission to investigate the 2008 financial crisis, then-Sen. Barack Obama
disparaged the idea, calling commissions the oldest Washington stunt in the book.
Instead of offering up concrete plans to solve these issues ... You pass the buck to a commission to study
the problem, Obama said in a speech on the economy in Golden, Colo., on Sept. 16, 2008. But heres the
thing: This isnt 9/11 we know how we got into this mess.
But after he took office, Obamas distaste for commissions seemed to

fade. During his first 2 years in the White House, the president has issued countless executive orders
creating advisory commissions, working groups, committees, councils and task forces on subjects ranging
from the restoration of the Chesapeake Bay to bioethical issues, to fitness, sports and nutrition.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, economic adviser to McCains presidential campaign, dismissed Obamas 2008
comments as campaign rhetoric. He can and has said anything to become president, and hes flip-flopped
on every policy position, Holtz-Eakin told POLITICO.
Republicans have criticized the presidents use of

commissions. When Obama announced in April that Vice President Joe Biden
would lead negotiations with a bipartisan group of lawmakers on a
Other
deficit reduction plan, Republicans derided the outcome of Obamas

earlier deficit commission.
The president ... utterly ignored the recommendations of his last
deficit commission and submitted a budget that would add $9 trillion to the debt and raise taxes
on job creators, said House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio).
They Say: Trust Net-Benefit

Turn the counterplan increases cynicism in government.
Bernstein 11 Jared Bernstein, Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, former
Chief Economist and Economic Adviser to Vice President Joe Biden, executive director of the White House
Task Force on the Middle Class, and a member of President Obamas economic team, holds a Ph.D. in
Social Welfare from Columbia University, 2011 (Commission Overload, On The EconomyJared
Bernsteins blog, September 28th, Available Online at http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/commission-overload/,
when you constantly kick tough calls to

commissions, you amplify cynicism about government. Too often in
this town, when you want to show you care about something that you
dont really want to do anything about (or, less snarkily, youre not ready to do anything
about), you kick it to a commission.
I havent seen polls on this, but Ill bet most peoples reaction to so, we created a
commission to study the issue and make binding recommendations,
etc. is those guys just cant do their jobs.
Thats one problem. The other is that

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Explanation for Negative

Explanation for Affirmative

1NC Wyden Committee CP

the Church Committee.

Our committee, chaired by Senator

Congress to create committees to investigate those allegations.

of the intelligence community and with making legislative

A number of reforms were implemented as a result,

The need for another thorough, independent, and public congressional

As former members and staff of the Church Committee we can

of Justice and White House. It is given a stamp of approval by the Foreign

Opsahl, senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, suggested

The will to study the problem may emerge as

A special investigatory committee should be bipartisan, consist of

The Church Committee brought these revelations to light,

Obama says he welcomes a public debate on the programs. If

the standing Congressional committees are

Only the counterplan results in a complete audit of domestic

Why is another Church Committee needed now? For more than a

any member of Congress who doesn't press for an investigation is

is no reliable way to calculate from

the scale of actual NSA abuses is substantially hidden.

the FISA court, also provides inadequate oversight, according to the

the new century will present

We have two choices, work together in solidarity

todays youth no longer see government and politics as an

Civic engagement consequently takes on a more

Independently, public trust in government is key to

declining political trust has played the central

tend to identify a conservative turn in public opinion as the cause. However,

public opposition to government is focused entirely on

people need to trust the government when they pay the

Progressive policies are vital to reduce widespread suffering

Progressivism is in part a particular moral and political response to the

one's own physical or economic safety is largely chargeable to our

That such suffering exists on a shockingly widespread scale in our

The president's defense of the surveillance programs last Friday depended

The president's defense, however, merely underscores

Secrecy breeds error

Secrecy undermines the foundation of learning: criticism. People on

But in the long run, openness made us learn, adapt, and

into the twenty-first century. But only if we stay an open society.

Secrecy has been allowed to metastasize under the Bush-Obama

Groupthink risks extinction. Decentralized, open decisionmaking is key.

The Constitution envisions the conduct of foreign policy as a

The constitutional assignment of powers, moreover, is compelling and

The preference for collective, rather than individual, decisionmaking

the President. First, he is commander-in-chief, but he acts in this capacity

The President's constitutional authority pales

The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter

the implications of U.S. power and

The counterplan solves this impact it checks executive

Congress needs to demonstrate its ability to check executive branch

The purpose of such a review should be to

lasting legacy was

Lawful, properly controlled intelligence activities are critical to our

Congress must initiate a full-scale, targeted, investigation outside

NSA leaks are ushering in a new day regarding Congressional

The counterplan removes Obama from the equation the

A comprehensive evaluation of U.S. intelligence activities and the

The Church Committee protected legitimate secrets while exposing the

While these reforms certainly didnt prevent every future intelligence

They Say: No Solvency CP Doesnt Pass