People v.

Dimaano
September 14, 2005
FACTS:
- Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo
Dimaano with 2 counts of rape and 1 count of
attempted rape.
- The first incident happened when Maricar was still 10
years old. While inside their house in Sucat,
Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down
beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to
lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus.
Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she
kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt
her. She was again ravished by her father after a few
days. This time, her father inserted his penis into her
vagina. On December 29, 95, her father sexually
assaulted her again. The last sexual assault
happened in the afternoon of January
1, 96.
Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of
his wife.
- The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime
Laboratory examined complainant and found her to
have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and
was in a non-virgin state.
- Appellant denied the accusations stating that he was
always in the office from 7:00am until 9:00pm
waiting to be dispatched to another assignment
overseas. He claimed it was impossible for him to
rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January
1, 1996 because there were other people in the
house. He argued that had he raped complainant,
then she would not have accompanied him to the
Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San
Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay
I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat,
Paraaque, where they applied for membership at the
Video City Club.
- The trial court convicted Edgardo and disregarded
the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa

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Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since the complainant

was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the
same. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
a.) WON the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
overcome the presumption of innocence of the
accused. - YES
b.) WON the voluntary and due execution of the
affidavit of desistance by the private complainant
should have been duly considered as a factor which
put to doubt the reasons behind the filing of the
criminal charges of rape against the accused. NO
c.) WON the complaint for attempted Rape was
valid - NO
HELD:
A.) - This credibility given by the trial court to the rape
victim is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly
their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct
and cross-examination by counsel. Absent any
showing
that
the
trial
judge
overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result
of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves
the appellate court's highest respect.
- It is likewise well established that the testimony of a
rape victim is generally given full weight and credit,
more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an
innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the
trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In
so testifying, she could only have been impelled to
tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill
motive.
- The delay of more than two years is not an indication
that the charges were fabricated for complainant's

reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete

obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the
studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all
brought about by genuine fear posed by her own
father against her.
B.) - The court attaches no persuasive value to a
desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite
incredible that a victim, after going through the
trouble of having the appellant arrested by the
police, positively identifying him as the person who
raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, repeating her
accusations in open court and recounting her
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and
declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case.
- Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of
desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer
assisted her when she affixed her signature and had
shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of
the cases. Besides, the trial court is not bound to
dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion
whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,
considering that the compromise agreement and the
affidavit of desistance were executed long after the
cases have been filed in court.
SYLLABUS ISSUE:
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No.
96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution

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which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of

cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due
to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
The Court held that:
- For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated,
these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of
the offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that
the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
- Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the
appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts
or omission constituting the elements of the crime of
rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation
of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of

Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the

appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the
complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of
a complaint or information, but is merely a
conclusion of law by the one who drafted the
complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this
Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
Sasot v. People
June 29, 2005
FACTS:
- The case subject of the present special civil action for
certiorari is a criminal prosecution against petitioners
for unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
- In May 1997, the NBI conducted an investigation
pursuant to a complaint by the NBA properties Inc.
against petitioners for possible violation of Art. 189
of the RPC on Unfair Competition. It was found out
that petitioners were using the logos of NBA
properties on their garment products. Hence, NBI
recommended the petitioners prosecution under Art.
189.
- In an SPA, Rick Welts, President of NBA Properties Inc.
constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo,
Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys
attorney-in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the
company, in the filing of criminal, civil and
administrative complaints, among others. The
Special Power of Attorney was notarized by Nicole
Brown of New York County and certified by Norman
Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B.
Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines,
New York, authenticated the certification. Welts also
executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998,

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before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of

New York.
Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez
recommended the filing of an Information against
petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the grounds that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the
court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
the person of the accused.
Petitioners argue that the fiscal should have
dismissed Weltss complaint because under the rules,
the complaint must be sworn to before the
prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only
a fax transmittal.[9] They also contend that
complainant is a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected
by Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered
patentee.
The Trial Court sustained the arguments of the
prosecution and denied the petitioners motion to
quash.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for
Certiorari with the CA which was also dismissed as
it was not the proper remedy in assailing a denial of
a motion to quash. Petitioners sought the
reconsideration which was also denied by the CA.
Hence, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC.

ISSUE: WON the case should have been dismissed by the

fiscal because it should have been personally sworn by the
complainant before the investigating prosecutor NO
HELD:
- The Court has consistently held that a special civil
action for certiorari is not the proper remedy
to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The proper procedure in such a

case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to

trial without prejudice on his part to present
the special defenses he had invoked in his
motion to quash and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed
a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and
instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate
the special defenses contained in their motion to
quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case such that
immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari
should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition.
The Court does not find any justification for the
quashal of the Information filed against petitioners.
Nowhere in sec. 3 Rule 117 of the Rules of Crim. Pro.
is there any mention of the defect in the complaint
filed before the fiscal and the complainants capacity
to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address
of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainants
affidavit and his witnesses and supporting
documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public who must certify that
he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. All these have been duly
satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution
Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted
that even the absence of an oath in the
complaint does not necessarily render it
invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form,

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which does not affect the substantial rights of

the defendant on the merits.
If prosecution follows after the completion of
the preliminary investigation being conducted
by the Special Prosecutor the information shall
be in the name of the People of the Philippines
and no longer the petitioner which is only an
aggrieved party since a criminal offense is
essentially an act against the State. It is the
latter which is principally the injured party
although there is a private right violated.
Petitioner's capacity to sue would become,
therefore, of not much significance in the main
case.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain
the present suit before our courts for unfair
competition or infringement of trademarks of a
foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our
duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to
which the Philippines and France are parties.

Lasoy v. Zenarosa
April 12, 2005
FACTS:
- In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996,
accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were
charged as follows:
o That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, not
having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of
42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting

tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said

law.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty. Both
accused applied for probation under Presidential
Decree No. 968.
People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two
separate motions, first, to admit amended
Information, and second, to set aside the
arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision
of the trial court dated 16 July 1996. In plaintiffs
motion to admit amended information. It stated that
the Information indicated that the accused were
carrying 42.410 grams when in truth they were
caught carrying 45 pieces of dried marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to
Metro Manila.
The Trial Court denied the Motion to Admit Amended
Information. However, the same court GRANTED the
amending of the Information. This information was
assigned to Branch 76 of RTC-QC presided by Judge
Monina Zenarosa.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash which was
opposed by the People in its Comment/Opposition
filed before the trial court. Subsequently, while the
motion to quash before the RTC was as yet
unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which they later
moved to withdraw to pave the way for Branch 76 of
the RTC of Quezon City to act judiciously on their
motion to quash. The Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 15 November 1996 noted the
motion and considered the petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February
1997, the trial court denied accuseds motion to
quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the
accused under the amended information. Accuseds
Motion for Reconsideration, duly opposed by the
prosecution, was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated 16 April 1997. Hence, the instant Petition for

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Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary

restraining order.
ISSUE: WON the first information is valid YES.
HELD:
- An information is valid as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
- In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way
that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can
decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not
necessary to follow the language of the statute
in the information. The information will be
sufficient if it describes the crime defined by
law.
- Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is
that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime
was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is,
to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with.
- the first information, applying Rule 110, Section 6,
shows on its face that it is valid.
o Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense
by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
- SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial
courts point of view that the accused cannot claim
their right against double jeopardy because they
participated/acquiesced to the tampering, we hold

that while this may not be far-fetched, there is

actually no hard evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot
overlook the fact that accused were arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first
information.
People v. Batin
November 28, 2007
FACTS:
- Castor and Neil Batin was convicted of murder for
shooting Eugenio Refugio while Eugenio was leaning
against a mango tree near his house in Novaliches,
QC.
- The prosecution presented the statements of
Josephine Refugio (wife of Eugenio) their neighbors
and the medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime lab. In
her statement, Josephine stated that Neil went to one
of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun
from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards
Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and
shouting: Huwag! Castor grabbed the gun from Neil.
After the gun was taken from him, Neil just
proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor
followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.
- Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: Sige,
banatan mo na. Neil responded by drawing the gun
from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and
her husband, and firing twice from his eye-level. Both
Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former,
backwards, and the latter landing on top of her. As
they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: Nanay,
may tama ako. She then pulled her husband by the
shoulder of his shirt so that she could take him to
their house as he was already slumped to the right.
She later rushed her husband to the Quezon City
General Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but
later expired.
- Neil stated that he accidentally pulled the trigger of
the gun.

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The Trial Court convicted Castor and Neil Batin guilty

of Murder. CA affirmed the conviction. However, on
13 November 2000, accused Neil Batin filed an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

ISSUE: WON treachery was specifically alleged in the

Information YES
HELD:
- The fact that the qualifying circumstances were
recited in the second paragraph and not in the first
paragraph of the Information, as commonly done, is
a matter of form or style for which the prosecution
should not be faulted. That the Provincial Prosecutor
decided to write the Information differently did not
impair its sufficiency. Nothing in the law prohibits the
prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As
long as the requirements of the law are observed,
the Information will pass judicial scrutiny.
- The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it
enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly. The rule is that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
Information in order not to violate the accuseds
constitutional right to be properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for
his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.
Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he
was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the
nature of the charges against him because of the
style or form adopted in the Information.

People v. Cachapero

May 20, 2004

FACTS:
-

The RTC of Camiling, Tarlac found Larry Cachapero

guilty of committing rape against Anna Toledo, 7
years old. CA affirmed.
Sometime in March 1998, Anna Toledo, who was
seven (7) years old, went to play with Lorena
Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in
Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
"During that occasion, appellant Larry Cachapero,
brother of Lorena, made her lie down and removed
her shorts and panty. He inserted his penis into her
sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry told her not to
tell her parents because he might be scolded.
"On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato
was conducting a remedial class in Reading to her
Grade I and II students. While they were reading the
word tagtuyot or saluyot, one of her students
Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna was sexually
abused by Manong Larry.
"She then ordered the students to leave the room
and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind. She
confronted Anna and asked her the truth. Anna
covered her face with her two hands, cried, and said
yes. The teachers had a conference, after which they
decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna.
Accused Larry Cachapero testified that at the time of
the alleged incident, he was in their house together
with his father and mother. He denied seeing the
private complainant on that day. He alleged the case
was filed against [him] because of the long standing
feud between his mother and the mother of the
private complainant.
The information stated:
o That sometime in March 1998, in the
Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this

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Honorable Court, the above-named accused

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of force and intimidation
succeed in having sexual intercourse with
Anna Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old minor.
ISSUE: WON the Information was sufficient as there was no
time that was indicated YES
HELD:
- The time of occurrence is not an essential element of
rape. This being so, its precise date and hour need
not be alleged in the complaint or information.
Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
o "SEC. 11. Date of commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission."
- The Information in this case alleged that the crime
was committed "sometime in March 1998" which,
according to private complainant, was more or less
at the closing of the school year. Being reasonably
definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently
meets the requirement of the law. After all, Section 6
of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that
the information must state, among others, the
approximate time of the commission of the offense.
- Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint
or information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. If the present appellant found the
Information insufficient, he should have moved
before arraignment either for a bill of particulars,
for him to be properly informed of the exact date of
the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the
Information, on the ground that it did not conform
with the prescribed form. Having failed to pursue

either remedy, he is deemed to have waived

objection to any formal defect in the Information.
Furthermore, the defense never objected to the
presentation of the prosecution evidence proving
that the offense had been committed in March 1998.
Appellant has not shown that he was deprived of a
proper defense, for he was in fact able to foist an
alibi. It cannot be said, therefore, that his
constitutionally protected right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him has
been violated.

Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan
July 10, 2013
FACTS:
- All the petitioners work for the City Government of
Cebu. Benilda B. Bacasmas (Bacasmas), the Cash
Division Chief, Alan C. Gaviola (Gaviola), the City
Administrator, Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City
Treasurer. By virtue of their positions, they are
involved in the process of approving and releasing
cash advances for the City.
- The process is as follows:
o Gonzales (paymaster) makes a request for
cash advance Bacasmas (Cash Div. Chief)
for approval Cesa (City Treasurer) [By

signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify that the

expense or cash advance is necessary, lawful, and
incurred under their direct supervision.]

Jaca (City Accountant) for processing preaudit Accountants advice [She also signs
the voucher to certify that there is adequate
available funding/budgetary allotment]
This Advice is returned with the voucher to
the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the
check. After it has been prepared, she affixes
her initials to the check Cesa then signs.
Gaviola (City Administrator) approves the
voucher and countersigns the check.

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A report of those cash advances liquidated by

Gonzales is called a Report of Disbursement (RD). An
RD must contain the audit voucher number, the
names of the local government employees who were
paid using the money from the cash advance, the
amount for each employee, as well as the receipts.
The RDs are examined and verified by the City
Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the Cash
Division for recording in the official cash book
A COA team conducted a surprise cash count and
revealed a shortage of P9,810,752.60 from 20
September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the cash and
accounts of Gonzales.
The team found that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and
Jaca failed to follow the above-mentioned procedure,
thus facilitating the loss of more than nine million
pesos on the part of the city government.
Specifically, the team said in its report that there
were irregularities in the grant, utilization, and
liquidation of cash advances; shortages were
concealed; and inaccurate and misleading pieces of
information
were
included
in
the
financial
statements.
The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and
Jaca not only signed, certified, and approved the
cash advance vouchers, but also signed and
countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies,
which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 7160; Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and
the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit
(COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382
and 97-002.
Hence an Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa and
Jaca.
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the
Information on three grounds: first, it did not specify
a reasonable time frame within which the offense
was committed, in violation of their right to be

informed of the charge against them; second, not all

of the accused were named, as Gonzales was not
charged in the Information; and third, the Information
did not specify an offense, because negligence and
conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.

"inexcusable negligence" in the same Information

does not mean that three distinct offenses
were thereby charged but only implied that the
offense charged may have been committed
through any of the modes provided by the law.
In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging
both the presence of conspiracy and gross
inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not
simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a
willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the
consequences of ones actions or omissions

ISSUE: WON the Information was sufficient YES

HELD:
- First, it is not necessary to state the precise
date when the offense was committed, except
when it is a material ingredient thereof. The
offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission. Here, the date is
not a material ingredient of the crime, not having
been committed on one day alone, but rather within
a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to
5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the
commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but
impossible as well.
- Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been
included in the Information, because the latter
incurred cash shortages and allegedly had
unliquidated cash advances. Cesa is wrong. The
Information
seeks
to
hold
petitioners
accountable for their actions, which allowed
Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved
the way for her to incur cash shortages,
leading to a loss of over nine million pesos.
Thus, the Information correctly excluded her
because her alleged acts did not fall under the
crime charged in the Information.
- The Information is sufficient, because it adequately
describes the nature and cause of the accusation
against petitioners, namely the violation of the
aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and

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Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan
April 23, 2010
FACTS:

Mayor Quintin Saludaga of Lavezares, Northern Samar

and SPO2 Fiel Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for
the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without
conducting a competitive public bidding as required by
law, which caused damage and prejudice to the
government. An information was filed for violation of Sec.
3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the
Government.
The information was quashed for failure to prove the
actual damage caused to the government, hence a new
information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA
3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private
person. The accused moved for a new preliminary
investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is
substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first
information.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion for preliminary
investigation. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for

Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would
warrant a new or another preliminary investigation. NO
HELD:
- While there are two ways of committing the offense, This
does not however indicate that each mode
constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under
both.
- There is no substituted information. Only the mode of
commission was modified. While jurisprudence
provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of
committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the government; or b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act
or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may
be charged under either mode or under both should both
modes concur.
Pacoy v. Cajigal
September 28, 2007

Nester Mendoza

FACTS:
- SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of
Presiding Judge Afable Cajigal of RTC 68 of Camiling
Tarlac.
- On July 4, 2002, an information for Homicide was
filed in the RTC against petitioner for shooting and
killing his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita
with an armalite rifle. Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty.
- However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing
the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder.
- The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing
out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word
Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph
of the Information. The accusatory portion remained
exactly the same as that of the original Information
for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of
the victims name from Escuita to Escueta.
- Petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of
Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground
that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in
the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to
enter his plea on the amended Information for
Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea
of not guilty.
- Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. The
MR was likewise denied. Thus, petitioner went
straight to SC and filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in amending the
Information after petitioner had already entered in plea to
the charge of information for homicide NO

HELD:
- In the present case, the change of the offense
charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution as defined in Teehankee.
- While the amended Information was for Murder, a
reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in
the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide
and its replacement by the word Murder. There was
no change in the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged or in the determination of
the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the
amended Information for Murder are exactly the
same as those already alleged in the original
Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the
killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment
made in the caption and preamble from
Homicide to Murder as purely formal.
- Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing
formal amendments in cases in which the accused
has already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the
accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused
are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made;
and when any evidence the accused might have
would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with
those of the original Information for Homicide, there
could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of

Nester Mendoza

the case; neither would there be any possible

prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
-

Amendment
May involve either
formal or substantial
changes

Substitution
Necessarily involves
a substantial change
from the original
charge

Amendment before
plea
has
been
entered
can
be
effected
without
leave of court

substitution
of
information must
be with leave of
court
as
the
original
information has to
be dismissed

Where
the
amendment is only
as to form, there is
no need for another
preliminary
investigation
and
the retaking of the
plea of the accused;
An
amended
information refers to
the same offense
charged
in
the
original information
or to an offense
which
necessarily
includes
or
is
necessarily included
in
the
original
charge,
hence
substantial
amendments to the
information after the

In substitution of
information, another
preliminary
investigation
is
entailed and the
accused
has
to
plead anew to the
new information

Substitution
requires
or
presupposes that
the
new
information
involves
a
different
offense
which does not
include or is not
necessarily
included in the
original charge, he

plea has been taken

cannot
be
made
over the objection of
the accused, for if
the
original
information
would
be withdrawn, the
accused
could
invoke
double
jeopardy

nce the accused

cannot
claim
double jeopardy

Cabo v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
- On June 24, 2000, Cabo and Bonifacio Balahay,

Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, were charged

for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. In the
information, it was alleged that Mayor Balahay
received from Cabo the amount of P104,000,
and that said mayor intervened in the
undertaking by Cabos company (OIDCI) for
consultancy services with the Municipality of
Barobo.
Cabo claimed that she was deprived of her right
to preliminary investigation so she filed a
motion for reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan
(SB) granted her motion and directed the
Special Prosecutor to conduct one.
Meanwhile, Cabo filed another motion seeking
permission to travel abroad for a family
vacation. The SB granted it in an order dated
May 2004, which stated that, in light of the case
still
being
under
reinvestigation,
and
considering that she had not yet been
arraigned, Cabo expressly consented to the
order that she be arraigned conditionally.

Nester Mendoza

[CONDITIONS:] If it is found that there is no

probable cause to proceed against her, the
arraignment will have no effect. However, if
there is a need to amend the present
information, then Cabo would have then
waived her right to object under Section
14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as well as her constitutional
right against double jeopardy.
When she was arraigned, she was duly assisted
by her counsel and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
offense charged. She also duly affixed her
signature in the minutes to signify her
conformity to the conditional arraignment and
the legal consequence thereof.
Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded his
reinvestigation and found probable cause to
charge her with the violation of RA 3019. The SB
then set a new schedule for arraignment in
October 2004. On the day before arraignment,
Cabo filed a motion (reiterate-not-guilty
motion) praying that she be allowed to
reiterate her previous plea in the conditional
arraignment so that she may be excused from
attending the arraignment the next day. SB,
however, did not act on her said motion.
Balahay, on the other hand, filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the
same did not charge any offense. It failed to
allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said
contract under the law, in his official capacity as
mayor.
The SB sustained Balahays contention that the
information was defective for lack of necessary
facts, but it did not immediately quash the
complaint. Instead, the court, in accordance

with Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,

ordered only the amendment of the information
and ordered the prosecution to correct the
defect. The amended information was filed in
February 2005 containing all the necessary
elements of the crime charged.
Cabo was notified of her re-arraignment in April
2005, but she filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment on the ground that she could no
longer be re-arraigned on the amended
information since amendment of the information
based on the substance is not allowed after the
plea has been made.
SB denied petitioners motion. It held that her
arraignment on the original information was
only conditional in nature to accommodate her
request to travel abroad so that she could be
tried in absentia. She agreed to the condition
that should the information be amended, she is
deemed to waive her right to object to the
amendment and to waive her constitutional
protection against double jeopardy. She was
considered estopped from raising her objection
to the amended complaint. Petitioner filed an
MR on the ground that double jeopardy had set
in.
She
asserted
that
her
conditional
arraignment had been confirmed by her October
motion (reiterate-not-guilty motion) reiterating
her plea of not guilty. Thus, her arraignment on
the original information was no longer
conditional,
and
double
jeopardy
must
consequently attach. SB denied her resolution.
This prompted her to file the petition for review
on certiorari.

Nester Mendoza

ISSUE: WON double jeopardy had attached on the basis of

the NOT GUILTY plea NO. DJ did not attach.
HELD:
- The SB was declared to have unequivocally laid

down petitioners conditions for arraignment.

Among those specified was that if there was a
need to amend the original information, she
forfeits her right to object and her RIGHT
TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY. She was assisted by
counsel and thereby informed of the legal
consequences of such conditions.
With regard to her formal manifestation
reiterating her not guilty plea (reiterate-notguilty motion), there was no showing that
Sandiganbayan
affirmed
her
motion.
Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court explicitly requires the accused to be
present at arraignment and personally
enter his plea. With respect to the applicability
of double jeopardy to the case, two requisites
were absent: The first requisite of double
jeopardy was not present since the original
information failed to allege the essential
elements for the violations allegedly committed
by petitioner and her co-accused. There was
also NO DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF
THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER (fourth
requisite). The SB merely ordered an
AMENDMENT. According to Section 4, Rule 117,
the prosecution is given an opportunity to
amend the defective information if the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. It is only
when the prosecution fails to properly amend
the information that the motion to quash be
granted.

Contrary to petitioners submission, the original

information can be cured by amendment even
after she had pleaded thereto, since the

Nester Mendoza

amendments ordered by the court below were

only as to matters of form and not of substance
(Section 14, Rule 110)