BANK OF AMERICA VS.

AMERICAN
REALTY CORPORATION
GR 133876 December 29, 1999

Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies

so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of
action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that

Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As
security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the
Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a
third party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor
of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection
suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently, it
filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the
said mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the
Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages against the
petitioner, for the latters act of foreclosing extra-judicially
the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits
before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.
Issue:
WON petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign
courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before

foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to
foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the
properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private
respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions
and

by

eventually

foreclosing

extra-judicially

the

mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules

against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in
jurisprudence and our statute books.
2. Conflicts of Law
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law,
which according to petitioner is the governing law with
regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not
lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for
sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the wellimbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be

Held: Yes.

properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign

1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two
remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of
action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two
remedies is complete in itself.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage
creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative.
Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of
the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of
the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As
to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected
by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with
any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action
which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative
remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise.

1 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts

will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local
or

domestic

or

internal

law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual

presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English
Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be
applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of

is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing

California,

United

the splitting up of a single cause of action.

respondent

American

States

of

America

Realty

while

Corporation

private

(ARC)

is

domestic corporation.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.

Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other

hand, is a limited liability company organized and existing
under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

occasions granted three major multi-million United States

(US) Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1)
Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A.
and

(3)

Eshley

Compania

Naviera

S.A.

(hereinafter

collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of which are

Republic of the Philippines

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of

SUPREME COURT

Panama

Manila

and

respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

Due

to

are

foreign

affiliates

of

private

the

default

in

the

payment

of

the

loan

amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate borrowers signed

and entered into restructuring agreements. As additional
security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC
G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999

as

third

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,

over its parcels of land including improvements thereon,

mortgages,

party
4

mortgagor

executed

two

real

estate

dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984,

located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan,

vs.

and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.

AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF

T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.

APPEALS, respondents.

Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the

payment of the restructured loans prompting petitioner
5

BANTSA to file civil actions

BUENA, J.:

before foreign courts for the

collection of the principal loan, to wit:

Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the

real

estate

mortgage

constituted

over a third

party

mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an

action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign
courts?

Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio

No 2098) against Liberian Transport
Navigation

Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
decision

a) In England, in its
High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench

of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R.

CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its

resolution,

Naviera

S.A.,

S.A.,

Eshley

El

Compania

Challenger

S.A.,

Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eddie

Navigation

Corp.,

Katipunan

Litonjua

S.A.,

Eduardo

and

Aurelio

Katipunan Litonjua on June 17, 1992.

dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's

motion for reconsideration.

b) In England, in its
High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench

Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an

Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio

international

No. 2245) against El Challenger S.A.,

banking

and

financing

institution

duly

licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and

2 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Espriona

Shipping

Company

S.A.,

Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio

ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is not applicable

Katipunan Litonjua on July 2, 1992;

in the present case, claiming that:

c) In Hongkong, in the

a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party

Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court

mortgagor

(Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley

principal restructuring agreements, was

Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger

never made a party defendant in the civil

S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A.

cases filed in Hongkong and England;

Pacific

Navigators

Corporation,

and

not

party

to

the

Eddie

Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua

b) There is actually no civil suit for sum

Chartering (Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio

of money filed in the Philippines since

Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo

the civil actions were filed in Hongkong

Katipunan Litonjua on November 19,

and England. As such, any decisions (sic)

1992; and

which

may

be

abovementioned

rendered

courts

are

in

the

not

(sic)

d) In Hongkong, in the

enforceable in the Philippines unless a

Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court

separate action to enforce the foreign

(Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley

judgments is first filed in the Philippines,

Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger

pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 of the

S.A., Espriona Shipping Company, S.A.,

Revised Rules of Court.

Pacific

Navigators

Corporation,

Eddie

Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua

Chartering
Eduardo

(Edyship)

Co.,

Katipunan

Jr.

and

Litonjua

on

c) Under English Law, which is the

governing

law

under

the

principal

agreements, the mortgagee does not lose

November 21, 1992.

its security interest by filing civil actions

for sums of money.

In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private

respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was private
not impleaded as party-defendant.

On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion

for
suspension

10

of the redemption period on the ground that

On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the

"it cannot exercise said right of redemption without at the

Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an

same time waiving or contradicting its contentions in the

application for extrajudicial foreclosure

of real estate

case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties

mortgage.

is legally improper and therefore invalid."

On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the

In an order

mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction in an

granted the private respondent's motion for suspension

extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with Integrated Credit and

after which a copy of said order was duly received by the

Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest bidder for

Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00).

11

dated 28 January 1994, the trial court

On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the

mortgaged properties at the foreclosure sale, consolidated

Pasig Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for

its ownership over the real properties, resulting to the

damages

against the petitioner, for the latter's act of

foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite

issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.

the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the

collection of the principal loan.

On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in

its favor, ICCS sold the real properties to Stateland

In its answer

petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting

the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an

Investment Corporation for the amount of Thirty Nine

Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00).

12

Accordingly, Transfer

Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-

3 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m) were issued in

doctrines

the latter's name.

Supreme Court in the cases of Caltex

laid

Philippines,
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision

13

Inc.

by

this

vs.

Hon.

Intermediate

Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No.

in favor of

74730 promulgated on August 25, 1989

private respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal

and Philippine Commercial International

portion of which reads:

Bank vs. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991 case),

WHEREFORE,

judgment

is

although said cases were duly cited,

hereby

extensively discussed and specifically

rendered declaring that the filing in

foreign

courts

by

the

defendant

mentioned, as one of the issues in the

of

assignment of errors found on page 5 of

collection suits against the principal

the decision dated September 30, 1997.

debtors operated as a waiver of the

security of the mortgages. Consequently,
the

down

plaintiff's

rights

as

owner

2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with

and

grave

possessor of the properties then covered

abuse

of

discretion

when

it

awarded the private respondent actual

by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-

and

78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760 and

exemplary

damages

totalling

P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998

T-78761, all of the Register of Deeds of

although such huge amount was not

Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were

asked

violated when the defendant caused the

nor

prayed

for

in

private

respondent's complaint, is contrary to

extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages

law

constituted thereon.

and

is

totally

unsupported

by

evidence (sic).

Accordingly, the defendant is hereby

ordered to pay the plaintiff the following
sums, all with legal interest thereon from

In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main

issues:

the date of the filing of the complaint up

1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of

to the date of actual payment:

filing
1) Actual or compensatory damages in
the amount of Ninety Nine Million Pesos

collection

suit

against

the

principal debtors for the recovery of the

loan before foreign courts constituted a

(P99,000,000.00);

waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

2) Exemplary damages in the amount of

2. Whether or not the award by the lower

Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00); and

court of actual and exemplary damages

3) Costs of suit.

third-party mortgagor, is proper.

in favor of private respondent ARC, as

The petition is bereft of merit.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed
decision of the lower court prompting petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied.

First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner

submits that a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires
the concurrence of two requisites: an ordinary civil action
for collection should be filed and subsequently a final
judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.

Hence, the instant petition for review

14

on certiorari where

herein petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals

the following assignment of errors:

of

to collect the principal loan does not suffice; a final

judgment must be secured and obtained in the personal

1.
Court

According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action

Appeals

The

disregarded

4 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Honorable
the

action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be

appreciated. To put it differently, absent any of the two

requisites, the mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have

In Danao vs. Court of Appeals,

waived the remedy of foreclosure.

jurisprudence enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co

vs.

We do not agree.
Certainly,

this

RFC,
Court

finds

petitioner's

Co
18

15

17

this Court, reiterating

and

Movido

vs.

invariably held:

arguments

. . . The rule is now settled that a

untenable and upholds the jurisprudence laid down in

Bachrach

Kim

16

mortgage creditor may elect to waive his

and similar cases adjudicated thereafter, thus:

security and bring, instead, an ordinary

action to recover the indebtedness with

In the absence of express statutory

the right to execute a judgment thereon

provisions,

may

on all the properties of the debtor,

institute against the mortgage debtor

including the subject matter of the

either a personal action or debt or a real

mortgage . . . , subject to the qualification

action to foreclose the mortgage. In other

that if he fails in the remedy by him

words, he may he may pursue either of

elected, he cannot pursue further the

the two remedies, but not both. By such

remedy he has waived. (Emphasis Ours)

mortgage

creditor

election, his cause of action can by no

means be impaired, for each of the two

Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down

remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an

the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute against the

election to bring a personal action will

mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real

leave open to him all the properties of

action to foreclose the mortgage.

the debtor for attachment and execution,

even including the mortgaged property
itself. And, if he waives such personal
action and pursues his remedy against
the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied
judgment thereon would still give him
the

right

to

sue

for

judgment,

in

which

deficiency

case,

all

the

properties of the defendant, other than

the mortgaged property, are again open
to

him

for

the

satisfaction

of

the

deficiency. In either case, his remedy is

complete,

his

undiminished,

cause
and

any

of

action

advantages

attendant to the pursuit of one or the

other remedy are purely accidental and
are all under his right of election. On the
other hand, a rule that would authorize
the plaintiff to bring a personal action
against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not
only in multiplicity of suits so offensive
to justice (Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil.
584) and obnoxious to law and equity
(Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404),
but also in subjecting the defendant to
the vexation of being sued in the place of
his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place
where the property lies.

5 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

19

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage

creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative.
Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of
the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of
the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but
with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale
is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted
real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the
debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private
respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party
mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not
parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property.
Notwithstanding,

there

is

20

no

legal

provision

nor

jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third

person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation
by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with
the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal
contractloanremains to be primarily bound. It is only
upon default of the latter that the creditor may have

recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged

remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a

properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the

cause of action.

amount of the loan.

21

As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of

In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the

Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal.

24

requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of

final judgment therein should concur, is untenable.

For non-payment of a note secured by

mortgage, the creditor has a single cause

we agreed with the

of action against the debtor. This single

petitioner in said case, that the filing of a collection suit

cause of action consists in the recovery

barred the foreclosure of the mortgage:

of the credit with execution of the

Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals,

22

security. In other words, the creditor in

A

mortgagee

collection
foreclosure

who

abandons
of

the

files

the

suit

chattel

remedy

his action may make two demands, the

for

payment of the debt and the foreclosure

of

of his mortgage. But both demands arise

mortgage

from the same cause, the non-payment

constituted over the personal property as

of the debt, and for that reason, they

security for the debt or value of the

promissory

note

when

he

seeks

constitute a single cause of action.

to

Though the debt and the mortgage

recover in the said collection suit.

constitute

. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a

suit

for

collection,

not

both

foreclosure,

so, the filing of the first complaint will

bar

waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the

subsequent

complaints

collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in

complaint.

By

simultaneously

or

successively, one to recover his credit

the present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a

and another to foreclose his mortgage,

result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise.

we will, in effect, be authorizing him

Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit is

plural redress for a single breach of

required for the rule on waiver to apply.

contract at so much cost to the courts

and

Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate

with

so

much

vexation

and

oppression to the debtor.

a case relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to

exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two

the

allowing the creditor to file two separate

mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for

alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and

same
exists

for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does

filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a

action which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless,

the
there

debt, and thereafter another complaint

the rule, for clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of

In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of

and

by filing a complaint for payment of the

Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate

other remedy of foreclosure.

one

cannot split up his single cause of action

the promissory note . . . .

of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the

to

by applying the rules above stated,

the mortgaged property as security for

that the mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery

refer

breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then,

his lack of desire and interest to go after

buttress its contention, this Court had occasion to rule

the

only one cause of action for a single

as basis for relief, he clearly manifests

23

agreements,

obligation. Consequently,

thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage

Court,

separate

latter is subsidiary to the former, and

Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly

disregarding the doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein this
High Court relaxed the application of the general rules to
wit:
In the present case, however, we shall
not follow this rule to the letter but
declare that it is the collection suit which
was waived and/or abandoned. This
ruling is more in harmony with the

6 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

principles

underlying

our

judicial

waived

the

right

to

foreclose

the

system. It is of no moment that the

mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on

collection suit was filed ahead, what is

its

determinative

the

Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-

even

78759, T-78762, T-78760 and T-78761.

foreclosure

is

the

proceedings

fact

that

ended

properties

originally

covered

by

(RTC Decision pp., 10-11)

before the decision in the collection suit

was rendered. . . .

In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of

Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of

severe criticism, to say the least.

26

context. We must stress that the Caltex case was never

intended

to

overrule

the

well-entrenched

doctrine

enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds

applicability in cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is
still good law.

Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by

citing the case of PCIB vs. IAC.

27

Again, petitioner tried to

fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be stressed that

far from overturning the doctrine laid down in Bachrach,

We then quote the decision

25

this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue

of the trial court, in the

by declaring:

present case, thus:

While the law allows a mortgage creditor
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the

to either institute a personal action for

exception rather than the rule, dictated

the debt or a real action to foreclosure

by the peculiar circumstances obtaining

the mortgage, he cannot pursue both

therein. In the said case, the Supreme

remedies simultaneously or successively

Court chastised Caltex for making ". . . a

as was done by PCIB in this case.

mockery of our judicial system when it

initially filed a collection suit then,

xxx xxx xxx

during the pendency thereof, foreclosed

extrajudicially the mortgaged property

Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No.

which secured the indebtedness, and

29392 to enforce payment of the 1.3

still pursued the collection suit to the

million promissory note secured by real

end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our

estate mortgages and subsequently filed

judicial system", the collection suit had

a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it

to be nullified because the foreclosure

violates the rule against splitting a cause

proceedings have already been pursued

of action.

to their end and can no longer be undone.

xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it has not been shown
whether the defendant pursued to the
end or are still pursuing the collection

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that

petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before
foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to
foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the
properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private
respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions

suits filed in foreign courts. There is no

and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages,

occasion, therefore, for this court to apply

petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against splitting a

the exception laid down by the Supreme

cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our

Court in Caltex by nullifying the collection

statute books.

suits. Quite obviously, too, the aforesaid

collection suits are beyond the reach of
this Court. Thus the only way the court
may prevent the spector of a creditor
having "plural redress for a single breach
of contract" is by holding, as the Court
hereby holds, that the defendant has

7 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the

remedy of foreclosure after the collection suit was filed,
considering that the creditor should not be afforded "plural
redress for a single breach of contract." For cause of action
should not be confused with the remedy created for its
enforcement.

28

Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial

determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign

but the efficacy of the remedy chosen in addressing the

country.

34

creditor's cause. Hence, a suit brought before a foreign

court having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the
action is deemed, for this purpose, to be within the
contemplation of the remedy available to the mortgageecreditor. This pronouncement would best serve the interest
of justice and fair play and further discourage the noxious
practice of splitting up a lone cause of action.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case

is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent

Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law,

If two or more suits are instituted on the

which according to petitioner is the governing law with

basis of the same cause of action, the

regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not

filing of one or a judgment upon the

lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for

sums of money.

ground for the dismissal of the others.

We rule in the negative.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its

This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner

to rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at bench,
Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence
presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the
matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the wellimbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact.

30

Thus, if the

foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our

courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local
law.

31

or

domestic

or

internal

This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual

presumption.

application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens

or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.

35

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private
respondent

is

entitled

to

the

award

of

actual

or

compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner

BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate
mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of
herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English

Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales,

merits in any one is available as a

29

32

said foreign law would still not find

applicability.

because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,

profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved,
otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no
damages will be given.

36

Indeed, the question of the value

of property is always a difficult one to settle as valuation of

real property is an imprecise process since real estate has
no inherent value readily ascertainable by an appraiser or
by the court.

37

The opinions of men vary so much

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is

concerning the real value of property that the best the

contrary to a sound and established public policy of the

courts can do is hear all of the witnesses which the

forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be

respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully

applied.

33

weighing that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is

just and equitable.

38

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts

or property, and those which have for their object public

In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals

order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered

for relying heavily on the valuation made by Philippine

ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by

Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA questions the act of

the appellate court in giving due weight to the appraisal

8 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro

In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court

Marquez and submitted as evidence by private respondent.

justified the award by presenting the following ratiocination

The appraisal report, as the records would readily show,

in its assailed decision

45

, to wit:

was corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Reynaldo Flores,

witness for private respondent.

Indeed, the Court has its own mind in

the matter of valuation. The size of the

On this matter, the trial court observed:

subject real properties are (sic) set forth

in their individuals titles, and the Court

The record herein reveals that plaintiff-

itself has seen the character and nature

appellee formally offered as evidence the

of said properties during the ocular

appraisal report dated March 29, 1993

inspection

(Exhibit J, Records, p. 409), consisting of

principally on the foregoing, the Court

twenty three (23) pages which set out in

makes the following observations:

it

conducted.

Based

detail the valuation of the property to

determine its fair market value (TSN,

1. The properties consist of about 39

April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of

hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del

P99,986,592.00

(TSN,

ibid.,

p.

5),

Monte,

Bulacan,

which

is

(sic)

not

together with the corroborative testimony

distant from Metro Manila the biggest

of

an

urban center in the Philippines and

Philippine

are easily accessible through well-paved

one

Mr.

appraiser

Reynaldo

and

director

F.
of

Flores,

Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p.

roads;

3). The latter's testimony was subjected

to

extensive

cross-examination

by

counsel for defendant-appellant (TSN,

April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22).

39

2.

The

properties

are

suitable

for

development into a subdivision for low

cost housing, as admitted by defendant's
own appraiser (TSN, May 30, 1994, p.

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court

31);

reiterates the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the

40

3. The pigpens which used to exist in the

The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and

property have already been demolished.

conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses

Houses of strong materials are found in

enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial courts

the vicinity of the property (Exhs. 2, 2-1

have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses

to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing

factual findings of the trial court should be respected.

as they testify.

41

community. It has even been shown that

the house of the Barangay Chairman is

This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses, principally because they are in
a better position to assess the same than the appellate
court.

42

Besides, trial courts are in a better position to

examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of

witnesses.

43

of the credibility of witnesses rest primarily with the trial

44

adjacent

to

(Exh.

27),

question

the

property

and

the

in

only

remaining piggery (named Cherry Farm)

in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away
from

the

western

boundary

of

the

property in question (TSN, November 19,

p. 3);

Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment

court.

located

In the case at bar, we see no reason that would

justify this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial

court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard to
the award of actual damages.

4. It will not be hard to find interested

buyers of the property, as indubitably
shown by the fact that on March 18,
1994,

ICCS

(the

buyer

during

the

foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated

real

estate

properties

to

Stateland

Investment Corporation, in whose favor

new titles were issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-

9 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

187781(m); T-187782(m), T-187783(m);

Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court

T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) by the

awarding an amount allegedly not asked nor prayed for in

Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic),

private respondent's complaint.

Bulacan;
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the

compensatory damages by the lower court exceeded that

subject

prayed for in the complaint, the same is nonetheless valid,

properties

to

Stateland

Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine

subject to certain qualifications.

Million (P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which is

more than triple defendant's appraisal

On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is

(Exh. 2) clearly shows that the Court

pertinent:

cannot rely on defendant's aforesaid

estimate (Decision, Records, p. 603).

Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or

authorize presentation of evidence.

It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of

When issues not raised by the pleadings

the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses command

are tried with the express or implied

great respect and consideration especially when the

conclusions are supported by the evidence on record.

consent of the parties, they shall be

46

treated in all respects as if they had been

Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the

raised

trial court committed no palpable error in giving credence

amendment of the pleadings as may be

to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who according to the

necessary to cause them to conform to

records, is a licensed real estate broker, appraiser and

the evidence and to raise these issues

director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since 1990.

may be made upon motion of any party

47

at any time, even after judgement; but

As the records show, Flores had been with the company

in

the

pleadings.

Such

failure to amend does not affect the

for 26 years at the time of his testimony.

result of the trial of these issues. If

evidence is objected to at the trial on the

Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not

ground that it is not within the issues

confine itself to the appraisal report dated 29 March 1993,

made by the pleadings, the court may

and the testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo Flores, in

allow the pleadings to be amended and

determining the fair market value of the real property.

shall

Above all these, the record would likewise show that the
trial

judge

in

order

to

appraise

himself

of

do

so

with

liberality

if

the

presentation of the merits of the action

the

and the ends of substantial justice will

characteristics and condition of the property, conducted an

be subserved thereby. The court may

ocular inspection where the opposing parties appeared and

grant

were duly represented.

continuance

to

enable

the

amendment to be made.

Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted,

we affirm the ruling of the trial court as regards the

The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,

valuation of the property

Inc. vs. Asociacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc.

citing

. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million

Pesos

(P99,000,000.00)

for

the

Northern

Appellate Court

50

Cement

Corporation

vs.

49

Intermediate

is enlightening:

39-

hectare properties (sic) translates to just

There have been instances where the

about Two Hundred Fifty Four Pesos

Court has held that even without the

(P254.00) per square meter. This appears

necessary

amendment,

to be, as the court so holds, a better

proved

the

approximation of the fair market value of

awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95

the

subject

properties.

This

is

at

trial

the

may

be

amount
validly

the

Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts

amount which should be restituted by

shown entitled plaintiff to relief other

the defendant to the plaintiff by way of

than that asked for, no amendment to

actual or compensatory damages . . . .

10 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

48

the complaint was necessary, especially

where defendant had himself raised the

amended to conform to the evidence,

point on which recovery was based. The

although it had not been actually so

appellate court could treat the pleading

amended. Former Chief Justice Moran

as amended to conform to the evidence

put the matter in this way:

although the pleadings were actually not

amended.

Amendment

is

also

When evidence is presented by

unnecessary when only clerical error or

one party, with the expressed or

non substantial matters are involved, as

implied consent of the adverse

we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands

party, as to issues not alleged in

vs. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco vs.

the pleadings, judgment may be

Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the

rendered

rule on amendment need not be applied

those issues, which shall be

rigidly, particularly where no surprise or

considered as if they have been

prejudice is caused the objecting party.

raised in the pleadings. There is

And in the recent case of National Power

implied consent to the evidence

Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113

thus

SCRA 556), we held that where there is a

adverse party fails to object

variance in the defendant's pleadings

thereto.

validly

as

presented

regards

when

the

and the evidence adduced by it at the

trial, the Court may treat the pleading as

Clearly, a court may rule and render

amended to conform with the evidence.

judgment on the basis of the evidence

before

it

even

though

the

relevant

It is the view of the Court that pursuant

pleading

to the above-mentioned rule and in light

amended, so long as no surprise or

of the decisions cited, the trial court

prejudice

should not be precluded from awarding

adverse party. Put a little differently, so

an amount higher than that claimed in

long as the basis requirements of fair

the

the

play had been met, as where litigants

absence of the required amendment. But

were given full opportunity to support

it is upon the condition that the evidence

their respective contentions and to object

of

been

to or refute each other's evidence, the

presented properly, with full opportunity

court may validly treat the pleadings as

on the part of the opposing parties to

if they had been amended to conform to

support their respective contentions and

the evidence and proceed to adjudicate

to refute each other's evidence.

on the basis of all the evidence before it.

pleading

such

notwithstanding

higher

amount

has

had
is

not

been

thereby

previously

caused

to

the

The failure of a party to amend a

In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was

pleading to conform to the evidence

afforded the opportunity to refute and object to the

adduced during trial does not preclude

evidence, both documentary and testimonial, formally

an adjudication by the court on the basis

offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play

of such evidence which may embody new

are deemed satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo

issues not raised in the pleadings, or

Flores was put under scrutiny during the course of the

serve as a basis for a higher award of

cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the court

damages. Although the pleading may not

acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed

have been amended to conform to the

no reversible error in awarding actual damages the amount

evidence

trial,

of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the lower

judgment may nonetheless be rendered,

court's actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and

not simply on the basis of the issues

supported by jurisprudence.

submitted

during

alleged but also the basis of issues

discussed and the assertions of fact
proved in the course of trial. The court
may treat the pleading as if it had been

11 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages

although the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
awarded,

being

excessive,

is

subject

to

reduction.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of

on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the

case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi

51

Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under

moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Considering its purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in

the premises.

every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a

prevailing party.

52

In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as

exemplary damages in the present case qualifies the test of

ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is

correct.

reasonableness.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss

DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of

with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs

Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the

effectively asked the court to make a determination of

amount

Saudia Airliness rights hence a submission to the courts

awarded

as

exemplary

damages.

According,

petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the

sum

of

P99,000,000.00

as

actual

or

jurisdiction.

compensatory

damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damage and the costs

of suit.

Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case

because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is
bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our

SO ORDERED.

Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the
right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,

Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in

concur.

personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or

where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her
right to file the case here because if shell file it in Saudi
Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of
course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF

APPEALS

a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was

FACTS: Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for

with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that

Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some coworkers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab
co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a
roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab coworkers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later,
Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila
office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her
to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but
to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where
she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated
Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of
Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince
determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the
Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines.
Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then
sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss

12 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at

summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet
she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was
defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to
her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is
tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her
humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge

of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution
dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision
10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
36533,

and the Orders

February 2, 1995

dated April

in CA-G.R. SP No.

dated August 29, 1994

and

that were issued by the trial court in

Civil Case No. Q-93-18394. 8

The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the
instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision 9, are
as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA
hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for
its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a
disco dance with fellow crew members
Thamer

Al-Gazzawi

and

Allah

Al-

Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because

it

was

almost

morning

when

they

returned to their hotels, they agreed to

have breakfast together at the room of
Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room,
Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after
he
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

did,

Thamer

attempted

to

rape

plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and

several security personnel heard her
cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested
Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter

FIRST DIVISION

as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few
days

later,

several

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,

back to Jakarta to help arrange the

COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON.

13 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

about

the

officials

interrogated

vs.

her

SAUDIA

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

Jakarta

incident. They then requested her to go

release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta,
SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and

base manager Baharini negotiated with

her that this was necessary to close the

the police for the immediate release of

case against Thamer and Allah. As it

the detained crew members but did not

turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to

succeed

to

her to appear before the court on June

cooperate. She was afraid that she might

27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to

be tricked into something she did not

Manila.

want

because

because

plaintiff refused

of

her

inability

to

understand the local dialect. She also

declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect.
Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to
return to Jeddah but barred her from
the Jakarta flights.

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA

summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27,
1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff
did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's
Saleemi,

Plaintiff

learned

intercession

of

that,
the

through

Saudi

the

Arabian

Manila
that

the

manager,

Aslam

investigation

was

routinary and that it posed no danger to

her.

government, the Indonesian authorities

agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant
SAUDI

(sic).

In

September

1990,

In

Jeddah,

SAUDIA

legal

officer

brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court

on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened
then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi

defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff

judge interrogated plaintiff through an

to Manila.

interpreter about the Jakarta incident.

After one hour of interrogation, they let

On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff

her go. At the airport, however, just as

thought that the Jakarta incident was

her plane was about to take off, a

already

superiors

SAUDIA officer told her that the airline

requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,

had forbidden her to take flight. At the

Chief

in

Inflight Service Office where she was told

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw

to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick

him, he brought her to the police station

took away her passport and told her to

where the police took her passport and

remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters,

questioned

until further orders.

behind
Legal

her,

Officer

her

her
of

about

SAUDIA,

the

Jakarta

incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the

police put pressure on her to make a

On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer

statement dropping the case against

again escorted plaintiff to the same court

Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed

where the judge, to her astonishment

to do so did the police return her

and

passport and allowed her to catch the

translated to her in English, sentencing

afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

her to five months imprisonment and to

shock,

rendered

decision,

286 lashes. Only then did she realize

One year and a half later or on lune 16,

that the Saudi court had tried her,

1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few

together with Thamer and Allah, for what

minutes before the departure of her

happened in Jakarta. The court found

flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed

plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to

to board the plane and instead ordered

a disco, dancing and listening to the

to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.

music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)

Miniewy,

socializing

the

Chief

Legal

Officer

of

SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid

with

the

male

crew,

contravention of Islamic tradition.

in

10

of the SAUDIA office brought her to a

Saudi court where she was asked to sign
a document written in Arabic. They told

14 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of

her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was

denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine

In the Reply

Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.

1994,

Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the

Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of

domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah

action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if

continued

that ground is raised for the first time on appeal.

flights.

to

serve

in

the

international

11

23

SAUDIA

filed with the trial court on October 24,

alleged

that

since

its

Motion

for

Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not

have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of

Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to
leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,

instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate

the same.

12
24

she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order

her being informed of the cause.

dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for

Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint

13

for

Order reads as follows:

damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("AlActing on the Motion for Reconsideration

Balawi"), its country manager.

of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,

thru counsel, on September 20, 1994,

On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To

Dismiss

14

and

which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1)

that the Complaint states no cause of action against

that

the

trial

court

has

considering

no

that

perusal

of

the

one for the recovery of actual, moral and

exemplary damages plus attorney's fees,

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To

15

the

plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is

jurisdiction to try the case.

Motion to Dismiss)

of

thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,

Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise

(4)

thereto

of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,

interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the

and

Opposition

14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith

Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in

extinguished;

the

plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October

. Saudia filed a reply

16

upon

thereto on

the

basis

of

the

applicable

Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil

March 3, 1994.

Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint

the jurisdiction of this Court as regards

17

the subject matter, and there being

wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On

nothing new of substance which might

August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion

to Dismiss Amended Complaint

18

cause the reversal or modification of the

order sought to be reconsidered, the

motion

The trial court issued an Order

19

for

reconsideration

of

the

defendant, is DENIED.

dated August 29, 1994

denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by

Saudia.

SO ORDERED.

From the Order of respondent Judge

20

25

denying the Motion

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its

to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for

Motion for Reconsideration

21

of the Order dated August 29,

1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to

Issuance

of

Writ

of

Preliminary

Temporary Restraining Order

26

Injunction

and/or

with the Court of Appeals.

hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada
filed

her

Opposition

22

(To

Defendant's

Reconsideration).

Motion

for

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution

with Temporary Restraining Order

AGUSTIN, E.P.

dated February 23,

1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further

conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in
the interim.

15 CONFLICT OF LAWS

27

In another Resolution

28

promulgated on September 27,

"conflicts

problem".

Otherwise,

the

1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's

Republic of the Philippines will sit in

Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction

judgment of the acts done by another

dated February 18, 1995, to wit:

sovereign state which is abhorred.

The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary

Injunction

is

II

hereby

DENIED, after considering the Answer,

Leave

with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary

supplemental

Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and

jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the

Rejoinder,

herein

matter as to absence of leave of court is

petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto

now moot and academic when this

(Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v.

Honorable

Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7,

respondents to comment on petitioner's

1993, Second Division).

April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For

it

appearing

that

of

court

before

pleading

Court

filing

not

is

required

the

Review With Prayer For A Temporary

Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days

SO ORDERED.

From
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable
Court the instant Petition

29

for Review with Prayer for

Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.

However, during the pendency of the instant Petition,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision

30

dated

April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the

Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that
certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to
Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded
to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in
an appeal.

Notice

Revised

Thereof.

Rules

of

Further,

Court

should

the
be

construed with liberality pursuant to

Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the
April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP
NO.

36533

entitled

"Saudi

Arabian

Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al."

and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A
Temporary Restraining Order on May 7,
1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day
reglementary

period

as

provided

for

under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for

Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order

31

dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After
both parties submitted their Memoranda,

32

the instant

case is now deemed submitted for decision.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet

become final and executory and this
Honorable Court can take cognizance of
this case.

33

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the

Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:

following issues emerge for our resolution:

I.

The trial court has no jurisdiction to

hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394
based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code
since the proper law applicable is the law
of

Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in

the

Kingdom

of

Saudi

Arabia

inasmuch as this case involves what is

known in private international law as a

16 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE

COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
TRY

CIVIL

CASE

NO.

Q-93-18394

ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V.

7. On January 14, 1992, just when

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".

plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident

was already behind her, her superiors
reauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy,

II.

Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah,

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN
THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD
GOVERN.

brought her to the police station where

the

police

questioned

took
her

her
about

passport
the

and

Jakarta

incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the

Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws

that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private
respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence
of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by
virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

police put pressure on her to make a

statement dropping the case against
Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed
to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

34

8. One year and a half later or on June

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since

her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19

35

and 21

36

of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter

of domestic law.

Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he

37

16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few

minutes before the departure of her
flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed
to board the plane and instead ordered
to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.

Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there

is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two
states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.

Meniewy,

the

Chief Legal Officer of

SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid

of the SAUDIA office brought her to a
Saudi court where she was asked to sigh
a document written in Arabic. They told

As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint

her that this was necessary to close the

38

case against Thamer and Allah. As it

dated June 23, 1994:

turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to

2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES
or

SAUDIA

is

corporation

doing

Philippines.

It

foreign
business

may

be

airlines
in

served

the

her to appear before the court on June

27,

1993.

Plaintiff then returned to

Manila.

with

summons and other court processes at

9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA

Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.).

summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah

Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114

once again and see Miniewy on June 27,

Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro

1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff

Manila.

did so after receiving assurance from

SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi,
that the investigation was routinary and

xxx xxx xxx

that it posed no danger to her.

6. Plaintiff learned that, through the
Arabian

10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer

government, the Indonesian authorities

brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court

agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after

on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened

two weeks of detention. Eventually, they

then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi

were again put in service by defendant

judge interrogated plaintiff through an

SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant

interpreter about the Jakarta incident.

SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

After one hour of interrogation, they let

intercession

of

the

Saudi

her go. At the airport, however, just as

17 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

her plane was about to take off, a

one State involves properties situated in another State. In

SAUDIA officer told her that the airline

other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex

had forbidden her to take that flight. At

form.

42

the Inflight Service Office where she was

told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told
her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the

fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did

11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal

transpire during her many occasions of travel across

officer again escorted plaintiff to the

national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to

same court where the judge, to her

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a

astonishment and shock, rendered a

"conflicts" situation to arise.

decision, translated to her in English,

sentencing

her

to

five

months

imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only

then did she realize that the Saudi court
had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The
court

found

plaintiff

guilty

of

(1)

adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing,

and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male
crew,

in

contravention

of

Islamic

tradition.

We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is

purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents
itself here, and the question of jurisdiction

After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended

Complaint,

44

and the Comment thereon, we note that she

aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21

of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the

a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the

of

confronts the

court a quo.

12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her

help

43

the

Philippines

Embassy

exercise

in

Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an

served the international flights.

39

the

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes

loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs

the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.

or public policy shall compensate the

latter for damages.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is

element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of

in

provides:

existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that

contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign

and

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the

affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to

rights

honesty and good faith.

pay for her upkeep, she worked on the

while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely

his

justice give everyone his due and observe

appeal from the decision of the court. To

domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA

of

performance of his duties, act with

Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of

Appeals,

45

this Court held that:

individuals and associations are rarely confined to the

geographic limits of their birth or conception.

40

The

aforecited

provisions

on

human

relations were intended to expand the

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are
many.

41

The foreign element may simply consist in the fact

that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a

foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of

18 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

concept of torts in this jurisdiction by

granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible

for

human

foresight

specifically provide in the statutes.

to

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law,

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance.

Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with

[Now Regional Trial Court]

private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19

and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies

(a) xxx xxx xxx

in the municipal forum.

Based on the allegations

46

(b) Personal actions. All other actions

in the Amended Complaint,
47

may be commenced and tried where the

we

defendant or any of the defendants

find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City

resides or may be found, or where the

48

plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at

read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction

possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.

the election of the plaintiff.

Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa

parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City

Blg.

the

assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of

"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980",

the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained

is hereby amended to read as follows:

is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair

129,

otherwise

known

as

trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.
Regional

Trial

Courts

shall

exercise

exclusive jurisdiction:

defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or

disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in
which

demand,

exclusive

of

interest,

damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees,
litigation

expenses,

and cots or the value

of

an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the

the

property

controversy
One

in

exceeds
hundred

thousand
(P100,000.00)

pesos
or,

in

49

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo

found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing
plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she
no longer maintains substantial connections. That would
have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

such other cases in

Metro Manila, where

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over

the demand, exclusive

the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint

of

and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private

the

above-

mentioned

items

exceeds Two hundred

Thousand

respondent

has

voluntary

submitted

herself

to

the

jurisdiction of the court.

pesos

(P200,000.00).

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several

(Emphasis ours)

motions

50

praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended

Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante

xxx xxx xxx

Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent

and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of

for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner

Court the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:

SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's

19 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-

Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)

What legal system should control a given situation where

As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company,

Ltd.:

51

some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;

and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system
regulate the situation.

We observe that the motion to dismiss

filed on April 14, 1962, aside from
disputing the lower court's jurisdiction
over

defendant's

person,

prayed

for

dismissal of the complaint on the ground

that

plaintiff's

cause

of

action

has

53

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify

the legal system that should ultimately control. Although
ideally,

all

choice-of-law

theories

should

intrinsically

advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do

not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem

prescribed. By interposing such second

of deciding which of these two important values should be

ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and

stressed.

54

Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense

on the basis of which it prayed the court

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to

to resolve controversy in its favor. For the

determine under what category a certain set of facts or

court to validly decide the said plea of

rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or

defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily

the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding

had to acquire jurisdiction upon the

whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question

latter's person, who, being the proponent

specified

of the affirmative defense, should be

deemed to have abandoned its special
appearance and voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

of

objecting

to

the

it must be for the sole and separate

purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court. If his motion is for any other
purpose than to object to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, he thereby
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. A special appearance by motion
made for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person
will be held to be a general appearance,
if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action
upon the further ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject
52

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the
trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its
exercise thereof, justified.

20 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

rule."

55

The

purpose

of

"characterization" is to enable the forum to select the

proper law.

56

57

An

essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a

jurisdiction of the court over the person,

matter.

conflicts

but a factual situation, event, or operative fact.

When the appearance is by motion for

purpose

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation,

Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;

the

in

"test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-oflaw rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such
as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor
or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.

58

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to

serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law.

59

These "test factors" or "points of contact"

or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person,
such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place
where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;

(4) the place where an act has been done,

including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and

the locus actus, such as the place where

tradition.

a contract has been made, a marriage

celebrated,

tort

There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that

is

the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private

particularly important in contracts and

respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted

torts;

beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act

committed.

will

The

signed
lex

or

loci

actus

contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused

(5) the place where an act is intended to

additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private

come into effect, e.g., the place of

respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the

performance of contractual duties, or the

arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent

place where a power of attorney is to be

under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer,

exercised;

taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she

reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of

(6) the

intention

of

the

contracting

parties as to the law that should govern

their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7)

the

place

where

judicial

or

or done. The lex fori the law of the

is

particularly

important

because, as we have seen earlier, matters

of "procedure" not going to the substance
of the claim involved are governed by it;
and because the lex fori applies whenever
the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application
in a given case for the reason that it falls
under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and

cases is decisive of practically all legal

relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers
relationships

contracts of affreightment.

particularly
60

(Emphasis

ours.)

allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for

purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that
there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion
although

she

was

to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done,

once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact"
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or
lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as
a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious
conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines
where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she
had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise
justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith."
Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all harm or the
totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including

that

injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and

of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many

contractual

private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the

reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed,

administrative proceedings are instituted

forum

Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of

already

working

in

Manila,

petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she

would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she
made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack
on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out,
she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,

21 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the

Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules
on tort liability

61

have been advanced to offer fresh judicial

approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with

the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an
occasion to apply the "State of the most significant
relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate
to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has

defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case.

the most significant relationship, the following contacts are

Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid,

to be taken into account and evaluated according to their

but

relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a)

expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at

the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where

hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately

the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,

concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not

residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of

just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the

business of the parties, and (d) the place where the

vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a

62

relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

appeal

after

trial

was

obviously

available,

and

transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the

trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that overall injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is
likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign

light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of

the foreign element or elements involved. Nothing said
herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the
results of the case in any manner whatsoever.

corporation engaged here in the business of international

air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby

was centered here, although it should be stressed that this

DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros

suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the

P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED

record, the claim that the Philippines has the most

to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for

significant contact with the matter in this dispute,

63

raised

further proceedings.

by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant

(herein

petitioner),

in

our

view,

has

been

properly

SO ORDERED.

established.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the
most interest in the problem", we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability
should have paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,
which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we
find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter."

64

As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no

obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles
19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never
alleged that Saudi law should govern this case.
correctly

held

by

the

respondent

65

appellate

And as
court,

"considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking

the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the
burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what
the law of Saudi Arabia is".

66

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent

appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of

22 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job

offer, it was stated, among others, that she was to be put
on probation for 3 months and termination of her
employment may be made by either party after 1 day notice
while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in
lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms
and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended
for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben
Tobias, the bank president, that she would have to resign
in line with some cost cutting and realignment measures of
the company. She refused but was informed by Tobias that
if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.

Issues:
1.

W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has

jurisdiction

2.

W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the

proper venue

3.

W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

1.

Labor

arbiters

have

original

and

exclusive

jurisdiction over claims arising from employeremployee relations including termination disputes
involving all workers, including OFWs. Here,
Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from
the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The
OEC authorized her working status in a foreign
country and entitled her to all benefits and
processes under our statutes. Although she may
been a direct hire at the commencement of her
employment, she became an OFW who was
covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon
certification by the POEA. When she was illegally
terminated, she already possessed the POEA

PNB VS. CABANSAG

G.R. No. 157010

employment certificate.

June 21, 2005

Facts:
Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While
she was there, she looked for a job and eventually applied
with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank.
PNB is a private banking corporation organized and
existing

under

Philippine

laws.

She

was

23 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

eventually

2.

A migrant worker refers to a person who is to be

engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she
is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably
with overseas Filipino worker. Here, Cabansag

was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore,

Republic of the Philippines

and employed by petitioner in its branch office in

SUPREME COURT

Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker.

Manila

Thus, she has the option where to file her

Complaint for illegal dismissal. She can either file

THIRD DIVISION

at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she

resides or the RAB where the employer is situated.
Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office
in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of
proper venue.

G.R. No. 157010

June 21, 2005

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.

3.

The appellate court was correct in holding that

respondent was already a regular employee at the
time of her dismissal, because her three-month

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

probationary period of employment had already

ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article

The Court reiterates the basic policy that all Filipino

281 of the Labor Code: An employee who is

workers, whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the

allowed to work after a probationary period shall

protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations.

be

Indeed,

Our labor statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws

petitioner recognized respondent as such at the

or judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in

time it dismissed her, by giving her one months

a foreign country.

considered

regular

employee.

salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent

with provision No. 6 of her employment Contract.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside
the July 16, 2002 Decision2 and the January 29, 2003
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
68403. The assailed Decision dismissed the CA Petition
(filed by herein petitioner), which had sought to reverse the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)s June 29,
2001 Resolution,4 affirming Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustrias
January 18, 2000 Decision.5
The assailed CA Resolution denied herein petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag]
arrived

in

Singapore

as

tourist.

She

applied

for

employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine

National Bank, a private banking corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal offices at the PNB Financial Center, Roxas
Boulevard, Manila. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch
was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as

24 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the

whatsoever outside business hours by any person,

Bank. At the time, too, the Branch Office had two (2) types

firm or company.

of employees: (a) expatriates or the regular employees, hired

in Manila and assigned abroad including Singapore, and (b)
locally (direct) hired. She applied for employment as Branch
Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00,
effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben
C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on
October 26, 1998, a letter to the President of the Bank in
Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O.
Cabansag, for the position.

6. Termination of your employment with the Bank

may be made by either party after notice of one (1)
day in writing during probation, one month notice
upon confirmation or the equivalent of one (1)
days or months salary in lieu of notice.
"Florence O. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed
office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in
Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence

xxxxxxxxx

O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the

Philippine

Overseas

Employment

Administration,

an

"The President of the Bank was impressed with the

Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a

credentials of Florence O. Cabansag that he approved the

bona fide contract worker for Singapore.

recommendation of Ruben C. Tobias. She then filed an

Application, with the Ministry of Manpower of the
Government

of

Singapore,

for

the

issuance

of

an

Employment Pass as an employee of the Singapore PNB

Branch. Her application was approved for a period of two
(2) years.

"Barely three (3) months in office, Florence O. Cabansag

submitted to Ruben C. Tobias, on March 9, 1999, her
initial Performance Report. Ruben C. Tobias was so

"On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to

Florence

xxxxxxxxx

O.

Cabansag

offering

her

temporary

appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of

Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her
successful completion of her probation to be determined
solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion
of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her
temporary appointment was subject to the following terms
and conditions:

impressed with the Report that he made a notation and,

on said Report: GOOD WORK. However, in the evening of
April 14, 1999, while Florence O. Cabansag was in the flat,
which she and Cecilia Aquino, the Assistant Vice-President
and Deputy General Manager of the Branch and Rosanna
Sarmiento, the Chief Dealer of the said Branch, rented, she
was told by the two (2) that Ruben C. Tobias has asked
them to tell Florence O. Cabansag to resign from her job.
Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed at the sudden turn of
events and the runabout way Ruben C. Tobias procured
her resignation from the Bank. The next day, Florence O.

1. You will be on probation for a period of three

Cabansag talked to Ruben C. Tobias and inquired if what

(3) consecutive months from the date of your

Cecilia Aquino and Rosanna Sarmiento had told her was

assumption of duty.

true. Ruben C. Tobias confirmed the veracity of the

information, with the explanation that her resignation was

2.

You

will

observe

the

Banks

rules

and

regulations and those that may be adopted from

imperative as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. Ruben

C. Tobias, likewise, told Florence O. Cabansag that the PNB

time to time.

Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a

3. You will keep in strictest confidence all matters

Cabansag had to resign from her employment. The more

related to transactions between the Bank and its

clients.
4. You will devote your full time during business
hours in promoting the business and interest of
the Bank.
5. You will not, without prior written consent of
the Bank, be employed in anyway for any purpose

25 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

remittance office and that, in either way, Florence O.

Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed. She then asked
Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a Formal
Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However,
Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O. Cabansag did
not submit any letter of resignation.
"On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned
Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she
submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he
needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the

local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking

d) Monetary equivalent of leave credits

Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting

earned

for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted

amount

her letter of resignation, her employment record will be

equivalent in Philippine Currency at the

blemished with the notation DISMISSED spread thereon.

time of payment;

on

Sunday

of

SGD

banking

in

the

1,557.67

or

its

Without giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag

asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to

e) Monetary equivalent of unused sick

look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she

leave benefits in the amount of SGD

should be out of her employment by May 15, 1999.

1,150.60 or its equivalent in Philippine

Currency at the time of payment.

"However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again

summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered

f)

her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On

Monetary

equivalent

of

unused

vacation leave benefits in the amount of

April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias

SGD

terminating her employment with the Bank.

319.85

Philippine

or

its

Currency

at

equivalent
the

time

in
of

payment.
xxxxxxxxx
g) 13th month pay in the amount of SGD
"On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered

4,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine

judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the

Currency at the time of payment;

Respondents, the decretal portion of which reads as

follows:

3. Solidarily to pay complainant actual damages

in the amount of SGD 1,978.00 or its equivalent

WHEREFORE,

considering

the

foregoing

premises,

in Philippine Currency at the time of payment,

judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents guilty of

and moral damages in the amount of PhP

Illegal dismissal and devoid of due process, and are hereby

200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of

ordered:

PhP 100,000.00;
1. To reinstate complainant to her former or

4. To pay complainant the amount of SGD

substantially equivalent position without loss of

5,039.81 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency

seniority rights, benefits and privileges;

at the time of payment, representing attorneys

fees.

2. Solidarily liable to pay complainant as follows:

SO ORDERED."

[Emphasis in the original.]

a) To pay complainant her backwages

from 16 April 1999 up to her actual

PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a

reinstatement. Her backwages as of the

Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed

date of the promulgation of this decision

that Decision, but reduced the moral damages to P100,000

amounted

and the exemplary damages to P50,000. In a subsequent

to SGD 40,500.00

or its

equivalent in Philippine Currency at the

Resolution,

time of payment;

Reconsideration.

the

NLRC

denied

b) Mid-year bonus in the amount of SGD

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

PNBs

Motion

for

2,250.00 or its equivalent in Philippine

Currency at the time of payment;

In disposing of the Petition for Certiorari, the CA noted that

petitioner bank had failed to adduce in evidence the

c) Allowance for Sunday banking in the

Singaporean

amount of SGD 120.00 or its equivalent

employment Contract with respondent. The appellate court

in Philippine Currency at the time of

found that the Contract had actually been processed by the

payment;

Philippine Embassy in Singapore and approved by the

law

supposedly

governing

the

latters

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),

26 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

which then used that Contract as a basis for issuing an

Court of Appeals have concurrent original jurisdiction over

Overseas Employment Certificate in favor of respondent.

such petitions for certiorari. Thus, in observance of the

doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, these petitions should

According to the CA, even though respondent secured an

employment

pass

from

the

Singapore

Ministry

be initially filed with the CA.11

of

Employment, she did not thereby waive Philippine labor

Rightly, the bank elevated the NLRC Resolution to the CA

laws, or the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC

by way of a Petition for Certiorari. In seeking a review by

over her Complaint for illegal dismissal. In so doing, neither

this

did she submit herself solely to the Ministry of Manpower

jurisdiction, venue and validity of employment termination

of Singapores jurisdiction over disputes arising from her

-- petitioner is likewise correct in invoking Rule 45. 12

Court of the CA Decision

-- on questions

of

employment. The appellate court further noted that a

cursory reading of the Ministrys letter will readily show
that no such waiver or submission is stated or implied.

It is true, however, that in a petition for review on certiorari,

the scope of the Supreme Courts judicial review of
decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only

Finally, the CA held that petitioner had failed to establish a

to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. This

just cause for the dismissal of respondent. The bank had

doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual

also failed to give her sufficient notice and an opportunity

questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve.

to be heard and to defend herself. The CA ruled that she

present case, the labor arbiter and the NLRC have already

was consequently entitled to reinstatement and back

determined the factual issues. Their findings, which are

wages, computed from the time of her dismissal up to the

supported by substantial evidence, were affirmed by the

time of her reinstatement.

CA. Thus, they are entitled to great respect and are

13

In the

rendered conclusive upon this Court, absent a clear

Hence, this Petition.

showing of

palpable

error

or arbitrary

disregard

of

evidence.14
Issues
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner

submits

the

following

issues

for

our
The Petition has no merit.

consideration:
"1. Whether or not the arbitration branch of the
NLRC

in

the

National

Capital

Region

First Issue:

has

jurisdiction over the instant controversy;

Jurisdiction

"2. Whether or not the arbitration of the NLRC in

The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified

the

in Article 217 of the Labor Code as follows:

National

Capital

Region

is

the

most

convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the

instant controversy; and

"ART.

217.

Jurisdiction

of

Labor

Arbiters

and

the

Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this

"3. Whether or not the respondent was illegally

Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive

dismissed, and therefore, entitled to recover moral

jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar

and exemplary damages and attorneys fees."8

days after the submission of the case by the parties for

decision without extension, even in the absence

In addition, respondent assails, in her Comment,

the

propriety of Rule 45 as the procedural mode for seeking a

stenographic

notes,

the

following

cases

of

involving all

workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

review of the CA Decision affirming the NLRC Resolution.

Such issue deserves scant consideration. Respondent

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

miscomprehends the Courts discourse in St. Martin

Funeral Home v. NLRC,10 which has indeed affirmed that
the proper mode of review of NLRC decisions, resolutions or
orders is by a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court and the

27 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,
those cases that workers may file involving wage,

rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and

the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the

conditions of employment

immigration regulations of that country. 16

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other

Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos

forms of damages arising from the employer-

working in the country to first obtain a local work permit in

employee relations;

order to be legally employed here. That permit, however,

does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264

of this Code, including questions involving the

bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does

not at all imply a waiver of ones national laws on labor.

legality of strikes and lockouts; and

Absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,

as a worker in the issuing country.1avvphil.zw+

such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status

Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,

all other claims, arising from employer-employee

Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for

relations, including those of persons in domestic

and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the

or household service, involving an amount of

POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The

exceeding

(P5,000.00)

Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona

regardless of whether accompanied with a claim

fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law,

for reinstatement.

this document authorized her working status in a foreign

five

thousand

pesos

country and entitled her to all benefits and processes

(b)

The

commission

shall

have

exclusive

appellate

jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

"direct hire" governed by and subject to the laws, common

subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who

More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:

"SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon

certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was
illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA
employment Certificate.
Moreover,

petitioner

admits

that

it

is

Philippine

corporation doing business through a branch office in

Singapore.18 Significantly, respondents employment by the
Singapore branch office had to be approved by Benjamin P.
Palma Gil,19 the president of the bank whose principal
offices were in Manila. This circumstance militates against
petitioners contention that respondent was "locally hired";
and totally "governed by and subject to the laws, common

x x x x x x x x x"

practices and customs" of Singapore, not of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly

have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
from employer-employee relations, including termination
disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas
Filipino workers (OFW).15

directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the

that

Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the

presumption

that

respondent

falls

under

the

legal

definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in

Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application
of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the
labor arbiter.

We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was

in

she was considered at the start of her employment as a

practices and customs prevailing in Singapore 17 she

x x x x x x x x x."

PNB branch

under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that

city state.

Prior to

employing

respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass

for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing

In any event, we recall the following policy pronouncement

of the Court in Royal Crown Internationale v. NLRC:20
"x x x. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino
workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and
social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary

28 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with

is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus

the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to

falls within the category of "migrant worker" or "overseas

labor,

Filipino worker."

promote

full

employment,

ensure

equal

work

opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate

the relations between workers and employers.1awphi1.net

As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her

For the State assures the basic rights of all workers to self-

Complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law

organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and

gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional Arbitration

just and humane conditions of work [Article 3 of the Labor

Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where

Code of the Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and

the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her

Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is

dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the

likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code

Philippines -- specifically to her residence at Filinvest II,

which states that laws which have for their object public

Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB

order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered

office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper

ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by

venue.

determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign

country."

Third Issue:

Second Issue:

Illegal Dismissal

Proper Venue

The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent

was already a regular employee at the time of her

Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure

dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of

reads:

employment

had

already

ended.

This

ruling

is

in

accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: "An

"Section 1. Venue (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have

employee who is allowed to work after a probationary

authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional

period shall be considered a regular employee." Indeed,

Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace

petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it

of the complainant/petitioner; Provided, however that cases

dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in lieu of a

of Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed before the

one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her

Regional Arbitration Branch where the complainant resides

employment Contract.

or where the principal office of the respondent/employer is

situated, at the option of the complainant.

Notice and Hearing Not Complied With

"For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as

As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all

the place or locality where the employee is regularly

rights, benefits and privileges provided under our labor

assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include

laws. One of her fundamental rights is that she may not be

the place where the employee is supposed to report back

dismissed

after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case

requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential

of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant

elements of procedural due process, and neither of these

workers, their workplace is where they are regularly

elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the

assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive

constitutional guarantee.22

without

due

process

of

law.

The

twin

their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report

the results of their assignment to their employers."

In dismissing employees, the employer must furnish them

two written notices: 1) one to apprise them of the particular

Under the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

acts or omissions for which their dismissal is sought; and

1995" (RA 8042), a migrant worker "refers to a person who

2) the other to inform them of the decision to dismiss them.

is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a

As to the requirement of a hearing, its essence lies simply

remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a

in the opportunity to be heard.23

legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas

Filipino worker."21 Undeniably, respondent was employed by
petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she

29 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

The evidence in this case is crystal-clear. Respondent was

not notified of the specific act or omission for which her

dismissal was being sought. Neither was she given any

and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and

chance to be heard, as required by law. At any rate, even if

regulations by simply contracting with each other." 31 Also,

she were given the opportunity to be heard, she could not

while a contract is the law between the parties, the

have defended herself effectively, for she knew no cause to

provisions of positive law that regulate such contracts are

answer to.

deemed included and shall limit and govern the relations

between the parties.32

All that petitioner tendered to respondent was a notice of

her employment termination effective the very same day,

Basic in our jurisprudence is the principle that when there

together with the equivalent of a one-month pay. This

is no showing of any clear, valid, and legal cause for the

Court has already held that nothing in the law gives an

termination of employment, the law considers the matter a

employer the option to substitute the required prior notice

case of illegal dismissal.33

and opportunity to be heard with the mere payment of 30

days salary. 24

Awards for Damages Justified

Well-settled is the rule that the employer shall be

Finally, moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal

sanctioned for noncompliance with the requirements of, or

for failure to observe, due process that must be observed in
dismissing an employee.25

of an employee is attended by bad faith or constitutes an

act oppressive to labor or is done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. 34 Awards for moral
and exemplary damages would be proper if the employee

No Valid Cause for Dismissal

was harassed and arbitrarily dismissed by the employer. 35

Moreover, Articles 282,26 28327 and 28428 of the Labor Code

In affirming the awards of moral and exemplary damages,

provide the valid grounds or causes for an employees

we quote with approval the following ratiocination of the

dismissal. The employer has the burden of proving that it

labor arbiter:

was done for any of those just or authorized causes. The

failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal
was not justified, and that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement and back wages.29

"The records also show that [respondents] dismissal was

effected

by

[petitioners]

capricious

and

high-handed

manner, anti-social and oppressive, fraudulent and in bad

faith, and contrary to morals, good customs and public

Notably, petitioner has not asserted any of the grounds

policy. Bad faith and fraud are shown in the acts

provided by law as a valid reason for terminating the

committed

employment of respondent. It merely insists that her

[respondents] dismissal in addition to the manner by

dismissal was validly effected pursuant to the provisions of

which

her employment Contract, which she had voluntarily

pressured to resign for two different and contradictory

agreed to be bound to.

reasons,

by

she

[petitioners]

was

namely,

before,

dismissed.
cost-cutting

First,
and

during

and

[respondent]
the

need

after
was
for

Chinese[-]speaking credit officer, for which no written

Truly,

the

contracting

parties

may

establish

such

stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they want,

and their agreement would have the force of law between
them. However, petitioner overlooks the qualification that
those terms and conditions agreed upon must not be
contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy or public
order.30 As explained earlier, the employment Contract
between

petitioner

and

respondent

is

governed

by

Philippine labor laws. Hence, the stipulations, clauses, and

terms and conditions of the Contract must not contravene

advice was given despite complainants request. Such

wavering stance or vacillating position indicates bad faith
and a dishonest purpose. Second, she was employed on
account of her qualifications, experience and readiness for
the position of credit officer and pressured to resign a
month after she was commended for her good work. Third,
the demand for [respondents] instant resignation on 19
April 1999 to give way to her replacement who was
allegedly reporting soonest, is whimsical, fraudulent and in
bad faith, because on 16 April 1999 she was given a period

our labor law provisions.

of [sic] until 15 May 1999 within which to leave. Fourth,

Moreover, a contract of employment is imbued with public

oppressive, anti-social and caused her absolute torture, as

interest. The Court has time and time again reminded

parties that they "are not at liberty to insulate themselves

30 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

the

pressures

made

on

her

to

resign

were

highly

[petitioners] disregarded her situation as an overseas

worker away from home and family, with no prospect for
another job. She was not even provided with a return trip

fare.

Fifth,

the

notice

of

termination

is

an

utter

manifestation of bad faith and whim as it totally disregards

[respondents] right to security of tenure and due process.
Such notice together with the demands for [respondents]
resignation contravenes the fundamental guarantee and
public policy of the Philippine government on security of
tenure.
"[Respondent] likewise established that as a proximate
result of her dismissal and prior demands for resignation,
she suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. Her standing
in the social and business community as well as prospects
for employment with other entities have been adversely
affected by her dismissal. [Petitioners] are thus liable for
moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
xxxxxxxxx
"[Petitioners] likewise acted in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent

manner

in

employment

and

therefore

are

terminating
liable

[respondents]
for

exemplary

damages. This should served [sic] as protection to other

employees of [petitioner] company, and by way of example
or correction for the public good so that persons similarly
minded as [petitioners] would be deterred from committing
the same acts."36
The Court also affirms the award of attorneys fees. It is
settled that when an action is instituted for the recovery of
wages, or when employees are forced to litigate and
consequently incur expenses to protect their rights and
interests, the grant of attorneys fees is legally justifiable. 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision

and

Resolution

AFFIRMED.

Costs

against

petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

31 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to

aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second
paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the
substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino
spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the
petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner,
being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the
presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce
decree with conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it
registered the foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner
and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order
recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign

CORPUS VS. STO. TOMAS

divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

void.

Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a

petition for review on certiorari

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC

decision is reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the

Facts:

ruling.

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired

Canadian

citizenship through

naturalization.

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG

He was

GR 186571

married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity

on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry
another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce
decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that
the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage

Facts

Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired

Canadian citizenship through naturalization

He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City

Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he

as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to

returned to the Philippines he found out that his

submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the

wife was having an affair with another man

basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this

case was filed before the Court.

He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the

same was granted

Issues:

After two years from the effectivity of the divorce

decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to love

32 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and

The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code

to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien

Tomas' marriage certificate

spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the

recognition of his foreign divorce decree

Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce before the RTC

registered the divorce decree on his and Sto.

The

foreign

divorce

decree

itself,

authenticity and conformity with

RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the

Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Art.
26(2) of the Family Code

after

its

the alien's

national law have been duly proven according to

our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to
Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgment (Please
see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,

Issue

particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule

W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the

132)

right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the

recognition of a foreign divorce decree
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the
Ruling

recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas'

The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art.

marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial order yet

26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right

exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree, thus, the Pasig

it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid

the absurd situation whre the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree

Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the

policy

against

absolute

divorces

cannot

be

subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign

country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to the rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his
or her alien spouse

An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the

recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the
court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established
by the decree) whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law

Remedy Available to Alien Spouse

33 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Corpuz
(Please see Art. 407 of the New Civil Code and the Law on
Registry of Civil Status -Act No. 3753)

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig

City.4

Due

to

work

and

other

professional

commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the

wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must

first

be

judicially

recognized

by

competent

Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of

1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

34 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,

Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact,

alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was

interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of

prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He

thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-

considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient

interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility

that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his

In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerberts

petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition
of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can

Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage

certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerberts position.

avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article

26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the

remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends

Code reads:

to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for

the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

THE COURTS RULING

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be

valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

spouse

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly

obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph

of Article 26 of the Family Code.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the

legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the

11

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective

marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of
the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

THE PETITION

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in

marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President

From

the

RTCs

ruling,12

Gerbert

filed

the

present

petition.13

Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers

under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is

present wording, as follows:

essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in

Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,

rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he

valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of

35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly

stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an

35 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly

obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds

her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have

that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,

capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise

capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Ibay-Somera.

21

In both

cases, the

20

and Pilapil v.

Court refused to

jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for

the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law. 26

acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights

after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and

the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign

the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

divorce had already severed the marital bond between the

Family

spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino

Code,

the

RTC was

correct in

limiting the

spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the

alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot

be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a

together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render

right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for

support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not

its recognition in this jurisdiction

continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to

conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens with the complementary

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in

statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to

the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino

dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words,

spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after

the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of

obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino

the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert

spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the

of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of

Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,

his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,

settling

decree.

after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

national law have been duly proven according to our rules

Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive

of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in

right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse

favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the

considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to

Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign

remarry.

judgments. This Section states:

the

24

doubts

created

by

the

divorce

Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of

the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign

decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The

effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the

36 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled

the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the

by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the

petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other

party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and

overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the

foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.

proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33

27

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."

28

This means that the foreign

judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts

under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens

the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments

between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.

applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment

on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign

made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or

divorce decree

in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree

as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the

Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and

divorce

the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity

certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34

decree

on

Gerbert

and

Daisylyns

marriage

to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign

We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the

authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes

need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what

into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official

had been done.

publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal

custody of the documents. If the copies of official records
are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied

by

certificate

issued

by

the

proper

diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign

service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a

terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or

copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required

illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

certificates proving its authenticity,

30

but failed to include a

copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation,

we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and

37 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a

foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration
of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for

the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by

recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be

Gerbert.

entered:
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
(a) births;

the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO

Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 both of which required

(b) deaths;

a final order from a competent Philippine court before a

foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered

(c) marriages;

in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the

registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the

(d) annulments of marriages;

registration of the foreign divorce decree without the

requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot

(e) divorces;

produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

(f) legitimations;
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
(g) adoptions;

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian

divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of

a

(i) naturalization; and

foreign

judgment

is

not

the

proper

proceeding,

contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation

of entries in the civil registry.

(j) changes of name.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a
xxxx

civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial

order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall

Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial

keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in

proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be

which they shall, respectively make the proper entries

judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of

concerning the civil status of persons:

Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural

requirements

(1) Birth and death register;

only the marriages solemnized but also divorces

and dissolved marriages.
Legitimation,

acknowledgment,

adoption,

the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registration. The law should be read in relation with the
a

judicial

recognition

of

the

foreign

judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the

context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on

38 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

complied

with

before

others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in

of

be

or claim any interest must be made parties to the

change of name and naturalization register.

requirement

must

be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not

(3)

that

judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may

in the present case, we cannot consider the petition

Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of

the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or

right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049

39 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

June 26, 2013

Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24

FACTS:

and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who

Court.

married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in

the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a

sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not

petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the

bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they

subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a

lost contact with each other.

foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara

(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,

Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be

Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in

made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of

Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to

special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules

Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse

of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a

from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact

party or a particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules

Fujiki.

of Court states:

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in

reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped

any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil

Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan

status of persons which has been recorded in the civil

which

declared

the

marriage

between

Marinay

and

Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January

2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity

of

Marriage).

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:

register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or

correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law,

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.

nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.

No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action

to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is
a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family

40 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which

presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii

expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not

bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)

lost contact with each other.

whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an

overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara

(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law

Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to

or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy

Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse

nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts

from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact

should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part

Fujiki.3

of the comity of nations.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to

reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which

SECOND DIVISION

declared

the

marriage

between

Marinay

and

Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January

2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial

G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute

Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family

Court

judgment

be

recognized;

(2) that

the

bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be

declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil

DECISION

Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

CARPIO, J.:

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Case

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC

immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional

withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a

cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Order dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No.

1

Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC

marriages.

dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign

Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.

The Facts

xxxx

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family

married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in

Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the

the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not

respondent has been residing for at least six months prior

41 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident

413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a

respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at

duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment

the election of the petitioner. x x x

of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to

the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the

petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The
trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with
any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC
took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to

or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule

108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in
the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of
the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.

declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special

that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it

dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki
stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its

proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a

own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19

particular fact," and not a civil action which is "for the

which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the

enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or

defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of

redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the

the

RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant

Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not

rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2)

have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5

the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court

of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied

judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and

with the provision.

venue

by

motu

proprio

dismissing

the

case." 20

Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner

contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners

Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on

motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC

bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by

stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the

Philippine courts.12

petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of

marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-

dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper

10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of

venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

the

psychological

The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the

incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of

provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity

divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he

of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the

now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other

wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd

hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of

because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue.

venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4

In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to

(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it

realize that the party interested in having a bigamous

should be taken together with the other ground cited by the

marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the

Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

Family

Code

on

the

prior, pre-existing marriage."

14

ground

of

Fujiki had material interest

and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the

marriage.

petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of

Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of

ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry

Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is

under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in

applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of

the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to

the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article

nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the

42 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can

The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the

be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the

infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior

proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as

marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34

[a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."

27

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be

the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The

made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo

trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to

Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the

dismiss the petition.

Moreover, the verification and

foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108

certification against forum shopping of the petition was not

proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such

authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-

as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to

11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate

establish the status or right of a party or a particular

dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in

28

the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara

affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,

who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file

their comment on the petition for review.

30

The public

respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and

the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed
that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside"
and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave
v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus,

Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial

decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In
other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil
status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven
as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 and Nial v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court
to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43
Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence
on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she
had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues

in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be

given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the

bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute

property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most

Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.

43 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is

setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the

applicable.

trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case

anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage

can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment

judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims

and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount

nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or

to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.

her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of

Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of

bigamy.

a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff

would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize

the

foreign

judgment

in

proceeding

rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59

for

cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage

Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its

parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48

automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the

Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom
it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a

I.

marriage

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment

relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove
the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which
has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the

44 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

void does not require

relitigation

under a

Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their

successors

in

interest

by a

subsequent

title."

Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the

judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts
are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven
in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds

external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of

establish the status or right of a party or a particular

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law

fact."67

or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of

efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under

the

rules

of

evidence. 64

Divorce

involves

the

dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign

divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment

nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
the

any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil

status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply

law,

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in

Japanese

Family

Court

judgment

is

fully

consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous

marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry

on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property

II.

interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires

proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to

45 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and

preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by
the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of
the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the

contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for

petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed

attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the

husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are

recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign

marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the

country.

law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting

marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an

entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous

safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.

marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of

02-11-10-SC

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes

safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited

bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate

grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support pendente

prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest

lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition

in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.

and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the

77

If anyone

and

other

related

laws.

Among

these

can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of

investigation

nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to

collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or

confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a

annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent

subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share

circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts

in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes,

under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.

he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of

8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries

protecting his marriage.

in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court

of

the

public

prosecutor

to

determine

"where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is

other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage

violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is

by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in

therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-

the civil registry.

Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or

financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior

cancellation

marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to

recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage

the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior

where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous

There is neither circumvention of the substantive and

marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to

procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law,

recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous

nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.

marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such

8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action

judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established,

to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to

there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of

recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which

the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

of

civil registry

entry

based

on

the

presupposes a case which was already tried and decided

under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

III.

does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment

annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,

a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369

Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no

define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for

cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on

Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can

Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce

be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the

decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to

marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the

determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

46 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code

Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the

provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen

effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent

and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

public policy. A critical difference between the case of a

capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse

foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a

shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In

bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the

Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative

nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine

intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to

public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family

avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse

Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The

remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a

Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing

divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under

a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.

the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of

No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available

Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine

to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to

courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree

recognize

precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.

marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for

Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits

bigamy.

foreign

judgment

nullifying

bigamous

because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective

are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case

measure to address the anomaly that results from a

was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the

marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow

"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and

divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The

legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the

anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the

foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the

marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under

question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign

the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by

judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating

extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce

to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign

decree, which is already effective in the country where it

country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its

was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the

effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii

Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn

expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should

not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)

of justice are to be served."91

whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an

overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a

any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to

marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who

repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of

obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law

ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition

or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy

abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of

nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts

bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26

should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part

of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,

of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules

after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is

of Court states that the foreign judgment is already

capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her

"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon

country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the

recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes

Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe

conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the

foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse

correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The

cannot remarry.

recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,

47 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil

registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a

bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when

the

offender

is

absent

from

the

Philippine

archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and
5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.

VALMONTE VS. CA
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
Service of Summons
Facts:
1.

Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign

resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are
husband and

48 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

wife

both

residents of 90222

Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.

Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member

2.

There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.

1.

rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of

profession in the Philippines, commuting for this

affecting the defendants interest in a specific property and

purpose between his residence in the state of

not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner

Washington and Manila, where he holds office at

Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in

S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita,

the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in

Manila.

accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective

Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the

outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by

sister of petitioner filed an action for partition

personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of

against former and her husband. She alleged that,

general circulation in such places and for such time as the

the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at

court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and

present a resident of 14823

Road,

order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the

the

last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other

Chesterfield,

Missouri,

Conway

U.S.A.,

while

defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this

complaint may be served with summons at
Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St.,
Ermita,

Manila

Valmonte

as

where

defendant

defendant

Alfredo

Lourdes

manner which the court may deem sufficient.

2.

D.

any of the first two modes. This mode of service, like the

Arreola

first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as

through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country

be found.He husband was also her counsel, who

where the defendant resides. The service of summons on

has a law office in the Philippines. The summons

petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the

were served on her husband.

order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and

certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court

Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents

which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and

counsel to her husband as the party to whom all

on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in

communications intended for her should be sent.

Service

of

summons

was

then

made

default for her failure to file an answer.

upon

petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo

D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the

3.

as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such

authorized to accept the process on her behalf.

leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported

Accordingly the process server left without leaving

by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf

a copy of the summons and complaint for

and setting forth the grounds for the application.

petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.

Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his
Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For
this reason private respondent moved to declare
her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife
and opposed the private respondents motion.
RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared
petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was
received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was

validly served with summons.
Ruling:
NO.

49 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on

petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court

one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not

4.

In the case at bar, the service of summons upon

petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of

Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can

3.

The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in

of the Philippine bar, however, practices his

4.

Finally, and most importantly, because there was no

order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given
ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules,
shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.

The plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at

present a resident of 14823
Republic of the Philippines

Chesterfield,

Missouri,

Conway

U.S.A.,

Road,

while

the

SUPREME COURT

defendants are spouses, of legal age and at

Manila

present residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive, South

Seattle, Washington, U.S.A., but, for purposes of
this complaint may be served with summons at

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108538

Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St.,

Ermita,

January 22, 1996

Manila

Valmonte

DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA, respondents.

defendant

Alfredo

Lourdes

D.

Arreola

be found.

petitioners,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD

where

defendant

Valmonte's spouse holds office and where he can

LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE,

vs.

as

Apparently, the foregoing averments were made on the

basis of a letter previously sent by petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte to private respondent's counsel in which, in
regard to the partition of the property in question, she

DECISION

referred private respondent's counsel to her husband as

the party to whom all communications intended for her
should be sent. The letter reads:

MENDOZA, J.:

July 4, 1991

Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. The

question is whether in an action for partition filed against

Dear Atty. Balgos:

her and her husband, who is also her attorney, summons

intended for her may be served on her husband, who has a
law office in the Philippines. The Regional Trial Court of

This is in response to your letter, dated 20 June

Manila, Branch 48, said no and refused to declare Lourdes

1991, which I received on 3 July 1991. Please

A. Valmonte in default, but the Court of Appeals said yes.

address all communications to my lawyer, Atty.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Alfredo D. Valmonte, whose address, telephone

and fax numbers appear below.

The facts of the case are as follows:

c/o Prime Marine
Gedisco Center, Unit 304

Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte

1564 A. Mabini, Ermita

are husband and wife. They are both residents of 90222

Metro Manila

Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner

Telephone: 521-1736

Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar,

however,

practices

his profession in the

Fax: 521-2095

Philippines,

commuting for this purpose between his residence in the

state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-

Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo

304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini Ermita, Manila.

D. Valmonte, who at the time, was at his office in Manila.

Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons,

On March 9, 1992, private respondent Rosita Dimalanta,

who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a
complaint for partition of real property and accounting of
rentals against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo
D. Valmonte before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 48. The subject of the action is a three-door

insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the

summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the ground
that he was not authorized to accept the process on her
behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a
copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte.

apartment located in Paco, Manila.

Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer
In her Complaint, private respondent alleged:

50 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

with

Counterclaim.

Petitioner

Lourdes

A.

Valmonte,

however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private

respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner

private respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte to hold that her

Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf

husband has the authority to represent her when an

of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion.

advantage is to be obtained by her and to deny such

authority when it would turn out to be her disadvantage. If

In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied

private respondent's motion to declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default. A motion for reconsideration was

this be allowed, Our Rules of Court, instead of being an

instrument to promote justice would be made use of to
thwart or frustrate the same.

similarly denied on September 23, 1992. Whereupon,

private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition

xxx

xxx

xxx

and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.

Turning to another point, it would not do for Us to
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a

overlook the fact that the disputed summons was

decision granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A.

served not upon just an ordinary lawyer of private

Valmonte in default. A copy of the appellate court's decision

respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte, but upon her

was received by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte on January

lawyer husband. But that is not all, the same

15, 1993 at his Manila office and on January 21, 1993 in

lawyer/husband happens to be also her co-

Seattle, Washington. Hence, this petition.

defendant in the instant case which involves real

property

The issue at bar is whether in light of the facts set forth

above, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served
with summons. In holding that she had been, the Court of
Appeals stated:

unequivocally directed the aforementioned counsel of

to

according

to

her

belongs

to

the

conjugal

defendants

(the

partnership

of

the

spouses Valmonte). It is highly inconceivable and

certainly it would be contrary to human nature
for the lawyer/husband/co-defendant to keep to

[I]n her above-quoted reply, Mrs. Valmonte clearly and

Dimalanta

which,

lawyer/husband/co-defendant,

address

all

communications

(evidently

referring to her controversy with her sister Mrs. Dimalanta

over the Paco property, now the subject of the instant case)
to her lawyer who happens also to be her husband. Such
directive was made without any qualification just as was
her choice/designation of her husband Atty. Valmonte as
her lawyer likewise made without any qualification or
reservation. Any disclaimer therefore on the part of Atty.
Valmonte as to his being his wife's attorney (at least with
regard to the dispute vis-a-vis (sic) the Paco property) would

himself the fact that they (the spouses Valmonte)

had been sued with regard to a property which, he
claims to be conjugal. Parenthetically, there is
nothing in the records of the case before Us
regarding any manifestation by private respondent
Lourdes A. Valmonte about her lack of knowledge
about the case instituted against her and her
lawyer/husband/co-defendant

by

her

sister

Rosita. . . .
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is given due

appear to be feeble or trifling, if not incredible.

course. This Court hereby Resolves to nullify the

This view is bolstered by Atty. Valmonte's subsequent

September 23, 1992 and further declares private

alleged special appearance made on behalf of his wife.

Whereas Mrs. Valmonte had manifestly authorized her
husband to serve as her lawyer relative to her dispute with
her sister over the Paco property and to receive all
communications regarding the same and subsequently to
appear on her behalf by way of a so-called special
appearance, she would nonetheless now insist that the
same husband would nonetheless had absolutely no
authority to receive summons on her behalf. In effect, she
is asserting that representation by her lawyer (who is also
her husband) as far as the Paco property controversy is
concerned, should only be made by him when such
representation would be favorable to her but not otherwise.
It would obviously be inequitable for this Court to allow

51 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

orders of the court a quo dated July 3, 1992 and

respondent Lourdes Arreola Valmonte as having
been properly served with summons.
Petitioners assail the aforequoted decision, alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred (1) in refusing to apply the
provisions of Rule 14, 17 of the Revised Rules of Court
and applying instead Rule 14, 8 when the fact is that
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident defendant;
and (2) because even if Rule 14, 8 is the applicable
provision, there was no valid substituted service as there
was no strict compliance with the requirement by leaving a
copy of the summons and complaint with petitioner Alfredo
D. Valmonte. Private respondent, upon the other hand,
asserts that petitioners are invoking a technicality and that

strict adherence to the rules would only result in a useless

property of the defendant has been attached

ceremony.

within the Philippines, service may, by leave of

court, be effected out of the Philippines by
personal service as under section 7; or by

We hold that there was no valid service of process on

Lourdes A. Valmonte.

publication in a newspaper of general circulation

To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first

order, in which case a copy of the summons and

in such places and for such time as the court may

order of the court shall be sent by registered mail

the nature of the action filed against petitioners Lourdes A.

to the last known address of the defendant, or in

Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent,

any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

Any order granting such leave shall specify a

This is because the rules on service of summons embodied

reasonable time, which shall not be less than

in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or

sixty (60) days after notice, within which the

the other of these actions.

defendant must answer..

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or,

if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served,
substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8

is

essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over

the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court. 3 If defendant cannot
be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad,
but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of

In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an

action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over
the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is
domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or
attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in 17 is not

for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for

Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in

complying with the requirements of fair play or due

summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication.

personam,

who

cannot

summons,

may

be

be

personally

summoned

either

served
by

with

means

of

substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by

process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the

action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest

publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule. 5

may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and

In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be

minded.6

a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in

personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his

he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so

Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private

person is essential to make a binding decision.

respondent's action, which is for partition and accounting

On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem,

Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not

essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is
a nonresident and he is not found in the country,

under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem.

the defendant's interest in a specific property and not to
render a judgment against him. As explained in the leading
case of Banco Espaol Filipino v. Palanca :7

summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with

[An action quasi in rem is] an action which while not strictly

Rule 14, 17, which provides:

speaking an action in rem partakes of that nature and is

substantially such. . . . The action quasi in rem differs from

17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant

does not reside and is not found in the Philippines
and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the

52 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the

former an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by
attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
general way thus designated. The judgment entered in
these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is

although

not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her

Philippines of the summons (against the contention that it

the

Court

considered

publication

in

the

must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to

should be made in the foreign state where defendant was

be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1)

residing) sufficient, nonetheless the service was considered

by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of

insufficient because no copy of the summons was sent to

general circulation in such places and for such time as the

the last known correct address in the Philippines..

court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and

order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient.

Private

respondent

cites

the

ruling

in

De

Leon

v.

Hontanosas, 67 SCRA 458,462-463 (1975), in which it was

held that service of summons upon the defendant's
husband was binding on her. But the ruling in that case is

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon

justified because summons were served upon defendant's

petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of

husband in their conjugal home in Cebu City and the wife

any of the first two modes, the question is whether the

was only temporarily absent, having gone to Dumaguete

service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can

City for a vacation. The action was for collection of a sum of

be justified under the third mode, namely, "in any . . .

money. In accordance with Rule 14, 8, substituted service

manner the court may deem sufficient."

could be made on any person of sufficient discretion in the

dwelling place of the defendant, and certainly defendant's

We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two,

husband, who was there, was competent to receive the

must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the

summons on her behalf. In any event, it appears that

Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the

defendant in that case submitted to the jurisdiction of the

defendant resides.8 Moreover, there are several reasons why

court by instructing her husband to move for the

the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte

dissolution of the writ of attachment issued in that case.

cannot be considered a valid service of summons on

petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of

On the other hand, in the case of Gemperle v. Schenker,

summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made

it was held that service on the wife of a nonresident

upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17

defendant was found sufficient because the defendant had

and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the

appointed his wife as his attorney-in-fact. It was held that

court which in fact refused to consider the service to be

although defendant Paul Schenker was a Swiss citizen and

valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A.

resident of Switzerland, service of summons upon his wife

Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.

Helen Schenker who was in the Philippines was sufficient

because

she

was

her

husband's

representative

10

and

In the second place, service in the attempted manner on

attorney-in-fact in a civil case, which he had earlier filed

petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court

against William Gemperle. In fact Gemperle's action was for

as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such

damages arising from allegedly derogatory statements

leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported

contained in the complaint filed in the first case. As this

by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf

Court said, "[i]n other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority

and setting forth the grounds for the application.

to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of her husband, so

that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits

Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order

granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was
not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to
the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an
action against a resident defendant differs from the period
given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant
who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the

filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar,

which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his
behalf"

11

Indeed, if instead of filing an independent action

Gemperle filed a counterclaim in the action brought by Mr.

Schenker against him, there would have been no doubt
that the trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over
Mr. Schenker through his agent and attorney-in-fact, Mrs.
Schenker.

period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while

In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A.

in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.

Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her attorney-inStrict compliance with these requirements alone can
assure observance of due process. That is why in one case,

53 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

fact. Although she wrote private res- pondent's attorney

that "all communications" intended for her should be

addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the

FACTS:

latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive

summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the

Plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan,

letter was written seven months before the filing of this

Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a night

case below, and it appears that it was written in connection

club; that they lived together from November 1952 to April

with

sister,

1955; that they were married in Pusan, Korea, on March

respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of

15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate

the property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this

Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police

kind, the exchange of correspondence was carried on by

clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and

counsel for the parties. But the authority given to

dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order

petitioner's husband in these negotiations certainly cannot

that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953,

be construed as also including an authority to represent

he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in

her in any litigation.

advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October,

the

negotiations

between

her

and

her

1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid

Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that

service on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in this case.

he then noticed that, on February 16, 1953, defendant was

already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED

and the orders dated July 3, 1992 and September 23, 1992
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48 are

confronted the

defendant with

the contents

of this

document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean

girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about

REINSTATED.

her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him

SO ORDERED.

Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a
her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they
were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to
him.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his
marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the
latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a
resident of Pusan, Korea,

summons was

served by

publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter,

plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she
not having filed an answer.

ISSUE:
WON Philippine court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having
been solemnized in Seoul, Korea.
RULING:
Yes.

RAYRAY VS. CHAE KYUNG LEE

G. R. No. L-18176 October 26, 1966

In order that a given case could be validly decided by a

court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over:
(1) the subject-matter of the litigation;
(2) the person of the parties therein; and

54 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

(3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.

The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of
plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the
jurisdiction of our courts of first instance and, in Manila, of
its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his
submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the
complaint

herein.

Defendant

was

placed

under

Republic of the Philippines

the

SUPREME COURT

jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by

Manila

publication.

EN BANC

This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the

parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole world.

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,

The res in the present case is the relation between said

parties, or their marriage tie.[Jurisdiction over the same

vs.

depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not

CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.

the

place

of

celebration

of

marriage,

or

the

locus

celebrationis plaintiff herein is a citizen of the Philippines,

domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our
jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and under plaintiff's theory -still is a non-resident alien. But,
this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has
jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of
marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled
in, or a national of, the forum.[8] Since plaintiff is a
Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the
lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In
other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the
marriage between the parties herein.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his
marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the
latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a
resident of Pusan, Korea,

summons was

served by

publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter,

plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she
not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the
reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the
lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila
pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or not
a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having
found no such collusion, the case was heard on the merits.
In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing
plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1)
that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted
abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the
relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having
been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the
jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal.
In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage
to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul,
Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given
case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must
have

55 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

jurisdiction

over (1) the

subject-matter

of

the

litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in

contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to

actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1

India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of

pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him

The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of

plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the
jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, 2 and, in Manila,
of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the

complaint

herein.

Defendant

was

placed

under

the

jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by

publication.5

parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole word.

The res in the present case is the relation between said
parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same
6

depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not

place

that, on February 16, 1958, defendant was already

married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted
was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice
in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March
15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived
with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding,
however, that there was no impediment to her contracting
marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated

This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the

the

translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed

the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply

The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his

4

in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its

of

celebration

of

marriage,

or

the

locus

celebrationis. Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines,

7

domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our

jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and
under plaintiff's theory still is a non-resident alien.
But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to
plaintiff herein.

that the status therein involves and affects two persons.

One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always
to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage
status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of
another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule
is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in
an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one
8

Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it

follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in
addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the
legality of the marriage between the parties herein.
As regards the substantial validity of said marriage,
plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan Korea,
sometime in 1952, where she was operating a nightclub;
that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955;
that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15,
1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D;
that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance"
Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February
16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could

56 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient

to establish that defendant was married to another person
prior to March 15, 1953, and we agree with this
conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely
purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National
Police. Secondly, the record does not show who prepared it,
much less that he had personal knowledge of the truth of
the

entry

therein

concerning

defendant's

status

on

February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant was

a native, not of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A
could, at best, be no more than hearsay evidence. Again,
when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with the

Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in

of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.

and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.

contents of Exhibit B, defendant did not say that she had

been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted
having previously lived with several other men, adding,
however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect,
negating the alleged previous marriage.
Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in
order to establish defendant's qualification to contract
marriage, why is it that the wedding took place, despite the
entry in said document to the effect that defendant was
married already? There is no competent evidence to the
effect that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy.
Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign law is
identical to the lex fori, or, in the case at bar, the Philippine
Law.9 In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the
defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited
before with other men, there was no impediment to her
marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on
her part would have been, in her opinion, a legal obstacle
to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage
certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for the entry of data
on whether any of the contracting parties had been
previously married; whether the prior marriage had been
dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been

such decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be

absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea.
And, again, why is it that Exhibit D states that defendant
had had no previous marriage?
Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the
relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are given to
his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records
show that he would not hesitate to lie when it suits his
purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted
marriage with the defendant, he said that he was single,
although, he admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in
1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or
Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us believe that his
marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because
Adelaida and he did no more than sign, on a small window
in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents
of which he did not read.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it
is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE
G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008

FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as
its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
and mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the

Arbitration

Branch

of

the

National

Labor

Relations

Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International,

Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged
nonpayment

of

commissions,

breach of employment contract.

57 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

illegal

termination

and

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of

from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law

La Union, instituted an action for damages before the

are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it

Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint

is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of

named

Raytheon

law asks the further question whether the application of a

International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two

substantive law which will determine the merits of the case

corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.

is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will

as

defendants

herein

petitioner

Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which

disclosed

that

per

the

written

agreement

between

respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as Special

become relevant only when the substantive issues of the

instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.

Sales Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court,

of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of

Connecticut.

Petitioner

sought

the

dismissal

of

the

in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its

complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action

jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or

and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way

available forum and the parties are not precluded from

of compulsory counterclaim.

seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the

Petitioner asserts that the written contract between

respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause,
that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of

foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to

oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of

foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based

witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens

on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual

and the evidence to be presented is located outside the

determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a

Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient

matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the

forums.

trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this

ground, it should do so only after vital facts

ISSUE:

are

established, to determine whether special circumstances

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON

require the courts desistance.

THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws
problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and
where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the

Republic of the Philippines

case even if the rules of conflict of laws or the convenience

SUPREME COURT

of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of

Manila

sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

SECOND DIVISION

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial

court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as

G.R. No. 162894

party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the

other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as
party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance
in court.

February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that

the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or
any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded

58 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

DECISION

which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also

TINGA, J.:

averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

combined and functioned as one company.

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks

the reversal of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of

In

its

Answer, 8

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the

respondents claim, it was a foreign corporation duly

petitioner

alleged

that

contrary

to

civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the

licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied

trial court.

entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying

the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied

As culled from the records of the case, the following

antecedents appear:

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of

the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as
its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
3

Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged
of

commissions,

illegal

termination

and

breach of employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995,

Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment
ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondents money
claims.

Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the

decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondents

complaint

on

disclosed

that

per

the

written

agreement

between

respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special

Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations
of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action
and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way
of compulsory counterclaim. 11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for
Summary

Judgment12

seeking

the

dismissal

of

the

complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration

nonpayment

assuming the alleged obligation of the said companies. 9

Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which

Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a

and mudflows.

combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of

the

ground

of

lack

of

jurisdiction.6

Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was

dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The
Resolution became final and executory on 09 November

to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same.

Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the
deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the
Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied
petitioners omnibus motion. The trial court held that the
factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to
be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a
valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of
forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial
court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a
foreign

corporation

licensed

to

do

business

in

the

Philippines.15

1998.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the order,
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La
Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,

docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants

herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as
BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the
earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the
allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed

which motion was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order

dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioners
motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of
Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and
a writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial
court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to
enjoin

the

trial

court

from

conducting

further

proceedings.20

respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government

the

On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the

commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project

assailed Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for

projects

and

that

respondent

was

not

59 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

paid

lack of merit. It also denied petitioners motion for

foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and

reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on 10

witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens

March 2004.22

and the evidence to be presented is located outside the

Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient

The appellate court held that although the trial court

should not have confined itself to the allegations in the
complaint and should have also considered evidence

forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the

dispute necessitate the immediate application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.

aliunde in resolving petitioners omnibus motion, it found

the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined

of

of

three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of

determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause

Walter

Browning,

insufficient

for

purposes

conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of

of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not

law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus,

rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the

in the instances27 where the Court held that the local

corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in

judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies

the case had indeed merged together based solely on the

with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be

evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the

proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the

issue should be threshed out during trial. 23 Moreover, the

parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine

appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court

Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to

when the latter decided not to desist from assuming

the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has

jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the

or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28

principle of forum non conveniens.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and

where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the

ERRED

THE

case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE

of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of

OF

sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is

IN

REFUSING

ACTION

TO

DISMISS

AGAINST

RAYTHEON

INTERNATIONAL, INC.

filed.29

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an

ERRED

THE

action is conferred by the Constitution and the law 30 and by

COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON

the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of

IN

REFUSING

TO

DISMISS

CONVENIENS.

24

Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite

repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel
on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer
handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed
relations with the law firm even before the filing of the
instant petition and that it could no longer find the
whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite
diligent efforts. In a Resolution 25 dated 20 November 2006,

whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some

of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 31 Civil Case No.
1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged
breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action
and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party
plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other

the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.

hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party

The instant petition lacks merit.

court.32

Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the

respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause,

that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of
the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of

60 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in

same shall be governed by the laws of the State of

Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or
any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law

are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it

evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to

is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of

mete a ruling that the complaint fails to state a

law asks the further question whether the application of a

cause of action.

substantive law which will determine the merits of the case

is fair to both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will
become relevant only when the substantive issues of the
instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.

Annexes

"A"

to

"E"

by

themselves

are

not

substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that

Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC)
assumed the warranty obligations of defendant
Rust International in the Makar Port Project in

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in

General Santos City, after Rust International

conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its

ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC.

jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or

Other documents already submitted in evidence

available forum and the parties are not precluded from

are likewise meager to preponderantly conclude

seeking remedies elsewhere. 34 Petitioners averments of the

that

foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to

International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service,

oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.

Inc. have combined into one company, so much so

No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving

Raytheon

International,

Inc.,

Rust

company (if at all) may be held liable for the

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a

obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for

unpaid commissions. Neither these documents
clearly speak otherwise.38

matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the

trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the

ground, it should do so only after vital facts

are

question of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged

established, to determine whether special circumstances

together requires the presentation of further evidence,

require the courts desistance.35

which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari

Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can

is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of

assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its

foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to
the sound discretion of the lower courts because their
findings are binding on this Court.

No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause of action against

petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the pleading.36 As a general
rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of
action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with
BMSI and RUST to function as one company. Petitioner
contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted
this allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of
Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr.
Walter Browning as well as other documents
in

the

hearing

shows

61 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case

produced

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED.

that

these

contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The

trial court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this
time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese
nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura
on the other hand invokes the trial courts ruling which
states that matters connected with the performance of
contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance, so since the obligations in the ICA are
executed in the Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon
should be dismissed.
HELD: No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking
cognizance of it.

HASEGAWA VS. KITAMURA

G.R. No. 149177

In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint

November 23, 2007

for specific performance and damages. Such case is

538 SCRA 261 Conflict of Laws Private International Law

Jurisdiction Lex Loci Celebrationis Lex Loci Solutionis
State of the Most Significant Relationship Forum Non

incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within

the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of

Conveniens

forum non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of

those provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing

FACTS:

a civil case.

In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd,

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention

a Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of

that Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the

cases, there are three phases and each next phase

construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April

commences when one is settled, to wit:

1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor

agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to
head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan

1.

subject matter,

In January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler

application

negotiate.

Kitamura

then

filed

complaint for specific performance and damages against

Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the
principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the

62 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

be

the parties, the issues, the

of

a substantive

law

which

will

determine the merits of the case is fair to both

contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but

to

litigation

of law asks the further question whether the

the general manager of Nippon

informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his

refused

should

to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice

Kitamura to head the road project. But in February 2000,

Nippon

Where

property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair

Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned

Hasegawa,

initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the

and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000).

Kazuhiro

Jurisdiction

parties.
2.

Choice of Law Which law will the court apply?

Once a local court takes cognizance, it does not
mean that the local laws must automatically
apply.

The

court

must

determine

which

substantive law when applied to the merits will be

fair to both parties.

3.

Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment

On

Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy

March

30,

1999,

petitioner

Nippon

Engineering

firm providing technical and management support in the

This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the
RTCs taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he
bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a
petition for certiorari. The question of which law should be
applied should have been settled in the trial court had
Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order
denying his MFR.

infrastructure projects of foreign governments, 3 entered

into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with
respondent

Minoru

Kitamura,

Japanese

national

permanently residing in the Philippines. 4 The agreement

provides that respondent was to extend professional
services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. 5
Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR)
Project

in

the

Philippines,

following

the

company's

consultancy contract with the Philippine Government. 6

When

the

Department

STAR
of

Project

Public

was

Works

near
and

completion,

Highways

the

(DPWH)

engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January

28, 2000, this time for the detailed engineering and
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement (BBRI) Project.7 Respondent was named as
the project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1.8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa,
Nippon's general manager for its International Division,
informed respondent that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services
would be engaged by the company only up to the
substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31,
2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry. 9

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent,

through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon
insisted that respondents contract was for a fixed term
that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149177

November 23, 2007

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING

CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

renewal of the ICA.10

As he was not able to generate a positive response from the
petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1,
2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. 11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had
been perfected in Japan and executed by and between
Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for

NACHURA,

lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution 2 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.

63 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be

heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus.12

In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved

THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT

Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a

MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS

certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project. 13

ENTERED

INTO

BY

AND

BETWEEN

TWO

JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN

THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN

On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular

Government v. Frank
performance

of

14

TOKYO, JAPAN.

that matters connected with the

contracts

are

regulated

by

the

law

prevailing at the place of performance, 15 denied the motion

B.

to

GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE NEED

dismiss.16

The

trial

court

subsequently

denied

THE

HONORABLE

REVIEW

OF

ADHERENCE

APPEALS

petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 17 prompting them to

TO

file with the appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first

PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R.

LIGHT

SP No. 60205].18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS. 26

OF

OUR

COURT

RECENT

TO

DEVELOPMENT[S]

THE
IN

dismiss the petition on procedural groundsfor lack of

statement of material dates and for insufficient verification

The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to

and certification against forum shopping.19 An Entry of

resolve is whether the subject matter jurisdiction of

Judgment was later issued by the appellate court on

Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and

September 20, 2000.20

damages involving contracts executed outside the country

by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of

Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the

lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most

CA, on September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary

significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.

period, a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

already stating therein the material dates and attaching

However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose

thereto the proper verification and certification. This

of the procedural matters raised by the respondent.

second petition, which substantially raised the same issues

as those in the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's

60827.21

decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the

filing of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate

court rendered the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision 22

60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in

the first one) and the instant petition for review thereof.

finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's

denial of the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among

We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.

others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not

60205 on account of the petition's defective certification of

applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings

non-forum

was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The

prejudice.27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of

CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in

the said case due to defects in the formal requirement of

applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23

verification28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the

shopping,

it

was

dismissal

without

Rules of Court on the statement of the material dates. 29

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied

by

the

CA

in

the

assailed

July

25,

2001

The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can refile the petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto

Resolution.24

the appropriate verification and certificationas they, in

Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of

prescribed period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said

fact didand stating therein the material dates, within the

denials, petitioners instituted the instant Petition for

Review on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the
appellate court:
A.

THE

The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the

absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties

HONORABLE

COURT

OF

APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL

COURT

Rules.31

VALIDLY

EXERCISED

JURISDICTION

OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE

64 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though

the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other
words, the termination of a case not on the merits does not

bar another action involving the same parties, on the same

Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his

subject matter and theory. 32

behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition

has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the

Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice

Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a

and has no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners still

matter that demands strict observance of the Rules. 42

indicated in the verification and certification of the second

While technical rules of procedure are designed not to

certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed

frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended

on procedural grounds,

33

petitioners are no longer required

by the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum

to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and

effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.43

shopping in the instant petition for review of the second

certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition

Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly

before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of

filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial of

non-forum

not

their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an

constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the

order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and

present case, is not a fatal defect. It will not warrant the

cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for

dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings,

certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file

considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the

an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections

said certificate are no longer present.

raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an

shopping

about

any

event

that

will

34

adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due

The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention
that petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and

course.44 While there are recognized exceptions to this

rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.

certify, on behalf of Nippon, the certiorari petition filed with

the

CA

and

not

the

instant

petition.

True,

the

Authorization35 dated September 4, 2000, which is attached

This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of

the case.

to the second certiorari petition and which is also attached

to the instant petition for review, is limited in scopeits

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient

wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given the authority to

forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and

sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the

resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages

petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority

filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation

cannot extend to the instant petition for review. 36 In a

was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by

plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally applied

Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese

the Rules or even suspended its application whenever a

language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no

satisfactory explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the

substantial relationship to the parties 46 following the [state

requirements have been made. 37 Given that petitioners

of the] most significant relationship rule in Private

herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on this point

International Law.47

and appended to their Reply 38 an updated Authorization 39

for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in the instant
petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance
with the Rules.

The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but

different theory when they elevated the case to the
appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss 48 filed with the
trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an

However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal

inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable

treatment to the defect in the verification and certification.

law which will determine the validity or invalidity of

As respondent pointed out, and to which we agree,

respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles

Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon

of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.49 While not

in

abandoning this stance in their petition before the

this

case.

The

aforesaid

September

4,

2000

Authorization and even the subsequent August 17, 2001

appellate

Authorization were issued only by Nippon's president and

invoked the defense of forum non conveniens.50 On petition

chief executive officer, not by the company's board of

directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that corporate
powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no
person, not even its officers, can bind the corporation, in
the absence of authority from the board. 40 Considering that

65 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

court,

petitioners

on

certiorari

significantly

for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other

arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense,
and introduced their new argument that the applicable
principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship
rule.51

Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this

it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the

petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as

claims.61

explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.

only

pointed

out

petitioners'

inconstancy

in

52

We

their

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss,

arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict

do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by

of laws principles.

law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for,

indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,

and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation

three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice

and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. 62 What

of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.

they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter

Corresponding to these phases are the following questions:

jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and

(1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which

lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant

law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting

relationship rule."

judgment be enforced?53
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts.54 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks
the

further

question

whether

the

application

of

substantive law which will determine the merits of the case

is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction
does not automatically give a state constitutional authority
to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the
lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one
do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts"
for the other.55 The question of whether the law of a state
can be applied to a transaction is different from the
question

of

whether

the

courts

of

that

state

have

jurisdiction to enter a judgment.56

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the

ceremony"63 or the law of the place where a contract is
made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus
means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or
to be performed."65 It controls the nature, construction, and
validity of the contract66 and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended
by them either expressly or implicitly. 67 Under the "state of
the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what
state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract,
the court should consider where the contract was made,
was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile,

In

this

case,

only

the

first

phase

is

at

issue

place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. 68

jurisdiction.1wphi1 Jurisdiction, however, has various

This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates

aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to

them according to their relative importance with respect to

adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the

the particular issue to be resolved.69

plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the

respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the
case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing which is the subject of the litigation. 57 In assailing
the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually
referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make

reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the second phase, the choice of law. 70 They
determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
substantive issues of a conflicts problem. 71 Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-

Jurisdiction

over

the

subject

matter

in

judicial

proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which

law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called
for.

establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law

and in the manner prescribed by law. 58 It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.59 To succeed in its motion for the
dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show that
the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to

66 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law

rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed
out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, first there should
exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of
the conflict of laws rules. 72 Also, when the law of a foreign
country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the

solution of a case, the existence of such law must be

pleaded and proved.73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving
a

foreign

element,

is

brought

before

court

or

administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to

the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either
because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the
case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply
the law of some other State or States. 74 The courts power to
hear

cases

and

controversies

is

derived

from

the

Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize

laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements,
even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.75
Neither

can

the

other

ground

raised,

forum

non

conveniens,76 be used to deprive the trial court of its

jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a
motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court does not include it as a ground. 77 Second, whether
a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.78 In this case, the RTC decided to assume

JOHANNES VS. HARVEY

jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based

on this principle requires a factual determination; hence,

Republic of the Philippines

this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter

of defense.

SUPREME COURT

79

Manila
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power
EN BANC

to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and

the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction
are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly
denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED.

G.R. No. 18600

March 9, 1922

B. E. JOHANNES, husband of Carmen Theodora

Johannes, deceased, as a administrator;
CARLOS D'ALMEIDA and IDA JOHANNES, with her
husband, J. E. JOHANNES, relators,
vs.
Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY, as judge of First
Instance of Manila, ALFREDO D'ALMEIDA, brother of
Carmen Johannes, as administrator, and PHILIPPINE
TRUST COMPANY, as late guardian for a certain cash
deposit of Carmen Johannes, respondent.
Amzi B. Kelly for relators.
Fisher & Dewitt and Francis B. Mahoney for respondents.

67 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

the manner provided by law, and that an order appointing

MALCOLM, J.:

an administrator is a final and appealable order.

The relevant facts disclosed by this petition for certiorari
Certain general observations may possibly serve to clarify

and the return thereto may be stated as follows:

the situation.
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida,
died intestate in Singapore, Straits Settlements, on August

It is often necessary to have more than one administration

31, 1921. Of her immediate family there remained the

of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property

husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles

in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign

D'Almeida and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida

country, administration is had in both countries. That

D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the brother

which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last

Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore,

domicile is termed the principal administration, while any

while the brother Alfred was in Manila. The Singapore heirs

other

apparently joined in asking that letters of administration be

administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant

granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements to

of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect

B. E. Johannes, the lawful husband of the deceased. At

beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.

least, on September 19, 1921, the husband of the

Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no

deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband

authority in the United States. The ancillary administration

was named the administrator of the property of the

is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country

deceased wife, which was locally situate within the

other than that of his las domicile, property to be

jurisdiction

Straits

administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable

Settlements. (Under the British law [22 & 23 Charles II c

for his individual debts or to be distributed among his

10, 29 Charles II c 3, and James II c 17], it would seem

heirs. (23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.;

that the husband is entitled to the whole of the estate of

Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882], 108 U. S., 256; Perez vs. Aguerria

his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other

[1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 443; Vaughn vs. Barret [1833], 5

next of kin.) On October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D'

Vt., 333.)

of

the

Supreme

Court

of

the

administration

is

termed

the

ancillary

Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of

the

of

The principal administration in this instance is that at the

P109,732.55. This sum it appears, was on deposit in the

Manila

estate

of

the

deceased

consisting

domicile of the late Carmen Theodora Johannes in

Manila banks under and by virtue of guardianship

Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the

proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes, which

Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary

were finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian,

to the domiciliary administration, conformable to the

the Philippine Trust Company, on January 16, 1922.

provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of

Civil Procedure. The proper course of procedure would be

The burden of the relator's contention is that the

for the ancillary administrator to pay the claims of

Honorable George R. Harvey, as judge of First Instance of

creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the

the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in

surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution

appointing Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of

among the next of kin. Such administration appears to be

the estate on deposit in the Philippines, and that an

required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of section

administration

596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit of the

in

the

jurisdiction

is

unnecessary.
the

settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings,

appointment of Alfred D'Almeida and to issue an order

have not been met. The decision of this court in Baldemor

directing the Judge of First Instance to have placed to the

vs. Malangyaon ([1916]), 34 Phil., 368), on which relators

credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate of

rely, is then not in point because predicated directly on the

Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late

provisions of the section last cited.

Accordingly,

relators

pray

the

court

to

annul

Carmen D'Almeida Johannes, now on deposit and subject

to the order of the court, with P5,000 as damages. The

It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a

respondents, Judge Harvey, and the administrator Alfred

preference when an administrator is to be appointed,

D'Almeida, in compliance with the order to show cause why

unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name

the writ should not issue, contend that the respondent

someone else. This preference has particular force under

judge has not in any manner acted in excess of the

Spanish

jurisdiction duly conferred upon and exercised by him in

Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 1085.) However, the Code of

68 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

law

precedents. (4 Escriche,

Diccionario de

Civil Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving

husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom
administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion
of the court to determine, for it may be found that the
surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility.
Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be considered in
determining the propriety of the appointment, and in this
connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the
deceased,

the

administrator

of

the

principal

administration, resides in Singapore. Undoubtedly, if the

husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court
would give consideration to this petition that he be named
the ancillary administrator for local purposes. Ancillary
letters should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary
representative, if he applies therefor, or to his nominee, or
attorney;

but

in

the

absence

of

express

statutory

requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some

other person. (24 C. J., 1114.)
There is still another aspect to the case. This is that
pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an
order

of

Court

administration

of

of
the

First
estate

Instance
of

appointing

deceased

an

person

constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties

thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is
appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy [1907], 8 Phil.,
594.)
As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance
has not acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and as there in
an appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the writ
prayed for cannot be granted. Costs against the relators. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
FACTS:

69 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where

declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable

one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and

controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons

obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to

whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the

remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under

relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that

Philippine law?

the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case

satisfies all the requisites for the grant of a petition for

On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros

declaratory relief.

M. Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son

and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady

Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation

Kimberly V. Orbecido.

presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to

cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,

In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen
and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married
Innocent Stanley and is now currently living in San

the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The

instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen

Gabriel, California with her child by him.

while residing in the USA

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of

the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed. Finding

Records of the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed

merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The

that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to

Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the

Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code

Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was

Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where

denied. Hence, this petition.

the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse

who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the

ISSUE:

Filipino spouse.

Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case

the Family Code

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner where the Court

held that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien

HELD: The petition is granted.

spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the

The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not

applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a
valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs the respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.

applicable to his case, but insists that since his naturalized

alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her
to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for

The

requisites

of

petition

70 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

law.
In the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals, the parties
were Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, the Court holds that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases

The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry

relief.

Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine

hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by

The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly

declaratory

of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., which involved a marriage

for

involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the

marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a

divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be

on record, the Court is unable to declare, based on the

allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at

respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was

the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule

naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce

otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

decree

and

had

remarried

an

American,

that

the

respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration

In view of the foregoing, the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are as follows: (1)
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that had
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Then the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
satisfied. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse,
should be allowed to remarry.
However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of
competent

evidence

duly

submitted

by

respondent

concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of

respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. For his plea to prosper, the respondent must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it,
and that such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts

cannot

take

judicial

notice

of

foreign

laws.

Furthermore, the respondent must also show that the

divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse
who had
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, due to lack of sufficient evidence submitted and

71 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

could only be made properly upon the respondents

submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are
as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing

along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San

vs.

Gabriel, California.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the
Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the
Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its
Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of
the divorce decree obtained against him by his American
wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under
the Philippine Law.

72 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of

the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to

"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article

remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a

26 thereof states:

petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,

Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

All

marriages

solemnized

outside

the

Philippines

in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where

RULE 63

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be

valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

35, 37, and 38.

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original

under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or

whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in

Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed

into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any

question of construction or validity arising, and for a

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines

declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

...

35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1)

there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly

that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the

obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her

controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial

to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to

determination.

remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to

Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where

govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It

one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce

seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the

decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of

celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino

the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the

citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the

State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage

time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two

while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration

Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as

of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,

an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce

has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is

granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried

also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when

an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into

question the validity of his second marriage.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the

Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of

Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to

Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this

provision had come about in the first place, and what was

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those

the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.

These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,

Brief Historical Background

while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them

abroad can.

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed

into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of

divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign

73 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered

necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be

to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose

extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its

that this be deleted and made into law only after more

terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12

widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

Legislative Intent

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil

is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the

instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the

spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married

application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

to the Filipino spouse.

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree

capacitating him or her to remarry.

validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the

Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at

the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time

the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino

citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an

American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of

have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a

Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in

valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin

this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife

requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and

are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"

obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein

Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by

his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the

proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and

Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in

applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of

this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the

Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving

marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of

parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage

validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a

were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes

sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;

naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce

hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still

decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to

remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of

the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be

to

sanction

absurdity

and

injustice.

Where

the

interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal

import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as

74 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent

evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife.
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must

with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were

prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an

born

American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree

predeceased Felicisimo.

six

children.

On

August

11,

1963,

Virginia

can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it

must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must
be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry

Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute

Divorce

and

Awarding

Child

Custody

on

December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married

Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no
children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that

1992.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,

dissolution of their Felicisimos conjugal partnership assets

as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to

and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17,

allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse

1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration

who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to

before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo

remarry. However, considering that in the present petition

claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the

there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we

petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since

are

bare

the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married

allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an

to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute

American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had

divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,

remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated

State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to

to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly

Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed

upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in

that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by

his favor.

virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family

Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May

Code

unable

to

declare,

based

on

respondents

15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the

Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch

Upon

cannot

death

be

of

given

his

dad,

Rodolfo

retroactive

effect

sought

to

the

validate

Felicidads bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this

would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.

23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

ISSUE:
No pronouncement as to costs.
Whether

or

not

Felicidad

may

file

for

letters

of

administration over Felicisimos estate.

SO ORDERED.

HELD:
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present

petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the

FACTS:

marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the

During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss

dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was

75 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific

guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce

decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and

Republic of the Philippines

due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and

SUPREME COURT

25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a

Manila

public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an

official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the

THIRD DIVISION

officer having legal custody of the document. If the record

is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied

by

certificate

issued

by

the

proper

diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign

service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x

of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the

Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that

G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.

As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the

September 12, 1995

and January 31, 1996

Resolutions

of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in

SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution

denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce

before the Family Court of the First

Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),

which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

76 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad

Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of

San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.

Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,

William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at

she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry

Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

her by virtue of paragraph 2,

He had

13

Article 26 of the Family

no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years

Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

from the time of their marriage up to his death on

14

December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their

Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the

conjugal

Order denying their motions to dismiss.

partnership

assets

and

the

settlement

of

15

They asserted

Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a

that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be

petition for letters of administration

before the Regional

given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous

Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-

marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested

3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

rights in derogation of Article 256

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo

that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at

from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting

100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,

Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

16

of the Family Code.

Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are

respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order

17

denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that

respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the

motion

deemed moot and academic

for disqualification
18

was

because then Acting

Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador

S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of

the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss

on the grounds of improper venue and

failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the

petition for letters of administration should have been filed
in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds
and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal

10

of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court

issued an Order
Unaware

of

11

the

denying the two motions to dismiss.

denial

of

the

motions

to

12

thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that

while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First

77 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

19

against Judge Tensuan

on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a

motion for reconsideration

20

from the Order denying their

motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state

the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order

21

granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled

to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,

22

the trial court required the parties to

submit their respective position papers on the twin issues

of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested

23

that he is

adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his

dismiss,

respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition

Mila filed a motion for inhibition

previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.

Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14,

24

and June 20,

25

1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the

petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the

petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and

doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and

not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was

philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there

without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of

is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view

administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was

sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article

bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of

26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy

absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry

of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."

Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind

Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that

Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that

the courts should do is to give force and effect to the

paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be

express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having

retroactively applied because it would impair the vested

been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,

rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.

the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry

32

under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage

Respondent moved for reconsideration
disqualification
denied.

27

26

and for the

of Judge Arcangel but said motions were

between the deceased and petitioner should not be

denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

28

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive

petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial

proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
xxx

33

portion of which states:

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;

reconsideration

34

which were denied by the Court of

Appeals.

the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are

REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the

to the trial court for further proceedings.

instant petition for review on certiorari.

29

35

Rodolfo later filed

a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of

was granted.

36

the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the

decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo

of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical

insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of

habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a

administration was improperly laid because at the time of

person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It

his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as

They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.

governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,

Guray

Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration

"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a

was properly filed in Makati City.

fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one

37

and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,

38

intends to return. They claim that a person can only have

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr.

30

and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.

31

It found that

one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never

changed

his

domicile,

the

petition

for

letters

of

administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,

Laguna.

the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly

dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to

by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As

Felicisimo

a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was

performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to

capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage

Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot

with

respondent. Thus

was

void

and

bigamous

because

it

was

be retroactively applied because it would impair vested

rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph

2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the

78 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of

Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly

residence to which when absent, one has the intention of

laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file

returning.

the subject petition for letters of administration.

the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his

42

However, for purposes of fixing venue under

personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence

The petition lacks merit.

or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal

Under Section 1,

continuity and consistency.

39

residence or domicile provided he resides therein with

Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the

petition for letters of administration of the estate of

Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,

40

we laid down

the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as

contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for

43

Hence, it is possible that a

person may have his residence in one place and domicile in

another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,

purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.

[T]he

Sale

term

residence"

"resides"
as

connotes

distinguished

ex

from

vi

termini

"legal

"actual

residence

or

domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and

"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of
time

of

residence

is

required

though;

residence must be more than temporary.

however,
41

the

(Emphasis

supplied)

Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute

dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased

44

purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented

billing statements
Chinese

General

45

from the Philippine Heart Center and

Hospital

for

the

period

August

to

December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100

San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association
Inc.,

letter-envelopes

47

48

46

and Ayala Country Club,

from 1988 to 1990 sent by the

deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the

deceaseds calling cards

49

stating that his home/city

address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,

Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident
of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court

50

which has territorial jurisdiction

over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on

December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of

the

National

Capital

Judicial

Region

which

had

territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in

Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3.

51

Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for

purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there
is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent

79 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality

to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil

Code,

considering

that

Felicidads

marriage

to

Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the

Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving
this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of

the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering

cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live

that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to

together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render

rule in the affirmative.

support to private respondent. The latter should not

continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
involved a marriage

conjugal property. She should not be discriminated

between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage

against in her own country if the ends of justice are to

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

52

was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained

abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not
valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife
after the divorce. Thus:

54

(Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. IbaySomera

55

where the Court recognized the validity of a

divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that

the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private

respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

be served.

53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court

ruled that she should no longer be considered married to
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code

80 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of

one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,

56

the Court stated

57

that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign

spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.

58

Although decided

on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was

obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
v. Recio,

60

59

In Garcia

the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case

in relation to Article 26.

61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,

historical

background

and

legislative

intent

62

the

behind

paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed,

to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All

marriages

solemnized

outside

the

Philippines

in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by

valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties

35, 37, and 38.

and productive of no possible good to the community, relief

in some way should be obtainable.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original

Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

64

Marriage, being a

mutual and shared commitment between two parties,

cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

Petitioners cite Articles 15

65

and 17

66

of the Civil Code in

stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar

as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts

35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

the ends of justice are to be served.

should not be discriminated against in his own country if

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly

obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x

Intermediate Appellate Court,

68

67

In Alonzo v.

the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its

results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the

Legislative Intent

first concern of the judge should be to discover in its

provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations

showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.

injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An

indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin

to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is

arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its

peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino

spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
63

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not

unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like

(Emphasis added)

robots to the literal command without regard to its cause

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving
a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified
the

law

already

established

through

precedent.1awphi1.net

81 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too

closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."

judicial
xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice

acquired

"as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his

cohabitation.

through

their

joint

efforts

during

their

due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it

assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it
for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice.

69

decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely

allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
70

the Court laid down the specific

guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce

judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied

by

certificate

74

Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that

letters of administration may be granted to the surviving

spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce

In Garcia v. Recio,

Section 6,

issued

by

the

proper

diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign

service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

71

solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies

72

of the

Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that

their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

interested person and must show, as far as known to the

petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has
a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.

75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an

interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144

76

of the Civil

Code. This provision governs the property relations between

parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly

of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text

A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an

73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court

for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.

wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both

the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to

marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the coowner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were

82 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.

Saguid v. Court of Appeals,

79

78

In

we held that even if the

cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before

the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

80

The

Court described the property regime under this provision

as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing

the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during
said

cohabitation

in

proportion

to

their

respective

contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of

the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry.

Absent

proof

of

the

extent

thereof,

their

contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed

to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. x x x

81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal

capacity

to

file

the

subject

petition

for

letters

of

administration may arise from her status as the surviving

wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order

which

dismissed

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED

to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

83 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

PHIL SEA INV. VS. CA

June 19, 1992

84 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

The Factual Antecedents

Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized under the laws
of Taiwan, Republic of China.4 On the other hand,
respondent Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a
domestic corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.5
On January 9, 2002, Ting Guan obligated itself under a
contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and steel
to Tung Ho. Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a request for
arbitration

before

the

ICC

International

Court

of

Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan failed to

deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap
iron and steel.6
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho on June 18, 2004 and
ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho the following: (1) actual
damages in the amount of US$ 659,646.15 with interest of
6% per annum from December 4, 2002 until final payment;
(2) cost of arbitration in the amount of US $ 47,000.00;
and (3) legal costs and expenses in the amount of NT $
761,448.00 and US $ 34,552.83.7
On October 24, 2004, Tung Ho filed an action against Ting

TUNGHO vs. TING GUAN

G.R. No. 182153

April 7, 2014

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182153

April 7, 2014

TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
vs.
TING GUAN TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.

Guan for the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral

award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
Branch 145. Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case based
on Tung Hos lack of capacity to sue and for prematurity.
Ting Guan subsequently filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss based on improper venue. Ting Guan argued that
the complaint should have been filed in Cebu where its
principal place of business was located.8
The Proceedings before the RTC
The RTC denied Ting Guans motion to dismiss in an order
dated May 11, 2005. Ting Guan moved to reconsider the
order and raised the RTCs alleged lack of jurisdiction over
its person as additional ground for the dismissal of the
complaint. Ting Guan insisted that Ms. Fe Tejero, on whom

DECISION

personal service

was

served,

was

not its

corporate

secretary and was not a person allowed under Section 11,

Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons. It also

BRION, J.:

asserted that Tung Ho cannot enforce the award in the

We resolve the petition for review on, certiorari1 filed by

petitioner Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corp. (Tung Ho) to
challenge the July 5, 2006 decision2 and the March 12,
2008 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 92828.

85 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Philippines without violating public policy as Taiwan is not

a signatory to the New York Convention.9
The RTC denied the motion in an order dated November 21,
2005 and ruled that Ting Guan had voluntarily submitted

to the courts jurisdiction when it raised other arguments

It was not until March 12, 2008, after the developments

apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss.

described below, that the CA finally denied Tung Hos

partial motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Proceedings before the CA

Ting Guans Petition before this Court
Ting Guan responded to the denials by filing a petition for
certiorari before the CA with an application for the

(G.R. No. 176110)

issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of

preliminary injunction.10

Ting Guans petition before this Court was docketed as G.R.

No. 176110. Ting Guan argued that the dismissal of the

In its Memorandum, Tung Ho argued that a Rule 65

case should be based on the following additional grounds:

petition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a

first, the complaint was prematurely filed; second, the

motion to dismiss. It pointed out that the proper recourse

foreign arbitral award is null and void; third, the venue was

for Ting Guan was to file an answer and to subsequently

improperly laid in Makati; and lastly, the enforcement of

appeal

the arbitral award was against public policy.15

the

case.

It

also

posited

that

beyond

the

reglementary period for filing an answer, Ting Guan was

barred from raising other grounds for the dismissal of the
case. Tung Ho also claimed that the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan since the return
of service of summons expressly stated that Tejero was a
corporate secretary.11

On April 24, 2007, Tung Ho filed its Comment dated April

24, 2007 in G.R. No. 176110, touching on the issue of
jurisdiction, albeit lightly. Tung Ho complained in its
Comment that Ting Guan engaged in dilatory tactics when
Ting Guan belatedly raised the issue of jurisdiction in the
motion for reconsideration before the RTC. However, Tung

In its decision dated July 5, 2006, the CA dismissed the

Ho did not affirmatively seek the reversal of the July 5,

complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of Ting

2006 decision. Instead, it merely stated that Ting Guans

Guan. The CA held that Tung Ho failed to establish that

petition "cannot be dismissed on the ground that the

Tejero was Ting Guans corporate secretary. The CA also

summons was wrongfully issued as the petitioner can

ruled that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to

always move for the issuance of an alias summons to be

assail the denial of a motion to dismiss if the ground raised

served". Furthermore, Tung Ho only prayed that Ting

in the motion is lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, any of

Guans petition be denied in G.R. No. 176110 and for other

the grounds for the dismissal of the case can be raised in a

just and equitable reliefs. In other words, Tung Ho failed to

motion to dismiss provided that the grounds were raised

effectively argue its case on the merits before the Court in

before the filing of an answer. The CA likewise ruled that

G.R. No. 176110.

Tung Ho properly filed the complaint before the RTCMakati.12

On June 18, 2007, we issued our Resolution denying Ting

Guans petition for lack of merit. On November 12, 2007,

Subsequently, both parties moved to partially reconsider

we also denied Ting Guans motion for reconsideration. On

the CA decision. Tung Ho reiterated that there was proper

January 8, 2008, the Court issued an entry of judgment in

service of summons. On the other hand, Ting Guan sought

Ting Guans petition, G.R. No. 176110.

to modify the CA decision with respect to the proper venue

of the case. The CA denied Ting Guans motion for partial
reconsideration in an order dated December 5, 2006.13

After the entry of judgment, we referred the matter back to

the RTC for further proceedings. On January 16, 2008, the
RTC declared the case closed and terminated. Its order

Ting Guan immediately proceeded to file a petition for

stated:

review on certiorari before this Court to question the CAs

rulings as discussed below. In the interim (on February 11,
2008), Tung Ho (whose motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision was still pending with that court) filed a "Motion to
Supplement and Resolve Motion for Reconsideration" before
the CA. In this motion, Tung Ho prayed for the issuance of
an alias summons if the service of summons had indeed
been defective, but its motion proved unsuccessful.14

86 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Upon examination of the entire records of this case, an

answer with caution was actually filed by the respondent to
which a reply was submitted by the petitioner. Since the
answer was with the qualification that respondent is not
waiving its claim of lack of jurisdiction over its person on
the ground of improper service of summons upon it and
that its petition to this effect filed before the Court of

Appeals was acted favorably and this case was dismissed

1) Whether the present petition is barred by res

on the aforementioned ground and it appearing that the

judicata; and

Decision as well as the Order denying the motion for

reconsideration of the petitioner now final and executory,
the Order of November 9, 2007 referring this petition to the
Court Annexed Mediation for possible amicable settlement

2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction

over the person of Ting Guan, specifically:

is recalled it being moot and academic. This case is now

a) Whether Tejero was the proper person

considered closed and terminated.

to receive the summons; and

On February 6, 2008, Tung Ho moved to reconsider the

b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary

RTC order. Nothing in the records shows whether the RTC

appearance before the trial court.

granted or denied this motion for reconsideration.

The Courts Ruling

Tung Hos Petition before this Court

We find the petition meritorious.

(G.R. No. 182153)

On May 7, 2008, Tung Ho seasonably filed a petition for
review on certiorari to seek the reversal of the July 5, 2006
decision and the March 12, 2008 resolution of the CA. This
is the present G.R. No. 182153 now before us.
Tung Ho reiterates that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Ting Guan. It also claims that the return of
service of summons is a prima facie evidence of the recited
facts i.e., that Tejero is a corporate secretary as stated
therein and that the sheriff is presumed to have regularly
performed his official duties in serving the summons. In
the

alternative,

Tung

Ho

argues

that

Ting

Guans

successive motions before the RTC are equivalent to

voluntary appearance. Tung Ho also prays for the issuance
of alias summons to cure the alleged defective service of
summons.16

I. The Court is not precluded from ruling on the

jurisdictional issue raised in the petition
A. The petition is not barred by res judicata
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on all points and matters determined in the
former suit.19 For res judicata to apply, the final judgment
must be on the merits of the case which means that the
court has unequivocally determined the parties rights and
obligations with respect to the causes of action and the
subject matter of the case.20
Contrary to Ting Guans position, our ruling in G.R. No.
176110 does not operate as res judicata on Tung Hos

Respondent Ting Guans Position

(G.R. No. 182153)
In its Comment, Ting Guan submits that the appeal is
already barred by res judicata. It also stresses that the
Court has already affirmed with finality the dismissal of
the complaint.17 Ting Guan also argues that Tung Ho
raises a factual issue that is beyond the scope of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.18

appeal; G.R. No. 176110 did not conclusively rule on all

issues raised by the parties in this case so that this Court
would now be barred from taking cognizance of Tung Hos
petition. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt on
technical or collateral aspects of the case, and not on its
merits. Specifically, we did not rule on whether Tung Ho
may enforce the foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in
that case.
B. The appellate court cannot be ousted of jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case
The courts jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted

The Issues

until it finally disposes of the case. When a court has

This case presents to us the following issues:

already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a

controversy,

its

jurisdiction

to

proceed

to

the

final

determination of the case is retained.21 A judge is

87 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

competent to act on the case while its incidents remain

findings of the lower courts are final and binding on this

pending for his disposition.

Court.22

The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the

B. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court

promulgation of G.R. No. 176110. The July 5, 2006

decision has not yet become final and executory for the
reason that there remained a pending incident before the
CA the resolution of Tung Hos motion for reconsideration
when this Court promulgated G.R. No. 176110. In this
latter case, on the other hand, we only resolved procedural
issues that are divorced from the present jurisdictional
question before us. Thus, what became immutable in G.R.
No. 176110 was the ruling that Tung Hos complaint is not
dismissible on grounds of prematurity, nullity of the foreign
arbitral award, improper venue, and the foreign arbitral
awards repugnance to local public policy. This leads us to
the conclusion that in the absence of any ruling on the
merits on the issue of jurisdiction, res judicata on this
point could not have set in.
C. Tung Hos timely filing of a motion for reconsideration
and of a petition for review on certiorari prevented the July
5, 2006 decision from attaining finality
Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, Tung Ho may file a petition for review on certiorari
before the Court within (15) days from the denial of its
motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of
the judgment. Tung Hos timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the CA and of a Rule 45 petition
before this Court prevented the July 5, 2006 CA decision
from attaining finality. For this Court to deny Tung Hos
petition would result in an anomalous situation where a
party litigant is penalized and deprived of his fair
opportunity to appeal the case by faithfully complying with
the Rules of Court.
II. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Ting Guan

However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the

appellate court reached, given the established facts.23 To
our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial
court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before
that court. Its voluntary appearance is equivalent to service
of summons.24
As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal
arguments in motions filed by the parties. Under the
omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available.25 The purpose of this rule is to obviate
multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatory motions
and pleadings. Party litigants should not be allowed to
reiterate identical motions, speculating on the possible
change of opinion of the courts or of the judges thereof.
In this respect, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
requires the defendant to file a motion to dismiss within
the time for, but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim. Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules
of Court, on the other hand, commands the defendant to
file his answer within fifteen (15) days after service of
summons, unless a different period is fixed by the trial
court. Once the trial court denies the motion, the
defendant should file his answer within the balance of
fifteen (15) days to which he was entitled at the time of
serving his motion, but the remaining period cannot be less
than five (5) days computed from his receipt of the notice of
the denial.26
Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may opt to file a
motion for reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall
have denied the motion for reconsideration does the
defendant become bound to file his answer.27 If the

A. Tejero was not the proper person to receive the

defendant fails to file an answer within the reglementary

summons

period, the plaintiff may file a motion to declare the

defendant in default. This motion shall be with notice to

Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts

finding that Tejero was not a corporate secretary and,

the defendant and shall be supported by proof of the

failure.28

therefore, was not the proper person to receive the

summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

The trial courts denial of the motion to dismiss is not a

This Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot re-examine,

license for the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition before the

review or re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review

CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the

made by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling

subject of a petition for certiorari as the defendant still has

reasons, we will not deviate from the rule that factual

an adequate remedy before the trial court i.e., to file an

88 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the

Guans partial motion. Ting Guan, therefore, went to this

case.29 As exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition

Court via a petition for review on certiorari while Tung Hos

for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss

partial motion for reconsideration was still unresolved.

is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant30 or

over the subject matter.31

Expectedly, Ting Guan did not question the portions of the

CA decision favorable to it when it filed its petition with this

We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guans

Court. Instead, Ting Guan reiterated that the CA should

blatant disregard of the rules of procedure in the present

have included additional grounds to justify the dismissal of

case. The Rules of Court only allows the filing of a motion

Tung Hos complaint with the RTC. The Court denied Ting

to dismiss once.32 Ting Guans filing of successive motions

Guans petition, leading to the entry of judgment that

to dismiss, under the guise of "supplemental motion to

improvidently followed. Later, the CA denied Tung Hos

dismiss" or "motion for reconsideration", is not only

partial motion for reconsideration, prompting Tung Hos

improper but also dilatory.33 Ting Guans belated reliance

own petition with this Court, which is the present G.R. No.

on

182153.

the

improper

service

of

summons

was

mere

afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid the foreign

arbitral awards enforcement which is still at its preliminary
stage after the lapse of almost a decade since the filing of
the complaint.

Under the Rules of Court, entry of judgment may only be

made if no appeal or motion for reconsideration was timely
filed.36 In the proceedings before the CA, if a motion for
reconsideration

(including

partial

motion

for

Furthermore, Ting Guans failure to raise the alleged lack

reconsideration37) is timely filed by the proper party,

of jurisdiction over its person in the first motion to dismiss

execution of the CAs judgment or final resolution shall be

is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before

stayed.38 This rule is applicable even to proceedings before

the RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss and a

the Supreme Court, as provided in Section 4, Rule 56 of

"supplemental motion to dismiss" without raising the RTCs

the Rules of Court.39

lack of jurisdiction over its person. In Anunciacion v.

Bocanegra,34 we categorically stated that the defendant
should raise the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction
over his person in the very first motion to dismiss. Failure
to raise the issue of improper service of summons in the
first motion to dismiss is a waiver of this defense and
cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and
pleadings.

reconsideration with the CA and seasonably appealed the

CAs rulings with the Court through the present petition
(G.R. No. 182153).
To now recognize the finality of the Resolution of Ting Guan
petition (G.R. No. 176110) based on its entry of judgment

Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear

before the RTC, the CA should have ordered the RTC to
issue an alias summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher
GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court35, we enunciated
the policy that the courts should not dismiss a case simply
because there was an improper service of summons. The
lower courts should be cautious in haphazardly dismissing
complaints on this ground alone considering that the trial
court can cure this defect and order the issuance of alias
summons

In the present case, Tung Ho timely filed its motion for

on

the

proper person

in

the

interest

of

substantial justice and to expedite the proceedings.

and to allow it to foreclose the present meritorious petition

of Tung Ho, would of course cause unfair and unjustified
injury to Tung Ho. First, as previously mentioned, the Ting
Guan petition did not question or assail the full merits of
the CA decision. It was Tung Ho, the party aggrieved by the
CA decision, who substantially questioned the merits of the
CA decision in its petition; this petition showed that the CA
indeed committed error and Tung Hos complaint before the
RTC should properly proceed. Second, the present case is
for the enforcement of an arbitral award involving millions
of pesos. Tung Ho already won in the foreign arbitration
and the present case is simply for the enforcement of this
arbitral award

III. A Final Note

in our jurisdiction. Third, and most

importantly, Tung Ho properly and timely availed of the

remedies available to it under the Rules of Court, which

As a final note, we are not unaware that the present case

has been complicated by its unique development. The
complication arose when the CA, instead of resolving the
parties separate partial motions for reconsideration in one
resolution, proceeded to first resolve and to deny Ting

89 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

provide

that

filing

and

pendency

of

motion

for

reconsideration stays the execution of the CA judgment.

Therefore, at the time of the entry of judgment in G.R. No.
176110 in the Supreme Court on January 8, 2008, the CA

decision which the Court affirmed was effectively not yet be

According to this ruling, the motu proprio recall or setting

final.

aside of the entry of final judgment was proper and

"entirely consistent with the inherent power of every court

Significantly,

the

reconsideration

rule

stays

that

the

timely

execution

of

motion
the

for

assailed

judgment is in accordance with Rule 51, Section 10 (Rules

governing the CA proceedings) which provides that "entry of
judgments may only be had if there is no appeal or motion
for reconsideration

timely filed. The date when the

judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be

deemed as the date of its entry." Incidentally, this
procedure

also

proceedings.40

governs

Following

before
these

Supreme

rules,

inter alia to amend and control its process and orders so as

to make them conformable to law and justice [Sec. 5(g),
Rule 135, Rules of Court,]. That the recall has in fact
served to achieve a verdict consistent with law and justice
is clear from the judgment subsequently rendered on the
merits." This course of action is effectively what the Court
undertook today, adapted of course to the circumstances of
the present case.

Court

therefore,

the

In light of these premises, we hereby REVERSE and SET

pendency of Tung Hos MR with the CA made the entry of

ASIDE the July 5, 2006 decision and the March 12, 2008

the judgment of the Court in the Ting Guan petition

resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

premature and inefficacious for not being final and

92828. SP. Proc. No. 11.-5954 is hereby ordered reinstated.

executory.

Let the records of this case be remanded to the court of

origin for further proceedings. No costs.

Based on the above considerations, the Court would not be

in error if it applies its ruling in the case of Realty Sales
Enterprises,

Inc.

and

Macondray

Farms,

Inc.

SO ORDERED.

v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.41 where the Court, in a

per curiam resolution, ruled that an entry of judgment may
be recalled or lifted motu proprio when it is clear that the
decision assailed of has not yet become final under the
rules:
The March 6, 1985 resolution denying reconsideration of
the January 30, 1985 resolution was, to repeat, not served
on the petitioners until March 20, 1985 - and therefore the
Jan. 30, 1985 resolution could not be deemed final and
executory until one (1) full day (March 21) had elapsed, or
on March 22, 1985 (assuming inaction on petitioners' part.)
The entry of judgment relative to the January 30, 1985
resolution, made on March 18, 1985, was therefore
premature and inefficacious. An entry of judgment does

NORTHWEST AIRLINES vs. CA

not make the judgment so entered final and execution

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

when it is not so in truth. An entry of judgment merely

records the fact that a judgment, order or resolution has
become final and executory; but it is not the operative act
that make the judgment, order or resolution final and
executory. In the case at bar, the entry of judgment on

FACTS:

Company

March 18, 1985 did not make the January 30, 1985

Agency

the date of entry, March 18, 1985, notice of the resolution

notice (and release) of the March 6, 1985 resolution

denying reconsideration.1wphi1

90 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

through

its

Japan

branch,

Agreement,

whereby

the

Northwest

authorized the C.F. to sell its air transportation

denying reconsideration of the January 30, 1985 resolution

parties, since March 18, 1985 was also the date of the

(C.F.),

entered into an International Passenger Sales

resolution subject of the entry, final and executory, As of

had not yet been served on the petitioners or any of the

Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp &

tickets

March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of

the

ticket

sales, Northwest sued C.F. in

Tokyo,

Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of

the ticket sales, with claim for damages

April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued by

jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the

the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of

defendant in the case before the Japanese Court

of the case at bar

Japan
The attempt to serve the summons was

CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in

unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in

a foreign court is a resident in the court of that

Manila and would be back on April 24,

foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction

1980

over the person of C.F. but it must be served in

the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court

April

24,

1980: Mr.

Dinozo returned

to C.F.

Office to serve the summons but he refused to

ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F.

receive claiming that he no longer an employee

HELD: YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the

After

the

attempts

of

service

were

challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied

unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent the

NORTHWEST's

summons together with the other legal documents

expenses, and exemplary damages

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan>

Japanese

Embassy

Department)

of

in

Manila>Ministry

Foreign

Affairs

of

(now

Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila who

28,

1980: C.F. received

from

Deputy

but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.

January

Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign

Accordingly, the presumption of validity and

decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese

29,

1981: Tokyo

Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is

presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on
service

Court rendered

judgment ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195

Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per
annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until
payment is completed

20,

1983: Northwest

a suit

foreign

(1) on its resident agent designated in

or,
(2) if there is no such resident agent, on
the government official designated by law

for

July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese

private

accordance with law for that purpose,

to that effect; or

enforcement of the judgment a RTC

business in the Philippines, service may be made:

o
filed

on

that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing

March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff

May

summons

Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides

so it became final and executory

of

corporation doing business in the Philippines.

Balingit copy of the judgment. C.F. did not appeal

litigation

court must stand.

Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons

fees,

regularity of the service of summons and the

Main Office
August

attorneys

presumption of its validity

ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F.

for

judgment has the burden of overcoming the

the

Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of First

claims

(3) on any of its officers or agents within

the Philippines.

Court sought to be enforced is null and void and

unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been

If the foreign corporation has designated

rendered without due and proper notice and/or

an

with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear

designation is exclusive, and service of

mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in

summons is without force and gives the

the Japanese Court sought in this action is null

court no jurisdiction unless made upon

and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of

him.

the defendant considering that this is an action in

personam. The process of the Court in Japan
sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese

91 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

agent

to

receive

summons,

the

Where the corporation has no such

agent, service shall be made on the

government official designated by law, to

deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful

wit:

methods of serving process.

(a) the Insurance Commissioner

in

the

case

of

foreign

insurance company

(b)

the

Superintendent

of

banking corporation
(c) the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the case of
other foreign corporations duly
licensed to do business in the
Philippines. Whenever service of
process

is

government

so

made,

office

or

the

official

served shall transmit by mail a

copy of the summons or other
legal

proccess

corporation

at

to
its

the

home

or

principal office. The sending of

such copy is a necessary part of
the service.

The service on the proper government official

under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code

Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to

assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to
do business here, to the status of domestic
corporations

We think it would be entirely out of line with this

policy should we make a discrimination against a
foreign

corporation,

like

the

petitioner,

and

subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by

attachment when it has complied not only with
every requirement of law made specially of foreign
corporations,

but

in

addition

with

every

requirement of law made of domestic corporations

In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing

business in Japan through its four duly registered
branches at the time the collection suit against it
was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of
Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be

92 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Accordingly,

the

extraterritorial

service

of

summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid

not only under the processual presumption but

Banks, in the case of a foreign

also because of the presumption of regularity of

performance of official duty.

Company,

Inc.,

(hereinafter

SHARP),

corporation

incorporated under Philippine laws.

As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged decision
of 10 November 1993,

the following are the factual and

procedural antecedents of this controversy:

On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines
and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through
its Japan branch, entered into an International
Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby
the former authorized the latter to sell its air
transportation tickets. Unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant
on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued
defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with
claim for damages.
Republic of the Philippines

On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons

SUPREME COURT

was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo

Manila

District Court of Japan against defendant at its

office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132,

FIRST DIVISION

Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa

Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

was

unsuccessful

because

the

bailiff

was

advised by a person in the office that Mr.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC.,
respondents.

Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to

receive court processes was in Manila and
would be back on April 24, 1980.
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the
defendant's office to serve the summons.

PADILLA, JR., J.:

Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the

decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of
the petitioner's complaint to enforce the judgment of a
Japanese court. The principal issue here is whether a
Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine
corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons
through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation
at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve
summons in Japan had failed.
Petitioner Northwest

Orient

claiming that he was no longer an

employee of the defendant.
After the two attempts of service were
unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo
District

Court

decided

to

have

the

complaint and the writs of summons

served at the head office of the defendant
in

Manila.

On

July

11,

1980,

the

Director of the Tokyo District Court

Airlines,

Inc.

(hereinafter

NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws of

the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil
Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 54, Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a
Japanese court against private respondent C.F. Sharp &

93 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

requested the Supreme Court of Japan

to

serve

diplomatic

the

summons

channels

through

upon

defendant's head office in Manila.

the

On August 28, 1980, defendant received

granting

from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the

dismissing the complaint (Decision, pp.

writ of summons (p. 276, Records).

376-378,

Despite receipt of the same, defendant

demurrer motion, the trial court held

failed

that:

to

appear

hearing.

Thus,

proceeded

at

the

the

to

hear

scheduled

Tokyo
the

judgment

demurrer

Records).

In

motion
granting

and
the

Court

plaintiff's

complaint and on [January 29, 1981],

rendered

the

ordering

the

defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of

83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at
the rate of 6% per annum from August
28, 1980 up to and until payment is
completed (pp. 12-14, Records).

The

foreign

Japanese

judgment

Court

sought

in

the

in

this

action is null and void for want of

jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant considering that this is
an action in personam; the Japanese
Court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant
because jurisprudence requires that

On March 24, 1981, defendant received

the

from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the

summons in Japan in order for the

judgment.

Japanese

Defendant

appealed

the

not

judgment,

having

the

same

became final and executory.

defendant

be

Court

served
to

with

acquire

jurisdiction over it, the process of

the Court in Japan sent to the
Philippines

which

is

outside

the

Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer

decision in Japan, hence, on May 20,

jurisdiction over the defendant in

1983, a suit for enforcement of the

the case before the Japanese Court

judgment was filed by plaintiff before the

of the case at bar. Boudard versus

Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch

Tait 67 Phil. 170. The plaintiff

Plaintiff

54.

was

unable

to

execute

contends that the Japanese Court

acquired jurisdiction because the

On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its

answer averring that the judgment of the
Japanese Court sought to be enforced is
null and void and unenforceable in this
jurisdiction

having

been

rendered

without due and proper notice to the

defendant and/or with collusion or fraud
and/or upon a clear mistake of law and
fact (pp. 41-45, Rec.).

case was tried on the merits. After the

plaintiff rested its case, defendant on
21,

1989,

filed

Motion

for

Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence

based

on

two

grounds:

(1) the foreign judgment sought to be

enforced is null and void for want of
jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is
contrary to Philippine law and public
policy and rendered without due process
of law. Plaintiff filed its opposition after
which the court a quo rendered the now
assailed decision dated June 21, 1989

94 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

having

four

(4)

branches

doing

business therein and in fact had a

permit

from

the

Japanese

government to conduct business in

Japan (citing the exhibits presented
by the plaintiff); if this is so then
service of summons should have
been made upon the defendant in
Japan in any of these alleged four

Unable to settle the case amicably, the

April

defendant is a resident of Japan,

branches;

as

admitted

by

the

plaintiff the service of the summons

issued by the Japanese Court was
made in the Philippines thru a
Philippine Sheriff. This Court agrees
that if the defendant in a foreign
court is a resident in the court of
that foreign court such court could
acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant but it must be
served upon the defendant in the
territorial jurisdiction of the foreign
court. Such is not the case here
because the defendant was served

with summons in the Philippines

personally within the jurisdiction of the

and not in Japan.

court and over a resident defendant if by

personal,

Unable to accept the said decision,

plaintiff on July 11, 1989 moved for
reconsideration of the decision, filing at
the same time a conditional Notice of
Appeal, asking the court to treat the said
notice of appeal "as in effect after and
upon issuance of the court's denial of
the motion for reconsideration."
Defendant

opposed

the

28,

1989

was

motion
filed

for

by

constructive

to

statutory

authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues

that

since

maintains

the

defendant-appellee

branches

considered

Corollarily,

in

Japan

resident

personal,

it

is

defendant.

substituted

or

constructive service of summons when

made in compliance with the procedural
jurisdiction

to

render

in

judgment

personam.
Such an argument does not persuade.

On October 16, 1989, the lower court

It is a general rule that processes of the

disregarded

for

court cannot lawfully be served outside

Reconsideration and gave due course to

the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of

the

Motion

the plaintiff's Notice of Appeal.

the court from which it issues (Carter vs.

Carter; 41 S.E. 2d 532, 201) and this is

In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial

court. It agreed with the latter in its reliance upon Boudard
4

or

the

plaintiff.

vs. Tait

substituted
conformably

rules is sufficient to give the court

reconsideration to which a Reply dated

August

service

wherein it was held that "the process of the court

has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired

over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the
boundaries of the state." To support its position, the Court
of Appeals further stated:

the instant case, personal service of

summons within the forum is required
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs.
125

SCRA

230).

To

confer

jurisdiction on the court, personal or

substituted service of summons on the
defendant not extraterritorial service is
necessary (Dial Corp vs. Soriano, 161
SCRA 739).

Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35

LRC, NS, 292, Am. Case 1912 D680).
There must be actual service within the
proper territorial limits on defendant or
someone authorized to accept service for

that the collection suit filed is an action

in personam, it is its theory that a
distinction must be made between an
action in personam against a resident
defendant and an action in personam
a

whether a

resident or not in the forum where the

action is filed, must be served with
summons within that forum.
But even assuming a distinction between
a resident defendant and non-resident
defendant were to be adopted, such
distinction

applies

only

to

natural

persons and not in the corporations.

This finds support in the concept that "a
corporation has no home or residence in
the sense in which those terms are

But while plaintiff-appellant concedes

against

of the party thus served (Iowa-Rahr vs.

him. Thus, a defendant,

In an action strictly in personam, such as

Nieto,

regardless of the residence or citizenship

non-resident

defendant.

Jurisdiction is acquired over a nonresident defendant only if he is served

95 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

applied to natural persons" (Claude Neon

Lights vs. Phil. Advertising Corp., 57
Phil.

607).

Thus,

as

cited

by

the

defendant-appellee in its brief:

Residence is said to be an attribute of a
natural person, and can be predicated
on an artificial being only by more or less
imperfect

analogy.

Strictly

speaking,

therefore, a corporation can have no

local residence or habitation. It has been

Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,

said that a corporation is a mere ideal

NORTHWEST elevated the case to this Court contending

existence,

in

that the respondent court erred in holding that SHARP was

contemplation of law an invisible

not a resident of Japan and that summons on SHARP

being which can have, in fact, no locality

could only be validly served within that country.

subsisting

only

and can occupy no space, and therefore

cannot have a dwelling place. (18 Am.
Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing Kimmerle v.
Topeka, 88 370, 128 p. 367; Wood v.
Hartfold F. Ins. Co., 13 Conn 202)

or domestic character of a corporation is

to be determined by the place of its
origin where its charter was granted and
not by the location of its business
activities (Jennings v. Idaho Rail Light &
P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A
is

"resident"

the country from which it comes, until the contrary is

shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. 6

Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign

corporation

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in

and

an

inhabitant of the state in which it is

incorporated and no other (36 Am. Jur.
2d, p. 49).

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a

judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign
country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule
131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its
official duty.

Defendant-appellee

is

Philippine

Corporation duly organized under the

Philippine laws. Clearly, its residence is
the

Philippines,

the

place

of

its

incorporation, and not Japan. While

defendant-appellee maintains branches
in Japan, this will not make it a resident
of Japan. A corporation does not become
a resident of another by engaging in
business there even though licensed by
that state and in terms given all the
rights

and

privileges

of

domestic

corporation (Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co.

vs. Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38 L ed. 248,
4 S Ct. 401).
On this premise, defendant appellee is a
non-resident corporation. As such, court
processes must be served upon it at a
place within the state in which the
action is brought and not elsewhere (St.
Clair vs. Cox, 106 US 350, 27 L ed. 222,
1 S. Ct. 354). 5
It then concluded that the service of summons effected in
Manila or beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan was
null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District
Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its decision was
void.

96 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has

the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the

Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the
invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that
burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of
summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was
not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court
did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of process upon a defendant
are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.
8

In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the

judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the

extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what
this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be
taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved
like any other fact.

Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the

Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an

official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated
copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to
present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law
is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption
of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the

decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had

stand.

a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in

Japan. This silence could only mean, or least create an

Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding

Japanese
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the socalled processual presumption

10

may be invoked. Applying

it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be

similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
private

foreign

corporation

doing

business

in

the

Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect; or (3)
on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive
summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of
summons is without force and gives the court no
jurisdiction unless made upon him.

11

made on the government official designated by law, to wit:

(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign
insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in
the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the
Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the
government office or official served shall transmit by mail a
copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of
such copy is a necessary part of the service.

12

process upon the Securities and Exchange Commission,

of

Banks,

and

the

Insurance

Commissioner, as the case may be, presuppose a situation

wherein the foreign corporation doing business in the
country no longer has any branches or offices within the
Philippines. Such contention is belied by the pertinent
provisions of the said laws. Thus, Section 128 of the
Corporation Code
14

13

and Section 190 of the Insurance Code

clearly contemplate two situations: (1) if the corporation

had left the Philippines or had ceased to transact business

therein, and (2) if the corporation has no designated agent.
Section 17 of the General Banking Act

15

does not even

speak a corporation which had ceased to transact business

in the Philippines.

97 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. The

respondent, however, insists that only service of any of its
officers or employees in its branches in Japan could be
resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the respondent
court, two attempts at service were made at SHARP's
Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. On the first
attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was believed to be the person
authorized to accept court process, was in Manila. On the
second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to accept the
summons because, according to him, he was no longer an
employee of SHARP. While it may be true that service could
have been made upon any of the officers or agents of
SHARP

at

its

three

other

branches

in

Japan,

the

availability of such a recourse would not preclude service

upon the proper government official, as stated above.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District
its head office in the Philippine's after the two attempts of
service had failed.

16

The Tokyo District Court requested the

Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the

summons and other legal documents to the Philippines.
Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent
the summons together with the other legal documents to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn,
forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila .
Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the
Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve

SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of

Superintendent

designated government official or on any of SHARP's

Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be

the

impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the

the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This

service is equivalent to service on the proper government
official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence,
SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not
valid under Philippine laws holds no water. 17
In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court
sustained the trial court's reliance on Boudard vs. Tait

18

where this Court held:

The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction
in personam over nonresidents, so as to
sustain a money judgment, must be
based upon personal service within the
state which renders the judgment.

Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing

xxx xxx xxx

of the past. In that case, a divided Supreme Court of Iowa

no

declared that the principle that there can be no jurisdiction

extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction

in a court of a territory to render a personal judgment

is acquired over the person of the

against anyone upon service made outside its limits was

defendant by serving him beyond the

applicable alike to cases of residents and non-residents.

boundaries of the state. Nor has a

The principle was put at rest by the United States Supreme

judgment of a court of a foreign country

Court when it ruled in the 1940 case of Milliken vs. Meyer

against a resident of this country having

22

no property in such foreign country

absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction

based on process served here, any effect

for purposes of a personal judgment by means

here

appropriate substituted service or personal service without

The

process

against

of

court,

either

the

has

defendant

personally or his property situated here.

that domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an

of

the state. This principle is embodied in section 18, Rule 14

of the Rules of Court which allows service of summons on

Process issuing from the courts of one

state or country cannot run into another,
and although a nonresident defendant

residents temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out

of the country. The rationale for this rule was explained in
Milliken as follows:

may have been personally served with

such process in the state or country of

[T]he authority of a state over one of its

his

such

citizens is not terminated by the mere

jurisdiction as to authorize a personal

fact of his absence from the state. The

judgment against him.

state which accords him privileges and

domicile,

it

will

not

give

affords
It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs.
Nieto

19

and Dial Corp. vs. Soriano,

20

as well as the

principle laid down by the Iowa Supreme Court in the 1911

case of Raher vs. Raher.

21

involved the enforcement of a judgment of the civil division

of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China.
The trial court dismissed the case because the Hanoi court
never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
considering that "[t]he, evidence adduced at the trial
conclusively

proves

that

neither

the

appellee

[the

defendant] nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi,

French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore
Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been his
employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was declared invalid
resulting in the failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendants in an action in personam
was the service of summons through publication against
non-appearing resident defendants. It was claimed that the
latter concealed themselves to avoid personal service of
summons upon them. In Dial, the defendants were foreign
corporations which were not, domiciled and licensed to
engage in business in the Philippines and which did not
have officers or agents, places of business, or properties
here. On the other hand, in the instant case, SHARP was
doing business in Japan and was maintaining four
branches therein.

98 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

to

him

and

his

also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment

of the privileges of residence within the
state, and the attendant right to invoke
the

The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard

protection

property by virtue of his domicile may

protection

of

its

laws,

are

inseparable" from the various incidences

of state citizenship. The responsibilities
of that citizenship arise out of the
relationship to the state which domicile
creates.

That

relationship

is

not

dissolved by mere absence from the

state. The attendant duties, like the
rights and privileges incident to domicile,
are

not

dependent

on

continuous

presence in the state. One such incident

of domicile is amenability to suit within
the state even during sojourns without
the state, where the state has provided
and employed a reasonable method for
apprising such an absent party of the
proceedings against him.

23

The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it

was incorporated.

24

In a strict technical sense, such

domicile as a corporation may have is single in its essence

and a corporation can have only one domicile which is the
state of its creation.

25

Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for

latter in so far as the terms "banking

certain purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in

institutions" and "bank" are used in the

which it has offices and transacts business. This is the rule

Act [Sec. 2], declaring on the contrary

in our jurisdiction and apropos thereto, it may be necessery

that

to quote what we stated in State Investment House, Inc, vs.

covered by special provisions applicable

Citibank, N.A.,

26

in

"all

matters

not

specifically

only to foreign banks, or their branches

to wit:

and agencies in the Philippines, said

The issue is whether these Philippine
branches or units may be considered
"residents of the Philippine Islands" as
that term is used in Section 20 of the
Insolvency Law . . . or residents of the
state under the laws of which they were
respectively incorporated. The answer
cannot be found in the Insolvency Law
itself, which contains no definition of the
term, resident, or any clear indication of
its meaning. There are however other
statutes, albeit of subsequent enactment
and effectivity, from which enlightening

foreign banks or their branches and

agencies lawfully doing business in the
Philippines "shall be bound by all laws,
rules,

corporations

foreign

corporation engaged in trade or business

within the Philippines," as distinguished
from a "'non-resident foreign corporation'
. . . (which is one) not engaged in trade or
bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec.
20, pars. (h) and (i)].

Decree No. 1034, states "that branches,

subsidiaries, affiliation, extension offices
or any other units of corporation or
juridical person organized under the
laws of any foreign country operating in
shall

be

considered

residents of the Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)].

No. 337, places "branches and agencies

in the Philippines of foreign banks . . .
(which are) called Philippine branches,"
in the same category as "commercial
banks, savings associations, mortgage
banks, development banks, rural banks,
stock savings and loan associations"
(which have been formed and organized
Philippine

laws),

making

no

distinction between the former and the

99 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

the

relation,

corporation. [Sec. 18].

court

itself

has

already

had

Inc.

vs.

Philippine

Advertising

Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign

corporation licitly doing business in the
Philippines, which is a defendant in a
civil suit, may not be considered a nonresident within the scope of the legal
provision authorizing attachment against
a defendant not residing in the Philippine
Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to Sec. 412
190, the

Code

of Civil

Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule 59 of the Rules

of 1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of
1964] in other words, a preliminary
attachment may not be applied for and
granted solely on the asserted fact that
the defendant is a foreign corporation
authorized

to

do

business

in

the

Philippines and is consequently and

necessarily, "a party who resides out of

The General Banking Act, Republic Act

under

fix

members, stockholders or officers of

of Act No.

The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential

Philippines

as

occasion to hold [Claude Neon Lights,

declares that the term "'resident foreign

the

or

liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of

Fed.

to

formation, organization, or dissolution of

The National Internal Revenue Code

to

applicable

regulations as provided for the creation,

This

applies

regulations

same class, except such laws, rules and

notions of the term may be derived.

corporation'

and

domestic banking corporations of the

the Philippines." Parenthetically, if it may

not be considered as a party not residing
in the Philippines, or as a party who
resides out of the country, then, logically,
it must be considered a party who does
reside in the Philippines, who is a
resident of the country. Be this as it may,
this Court pointed out that:
.

Our

jurisprudence

laws
indicate

and
a

purpose to assimilate foreign

[Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., vol.

corporations, duly licensed to

37, pp. 394, 412, 493].

do

business

status

here,

of

to

the

domestic

corporations. (Cf. Section 73,

Act No. 1459, and Marshall
Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser
& Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 385, 411) We think it
would be entirely out of line
with this policy should we
make

discrimination

against a foreign corporation,

like

the

petitioner,

and

subject its property to the

harsh

writ

of

attachment

seizure

when

it

by
has

complied not only with every

requirement

of

specially

of

law

made
foreign

corporations, but in addition

with every requirement of law
made

of

domestic

corporations. . . .

corporations authorized to do business

in the Philippines "to the status of
domestic corporations, subsumes their
found

and

operating

as

corporations, hence, residing, in the

country.

American law: that the residence of a

corporation, if it can be said to have a
residence,

is

necessarily

where

it

exercises corporate functions . . .;" that it

is considered as dwelling "in the place
where its business is done . . .," as being
where

its

franchises

are

exercised . . .," and as being "present

where it is engaged in the prosecution of
the corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign
corporation licensed to do business in a
state is a resident of any country where
it maintains an office or agent for
transaction of its usual and customary
business for venue purposes;" and that
the

the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of

the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a
resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to
have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving
process.

27

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it

by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the
processual

presumption

"necessary

signification

element

in

its

is locality of existence."

100 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

but

also

because

of

the

presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages to be without merit. We
find no evidence that would justify an award for attorney's
fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary
damages warranted. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code,
before the court may consider the question of whether or
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory

damaged.

There

being

no

such

proof

presented by NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be

adjudged in its favor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and
the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
NORTHWEST's

The same principle is recognized in

"located

Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time

not exemplary damages should be awarded, the plaintiff

Obviously, the assimilation of foreign

being

In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in

claims

for

attorneys

fees,

litigation

expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar

as

in

sustained

the

trial

court's

dismissal

of

NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of

Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private
respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to
NORTHWEST

the

amounts

adjudged

in

the

foreign

judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the

legal rate from the filing of the complaint therein until the
said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quaison and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

collection suit against Worlder Enterprises and Chin San.

Summonses

were

allegedly

served

upon

Worlder

Enterprises and Chin San at their addresses in Hongkong

but they failed to respond thereto. Consequently, the

HANG LUNG BANK VS. SAULOG

G.R. No. 73765

August 26, 1991

Supreme Court of Hongkong issued the following:

JUDGMENT
THE 14th DAY OF JUNE, 1984

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

No notice of intention to defend having

Manila

been

given

by

the

1st

and

2nd

Defendants herein, IT IS THIS DAY

THIRD DIVISION

ADJUDGED that:

G.R. No. 73765 August 26, 1991

(1) the 1st Defendant (Ko Ching Chong

Trading otherwise known as the Worlder
Enterprises) do pay the Plaintiff the sum

HANG LUNG BANK, LTD., petitioner,

of

vs.
HON. FELINTRIYE G. SAULOG, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch CXLII, Makati, Metro Manila, and CORDOVA
CHIN SAN, respondents.

HK$1,117,968.36

together

with

interest on the respective principal sums

of

HK$196,591.38,

HK$526,557.63,

HK$200,216.29,

HK$49,350.00

and

HK$3,965.50 at the rates of 1.7% per

month (or HK$111.40 per day), 18.5%
per annum (or HK$101.48 per day),

Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioner.

1.85% per month (or HK$324.71 per

day), 1.55% per month (or HK$25.50 per

Castelo Law Office for private respondent.

day) and 1.7% per month (or HK$2.25

per day) respectively from 4th May 1984

FERNAN, C.J.:p

up to the date of payment; and

Challenged in this petition for certiorari which is anchored

(2) the 2nd Defendant (Cordova Chin

on grave abuse of discretion, are two orders of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch CXLII of Makati, Metro Manila
dismissing the complaint for collection of a sum of money
and denying the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
order on the ground that petitioner, a Hongkong-based
bank, is barred

by the

General Banking Act from

San) do pay the Plaintiff the sum of

HK$279,325.00 together with interest on
the principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at
the

rate

of

1.7%

per

month

(or

HK$141.67 per day) from 4th May 1984

up to the date of payment.

maintaining a suit in this jurisdiction.

AND IT IS ADJUDGED that the 1st and
The records show that on July 18, 1979, petitioner Hang
Lung Bank, Ltd., which was not doing business in the

2nd Defendants do pay the Plaintiff the

sum of HK$970.00 fixed costs.

Philippines, entered into two (2) continuing guarantee

agreements with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong whereby

N.J.

the latter agreed to pay on demand all sums of money

Registrar

BARNETT

which may be due the bank from Worlder Enterprises to

the extent of the total amount of two hundred fifty
thousand Hongkong dollars (HK $250,000).

Thereafter, petitioner through counsel sent a demand letter

to Chin San at his Philippine address but again, no
response was made thereto. Hence, on October 18, 1984,

Worlder Enterprises having defaulted in its payment,

petitioner filed in the Supreme Court of Hongkong a

101 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

petitioner instituted in the court below an action seeking

"the enforcement of its just and valid claims against private

respondent, who is a local resident, for a sum of money

Plaintiff Hang Lung Bank, Ltd. with

based on a transaction which was perfected, executed and

business and postal address at the 3rd

consummated abroad."

Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway,

Hongkong, does not do business in the

In his answer to the complaint, Chin San raised as
affirmative defenses: lack of cause of action, incapacity to
sue and improper venue.

Philippines. The continuing guarantee,

Annexes "A" and "B" appeared to have
been transacted in Hongkong. Plaintiff's
Annex "C" shows that it had already

Pre-trial of the case was set for June 17, 1985 but it was
postponed to July 12, 1985. However, a day before the
latter pre-trial date, Chin San filed a motion to dismiss the
case and to set the same for hearing the next day. The
motion to dismiss was based on the grounds that petitioner
had no legal capacity to sue and that venue was improperly
laid.

obtained judgment from the Supreme

Court of Hongkong against defendant
involving the same claim on June 14,
1984.
The cases of Mentholatum Company, Inc.
versus Mangaliman, 72 Phil. 524 and
Eastern Seaboard Navigation, Ltd. versus

Acting on said motion to dismiss, on December 20, 1985,

the lower court

issued the following order:

On

defendant

Chin

San

Cordova's

plaintiff's opposition, dated July 12,

1985; defendant's reply, dated July 22,
plaintiff's

supplemental

opposition, dated September 13, 1985,

and

defendant's

rejoinder

filed

on

September 23, 1985, said motion to

dismiss is granted.
Section

14,

1-8, relied upon by plaintiff, deal with

isolated transaction in the Philippines of

motion to dismiss, dated July 10, 1985;

1985;

Juan Ysmael & Company, Inc., 102 Phil.

foreign corporation. Such transaction

though isolated is the one that conferred
jurisdiction to Philippine courts, but in
the

instant

General

Banking

Act

the

not the proper action.

5

Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said

order but it was denied for lack of merit.

"No foreign bank or

banking

corporation

formed, organized or
existing

under

any

transaction

Case dismissed. The instant complaint

SO ORDERED.

provides:

case,

occurred in Hongkong.

Hence, the

instant petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of said

orders "so as to allow petitioner to enforce through the
court below its claims against private respondent as
recognized by the Supreme Court of Hongkong."

laws other than those

of the Republic of the

Petitioner asserts that the lower court gravely abused its

Philippines,

shall be

discretion in: (a) holding that the complaint was not the

permitted to transact

proper action for purposes of collecting the amount

business

the

guaranteed by Chin San "as recognized and adjudged by

or

the Supreme Court of Hongkong;" (b) interpreting Section

maintain by itself any

14 of the General Banking Act as precluding petitioner

suit for the recovery of

from maintaining a suit before Philippine courts because it

any debt, claims or

is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the

demands

whatsoever

Philippines despite the fact that it does not do business

until after it shall have

here; and (c) impliedly sustaining private respondent's

obtained, upon order

allegation of improper venue.

in

Philippines,

of

the

Monetary

Board, a license for

We need not detain ourselves on the issue of improper

that purpose."

venue. Suffice it to state that private respondent waived his

102 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

right to invoke it when he forthwith filed his answer to the

foreign

complaint thereby necessarily implying submission to the

license prescribed shall be punished by

jurisdiction of the court.

corporation

not

having

imprisonment for not less

than

the
six

months nor more than two years or by a

The resolution of this petition hinges on a determination of
whether petitioner foreign banking corporation has the
capacity to file the action below.

fine of not less than two hundred pesos

nor more than one thousand pesos, or
by both such imprisonment and fine, in
the discretion of the Court.

Private respondent correctly contends that since petitioner

is a bank, its capacity to file an action in this jurisdiction is
governed by the General Banking Act (Republic Act No.
337), particularly Section 14 thereof which provides:

In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted this last

quoted provision as not altogether prohibiting a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines
from suing or maintaining an action in Philippine courts.

SEC. 14. No foreign bank or banking

corporation formed, organized or existing
under any laws other than those of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be

What it seeks to prevent is a foreign corporation doing

business in the Philippines without a license from gaining
access to Philippine courts. As elucidated in Marshall-Wells
Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70:

permitted to transact business in the

Philippines, or maintain by itself or

The object of the statute was to subject

assignee any suit for the recovery of any

the foreign corporation doing business in

debt, claims, or demand whatsoever,

the Philippines to the jurisdiction of its

until after it shall have obtained, upon

courts. The object of the statute was not

order of the Monetary Board, a license

to prevent it from performing single acts

for that purpose from the Securities and

but to prevent it from acquiring a

Exchange

officer,

domicile for the purpose of business

director or agent of any such corporation

without taking the steps necessary to

who

the

render it amenable to suit in the local

Philippines without the said license shall

courts. The implication of the law is that

be punished by imprisonment for not

it

less than one year nor more than ten

Legislature

years and by a fine of not less than one

corporation which happens to obtain an

thousand pesos nor more than ten

isolated order for business from the

thousand pesos. (45 O.G. No. 4, 1647,

Philippines from securing redress from

1649-1650)

Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to

Commissioner.

transacts

Any

business

in

was

never

the

to

purpose

exclude

of

the

foreign

permit persons to avoid their contract

In

construing

this

provision,

we

adhere

to

the

interpretation given by this Court to the almost identical

Section 69 of the old Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) which
reads:

made with such foreign corporation. The

effect of the statute preventing foreign
corporations from doing business and
from bringing actions in the local courts,
except on compliance with elaborate

SEC.

69. No

corporation

foreign
formed,

corporation

or

organized,

or

existing under any laws other than those

of the Philippines shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippines or
maintain by itself or assignee any suit for
the recovery of any debt, claim, or
demand whatever, unless it shall have
the license prescribed in the section
immediately

preceding.

Any

officer,

director or agent of the corporation or

any person transacting business for any

103 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

requirements,

must

not

be

unduly

extended or improperly applied. It should

not be construed to extend beyond the
plain meaning of its terms, considered in
connection

with

its

object,

and

in

connection with the spirit of the entire

law.
The fairly recent case of Universal Shipping Lines vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,

10

although dealing with the

amended version of Section 69 of the old Corporation Law,

Section 133 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.

68), but which is nonetheless apropos, states the rule

unscrupulous

succinctly: "it is not the lack of the prescribed license (to do

relationships abroad.

Filipino

citizens

who

have

business

business in the Philippines) but doing business without

license, which bars a foreign corporation from access to our

In its pleadings before the court, petitioner appears to be in

courts."

a quandary as to whether the suit below is one for

enforcement or recognition of the Hongkong judgment. Its

Thus, we have ruled that a foreign corporation not licensed

complaint states:

to do business in the Philippines may file a suit in this

country due to the collision of two vessels at the harbor of
Manila

11

and for the loss of goods bound for Hongkong but

erroneously discharged in Manila.

12

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by undersigned

counsel, and to this Honorable Court,
most respectfully alleges that:

Indeed, the phraseologies of Section 14 of the General

1.

Banking Act and its almost identical counterpart Section

organized and existing under and by

Plaintiff

is

corporation

duly

69 of the old Corporation Law are misleading in that they

virtue of the laws of Hongkong with

seem to require a foreign corporation, including a foreign

business and postal address at the 3rd

bank or banking corporation, not licensed to do business

Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway,

and not doing business in the Philippines to secure a

Hongkong, not doing business in the

license from the Securities and Exchange Commission

Philippines, but is suing for this isolated

before it can bring or maintain an action in Philippine

transaction, but for purposes of this

courts. To avert such misimpression, Section 133 of the

complaint may be served with summons

Corporation Code is now more plainly worded thus:

and legal processes of this Honorable

Court, at the 6th Floor, Cibeles Building,

No

foreign

corporation

transacting

business in the Philippines without a

license, or its successors or assigns,
shall

be

intervene

permitted

to

in

action,

any

maintain
suit

or
or

proceeding in any court or administrative

6780

Ayala

Avenue,

Makati,

Metro

Manila, while defendant Cordova Chin

San, may be served with summons and
other legal processes of this Honorable
Court at the Municipality of Moncada,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines;

agency of the Philippines.

2. On July 18, 1979 and July 25, 1980,
Under this provision, we have ruled that a foreign
corporation may sue in this jurisdiction for infringement of
trademark and unfair competition although it is not doing
business in the Philippines

13

because the Philippines was

a party to the Convention of the Union of Paris for the

Protection of IndustrialProperty.

14

defendant

Guarantees,

executed
in

Continuing

consideration

of

plaintiff's from time to time making

advances,

or

coming

to

liability

or

discounting bills or otherwise giving

credit or granting banking facilities from
time to time to, or on account of the

We even went further to say that a foreign corporation not

licensed to do business in the Philippines may not be
denied the right to file an action in our courts for an
isolated transaction in this country.

the

15

Since petitioner foreign banking corporation was not doing

business in the Philippines, it may not be denied the
privilege of pursuing its claims against private respondent
for a contract which was entered into and consummated
outside the Philippines. Otherwise we will be hampering
the growth and development of business relations between
Filipino citizens and foreign nationals. Worse, we will be
allowing the law to serve as a protective shield for

104 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Wolder Enterprises (sic), photocopies of

the Contract of Continuing Guarantees
are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and
"B", respectively, and made parts hereof;
3. In June 1984, a complaint was filed by
plaintiff against the Wolder Enterprises
(sic) and defendant Cordova Chin San, in
The Supreme Court of Hongkong, under
Case No. 3176, and pursuant to which
complaint, a judgment dated 14th day of
July,

1984

was

rendered

by

The

Supreme Court of Hongkong ordering to

(sic) defendant Cordova Chin San to pay

the plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00

b) To pay an amount equivalent to 25%

together with interest on the principal

of the total amount due and demandable

sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate of

as of and by way of attorney's fees; and

HK$1.7% per month or (HK$141.67) per

day from 4th May, 1984 up to the date

c) To pay costs of suit, and

the said amount is paid in full, and to

pay the sum of HK$970.00 as fixed cost,

Plaintiff prays for such other and further

a photocopy of the Judgment rendered

reliefs, to which it may by law and equity,

by The Supreme Court of Hongkong is

be entitled.

hereto attached as Annex "C" and made

an integral part hereof.

The

4. Plaintiff has made demands upon the

defendant

in

this

case

to

pay

the

aforesaid amount the last of which is by

letter dated July 16, 1984 sent by
undersigned counsel, a photocopy of the
letter of demand is hereto attached as
Annex "D" and the Registry Return Card
hereto

attached

as

Annex

"E",

respectively, and made parts hereof.

However,

this

notwithstanding,

defendant failed and refused and still

continue to fail and refuse to make any
payment to plaintiff on the aforesaid
amount of HK$279,325.00 plus interest
on the principal sum of HK$250,000.00
at the rate of (HK$141.67) per day from
May 4, 1984 up to the date of payment;

rights and interests of herein plaintiff, it

has engaged the services of undersigned
counsel, to file the suit at bar, and for
whose services it has agreed to pay an
amount equivalent to 25% of the total
amount due and owing, as of and by way
of attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully

Honorable

Court

prayed
that

of

judgment

this
be

rendered ordering the defendant:

a)

To

pay

plaintiff

the

sum

of

HK$279,325.00 together with interest on

the principal sum of HK$260,000.00 at
the rate of HK$1.7% (sic) per month (or
HK$141.67 per day) from May 4, 1984
until the aforesaid amount is paid in full;

105 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

therefore

appears

to

be

one

of

the

enforcement of the Hongkong judgment because it prays for

the grant of the affirmative relief given by said foreign
judgment.

17

Although petitioner asserts that it is merely

seeking the recognition of its claims based on the contract

sued upon and not the enforcement of the Hongkong
judgment

18

it should be noted that in the prayer of the

complaint, petitioner simply copied the Hongkong judgment

with respect to private respondent's liability.
However, a foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not
recognized in the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is
being sought. Hence, in the interest of justice, the
complaint should be considered as a petition for the
recognition of the Hongkong judgment under Section 50
(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the
defendant, private respondent herein, may present evidence
of lack of jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud or clear
mistake of fact and law, if applicable.

5. In order to protect and safeguard the

most

complaint

16

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the lower court are

hereby set aside. Civil Case No. 8762 is reinstated and the
lower court is directed to proceed with dispatch in the
disposition of said case. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

BELLIS v. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
FACTS
Mr. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the
time of his death. He had five (5) legitimate children with
his first wife, Mary Mallen, whom he divorced. He had three
(3) legitimate daughters with his second wife, Violet, who
survived him, and another three (3) illegitimate children
with another woman. Before he died, he executed two (2)
wills, disposing of his Texas properties, the other disposing
his Philippine properties. In both wills, he recognized his
illegitimate children but they were not given anything.
Under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs or legitime
reserved to illegitimate children.

Naturally, the illegitimate children, Maria Cristina

and Merriam Palma, opposed the wills on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitime as illegitimate children.
Under Philippine law, they are entitled to inherit even if
they are illegitimate children. They claim that Philippine
law should be applied.
ISSUE
What law should be applied, the Philippine law or
the Texas law? May the illegitimate daughters inherit?
HELD
What applies is the Texas law. Mr. Bellis is a national and
domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Hence, both the

106 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

intrinsic validity of the will (substance or successional

rights) and the extrinsic validity (forms of the will) are
governed by Texas law.

Since under Texas law, the

decedent may dispose of his property as he wishes, the Will

should be respected. The illegitimate daughters are not
entitled to any legitime.
Assuming that Texas law is in conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of domicile) should govern,
the same should not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
the Philippine law since Mr. Bellis was both a national and
domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Nonetheless, if
Texas law has a conflict rule, renvoi would not arise, since
the properties covered by the second will are found in the
Philippines. The renvoi doctrine applied in the case of
Aznar v. Garcia cannot be applied since said doctrine is
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country
and domiciliary of another country. Moreover, it has been
pointed out that the decedent executed two (2) wills- one to
govern his Texas properties and the other his Philippine
estate; the latter being the basis of the argument of
illegitimate children that he intended Philippine law to
govern. Assuming that such was the intention of the
decedent in executing a separate Philippine will, it would
not alter the law. As rule in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision of
foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
the national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.
A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

107 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,

"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and

from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated

Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the

April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by

satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery

the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t

to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and

the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and

The facts of the case are as follows:

Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of

executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the

total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the

Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.

Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary

estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the

Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to

him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1

following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first

wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and

illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,

other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,

Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the

1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and

foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall

approving

go to his seven surviving children by his first and second

administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art.

wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander

16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the

Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.

decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not

Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t

provide for legitimes.

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been

resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was

denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-

admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila

appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of

on September 15, 1958.

which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor

will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of

even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court

$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.

in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,

Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos

1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the

Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,

decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of

various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction

another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the

of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which

decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile

it released from time to time according as the lower court

thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming

approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed

Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the

by the latter three requesting partial advances on account

domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the

of their respective legacies.

same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to

Philippine

On

January

administration,

8,

1964,

preparatory

the executor submitted

to

108 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

closing

its

and filed its

the

law,

executor's

but

would

final

still

account,

refer

to

report

Texas

and

law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs

theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would

arise, since the properties here involved are found in the

new. It must have been their purpose to make the second

Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the

paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which

conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed

must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As

different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not

further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added

rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never

a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that

invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather,

capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of

they argue that their case falls under the circumstances

the decedent.

mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation

to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good

customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render

Congress has not intended to extend the same to the

applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or

succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically

testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the

chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional

order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;

rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions

(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)

must prevail over general ones.

the capacity to succeed. They provide that

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal

two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his

property is subject to the law of the country where

Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended

it is situated.

Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming

that such was the decedent's intention in executing a

However, intestate and testamentary successions,

separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as

both with respect to the order of succession and

this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a

to the amount of successional rights and to the

provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his

intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall

properties

be regulated by the national law of the person

Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and

whose

shall

be

distributed

in

accordance

with

consideration,

void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to

whatever may he the nature of the property and

those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the

regardless of the country wherein said property

Civil Code states said national law should govern.

succession

is

under

may be found.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the

citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the

law of the nation of the decedent.

laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.

Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph

three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall

the will and the amount of successional rights are to be

determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments

promulgated, or by determinations or conventions

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,

agreed upon in a foreign country.

Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code

afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress
deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art.
11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code,

MICIANO v. BRIMO

while reproducing without substantial change the second

GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927

paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the

50 PHIL 867

109 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a
will which one of the clauses states that the law of the
Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his
nationality, and that legatees have to respect the will,
otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be
annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre
Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by
his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did
not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides
that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the
nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?
HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that
Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
____________________________________________________
FACTS:
A will of an American testator provided that his
estate should be disposed of in accordance with the
Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever
would oppose his wishes that his estate should be
distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit
their inheritance
ISSUE:
Will there be forfeiture?
HELD:
Even if the testators wishes must be given
paramount importance, if the wishes of the testator
contravene a specific provision of law, then that
provision in a will should not be given effect. A persons
will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED, so his
right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions
of the Philippine laws.

110 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

accordance with his national law. He cannot provide

otherwise.
The SC held that those who opposed would not
forfeit their inheritance because that provision is not legal.

the amount of the successional rights and the

intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,

administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G.
Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of
his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the
Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and
the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.

nature of the property or the country in which it

may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the
Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of
partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to
prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary

with

the

consideration

that

the oppositor was

trial

court,

and,

taking

granted

into

ample

opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no

abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which,
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied
with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with
the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the

partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions,
in respect to the order of succession as well as to

111 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of

the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law,
I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having
been conferred upon me by conquest and not by
free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other
hand, having resided for a considerable length of
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded

in acquiring all of the property that I now possess,

not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the

it is my wish that the distribution of my property

testator's national law.

and everything in connection with this, my will,

be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting
all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I
annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and
the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any
legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected
the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law
or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law
of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it

112 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is

directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such
a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo
as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

two rules in California on the matter; the internal law

which applies to Californians domiciled in California and
the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of
California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines,
the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine
law only.
____________________________________________________
Facts: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York,
migrated to California where he resided and consequently
was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine
years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during
the entire period of his residence in this country, he had
always considered himself as a citizen of California.

AZNAR VS. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

7 SCRA 95 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Law

Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated
to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In
1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money
in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo
Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen
claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law,
the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he

instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared
as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of
Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code,
California law should be applied, the matter is returned
back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately
applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in
view of successional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter
Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the
Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply,
our courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs
and consequently a testator should dispose any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion.
Issue: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should
apply.
Held: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more
successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in
effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the

national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate

1.

The conflict rule which should apply to

Californians outside the California, and

2.

The internal Law which should apply to

California domiciles in califronia.

children not being entitled to anything under California

law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should be applied in determining the successional rights of
his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more
successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are

113 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of

the California Civil code States that if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and
is governed by the law of the domicile.

Christensen being domiciled outside california,

the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and
case is remanded to the lower court with
instructions that partition be made as that of the
Philippine law provides.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September
14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be

Aznar v. Garcia - Appellees argue that what Article 16 of

the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another
for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands
that We should

enforce

the California

internal

enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without

issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of
the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:

law

prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child,

conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If

named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.

we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are

Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines

bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code,

about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now

then we must enforce the law of California in accordance

residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los

with the express mandate thereof and as above explained,

Angeles, California, U.S.A.

i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. x x x We

4. I further declare that I now have no living

therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

ascendants, and no descendants except my above

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the

named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN

validity of the provisions of his will depriving his

DANEY.

acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be

governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to

xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal

law of California.

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN

CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,

Republic of the Philippines

about

eighteen

years

of

age

and

who,

SUPREME COURT

notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized

Manila

Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor

has she been at any time adopted by me, and

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF

EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

who, from all information I have now resides in

Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE

THOUSAND

SIX

114 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

PESOS

deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen

Christensen

with

the

Davao

Branch

of

the

Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the

rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositorappellant.

HUNDRED

(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be

xxx

xxx

xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my

counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but

well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY

these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney),

now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed
at my death and which may have come to me from
any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that
the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen
Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was
filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that
the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen,
one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the
estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION
OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS
THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING
HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT
UNDER

UNDER
THE

INTERNATIONAL
RENVOI

LAW,

DOCTRINE,

PARTICULARLY
THE

INTRINSIC

VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV

because several foreign elements are involved, that the

forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT

in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,

THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE

which requires that the domicile of the decedent should

EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria

Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged

natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all

purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT

UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a

GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE

citizen of the United States and of the State of California at

ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic

validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by
the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on
Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through

115 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a

citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no question that at
the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor
himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the

probate, the facts of record show that the

deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact

deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on

that he was born in New York, migrated to California and

November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.;

resided there for nine years, and since he came to the

his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed

Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely

school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the

and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and

U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of

considering that he appears never to have owned or

Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the

acquired a home or properties in that state, which would

State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the

indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines

Philippines until 1904.

and make home in the State of California.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many

the United States and stayed there for the

shades of meaning from mere temporary presence

following nine years until 1913, during which time

to the most permanent abode. Generally, however,

he resided in, and was teaching school in

it is used to denote something more than mere

Sacramento, California.

physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws,

p. 29)

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines

was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship

again departed the Philippines for the United

that he acquired in California when he resided in

States and came back here the following year,

Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost

1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again

by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory

returned to his own country, and came back to

of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the

the Philippines the following year, 1939.

deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of

California by the fact that when he executed his will in

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the

foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved

by

this

Honorable

Court,

without

prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence

to prove their case not covered by this stipulation

1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so

that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion
is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

of facts. 1wph1.t
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation,
in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945.
Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney";
Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,

be taken to mean the same thing, a place of

permanent abode. But domicile, as has been
shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place where he
has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he

t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

went

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned

properly be said to have sufficient connection with

once more to California shortly after the making

of his last will and testament (now in question
herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)

on

business

which

would

require

his

presence for several weeks or months, he might

the place to be called a resident. It is clear,
however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could
not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile

of

choice

requires

the

exercise

of

intention as well as physical presence. "Residence

simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily

116 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

presence in that place and also an intention to

to follow the person of its owner, and is governed

make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a

by the law of his domicile.

term used with many shades of meaning, from the

merest

temporary

presence

to

the

most

permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that

any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p.
29)

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's

opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified
to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary

cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the

dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of

Philippines, which is as follows:

California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in

the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal

property is subject to the law of the country where

validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will,

such law being in force in the State of California of which

it is situated.

Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,

However, intestate and testamentary successions,

accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the

insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in

both with respect to the order of succession and

to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall

renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary

provision in question should be referred back to the law of
the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

be regulated by the national law of the person

whose

succession

is

under

consideration,

whatever may be the nature of the property and

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various

authors, thus:

regardless of the country where said property may

be found.

The problem has been stated in this way: "When

the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a

The application of this article in the case at bar requires

jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the

the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"

reference to the purely internal rules of law of the

is used therein.

foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign

law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

There is no single American law governing the validity of

testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The

the Union having its own private law applicable to its

Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,

citizens only and in force only within the state. The

applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which

"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code

referred the matter back to Michigan law. But

above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to

once having determined the the Conflict of Laws

any general American law. So it can refer to no other than

principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see

the private law of the State of California.

why the reference back should not have been to

Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have

The next question is: What is the law in California

governing

the

disposition

of

personal property?

The

decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the

executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place
where personal property is situated, it is deemed

117 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

resulted in the "endless chain of references" which

has so often been criticized be legal writers. The
opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely
to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling

logical

reason

why

the

original

reference should be the internal law rather than

to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying
internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi

are a bit more consistent for they look always to

French law, however, would show that if a French

internal law as the rule of reference.

court were called upon to determine how this

property should be distributed, it would refer the

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the

objectors

to

the

renvoi

plead

that

greater

uniformity will result from adoption of their

respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the
doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above,

distribution to the national law of the deceased,

thus

applying

the

Massachusetts

statute

of

distributions. So on the surface of things the

Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law
is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself
into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that
this is what a French court would do. If it accepts
the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.

had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,

judgment would have been against the woman; if

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is

the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,

presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the

and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would

forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws

be for the woman. The same result would happen,

rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back

though the courts would switch with respect to

again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the

which would hold liability, if both courts accepted

narrower sense. The German term for this judicial

the renvoi.

process

is

'Ruckverweisung.'"

(Harvard

Law

Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question,

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign

and where the validity of a decree of divorce is

law is to be resorted to as governing a particular

challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws

case, the further question may arise: Are the rules

rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the

as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign

parties in the divorce case, is applied by the

law also to be resorted to? This is a question

forum, but any further reference goes only to the

which, while it has been considered by the courts

internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,

in but a few instances, has been the subject of

recognized by the situs, will be recognized by

frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists;

every court; and every divorce, valid by the

and the doctrine involved has been descriptively

domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere.

designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send

(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

back,

or

the

"Ruchversweisung",

or

the

"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts,

England,

and

France.

The

question arises as to how this property is to be

distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume

(1)

that

this

question

arises

in

Massachusetts court. There the rule of the

conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French

statute

of

distributions,

or whatever

corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a

distribution

accordingly.

An

examination

118 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

of

the question postulated and the operation of the

adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many
cases result in returning the main controversy to
be decided according to the law of the forum. ...
(16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of
renvoi

is

that

the

court

of

the

forum,

in

determining the question before it, must take into

account the whole law of the other jurisdiction,
but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then
apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may
be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi

has generally been repudiated by the American

personal property upon death in accordance with

authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

the law of domicile, and if he finds that the

Belgian law would make the distribution in

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
the reasons for its application in a country explained by
Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol.

accordance with the law of nationality that is

the English law he must accept this reference
back to his own law.

27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its

article are quoted herein below:

conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that
the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary
or internal law of the foreign state or country, but
its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
xxx

and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be

enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to
such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in
other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with

xxx

foreign element involved is in accord with the general

xxx

principle of American law that the domiciliary law should

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the

Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country
as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the
contrary exists, the court shall respect:

disclaims the right to bind its nationals

abroad as regards their personal statute,
and desires that said personal statute
shall be determined by the law of the
domicile, or even by the law of the place
where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign
systems of law, provided it be certain
one

of

them

is

govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of

the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one
or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of
the state where he was domiciled at the time of
his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as
the law of situs is consulted in questions about

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which

that

Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession

necessarily

competent, which agree in attributing

the determination of a question to the
same system of law.

the devise of land. It is logical that, since the

domiciliary

rules

control

devolution

of

the

personal estate in case of intestate succession, the

same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted

testamentary

dispostion

of

the

property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary

has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition
as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York
court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at
the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is
one of the universal application. It had its origin

xxx

xxx

xxx

in that international comity which was one of the

first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to

business

distribute the personal estate of an Englishman

accumulating property take but little notice of

who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance

boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice

with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire

of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,

whether the law of Belgium would distribute

Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

119 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

intercourse

and

the

process

of

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it

Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal

does not appear in each case that there exists in the state

law of California. But as above explained the laws of

of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or

California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens,

identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in

other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the

residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for

validity

the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of

acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be

California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared

governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to

in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the

Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal

law of California in accordance with the express mandate

law of California..

of

the

provisions

of

his

will

depriving

his

thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law

for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is

law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs

no law to the contrary in the place where the property is

against appellees.

situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to

Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the
law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained

Padilla,

Bautista

Paredes,

Dizon,

Angelo,
Regala

Concepcion,
and

Reyes,

Makalintal,

JJ.,

Barrera,
concur.

Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

in the various authorities cited above the national law

mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule
in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.
The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal law
of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil.
130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in
the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject
in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the

120 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, PHILIPPINE

TRUST CO., v. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C.

those for the children which are short of the

BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN

legitime given them by the Civil Code of the

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

Doctrine:

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil

Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be

governed by the national law of the testator provided that
the law be evidenced in the court.

Philippines, are valid NO.

RATIO: The court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909,
and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl
Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the
death of the testator. Since no right to share in the
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of

FACTS: Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January

30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
1922.

Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer
claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

Decedent in this case gave out of the total estate

(after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33
in cash, his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all
shares of stock of several mining companies and to his
brother and sister the same amount. To his children he
gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two
children

question

the

validity

of

the

testamentary

provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above

indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the
legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.

Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received

legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore,
have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws of the forum, should be twothirds of the estate left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned
by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question.
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it
was found out and it was decided that the testator was a

Lower Court Ruling: Dismissed the objections filed by

Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward
Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the
executor and approving the said project.
The testator permanent residence or domicile in
the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that
state.

citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this

as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision
dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is
whether the testementary dispositions, especially hose for
the children which are short of the legitime given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose
of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada
Laws of 1925, supra). The law of Nevada, being a foreign
law can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O.

Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that
his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance
with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to
probate.

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official

record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal
custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate

ISSUES:
1.
2.

that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

Whether Magdalena C. Bohanan can claim. NO
Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially

121 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

We have, however, consulted the records of the

decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was

case in the court below and we have found that the foreign

merely

law was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein)

remained to be a citizen of the United States and

counsel as Exhibits "2".

of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the

residence

testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the

of the

State

of Nevada.

Under all the

and

he

continued

and

rest of his days in that state. His permanent

In addition, the other appellants, children of the

laws

temporary,

or

domicile

in

the

United

States

depended upon his personal intent or desire, and

above

he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore

circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the

at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that

pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the

state.

Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial

Nobody

can

choose

his

domicile

or

permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive

notice of by us, without proof of such law having been

personal right.

offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O.

Republic of the Philippines

Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of

SUPREME COURT

the United States and of the State of Nevada and

Manila

declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is

fully in accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada

EN BANC

and

admits

the

same

to

probate.

Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named

G.R. No. L-12105

as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to

January 30, 1960

such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the

sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.

issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,

may enter upon the execution and performance of

vs.

its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).

MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and

MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever
questions on appeal. The executor filed a project of

Jose D. Cortes for appellants.

partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.

with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:

(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and

LABRADOR, J.:

Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of

Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the
objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan
and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted
by the executor and approving the said project.

Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last

will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on
April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made
the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the
testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a
citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of
California where some of his properties are
This

Notwithstanding

contention
the

long

in

AGUSTIN, E.P.

untenable.

residence

122 CONFLICT OF LAWS

Bohanan,

which

consists

of

several

mining

companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the

testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B.
Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same
amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000

On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila,

located.

George

of

the

each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his

daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly
installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox,
P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate
(after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33
in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and
one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies
and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his

children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and

P12,000.

Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909,

and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children

question

the

validity

of

the

testamentary

provisions

disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated,

claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that

sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl

Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the
death of the testator. Since no right to share in the
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of

the laws of the form concede to them.

Nevada and since the court below had already found that

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the

Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer

testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to

received. The will has not given her any share in the estate
left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial
court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the
testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and
that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87
Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855
and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below
refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground

there was no conjugal property between the testator and

claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's
children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received
legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore,
have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws of the forum, should be twothirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the
testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by
him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of
the forum valid?

that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a

citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because

requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.

the

Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

successional rights to personal property are to be earned

testator

died

in

1944,

expressly

provides

that

by the national law of the person whose succession is in

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of

question. Says the law on this point:

sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or

her estate, real and personal, the same being

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions,

chargeable with the payment of the testator's

in respect to the order of succession as well as to

debts.

the extent of the successional rights and the

intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be

Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator,

Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa
had already been passed upon adversely against her in an
order dated June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records,
Court of First Instance), which had become final, as

regulated by the national law of the person whose

succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property and the country in which it
is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is
the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)

Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed

therefrom to question its validity. On December 16, 1953,

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found

the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of

out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the

P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against

State of Nevada because he had selected this as his

her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I,

domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated

Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said

April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether

error found that there exists no community property owned

the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the

by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree

children which are short of the legitime given them by the

of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C.

Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed

Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained

that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his

therein, i.e. that there was no community property

properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of

acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during

1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing

their converture.

of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was

introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do.
The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved

123 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our

Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An
official

record

or

an

entry

therein,

when

admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by

an official publication thereof or by a copy tested
by the officer having the legal custody of he
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the
court below and we have found that during the hearing on
October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan
for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was
introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as
Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44,
Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws presented
by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court
as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January
23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of
First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator,
do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the
State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of
1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of
such law having been offered at the hearing of the project
of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by
the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided
and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator
is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above,
which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance
with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras,

Bengzon,

Endencia,

C.J.,

Padilla,

Bautista

Angelo

JJ.,

Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

124 CONFLICT OF LAWS

AGUSTIN, E.P.

and

concur.