Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRIL Page 1
Part I&II: Intro & Jurisdiction
Thursday, November 12, 2009
8:16 AM
-there were attempts to have a uniform law (by ASEAN) but because of principles of SOVEREIGNTY and
INDEPENDENCE, this may not be achieved
-attempts to have uniform law:
*1928 Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana: on PRIL
*Bustamante Code: uniform provisions on civil law, commercial law, penal law and law on procedure
(wehe so walang political law and ethics)
*creation of the Inter-American Council of Jurists by OAS in 1948 - but has not achieved anything
concrete
*1951 Hague Convention on PRIL: on family law, succession and products liability (3 lang to ah)
HILTON V. GUYOT
f: 2 cases
CASE 1: Gustave Guyot (liquidator for French firm CHARLES FORTRICH & CO.) sued co-partners of A.T. STEWART &
CO. Henry Hilton and William Libbey (residents of NY) in FRENCH COURT for amount due to the French firm
Summary
Plaintiff: french
Defendant: american
Forum 1: France
Case2: Guyot sued Hilton and Libbey in US Circuit Court for the amount due based on the FRENCH JUDGMENT. US
CC held judgment conclusive, entered decree in favor of Guyot W/O EXAMINING ANEW MERITS OF THE CASE
-Hilton and Libbey now appeals: French courts gives no force and effect to the duly rendered judgments in US
Courts against French citizens SO US courts should also not give force and effect to French judgments against US
citizens
COMITY
-neither a matter of absolute obligation nor mere courtesy and good will
-RECOGNITION WHICH ONE NATION ALLOWS WITHIN ITS TERRITORY
…OF THE LEGISLATIVE
…EXECUTIVE
…OR JUDICIAL ACTS
OF ANOTHER NATION,
HAVING DUE REGARD BOTH TO
...INTERNATIONAL DUTY
…AND CONVENIENCE
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS
LAWS
-application to the case: French only gives prima facie effect (not conclusive) on the judgment of foreign courts
unless that state has treaty with France
-France tries the case anew
-Prima facie evidence yung judgment iff:
*rendered by competent court having jurisdiction over COA and Parties
*upon due allegations and proofs
*opportunity to defend against them
*proceedings are according to course of civilized jurisprudence
*judgment stated in clear and formal record
-judgment may be IMPEACHED if:
*fraud or prejudice
*principles of IL and COMITY, it should not be given full credit
*it is usual that countries not give conclusive effect on foreign judgments, mere prima facie effect
B. DEFINITION
• Part of municipal law which governs cases involving a foreign element
• MINOR: those universal principles of right and justice which govern the courts of one state
having before them cases involving
...the operation
...and effect f laws of another state or country
• CHESIRE: part of law which comes into play
when the issue before the court
AFFECTS SOME FACT OR EVENT OR TRANSACTION
that is SO CLOSELY CONNECTED W/ FOREIGN SYSTEM OF LAW
as to necessitate recourse to that system
• 2nd ed, American Jurisprudence: part of the law of each state or nation
which determines whether, in dealing w/ a legal situation,
the law of some other state or nation will be
...recognized,
...given effect
...or applied
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...given effect
...or applied
• HILTON v. GUYOT: law concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation,
by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominion of another nation
Italy
-Italy was divided into many city-states, each have own law - so they have conflicts of law problems
BARTOLUS (father of conflict of laws): formulated the THEORY OF STATUTES
-the theory of statutes was used by the Italian city-states to resolve conflict of law issues
STATUTES classification
1. REAL STATUTES (STATUTA REALIA): applied to immovable property w/n the state
2. PERSONAL STATUTES (STATUTA PERSONALIA): followed persons even outside his domicile, governed all
questions concerning
…personal status
…capacity
…movables
3. MIXED STATUTES (STATUTA MIXTA): on contracts - depend on where entered
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Netherlands
BURGUDNOU, RODENBERG, ULRICH HUBER (first used CONFLICT OF LAWS): State was under no
obligation to apply foreign law UNLESS imposed by
…treaty
…COMITAS GENTIUM (Comity of Nations?)
…on consideration of courtesy and expediency
JOHN VOET: no statue, real, personal or mixed, can act by itself beyond the territory of the legislator nor
can it have any effect elsewhere against the will of the legislator of another state
-Territorial Principle:
GR: laws of every state may operate ONLY WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF SUCH STATE
X: may recognize laws of another country PROVIDED that it will not prejudice the subjects of the
sovereign whose recognition is sought
*Comitas Gentium (Comity of Nations) approach readily accepted
-most trans-jurisdictional disputes to be resolved by the application of IUS GENTIUM or IUS COMMUNE
Ius Commne: supranational law based on Roman Law, became continental European Common Law
-nations began codifying their national laws to include conflict of laws provisions:
*Bavarian Code: theory of statutes
*Prussian Code: theory of efficacy of contracts
*French Civil Code: pattern for Civil Codes of Spain, Belgium, and Romania: nationality principle
-adopted by RP: ART15, NCC
J. JOSEPTH STORY: Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws - territorial theory/comitas gentium approach
-territorial sovereignty, founded conflict of laws on the principle of comity of nations
-adopted by JOSEPH BEALE, American Restatement of Conflict of Laws, developed territorial "VESTED
RIGHTS" school of thought
PASCUALE MANICINI: Nationality as the Basis of Law of Nations- nationality theory(sortof Mixed
statute)
-nationality theory on
Status
Capacity
Private interests of the individual
-NEW THEORY OF PRIL
A. MODRN DEVELOPMENTS
*Neostatutists: when two or more independent laws are applicable to a conflict of laws problem, the
method so devised determines what law shall prevail
*Internationalists: there should be a single body of rules that can solve problems involving foreign
element
*Territorialists: law of the State applied to persons and things within the State, no foreign law should be
applied
-branch: only rights vested or acquired under a foreign law are recognized but not the foreign law itself
*2nd Restatement, William Reese: the law to be applied in a conflict of laws case is the law of the most
significant relationship
*CAVERS, CURRIE AND EHRENZWEIG: policy-centered approaches
Conflict of Laws in RP
-only when RP became sovereign state
In NCC
Art15: nationality principle
Art. 15. Laws relating to
*family rights and duties,
*or to the status,
*condition and
*legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a )
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws,
their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (1 6a )
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-principle of ius gentium: codified in Roman Codes
-rule on Personal law: Code of Napoleon, followed by
*Codes of Netherlands
*Romania
*Italy
*Portugal
*Spain
…
In RP
Spanish Civil Code of 1888: enforced in RP Dec7, 1889 until August 30, 1950
-Conflict of laws provisions adopted by RP NCC
Code of Commerce of Spain: foreign transactions provisions - also enforced in Dec1, 1888
New:
1987 Consti: Nationality, Comity
Special Statutes:
1. Corporation Code
2. General Banking Act
3. Act Instituting Foreign Currency System in the Philippines
4. Philippine Foreign Law Guarantee Corporation
5. Act Regulating Retail Business
6. Anti-Dummy Law
7. Nationalization of the Rice and Corn Industry
8. Insurance Code
9. Protection of Intellectual Property
10. Patent Law
11. Tradesmark Law
12. COGSA
13. Salvage Law
14. Public Service Act
15. Civil Aeronautics Act
16. Philippine Overseas Shipping Act
17. Investment Incentives Act
18. Export Incentives Act
19. RA 7722 liberalizing entry of foreign banks in the Philippines
American Institute
Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws
Second Restatement
D. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Graveson: this branch of law is more completely judge-made than almost any other
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…enforce them
On all persons and property within its territory
HOW SERVED
Action in personam Action in rem
Natural persons 1. personal service 1. personal service (see left)
-defendant who may be: -deliver summons + copy of complaint to defendant 2. substituted service
1. defendant -tender summons + copy of complaint 3. extraterritorial service
2. prisoner 2. substituted service -only for the following situations: actions involve
3. entity w/o juridical -only resorted to when: a. personal status of plaintiff
personality a. justifiable causes b. relates to, or the subject of w/c, is property w/n RP in
4. minors and incompetents b. cannot serve defendant w/n reasonable time w/c defendant has claim or lien, actual or contingent
5. resident temporarily out of c. all reasonable diligent efforts have been exerted c. relief demanded consists of excluding the defendant
RP -HOW: leave copies at from any interest in the property in RP
6. defendant cannot be found *defendant’s residence: person then residing d. property of defendant in RP attached w/n RP
+ does not reside in RP therein w/sufficient age and discretion
7. defendant unknown *OR office/regular place of business: person in
charge thereof
Juridical persons
1. DOMESTIC CORP (corporations, partnership, 1. personal service on (6 persons only – Service by publication?
association organized under RP Laws) list exclusive): Extraterritorial? But domestic nga eh so din a
a. President sha nonresident+not found in RP
b. GM
c. Managing Partner
d. Corporate Secretary
e. Corporate Treasurer
f. In house counsel
- no substituted service!
2. FPJE Personal service ON (successive) Extraterritorial service
1. resident agent designated in
accordance w/law
2. government official designated by
law
3. any of the officers or agents w/n
RP
3. Public Corp RP: Solgen Hmmm…
LGU: executive head, other officer/s as
law or court may direct
Nature of Actions
1. As to SUBJECT MATTER
Real Action Action brought for the protection of real rights, land, tenements or hereditaments or
one founded on privity of estate only (accion reivindicatoria)
Personal Action which is not founded upon privity of real rights or real property (action for a sum
Action of money)
Mixed Action Actions brought for protection or recovery of real property and also for award for
damages sustained.
Action in One which is not directed only against a particular persons but against the thing itself
Rem and the object of which is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection against the right sought to be enforced (judgment which is binding to the
whole world)
Action in One which is directed against particular persons on the basis of their personal liability to
Personam establish a claim against them and the judgment wherein is binding only upon the
parties impleaded or their successors in interest
Action One directed against particular persons but the purpose of which is to bar and bind not
Quasi in only said persons but any other person who claims any interest in the property or right
Rem subject of the suit.
De Midgely v. Ferandos
A quasi in rem action is an action betw een parties w here the direct object is to reach and
dispose of property ow ned by them or some interest therein. Jurisdiction w as acquired because
it w as a quasi in rem action, w here jurisdiction over the person is not required and w here the
service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying w ith the requirement of due
process.
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a. Voluntary appearance
b. Submission to authority
2. If non-resident who is initially the plaintiff: if counterclaim filed against him, he is already
deemed to be under the court's exercise of jurisdiction
3. Served with the legal process within the state: SERVICE OF SUMMONS (RULE 14, ROC)
Section 6: PERSONAL SERVICE
-handing him a copy
-tendering him a copy if he refuses
I: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Paul Schenker, through the service of
summons to HELEN SCHENKER
H:
ON Alleged voluntary appearance: none
1. The Answer contained affirmative defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker
2. Counterclaim was filed by HELEN SCHENKER ONLY, not by PAUL SCHENKER
BUT COURT COULD STILL EXERCISE JURISDICTION over Paul Schenker BECAUSE OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO
MRS. HELEN SCHENKER
-Helen Schenker (as derived from the answer) was the REPRESENTATIVE AND ATTY IN FACT OF PAUL SCHENKER
-had authority to sue, and be sued
-situs could bind the world, not just the interest of specific persons
-basis of exercise of jurisdiction: presence of the property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
e.g. forfeiture of tangible property, registration of land title
Quasi In rem:
-based on state's physical power over the property found within its territory BUT affects only interests of
particular persons in that thing
e.g. action to quiet title to property: the claimant's title to the property in question is superior to others
In Proceedings IN REM and QUASI IN REM: as long as there is adequate notice + opportunity to be
heard, okay na! this can be done through publication
PENNOYER V. NEFF
F:
Case 1:
Plaintiff: Mitchell Pennoyer? (from Oregon)
Forum: Oregon
Defendant: Neff, from California
PRIL Page 7
Defendant: Neff, from California
Service of Summons: by PUBLICATION in an OREGON Newspaper
COA: for payment of $300 attorney's fees
-for execution of judgment, Pennoyer was awarded in public sale the land of Neff located in Oregon
HELD: For Neff - case 1 judgment VOID because no jurisdiction over him
*Judgments in Personam - dapat personal service or substituted service (in RP ROC)
-if service by publication + defendant non resident + publication in place where nonresident could not see the
publication = fraud and oppression
Actions in Personam: object of the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants
-if non resident: process from the tribunals of one state CANNOT run into another state, and summon parties there
domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them. Nor can Publication.
casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities NOT ENOUGH
TO SUBJECT THE NON-RESIDENT CORPORATION TO SUIT ON CAUSES OF ACTION NOT CONNECTED WITH ITS
ACTIVITIES
Vs.
If Continuous corporate operations - even if COA entirely distinct from activities, pede
It is enough that appellant (non-resident corporation - FPJE) has established such contacts with the state that the
particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual.
Ma'am: this approach of minimum contacts and fundamental fairness demands that there be forum-
transaction contacts that will make it fundamentally fair to require the defendant to defend a suit in the
forum regardless of his nonresident status
MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK AND TRUST CO., TRUSTEE, ET.AL MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER
FACTS: Even if this is a proceeding in rem, use the most reasonable means to ensure that the
Defendant: Central Hanover Bank defendants be notified of the proceedigns against them (so since you know the
-a trust company IN NY addresses of the defendants)
-had exclusive control and management of trust funds established y it under NY Banking Law
Plaintiffs: some are nonresidents of NY
COA: for judicial settlement of assets - binding on everyone
SERVICE: publication in NY, pursuant to law (even if the bank had the addresses of the beneficiaries in its books!)
Forum: NY
ISSUE: WON the judgment in NY court binds non-residents who are beneficiaries of the common fund maintained
by Central Hanover Bank which it wanted to settle
HELD: NY Banking Law violates DUE PROCESS so VOID - NY Judgment not binding
STANDARD FOR ADEQUATE NOTICE: the means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and constitutional validity of any chosen
method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected
Here: Bank had names, addresses of the beneficiaries of its trusts so Notice by Publication is not enough: Where
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for
resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency
MA'AM: ADEQUATE NOTICE STANDARD
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SHAFFER V. HEITNER SHAFFER v. HEITNER
Plaintiff: Heitner (non resident of Delaware) -the freeze order was imposed but the certificates of stocks were not in Delaware
Defendants: Officers of Greyhound and Greyhound (Greyhound incorporated in Delaware BUT the officers are
nonresidents of Delaware) Difference from Pennoyer case: minimum contacts should be among, defendant,
COA: violation of the officers of duties, resulting to criminal and civil antitrust liabilities
forum and COA
RELIEF: motion for an order of sequestration of shares of Greyhound stocks belonging to the officers (none of the
certificates of stocks were in Delaware)
Forum: Delaware (because it was Greyhound's state of incorporation) *most corporation in US is incorporated in Delaware because they have the most
SERVICE: Certified mail to last known address + publication in newspaper corporation-friendly laws; after incorporation umaalis sila…
Delaware for Heitner so Officers appealed
Assignment next week: until proof of foreign law (before part three) -November
ISSUE: WON there was sufficient contacts of the Officers of the Greyhound in Delaware to justify the exercise of 26?
Delaware Courts of jurisdiction over person of defendant officers
PRIL Page 9
other for a
3. When such was
4. ASSUME JURISDICTION
PRIL Page 10
*1 Class Lecture
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
3:54 PM
Ma'am's Lecture:
GR: laws have effect only in their territories
e.g. PFR: laws applicable only in the Philippines
Basis: every nation is sovereign and independent; another state
cannot force our courts to apply their laws
Hilton v. Guyot:
-why is it that despite sovereign states, we end up recognizing foreign
judgments
H: PRIL adopted in municipal laws through comity
-in short, Hilton and Libbey were saying, "ang daya!"
-definition of comity:
Not absolute obligation: or else, the court would be compelled
to apply the law of another nation; sovereignty would just go
out the window
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS
WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS LAWS
-rights of own citizens are assured to be protected first!
(reciprocity) - the laws are meant to benefit us
Not mere courtesy or good will or convenience: or else,
…if mere courtesy: random, unsystematic - courtesy cannot be
claimed, not a right…so may be given through discretion of the
court
-RECOGNITION WHICH ONE NATION ALLOWS WITHIN ITS TERRITORY
…OF THE LEGISLATIVE
…EXECUTIVE
…OR JUDICIAL ACTS
OF ANOTHER NATION,
HAVING DUE REGARD BOTH TO
...INTERNATIONAL DUTY
…AND CONVENIENCE
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS
WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS LAWS
…mere recognition: it's part of international duty? How?
e.g. if already acquired favorable judgment abroad, it would
result in injustice if the successful litigant would be compelled
to litigate again since he would entail more expenses??? Plus in
a way, you're not respecting the competence of those courts to
render judgment???
SABI NI MA'AM: if same law, spend money…waste his time…to
go through the whole procedure knowing that the result would
be the same anyway
If different law: you entered a contract, knowing what law is
applicable so by applying a different law, unfair
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applicable so by applying a different law, unfair
+ end of litigation
Loses element of surprise: alam mo na ung sasabihin ng kalaban
so unfair na…dapat i-res judicata na!
Help in relations of states: don't waste time and energy of the
courts in each states
DISSENT: res judicata and public policy of end of litigation
-encourage states to recognize each other's laws: comity should prove
to be beneficial to states
Lowers standard of comity: principle of retortion is a task for the
legislature to do, not for the courts; the court in applying comity was
doing legislative act. Plus injustice is that private individuals cannot
change laws so why make them suffer for the difference in laws in
different states?
PRIL and PIL: see table in notes; this section would only contain the
comments of ma'am beth during the lecture
Example of PRIL found in Municipal law: Artilce 15, 16, 17 NCC + other
provisions of wills
Why PRIL in Civil Law Bar subject: many of conflict of laws rules are in
Civil law…. But abroad, PIL and PRIL are at par, both part of
international law…
PRIL Page 12
Vested right applies: right under State A has already been vested in
the victim so anywhere he goes, the vested right apply
X: if the law where the action is filed says that the law where the
injury happened governs,
Savigny: situs
Manicini: nationality theory
IN RP:
…
Sources of PRIL
Comments of ma'am on treaties: before, more of PIL
-now, there are treaties which provides PRIL rules
Jurisdiction
PRIL Page 13
Cont part III and part IV
Long-arm of the law
Thursday, November 12, 2009
-enumerate the contacts, when these are present,
9:20 PM
justify the application of the court
*Usual grounds when this was used by the court: In Re: Union Carbide
>When plaintiff made the choice of the forum primarily to harass defendant by inflicting upon him -accident happened in INDIA. Plant in India needed
to be inspected. Only thing in US are the plans and
unnecessary expense and hardship in pursuing the remedy
the mother company…
>Where non-resident plaintiff chose the forum because he felt that the jury verdicts were larger than -so dismiss based on forum non conveniens
in other for a *court explains that even if we have jurisdiction,
>When such would be burdensome on the court or taxpayers we don't want to because of all the things we
>When the parties are non-residents and there was a severe backlog of cases when it perceived that mentioned
jury duty, when compulsory, should not be foisted on a community with no link with or interest in the *also shows that the community most affected -
litigation India
>when the court's local machinery was inadequate to effectuate a right, such as when it had no way of >Indian people would not want to be
securing evidence and the attendance of willing witnesses inconvenienced just to participate in the
proceedings...
Union Carbide Case (short summary, as mentioned)
Wing On Company v. Syyap
-thousands of residents of Bhopal, India filed suit for damages in NY as a result of a large scale accident -the court shall not disturb the preference of the
in a Union Carbide Bhopal's chemical plant. plaintiff as to the venue UNLESS it is strongly in
H: US Court dismissed case based on forum non conveniens doctrine favor to the defendant
English and Scottish courts Grounds used to dismiss based on forum non
-applied forum non conveniens when there was another available and ore appropriate forum, in which conveniens evolved…
the ends of justice would be better served, by eliminating the vexatious or oppressive character of the As to public interest: not waste judicial time,
pending proceedings and by removing any unfairness to either party which would result from trial in considering the interests of the private litigants
the forum seized of the case
WHEN THE COURTS ASSUME JURISDICTION
*Avoid global forum shopping: filing of repetitious suits in courts of different jurisdiction over a case When forum law applied
-would result to different decisions by different courts 1. When forum law says so
2. When foreign law not properly pleaded and proved
First Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals(short summary, as mentioned) *ignorance of the law excuses no one: but this is
-forum-shopping originated from PRIL, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the only applicable to Philippine Law
PRIL Page 14
-forum-shopping originated from PRIL, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the only applicable to Philippine Law
forum or place wherein to bring the suit Why need to plead it? Court cannot take judicial
-why: notice of foreign law
*to secure procedural advantages -laws are effective only w/n its territory. So outside
*to annoy and harass defendant their territory, they have no legal effect. If we want
it to be effective outside its jurisdiction, it has to be
*to avoid overcrowded dockets
proven as a fact (proven by evidence).
*select a more friendly venue How to prove:
-public document
Wing On Company v. Syyap -copy duly certified by the officer who has custody
-plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the + an attestation that he has custody of it (by the
defendant" consulate office with official seal)
Fleumer v. Hix
PRIL Page 15
Summary: should consider both public and private interests
Private interests:
*relative ease of access to source of proof
*Availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses
*cost of obtaining and attendance off willing witnesses
*possibility of viewing the premises if appropriate
*all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive
Public Interest
*administrative difficulties encountered when courts are congested
*jury duty: burden on community
*appropriateness of having the trial in a court that is familiar with the applicable state law rather than
getting another forum enmeshed in a complicated conflict-of-laws problem
PRIL Page 16
WHEN CAN'T REFUSE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION:
*when the forum is the only state where jurisdiction over defendant can be obtained
*when the forum provides procedural remedies not available in another state
2. ASSUME JURISDICTION
GR: apply law of the forum
1. A specific law of the forum decrees that internal law should apply
Civil Code
Article 16: makes real and personal proerty subject to the law of the country where they are situated
Intestate and testamentary succession: governed by lex nationale of the person whose succession is
under consideration
Article 829: makes revocation done outside the Philippines valid according to the law of the place
where the will was made or lex domicilli
Article 819: prohibits Filipinos from making joint wills even if valid in the country where they were
executed
2. The proper foreign law was not properly pleaded and proved
-no Judicial notice of foreign law
Relevant rules of evidence:
» To prove written foreign law: follow requirements in Sec 24-25, Rule 132
» May be subject of judicial admission
» Processual presumption - no proof nor admission, foreign law presumed to be the same as that in the Philippines
Rule 132
Section 19 - CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
For the purpose of their presentation evidence,
documents are either public or private.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS are:
a. The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
c. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
therein.
All other writings are PRIVATE.
• Requisites:
1. The court takes judicial notice thereof
2. The same is testified to by a witness expert in the subject
• C A took judicial notice of the Ballantyne Scale of Values [1]
Legal treatises also included
PRIL Page 17
3. The case falls under any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law:
...when foreign law is
(1) contrary to an important public policy of the forum
(2) penal in nature
(3) procedural in nature
(4) purely fiscal/administrative in nature
(5) (will) work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum
(6) case involves real/personal property situated in theforum
(7) application of foreign law might endanger vital interest of the state (forum)
(8) contrary to good morals
PRIL Page 18
Chapter V. Choice of Law
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
3:55 PM
*But there may be instances where no exercise of jurisdiction but internal law applies, or exercises jurisdiction but its int ernal law does not apply
I. TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Vested-Rights Theory - Beale
-choice of law rules that are simple in form and capable of easy administration would promote uniformity of result, enhance pr edictability and discourage
forum-shopping
-an act done in a foreign jurisdiction gives rise to the existence of a right if the laws of that state provides so, and this right is vested on the plaintiff and he
could enforce it in any forum he chooses to bring suit.
-applies LAW FO THE PLACE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ACT necessary to complete the COA
(so pano un, basta away mag-asawa wala lang. wala kaming pakialam sa inyo!)
PRIL Page 19
***
Gray v. Gray: court automatically applied the law of the place of the wrong, rejecting a choice -of-law method based on reason, justice and expediency
-but should have looked behind the policy why prohibit suits between spouses
CRITIQUE:
It tends to the "narrow-minded who may be inclined to depreciate the practical and equitable consideration that should control the adjudication of co nflict
cases in favor of an exaggerated local policy on the gound that they and the sovereign which they represent can do as they pl ease"
I. MODERN APPROACHES
Place of the Most significant relationships - Willis Reese (2nd Restatement)
-plurality of factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems
(b)relevant policies of the concerned states
© relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those in the determination of the particular issu e
(d)the protection of justified expectations of the parties
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result
(g) ease in the determination and the application of the law to be applied
Consider factual contacts! Depends on the relative importance and relevance to the issue at hand
Torts:
1. Place where injury occurred
2. Place where the negligent conduct occurred
3. Domicile, residence or nationality of the parties
4. Place where the relationship between the parties is entered
Contracts:
1. Law chosen by the parties and in the absence thereof
2. Place of contracting
3. Place of negotiation of the contract
4. Place of performance
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3. Place of negotiation of the contract
4. Place of performance
5. Domicile, residence, or nationality, or place of incorporation and place of business of parties
Illinois
PRIL Page 21
***
Restatement 2d: state of the most significant relationship
Auten v. Auten: "center of gravity", "place of the most significant contacts", "Grouping of contacts"
Auten Haag
The wife's home was the center of gravity The husband's home was the center of gravity
CRITIQUE:
*used to support virtually any result, hamper sound development of common law
*how to determine (standard) which of the contacts were significant and how to evaluate relative importance of a group of con tacts
****
Babcock: application of NY Law advanced the policy reflected in that law, while the failure to apply Ontario law did not impa ir the policy behind the law.
Critique:
*conflicts cases were ordinarily concerned only with private and not governmental interests
*unworkable, it will require the court to decide each case in an ad hoc basis
*not all state legislatures published committee reports that explained the background and purpose of the laws - courts speculate
*not all laws reflected policy or had a purpose other than to decide cases
PRIL Page 22
Comparative Impairment - William Baxter
-subordination of the state objective which would be least impaired
-courts weigh conflicting interests and apply the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not f ollowed
Trautman and Von Mehren comments: at the time the decision was made, restrictive policy on the right of women was on the wane in Massachusetts so at
that time, the contract was made not based on a strongly held policy.
-functional analysis: consider WON the law of a state reflects an "emerging" or "regressing" policy
Vs. interest analysis which apply a particular rule of substantive law in order to implement a policy reflected therein
-courts would prefer rules of law whether they are forum law or another state's law as long as they make "good socioeconmic se nse for the time the court
speaks and are sound in view of present day conditions
Critique: absence of principled and objective standards by which superiority of law over another may be determined.
PRIL Page 23
PFR review
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
5:42 PM
B. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
*In Buccat v Buccat, the Supreme C ourt refused to grant annulment filed by the husband because his wife gave birth to a baby a mere 89 days after their marriage. It held
that it is unbelievable that the wife could have concealed the fact that she was 6 months pregnant at the time of the marriage.
*However, in Aquino v Delizo, the Supreme C ourt granted annulment because the wife concealed the fact that she was 4 months pregnant during the time of the marriage.
It argued that since Delizo was “naturally plump,” Aquino could hardly be expected to know, by mere looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of the marriage.
GROUND FOR WHO CAN FILE PRESCRIPTION HOW TO RATIFY (Art. 45)
ANNULMENT (Art. 47) (Art. 47)
(Art. 45)
Lack of parental consent 1. Underage party 1. 5 years after attaining 21. Free cohabitation after attaining age of 21.
2. Parent or guardian 2. Before child reaches 21.
Insanity 1. Sane spouse with no knowledge of the 1. Any time before the death of insane party Free cohabitation of insane party after
other’s insanity coming to reason
2. Legal guardian of insane party
3. Insane party 2. During lucid interval or after regaining sanity,
and before death
Fraud Injured party (defrauded party) Five years after discovery of fraud Free cohabitation after having full knowledge
of fraud
Force, intimidation, undue Injured party Five years after disappearance of force or Free cohabitation after the force has ceased
influence intimidation or disappeared
Impotence Healthy party Five years after marriage Deemed ratified when action prescribes
STD Healthy party Five years after marriage Deemed ratified when action prescribes
A. LEGAL SEPARATION
BED AND BOARD SEPARATION MAY BE DECREED WHEN THERE IS (Art. 55):
1. Repeated violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner.
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious or political affiliation.
3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce petitioner, a common child, or child of petitioner, to engage in prostitution or connivance in such corruption or
inducement.
4. Final judgment sentencing respondent to imprisonment of more than 6 years, even if pardoned (executive pardon, not pardon from offended party).
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of respondent.
• When it existed from the time of celebration, and concealed from petitioner, can be a ground for annulment of marriage. When it occurred only after the marriage, it
is only a ground for legal separation, whether concealed or not.
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of respondent.
• ditto on rules on drug addiction.
7. C ontracting by respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines of abroad.
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion.
9. Attempt on the life of petitioner by respondent.
• There is no need for criminal conviction.
10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
PRIL Page 24
Summary table: Choice of Law approaches
Traditional approach
-emphasize principles of simplicity, convenience and uniformity
Modern approaches
-rel ate to reaching appropriate results in particular ca ses
Place of Wi l lis Reese -pl urality of fa ctors: Auten v. Auten: "center of gra vity", "place of the *us ed to s upport vi rtually a ny result, hamper sound
the Most (2nd (a) the needs of the interstate and international sys tems mos t s ignificant contacts", "Grouping of contacts" development of common l aw
Res tatement) (b)relevant policies of the concerned states -the place where there were more fa ctual contacts *how to determine (standard) which of the contacts
significant © rel evant policies of other i nterested s tates and the wa s England, as the only contact wi th US is the were s ignificant and how to evaluate relative i mportance
relationship rel ative interest of those i n the determination of the execution of the contract, and i t only happened i n US of a group of contacts
s parti cular issue beca use the husband was i n US
(d)the protection of justified expectations of the parties
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law Haag vs. Barnes: i n thi s case, the place where there
(f) certa inty, predictability, a nd uniformity of result were more fa ctual contacts was Ilinois (the home of
(g) ea se in the determination and the application of the the da d)
l a w to be a pplied
Torts:
1. Pl a ce where i njury occurred
2. Pl a ce where the negligent conduct occurred
3. Domi cile, residence or nationality of the parties
4. Pl a ce where the relationship between the parties is
entered
Contra cts :
5. La w chosen by the parties and in the a bsence thereof
6. Pl a ce of contracting
7. Pl a ce of negotiation of the contract
8. Pl a ce of performance
9. Domi cile, residence, or nationality, or place of
i ncorporation and place of business of parties
Interest Brainered -l ook at the policy behind the laws of the i nvolved s tates a nd Babcock v. Jackson: a ppl ication of NY Law a dvanced *confl icts cases were ordinarily concerned only with
Currie the i nterest each state had in applyi ng its own law the policy reflected i n that law, while the failure to pri va te a nd not governmental interests
Analysis
-fa ctual contacts alone did not determine the outcome of a a pply Ontario l aw did not impair the policy behind the *unworkable, it will require the court to decide each
ca s e UNLESS they reflected a state policy which would be l a w. ca s e i n a n ad hoc basis
a dva nced by a pplication of the substantive state law *not a l l state legislatures published committee reports
-determine which s tate had the real interest in having i ts law tha t explained the background a nd purpose of the laws -
a pplied courts s peculate
*not a l l laws reflected policy or ha d a purpose other
tha n to decide ca ses
Comparativ Wi l liam Baxter -s ubordination of the state objective which would be least
e i mpaired
-courts weigh conflicting interests and apply the l aw of the
Impairmen s tate whose interest would be more i mpaired if its law were
t not fol lowed
Functional Donald -a fter determining the concerned jurisdiction or i nterested Mi l i ken v. Pra tt (1981)
Tra utman and s ta te Fa cts : Daniel Pra tt, resident of Ma ssachusetts, was
Analysis
Arthur Von -l ooked into: s ued by Mi liken and Co. as a guaranty on his wife's
Mehren > the general policies of the s tate beyond those l oa n, as required by the company.
refl ected in its substantive law -l oan executed i n Maine
>pol icies and values relating to effective and Ma s sachusetts law Ma i ne La w
ha rmonious i ntercourse between states
PRIL Page 25
Ma s sachusetts law Mai ne Law
ha rmonious i ntercourse between states
e.g. *reci procity Spouse ca n't act as Spouse ca n be a
*a dva ncement of multistate activity s urety for the other's s urety for the other's
*protecti ng justifiable expectations obl igation debt
*evenhandedness i n dealing with s imilar ca ses -s uit brought i n Maine
*effectiveness HELD: DANIEL LIABLE
-then consider the relative strength of a state policy (policy - -contract was complete when Miliken received
wei ghing) Daniel's guaranty and extended credit on the
s trength of his guaranty
-pl ace of contracting was Maine
PRIL Page 26
*PRIL Lecture Notes: December 1
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
1:40 PM
*the fact that the court exercises jurisdiction, does not automatically follow that it would apply its own forum law...
*usually, in Family law cases and torts cases, courts would apply forum law instead of foreign law because of policies and va lues. As opposed to contract law, which most
of jurisdictions share common provisions and basic principles, not value -laden laws so even if apply foreign law, as if you're applying local law…
e.g. other countries have divorce, while in Philippines, not allowed…
-these laws reflect the values of that society…
*In the world, only RP and Malta have no divorce!
VARIOUS APPROACHES
1. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
-more territorial
-laws have effect only w/n a certain territory
2. MODERN APPROACHES
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
1. VESTED-RIGHTS THEORY
-Which law applies: Occur in the place where the last act giving rise to a COA
e.g. torts: ACT + INJURY
If both happen in 1 state: domestic
If 2 different places: conflicts-torts case
GRAY V. GRAY
-wife sued husband because of the injury she incurred because of her husbands driving.
-they lived in NH /New Hamp-shir/ - which allowed suits between spouses
-the incident happened in Maine - which does not allow suits between spouses
-Wife sued husband in NH
HELD: wife cannot sue husband because in the place where the injury occurred, she has no right to sue her husband
Law 1: can't sue even if there's a COA because they are husband and wife
Law2: can't sue because there's no COA in the first place, incidental lang status nila as spouses - which applies in this case!!! Broad prohibition
*what if law 1: can sue in another forum which allows suits between spouses BECAUSE THE WIFE HAS A COA!
Probable policy why disallow suits between spouses: marital harmony, may resolve dispute by themselves
***
Vested rights theory simple. SUC of results.
PROs: anticipate outcome of the case because uniform…
CONS: unjust
-plus so much uncertainty in your rights. If you're riding a moving vehicle, if you cross a border you have a right but after crossing another border, you lose such right to
sue...
Cf. Principle of preference
PRINCIPLES OF PREFERENCE
-social expediency + justice
-3 steps:
1. Scrutinize transaction
2. Compare foreign law vs. domestic law (effects)
3. Which effect would be in accordance with justice and social expediency
-even if still territorial, considers other factors too…
-gives a character of a modern approach
PRIL Page 27
-gives a character of a modern approach
Traditional law: justice is in the uniformity of decisions, even if the approach results to an unjust result
MODERN APPROACHES
MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
-forum would look at where the most RELEVANT + IMPORTANT FACTUAL CONTACTS occur!!!! Not the number of contacts
AUTEN V. AUTEN
-Auten spouses married in England, had children in England, lived there for 14 years…But husband left them, went to NY
-Mrs. Auten followed Mr. Auten in NY, compelled him to enter a SEPARATION AGREEMENT wherein Mr. Auten would give support (£50 ) to family, would live separately,
and Mrs. Auten cannot sue him in connection with their separation
…
HELD: Apply ENGLAND LAW, which has the most concern in prescribing and governing the obligations of Mr. Auten to family…
-apply the law which the parties intends or expects to be applied: here ENGLISH LAW
***
If traditional approach applied, would the result be different?
>>>YES. Law of place of contracting so NY Law applies (place of execution of the contract)
>>>si Ma'am: Breach was in NY because it is where Mr. Auten refused to pay the support (place of enforcement)
...The acceptance of the agreement was in NY
HAAG V. BARNES
-Illinois lawyer and NY Legal secretary had an illegitimate child born in Illinois. They entered into a SUPPORT AGREEMENT wher ein the Illinois lawyer would pay
$275/month for support. NY Legal secretary sued separately
CRITIQUE: Different application of the MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
-difference in determining what contact is significant and relevant
-very individualistic: the judge alone would determine what law would apply, what contacts would be relevant….depends on the j udge
INTEREST ANALYSIS
-look at the policy behind the law of the states, not merely the significant factual contacts in the dispute; apply the law of the state which has more real interest in
applying its law
-"Interest" of the STATE, not the individual, not the litigants
TRUE CONFLICT: where both states are both interested
Cf: Alabama and Mississippi case
ALABAMA: liability of ER for damages to Ees… (to compel the Ers to be more vigilant in making sure that the Ees would do thei r jobs well…)
MISSISSIPPI: protect ER from liability arising from the negligence of co -EEs of the complainant EE - protect rin Ees…because the ER would get back at the Ees in one way or
another
In Grey v. Grey decided using interest analysis, would the result be the same?
NH: allows suits vs. spouses - interest
Maine: does not allow suits - interest in preserving harmonious relationship of their own citizens
***
BOBCOCK V. JACKSONS
-neighbor Bobcock was seriously injured because of an incident wherein Mr. Jackson drove the vehicle
-Bobcock sued Jackson
-Jackson, as a defense, alleged that Ontario law does not allow suits unless the owner or driver of the vehicle is engaged in the business of carrying passengers for
compensation…
…basta alam mo na un...
PRIL Page 28
Chapter VI: The Problem of Characterization
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
1:30 AM
Art16: If property,
>Where property located.
If succession issues such as
○ order of succession
○ Amount of successional rights
○ Intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
>national law of person whose succession is under consideration
(irrelevant location of property and what property is involved)
Problem with Single-aspect method: inherently rigid and unjust decisions may result from their application
How to avoid: resort to escape devices
• Renvoi
• Characterization
EAP notes
Marriage - lex loci celebrationis
Contracts - lex loci contractus
Torts - lex loci delicti
Property - lex situs
Succession - lex loci nationalii
2 TYPES OF CHARACTERIZATION
1. SUBJECT-MATTER CHARACTERIZATION
-classification of a factual situation into a legal category
-the legal category to which an issue is assigned determines the governing law…
e.g. Torts, contracts, family law or property
CON: Problem pervasive since at least 2 jurisdictions w/ divergent laws are involved
GIBBS V. GOV'T OF PI
FACTS:
-Eva Gibbs and husband Allison Gibbs were citizens of California
…domiciled in California
-they owned 3 parcels of land in MANILA, forming part of the conjugal partnership
-Eva died
-Allison was appointed as administrator
-Allison filed an ex parte petition wherein he alleged that in accordance with California law, all the conjugal properties would redound to the surviving spouse upon death
of one. He now seeks to be adjudicated as the SOLE AND ABSOLUTE OWNER of the lands [SEC1401, CIVIL CODE OF CALIFORNIA]
TC: FOR ALLISON, ISSUED A DECREE ADJUDICATING HIM AS HE PRAYED (sole and absolute owner of the property)
-Allison presented the decree to the Register of Deeds of Manila to demand a TCT
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA: refused to register because INHERITANCE TAX NOT YET PAID
-so Allison filed Petition for mandamus to compel Register of Deeds to issue TCT w/o payment of inheritance tax
CFI: should pay inheritance tax first
SC: Sc remanded the case to CFI for presentation of evidence regarding:
(1) pertinent Californian law at the time of Eva's death
(2) evidence w/ re reference dates of acquisition of the property
(3) California law at the time of acquisition
WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Administrative Code should apply ?
PRIL Page 29
WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Administrative Code should apply ?
Lex Rei Sitae. Therefore Philippine Law
-Real property is subject to the lex rei sitae. The respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptual contract, are determined by the
law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or of the place where the marriage was celebrated.
-HERE: since the properties were found in RP, Philippine law apply
-Applying NCC, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband,
subject t the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband.
-Wife had descendible interest, equal to that of her husband. That descendible interest is transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission is taxable
under RP Administrative Code.
-CHA: The court characterized the case as involving real property, thus, the land would be governed by lex situs. Since the lex situs makes the wife co-owner, upon her
death, her share is transferred by inheritance to the heirs so Husband would be liable to inheritance tax upon the transfer.
Disposition: 1/2 of the estate was taxed.
EAP notes
If characterized as succession case, law of domicile of decedent would apply - Allison would not have to pay tax
*~*~*~*
2. Substance-Procedure Dichotomy
-directs the court to the extent it will apply foreign law
-if issue SUBSTANTIVE: court may apply foreign law
-if issue PROCEDURAL: apply law of the forum
>why: rights and duties of parties arising from a legal situation shall not be substantially varied because of the forum in which an action is brought to settle
disputed questions arising out of the situation.
>If parties were frequently exposed to hazards and unknown requirements of foreign law, international commerce would hardly continue
>so courts seek to reference to the foreign law deemed appropriate, to protect parties against a substantial change of position because of the fortuitous
circumstance that suit is brought in that particular state
>if refer to foreign law, a heavy burden would be thrown upon the courts of the forum and the orderly administration of justice would be hampered an
delayed; makes administration of the foreign law by the local tribunal impractible, inconvenient, or violative of local policy
EAP notes
Why apply law of the forum if procedural issue: Due process + practicality (we can't presume to know what the procedure of the other state (foreign state) is)
GRANT v. MCAULIFFE
Facts:
-All the parties are Californian citizens, but the injury happened in Arizona
-Pullen, the negligent party, died - Mcauliffe appointed as his administrator. So the Plaintiffs claimed against estate of Pullen before California courts
>MTD by Mcauliffe: under Arizona law (law of the place of injury), action is barred
Arizona law California law
A tort action which has not been commenced before the death of the Causes of action for negligent torts survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be
tortfeasor must be abated maintained against the estate
TC: granted MTD, dismissed case
WON the claimants could claim against the estate (i.e. WON California law should apply)?
YES. Since Survival of COA is governed by the law of the forum (being merely procedural)
-Survival of COA is not an essential part of the COA itself but relates to the procedures available for the enforcement of thelegal claim of damages
-also applied most significant contacts approach: in this case
*decedent's estate is located in California
*letters of administration were issued to Mcauliffe in California
>the responsibilities of Mcauliffe as administrator of Pullen's estate, for injuries inflicted by Pullen before his death aregoverned by the law of California: forum law retains
control of the administration of the estate
*~*~*
Reactions to Grant Case: Negative!
-based on erroneous characterization that was greatly influenced by "sympathy factors"
-correct result, dubious method: it would be better if the court state explicitly the considerations that led them in the first place to determine what the result should be,
and indicate clearly how these considerations will be appraised in other cases
*problem: 'procedure' and 'substance' are so closely connected that in many cases a refusal to accept the foreign rule as to a matter falling into the doubtful class will
defeat the policy involved in following the foreign substantive law
MARIE v. GARRISON
Facts: Marie & Garrison entered into a contract of sale of interest in a land
-the said contract is declared void by NY statute of Frauds
Garrison Marie
NY Statute of frauds affected the remedy of the contract by prescribing evidence Substantive - goes to the existence of the contract
-rule of forum -law of contracting (not NY because it was executed outside NY)
WON the contract declared void by a statute still subsists as a contract with the only effect of depriving the party of a remedy or a mere word of evidence?
It was a word of substance.
-statute provided that the contract of sale of any interest in land shall be void unless it was in writing
PRIL Page 30
-when substantive: if provides for a shorter period for certain types of claims that fall w/n a wider classification covered by a general statute of limitations
TEST to determine WON statute of limitations is procedural or substantive: SPECIFICITY TEST (Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co, Ltd)
>substantive: limitation directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right
Translation: there's a general rule which usually allows [the action to proceed], but there's a more specific rule which doesnot allow it
Borrowing statutes: bar the filing of a suit in the forum if it is already barred by the statute of limitations in the placewhere the COA arose
BUT in Cadalin v. POEA: although the statute of limitations of the place where the COA arose already barred the action, sinceit was against public policy, the action
was allowed to proceed
PRIL Page 31
VII. Problem of Renvoi
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
11:11 PM
A. DEFINITION OF RENVOI
Renvoi
-procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the conflict of laws rules of the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of law rules of which, in turn, refers the matter
to the law of the forum or a third state
-2 types:
• REMISSION: reference back to the law of the forum
• TRANSMISSION: reference to a 3rd state
-When usually employed:
*where domiciliary and nationality laws are applied to the same individual in issues involving
>succession
>domestic relations
>real properties
AZNAR V. GARCIA
Facts:
-Decedent: Edward Christiansen
>Citizen of the US, State of California at the time of death
>BUT was living in the Philippines at the time of death (domicile)
>and his Properties are in the Philippines
-Will of decedent:
>P3,600 to Maria Helena Christiansen-Garcia (the acknowledged natural child of decedent)
>The rest of the estate to Maria Lucy Christiansen-Daney (daughter)
-testate proceedings in PHILIPPINES
>>>HELENA GARCIA opposed: Philippine Law should apply!
LAW OF CALIFORNIA LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES
*California Probate Code: testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he Art16, NCC: National law of the person
desires (+ In re Kaufman) whose succession is in Question
*Art946, Civil Code of California: "If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
his domicile" (conflict of law rule for Californian citizens abroad)
TC: California law applies
MR/Appeal by Garcia: the conflicts of law rule of California reverts the issue back to the Philippines, thus, Philippine law should apply (thus
she is entitled to her legitime)
****
Ma'am: by accepting the renvoi, and applying forum law (as the foreign forum referred the case back to the forum), the Court rendered justice to the natural child of the
decedent by granting her her legitimes.
3rd. DESISTANCE/MUTUAL DISCLAIMER OF JURISDICTION. Forum court refers to foreign court's law. Foreign law does not have a conflict of law rule which apply to non-nationals
so still apply forum law.
(same as accepting renvoi, but since foreign law not applicable when outside the foreign state, forum court desists in applying foreign law)
4th. FOREIGN COURT THEORY. Forum court would assume position of the foreign court, i.e. forum court would apply the law that the foreign court would apply if it had assumed
jurisdiction.
Note: In all the explanation given in the book, it appears that in Renvoi, there is no actual transfer of the case to another court. The forum court still exercises jurisdiction over the dispute
but just use renvoi to use other law or to desist from using foreign law.
DISADVANTAGE OF RENVOI: if both courts follow the same renvoi theory: no end to the case
Resembles…
…revolving doors
PRIL Page 32
…revolving doors
…a game of lawn tennis
...A logical cabinet of mirrors
…circulus inextricabilis
C. USEFULNESS OF RENVOI
-avoid unjust results
WON Mrs. Price has the capacity to enter into an obligation in the state of Michigan (so as to make her liable)?
NO.
-dispute does not involve construction/force/effect of instruments BUT OF MRS. PRICE'S CAPACITY.
-(not sure): apply law of the place of performance (here it's Michigan)
HELD: MICHIGAN LAW applies. MRS. PRiCE NOT LIABLE. A married woman cannot bind her separate estate through personal engagement for
the benefit of others.
***
University of Chicago v. Dater case is sound:
-Michigan protected Michigan wife; Illinois not interested in applying its law
-application of renvoi promoted uniformity of results inspite of discrepancies in the choice-of-law rules
OBJECTIONS TO RENVOI
1. CON: place the court in a perpetually enclosed circle from which it would never emerge and that it would never find a suitable body of substantive rules to apply to a particular
case - only workable if 2 states does not have same renvoi theory and if only 1 rejects renvoi
PRO: Dean Griswold
>False premise: the "chain" would stop if remission is to the state's INTERNAL LAW ALONE
>Allowed for necessity and expediency
2. CON: Courts may be unnecessarily burdened w/ the task of identifying the choice-of-law rules of another state
PRO: forum court would not use renvoi if it cannot ascertain what the conflict-of-law rules of the foreign state in the first place…
PRIL Page 33
PFAU v. TRENT ALUMINUM CO.
Pfau
-domiciled in Connecticut
-Student of Iowa (Parsons College, Iowa)
Trent
-domiciled in NJ
-also a student of Iowa (Parsons College)
-Trent agreed to drive Pfau to Missouri using a car registered in NJ, insured in NJ, and insured by a carrier in NJ
-car collision (NJ registered car driven by Trent collided with Joseph Davis car when Trent failed to negotiate a curve) occurred in IOWA. Pfau
incurred injuries.
-Pfau sues before an NJ court
***
BELLIS V. BELLIS
Amos Bellis
-born in Texas
-citizen of Texas
-executed a will in RP: all his property...
-had 2 marriages and some illegitimate children
3 illegit children
-Oppositors-appellants
CFI: applied law of the nationality of the person whose succession is in question - Texas law
PRIL Page 34
*PRIL December 8 Lecture
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
9:08 PM
Renvoi
-one of the escape devices resorted by the court to escape the injustice brought about by the mechanical application of a theory
*but you can see that the courts would do what they want to do: you can't really predict what the court would do
Article 15, NCC: national law governs personal law of a person
(family law, status…)
-when renvoi, foreign law would apply either forum law's state,
Or a third state.
e.g. in marriage
Example 1:
Husband is a national of country 1
Wife is a national of country 2
Marriage was celebrated in country 3
Example 2:
Husband and wife are nationals of country 1
They live in country 2
If forum is Philippines, not just look at Family code, can also look at:
*Civil Code
*Constitution (as to ownership of a foreigner of real properties in RP)
Example 3:
Citizens of Canada
Married in Australia
Properties in the Philippines
What if Canadian national law: Absolute Community Property
Australia provide CPG
…both provides that both husband and wife jointly own the properties…
But in RP where the property is located, prohibit foreigners from owning property!
"referral of State B" not really referral, we don't know anyone from State B. So lawyer of party arguing laws of State B are applicable, lawyer sho uld do the research. Law would be pleaded and proved before the forum court. Court
would then have option of accepting or rejecting the foreign law.
Aznar v. Garcia
-will gave only P3600 to acknowledged natural child, while the rest was given to the other legitimate daughter. Acknowledged n atural child opposed, arguing her legitimes (in accordance with Philippine law) was denied of her. So what
law applies?
H: In the end, Philippine law applied.
_Philippine court refers to California law (place of nationality)
_California court refers to Philippine law (place of domicile)
_Philippine law would now apply its internal law = legitimes protected!
*Court accepted the renvoi to protect the rights of a natural child acknowledged by the decedent
CON: It's up to the courts when to apply renvoi - subject to abuse!
MUTUAL DISCLAIMER
-laws are passed to apply to a certain group of people - the citizens of that state!
ANNESLEY V. ANNESLEY
-English subject lives in Francem, executed a will in France wherein she disposed more than 1/3 of her estate in favor of her daughter. However, French law does not allow such disposition of property
H: French law would apply - only dispose 1/3 of her estate through the will
-English law referred case to law of the domicile (French law)
-French law referred case to law of nationality (English law)
-English law referred it back to law of domicile (French law)
-Now English law thought of how French courts would have decided - and concluded that it would apply its own law - thus testatrix is limited to 1/3 disposition of her estate through a will
*shows why renvoi is criticized: eternal reference from one law to another!
USEFULNESS OF RENVOI
-avoid unjust results
*false conflict because the 2 places where the closer and most significatn relationship to the parties as well as to other fa ctors, those 2 places had no conflicting laws
BELLIS V. BELLIS
-domiciliary and national of TEXAS, owned properties (personal property) in RP
H: No real conflict!
PRIL Page 35
VIII. NOTICE AND PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
9:09 PM
X: Delgado v. Republic: JN may be taken of a foreign law with which the court is evidently familiar. Familiarity with the foreign law may be because
(1) the law is generally known, e.g. Spanish or American law from which RP law was derived
(2) judge had previously ruled upon it in other cases
US: courts are allowed to take JN of the law of sister states as required by the full faith and credit clause of US Consti
(court, though, did not rule on alleged renunciation. For purposes of the discussion, Court assumed that renunciation was not upheld)
WON Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be applied and not Texas law?
Texas law applies, but because of estoppel (?) and it is yet to be proven…
*note: in Succession, it was held in this case that there was no fideicommissary substitution so the 1st heir instituted (Mr. Magno) had no
obligation to preserve the properties inherited from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other heirs (the siblings)
*no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas (although it was arguing that RP laws apply), there
is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjgal estate
>>>so PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it (which is initial ly at least 1/2 of
the estate), for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other
controverted fact, create estoppel.
PRIL Page 36
RULING THAT MRS. HODGES'S ESTATE CANNOT BE LESS THAN 1/4 OF THE CPP VS. FINDING THAT NO EVIDENCE YET OF TEXAS
LAWS? Court said that evidence should still be presented re: what Texas law contains but PCIB now cannot allege that the esta te is less than
1/4…
*Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in di spute between the
parties in any proceeding, with the rare exceptional n instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge o f the court,
such as when they are well and generally known, or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of th e parties
concerned claim otherwise.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
Emil Johnson (decedent)
-native of Sweden
-Citizen of US (Illinois)
-resident of RP at time of death
-made a WILL
>holographic
>signed and written by him
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not conform with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippines, which requir ed 3
witnesses)
-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will was executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois (he was a citizen of Ill inois)
TC: declared the will to be legal and admitted it to probate
--after will probated, her alleged daugher, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree, saying that the will was not executed in
accordance with Illinois law, and that the decedent was not a resident of the state of Illinois
***
Saudi ARAMCO
-incorporated in Delaware
-licensed to do business in NY
-engaged in extensve business activities in Saudi Arabia
LEARY V. GLEDHILL
PRIL Page 37
LEARY V. GLEDHILL
-both parties were acquainted in the military service
-in the past, they had corresponded, resulting to Leary purchasing $1,000 worth of stock
-Gledhill invited Leary to France, wherein Gledhill told him that he needed $4,000 and he could already raise $2,000, but need ed Leary's help
to raise the $4,000. No mention of selling plaintiff shares of stock
-Leary returned to Germany. From there, he sent Gledhill $1,500 w/o indicating on the check or in the accompanying letter what the money
was for.
-Later, Leary sued Gledhill for recovery of the $1,500 before NJ courts, which was allegedly a loan to Gledhill
-Gledhill's defense: he didn't borrow money from Leary
>Moved to dismiss:
(1) no promise to repay
(2) no demand for repayment
(3) no pleading or proof of the law of France where the transaction occured
ZALAMEA V. CA. Court rigorously applied the rule requiring proof of foreign law, held that since foreign law pleaded but not proven, private respondent's conduct was
excused
ZALAMEA V. CA
(case of bumping off, WON overbooking is allowed in US)
-Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila agent of Tans World Airlines Inc. - 2 on 75% discount, and one
full-fare. All tickets confirmed in Manila and re -confirmed in NY
-Probably in NY, the 3 were wait-listed as their seats were already taken. As Mr. Zalamea was holding the full -fare ticket, he was allowed to
board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea and their daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to Manila from other airlines
-Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based on breach of contract of carriage before RTC Makati
-RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD + Atty's fees
-CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking being an accepted practice in US Airlines so no fraud nor bad faith on the part of Tran sWorld
Airlines
WON MD should have been awarded for BF on part of TransWorld Airlines? YES. Overbooking = BF
1. US law allowing overbooking never proved. Just presented statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather (customer service agent) in her de position
wherein she said that OVERBOOKING WAS ALLOWED based on the Code of Federal Regulations fo the Civil Aeronautics Board.
-what is required to be able to prove foreign law:
*official publication
*copy of the written law attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or his deputy + certificate that su ch officer has
custody + seal of the office of the officer who made the certification
>who can make the certification:
…secretary of an embassy or legation
…consul general
…consul
…vice consul
…consular agent
…any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
-here, none presented to prove contents of the Code of Federal Regulations for the Civil Aeronautics Board
-so CA erred in finding that overbooking is allowed under US laws
2. Even if there is such US law existing allowing overbooking, it's irrelevant!
-lex loci contractus applies: tickets sold, issued in RP so RP law applicable
3. Overbooking = BF
-where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case al l of them would
show up for check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenge r is entitled to
an award of moral damages
-even if overbooking allowed, TWA still guilty for not informing its passengers beforehand
***
Under venue in Warsaw: Art28
1. Court of the place of domicile of the carrier
2. Court of the principal place of business of the carrier
3. Court where the transaction occurred
4. Court of the place of destination
MICIANO V. BRIMO
*this is also a case in succession where decedent wants RP law, instead of Turkish law, to apply, and one of brothers was thr eatened to be
disinherited
Joseph Brimo
-Turkish National
-but had properties in the Philippines
-and executed will in the Philippines, which contained a provision which provided that the disposition of his properties shoul d be done in
accordance with Philippine laws, and that an heir who opposes such will would be deprived of his share.
-Andre Brimo, his brother, opposed the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator of Joseph's estate on the g round that the
will was not in accordance with the laws of Turkey, thus void for violating Art. 10, NCC:
"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the succes sional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated."
PRIL Page 38
be situated."
HELD: Turkish law should be applied so provision in the will void. Brimo would not be disinherited, because of the impossibil ity of
the condition imposed upon him.
1. Court presumed that Turkish laws were the same as RP laws (processual presumption)
2. Since under our law, the project partition was valid, it should be upheld.
3. However, provision of the will with regards application of RP law instead of Turkish laws is void (but still used RP laws in distributing the estate of the
decedent, but with the excuse that the Court was just presuming Turkish laws to be the same as RP laws…)
Xxx
*use of most significant relationship theory/disingenuous characterization: same conclusion w/o flouting testator's intention (to use RP law)
Xxx
SUNTAY V. SUNTAY
*again, a succession case…but I cannot find the digest…maybe it's under another subject…hmmm…
Jose Suntay
-Filipino Citizen
-resident of the Philippines
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China
-left properties in RP, and a house in China
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd wife and child of 2nd marriage
-2 proceedings:
*intestate proceedings, one of the children of the 1st marriage appointed as administrator of the estate
*Testate proceedings, by the widow showing a will allegedly executed in 1929 in RP
>denied: loss of will before hearing
>appealed: further proceedings, deposition of witnesses to a will taken : still dismissed
-Pacific war ensued
-after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino) presented the alleged will of his father in Chinese Characters executed and signed by him in 1931
and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in Amoy, China
-presented petition for probate of either the 1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931 will - both DISALLOWED
3. PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court, it may be presumed that
the proceedings in the probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those in RP Courts
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices through personal service or service by publication
-so since no notice of the proceedings before Amoy, China that it was a probate proceeding, it cannot be deemed as a probate
proceeding and is deemed as merely a deposition or perpetuation of testimony
Xxx
W ON RP law should be applied? No. But not proved so presumed that RP Laws same as English law
Presume that English law is the same as RP laws = only asses estate and inheritance tax on 1/2 of the estate.
1. W hen stevensons married during 1909, old civil code still applies.
Old civil code New civil code
Nationality theory of determining property relation of Same
spouses where one is a foreigner, no prenuptual
agreement: follow husband's nationality
Limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land Includes marriages celebrated in RP and aborad
…but both only applies to mixed marriages. Here, both spouses are Brits!
PRIL Page 39
2. Manresa said English law (the law of the husband's nationality) should be used.
3. But no proof of English law presented by CIR. So apply processual presumption, presume English law = RP laws
Xxx
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DECIDING EITHER TO APPLY DOMESTIC LAW OR TO DECIDE CASE AGAINST PARTY WHO FAILED TO PROVE FOREIGN LAW FROM WHICH HIS
CLAIM ARISES:
1. Degree of public interest involved in the dispute
2. Accessibility of foreign law materials to the parties
3. Possibility that plaintiff is merely forum shopping
4. Similarities between forum laws and foreign law on the issue in point
(usually forum law only applied when issue involves marriage and family relations)
UNDER EXCEPTIONS:
1. FOREIGN LAW IS CONTRARY TO IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM
Public policy:
-principle of law
...which holds that no subject or citizen
...can lawfully commit any act
...which has a tendency to be
>injurious to the public or
>against public good.
PRIL Page 40
>some prevalent concept of good morals,
>some deep-rooted tradition of the commonwealth.
-dismissal through this method is technically not dismissal on the merits BUT in reality, plaintiff cannot get jurisdiction in any other court
W ON the contract provisions should be followed (i.e. W ON Pakistani law should apply and the case brought before Pakistani Cou rts)?
NO
1. PIA cannot invoke Par10 (venue and applicable law) of its contract to prevent application of labor laws and regulations of th e
Philippines because
*the EER is a relationship affected w/ public interest
*In accordance with Art17.3: RP Labor laws cannot be rendered illusory by parties agreeing upon some other law to govern thei r relationship
2. PIA cannot invoke that Karachi court is the sole venue for the dispute: court used place of significant contacts approach
*contract executed in RP
*contract was between Philippine citizens and a corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines (therefore a Resident Company)
*though the Filipina stewardesses were assigned in the Middle East and Europe, they were based in the Philippines in between assignments
-Par10 cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law
3. PIA did not invoke the Pakistani law applicable: so presume as same as Philippine law (applied Processual Presumption)
Xxx
CRITIQUES TO THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
*ulitimate escape device: Court can disregard the applicable law to arrive at its desired result without having to provide th e rigorous level of analysis required to explain
the shift
*intolerable affectation of superior virtue
*court of the forum sits in judgment over the wisdom and soundness of the applicable foreign law
Test when the public policy exception is properly invoked : WHEN THE FOREIGN COURT IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE FOREIGN LAW IS
*BARBAROIUS IN ITS PROVISIONS OR
*FRIGHTFULLY UNJUST IN THE PARTICULAR CASE
XXX
PRIL Page 41
>marriage between ascendants and descendants (incest!)
6. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW WILL WORK UNDENIABLE INJUSTICE TO THE CITIZENS OF THE FORUM
7. THE FOREIGN LAW IS PENAL IN CHARACTER
Chief Justice Marshall: Courts of no country execute penal laws of another.
What is penal? HUNTINGTON V. ATTRILL: whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforece it to be, in its essential character and effect, a pubish ment of
an offense against the public
LOZADA V. POSADAS: when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state which under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon
>>>this definition however was broadened in common use as penal statutes were understood to include
>"all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation"
> impose a penalty for their commission
What is a penalty? Restatement of Conflicts of laws: a sum of money exacted as punishment for a civil wrong (there's a claim or right)
Vs. compensation: for loss suffered by injured party
Penal laws and Revenue laws: deemed as different, but there are views holding Revenue laws as penal in character
EXTRADITION
Basis: jurisdictional cooperation + assistance among States in the enforcement of their criminal laws
Scope: all offenses except Political or religious
What happens: when a person indicted for a penal offense or a convict serving sentence ESCAPES to another country, the receiving country ha s legal obligation to
surrender escapee to the State from which he escaped
8. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW MIGHT ENDANGER THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE STATE
PRIL Page 42
*PRIL December 10 Lecture
Thursday, December 10, 2009
10:59 PM
Philippine laws
-should be published…
>15 days after publication: effectivity
*shows that Foreign law, even if it is really the law applicable, cannot be applied if not properly proved
I. Failed to prove what foreign law is and you are using it as your source of claim. If fails to do so, no COA
Leary v. Gledhill
-Leary sued Gledhill but Gledhill averred that since transaction occurred in France, French law should apply. US Court said that even if French law was not proven, it can
be assumed that the parties acquiesced to the application of forum law, and under forum law, Leary can recover.
Zalamea v. CA
-Zalameas were bumped off their flight back home. Upon coming home, they sued for Damages. Ca removed MD, taking JN of US law allowing overbooking. Court held
that CA erred, the alleged Federal law applicable not being properly proved. But actually irrelevant because law of the place of transaction should have been applied, i.e.
RP laws, wherein overbooking is deemed BF
-In US, it is a practice that overbooking is allowed because many often does not appear
3. Processual presumption
Miciano v. Brimo
-Turkish national executed a will making RP laws apply to the disposition of his estate. Court held that Turkish law should be applied, thus making the provision in his will
void. BUT since failed to prove Turkish law, presume that RP law same as Turkish law so in the end, applied RP laws in distributing the estate among the heirs
Suntay v. Suntay
-the 2nd will presented before the court was allegedly probated already in China. The GR is that if the will is duly admitted and probated in another country, it would be
recognized in RP. However, should first prove that the said court is a probate court and also prove what Chinese Probate laws are. However, none given so presumed that
probate proceedings in China same with RP probate procedures. In accordance with RP Probate proceedings, should send notices
PRIL Page 43
penal law) is greater than the interest of the forum law (where no penal law was violated, he's just found there)
e.g. Polanski: had many sexual relationship with young women, and was found guilty of having sex w/14 years old. Escaped fromthe place where it happened, after
several years, was extradited back.
d. Issues related to Property
Reasoning:
i. Land and everything attached to it are w/n the exclusive control of the state: only State officials can lawfully deal with th em physically - their consent
necessary
ii. Immovables are of greatest concern to state
iii. Demands of certainty and convenience\
-an exception!
e.g. Foreigner marries a Filipina. However, here, he's not allowed to own real property in RP. So still follow law of situs, i.e. Philippine law
e. Foreign law is revenue/fiscal/administrative law
"taxes are the lifeblood of the state"
-mark of sovereignty
f. Foreign law is contrary to good morals
g. Foreign law's application would work injustice to the citizens of the forum
h. Foreign law might endanger vital interests of the state
PRIL Page 44
Part 3: PERSONAL LAW
Monday, December 14, 2009
4:14 PM
IX. NATIONALITY
A. IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL LAW
-an individual's nationality or domicile serves as a permanent connection between the individual and a
state
-personal law would allow courts to exercise jurisdiction or determine the governing choice-of-law rule
on a specific situation or transaction involving him
Personal law
-follows an individual wherever he is
-governs transactions which affect the individual most closely
e.g. marriage
Divorce
Legitimacy
Capacity to contract
History:
*Medieval City States of Italy: commercial activities ensued between inhabitants of different cities of
different sovereign states = DOMICILE AS BASIS FOR PERSONAL LAW
*Code of Napoleon (1803) and Austrian Code (1812): LAW OF NATIONALITY
Demerits:
*does not solve problems relating to
>stateless individuals
>individuals w/ multiple nationalities
*does not give decisive solution in states w/ diverse legal systems (US - no single law)
*person's ties with a nation may be attenuated (national of State A but lives most of his life in State B -
see Nottebohm) - no shared identity or belonging with a particular state
B. DETERMINATION OF NATIONALITY
-depends on the municipal laws of each state
HAGUE CONVENTION ON CONFLICT OF NATIONAL LAWS:
Art1: "It is for each state to determine who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States
insofar as it is consistent with international convention, international customs, and the principles of law
generally recognized w/ regard to nationality"
Art2: Questions as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state "shall be
determined in accordance with the law of that state."
PRIL Page 45
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1991)
PRIL Page 46
x-----------------------------------------------------------*-----------------------------------------------------------x
2. CITIZENS BY NATURALIZATION
Naturalization
-confers to an alien a nationality
after birth
by any of the means provided by law
-in RP: by judicial method under CA no. 473
-during Martial Law (LOI No. 276): not applicable anymore
-removed:
*filing of Declaration of Intention
*filing of Income Requirements
*Language requirement: as long as able to speak and write Filipino/English/Spanish/any principal
Filipino language
More discussion:
*On 10 yr-continuous residence requirement
Ratio: enable government to
*observe applicant's conduct
*ensure that applicant has imbibed the principles and spirit of our Consti
When reduced to 5 years: Applicant… (Section 3, CA 473)
1. honorably held office under Gov't
2. Established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in RP
3. Married to a Filipino woman
4. Engaged as a teacher (public or private - but not int'l school) for 2 years
(note however YEE V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 7 SCRA 832: only Filipino citizens can be
public school teachers)
5. Born in RP
*On CHARACTER
-requires:
+Good Moral character
+conducted self in a PROPER + IRREPROACHABLE manner
Proper and Irreproachable conduct
-higher standard of morality than good moral character
-moral character of the highest degree, not enough to be a law-abiding citizen (Dy Lam Go vs. Republic)
-EVIDENCE: testimony of 2 character witnesses
>well known in the community and enjoy such a high reputation for probity (honesty/integrity),
PRIL Page 47
>well known in the community and enjoy such a high reputation for probity (honesty/integrity),
their word may be taken on its face value
>can't be employees of the petitioner
>must have known applicant for the period prescribed by law
>had opportunity to observe him personally
>can attest to the possession of the applicant of the qualifications - e.g. proper and irreproachable
conduct during the entire period of residence
x---------------------------------------------------x
(econ requirement continued)
Lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
-substantial gainful employment or the obtaining of tangible receipts
-appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate support for himself and
his family in the event of sickness, unemployment or disability to work
-his financial condition must be such as to permit him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization
-regard w/ caution if family business
2. In pari delicto: vendor (who knew that he was selling to an alien) cannot file suit to void sale to an alien
(who cannot own land, and must have known it)
3. Foreigner later naturalized as a Filipino:purpose of prohibition is to prevent the patrimony of our
nation for future generations of Filipinos; since vendee already a Filipino, end would not be frustrated
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
PRIL Page 48
during the period of such war;
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Moral turpitude
-act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social life in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary law of right and duty between men
or conduct contrary to honesty, modesty, or good morals
Co-mingling requirement
-can't qualify if kept wife and children in a neighboring country, merely visiting them
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Declaration of Intention
WHEN: 1 year prior to filing of petition
WHERE: w/ OSG
CONTENTS: it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of RP
Exemptions:
1. Born in RP + received primary and secondary education in public schools/private schools
recognized by Government, not limited to any race or nationality
2. Resided continuously in RP for min 30 years before filing their petition
3. Widow and minor children of an applicant for naturalization who died pending petition for
naturalization
-if exempted, still has to file a statement as to his exemption and the reasons therefor to apprise the
public, especially those officers charged with notice of the application, of the reasons advanced to
support exemption claim, to prepare them to contest it - FAILURE TO DO SO IS FATAL
WHO HEARS THE PETITION: RTC of the province in which petitioner has resided for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition
-RTC has exclusive jurisdiction
VIVO V. CLORIBEL
PRIL Page 49
X---------------------------------------------X
x-------------------------------------x
PRIL Page 50
*then the matalinhagang phrase…page 186 (matampuhin ang RP Citizenship, di basta-bastang pede itapon…)
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
x----------------------------------------------x
PRIL Page 51
permanent residence there
c. Invalid declaration of intention
d. Minor children failed to graduate in a school required by law through fault of parents
>neglect to support
>transferring to another school
e. Naturalized citizen allowed himself to be used as a dummy
-if granted: clerk of court forward copy of decree of cancellation to:
*OP
*OSG
-No defenses of estoppel or res judicata: mere grant of political privilege. If fraudulent, not res judicata
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Article IV, Section 5: Discourage dual or multiple nationalities: dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt withby law
"Effective Nationality": test to determine rights of an individual who may claim multiple nationality in a
third state
Frivaldo:
Why is it that if he is naturalized, and even if he claims that he loses his
citizenship, he can still not hold office…
Frivaldo 2: liberal interpretation, Taking oath (repatriated) retroacted to the
time he filed a COC since law is not clear when citizenship requirement
required
PRIL Page 52
(3) marriage of Filipinas to foreigners
*act of voting not enough, running for office enough to show that you did not
have allegiance
---similar to Aznar case: as long as no positive act to renounce citizenship,
considered still a Filipino citizen - filing of COC is enough
LI Yao Case
-tax amnesty did not erase the fact that he did not have good moral
character during the pendency of his naturalization proceeding
>>>opportunity to make up for their mistakes
Nottebohm Case
-when there are some issues which are to be determined by one's state laws,
apply the law of the effective nationality
(weh..okay, my turn)
Kookooritchin Case
-stateless individual
…so better to follow the law of the domicile (where you live better provides
conditions which are closer to you)
FPJ CASE
-political law - includes citizenship - does not distinguish between legitimate
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x and illegitimate children
2. STATELESSNESS
2 senses:
a. De jure: individual stripped of his nationality by his own former government w/o having an opportunity DOMICILE
to acquire another Merits and Demerits
b. De facto: individual possessed a nationality but whose country does not give them protection outside Merits: person and particular state
own territory (i.e. refugees) -so how more appropriate? See under Kookooritchin
-escaped from their countries w/o any travel documents, identity papers or any form of identification
normally granted by their government Demerits:
e.g. Vietnam war: Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laos 1. Should show factum et animus
Fact: physical presence
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees: basic rights of stateless persons Animus
1954 UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness >manendi: intention to remain
1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: enumerates conditions under w/c an individual > revertendi: intention to return - means that you're actually in another place
would not lose his nationality upon the risk of becoming stateless:
*marriage IMELDA MARCOS CASE
*divorce -the case where the justices insist that the election qualifications intended to
*adoption mean "domicile" since in election law, domicile = residence
*naturalization Cf. CAASI v. COMELEC: what if Miguel lived in Pangasinan since birth and
*expatriation intends to return and stay there? Would his green card mean a thing?
-prohibits deprivation of identity as punishment or as discriminatory instrument for political, religious or Ma'am: she became a Metro Manila Governor. How could she have not
ethnic reasons intended to have her domicile in Metro Manila then? Or else she would not
-jus sanguinis country should grant nationality to those born in their countries qualify as Governor of Metro Manila
-jus soli country should consider its national stateless persons when one of the latter's parents is a
national of their country (i.e. parent born in that country) Separate opinions: manner by which Tacloban residence was acquired.
"by my watch it's not yet 2 o'clock so you're watch is wrong…my watch is
expensive"
4 principles of DOMICILE
PRIL Page 53
PRIL Page 54
The Nottebohm Case
Monday, December 14, 2009
4:14 PM
Individuals as objects of Int'l Law Case: The Nottebohm Case (1955; ICJ)
Facts: Nottebohm was born in Germany, and was a German citizen, although he lived in Guatemala
since 1903, and conducted a prosperous business there, but never became a citizen of Guatemala. In
1939, he applied to become a citizen of Liechtenstein. The application was approved even though a
requirement was that he be in residence there for at least 3 years, but there was an exception and he
became a citizen of Liechtenstein. When he tried to re-enter Guatemala in 1943, he was refused entry
(probably because of his original German citizenship and because of WWII). Liechtenstein offered
Nottebohm protection against the government of Guatemala and sued Guatemala in the International
Court of Justice. However, the government of Guatemala argued that Nottebohm did not gain
Liechtenstein citizenship for the purposes of international law.
Issue: Whether the conferment of the Lichtenstein citizenship is not contrary to int'l law, and if
Lichtenstein's claim on behalf of Nottebohm is admissible in court. -
No.
Holding: The court agreed with Guatemala and held that claims by Lichtenstein were inadmissible .
Reasoning: Although the Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to determine its own
citizens and criteria for becoming one in municipal law, such a process would have to be scrutinized on
the international plain in questions of diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the principle of effective
nationality, where the national must prove a meaningful connection to the state in question. This
principle was previously applied only in cases of dual nationality to determine which nationality should
be used in a given case. However, Nottebohm had forfeited his German nationality and thus only had
the nationality of Liechtenstein.
Notes • Here the individual cannot bring the claim himself (objective view) • Lichtenstein trying to get
damages on behalf of Nottebohm ○ Guatemala doesn’t recognize his citizenship • Nottebohm was
under Lichtenstein laws, a citizen. ICJ says ok it might be fine under Lichtenstein's laws, but not ok under
int'l law • ICJ looking for real links in Lichtenstein. Must show there is a real connection before
Lichtenstein can act on your behalf. • Pg. 343 - first full paragraph • Reasoning: ○ What sources of law
were looked at? § Arbitration and judicial decisions § Opinions of writers ○ Nationality is a legal bond
having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties (pg. 345) • Problem: Which state
will represent him? Guatemala won't. So now that's why individuals are given the right for individuals to
bring rights on their own.
PRIL Page 55
Comparison of Citizenship from RP Consti
Monday, December 14, 2009
7:31 PM
PRIL Page 56
Talaroc v UY
Monday, December 14, 2009
8:07 PM
PRIL Page 57
therein. His honor the Judge noted that, while under the Roa doctrine (Roa vs. Insular Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil., 315), Alejandro D. Uy would be a Filipino citizen regardless of the nationality of
his parents, yet, he said this doctrine was abandoned in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, (79 Phil.,
249.), Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, (79 Phil., 249), decided with Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor and Villahermosa vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil., 541.
It may be recalled that in the case of Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, supra, the petitioner was
born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines on July 6, 1899, his father being a native of China and his
mother a Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country up to the year 1895 when he went to
China and never returned, dying there about 1900. In May, 1901, Roa, was then a minor, was sent
to China by his widowed mother for the soul purpose of studying and returned in October, 1910,
being then about 21 years and 3 months of age. He was denied admission by the board of special
inquiry, whose decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance in habeas corpus proceedings.
This Court held that Article 17 of the Civil Code "is sufficient to show that the first paragraph affirms
and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli." Citing various decisions,
authorities, and opinions of the United States Attorney General, it found that the decided weight of
authority was to the effect that the marriage of an American woman with an alien conferred his
nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the
husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts showed that
she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that where the widowed mother herself thus
reacquired her former nationality, her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her
nationality with the proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.
The Roa decision, promulgated on October 30, 1912, set a precedent that was uniformly followed in
numerous cases. The long line of decisions applied the principle of jus soliup to September 16,
1947, when that principle was renounced in the cases of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor and Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines cited in the appealed decision.
These two decisions are not, in our opinion, controlling in this case.
Article IV, entitled "Citizenship", of the Constitution provides:
1âwphï l.nê
t
PRIL Page 58
been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle of res adjudicata." Certainly, it would neither be fair nor
good policy to hold the respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship and
the Government had confirmed his Philippine citizenship on the faith of legal principle that had the
force of law. On several occasions the Secretary of Justice had declared as Filipino citizens persons
similarly circumstanced as the herein respondent. (Opinion 40, series of 1940, of the Secretary of
Justice. See also Opinion No. 18, series of 1942, of the Commissioner of Justice, 1942 Off. Gaz.,
September.)
Cut out of the same pattern and deserving of the same consideration is the proposition that
Alejandro D. Uy became a Philippine citizen at least upon his father's death.
It has been seen that, according to the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to
Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise and that there
after her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother's. This rule was not
changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until Commonwealth Act No.
63 went into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for
regaining Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such cases. It is to be noted that when
Commonwealth Act No. 63 was passed Ursula Diabo had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro
D. Uy had been of age 3 years, and that the new law carries the provision giving it retroactive effect.
This conclusions make superfluous consideration of the rest of the several assignments of error by
the appellant upon which we refrain to express on opinion.
The decision of the lower court is reversed and the respondent and appellant declared a Filipino
citizen and eligible to the office of the municipal mayor. The petitioner and appellee will pay the costs
of both instances.1âwphï l.nê
t
PRIL Page 59
filipina a ser ciudadano chino.
Alejandro D. Uy, de acuerdo con el Codigo Civil antiguo, es ciudadano filipino porque opto serlo al
llegar a mayor edad. Tambien es ciudadano filipino por dispsicion constitucional. Al votar en las
elecciones verificadas en el pais al llegar a la mayor edad, demonstro que quiso abrazar la
ciudadania filipina. La Constitucion dice asi: "Son ciudadanos filipinos: . . . (4) los que, siendo hijos
de madres de ciudadania filipina, optaren por esta al llegar a la mayor edad." (Art. 4, Titulo IV,
Constitucion). Bueno es hacer constar que existe error en esta disposicion: debe decirse "madres
de nacionalidad filipina" y no "madres de ciudadania filipina." La filipina que se casa con un
extranjero sigue la ciudadania de su marido; por el simple hecho del matrimonio pierde la
ciudadania filipina y se hace extrnjera: no puede continuar en la condicion de ciudadana filipina por
expresa disposicion de la ley, pero no pierde la nacionalidad filipina.
Por la razones expuestas, y no por otras, Alejandro D. Uy adquirio la ciudadania filipina.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I would rest the judgment in this case on the undisputed fact that the respondent was born out of
wedlock in Iligan, Lanao, on 28 January, 1912 of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father who were
married on 3 March, 1914 and that his father died on 17 February, 1917. He was a Filipino citizen,
became Chinese citizen when his father and mother were married and reacquired his original
citizenship on the death of his father, because being under age he followed the citizenship of his
mother who reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband and never remarried.
I do not agree to the proposition that persons born in this country of alien parentage or whose father
is an alien must be deemed Filipino citizens under and by virtue of the doctrine laid down in the case
of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Precisely, the judgment in the cases of Tan Chong
vs. The Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, 45 Off.
Gaz., 1269, holds that as the doctrine laid down in the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra,
is in conflict with the law in force at time it must be abandoned. Jose Tan Chong invoked also the
benefit of the doctrine in the Roa vs. Collector of Customs case. There is only an exception to the
rule laid down in the cases of Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs. The
Commonwealth of the Philippines, supra.
Labrador, J., concurs.
PRIL Page 60
Monday, December 14, 2009
8:11 PM
Though it is unclear whether or not the Philippines would have been within the scope of these laws, some authors and Supreme Court
justices later argued that the Philippines, as a colony would have been included as one of the “kingdoms” in that law:
Moreover, the Government of the Spanish Monarchy, in encouraging the multiplication of her subjects during the period of her glory and in
granting citizenship by birth in “these kingdoms” which were carried forward in the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, under the same policy of the
multiplication of her subjects, can have no other intention than to apply said law to the inhabitants of its dominions, colonies and territories
under its sovereignties.[2]
Another law of Spain which involved citizenship was the Order of the Regency of 14 August 1941. Some provisions stated that:
Foreigners who desire to gain Spanish citizenship should apply for it by means of an application filed with the Governor-General who was
empowered in the interest of the nation to grant or deny the same. Compliance with this Royal Decree has been declared absolutely essential for
the acquisition of citizenship with a view to acquire the status of a Spanish subject in the Philippine Islands prior to the change of sovereignty.[3]
The Royal Decree of 23 August 1868, promulgated specifically for the Philippine Islands, provided for the political status of children
of foreigners born in the Philippines. The following were considered foreigners:
First, the legitimate and recognized natural children of a father who belongs to another independent State, and the unrecognized natural, and
other illegitimate children of a mother belonging to another State born outside of the Spanish dominions; Second- The children specified in the
preceding paragraph, born in the Spanish dominions or on board Spanish vessels on high seas if they do not, on attaining the age of majority
fixed in the laws of the kingdom, elect Spanish nationality; Third- Those being Spaniards, acquire another nationality, as well by renouncing the
first as be accepting employment from another government without authority of the sovereign; Fourth- The woman who contracts marriage
with the subject of another state.[4]
Finally, there was the Law of 4 July 1870 – the “Ley Extranjera de Ultramar” which was expressly extended to the Philippines by Royal
Decree of 13 July 1870, and published in the Official Gazette on 18 September 1870:
Art. 1. These are foreigners: (a) All persons born of foreign parents outside of the Spanish territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanish
territory of foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not claim Spanish nationality; (c) Those born in Spanish territory of foreign
parents, or foreign fathers and Spanish mothers, while they do not make that claim; (d) Spaniards who may have lost their nationality; (e) Those
born outside of Spanish territory of parents who may have lost their Spanish nationality; and (f) The Spanish woman married to a foreigner. For
purposes of this article, national vessels are considered a part of Spanish dominions.
Art. 2. Foreigners who under the laws obtain naturalization papers or acquire domicile in any town in the Spanish provinces of the Ultramar are
considered Spaniards.
B. Treaty of Paris
To end the six-month hostilities between Spain and the United States following the declaration of war by the United States in 25
April 1898, Commissioners met in Paris on 1 October 1898 to produce a treaty that would bring an end to the war. The treaty was
signed on 10 December 1898 whereby Spain yielded possession of the Philippines, along with Puerto Rico, Guam and Cuba, to
the United States. The treaty tackled the disposition of the Islands ceded by Spain to the United States
Article IX of the Treaty of Paris defined those who were the citizens of the Philippines. The provision read:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject thereof
to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratification of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they may reside.
The civil and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories thereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.[5]
Under the Treaty, native subjects and Spanish subjects who did not exercise their option to leave the Philippines, but remained in
the country and adopted the nationality of the Philippineswere considered citizens of the Philippines. However, those Spanish subjects
who remained in the Philippines, but who declared before a court of record their intention to preserve their allegiance to Sp ain within a
year and a half from the date of ratification of the treaty (11 April 1900) retained their Spanish nationality.
PRIL Page 61
In the case of Bosque v. U.S., 1 Phil.88 (1908) it was held that the absence of a Spanish subject from the Philippines during the entire
period allowed by treaty for making a declaration of his intention to preserve allegiance to the Crown of Spain prevented the loss of
his Spanish Nationality by his failure to make such a declaration. It was opined that under the treaty it was necessary that he had a
residence de facto in the Philippines for the eighteen months following the ratification of the treaty.
A child under parental authority whose father did not take advantage of the right of declaration of Spanish citizenship as provided
for by the treaty also was considered a citizen of thePhilippines.[6] However, if the child had no parents or guardians in
the Philippines or Puerto Rico at the time the treaty was ratified, he would retain his Spanish nationality without the necessity of
declaring such to be his intention.[7]
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill defines who the citizens of the Philippines were. It stated:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except as such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the united States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight: Provided, That the Philippine legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Island who could become citizens of the United States if
residing therein.[9]
All those that were considered citizens of the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris were deemed to be citizens under the Philippine
Bill.
All those born after 11 April 1899 to parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in
the Philippines were ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. In effect the doctrine of jus soli, citizenship by place of birth,
which prevails in the United States, was extended to the Philippines.[10]
A woman of foreign nationality who married a citizen of the Philippines was also considered a Philippine citizen as she followed her
husband’s citizenship.[11]
Children born of Chinese fathers and Filipina mothers within the Philippines, with certain exceptions, were also citizens of
the Philippines. Even though the Chinese father and mother of the child were not legally married, the child was nevertheless
presumed prima facie to be a citizen of the Philippines, inasmuch as under the law he followed the status of his legally recognized
parent, who is his mother, a Filipina. If such children were taken to their father’s country during their minority, they still remained
citizens of the Philippines. However, if their fathers’ origin claimed them as citizens under the principle of jus sanguinis, they were
then considered as possessing dual nationality.
Children born in the Philippines of Chinese parents were also considered citizens of the Philippines.[12] A child born of alien parents,
who went to his father’s native land at a tender age and remained there during minority, on becoming of age, he should elect
Philippine citizenship if he desires to be a citizen of the Philippines. A failure to express such desire within a reasonable period of
time should be regarded as a strong presumption of his purpose to become definitely identified with the body politic of his father’s
country. [13]
Citizenship may be lost by the action of a person, either express or implied. Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation of one’s
nationality and allegiance by becoming a citizen of another country.[14] Actual renunciation may not be necessary in order to forfeit
citizenship; a mere absence for a prolonged period, without an intention to return may be sufficient. The rule of the Department of
State of the United States government was adopted, whereby, a continued residence abroad for three years, after attainment of
majority, produces a loss of citizenship, unless it is clearly proved that animus revertendi existed. Commission of certain crimes may
also cause the loss of citizenship[15].
As the above-stated provision is just a re-enactment of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill, all persons considered as citizens under the
former law were also considered as such under the Philippine Autonomy Act. However, it was only in the latter that the proviso,
also found in the Philippine Bill, providing for suppletory law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship was given effect by the
enactment of Act No. 2927 by the Philippine Legislature in 1920. The said law constituted the Naturalization Act of the Philippines.
PRIL Page 62
Under the law citizenship may now be acquired by the following groups of people:
a. natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof;
b. natives of insular possessions of the United States; and
c. citizens of the United States, or
d. foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the later country if residing therein.[17]
E. 1935 Constitution
In the 1935 Constitution, Filipino citizenship was defined, classified and regulated by Article IV, which stated that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of the Constitution, had been elected to public office
in the Philippine Islands
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.[18]
Those who were considered citizens at the time of the adoption of the constitution included those deemed citizens under the Jones
Law: “all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1989, and then residing in the
said islands, and their children born and subsequent thereto...” This was in turn a reproduction of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902.[19]
Those who were naturalized according to the Naturalization Law of Act No. 2927 (March 26, 1920), come under the scope of
Section 1(1). Under this Act, the privilege of naturalization was given to the following persons:
(1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens of the Philippines, because they were not living in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and
were not subjects of Spain on that date, not were they children of Filipino citizens born after that date; (2) natives of the insular possessions of
the United States, such as natives of Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands; (3) residents of the Philippines who were citizens of the
United States; and (4) residents of the Philippines who could become citizens of the United States under the American laws ifresiding there.[20]
As can be seen from the previous citizenship laws, the principle of jus sanguinis was not applicable prior to the 1935 Constitution.
Before Section 1, which considered citizens those whose fathers were Filipino citizens, the prevailing doctrine had beenjus soli. [21] By
recognizing the principle of jus sanguinis, it was recognized that a blood relationship would serve “as a better guarantee of loyalty to
the country of one’s parents”[22] than jus soli.
Section 1(2), at the time the Constitution was framed, was said to be inserted for the benefit of Delegate Fermin Caram of Iloilo.
Since Caram was born of Syrian parents and had not been naturalized, an “anomaly of the Constitution being signed by one who is
not a citizen” would have been an issue, if thus subsection had not been included. However, the Supreme Court has held that the
delegates would not have added such a provision without considering its effect on others.[23]
Section 1(4) contemplated a situation where only the mother was a Filipino citizen, and gave the child an opportunity to elect
Filipino citizenship only when he reached the age of majority. Prior to his reaching such an age, he at most has an inchoate right to
Filipino citizenship.[24] The provision is also applicable to mothers who were Filipinos before acquiring the nationality of their
foreign spouses. To restrict its interpretation in such a way that the time of election was considered controlling as to the status when
the mother should be a Filipina would have nullified the particular provision.[25] For illegitimate children however, this provision
would not have been applicable, since the citizenship of the father would not then be material, since an illegitimate child as a rule
follows the nationality of the mother.[26]
The right to elect is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 652, which states the requirements and procedure for election, and must
be express:
Option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be expressed in a statement to be filed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oath and shall be filed with the nearest civil registrar. The party elected must likewise accompany the aforementioned
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Where the party concerned resides abroad, he
must make the statement before any officer of the government of the Philippines authorized to administer oaths and must forward such
statement together with his oath of allegiance to the civil registrar of Manila.[27]
On the naturalization of non-citizens, Section 1(5) possessed great significance. Desirable aliens are welcomed, but a balance must be
created wherein the law “bars undesirables without unduly discouraging the worthwhile aliens desirous of becoming Filipinos.”
[28] Naturalization has been defined as the “legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that belong to a natural
born citizen. Naturalization may be obtained through a general law of naturalization applied through a judicial process.”[29]
F. 1973 Constitution
Article III, Section 2 enumerates the following as citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The purpose of the first paragraph of the provision was to protect the continued enjoyment of Philippine citizenship to those who
already possess the right as of 17 January 1973.
The Section 2(2) followed the principle of jus sanguinis. However, unlike the 1935 Constitution, Filipino mothers were placed by the
1973 Constitution on equal footing with Filipino fathers as far as the determination of the citizenship of their children was
concerned. The father or mother may be a natural-born Filipino or a Filipino by naturalization or by election. The only important
consideration here was that the mother must be a Filipino at the time of the birth of the child. It must be reiterated that this rule
applied only to those born of a Filipino mother on or after 17 January 1973.
As the 1973 Constitution followed the doctrine of jus sanguinis, it disregarded the place of birth of a person. As long as one was born
of Filipino parents, he was considered a Filipino. If he was born in a country where the rule of jus soli was the prevailing principle, it
would be a case of dual citizenship.
PRIL Page 63
would be a case of dual citizenship.
The Section 2(3) defined the status of individuals who elect Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution. Under the said
Constitution, a child born of a Filipina mother married to an alien was considered an alien unless he elected Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority. However, if his mother reacquired her Philippines citizenship during
his minority there was no need for election since by operation of law, he is a Filipino citizen.
Section 2(4) provided for a means by which even individuals, who were not Filipino citizens by virtue of birth or of Filipino
mothers, may become citizens of the Philippines through naturalization.
G. 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution builds on the previous Constitutions, but modifies provisions which cannot be found in the 1973 and 1935
Constitution. Those who were citizens during the adoption of the new Constitution were considered citizens. However, this does
not rectify any defects in the acquisition of such citizenship under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. “If a person’s citizenship was
subject to judicial challenge under the old law, it still remains subject to challenge under the new – whether or not the judicial
challenge had been commenced prior to the effectivity of the new Constitution.”[30]
The principle of jus sanguinis still applies, and in following the lead of the 1973 Constitution, the Filipino woman is placed on the
same footing as Filipino men in matters of citizenship. It is essential, however, that the mother is a Filipina when the child is
born.[31] The principle of parental authority is still applicable in the new Constitution, so this article only applies to legitimate
children, not to adopted or illegitimate ones. Mothers have parental authority over illegitimate children. Adopted children, on the
other hand, as they are not related by blood, do not follow their adoptive parents’ citizenship, despite being under their parental
authority. [32]
As for those who were born after the adoption of the 1973 Constitution of Filipino mothers, the 1987 Constitution still provides the
transitory provision that was also in the 1973 Constitution: “Those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.”[33]
Naturalization still remains one of the ways by which a person may acquire citizenship. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
natural born citizens:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens
In the 1973 Constitution, the second sentence was not yet included. Furthermore, even under the 1935 Constitution, it was not
settled whether the child of a Filipino mother who elects Philippine citizenship was a natural-born Filipino or a naturalized one. A
liberal view was adopted by the 1987 Constitution, based on the argument that the election retroacts to the moment of birth, since it
was such that gives him potential to make the election.[34]
However, if a person loses his citizenship and subsequently reacquires such citizenship, that person would no longer be considered a
natural-born Filipino but a naturalized one (whether under the 1973 or the 1987 Constitution). An exception to this rule is
reacquiring one’s citizenship through repatriation, where one regains one’s former citizenship.[35]
Section 3 states that “Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.”[36] The loss of citizenship is
governed by two laws, Commonwealth Act No. 63 (for natural-born and naturalized citizenship) and Commonwealth Act No. 473
(for naturalized citizenship). Under C.A. No. 63, citizenship may be lost: “through naturalization in a foreign country, by express
renunciation of citizenship, by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, by rendering service in the armed forces of a foreign country,
and by being a deserter of the armed forces.” Under Commonwealth Act No. 473, one’s certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if “found to have been fraudulently obtained, by permanent residence in the country of origin within five years of
naturalization, or when petition is found to have been made on an invalid declaration of intent, or upon failure to comply with the
requirements for the education of minor children, or if the person allows himself to be a “dummy” for aliens.”[37]
Reacquisition may happen either through naturalization or repatriation.
Section 4, which states that “citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission,
they are deemed under the law, to have renounced it,”[38] modifies the 1973 Constitution by “making no reference to sex... on the
chance that some country might have a law which divests a foreign husband of his citizenship.”[39]
In Section 5, the Constitution “recognizes the problem of dual allegiance, but leaves concrete ways of dealing with it to Congress.”
[40] The same may be said of dual citizenship, which is not contemplated in the provision, it being a “seldom intentional and perhaps
never insidious...condition that arises from the fact that Philippine law cannot control international law, and the laws of other
countries on citizenship.”[41] Dual Citizenship is covered by RA 9225, which provides that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their citizenship after taking the
oath mentioned therein.
As can be seen, though there had been changes from the Spanish Laws to the Philippine Constitutions, continuity has been
maintained. Each Constitution usually includes a provision to accommodate previous ones. Major changes include the transition
from jus soli to jus sanguinis in the 1935 Constitution, the equalization of men and women (fathers and mothers) as regards citizenship
in the 1973 Constitution, and the classification of children of Filipino mothers who needed to elect citizenship as natural-born, the
retention of citizenship upon marriage to foreigners, and the recognition of the problem of dual allegiance in the 1987 Constitution.
PRIL Page 64
[11] Martinez de Hernandez, 2 Porto Rico Fed. 519(1907)
[12] U.S. v. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917)
[13] Lim Teco v. Collector of Customs, 24 Phil 84 (1913)
[14] Roa, 23 Phil 323
[15] Id.
[16] THE PHILIPPINE AUTONOMY ACT § 2 (1916)
[17] MALCOLM, supra note at 8, 393
649-652.
PRIL Page 65
*Ma'am Beth's Crammed lecture on domicile
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
1:59 PM
Frivaldo:
Why is it that if he is naturalized, and even if he claims that he loses his citizenship, he can still not hold office…
Frivaldo 2: liberal interpretation, Taking oath (repatriated) retroacted to the time he filed a COC since law is not clear when citizenship requirement required
Common element ng other grounds: abandonment of allegiance to the Philippines by positive acts
On rendering service to the Armed Forces of another country: defend another state
Accepting a commission: apply with AFP: means you are ready to defend a country, and you won't offer your life to another country if you don't believe to the interest of
that country
LI Yao Case
-tax amnesty did not erase the fact that he did not have good moral character during the pendency of his naturalization proceeding
>>>opportunity to make up for their mistakes
Nottebohm Case
-when there are some issues which are to be determined by one's state laws, apply the law of the effective nationality
(weh..okay, my turn)
Kookooritchin Case
-stateless individual
…so better to follow the law of the domicile (where you live better provides conditions which are closer to you)
FPJ CASE
-political law - includes citizenship - does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children
DOMICILE
Merits and Demerits
Merits: person and particular state
-so how more appropriate? See under Kookooritchin
Demerits:
1. Should show factum et animus
Fact: physical presence
Animus
>manendi: intention to remain
> revertendi: intention to return - means that you're actually in another place
"by my watch it's not yet 2 o'clock so you're watch is wrong…my watch is expensive"
4 principles of DOMICILE
On domicile relative to purpose: depends on purpose
In re Dorrance Estate
-expression of desire to have a domicile in one state does not void the fact that he has performed acts (had a presence in the other domicile) and has intention to stay in
another place
How to determine intent if not by length of time? By the acts of the person
-not time per se, not motive (reason why you're in one place or another)
PRIL Page 66
-not time per se, not motive (reason why you're in one place or another)
-difficulty with acts: acts does not always correspond with words...
PRIL Page 67
CA 473
Monday, December 14, 2009
11:53 PM
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declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued.
The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education5 of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,
during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of
himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in
the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or
those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those
who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before
filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon
complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that
which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his
children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the
widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.6
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file
with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner,
setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the
place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her
arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of
the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act,
specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act;
that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are
citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also
set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must
be made part of the petition.
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the
duty of the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the
hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is
located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date
and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes
to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall
not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as
soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and
other pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of Justice,8 the Provincial
Inspector9 of the Philippine Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace10 of the
municipality wherein the petitioner resides.
Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any
election. The hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor-General, either himself or through his
delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the Commonwealth11 of the
Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view
of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the
disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied with all requisites herein established, it shall
order the proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization
certificate in the proper civil registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand
seven hundred and fifty-three.12
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seven hundred and fifty-three.12
Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to
the Supreme Court.13
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.—If, after the lapse of thirty days from and
after the date on which the parties were notified of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon
appeal, the decision of the court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, 14 and the said decision
has become final, the clerk of the court which heard the petition shall issue to the petitioner a
naturalization certificate which shall, among other things, state the following: The file number of the
petition, the number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed in
the presence of the clerk of the court, the personal circumstances of the person naturalized, the
dates on which his declaration of intention and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting
the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of the petitioner
with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, must be affixed to the
certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the following
oath:
"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Commonwealth 15 of the Philippines;
[and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of
America in the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; 16 and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
"So help me God."
Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court shall keep two books; one in which the petition
and declarations of intention shall be recorded in chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof
from the filing of the petition to the final issuance of the naturalization certificate; and another, which
shall be a record of naturalization certificates each page of which shall have a duplicate which shall
be duly attested by the clerk of the court and delivered to the petitioner.
Section 14. Fees.—The clerk of the Court of First Instance shall charge as fees for recording a
petition for naturalization and for the proceedings in connection therewith, including the issuance of
the certificate, the sum of thirty pesos.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each appeal and for the services rendered by him
in connection therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case,
he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the
the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be
forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Department of the Interior20 and the Bureau of Justice.21
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation
of the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.
Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify,
forge, change, alter, or cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and
assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate for the
purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or
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purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or
persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a naturalization
certificate in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in the case that the
person convicted is a naturalized citizen his certificate of naturalization and the registration of the
same in the proper civil registry shall be ordered cancelled.
Section 20. Prescription.—No person shall be prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense
implying a violation of the provisions of this Act, unless the information or complaint is filed within five
years from the detection or discovery of the commission of said offense.
Section 21. Regulation and blanks.—The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations
for the proper enforcement of this Act. Naturalization certificate blanks and other blanks required for
carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor-General,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 22. Repealing clause.—Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended
by Act Numbered Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled "The Naturalization Law", is
repealed: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any prosecution, suit, action,
or proceedings brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or existing before the
taking effect of this Act, but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts, things, or
matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed or amended by this Act are continued in force and effect.
Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.—This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, June 17, 1939.
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XI. Domicile
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
2:05 PM
A. DEFINITION
Domicile
-MUNICIPAL LAW:
*natural persons (Art 60, NCC): For exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations = PLACE OF
HABITUAL RESIDENCE
*Juridical persons (Art51, NCC):
GR: determined by the LAW CREATING OR RECOGNIZING IT
(if none): PLACE WHERE THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATION/PLACE OF BUSINESS
-CONFLICT OF LAWS:
*place with which a person has a settled connection for certain legal purposes
…either because his home is there
…or because that place is assigned to him by law
JUSTICE STORY: true, fixed permanent home and principal establishment and to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning
*Technical meaning:
(1) intention to make it one's domicile
(2) physical presence
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B. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF DOMICILE
MERITS
In common law countries
*satisfies the very purpose for having a personal law
*adequate basis to exercise rights and for the state to impose duties on him ( Lawrence v. State Tax
Commission)
In federal system
*law of the domicile is the law of the place where the individual lives
DEMERITS
1. Domicile is NOT ASCERTAINABLE W/O FIRST RESORTING TO THE COURTS TO ESTABLISH WON THERE IS
ANIMO MANENDI
2. Notion of domicile differs widely w/ some states distinguishing between domicile and residence or
attributing different meanings of domicile for different purposes
3. Same problem as attenuated connection in use of personal law
Instances when our courts refer to the domicile of an individual in order to determine his rights or
obligations:
1. Where litigant = alien (country follows domiciliary principle):
*Personal status
*capacity
*condition
*family rights
-determined by the law of his domicile
2. If it concerns stateless persons/ persons w/ dual or multiple nationalities
3. When an alien domiciled in RP executes a will abroad: law of the domicile governs the formalities of the
will
4. Revocation of will outside RP: validity of revocation follows law of the domicile of the testator (Art 829)
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Frivaldo:
Why is it that if he is naturalized, and even if he
claims that he loses his citizenship, he can still
not hold office…
Frivaldo 2: liberal interpretation, Taking oath
(repatriated) retroacted to the time he filed a
COC since law is not clear when citizenship
requirement required
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(assume that his application for repatriation was
already granted)
LI Yao Case
-tax amnesty did not erase the fact that he did
not have good moral character during the
pendency of his naturalization proceeding
>>>opportunity to make up for their mistakes
Nottebohm Case
-when there are some issues which are to be
determined by one's state laws, apply the law of
the effective nationality
(weh..okay, my turn)
Kookooritchin Case
-stateless individual
…so better to follow the law of the domicile
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which are closer to you)
FPJ CASE
-political law - includes citizenship - does not
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
children
DOMICILE
Merits and Demerits
Merits: person and particular state
-so how more appropriate? See under
Kookooritchin
Demerits:
1. Should show factum et animus
Fact: physical presence
Animus
>manendi: intention to remain
> revertendi: intention to return - means that
you're actually in another place
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Cf. CAASI v. COMELEC: what if Miguel lived in
Pangasinan since birth and intends to return
and stay there? Would his green card mean a
thing?
Ma'am: she became a Metro Manila Governor.
How could she have not intended to have her
domicile in Metro Manila then? Or else she
would not qualify as Governor of Metro Manila
4 principles of DOMICILE
On domicile relative to purpose: depends on
purpose
In re Dorrance Estate
-expression of desire to have a domicile in one
state does not void the fact that he has
performed acts (had a presence in the other
domicile) and has intention to stay in another
place
D. KINDS OF DOMICILE
3 KINDS:
1. Domicile of origin
2. Domicile of choice
3. Constructive domicile
*DOMICILE OF ORIGIN
-person's domicile at birth
-legitimate child: follow domicile of father
-illegitimate child: follow domicile of mother
*length of time and motive that prompted a person to change his domicile: irrelevant in determining
WON a new domicile has been acquired
-motive only relevant to gauge the genuineness of the intent to acquire a new domicile
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VELILLA V. POSADAS
-Moody resided in RP for 25 years, established a business
in RP, but had leprosy. Allegedly on the motive of evading
confinement in the Leper Colony, he stayed in India and
allegedly intended to stay in Paris (he actually stayed there
for 3 months for treatment in the Pasteur Institute) and
made a statement that he intended to not stay in the
Philippines anymore. He died in India, giving all his shares
of stocks to sister. Estate was being assessed inheritance
tax. Sister argues that no inheritance tax should be levied,
Moody not being a resident alien of the Philippines.
H: RP is his domicile. His 3 month stay in Paris and the fact
that no evidence was shown that he intended to stay in
Paris DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE INTENDED TO STAY IN
PARIS AND INTENDED TO ABANDON RP AS HIS DOMICILE
-here, his alleged "motive" of not staying in RP was
examined. However, motive is generally not made basis in
determining the place of domicile. No wrong or right
motive (court said that it would be a bad motive not to
come back to RP because he was going to be confined in
the leper colony, thus, he should not be allowed to use it
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court to decide this
Critiques to Moody's case: -why not India? No evidence that he intended to stay
1. ON intent of Moody to never live in Manila again: Isn't it sufficient to establish animo non revertendi? there. Though it was the place where he wrote the letter
2. WON justified to dwelve into motive of not wanting to live in Manila (i.e. evade confinement in Leper where he said that he had no intention to stay in RP
Colony) -in short: no evidence to show that he intended to stay in
3. On length of stay in Paris (3 months): Isn't it enough to comply with actual residence requirement to either Paris or India + short time of stay in Paris (25 years
acquire new domicile in RP vs. 3 months in Paris) which is also a deviation in the
general rule that the length of time is not an important
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-Court is conservative here, but then again, this is about
taxes
WHITE v. TENNANT
Facts: Mr and Mrs White lived in West Virginia but decided
to transfer to Pennsylvania, even selling their farm in West
Virginia, took all their properties and livestock, and
transferred to Pennsylvania. However, upon coming their,
Mrs White contracted typhoid fever so they went back to
West Virginia. Mrs White stayed in West Virginia but Mr
White tended to their livestock in Pennsylvania during the
day. Mr. White later contracted typhoid fever, and died.
WV law Pennsylvania
Wife gets all 1/2 to wife, 1/2 to siblings
-siblings wanted Pennsylvania law to apply?
a. MINORS or INFANTS
-follows domicile of their parent:
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a. MINORS or INFANTS
-follows domicile of their parent:
LEGIT: father
ILLEGIT: mother
AFTER DEATH OF FATHER: mother
AFTER DEATH OF FATHER, MOTHER REMARRIES: now, under A212, FC, even after mother
remarries, no effect on parental authority so minors still follow domicile of their mother
...BEFORE:Art 328 (1) provides that if widow mother remarries, she loses parental autorithy over
her kids) - kids retained the domicile they had before his widowed mother remarried until he
voluntarily changed it upon reaching majority age
-basis: parental authority
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*recent rulings of US courts on people under compulsion: they could now develop required unqualified
intention to establish his permanent abode in such place, i.e., to make the place where he was
compelled to stay his domicile of choice
-to hold otherwise amounts to curtailment of a constitutionally protected liberty of a person to choose
his domicile
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b. Married Women
-basis: unity of identity of spouse + gender-based presumption that the identity was determined by the
husband so wife follows the husband
-today: this is deemed archaic, invidious stereotype, gender -based discrimination = violates EPC
-in RP today: Art 69, FC: husband AND wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, Court
would decide. No need to follow the other spouse.
…but no new case over right of wife to establish her own domicile
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WON A CHINESE WIDOW WHO WAS ADMITTED TO AND ACQUIRED A RESIDENCE IN RP AS WIFE OF A
CHINESE MERCHANT (2ND HUSBAND) WAS ENTITLED TO BRING INHER MINOR CHILDREN BY 1ST
MARRIAGE? NO.
1. A man's domicile is also the domicile of his wife and minor children
Ration: he (husband) is duty bound to protech, support and keep them in his company
2. Tan Bon merely entered RP by virtue of the right of her husband. She does not belong to the privileged
class.
3. Since Go Chen and Go Lek are not children of the 2nd husband, they are not entitled to enter
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If this case decided using MODERN VIEW, dispense with any presumption that the wife's domicile is the
same as her husband's as each party establishes his or her own domicile completely independent of
each other.
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*PRIL January 5 lecture
Tuesday, January 05, 2010
12:02 AM
Review on Domicile
-domicile is permanent; different from residence
-establish Physical presence (may not be continuing) + intend to return/remain in such place
Kinds of Domicile:
1. DOMICILE of ORIGIN: domicile at birth (not place of birth)
Legitimate: father - but the father's domicile may not be the place of birth of the child - so domicile of origin is the domicile of the parent concerned at the time the child
is born
Illegitimate: mother
2. DOMICILE of CHOICE: animo et facto
-person should be of sui juris (capacity to act)
*minor cannot make a domicile of choice because no capacity to act yet. But in adoption, if the parent giving up the child to be adopted is a minor, nothing stated that the
minor parent is not capacitated SO LONG AS SHE/HE IS THE BIOLOGICAL PARENT!!!! (no requirement that the parent of the minor parent (therefore the grandparent)
would sign first - this is a special law that qualifies the special law on the capacity of minors to contract as stated in the Civil code)
VELILLA V. POSADAS
-Moody resided in RP for 25 years, established a business in RP, but had leprosy. Allegedly on the motive of evading confinement in the Leper Colony, he stayed in India
and allegedly intended to stay in Paris (he actually stayed there for 3 months for treatment in the Pasteur Institute) and made a statement that he intended to not stay in
the Philippines anymore. He died in India, giving all his shares of stocks to sister. Estate was being assessed inheritance tax. Sister argues that no inheritance tax should be
levied, Moody not being a resident alien of the Philippines.
H: RP is his domicile. His 3 month stay in Paris and the fact that no evidence was shown that he intended to stay in Paris DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE INTENDED TO STAY
IN PARIS AND INTENDED TO ABANDON RP AS HIS DOMICILE
-here, his alleged "motive" of not staying in RP was examined. However, motive is generally not made basis in determining the place of domicile. No wrong or right motive
(court said that it would be a bad motive not to come back to RP because he was going to be confined in the leper colony, thus, he should not be allowed to use it to
determine that he intends to leave RP). It's not for the court to decide this
-why not India? No evidence that he intended to stay there. Though it was the place where he wrote the letter where he said that he had no intention to stay in RP
-in short: no evidence to show that he intended to stay in either Paris or India + short time of stay in Paris (25 years in RP vs. 3 months in Paris) which is also a deviation in
the general rule that the length of time is not an important factor in determining the place of domicile
-Court is conservative here, but then again, this is about taxes
*if Abandoned old domicile (indicator: selling home) + en route to new domicile = new domicile is deemed to be the new domicile of the person (US COURTS)
WHITE v. TENNANT
Facts: Mr and Mrs White lived in West Virginia but decided to transfer to Pennsylvania, even selling their farm in West Virginia, took all their properties and livestock, and
transferred to Pennsylvania. However, upon coming their, Mrs White contracted typhoid fever so they went back to West Virginia. Mrs White stayed in West Virginia but
Mr White tended to their livestock in Pennsylvania during the day. Mr. White later contracted typhoid fever, and died.
WV law Pennsylvania
Wife gets all 1/2 to wife, 1/2 to siblings
-siblings wanted Pennsylvania law to apply?
WON the domicile of Mr. White is Pennsylvania, thus, its law would govern the administration of the decedent's estate? YES
-even if they stayed there for a very short period of time, since there was ACT (of staying in Pennsylvania and even selling all their properties in WV) + INTENT to abandon
old domicile and establish new domicile
*in RP, we're not that mobile. People all want to live in the cities so domicile is not really a problem for them
3. CONSTRUCTIVE
-governs:
*minors
*mentally disabled persons
*married women
-law provides what their domicile is
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CARABALLO vs. REPUBLIC
-Caraballo was a staff sergeant of the US Air force temporarily assigned in Clark Airbase. During his stay, he petitioned for the adoption of a Filipino child, but was
contested by the Provincial Fiscal, he being not a resident alien which the Civil Code requires.
H: Since he is a nonresident alien not qualified to adopt, he cannot adopt
-since he was temporarily staying in RP, his stay not from his own volition, he cannot be deemed to have established his domicile in Clark (RP)
-mam: the law does not provide that the adopter should be in his domicile of choice: as long as he has a domicile - the domicile which was assigned to him
In US CASES: more lenient - the person under compulsion could prove that even after compulsion, he intends to stay in the place where he is compelled to stay
MARRIED WOMEN
-in the Imelda case, court confused as regards residence and domicile
-married women are previously assumed to follow the domicile of the husband
-FC: both husband and wife decide on where FAMILY domicile should be.
DE LA VINA v. VILLAREAL
F: Wife left Husband who was adulterous, established domicile far from the family domicile and filed divorce there. Husband said that she should have filed case in the
place of family domicile.
H: Husband gave reason for the wife to establish her own domicile - adultery of the husband
-in US, no presumption that the wife and the husband are domiciled in the same place; dispense with any presumption that the wife's domicile is the same as her
husband's as each party establishes his or her own domicile completely independent of each other.
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CXI: PRINCIPLES ON PERSONAL STATUS AND CAPACITY
Wednesday, January 06, 2010
3:24 PM
A. DEFINITION
Personal status: general term
-includes both condition and capacity
-embraces:
○ Beginning and end of human personality
○ Capacity to have rights in general
○ Capacity to engage in legal transactions
○ Protection of personal interests
○ Family relations:
Husband and wife
Parent and child
Guardian and ward
○ Transactions of family law:
Marriage
Divorce
Separation
Adoption
Legitimation
emancipation
○ Succession
-taken from ROMAN DOCTRINE OF
Status libertates: freedom
Status Civitates: citizenship
Status familiae: position as head of the house/ free person subject to the pater familia
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BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)
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○
○
○
○
○
○
○
-
-
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If this case be decided now in RP: no absolute divorce: Divorce is considered violation of public policy. Therefore: courts could no longer try actions for divorce even if
brought by nationals whose laws allow it
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GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
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EXTINGUISHMENT: upon death
-declaration of death issued by a competent court is considered valid for all purposes
-effect of death: some of the rights and obligations may be extinguished, some may be passed on to the successors
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D. ABSENCE
-no uniform treatment
-steps to deal w/ absence:
1. There's a rebuttable presumption that a person is dead when he has been absent for a number of years
2. A person's unexplained absence is judicially investigated and established which results in legal effects similar to those of death
3. A judicial decree shall have to be issued declaring the person dead before legal effects of death take place
Summary of periods
GR: 7 years (for all other purposes)
X:
1. Succession
GR: 10 years
X: if lost when above 75 y.o.: 5 years
2. Special circumstances: 4 years:
a. On board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, not been heard of
b. On board a plane which is missing, not been heard of
c. Was in the armed forces and has taken part in war, missing
d. Has been in danger of death under other circumstances, existence not been known
3. For purposes of contracting a subsequent marriage
GR: 4 years
X: 2 years
WHY Shorter period? More modern means of communications
E. NAME
B4: not a problem because persons are free to assume a name and change it at will
NOW: determined by law, cannot be changed w/o judicial intervention
ART 364-366, NCC: rules that govern the use of surnames of legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated and adopted children; married women; separated and widowed women
-make distinctions between the right of women whose marriage has been annulled to use her former husband's name depending on WON she gave cause for the
annulment of the marriage.
ART 376, NCC: no person can change his name or surname w/o judicial authority
Some of the grounds alleged when the courts have allowed petitions:
1. Ridiculous or tainted w/ dishonor or extremely difficult to pronounce
2. Change is necessary to avoid confusion
3. The right to a new name is a consequence of a change in status
4. Sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality w/c unduly hamper social and business life
Change of name: personal law determines WON he could validly change name
F. AGE OF MAJORITY
-determined by one's personal law
-effects of emancipation:
○ Parental authority ceases
○ Now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life
Exceptions: A46, PD 603
PRIL Page 83
Exceptions: A46, PD 603
-RA 6809: age of majority lowered to 18 from 21 BUT parental consent still needed for marriages of couples below 21
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If Frank's Capacity to act is made basis in deciding this case, thus the courts would refer to his personal law - the law of Illinois - the case would be decided the same way
because in accordance with the law of Illinois, he is capacitated to contract
PRIL Page 84
*PRIL Lecture: January 7
Friday, January 08, 2010
12:45 AM
In PRIL: WON a person who has acquired capacity to act in accordance with his personal law can bring the effects of this capa city in other places
RECTO v. HARDEN
F: Mrs. Harden sought Recto's services to protect her interest in the conjugal property in preparation for a divorce proceedi ng in US. She won but on appeal, the SPS
mutually agreed to desist claiming from each other. Since Recto's AF's is 20% of Mrs. Harden's part in the conjugal property, he now contests the agreement. As a
defense, the American sps. Claimed divorce is not valid in RP, thus, invalid object of contract, thus, cannot be enforced in RP
H: RECTO can still recover. Object valid (not really for divorce)
Cf: Barnuevo v. Fuster - both are ruled before RP became a republic so DIVORCE
BARNUEVO v. FUSTER
F: Spanish couple wanted divorce in RP. RP court initially granted but husband contests it.
H: Even if RP can't grant divorce, since properties and the parties are in RP, the CFI has jurisdiction over them, even if su bject matter not w/n RP's power to grant
-shows LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION: laws of country with respect to the issue
Vs JUDICIAL JURISDICTION: what the laws of the country provide which court and what procedure should exercise jurisdiction
*Jurisdiction vs. Choice of law
*the court may have jurisdiction to hear the case but may apply another law (law of the parties - legislative jurisdiction)
*problem:
Beginning: depends on the personal law of the individual
E.g. if the transaction involves several international elements
-State A does not have conditional personality (requires actual birth for personality to attach). If a grandfather excited ove r the pregnancy of his daughter, and writes
in his will that the conceived child be given 1M, grandfather child
GR (succession): heir should be born alive
If child RP citizen: pede provided follow conditions
If child not RP citizen, law provides that should first be born to be a person: cannot inherit
NAME
Conflicts problem: if a Filipino citizen wanted to change his name, did so in another country and that country granted (but h e did not qualify under RP Law) - such
change of name is not valid
Silverio case: had sex change in another country, became a woman, wanted that her passport reflect her new sex, TC allowed ch ange - on appeal court did not grant it
(not looking on Constitutional grounds)
-in US: it's rather easy to change one's name (for as long as not to evade legal obligation)
-issue: name given to Filipino Children - follow surname of father if legitimate, follow name of mother if illegitimate
--but this depends if you're born in RP (even if your parents are Filipinos)
-In German: no middle name, then follow the surname of the mother - in courts: Absence of middle name allowed. Ma'am's case: court followed foreign law but
infused RP law…
Marriage…
-usually apply law of the forum: because marriage issues concern family and the law governing it shows the values of the socie ty
HELD: Child not legitimate - failed to prove validity of the Chinese marriage
P v. MORA DUMPO
-consent of father not acquired which was deemed an essential requisite of the validity of marriage
PRIL Page 85
P v. MORA DUMPO
-consent of father not acquired which was deemed an essential requisite of the validity of marriage
H: 2nd marriage not valid
If under FC - under formal requisites of marriage (extrinsic) - and under FC, if defects in formal requisite, marriage still valid
PRIL Page 86
P4: Choice of law problems; CXII: Choice of law in Family Relations
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
2:02 PM
Intro
*Mobility of people led to transactions and relations which are conneted to more than 1 legal system,
leading to interstate or international families
Legal consequences:
*validity of marriage
*personal and property relations between parties
*status and rights of children
Family Law
-reflects strong politicies of the sate anchored on values and mores highly held by its society
-one of the most complicated and sensitive areas to be dealt with in PRIL
A. MARRIAGE
Art1, FC: Marriage defined
-a special contract
-of permanent union
-between a man and a woman
-entered into in accordance with law
-for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
-It is the foundation of the family
-and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation,
Except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within limits
provided by this Code
AS A SPECIAL CONTRACT:
(1) entered by a man and a woman
(2) contracting parties must be at least 18 years of age
(3) solemnized by a person specially authorized by law
(4) a permanent union
unless one of the parties dies
Or marriage is annulled or declared void in special circumstances
(5) it cannot be abrogated, amended or terminated by one or both parties at will
(6) the nature and consequences as well as the incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation by the parties (will of the parties not paramount)
(7) violation of marital obligations may give rise to penal or civil sanctions (unlike ordinary contracts,
which at most could lead to action for damages)
Highlight:
• Solidarity of the family
• Importance of ffamily
• Paramount interest of the state in preserving it
Art26, FC:
"all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
In accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized
And valid there as such,
Shall also be valid in this country."
Formalities Capacity of the
External conduct required of the parties or 3p necessary to the formation of a parties to marry
PRIL Page 87
External conduct required of the parties or 3p necessary to the formation of a parties to marry
legally valid marriage (see it later)
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PRIL Page 88
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There may be instances where even if the marriage is allowed to be celebrated in accordance with the
law of the state (extrinsic requisites all complied with), the marriage is still void for lack of capacity to
the parties to contract the marriage (intrinsic requisites) in accordance with their personal laws. This is
allowed though because:
Examples:
CC:
1. Bigamous
2. Polygamous
3. Incestuous
FC (adds):
a. If under aged (below 18)
b. Bigamous/polygamous
c. Subsequent marriage after annulment/declaration of nullity w/o recording in Civil Registry and Registry
of properties the JUDGMENT, the partition and distribution of properties of spouses and delivery of
children's presumptive legitimes
d. Mistake in identity of contracting parties
PRIL Page 89
d. Mistake in identity of contracting parties
e. Psychological incapacity
f. Marriage is incestuous
g. Void by reason of public policy
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In RP:
1. At least 18 years old
2. Not barred by any impediment to marry each other
3. Consent freely given in the presence of authorized solemnizing officer
MATRIMONIAL CONSENT: parties are not ignorant that the marriage is a permanent union
PRIL Page 90
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Public Policy
Christianity: prohibits
*polygamous
*incestuous marriages (if the general consent of all Christiandom deems it to be such)
PRIL Page 91
GR: marriages which are manifestly incompatible w/ the ordre public of the state of which the parties
are nationals may be refused recognition.
X: the existence or non-existence of the foreign marriage is merely a PRELIMINARY QUESTION that
arises incidentally (issue does not profane the mores of the forum - tax, property, succession)
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IN RE DALIP SINGH BIR'S ESTATE (1948)
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Marriages Celebrated by a Consular Officer
ART9, Hague Convention on Validity of Marriages:
marriage celebrated by a diplomatic agent/consular official
…in accordance w/ his state law (State A's)
…shall be considered VALID
…as long as it is not prohibited by the state of celebration (State B)
If 1 party is an Alien:
Alien should comply with marriage requisites under his national law
Should submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issue by his diplomatic or
consular office
If it concerns Stateless persons/ refugees: instead of certificate from diplomatic/consular office, submit
an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such legal capacity to contract marriage
4. EFFECTS OF MARRIAGES
Personal Relations Between the Spouses
personal relations
*mutual fidelity
*mutual respect
*cohabitation
*support
*right of wife to use the husband's family name
--governed by NATIONAL LAW
If different nationalities:
GR: national law of husband
X: contrary to law, customs, good morals of the forum
ART 69, FC: Both husband and wife has right to fix family domicile
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2nd Restatement: Wife who lives w/ her husband has same domicile UNLESS special circumstances of
wife make such unreasonable
*critique: gender bias
PRIL Page 92
1. Both spouses are ALIENS
2. Extrinsic validity of contracts: property located outside RP (in State A) + contract executed in state
A
3. Extrinsic validity of contracts: property in State A whose laws require different formalities for
extrinsic validity of contracts + contract executed in RP
…generally follow lex rei situs (as stated in Article 16, NCC)
…as long as at least 1 of the spouses is Filipino (if both are aliens, then under exception!)
…PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY: even if the Filipino changed nationality after marriage, property regime
will remain unchanged - in accordance w/ ART7, HAGUE CONVENTION ON MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
REGIMES: the applicable law continues notwithstanding any change of nationality or habitual residence
PRIL problems:
• Recognition of the divorce decree
• Division of marital property
• Claim to custody of the children
• Provisions for the support of a dependent spouse and children
DIVORCE JURISDICTION: domicile of one of the parties (Matrimonial domicile): reasons why:
-divorce, being a matter of concern of the state, should be controlled by the law of the place w/ w/c the
person is most intimately concerned, the place where he dwelleth and hath his home
-substantial contact w/ relationship
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE: lex fori (determined by the law of the forum)
FOR ADDITIONAL CASES SUMMARIES, CLICK ON THE FF LINK (but once reposted on Blogger, these links
would need to be rechecked)
• San Luis v. San Luis
• Republic v. Obrecido
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PRIL Page 93
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PRIL Page 94
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WHO MAY CLAIM JURISDICTION *on Art 36: grounds during marriage, not during the
*place of celebration of marriage celebration of the marriage
*place of marital domicile
WHEALTON v. WHEALTON: even if court acquires only personal jurisdiction (not the place of celebration
nor the place of marital domicile?), the court may grant annulment decree
D. PARENTAL RELATIONS
LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD
-depends on the personal law of the parents
-usu: personal law of the father - and this is shared by many for "preservation of the stability of the
family"
INCLUDES
* Paternity -Civil status of the father/mother w/ respect to the child begotten by him (or her)
*Filiation - status of the child in relation to his parents
IN RP
PRIL Page 95
Legitimacy of child
-same nationality: national law of parents
-different nationalities: national law of the father (Art 15, NCC)
PRIL problem
2. Common law: usually children born w/n lawful wedlock are legitimate
-modified:
○ Offspring of invalid marriages may be considered legitimate (even if the marriage are invalid,
children born when their parents were together are still considered legitimate)
○ Offspring originally born illegitimate may be legitimated - subsequent marriage by parents or
recognition on the part of either or both
-problem: if parents (who are not married) have different personal laws, different rules govern as
regards legitimacy of the child
2ND RESTATEMENT:
Sec 287: LAWS GOVERNING LEGITIMACY
child legitimate if considered such under local law of the state where either
a. Parent domiciled when child's legitimacy is claimed to have been created
b. Child domiciled when parent acknowledged child as his own
Sec 288: INCIDENTS OF LEGITIMACY CREATED BY FOREIGN LAW
-same treatment by forum - forum recognizes the status recognized by the foreign law
E. ADOPTION
Def: the act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between
persons not so related by nature
-judicial act which creates between 2 persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and affiliation
-in GREEK, ROMAN and JAPANESE CULTURES: means of perpetuating the ancestor's cult threatened by
birth extinction - pamparami ng lahi! So usually adopted a male
Goals of adoption
B4: supply solace to those who had no children so that the void which exsited in childless homes may be
filed
NOW: extend to orphan or indigent child the protection of society in the person of adopter
PRIL Page 96
Upon separation of the parents,
X: A184: aliens w/ some relationship w/ adopted child GR: agreement as to custody would be valid
X: if they don't agree:
*RA 8552: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 *below 7: mother
○ ArtIII, Sec7b: aliens can adopt, provided: *above 7: best interest of the child, preference of the
Resided in RP for at least 3 consecutive years prior to time of filing application for adoption child
Maintains residency in RP until adoption decree issued
Submission of a certification from the alien's country w/c Question of Public policy question: Would an agreement
□ attests to his/her legal capacity to adopt between the partners be valid as to the custody of the
□ States that their law allows adopted children into the adopter's country child?
*these requirements may be waived when child to be adopted is a relative by consanguinity or There is no strong public policy on agreements as between
affinity of the adopter/spouse of the adopter parents as to custody of the child, provided that the child's
interest is protected (which is best protected if the child
*RA 8043: governs adoption by other aliens would have link with both parents)
-before this law, adoption was practiced pursuant to Rules and regulations on Foreign Adoption,
implementing Child and Youth Welfare Code… ADOPTION
GR: Law of the domicile of the child
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NOW: ADOPTION
Domestic Adoption law provides that ALIENS can adopt
Filipino children, provided
1. Resided in the Philippines for 3 years prior to the
application
2. Aliens reside in RP during the pendency of the petition
-problem: some aliens' stay cannot be extended…what if
the process is longer than their allowed stay?
…it usually takes long for adoption process
○ -benefit: magulo lang because there are many hearings but
○ it is easier to have children adopted here vs. Intercountry
○ adoption
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
-Filipinos permanently residing abroad governed
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EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
-governed by the law w/c created the adoption
-RP Courts: Adoption relates to civil right, does not affect changes in the political rights of the adopted
child including child's eligibility to acquire citizenship of adopter
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PRIL Page 97
PRIL Page 98
*Pril Lecture Jan 12
Saturday, January 16, 2010
2:31 PM
As to consent of parent: IN RP, mere part of validity of a marriage license - so any defect in it merely makes the marriage license
questionable but would not render the marriage void
PFR Review
*if there's defect in
>formal requisite: administrative remedy
>essential requisite: voidable
*if there's lack of essential or formal requisite: void
APT v. APT
-German nationals, one located in England and the other in Argentina. Marriage was by proxy marriage, celebrated in Argentina. Wife
in England contests the validity of the marriage. Court held that the marriage was valid in the place where it is celebrated, thus it
should be deemed valid wherever it is (here, the question was only as regard the celebration of the marriage - a formal requisite)
-physical presence of the parties during celebration of marriage: formal requisite
If this case was brought in the Philippines, Apt and Apt both Filipinos, how would the court decide the case?
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n )
*so Some argue that both the formal and essential requisite require physical presence of the spouses. So is it merely a defect or
absence?
Under Art 2(2): It requires presence just to show that consent is freely given - and not essential but merely a formality. You only have
to be present for a marriage to be done
…but there's not RP case on this and there's ambiguity as to how our laws were written so we could argue that proxy marriages are
allowed in RP
-BUT WHY HAVE A PROXY WEDDING if persons want to spend much just to have a wedding?
"You should know how to invent…"
e.g. If you're Catholic, you would want to give birth to a legitimate child so marriage first before getting birth…
IN RE MAY'S ESTATE
Uncle and niece got married under Jewish customs in Rhode Island, but were residents and domicilaries of NY. Upon death of the wife,
husband petitioned for letters of administration but their daughter contested the validity of their marriage, it being prohibited in NY
(but allowed under law of Rhode Island). Court used the case of Van Voorhis v. Brintall, where GR is that a marriage valid in accordance
with the law of the place where it is celebrated, it is valid everywhere. The two exceptions mentioned there not being present (i.e. no
positive law governing marriages outside NY + not deemed incestuous under natural law), the marriage was considered valid
Dissent: NY law made law to govern people w/n their jurisdictions _ only went to Rhode island to get married (applied modern
approach - more contacts w/ NY than Rhode Island)
-so allow people who can afford to go outside RP to contravene our law…pro-rich: EPC denied
If in RP: void for being against public policy
-where family relationships are protected
PRIL Page 99
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES
In RP: RP law applies to property relations of Filipino spouses
X: where aliens or where property located outside RP
-change of nationality of spouses does not affect the law that governs their property relations
e.g. If in RP, husband and wife should support each other
If husband became naturalized in a country where support is the sole obligation of supporting, there would have been a change but
under the ….
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO
-Tenchavez and Escano married discretely, Escano's family objected it so Escano still lived with her parents until she left for the US,
obtained divorce there, married a US Citizen, and later became a US Citizen. Tenchavez filed for legal separation and damages. Court
held that he has grounds for legal separation and damages, the 2nd marriage contracted by Escano being bigamous (adulterous). A
divorce decree between Filipinos deemed not valid in RP.
"On Housewife: not to be mean but they are not wives and they don't have a house"
REPUBLIC V. OBRECIDO
A former Filipina who allegedly was naturalized allegedly obtained divorce so Filipino husband filed a petition for authority to remarry.
Court did not grant such petition, failing to prove that the wife was indeed naturalized and obtained a valid divorce decree. However,
using A26.2, FC, naturalized Filipinos are considered aliens so can validly obtain divorce.
-ma'am: wrong. Should have used A15, NCC to validate the divorce since now, the naturalized citizen's national law is the law of the
state where he or she was naturalized, thus, if that state allow divorce, he or she could acquire divorce decree.
-J. Coquia: anti-rich ruling. Those who can go abroad, then be naturalized there, can validly obtain divorce decree.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custodyon
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of dministration8 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term"place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a personas
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return.They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
***
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule
in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December
22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xx x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added) Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st
spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly American citizen who divorced him, then remarried
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1awphi1
.n
et
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen .
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage ; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment
or for legal separation.*5+ Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[ 7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
.. .
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those Short summary: Filipino husband left by Filipina wife,
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. Filipina wife was naturalized as an US citizen then divorced
him. He now wants a declaration allowing him to remarry
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was again. Court held that A26.2 is also applicable to cases
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was where the spouse who obtained divorce decree is a
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides: naturalized citizen of a State allowing divorce, provided the
law allowing such divorce is proven + divorce decree
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the proven. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is remarry.
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. mphasis supplied) Facts:
-Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at 1981
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties -Villanueva left for US in 1986, bringing son with them
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was -few years later, Villanueva was naturalized as US Citizen;
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American sometime in 2000, Orbecido found out through son that
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A. -Orbecido filed PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY
RTC: granted it
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ -MFR filed by OSG: Art26 only applies to mix marriages, not
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26: in one where both are Filipinos even if the other one was
naturalized
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re -marry, while the spouses of WON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can. REMEDY? YES
-action constitutes Petition for Declaratory Relief which is
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. granted if the ff are present:
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
widespread consultation. ( mphasis supplied.) interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
Legislative Intent the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of --here OSG and Orbecido are adverse parties - one for
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to protection of marriage while the other against it; then it is
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after ripe for judicial determination because if Orbecido decides
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. to remarry, he may face litigation wherein the validity of his
2nd marriage may be questioned
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] WHY NOT ANNULMENT OR LEGAL SEPARATION:
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held -Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties -legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization? would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the naturalized alien spouse.
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of WON ART26.2, FC APPLIES TO CASES WHERE BOTH
obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under SPOUSES ARE FILIPINOS BUT ONE WAS NATURALIZED AND
Philippine law and can thus remarry. WAS ALSO THE ONE WHO OBTAINED DIVORCE DECREE?
YES, provided already naturalized at the time divorce
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that decree was obtained
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the -as was cited in San Luis vs. San Luis
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a Brief Historical Background
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry -On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the 26 thereof states:
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12] were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35,
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse 37, and 38.
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino -On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
Article 26. into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as amended, it now provides:
follows: ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
and in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage CPCP opposed Art26.2 because it was discriminatory
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife (against Filipinos whose spouses who are in abroad) and
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the because it is the beginning of recognition of absolute
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” divorce.
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Legislative Intent
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse. allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13] and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, or intent
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically *note: decisions cite Quita v. CA on the court ruling that A
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
capacitated to enter into another marriage. longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
NOTE HOWEVER that this is just an obiter dictum, as
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code recognized in this case.
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. TWIN ELEMENTS FOR APPLICATION OF ART26.2:
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on 1. There is a valid marriage that has been
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
HOWEVER, HERE, THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
No pronouncement as to costs. REMARRY GRANTED BY TC WAS SET ASIDE BECAUSE
OBRECIDO FAILED TO PROVE THE FF:
SO ORDERED. 1. Wife validly obtained naturalization
2. Foreign law allowing divorce
3. Wife validly obtained divorce decree
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairman
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[7] Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
[8] Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing
Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
[12] Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
[13] Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
[14] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
([2005V1161] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.,
G.R. No. 154380, 2005 Oct 5, 1st Division)
Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who
divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the
standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law
(can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently
provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However,
as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on
this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for
18 years in their Alabang residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S
ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence
at the time of his death)
2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be
applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff:
○ Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue
○ Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
1. Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed
2. Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law
Back to top
Article IV. Penalties
Sec. 16. Penalties. — (a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or carrying
out of an illegal adoption, in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more than Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200.000), at the discretion of the court. For purposes of this Act, an adoption is illegal if
it is effected in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or established State policies, its
implementing rules and regulations, executive agreements, and other laws pertaining to
adoption. Illegality may be presumed from the following acts:
(1) consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended by coercion, fraud,
improper material inducement;
(2) there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption;
(3) the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for adoption were not complied
with; and
(4) the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to danger, abuse and exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and
integrity of records, documents and communications of adoption applications, cases and
processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1)
day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not
more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated.
Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves two or
more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall merit the
penalty of reclusionperpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided shall be
in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under
other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. — Any government official, employee or functionary who
Short summary: Filipino husband left by Filipina wife, Filipina wife was naturalized as an US citizen then divorced him. He now wants a declaration allowing him to remarry
again. Court held that A26.2 is also applicable to cases where the spouse who obtained divorce decree is a naturalized citizen of a State allowing divorce, provided the law
allowing such divorce is proven + divorce decree proven. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Facts:
-Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in 1981
-Villanueva left for US in 1986, bringing son with them
-few years later, Villanueva was naturalized as US Citizen; sometime in 2000, Orbecido found out through son that wife obtaine d a divorce decree and remarried
-Orbecido filed PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY
RTC: granted it
-MFR filed by OSG: Art26 only applies to mix marriages, not in one where both are Filipinos even if the other one was natural ized
WON ART26.2, FC APPLIES TO CASES WHERE BOTH SPOUSES ARE FILIPINOS BUT ONE WAS NATURALIZED AND WAS ALSO THE ONE WHO OBTAINED DIVORCE DECREE?
YES, provided already naturalized at the time divorce decree was obtained
-as was cited in San Luis vs. San Luis
Brief Historical Background
-On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
-On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
CPCP opposed Art26.2 because it was discriminatory (against Filipinos whose spouses who are in abroad) and because it is the beginning of recognition of absolute divorce.
Legislative Intent
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it shou ld be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent
*note: decisions cite Quita v. CA on the court ruling that A Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry. NOTE HOWEVER that this is just an obiter dictum, as recognized in this case.
HOWEVER, HERE, THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY GRANTED BY TC WAS SET ASIDE BECAUSE OBRECIDO FAILED TO PROVE THE FF:
1. Wife validly obtained naturalization
2. Foreign law allowing divorce
3. Wife validly obtained divorce decree
Note: Please the Supreme Court rule for the procedures in domestic adoption.
Back to top
Article VII. Violations and penalties
Sec. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud,
improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the
name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
.Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall
cooperate in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein
prescribed and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity
of records, documents, and communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2)
years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it
involves two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking
and shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided, shall be
in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under
other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence
and perpetually excluded from entry to the country.
.Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of
the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the
above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules
and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
Immovable Movable
Lex situs: rights, May be:
interests of various • Lex domicili (mobilia sequuntur personam):they could be moved from place
person are determined to place, difficult to anticipate where they may be situated at a given time
by the law of the place • lex situs:
where the land is ○ Traditional reason: the state has the sole power to decide the validity
situated and effects of the transfer of property
○ Policy-oriented rationale: parties expect their transaction would be
governed by the law of the place where the property is located
• Lex loci actus (law of the place where the transaction was completed)
• Proper law of transfer: law of the state which has the most real
connections with the transfer
*January 26 PRIL Lecture
In RP: -volunteer daw
ART414: property is anything that may be an object of appropriation -in RP: lex situs for both movable and immovable properties (Art 16)
ART 16: irrelevant if real or personal property (as regards nationals) - lex situs applies Why: for simplicity and convenience
Problem: what if the place where the property is located distinguishes between rules applicable to
real and personal property and the applicable law is not their law? Difference if traditional reason or policy-centered approach?
Why RP adopted Lex Situs? Traditional approach: centers on the territory: since it is part of the territory of the state,
• Being physically part of the country, it [the property] should be subject to the laws thereof. it is the state's law which would govern
• The situs is the place most closely and significally related to the issue in question Policy-oriented: most significant contacts, state whose interest is less impaired
• Increase in the amount and variety of personal property not connected w/ the person of the owner, so
adopt lex situs even with movables. Other laws which may apply as to movable properties:
*lex domicili
B. CAPACITY TO TRANSFER OR ACQUIRE PROPERTY *Lex loci actus
-governed by LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED: LEX SITUS *proper law of transfer
*~*~*~
Anton volunteered to recite…ayaw ni ma'am. Baka kasi tangerine ang color scheme
nila. :p
*in Property: it's not the same, quite different (does not follow the personal law of the
person) = lex situs applies!
EXCEPTIONS
1. Transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the land
-lex intentionis or lex voluntatis
2. When transaction is merely an accessory to a principal contract
3. Succession
-personal law
*since it did not directly relate to the transfer of title, law of the place of contracting
applies
2. When transaction is merely an accessory to a principal contract (i.e. mortgage for a loan)
Apply: lex situs applies to the mortgage contract (thus, this is still not an exception) but law on
contracts govern the principal contract
On Movables:
Policy-centered approach: forum court not bound to look to the law of the situs when
*the situs is INSIGNIFICANT OR INCIDENTAL
e.g. place merely chosen for convenience of one of the parties, when they both know that the
property would be used somewhere else
RUDOW V. FOGEL: issue was WON the conveyance would result in a constructive trust among
family members all residing in another state (and not the title to the land)
>>>court applied the law of the domicile of the trustor and trustee instead of the lex situs of the
property
Divorce Annulment/nullity
After marriage At the time of celebration
Grounds depend on the law of the forum Grounds depend on ???
e.g. State A: specific grounds of marital fault
State B: No fault - can apply for irreconcilable differences
*on Art 36: grounds during marriage, not during the celebration of the marriage
Is there any provision in the FC providing that the FATHER should be followed?
YES. On property relations of spouses, on the parental authority
State A provides that the father shall have sole custody over illegitimate child (father's domicile)
while State B provides joint custody observed by both parents over the illegitimate child. H & W are
not married, had a child, lived in State B. Could W & H stipulate that upon death of W, H would
exercise sole parental authority and custody over the illegitimate child?
-on ma'am's initial question vesting custody and parental authority over the child: it's in the best
interest of the child
Question of Public policy question: Would an agreement between the partners be valid as to the
custody of the child?
There is no strong public policy on agreements as between parents as to custody of the child,
ADOPTION
GR: Law of the domicile of the child
X: law of the domicile of the adopter
NOW: ADOPTION
Domestic Adoption law provides that ALIENS can adopt Filipino children, provided
1. Resided in the Philippines for 3 years prior to the application
2. Aliens reside in RP during the pendency of the petition
-problem: some aliens' stay cannot be extended…what if the process is longer than their allowed
stay?
…it usually takes long for adoption process
-benefit: magulo lang because there are many hearings but it is easier to have children
adopted here vs. Intercountry adoption
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
-Filipinos permanently residing abroad governed
What if an OFW not permanently residing abroad wants to adopt in RP? What law would apply?
Ma'am: permanent residency is subject to the place of present residence of the person in question
Next meeting:
Intercountry adoption law
-procedure
-recognition of foreign judgment (if the adoption decree is issued by a foreign country) - look at the
Hague conference
-then continue with the next chapter
*MONEY
*DEBTS
-in this case: debt - follow law where the debtor can be found
*SHARES OF STOCKS
-found in the state where it is located - domicile of the corporation
>>>review in Capital Gains Tax!!!
Review:
Cf: Pennoyer vs. Neff: If personal actions, should give summons personally and not through
publication or else no jurisdiction over person of defendant
quasi in rem: (De Midgeley v. Ferandos: A quasi in rem action is an action between parties where
the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them or some interest therein.
Jurisdiction w as acquired because it w as a quasi in rem action, w here jurisdiction over the
person is not required and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of
complying w ith the requirement of due process.
In rem: w here the direct object is to reach and dispose of property ow ned by them. (i.e.
testamentary proceeding w hich is an action in rem par excellance)
2. SITUS OF MONEY
*cha: Only Checks were in the local branch, not money. Probably, the pleading prayed that
money, not checks were to be levied on or something. Boo… this case is labo
3. SITUS OF DEBTS
-still UNSETTLED in RP
-suggested that the law w/c governs the contract from which the debt arises should govern the
transfer of the debt
2 kinds of movable property:
1. Choses in possession: all kinds of TANGIBLE PHYSICAL OBJECTS
2. Choses in action: INTANGIBLE objects
a. Mere rights of action: debt arising from a loan
b. Rights represented by a document: capable of delivery, susceptible to negotiation as a
separate legal entity
•
•
•
FACTS:
PEBV:
-foreign corporation organized under laws of Netherlands
-though not engaged in business in RP, is the registered owner of TM Philips and PHILIPS SHIELD
EMBLEM under the Cert. of Registration issued by the Philippine Patents Office
-incorporated 1922 pa!
STANDARD PHILIPS:
-issued Cert of Registration on May 1982
PEBV, PHILIPS ELECTRICAL AND PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL filed a complaint for cancellation of
the word Philips from STANDARD PHILIPS' corporate name before SEC
COA: (1) prior registration with Bureau of Patents by PEBV; (2) prior registration of PHILIPS
ELECTRICAL and PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL with SEC.
-Standard Philips refused to amend its Articles of incorporation
So PEBV, Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial (Petitioners na from hereon) filed a petition for
issuance of writ of PI before SEC
COA: Standard Philips' use of PHILIPS amount to infringement and clear violation of Petitioners'
exclusive right to use the same, considering engaged in same business
ANSWER:
(1) PEBV had no capacity to sue;
(2) no similarity if considered in entirety;
(3) its products (chain rollers, belts, bearings, cutting saw) are different from petitioners'
(electrical products)
SEC: for Standard Philips (did not issue injunction); subsequently dismissed the petition itself for
lack of merit: Sec 18 applicable only when corporate names in question are identical - here no
confusing similarity at Standard Philps contain at least 2 words different…
-MR denied
CA: Reverse case (where it was held that when the other corporation's name constitutes a
dominant part of the complainant's corporate names, the former cannot be allowed to use it) not
for-square (di ba all fours?) with the present case because not involved in same business; unrelated
*two requisites:
(1) that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name;
and
(2) the proposed name is either:
(a) identical; or
(b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name
already protected by law; or
(c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.
ON ARGUMENT THAT OTHER COMPANIES ALSO USES "PHILIPS": So? The fact that there
are other companies engaged in other lines of business using the word "PHILIPS" as part of their
corporate names is no defense and does not warrant the use by Private Respondent of such word
which constitutes an essential feature of Petitioners' corporate name previously adopted and
registered and-having acquired the status of a well-known mark in the Philippines and
internationally as well
*As a general rule, parties organizing a corporation must choose a name at their peril; and the use
of a name similar to one adopted by another corporation, whether a business or a nonbusiness or
non-profit organization if misleading and likely to injure it in the exercise in its corporate functions,
regardless of intent, may be prevented by the corporation having the prior right, by a suit for
injunction against the new corporation to prevent the use of the name
RP vs. CA: American and his Filipina wife wanted to adopt the nephews and niece of Filipina wife. However, court held that since
the law requires joint adoption when one of the spouses adopting is an alien, and the said alien should thus also be qualified to
adopt, and here the alien is not qualified to adopt, then the adoption decree was not issued.
*this case was adopted using the FC
*if under the DOMESTIC ADOPTION LAW of 1998: ALIEN may adopt provided that before the filing of the petition, required to
reside 3 years before filing of petition plus residence until finalization of adoption (stranger adoption)
---however, there's a similar provision in the Domestic Adoption Law (related-persons adoption). What process does this serve?
Instead of requiring supervised child custody, if the alien is related, the adopter-alien could ask for a shorter period (and even a
waiver of the period - but still has to be a residence in RP for 3 years)
…if related, the importance of bonding between adopter and adoptee need not be established
Effects of Adoption
-grants the adoptee the same rights as the natural child
-is it required that the foreigner adopter's country would allow the adopted child to change his citizenship to that of the adopter's
country? NO
Intercountry Domestic
-socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino Child by *filipino citizen
*alien *alien w/ residency requirements
*filipino residing abroad
Procedure
-last resort: only resorted to if not possible that adoption be in RP - all possibilities exhausted in RP
-shall not exceed 600/year granted
-under Muslim law: no adoption
1. Adoption application
2. Filing w/ RTC/ ICAB…
3. Family selection and matching
4. Pre-adoptive placement cost
5. Supervised Trial Custody
6. Issuance of decree of adoption
Family selection/Matching
-on early decisions…?: not expressly provided that this must be taken, but it's recommended?
-child study: like a case study in the domestic adoption act
-purpose: make sure that the relationship to be created shall be for the best interest of the child, would work for the child' s welfare
-but since Domestic adoption considered first…after considering that domestic adoption is not in the best interest of the chil d, lipat sa intercountry - clearance by
ICAB
-adoptive parents mandated to fetch the adoptive child in RP (di pede padeliver ung bata)
-matching proposal: ICAB would determine if the adopter and the adoptee are compatible
RECOGNITION OF ADOPTION
-in compliance w/ Hague Convention of 1993
-contracting parties should recognize the decree of adoption, solely based on their being signatories to the Hague Convention
-may only refuse if manifestl y contrary to its public policy (public policy escape device)
EFFECTS
1. Legal parent-child relationship (as if child is a legitimate natural child)
2. Parental responsibility/authority
3. Termination of pre-existing legal relationship
-depends on the contracting state
-if terminated (between child and natural parents): child shall enjoy equivalent child
-if not:
a. Receiving state should permit it
b. Adopter should consent?
c. Child's consent
MA'AM:
-minimum age to adopt is 18…but in reality:
*late 20s
*at least 5 years marriage
*if less than 5 years: finding that they cannot conceive their own biological child (treatment to adopted child may change)
-16 year age difference same in intercountry and domestic.
-Difference w/ Hague Convention, there's a choice on where the decree is to be filed…
-but in reality, it's useless to file it w/ RTC because RTC would merely determine if the application is sufficient in form an d substance
-issuance of decree:
*the receiving state (the adopter's state) determines capacity of the adopting parents to adopt
*then matching done in RP
*then matched child's files sent in the receiving state
*~*~*~
Anton volunteered to recite…ayaw ni ma'am. Baka kasi tangerine ang color scheme nila. :p
*in Property: it's not the same, quite different (does not follow the personal law of the person) = lex situs applies!
EXCEPTIONS
1. Transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the land
-lex intentionis or lex voluntatis
2. When transaction is merely an accessory to a principal contract
3. Succession
-personal law
*since it did not directly relate to the transfer of title, law of the place of contracting applies
As to Exception # 2:
2 contracts:
Principal contract (loan)
Accessory contract (security)
"In the ideal world, your name should be worth something" - Ma'am Beth
EXCEPTIONS: the law DOES NOT CONSIDER here the property to be the main issue!
Family law: usually won't apply foreign law because family law would apply the law which reflects the values held highly by s ociety of the forum
Vs.
Contract Law: not much attachment to the societies moral mores; reflect business practices
Intrinsic Valitidy
-nature, content, effects of agreements
1. Lex loci contractus: protect jusitified expectations of the parties + stability of the laws which govern their transactions - whenever there are controversies, you are
encouraging uniformity, simplicity, convenience and predictability
2. Lex loci solutionis: law of the place of performance
*Ma'am: there's only an apparent conflict because regardless of what law would be applied, law of Canada would govern
What is clear:
Validity of the contract - law of the place of contracting forever! (problem: where is the place of contracting)
*ma'am on point that there's no conflict of law case: there's a foreign element so it's a conflicts of law case
-used layman's definition of conflict of law here
-issue of turf: the two cases shows how the court limits the agreement of the parties as to their choice of forum
-yeah sure, the jurisdiction is conferred by law; these choice of forum clauses is more of choice of venue because jurisdictio n cannot be subject to agreement of the
parties
*but if follow the choice of forum clause, it would appear that the court might not still recognize it even if it places SOLE LY, etc.
ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Arbitration clause: an agreement between the parties wherein the parties agree to undergo arbitration proceedings
PUROMINES case
-Arbitration clause provided that the parties should undergo arbitration first but the victim party filed suit in RTC
H: recognize validity of arbitration clause
ADHESION CONTRACT
-one wherein dominant party draft the contract
-why still considered voluntary: when the adhering party enters into the contract, he is presumed to have read and understood the terms of the contract and have
agreed to be bound by it (there's real consent on the part of the party adhering)
X: Sweet lines case: not valid: no choice, plus passengers usually illiterate (no freedom of choice really)
-in this case, gave additional condition to the company to ensure that the passengers would understand the terms of the contra ct
Undue advantage to one party (language…)
*you just accept the terms of the contract, w/o looking at the ticket
ENGEL vs. VELASCO: where telegraphic communications are followed by letters expressly referring to the telegrams and confirmi ng the same, such telegrams become
adminssible as part of correspondence between parties
Facts:
(note that in the book, seller was said to be the one who's supposed to open the letter of credit)
-Valderama (who is residing in RP) was to buy railroad equipment from Macmillan who is in Canada. He authorized his agent, Spl ane, to represent him before Macmillan in
buying the equipment (as evidenced by a letter)
-in their countract, Valderama was to pay by letter of credit and would pay the freight charges. Macmillan would take care of shipping the equipment
-Valderama failed to acquire Import License from the Import Control Commission
-Appellee was forced to cancel the freight engagement contract and incurred expenses amounting to $21,260.59
-Macmillan filed action to recover the sum he paid
-Defense:
1. Splane was not authorized to enter into the contract in behalf of Valderama, thus the contract was perfected in Manila upon h is receipt of the approval of his offer by
letter
2. He is excused from acquiring a letter of credit because he failed to acquire Import License
WON Valderama was legally excused from performing his obligation to secure a L/C? NO
*not in the digest but conclusion: Under RP Law (NCC): if the contract was not performed for reasons beyond the control of th e obligor (esp. if due to State action) then the
obligor is excused from performing the contract
-here, regardless if Lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis would be applied, Canadian law would be applicable
DISPOSITION: the failure of the defunct Import Control Commission to act on the appellant's application for import license ca nnot constitute a legal excuse for his failure to
perform his obligations under the contract
Facts:
-German Company Hamburg Amerika Paketfacht Actien Gesselschaft owned Samba
-French Company Compagnie de Commerce et de Navigation D'Extreme Orient procured the services of the German Company to transpo rt their goods from Saigon to
Europe
-However, there were rumors of impending war between European countries so German Company ordered the master of Samba to go to a neutral port (and not proceed to
Saigon, a French Port)
-Still, Samba proceeded to load cargo in Saigon and then obtained a bill of health to head to Manila
-Samba headed to Manila, stayed there. Goods of French company perished
-as a result, some of the cargo were sold and some were dumped into the sea
-French company now sues the German company for breach of contract in RP, praying for the recovery of the full value of the ca rgo
-German company filed a counterclaim for
1. freight due
2. Expenses for its maintenance
3. Wages of the crew
BUT alleged at the same time that RP courts did not have jurisdiction: Board of Arbitration in England was designated as the litigating body in the contract
*~*~*~
King Mau v. Sycip
Short summary: Although the contract was entered and to be performed in NY, agent sued for collection of unpaid commission vs. his principal in RP. Court held that they
had jurisdiction, the defendant being located here.
Facts:
-King Mau Wu is the agent of Sycip
-the agency agreement was executed in NY
-under the agency agreement, King Mau was made the exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of Philippine Coconut oil and its deri vatives outside RP and was to be paid
commission for it
-King Mau alleges however that he was not paid commission for the sale he caused between Sycip and Jas Maxwell Fassett so he c laimed in RP against Sycip
-Sycip's affirmative defense: the said claim was covered by a separate contract + it was already paid
(and although not mentioned, it was allegedly one of the contentions that RP courts have no jurisdiction because the contract was executed in NY and not in RP)
HSBC V. SHERMAN
Short summary: HSBC executed an overdraft facility w/ a Singaporean Company, with guarantees executed by its directors as security in case o f default. Since the company
defaulted, HSBC went after the directors in RP. As defense, the directors alleged that the contract stipulated that the any d ispute should be brought before Singaporean
courts. Court held that stipulation does not make Singaporean courts the exclusive court to have jurisdiction so RP courts ca n exercise jurisdiction.
Facts:
-HSBC granted Eastern Book Supply Service an overdraft facility in the amount of $200k Singaporean dollars
-as security in case the company defaulted, the directors Jack Robert Sherman, et al. executed a Joint and Several Guarantee i n favor of Bank.
-Company failed to pay its obligation
-HSBC now demanded that the directors pay pursuant to the guaranty but failed to do so
-thus, HSBC filed action for collection before RTC
Defense: RP Courts have no jurisdiction because of the clause in the contract w/c provides:
"We hereby agree that the courts of the Republic of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this gu arantee"
WON RP COURTS ARE DIVESTED W/ JURISDICTION BECAUSE OF THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE? NO
1. The parties did not stipulate that ONLY COURTS OF SINGAPORE, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL THE REST, HAS JURISDICTION
2. The clause did not divest RP courts w/ jurisdiction:
-Jurisdiction is the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things w/n its boundaries subject to certain exce ptions
(plus the fact that parties cannot agree on jurisdiction of the courts; jurisdiction is vested by law)
*~*~*~
Ma'am's comments:
*King Mau saying that there's no conflict of law: wrong because conflict of laws cases encompass all cases which have at least one foreign element
-thus, in that case, there was clearly a foreign element
-and there must have been only apparent conflict: RP, using the interest analysis approach, may have no interest in applying i ts laws. Thus, there's a false conflict and the RP
courts may exercise jurisdiction but should have applied the law of the interested state which is lex loci celebrationis
*2nd Restatement:
Facts:
-Puromines and Makati Agro Trade entered into contact w/ Philip Brothers Oceanic Inc for the sale of Urea in bulk.
-their contract provided that arbitration be done in Europe for any dispute arising between the parties
-The Urea was shipped but upon arrival to the ports of destination, the Urea was in bad order and condition, caked, lumpy and contaminated w/ rust and dirt
-Puromines and Makati Agro filed for complaint of breach of contract of carriage vs. Shipper and charter of the vessel.
-Philip's brother's defense: the arbitration clause in the bill of lading (contract of affreightment + sales contract) provide s that the parties first undergo arbitration in Europe
WON the dispute is arbitrable - thus subject to arbitration proceedings first? YES
(case discussed WON the contract between Puromines and Philip Brothers is a bareboat charter or an affreighment contract beca use Philip Brothers' liability would depend
on the contract entered. If it is a demise or bareboat charter, the shipper and not Philip brothers (which is only the charte rer) would be liable. If it is a contract of
affreightment, then Philips Brothers would be liable)
-whether the liability of respondent should be based on the same contract or that of the bill of lading, the parties are never theless obligated to respect the arbitration
provisions on the sales contract and/or the bill of lading. Petitioner being a signatory and party to the sales contract cannot escape from his obligation under the arbitration
clause as stated therein.
-also, the court already previously held (the case cited many jurisprudence) that arbitration was already held valid and const itutional
-RULE NOW:
GR: courts would look w/ favor upon amicable settlements and will only interfere w/ great reluctance to anticipate or nullify the action of arbitration
X: agreement absolutely closes the doors of the courts against the parties (contract void)
*~*~*~
Facts:
-Zapata (Houston Corporation) owned an ocean -going, self-elevating drilling rig Chaparral. It wanted the rig to be towed from Louisiana to Ravena, Italy.
-Zapata contracted the services of Unterweser, a German corporation, for the said towing
-their contract contained a forum-selection clause: "any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice"
-while the rig was being towed by Unterweser's deep sea tug (the Bremen), a severe storm arose which caused the rig to be seri ously damaged. The rig was thus brought to
the nearest port of refuge, which was in Tampa, Florida.
-Zapata sued Unterweser before Tampa courts alleging negligent towage and breach of contract
>Unterweser's defense: forum clause = MTD or forum non conveniens
-Pending Tampa court's decision, Unterweser filed action for breach of towage contract before the London Court of Justice
> Zapata contested London court's jurisdiction
>>London court conferred jurisdiction
>> Tampa court: denied MTD of Unterweser:
…forum selection clause is uneforceable, using traditional view that "agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are
contrary to public policy - will not be enforced"
*~*~*~
1912: NY Arbitration Law passed: arbitration contracts made valid, enforceable and irrevocable
Miller v. AIC: arbitration clauses no longer considered offensive to public policy
3. Adhesion contracts
PAL vs. CA
Short Summary: Mejia has asked PAL to ship her Microwave oven from SF to MLA but upon arrival, the front glass door was broke n and damaged. Mejia claimed for
damages from PAL but PAL disclaimed any liability, arguing that the claims were filed beyond the reglementary periods and no higher valuation was declared by the
passenger. The court held that although the air waybill was binding upon Mejia, the application of the provisions in the said adhesion contract should be interpreted by the
court based on equity and fairplay. In this case, PAL is still liable because of its indifference (failure to explain why the microwave glass was broken) and it cannot be
exculpated on pure technicality and bureaucratic subterfuge (on the reglementary period)
U V
In re Estate of Johnson
summary: Past case. This is the case where one of the daughters in the first marriage wanted to invalidate the will so that intestate proceedings may
instead be conducted (i.e. she will be an heir). Will was earlier probated, allegedly in accordance with Illinois law (TC judge took JN of the law just based
on an annotation), and is sought to be nullified on the grounds that it was not made in accordance with Illinois law and that the decedent is an RP
resident. Court held that since no Illinois law showed (to prove that it was indeed not made in accordance with Illinois law) and since what matters is that
the decedent is a CITIZEN of Illinois and since she did not contest the taking of JN of the TC of a foreign law w/o the proof required, then deemed admitted
that the will was in accordance with Illinois law.
Facts:
Emil Johnson (decedent)
-native of Sweden
-Citizen of US (Illinois)
-resident of RP at time of death
-made a WILL
>in RP
>holographic
>signed and written by him
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not conform with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippines, which required 3 witnesses)
-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will was executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois (he was a citizen of Illinois)
TC: declared the will to be legal and admitted it to probate (TC judge relied on Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in
vol.3 of Starr & Curtis' Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed, p.426)
--after will probated, her daugher from first marriage, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree, saying:
1. will was not executed in accordance with Illinois law
2. the decedent was not a resident of the state of Illinois
1. WON Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to wills of aliens residing in RP?
Section 636: authorizes probate by our courts of a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, when
such will is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which the testator is a citizen of subject, and which might be proved under
the law of such state or country.
-IT IS APPLICABLE: the "state" would include US, and the operation of law is not limited to wills of aliens.
-if Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of US and of the state of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippines,
provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under laws of the State of Illinois
U V
U V
Babcock Templeton v. Rider Babcock
Summary: A Californian citizen who resides in RP at the time of her death executed a holographic will which made principal beneficiaries the children of
Babcock Templeton. Brother who got something smaller (probably none at all - not clear from book) contests the validity of the will saying that she
did not acquire domicile in California (which laws would authorize RP courts to probate the will as a holographic will). Court held that it was the
decedent's intention to establish her domicile in California so California law would apply.
Facts:
Decedent: Jennie Rider Babcock
Beatrice Babcock Templeton (mother of 3 children who are principal beneficiaries of William Rider Babock (brother of Jennie)
the will)
• Jennie was a resident of California (though temporarily residing in RP) • Jennie never acquired domicile in California; or
• She acquired her domicile in California, and never lost it • If ever Jennie did, she lost it
Wanted the will probated in RP Contested the probate of the will (kasi di sha kasama/maliit part
nya)
"Will":
• Paper writing
• Testamentary character
• Not executed as a will under RP laws
• But alleged to be made in accordance with CALIFORNIAN Law (and both parties agreed that it may be proved in accordance w/ Californian law as her
holographic will)
-alleged to be authorized for probate under Section 636, Civil Procedure (see In Re Estate of Johnson)
WON Jennie, at the time the will was made, was a citizen of California (so that her will may be probated in accordance with California laws)?
YES
1. Citizenship: how determined here:According to 14th Amendment of US Constitution, citizenship of a person born in US is dependent upon the place of
residence or domicile of the person. - so it was essential to determine WON she had domicile in California
2. Jennie voted in California!Voting in a place is an important circumstance and , where the evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of
franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of his life does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which
he lives more than in the act of voting.
3. No evidence to refute the conclusion that Jennie obtained domicile in California
*since she is not a Filipino Citizen, she is considered an alien whose will is provable as the will of a citizen of another state or country
U V
U V
Cayetano v. Leonidas
Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US which did not leave anything to her
father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made her will, US laws would apply
as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything)
Facts
Decedent: Adoracion Campos
Surviving heirs:
• Father: Hermogenes - only compulsory heir
• Sisters: Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina
-Hermogenes executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion
-11 months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
- An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes:
• will in question is a forgery
• intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void
• even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him
- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests): confirms validity of will
-TC: admitted last will and testament, allowed probate inRP
- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief:
• withdrawal of his opposition was secured through fraud
+ motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
-TC: dismissed: failed to present evidence in support of it
WILL:
• Adoracion was a US citizen, a permanent resident of Pennsylvania at the time she made the will
• She died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister
• Made in accordance with Pennsylvania law, probated and registered in Penn. after her death
WON the intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of the will? YES HERE.
GR: probate court's authority is limited only to:
• the extrinsic validity of the will
• due execution
• testatrix's testamentary capacity
• Compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law
X: where practical considerations demand intrinsic validity to be passed upon
WON the will is valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime? YES
1. It was sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident ofPhiladelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
2. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent: law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. [Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code]
3. Pennsylvania law: no legitimes, testator could give away entire estate to strangers!
WON the will (which completely deprived compulsory heir of share) is against public policy? NO
-used Bellis v. Bellis: whatever public policy or good customs may be involved, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals
U V
C. Interpretation of Wills
-governed by rules of interpretation of decedent's NATIONAL LAW
Ambiguity...
GR: where terms clear and unambiguous, lex intentionis should be followed (A1370)
X: ambiguous: intention of the party or the exact meaning may be inferred by
• referring to the context of the instrument itself
• Referring to testator's contemporaneous and subsequent acts in keeping with the nature of the document
D. Revocation
Art. 828: will revocable at any time before the death of testator
>>>cannot waive or restrict right to revoke a will
Art. 829:
Revocation done outside RP + domicile outside RP: validity depends on:
1. Law of the place where will was made (lex loci celebrationis)
2. Law of the place where testator had his domicle (lex domicili)
Revocation done outside RP + domicile in RP:
1. Law of the domicile
2. Law of the place of revocation
Problem:
Testator domiciled in State A, already had a will. Revoked will in accordance with laws of State A.
Transferred domicile to State B, where revocation done in State A invalid. Died in State B.
Is the revocation valid?
Common law: apply law of domicile at time of death
RP: law of the place of revocation
E. Probate
-adjudication that the last will and testament of a person was executed with all the formalities required by law
-authentication of the will
-merely procedural: follow law of the forum
BUT: look at foreign law if suit made as to extrinsic requirements in the execution of the will
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto.
-wills made and probated in foreign country in accordance with laws of that country [Rule 77, section 1]:
• should be filed and recorded in the proper RTC
• Due execution and testamentary capacity of testator does not need to be proved again (note: sabi ni Sir B it should still undergo probate proceedings in RP)
Art 817, NCC (same ~ similar to Sec 636 of old CivPro rules): A will made in the Philippines
...by a citizen or subject of another country,
...which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject,
...and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.
Common law:
○ Movable properties: will admitted to probate valid at the last domicile of the testator as valid everywhere
○ Immovable properties: probate of the will in his last domicile does not affect the conveyance of land which is subject to lexsitus
U V
Suntay v. Suntay, supra
Summary: Decedent left two families. Surviving spouse presented alleged will, and so did his son from the first marriage (2nd will made in China, allegedly in
accordance with Chinese law). Court held that neither of the will could be probated as the Philippine-made will was not duly proved, and the allegedly
already-probated China-made will was not sufficiently established.
Facts:
Jose Suntay
-Filipino Citizen
-resident of the Philippines
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China
-left properties in RP, and a house in China
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd wife and child of 2nd marriage
-after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino) presented the alleged will of his father in Chinese Characters executed and signed by him in 1931 and that the
same was filed, recorded and probated in Amoy, China
-presented petition for probate of either the 1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931 will - both DISALLOWED
3. PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those in RP Courts
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices through personal service or service by publication
-so since no notice of the proceedings before Amoy, China that it was a probate proceeding, it cannot be deemed as a probate proceeding and is deemed as
merely a deposition or perpetuation of testimony
U V
Facts:
-Jose and Evelyn Cunanan lived in NY w/ 3 children (already naturalized, working as doctors). Jose executed a will wherein he bequeathed all the
remainder of the real and personal property "wherever situated" to his wife
-if ever Evelyn dies first, Jose's properties would go to his children and grandchildren upon his death, with his brother Rafael as trustee
-Evelyn also executed her own will. In both wills, it was stated that if the two of them died at the same time, it would be presumed that Jose died first.
-Sadly, the whole Cunanan family died in a fire in 1982.
-Rafael filed separate proceedings for the probate of the 2 wills (Jose's and Evelyn's) in NY
-both wills admitted to probate, letters testamentary issued to Rafael
-in 1983, Salud Perez (mother of Evelyn) filed a petition to reprobate the wills, asked that she be appointed the administratrix
TC of Bulacan: Approved the petition, made her the administratrix of the Cunanan's properties
Acts of administration:
• Motion praying that the proceeds of the insurance made by Jose in favor of Evelyn and their children be delivered to her
• Motion that Rafael be ordered to give her bank deposits and certificates amounting to about P38k
-Rafael contested proceedings in RP:
• Salud is not an heir
• Wills of Jose and Evelyn, who were both American citizens, were executed in accordance with the formalities of NY law
WON the wills of the Cunanan spouses may be made effective in RP? YES, provided follow rules of court!
1. When are wills executed by aliens abroad effective in RP?Art 816: if made with the formalities prescribed
a. by the law of the place in which he resides
b. in his country
c. By NCC
2. Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
a. Due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws
b. Testator has his domicile in the foreign country (not in RP)
c. The will has been admitted to probate in such country
d. The fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court
e. The laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
3. HERE:all except first and last were proven by evidence
4. Why need to present evidence of the contents of the foreign law? RP courts cannot take JN of foreign laws
5. Wills of the Cunanan Spouses should be probated jointly (but it doesn't mean that it's a joint will):
a. construe rules liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding
b. No Joint wills: the Cunanan spouses executed SEPARATE WILLS. Since the 2 wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property
which in all probability are conjugal, joint probate na!
6. NOTICE should have been given by Mrs. Perez to the other Cunanan Heirs:
• they are also heirs of Jose Cunanan
• As regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for
the first time
Disposition: Remand case, submit evidence necessary (under item 2, a and e) and give notice to the other heirs
F. Administration of Estate
1. manage and settle decedent's debts
2. Distribute the residuum of the estate to the deceased's heirs
Executor Administrator
When there's a person named in the will When there's no person named, or the person named unqualified
U V
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Inc.
Summary: mere excerpt to show the relevance of ancillary administration
Facts:
-Decedent: Idonah Slade Perkins - left 2 stock certificates covering 33,002 shares in BCMI
-BCMI Stock certificates: in possession of Country Trust Company of NY (domiciliary administrator of Idonah's estate)
-ancillary administration proceedings instituted in Manila: appointed finally Renato Tayag
-BCMI was compelled by the court to deliver to Tayag the Certificates. BCMI did not comply
WON Tayag (and not Country Trust Company of NY) is entitled to administration of the BCMI Certificate of Stocks? TAYAG as ancillary
administrator
1. No contest that ancillary administrator has control and possession of all assets of the decedent w/n the jurisdiction of the Philippines
2. An administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country
3. Principal vs. Ancillary administration:
Principal administration: that which is granted in the jurisdiction of the decedent's last domicile
Ancillary administration: any other administration
Why? A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) have any effect beyond the limits of the countryin which it is granted.
When proper? When a person dies leaving property in a country other than that of his last domicile
4. BCMI, as a domestic corporation, owes full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of lower courts.
5. The situs of the shares of stocks is here in RP [Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. CIR]
G. Trusts
-right of property, real or personal, held by one party for the benefit of another
-may be created by deed during the lifetime of the settler or by will
PRIL problem: When properties are located in places other than where the trustor is domiciled and where the trust was made - does the effect of that trust extend
extraterritorially?
• Validity
• Essential propriety of the trust
• Compliance with formalities
Choice-of-law provision: courts of the place where trust is being administered will normally apply the chosen law (carry out intent of the trustor)
>if none: follow the law that will sustain the validity of the trust
Testamentary trusts :: contained in a will :: follow the law of the place to which extrinsic validity of the will depend (usu. Lex loci contractus)
But since it involves properties: lex situs
In re Estate of Johnson
summary: Past case. This is the case where one of the daughters in the first marriage wanted to invalidate the will so that i ntestate
proceedings may instead be conducted (i.e. she will be an heir). Will was earlier probated, allegedly in accordance with Illi nois law (TC judge
took JN of the law just based on an annotation), and is sought to be nullified on the grounds that it was not made in accorda nce with
Illinois law and that the decedent is an RP resident. Court held that since no Illinois law showed (to prove that it was inde ed not made in
accordance with Illinois law) and since what matters is that the decedent is a CITIZEN of Illinois and since she did not cont est the taking of JN
of the TC of a foreign law w/o the proof required, then deemed admitted that the will was in accordance with Illinois law.
*Citizen in US is determined by the place where the person is domiciled
*Lower court relied on mere annotation - so wrong!
Holographic Wills
…
Babcock Templeton v. Rider Babcock
Summary: A Californian citizen who resides in RP at the time of her death executed a holographic will which made principal beneficiari es the
children of Babcock Templeton. Brother who got something smaller (probably none at all - not clear from book) contests the validity of
the will saying that she did not acquire domicile in California (which laws would authorize RP courts to probate the will as a holographic
will). Court held that it was the decedent's intention to establish her domicile in California so California law would apply.
-Issue: What laws should apply: NY law/ California law/ RP law
…go back to lesson of domicile: abandonment of domicile only when there's abandonment of old domicile
Cayetano v. Leonidas
Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US which did not leav e
anything to her father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made
her will, US laws would apply as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything)
Interpretation of wills
-apply NATIONAL law of decedent
GR on interpretation
a. If will clear, apply it
Revocation of will
Revocation done outside RP + domicile outside RP: validity depends on:
1. Law of the place where will was made (lex loci celebrationis)
2. Law of the place where testator had his domicle (lex domicili)
Revocation done outside RP + domicile in RP:
1. Law of the domicile
2. Law of the place of revocation (lex loci actus)
*but no clear reason why it's different. :(
*TIP in EXAM: apply the law of ______ (do not specify agad what law of the place would apply)
Probate
Suntay v. Suntay, supra
Summary: Decedent left two families. Surviving spouse presented alleged will, and so did his son from the first marriage (2nd will made in
China, allegedly in accordance with Chinese law). Court held that neither of the will could be probated as the Philippine -made will was not
duly proved, and the allegedly already-probated China-made will was not sufficiently established.
-this is a decision of a foreign tribunal. To give it effect in RP, show that the will was probated in a court which had juris diction
Tort
-derived from French word torquere [to twist]
-an act or omission producing an injury to another w/ any previous existing lawful relation of which the
act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident
Anglo-American Law Spanish
includes Malice and Willful intent Non-contractual negligence
-Art 20, 2176, NCC: tortfeasor
…one who, contrary to law, by his act or omission, willfully or negligently causes damage to another and
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
How to determine applicable law: specific policy behind substantive tort law should be evaluated in the
light of the needs of interstate and international systems
e.g. policy of upholding justified expectations of the parties
Minimize the adverse consequences of subjecting party to law of more than 1 state
Discouraging forum shopping
Achieving decisional harmony
*on Justified expectations: in torts cases, the parties to an accident could not have relied on a particular
state law since accidents are fortuitous (thus, no intent to have one law applicable eh di naman nya
plinano)
-BUT they may nevertheless have anticipated that they may be held liable for some future act and insure
against it
-Corp: may expect that the laws of the state where it had continuous and systematic business activities
to be applicable in particular circumstances, but no way of complying w/ various laws w/o
reincorporating in each state
>>>court should lessen adverse effects of applying laws of several states on parties
Conflicts torts
-when tortuous conduct and place of resulting injury different + one state imposes higher standards
than the other state
-when there's difference in product liability laws and varying judicial interpretations of extent of liability
B. LEX LOCI DELICTI COMMISSI (law of the place where the alleged tort was committed)
-determines the tort liability in matters affecting conduct and safety
-Rules w/c regulate conduct w/n state's borders: traffic rules, speed limits
-PROBLEM: when the acts which would produce the injury happens in one state but the injury happens
in another
*but regardless, the traditional view is that an actor liable by the lex loci delicti is liable EVERYWHERE
>vested rights: damages arising from torts committed in one state are actionable in another state
>limits:
• When the forum court's public policy or law is contravened by the proper law
• When the forum does not impose liability on said tortuios act - but this is not a violation of public
policy of the forum
-negligent conduct happened in Alabama (where Employer's Liability act allowed recovery from
ER), but injury incurred in Mississippi (where no such law in force). EE claimed before Alabama
courts.
-Court held in this case that if the infraction creates a right of action in the forum, then it may be a
COA in that forum and may be enforced even outside the forum provided comity allows it. BUT if
the injury was inflicted outside the forum, the forum's laws does not allow recovery and since
the local law must be ascertained to determine what the claimant's rights are, claimant has no
COA in the forum.
…ulit: if COA (i.e. injury) incurred in Alabama where it is actionable by law, then EE had a COA. But
since the Alabama law only applies in Alabama, if the COA was incurred out of Alabama then there
would be no COA. Injury cannot be claimed in Alabama.
U V
Summary: Loucks killed in Massachusetts by negligent act of Standard Oil's
employees. However, his heirs are residents of NY, so they brought action before NY
courts. NY courts now resolves WON the action may be enforced in NY using
Massachusetts law as COA.NY Court held that it was not against NY's public
policy to allow the enforcement of a right of action which was
granted by a foreign law to the claimants as they had a vested right which the
court should help protect.
Facts:
-Everett Loucks was a resident of NY
-he had a wife and kids, who were also residents of NY
-while travelling on a highway in Massachusetts, he was run down and killed through the negligence of
defendant Standard Oil Co.'s employee then engaged in its business.
-Massachusetts law allow recovery, so does NY law though not in the same terms
Massachusetts NY
If a person or corporation…by negligence of its agents or servants while Gives a civil remedy
engaged in its business…causes the death of a person who is in the exercise of due where death is
care…it shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than $400, nor more caused in NY
than $10,000...
+ Constitution, Art 1, §18: there shall be some atonement for the wrong - civil remedy where death is
caused
-Administrat\ors of Loucks' estate filed action before NY courts
WON Loucks' estate may recover in NY courts on the basis of Mass. Law? YES
The heirs have a vested right: though the source of the obligation invoked is a foreign statute which is
U V
C. MODERN THEORIES ON FOREIGN TORT LIABILITY
1. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP
-consider state's contacts w/ the occurrence and the parties:
Place where the injuries were sustained
Domicile of the victim/tortfeasor
Residence of the victim/tortfeasor
Nationality of the victim/tortfeasor
Place where the relationship of the parties are centered
-after considering state's contacts:
a. Identify the interested state
b. Evaluate the relevance of the contacts to the issue in question
-not mechanical counting of factual contacts BUT localizing the state of the most significant
relation and assess the event or transaction in the light of the relevant policy considerations of
the interested states and underlying policies
-
F: the parties, the car registration, the garage of the car, et al. where all in NY but the accident,
and thus the injuries, happened in Ontario. Mr. Jackson, as his defense, claims that since lex loci
delicti comissi is in Ontario, and Ontario law provides that liability only attaches if the negligent
party is a public transpo operator, he being not a trasnpo operator, he is not liable
H: Other than the place of accident, all of the factors connected w/ the case other than the place
of accident occurred in NY. Since the guest-host relationship was formed in NY and involved a trip
that commenced and was to terminate there, the court held NY to be the state of the most
significant relationship as far as the question of guest-host immunity was in issue
U V
PRIL Page 153
U V
Summary: A Filipina stewardess was attempted to be raped by fellow male
attendants who were Saudi nationals in Indonesia. The complaint for attempted rape
was filed but when she got in Saudi Arabia, Saudi authorities questioned her and
forced her to drop the charges against the two Saudi nationals. Before she left for
Manila, she was brought by ER to courts and made to sign Arabic documents (all in
the pretense that it was routine procedure in dropping case against Saudi nationals)
but was instead sentenced for adultery and other violations of Islamic laws and
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and lashes. With assistance of RP embassy, Saudi
officials (*I want to curse here but since this would be posted online, I better
not…WTF…) admitted they wrongly accused Filipina. Still, Saudi Arabian Airlines
terminated the contract. Filipina filed for damages against airline company in RP
courts, which Saudi Arabian Airlines contested, saying that RP lacked substantial
interest in the case. Court held that RP courts have jurisdiction since both the
plaintiff and defendant claimed reliefs from RP courts, and that RP law is applicable
since the injury is in RP and it is of no consequence that the other acts happened
abroad (then goes the long long discussion on PRIL)
Eto na formally...
Facts:
-Milagros Morada is a flight atttendant for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA)
-while in Jakarta, she
• Went to disco w/ fellow attendants Thamer and Allah (both Saudi nationals)
• Agreed to have breakfast at Thamer's room where Thamer attempted to rape her after Allah
excused himself. Rape was not consumated when hotel staff heard Morada's cries. Thamer and
Allah were both arrested
• Saudi government made the Indonesian authorities deport the 2 Saudi nationals only after 2 weeks
of detention
• She was transferred to Manila (note: this until the next two paragraphs are important)
-during one of her trips to Jeddah (1992), she was brought to the police who took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Her passport was returned only after she agreed to drop
the case against the 2 Saudi nationals
-In 1993, before she was to return to Manila, a SAUDIA officer brought her to Saudi Court to sign an
Arabic document, then later interrogated through an interpreter…all these with the assurance of
SAUDIA that it was merely routine procedure necessary to drop the charges against 2
nationals. INSTEAD, SHE WAS SENTENCED TO 5 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND 286 LASHES FOR ADULTERY,
GOING TO DISCO AND LISTENING TO MUSIC AND SOCIALIZING W/ MALE CREW, ALL IN VIOLAITONOF ISLAMIC
LAW (wtf?)
-RP embassy assisted Morada, eventually Saudi authorities admitted that she had been wrongly
convicted
-SAUDIA terminated her contract before she was allowed to return to Manila
-Morada filed COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES vs. SAUDIA
COA: Art 19 & 21, NCC
MTD:
U V
PRIL Page 155
U V
2. INTEREST ANALYSIS
-considers the relevant concerns that the state may have in the case and its interest in having its
laws applied on that issue
-Determine WON there's a true or false conflict
False conflict: if only 1 state has an interest in having its law applied and failure to apply the other
state's law would not impair the policy reflected in that law
True/Apparent conflict: if more than one state has an apparent interest in applying its law to the
case
-take a second look at the policies and interests of the concerned states
Cf.
In this case, there's only a false conflict:
Ontario law NY law
policy behind its guest statute:
• to protect the host from suits by ungrateful guests
• Protect insurance companies from collusive suits
No interest in applying its law when both victim and NY policy allows recovery to all persons
tortfeasor are non-domiciliaries and other contacts are injured even when its domiciliaries act
not in Ontario outside the state
*application of NY law doest not impair policies of Canada
U V
Summary: Driscoll Hotel illegally sold liquor to Sorrensen in Minnesota,
causing the latter to be drunk so that the automobile driven by him wherein
Schmidt was a passenger, turned over and thus caused injuries to Schmidt in
Wisconsin. MTD for lack of COA: the law does not punish acts the result of
which happened in another state. Court held that since all the parties involved
are residents of Minnesota and the violation of the respondent occurred in
Minnesota, its wrongful conduct was complete in Minnesota, the plaintiff, who is
also a resident of Minnesota, should be allowed to recover.
Facts
-Johnson Sorrensen was illegally sold liquor by Driscott Hotel Inc. (doing business as Hook-Em-
Cow Bar and Café) in Minnesota. (probably Sorrensen is a minor)
-Sorrensen became intoxicated before he left the Café.
WON Schmidt could recover from the Corporation for its illegal act done in Minnesota
when the injuries incurred by him happened in Wisconsin? YES
GR: the place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place. The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury (Restatement)
-since here, the place of the last event is Wisconsin but Wisconsin has no similar law such as that
of Minnesota Civil Damage Act, then Driscoll Hotel should have not been held liable
(but wait…there's more!)
IN THIS CASE:
2 wrongs to schmidt:
1. By Driscott hotel: sold to sorrenson intoxicating liquors in violation of MSA - there's no
tort law applicable but even if there was, there was nothing to support a claim that a
defendant ever consented to be bound by Wisconsin law
2. By Sorrenson: negligence caused the car to turn over - there might be wisconsin tort law
applicable
-however, both interest of Wisconsin and Minnesota would be ineffective if this would be
the case!
Wisconsin Minnesota
Afford remedies it deems proper for those injured Admonishing a liquor dealer whose violation
there as a result of foreign violations of liquor of its statutes was the cause o such
laws injuries and providing the injured party a
remedy under Civil damages act
U V
Ma'am: Schmidt illustrates imposition of liability under a substantive rule of tort law that has a
strong underlying admonitory policy
ulit!
-illustration of loss distribution: the guest statute of NY
-parties' domicile would be the issue around which the grant or withholding of damages would
center
U V
Summary: Californian citizen sued Taiwanese company for product liability,
allegedly because there's a defect in the make of the motorcycle. Taiwanese
company sued Japanese company (Asahi) for indemnification. Court held that
there was no minimum contact for the Californian court to exert jurisdiction
over the Japanese company for the claim of the Taiwanese company.
Facts
-Californian driver of a motorcycle lost control of his vehicle and collided with a tractor. As a
result, he sustained injuries and his wife, who was a passenger of the motorcycle, died
-Californian driver sued Taiwanese company, Cheng Shin, for product liability + death of his wife in
California Court
COA: accident was caused by a defect in the make of the motorcycle
-taiwanese company filed cross-complaint vs. the japanese company, asahi metal industry, for
indemnification
COA: Asahi was the manufacturer of the tire valve assembly which sold to Cheng Shin and
other tire manufacturers the tire valve assembly.
-Cheng shin and the Californian driver settled the case, so only the suit of Cheng Shin against Asahi
remains pending
-Asahi filed motion to quash the service of summons on them:
1. California courts could not exert jurisdiction over Asahi based on Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment (which provides that the defendant should have established by his
own acts minimum contacts with the forum state before the forum state could exercise
WON California courts could exercise jurisdiction over Asahi, a Japanese corporation? NO
1. What does the Due Process Clause require: that the defendant PURPOSELY established
"minimum contacts" in the forum state *
2. Are there MINIMUM CONTACTS?
A. Definition: some act by which the defendant avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities w/n the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws
-the acts should be by the defendant itself
B. The placement f a product into the stream of commerce, w/o more, is not an act of
the defendant purposely directed toward the forum state!
• What could have been considered purposeful acts of the defendant corporation:
Designing the product for the market in the forum state
Advertising in the forum state
Establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum
state
Marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum
• Awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the
forum state DOES NOT convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream
into an act purposely directed toward the forum state
C. Cheng Shin failed to prove that Asahi purposely did acts to fully avail itself of the
California market:
• No office, agents, employees or property in California
• No advertisement or otherwise solicitation of business in california
• No distribution system
• No designed product for California market
3. Due Process clause forbids a state from exercising personal jurisdiction on a Foreign
defendant when it would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice
-unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal
jurisdiction over national borders
-HERE: Asahi had to travel all the way from Japan to California and submit its dispute w/ Cheng
Shin in a foreign nation's judicial system when
Transaction on which the indemnification claim is based took place in Taiwan
Asahi's components were shipped from Japan to Taiwan
No demonstration that it is more convenient to try the case in California rather than either
in Japan or Taiwan
U V
Facts: Helicopter
• owned by English Corporation
• Manufactured by Aerospatiale (French Company), which sold its helicopters in Texas
• Serviced and operated by a Malaysian Company
• Crashed in Brunei, killing a Brunei resident
-widow of Brunei resident sued Malaysian and French company in TEXAS
Why: Texas law more favorable on products liability
+ higher amount of damages awarded
Defendants filed MTD based on Forum Non Conveniens
HELD:
1. Brunei was the natural forum for the Trial of the action
2. It would be oppressive for the plaintiffs (who were Brunei nationals) to continue w/ the Texas
Proceedings
3. French company would not be able to pursue Legal proceedings against Malaysian Company
(bakit?)
U V
Facts: Bier sued Mines de Potasse d' Alsac in Dutch courtalleging that the discharge made by Alsac in the
Rhine river caused pollution damage
-BIER: a Dutch Market gardener who used water from Rhine river to irrigate his field and nurseries in
Rotterdam
WON Dutch Courts can exercise jurisdiction in accordance w/ Art 5(3) of the Brussels
convention?
Cause of harm: in France
Effect of the cause: in Netherlands
U V
Summary: Volkswagen
Facts:
-Sps Harry and Kay Robinson are residents of NY
=The SPs bought a AUDI from Seaway Volkswagen (Retailer Corp), a retailer of Worldwide Volkswagen
Corp (Intl Corp) in NY.
-Both Retailer and Intl Corp are incorporated and are doing business in NY
-the sps incurred injuries allegedly due to the defective design and placement of their automobile's gas
tank and fuel system in Oklahoma.
-the suit was brought before OKLAHOMA Court against Retailer and Intl Corporation
>MTD: no jurisdiction, violates Due Process clause (as was discussed earlier in the Asahi Case)
>TC: denied MTD
Torts vs. QD
US: Torts include both intentional acts and negligent acts
Spanish: only negligence (no criminal intent)
RP: halo
Culpa aquiliana: no contractual relationship, no intent
DOLO: w/ intent
In determining applicable law: look at the policies of the states, uphold justified expectations of parties
*Tort is transitory
-if a person has already been held liable in one place, he could be held liable anywhere he could be found
*On public policy: even if there's not the same law, and they would not get as much, since the claim is not a
violation of NY's public policy, then the claimants should be allowed to claim!
*highlight FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY - meaning not just public policy since all laws are presumed to
reflect public policy of the state under which it was created
INTEREST ANALYSIS
-look at which state/s has interest to protect or enforce its laws
False conflict vs. True conflict
Babcock Case: Even if accident happened in ONTARIO, all the parties are from NY and Ontario has no interest
in enforcing their law in this situation
Critique: here, it involves the interests of private litigants and not the interests of the state in making the said
law!!!
-the state is encouraged to exaggerate it's interest
CAVERS
-only when there's true conflict in applying its own laws
-states what to do when there's a true conflict (there's two or more states who claim that their laws should be
applicable)
e.g. State of Injury's liability laws are stricter
State of conduct more lenient
What law would be applied: apply higher standard of conduct - thus the stricter law????
Summary: Driscoll Hotel illegally sold liquor to Sorrensen in Minnesota, causing the
latter to be drunk so that the automobile driven by him wherein Schmidt was a passenger,
turned over and thus caused injuries to Schmidt in Wisconsin. MTD for lack of COA: the
law does not punish acts the result of which happened in another state. Court held that
since all the parties involved are residents of Minnesota and the violation of the
respondent occurred in Minnesota, its wrongful conduct was complete in Minnesota, the
plaintiff, who is also a resident of Minnesota, should be allowed to recover.
-what policy Minnesota law wants to uphold: not to give drinks to persons already drunk and intoxicated -
Drunk Shop Act
-whenever special controls are imposed by law, the benefits and protections are extended even outside their
territories (aaah…un pala un…haha yey!)
Product liability
-arises from
• Negligence
• Strict liability
• Breach of warranty against hidden defects
Problem: differences in the laws of the states on the basis & extent of liability
…place of injury different from the place of tortiuos conduct - and there's difference between their product liability laws
e.g. food from abroad, causes injury here…
Summary: Californian citizen sued Taiwanese company for product liability, allegedly because there's a defect in the make of the
motorcycle. Taiwanese company sued Japanese company (Asahi) for indemnification. Court held that there was no minimum contact
for the Californian court to exert jurisdiction over the Japanese company for the claim of the Taiwanese company.
*on the allegation of Asahi that it did not foresee that their products would make contacts in US - so what could they have foreseen? They may have targeted
merely Asian Market
*Minimum contacts/ substantial connection: required by the due process clause of US
--"PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT": not just one person who brings it in the forum; they did not foresee that their products would be use d or reach a certain place
e.g. Item made of wool. The manufacturer of the RTW would not have foreseen that the wool would be used in a tropical country where it is impractical to wear
wool.
…product not just brought in
-what is a tire valve???
Summary: Volkswagen was sued by a taiwanese corporation for the damages caused by the taiwanese motorcycle ...
ACTA
-suit can be filed against:
1. Government official acting under colorable title
2. Private individual
3. State, if only it has waived its immunity from suits
4. Corporations
-far more success in filing suits against public officials (although they claim that these were under state
acts)
Defenses:
• Forum non conveniens
• Act of state
• No proximate cause (esp. in UNOCAL and Chevron)
ACTA: Both place of injury and place of conduct are not in the forum state; only connection is that the
defendant is there (and so is the plaintiff)
Critique: extraterritorial application of US law over conduct committed outside US
Time v. Reyes
-Time published an article wherein Ponce Enrile and Villegas were depicted as corrupt officials so the
two sued times in RTC Rizal. Court ruled that the venue where the case was filed was provided under a
special law - RA 4363 which should be followed (since they are officials of Manila, either in RTC of
Manila or the place where the article was published). On the argument that Times is not in Manila,
inconvenient to bring suit where they are, court ruled that the RP laws cannot extend its application
abroad.
If apply traditional approach: law of the place where the tort happened : place of publication: NY
If apply modern approach: Most significant relations: the plaintiffs is in Manila, the alleged acts imputed
on the two plaintiffs are in Manila, the effects are in Manila…harm of reputation in RP not in NY = so can
apply RP law
Exceptions
1. When the defendant is immune from criminal liability
2. When the crime happened w/n territorial waters but on board a foreign vessel
3. When the defendant is a Filipino, under the exceptions in Article 2, RPC
LIANG v. RP
-Liang accused Cabal of theft and even called her a b*tch! So he was sued for grave oral defamation.
DFA gave an office of protocol making him immune from criminal liability so lower courts dismissed the
charges. Court held: (1) DFA determination not binding; (2) ADB officers only immune if in official
capacity; (3) Slander (imputation of a theft) not an official duty; (4) Vienna convention does not make a
diplomat immune from criminal liabilities.
WYLIE v. RARANG
-"Auring" was accused in the memo of the airbase of criminal acts which led to the investigation of
Auring for the alleged crimes. Auring sued the officials of the airbase. Court held that the officials cannot
claim immunity from crimes because doing criminal acts is not deemed a part of official duty.
CRIMES COMMITTED ON BOARD A FOREIGN VESSEL even if it is within the territorial waters of the
coastal state
>as long as no disruption of peace and order - see Art 27
FRENCH RULE: only prosecute if against peace and security of the coastal state
ENGLISH RULE: if w/n coastal waters, can prosecute criminal even on board foreign ship
• is there an actual difference in deciding what cases may be heard by PHILIPPINE COURTS? None. It's the
starting point which is different. If it pertains to internal affairs of the ship, it is w/n the jurisdiction of
the flag state. It would only fall under the jurisdiction of the country of the coastal state if it affects the
peace and order of the coastal state.
US v. FOWLER
-Fowler et al. stole bottles of champagne on a foreign vessel in the high seas. Victim filed suit in RP.
Court held that the applicable law then, Act 136, only confers jurisdiction to RP if the ship is registered
an licensed in RP. Lawton is not so registered.
-RP cannot exercise jurisdiction in the High seas
P v. WONG CHENG
-Wong Cheng smoked opium in a foreign vessel in territorial waters of RP. Sued in RP. Court said that
since we follow the English rule, only triable in the courts of the country w/n whose territory they were
committed. Court acquires juridiction.
-smoking opium w/n territorial jurisdiction of RP: w/n jurisdiction? But no showing that there's many
opium, blah blah…? Apparently, they smoked opium in open view of everyone. Encourages everyone to
violate the law
US v. LOOK CHAW
-Opium was landed in Cebu upon boarding of RP investigators of the ship. Court held that generally
mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in RP, abroad a foreign vessel in transit, does not constitute
a crime; X: when the ship is landed.
UNCLOS
-Art 27
Criminal jurisdiction of COASTAL STATE not exercised ON BOARD A FOREIGN SHIP passing through the
territorial sea…
(d) if such measure are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances...
Extradition: unjust to not be able to punish an act done just because he is not w/n the forum's
jurisdiction
On rapists of children: "How can you be kind to them, they're not human beings."
-why is it that during the times of war, incorporation test is followed and not the incorporation test?
DAIMLER V CONTINENTAL TIRE: company incapable of loyalty or enmity so the qualities of its SH would
be made basis (during times of war, the corporation takes the characteristics of the SH who are running
and controlling it)
-business transactions cannot be subjected to whims and caprices of the SH who controls the
corporation
-can a foreign corporation acquire a different domicile from place of incorporation? YES
How about domicile?
IN NCC: if not stated, the domicile may be the residence of the corporation (place where it is doing
business)
For Thursday: we finish the chapter then additional cases for recognition and enforcement of foreign
NEDA: looks at WON a corporation has been used as a vehicle to circumvent restrictions of the
constitution
ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS
-occassional, incidental, casual
-not of a character to indicate purpose to engage in business
CRITICISM about estoppel rule: Foreign corporation allowed to recover even if it should not have been
granted relief by the RP Court
---so is there even corporation by estoppel in MLFI?
Both parties knew that MLFI did not have license in RP
So Lara's can't now alleged that it is not okay with them that MLFI did not have license
*trend today though is corporation by estoppel
FOR A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO BE DOING BUSINESS IN RP, IS IT REQUIRED TO HAVE ENTERED INTO
MORE THAN ONE TRANSACTION?
NO. rule is that even if the corporation has merely transacted an isolated transaction, if that transaction
is not casual (it is w/n their normal course of business) + intent to establish business in RP = doing
business
SPECIAL CORPORATIONS
1. RELIGIOUS SOCIETES AND THE CORPORATION SOLE: A corporation composed of a single entity
-how to determine nationality
Ung Siu Si Temple: nationality of controlling SH; the community who is the beneficiary of the
corporation sole
ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR of DAVAO: the community who is the beneficiary of the
corporation sole - not the nationality of the incumbent
*but if control test used, the incumbent who holds the money in trust is a foreigner so the corporation
sole would have had a nationality of the foreigner
*Ma'am: it should not be automatic - would depend