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*First Meeting (November 10)

Tuesday, November 10, 2009


10:26 AM

On recits: 4 to 5 recits per sem - if good, add .25 on grade


On absences: 4 maximum absences
-no finals if many absences (what's the point of taking the exam if you don't know anything)
-no midterms unless pumayag si ma'am
-not as strict as PFR…owwws….

Book ni ma'am ang resource material


-can read originals but ma'am's digests are sufficient
-additional cases if not in the book
-not per paragraph question
-review basic concepts in civil law - especially PFR
-can use laptop

On Thursday: first Chapter of Ma'am's Book on jurisdiction

PRIL Page 1
Part I&II: Intro & Jurisdiction
Thursday, November 12, 2009
8:16 AM

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I: SCOPE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: ITS NATURE, DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE

A. DIVERSITY OF LAWS AND CUSTOMS


-190 independent and sovereign states, and still growing
-each state have different legal system (own laws, own jurisprudence) influenced by
*religion
*customs
*culture
-with development in transportation and communication, interaction between nationals of states are
increasing
-division of world into many independent states with own laws + occurrence of events that contains
elements significant to more than 1 legal system = conflict of laws

-there were attempts to have a uniform law (by ASEAN) but because of principles of SOVEREIGNTY and
INDEPENDENCE, this may not be achieved
-attempts to have uniform law:
*1928 Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana: on PRIL
*Bustamante Code: uniform provisions on civil law, commercial law, penal law and law on procedure
(wehe so walang political law and ethics)
*creation of the Inter-American Council of Jurists by OAS in 1948 - but has not achieved anything
concrete
*1951 Hague Convention on PRIL: on family law, succession and products liability (3 lang to ah)

-PRIL confronts not only judges but also administrative agencies


-adoption/incorporation of principles of PRIL in municipal law is based on COMITY

HILTON V. GUYOT
f: 2 cases
CASE 1: Gustave Guyot (liquidator for French firm CHARLES FORTRICH & CO.) sued co-partners of A.T. STEWART &
CO. Henry Hilton and William Libbey (residents of NY) in FRENCH COURT for amount due to the French firm
Summary
Plaintiff: french
Defendant: american
Forum 1: France

Case2: Guyot sued Hilton and Libbey in US Circuit Court for the amount due based on the FRENCH JUDGMENT. US
CC held judgment conclusive, entered decree in favor of Guyot W/O EXAMINING ANEW MERITS OF THE CASE

-Hilton and Libbey now appeals: French courts gives no force and effect to the duly rendered judgments in US
Courts against French citizens SO US courts should also not give force and effect to French judgments against US
citizens

H: for Hilton and Libbey


GR: Law has only effect within territory of state
"No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. "

X: if there's comity of nations


"The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by
legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, DEPENDS
UPON what our greatest jurists have been content to call THE COMITY OF NATIONS"

COMITY
-neither a matter of absolute obligation nor mere courtesy and good will
-RECOGNITION WHICH ONE NATION ALLOWS WITHIN ITS TERRITORY
…OF THE LEGISLATIVE
…EXECUTIVE
…OR JUDICIAL ACTS
OF ANOTHER NATION,
HAVING DUE REGARD BOTH TO
...INTERNATIONAL DUTY
…AND CONVENIENCE
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS
LAWS

-application to the case: French only gives prima facie effect (not conclusive) on the judgment of foreign courts
unless that state has treaty with France
-France tries the case anew
-Prima facie evidence yung judgment iff:
*rendered by competent court having jurisdiction over COA and Parties
*upon due allegations and proofs
*opportunity to defend against them
*proceedings are according to course of civilized jurisprudence
*judgment stated in clear and formal record
-judgment may be IMPEACHED if:
*fraud or prejudice
*principles of IL and COMITY, it should not be given full credit

*it is usual that countries not give conclusive effect on foreign judgments, mere prima facie effect

DISSENTING: J HARLAN, BREWER AND JACKSON:


-apply res judicata and public policy that there should be end to litigation

B. DEFINITION
• Part of municipal law which governs cases involving a foreign element
• MINOR: those universal principles of right and justice which govern the courts of one state
having before them cases involving
...the operation
...and effect f laws of another state or country
• CHESIRE: part of law which comes into play
when the issue before the court
AFFECTS SOME FACT OR EVENT OR TRANSACTION
that is SO CLOSELY CONNECTED W/ FOREIGN SYSTEM OF LAW
as to necessitate recourse to that system
• 2nd ed, American Jurisprudence: part of the law of each state or nation
which determines whether, in dealing w/ a legal situation,
the law of some other state or nation will be
...recognized,
...given effect
...or applied

PRIL Page 2
...given effect
...or applied
• HILTON v. GUYOT: law concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation,
by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominion of another nation

PIL vs. PRIL


Category PUBLIC IL PRIVATE il
Applicability of ratione Relationships of states Relationship of individuals in their private
personae and ratione among themselves transactions which involve a foreign element
materiae
Sources of law A38, ICJ Statute: GR: from internal law of each state, NOT from
*custom any international law extraneous to municipal
*treaties law
*GPIL NATIONAL CONFLICT RULES: Internal law of
*juridical decisions each country
*teachings of most highly
qualified publicists X: if conflict governed by treaty
e.g. Hague Convention on the Conflict of Laws
relating to the form of testamentary
dispositions
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RULES:
*international conventions
*foreign case law
*commentaries interpreting these conventions
Persons involved *States *Individuals
*Internationally Recognized *Corporations
organizations
Transactions governed State to state Private transactions
Government to government
Remedies *Diplomatic protest *courts
*peaceful means of *admin tribunals
settlement of international
disputes:
>diplomatic negotiations
>arbitration
>conciliation
*adjudication by filing case
before int'l tribunals
*war

Municipal law vs. Conflict of Law rules in Municipal law


Municipal law Conflict of Law in ML
No foreign element present Involves foreign element

C. OBJECT, FUNCTION AND SCOPE


Object and Function
-provide rational and valid rules or guidelines in deciding cases where involved relates to more than one
jurisdiction
-protection of rational expectations
-stability and uniformity of solutions

ArtII (2), 1987 CONSTI: Recognize generally accepted principle of IL,


Adhere to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations

SCOPE: almost all subjects


1. Jurisdiction of courts
2. Evidence of proof of foreign law
3. Personal law of individuals and juridical entities
4. Naturalization law
5. Laws on domicile and residence
6. Family relations
7. Contracts
8. Torts
9. Crimes
10. Corpo law
11. Property law
12. International air transport (Warsaw convention)

CHAPTER II: A BRIEF HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS


A. ROMAN LAW ORIGIN
Roman Empire
Ius gentium:
-law of nations in PIL
-governs relations of States
-body of rules developed by the PRAETOR PEREGRINUS to resolve disputes between
Foreigners
Foreigners and Roman Citizens

Ius Civile: applied only to Roman Citizens

Italy
-Italy was divided into many city-states, each have own law - so they have conflicts of law problems
BARTOLUS (father of conflict of laws): formulated the THEORY OF STATUTES
-the theory of statutes was used by the Italian city-states to resolve conflict of law issues

STATUTES classification
1. REAL STATUTES (STATUTA REALIA): applied to immovable property w/n the state
2. PERSONAL STATUTES (STATUTA PERSONALIA): followed persons even outside his domicile, governed all
questions concerning
…personal status
…capacity
…movables
3. MIXED STATUTES (STATUTA MIXTA): on contracts - depend on where entered

16th century France


CHARLES DUMOULIN: method to determine what law would govern CONTRACTS BETWEEN DIFFERENT
NATIONALS
BERTRAND D'ARGENTE: PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL SUCCESSION

PRIL Page 3
Netherlands
BURGUDNOU, RODENBERG, ULRICH HUBER (first used CONFLICT OF LAWS): State was under no
obligation to apply foreign law UNLESS imposed by
…treaty
…COMITAS GENTIUM (Comity of Nations?)
…on consideration of courtesy and expediency
JOHN VOET: no statue, real, personal or mixed, can act by itself beyond the territory of the legislator nor
can it have any effect elsewhere against the will of the legislator of another state
-Territorial Principle:
GR: laws of every state may operate ONLY WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF SUCH STATE
X: may recognize laws of another country PROVIDED that it will not prejudice the subjects of the
sovereign whose recognition is sought
*Comitas Gentium (Comity of Nations) approach readily accepted
-most trans-jurisdictional disputes to be resolved by the application of IUS GENTIUM or IUS COMMUNE
Ius Commne: supranational law based on Roman Law, became continental European Common Law

-nations began codifying their national laws to include conflict of laws provisions:
*Bavarian Code: theory of statutes
*Prussian Code: theory of efficacy of contracts
*French Civil Code: pattern for Civil Codes of Spain, Belgium, and Romania: nationality principle
-adopted by RP: ART15, NCC

J. JOSEPTH STORY: Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws - territorial theory/comitas gentium approach
-territorial sovereignty, founded conflict of laws on the principle of comity of nations
-adopted by JOSEPH BEALE, American Restatement of Conflict of Laws, developed territorial "VESTED
RIGHTS" school of thought

FREDERICH CARL VON SAVIGNY: System of Modern Law - Situs theory


-advocated historical school of jurisprudence
-applicationof foreign law was not due to comity BUT the resultant benefits for everyone concerned
-founder of MODERN PRIL
-theory of situs/seat of legal relationship: every element of a transaction be governed by the law of the
place with which said element has the most substantive connection

PASCUALE MANICINI: Nationality as the Basis of Law of Nations- nationality theory(sortof Mixed
statute)
-nationality theory on
Status
Capacity
Private interests of the individual
-NEW THEORY OF PRIL

A. MODRN DEVELOPMENTS
*Neostatutists: when two or more independent laws are applicable to a conflict of laws problem, the
method so devised determines what law shall prevail
*Internationalists: there should be a single body of rules that can solve problems involving foreign
element
*Territorialists: law of the State applied to persons and things within the State, no foreign law should be
applied
-branch: only rights vested or acquired under a foreign law are recognized but not the foreign law itself
*2nd Restatement, William Reese: the law to be applied in a conflict of laws case is the law of the most
significant relationship
*CAVERS, CURRIE AND EHRENZWEIG: policy-centered approaches

Conflict of Laws in RP
-only when RP became sovereign state
In NCC
Art15: nationality principle
Art. 15. Laws relating to
*family rights and duties,
*or to the status,
*condition and
*legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a )

Art16(1): lex situs rule - from Art10 of Spanish CC


Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is stipulated.

Art 16(2): universal successsion -from Art11 of Spanish Civil Code


However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (1 0a )

Art17(1): lex loci contractus -from Art11 of Spanish Civil Code


*no significant jurisprudence on PRIL in RP
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have,
for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (1 1 a )

Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws,
their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (1 6a )

-in Law School:


*PRIL included in Curriculum at start of Law school (1911)
*PRIL included under Civil Law in Bar exams
*more transactions involving Filipinos abroad, increasing application of PRIL in the Philippines

CHAPTER III: SOURCES OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS


A. CODES AND STATUTES
-Conflict of Laws from Continental Europe - codified - so Civil Codes are primary sources of Conflict of
Laws rules
-principle of ius gentium: codified in Roman Codes

PRIL Page 4
-principle of ius gentium: codified in Roman Codes
-rule on Personal law: Code of Napoleon, followed by
*Codes of Netherlands
*Romania
*Italy
*Portugal
*Spain

In RP
Spanish Civil Code of 1888: enforced in RP Dec7, 1889 until August 30, 1950
-Conflict of laws provisions adopted by RP NCC
Code of Commerce of Spain: foreign transactions provisions - also enforced in Dec1, 1888

New:
1987 Consti: Nationality, Comity

Special Statutes:
1. Corporation Code
2. General Banking Act
3. Act Instituting Foreign Currency System in the Philippines
4. Philippine Foreign Law Guarantee Corporation
5. Act Regulating Retail Business
6. Anti-Dummy Law
7. Nationalization of the Rice and Corn Industry
8. Insurance Code
9. Protection of Intellectual Property
10. Patent Law
11. Tradesmark Law
12. COGSA
13. Salvage Law
14. Public Service Act
15. Civil Aeronautics Act
16. Philippine Overseas Shipping Act
17. Investment Incentives Act
18. Export Incentives Act
19. RA 7722 liberalizing entry of foreign banks in the Philippines

B. TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS


1. Convention on International Civil Aviation
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to international Carriage by Air - Warsaw
Convention
3. Convention on Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft
4. Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
5. UN COGSA
6. Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages
7. Convention on Traffic of Person
8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
9. Convention on Political Rights of Women
10. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children
11. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution
of Others
12. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
13. Berne Conventions for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
14. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
15. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
16. Hague Conventions on PRIL:
…personal status
…patrimonial family status
…patrimonial status such as agency and trusts
17. Convention on Recognition of Foreign Judgment on Civil and Commercial matters
18. Convention in Respect of Inter Country Adoption

C. TREATIESES, COMMENTARES AND STUDIES OF LEARNED SOCIETIES


European
Ulrich Huber, De Conflicto Legum Diversarum in Diversia Impecis
Mareas (di ba Manresa?), Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol
FK von Savigny, System des Beutigen Romishcen Rights, english translation by Guthrie
Andrei Weiss, Traite Theorique et Pratique de Droit International Prive

American and English


JH Beale, Conflict of Laws
DF Cavers, The Choice of Law Process
E. Cheatham, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws
B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws
A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws
HF Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
AK Kuhn, Commentarieson PRIL
A Gussbaum, Principles of PRIL
E Rabel, The Conflict of Laws
J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
F Wharton, Treatiese on the Conflict of Laws
GC Chesire, Private International Law
RH Graveson, Conflict of laws

American Institute
Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws
Second Restatement

D. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Graveson: this branch of law is more completely judge-made than almost any other

PART TWO: JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW

CHAPTER IV: JURISDICTION


Judicial Jurisdiction: power or authority of a court to
...try a case
…render judgment
…and execute it in accordance with law
Legislative jurisdiction: ability of the state to
…promulgate laws
…enforce them

PRIL Page 5
…enforce them
On all persons and property within its territory

Four major questions:


1. Has the court JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF DEFENDANT OR HIS PROPERTY
2. Has the court JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER/competency
3. Has the suit been brought in the PROPER VENUE in cases where a foreign element is involved
4. Is there a STATUTE OR DOCTRINE under which a court otherwise qualified to try the case may or may
not refuse to entertain it (FORUM NON CONVENIENS)

A. BASIS OF EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION


1. Jurisdiciton over the person (FORUM-DEFENDANT CONTACTS)
2. Jurisdiction over the res (FORUM-PROPERTY CONTACTS)
3. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter

NOTE: Forum = place where the judicial jurisdiction is sought to be exercised


Notes from CIVPRO LEONEN
Venue (R4) Summons (R14)
Real Actions: action affecting title to or possession of real property or Action in Rem: Actions, the judgment of which affects the whole
any interest therein world.
Personal Actions: all other actions Action in Personam: Actions, the judgment of which affects only the
parties to the action

HOW SERVED
Action in personam Action in rem
Natural persons 1. personal service 1. personal service (see left)
-defendant who may be: -deliver summons + copy of complaint to defendant 2. substituted service
1. defendant -tender summons + copy of complaint 3. extraterritorial service
2. prisoner 2. substituted service -only for the following situations: actions involve
3. entity w/o juridical -only resorted to when: a. personal status of plaintiff
personality a. justifiable causes b. relates to, or the subject of w/c, is property w/n RP in
4. minors and incompetents b. cannot serve defendant w/n reasonable time w/c defendant has claim or lien, actual or contingent
5. resident temporarily out of c. all reasonable diligent efforts have been exerted c. relief demanded consists of excluding the defendant
RP -HOW: leave copies at from any interest in the property in RP
6. defendant cannot be found *defendant’s residence: person then residing d. property of defendant in RP attached w/n RP
+ does not reside in RP therein w/sufficient age and discretion
7. defendant unknown *OR office/regular place of business: person in
charge thereof

FOR 7 (unknown defendant)


-w/leave of court, service by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation
FOR 5 and 6 – extraterritorial service
-w/leave of court
1. personal service outside RP
2. by publication + send through registered mail to
the last known address the copy of the summons
3. any manner the court deems sufficient

Juridical persons
1. DOMESTIC CORP (corporations, partnership, 1. personal service on (6 persons only – Service by publication?
association organized under RP Laws) list exclusive): Extraterritorial? But domestic nga eh so din a
a. President sha nonresident+not found in RP
b. GM
c. Managing Partner
d. Corporate Secretary
e. Corporate Treasurer
f. In house counsel
- no substituted service!
2. FPJE Personal service ON (successive) Extraterritorial service
1. resident agent designated in
accordance w/law
2. government official designated by
law
3. any of the officers or agents w/n
RP
3. Public Corp RP: Solgen Hmmm…
LGU: executive head, other officer/s as
law or court may direct

Notes from CIVPRO AVENA

Nature of Actions

1. As to SUBJECT MATTER

Real Action Action brought for the protection of real rights, land, tenements or hereditaments or
one founded on privity of estate only (accion reivindicatoria)
Personal Action which is not founded upon privity of real rights or real property (action for a sum
Action of money)
Mixed Action Actions brought for protection or recovery of real property and also for award for
damages sustained.

Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena


Personal Action – action against personal property
Real Action – action on real property
Action in Personam – action against a person
Action in Rem – action against a thing.

2. As to their BINDING EFFECT

Action in One which is not directed only against a particular persons but against the thing itself
Rem and the object of which is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection against the right sought to be enforced (judgment which is binding to the
whole world)
Action in One which is directed against particular persons on the basis of their personal liability to
Personam establish a claim against them and the judgment wherein is binding only upon the
parties impleaded or their successors in interest
Action One directed against particular persons but the purpose of which is to bar and bind not
Quasi in only said persons but any other person who claims any interest in the property or right
Rem subject of the suit.

De Midgely v. Ferandos
A quasi in rem action is an action betw een parties w here the direct object is to reach and
dispose of property ow ned by them or some interest therein. Jurisdiction w as acquired because
it w as a quasi in rem action, w here jurisdiction over the person is not required and w here the
service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying w ith the requirement of due
process.

1. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON (in personam Jurisdiction)


Generally
a. Voluntary appearance

PRIL Page 6
a. Voluntary appearance
b. Submission to authority

OVER THE PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF


-when plaintiff invokes the aid of the court by filling a suit

OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT


1. Enters appearance
GR: appearance of defendant or lawyer - gives consent for the forum's exercise of jurisdiction over
him
X: Special appearance for the purpose of protesting the jurisdiction of the court

2. If non-resident who is initially the plaintiff: if counterclaim filed against him, he is already
deemed to be under the court's exercise of jurisdiction

3. Served with the legal process within the state: SERVICE OF SUMMONS (RULE 14, ROC)
Section 6: PERSONAL SERVICE
-handing him a copy
-tendering him a copy if he refuses

Section 7: Substituted Service


-for justifiable causes, defendant cannot be served w/n reasonable time personally
a. Residence: with some person of SUITABLE AGE and DISCRETION THEN RESIDING THEREIN
b. OFFICE/ REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS: competent person in charge thereof

Section 12: Service upon Foreign Private Juridical Entity (FPJE)


Defendant: foreign Private Juridical Entity
-transacted business in RP
How Service made:
a. on RESIDENT AGENT designated in accordance with law for that purpose
b. if NO AGENT:
i. on government official designated by law to that effect
Ii. On any of its officers or agents within the Philippines

Section 15. Extraterritorial Service


Defendant:
a. Does not reside + not found in RP
b. Action affects the personal status of plaintiff
c. Relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines in which the defendant has
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent
d. Or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein
e. Or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines
How service:
-with leave of court
a. Personal service
b. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order + copy of summons and order sent thru registered mail to last known address
c. In any other manner the court may deem sufficient

WILLIAM GEMPERLE V. HELEN SCHENKER


F:
Case 1: Helen Schenker, representing her husband Paul Schenker, filed with CFI of Rizal a complaint vs. William
Gemperle
COA: enforcement of Schenker's initial subscription to shares of stock in Philippine-Swiss Trading Co, Inc.
-allegations published

Case2: William Gemperle vs. Paul Schenker


COA: damages? For publishing allegations which were irrelevant and immaterial to Case 1, with the only purpose
of attacking his honesty, integrity, and reputation and of bringing him into public hatred, discredit…as a business
man
SERVICE OF SUMMONS: Done through wife of Paul, HELEN SCHENKER

I: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Paul Schenker, through the service of
summons to HELEN SCHENKER

Gemperle's arguments: Voluntary appearance on part of Schenker


- not special appearance, already filed answer without contesting court's jurisdiction
-Schenker even filed counterclaim

H:
ON Alleged voluntary appearance: none
1. The Answer contained affirmative defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker
2. Counterclaim was filed by HELEN SCHENKER ONLY, not by PAUL SCHENKER

BUT COURT COULD STILL EXERCISE JURISDICTION over Paul Schenker BECAUSE OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO
MRS. HELEN SCHENKER
-Helen Schenker (as derived from the answer) was the REPRESENTATIVE AND ATTY IN FACT OF PAUL SCHENKER
-had authority to sue, and be sued

2. JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPERTY (in rem jurisdiction)


a. Seizure of property under a legal process
b. Institution of legal proceedings wherein the court's power over the property is recognized and made
effective

-situs could bind the world, not just the interest of specific persons
-basis of exercise of jurisdiction: presence of the property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
e.g. forfeiture of tangible property, registration of land title

Quasi In rem:
-based on state's physical power over the property found within its territory BUT affects only interests of
particular persons in that thing
e.g. action to quiet title to property: the claimant's title to the property in question is superior to others

In Proceedings IN REM and QUASI IN REM: as long as there is adequate notice + opportunity to be
heard, okay na! this can be done through publication

PENNOYER V. NEFF
F:
Case 1:
Plaintiff: Mitchell Pennoyer? (from Oregon)
Forum: Oregon
Defendant: Neff, from California

PRIL Page 7
Defendant: Neff, from California
Service of Summons: by PUBLICATION in an OREGON Newspaper
COA: for payment of $300 attorney's fees
-for execution of judgment, Pennoyer was awarded in public sale the land of Neff located in Oregon

Case 2: Neff vs. Pennoyer


COA: for recovery of Neff's land from Pennoyer, illegality of public sale: no jurisdiction over defendant so void
judgment in Case 1

HELD: For Neff - case 1 judgment VOID because no jurisdiction over him
*Judgments in Personam - dapat personal service or substituted service (in RP ROC)
-if service by publication + defendant non resident + publication in place where nonresident could not see the
publication = fraud and oppression
Actions in Personam: object of the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants
-if non resident: process from the tribunals of one state CANNOT run into another state, and summon parties there
domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them. Nor can Publication.

*pede Substituted service by publication IFF (proceedings in rem)


1. Property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act to any proceedings
authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale
2. Object of the action is to reach and dispose of the property in the State or of some interest therein, by enforcing a GEMPERLE V. SCHENKER
contract or a lien respecting the same Ma'am:
3. Or to partition the property in the state among different owners GR: service of summons on wife is not service of summons on the defendant
4. When the public is a party, to condemn and appropriate it for a public purpose
husband
*no jurisdiction over non-resident defendants when these non-resident defendants have no property within the
X: in this case, the wife is the attorney in fact of her husband
territory of the forum
*jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and determine the obligations of the non-resident is only incidental to its PENNOYER V. NEFF
jurisdiction over the property and its jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon facts to be ascertained after it IN PERSONAM: dapat personal service
has tried the cause and rendered the judgment. By attaching property, you're not converting the action to an action in rem
***if the judgment is previously void (no jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant), it will not COA in first case: in personam!
become valid by the subsequent discovery of the property of the nonresident defendant or by his subsequent
acquisition of it - or else, judgment would occupy a doubtful position of being void or valid depending on the
presence of property of the nonresident defendant in the forum's territory

INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. VS. WASHINGTON


Facts:
COA: International Shoe Company being assessed taxes by Washington State for employing salesmen in
Washington
INTERNATIONAL SHOE CASE V. WASHINGTON
Parties: International shoe Company is Presence: why considered
-principal place of business: Missouri Here: presence through continuous and systematic operations
-maintains places of business in other states aside from Washington -here, considered presence because this involves a corporation. The state acquires
-no office in Washington, but they hired 11-13 salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by its presence in the territory of the
based in Missouri forum . But here, since it involves a company, its presence in the territory of the
-these salesmen were not authorized to contract in Washington: they can only exhibit their samples and solicit forum might be determined from the activities in the state
orders; approval of the transaction, shipping of transaction, invoice of shipment were all made outside Washington -minimum contacts + fundamental fairness
SERVICE: gave summons to agents + mailed it through registered mail at home office in Missouri
Ma'am: this approach of minimum contacts and fundamental fairness demands that
Washington SC:
there be forum-transaction contacts that will make it fundamentally fair to require
the regular and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by International shoe's Salesmen the defendant to defend a suit in the forum regardless of his nonresident status
+ additional activities of its agents: e.g. if a person sells only 2 pairs of shoes in a state, would he be sufficiently appraised
…display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms of any suit against him in that state? No. so no expectation that he be hailed in court
...salesmen's residence in Washington + if mejo marami ang kita, may expectation dapat na you may be sued in that state
= resulted in the CONTITUOUS FLOW OF ITS PRODUCTS INTO WASHINGTON, SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE DOING
BUSINESS IN THE STATE so as to make International Shoe amenable to suits before Washington Courts -did not look into what kind of suit was filed: even if in personam or in rem or even
quasi in rem, not strict what kind of service was used as long as notions of fair play
was observed
HELD: Washington can impose taxes on International Shoe
-Before; Judgment in personam: grounded on de facto power over defendant's person - presence within territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him [Pennoyer vs. Neff]
-now: capias ad respondendum gave way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, OKAY NA IF
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE CERTAIN MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE FORUM SUCH THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF
THE SUIT DOES NOT OFFEND "TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE [Milliken v. Meyer]
-PRESENCE OF A CORPORATION (CORPORATE PERSONALITY IS A FICTION): its presence without, as well as within a
state of its origin can be manifested ONLY BY ACTIVITIES carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act
for it
-present/presence symbolize those activities of the corporation's agents within the state which courts will deem to
be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process
-if ACTIVITIES
...continuous
…systematic
…also gives rise to the liabilities sued
EVEN if NO CONSENT TO BE SUED or NO AUTHORIZATION to an agent to accept service of process…

casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities NOT ENOUGH
TO SUBJECT THE NON-RESIDENT CORPORATION TO SUIT ON CAUSES OF ACTION NOT CONNECTED WITH ITS
ACTIVITIES
Vs.
If Continuous corporate operations - even if COA entirely distinct from activities, pede

It is enough that appellant (non-resident corporation - FPJE) has established such contacts with the state that the
particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual.
Ma'am: this approach of minimum contacts and fundamental fairness demands that there be forum-
transaction contacts that will make it fundamentally fair to require the defendant to defend a suit in the
forum regardless of his nonresident status

MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK AND TRUST CO., TRUSTEE, ET.AL MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER
FACTS: Even if this is a proceeding in rem, use the most reasonable means to ensure that the
Defendant: Central Hanover Bank defendants be notified of the proceedigns against them (so since you know the
-a trust company IN NY addresses of the defendants)
-had exclusive control and management of trust funds established y it under NY Banking Law
Plaintiffs: some are nonresidents of NY
COA: for judicial settlement of assets - binding on everyone
SERVICE: publication in NY, pursuant to law (even if the bank had the addresses of the beneficiaries in its books!)
Forum: NY

ISSUE: WON the judgment in NY court binds non-residents who are beneficiaries of the common fund maintained
by Central Hanover Bank which it wanted to settle

HELD: NY Banking Law violates DUE PROCESS so VOID - NY Judgment not binding
STANDARD FOR ADEQUATE NOTICE: the means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and constitutional validity of any chosen
method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected

Here: Bank had names, addresses of the beneficiaries of its trusts so Notice by Publication is not enough: Where
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for
resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency
MA'AM: ADEQUATE NOTICE STANDARD

PRIL Page 8
SHAFFER V. HEITNER SHAFFER v. HEITNER
Plaintiff: Heitner (non resident of Delaware) -the freeze order was imposed but the certificates of stocks were not in Delaware
Defendants: Officers of Greyhound and Greyhound (Greyhound incorporated in Delaware BUT the officers are
nonresidents of Delaware) Difference from Pennoyer case: minimum contacts should be among, defendant,
COA: violation of the officers of duties, resulting to criminal and civil antitrust liabilities
forum and COA
RELIEF: motion for an order of sequestration of shares of Greyhound stocks belonging to the officers (none of the
certificates of stocks were in Delaware)
Forum: Delaware (because it was Greyhound's state of incorporation) *most corporation in US is incorporated in Delaware because they have the most
SERVICE: Certified mail to last known address + publication in newspaper corporation-friendly laws; after incorporation umaalis sila…
Delaware for Heitner so Officers appealed
Assignment next week: until proof of foreign law (before part three) -November
ISSUE: WON there was sufficient contacts of the Officers of the Greyhound in Delaware to justify the exercise of 26?
Delaware Courts of jurisdiction over person of defendant officers

HELD: NO. Being mere officers is not sufficient minimum contact


*Officer's holdings in Greyhound do not provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the jurisdiction of
Delaware Courts because property is NOT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF LITIGATION (not action in rem)
-Heitner used International Shoe vs. Washington to say that the officers should be liable for their minimum
contacts in Delaware + Delaware Corporation Law
COURT: Delaware law bases jurisdiction not on the officers status as corporate fiduciaries, BUT ON THE PRESENCE
of their PROPERTY in the state (here, none). The law does not concern sequestration. And sequestration relevant
only if the nonresident defendants have property in Delaware.
*there is no necessary relationship between holding a position as a corporate fiduciary and owning stock or other
interests in the corporation.
*the Officers-appellants, who are not required to acquire interest in Greyhound in order to hold their positions, did
not by acquiring those interests, surrender their rights to be brought to judgment only in states with which they
had "Minimum Contacts:
MA'AM: US SC defined the outer reaches of permissible exercise of judicial jurisdiction when it held that
MINIMUM CONTACTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS TEST SHOLD BE SATISFIED REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE
PROCEEDINGS ARE IN REM, QUASI IN REM OR IN PERSONAM. Note that Shaffer demands that minimum contacts
exist among the forum, defendant AND THE COA. In INTERNATIONAL SHOE, all that was required was minimum
contact between defendant and forum.

Long arm statutes


-specify the kind of contacts upon which jurisdiction will be asserted by a sate
e.g. Commission of tortuous acts w/n the state
Celebration of a contract there
Presence of property owned by defendant
*if these or other minimum contacts exists, the court can exercise jurisdiction because it has a justified
interest in providing the plaintiff with a forum, no fundamental unfairness results
-if long-arm statute broad, as long as it doesn't conflict with Consti, courts now have discretion to define
on a case-to-case basis

3. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER (competence)


-conferred by law or consti
-based on the nature of the controversy
-it is necessary that said power to try be properly invoked…by filing a petition
-cannot be conferred by consent of parties: decision is void if court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in
rendering it

B. WAYS OF DEALING WITH CONFLICTS PROBLEM


1. DISMISS CASE
Doctrine of Forum non conveniens
-courts may decline to try the case on the ground that the controversy may be more suitably tried
elsewhere
-literal interpretation: forum is inconvenient

*Usual grounds when this was used by the court:


1. When plaintiff made the choice of the forum primarily to harass defendant by inflicting upon him
unnecessary expense and hardship in pursuing the remedy
2. Where non-resident plaintiff chose the forum because he felt that the jury verdicts were larger than in

PRIL Page 9
other for a
3. When such was

4. ASSUME JURISDICTION

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*1 Class Lecture
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
3:54 PM

Ma'am's Lecture:
GR: laws have effect only in their territories
e.g. PFR: laws applicable only in the Philippines
Basis: every nation is sovereign and independent; another state
cannot force our courts to apply their laws

Exception: when the law applies expressly in other states


e.g. Article 15

But with the advance in the communications in transportations,


conflict of laws cases are increasing

Hilton v. Guyot:
-why is it that despite sovereign states, we end up recognizing foreign
judgments
H: PRIL adopted in municipal laws through comity
-in short, Hilton and Libbey were saying, "ang daya!"
-definition of comity:
Not absolute obligation: or else, the court would be compelled
to apply the law of another nation; sovereignty would just go
out the window
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS
WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS LAWS
-rights of own citizens are assured to be protected first!
(reciprocity) - the laws are meant to benefit us
Not mere courtesy or good will or convenience: or else,
…if mere courtesy: random, unsystematic - courtesy cannot be
claimed, not a right…so may be given through discretion of the
court
-RECOGNITION WHICH ONE NATION ALLOWS WITHIN ITS TERRITORY
…OF THE LEGISLATIVE
…EXECUTIVE
…OR JUDICIAL ACTS
OF ANOTHER NATION,
HAVING DUE REGARD BOTH TO
...INTERNATIONAL DUTY
…AND CONVENIENCE
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS
WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS LAWS
…mere recognition: it's part of international duty? How?
e.g. if already acquired favorable judgment abroad, it would
result in injustice if the successful litigant would be compelled
to litigate again since he would entail more expenses??? Plus in
a way, you're not respecting the competence of those courts to
render judgment???
SABI NI MA'AM: if same law, spend money…waste his time…to
go through the whole procedure knowing that the result would
be the same anyway
If different law: you entered a contract, knowing what law is
applicable so by applying a different law, unfair

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applicable so by applying a different law, unfair
+ end of litigation
Loses element of surprise: alam mo na ung sasabihin ng kalaban
so unfair na…dapat i-res judicata na!
Help in relations of states: don't waste time and energy of the
courts in each states
DISSENT: res judicata and public policy of end of litigation
-encourage states to recognize each other's laws: comity should prove
to be beneficial to states
Lowers standard of comity: principle of retortion is a task for the
legislature to do, not for the courts; the court in applying comity was
doing legislative act. Plus injustice is that private individuals cannot
change laws so why make them suffer for the difference in laws in
different states?

PRIL and PIL: see table in notes; this section would only contain the
comments of ma'am beth during the lecture
Example of PRIL found in Municipal law: Artilce 15, 16, 17 NCC + other
provisions of wills

Why PRIL in Civil Law Bar subject: many of conflict of laws rules are in
Civil law…. But abroad, PIL and PRIL are at par, both part of
international law…

CHAPTER II: HISTORY


Roman Law origin
-applied ius gentium vs. ius civile (as developed by the Praetor
pregrinus)
-developed by Roman Law and Italian City-states

Theory of Statutes - by Bartolus


1. Real Statutes: immovable property
2. Personal Statutes: movable property, persons capacity, personal
status
3. Mixed Statutes: contracts

French : universal succession


HUBER: territorial principle
…basta one principle at the start: territorial principle or principle of
comitas gentium

Story: territorial theory, comity


Beale: Theory of vested rights
E.g. Torts
1. Act or omission done
2. Injury occurs
-but both components may have been done in different states!
e.g. product liability case: may be manufactured in another state,
then the injury happened in another state
-nationality of the person is not relevant...
Question of vested rights enter:
State A: considers the conduct a tortuous conduct
State B: does not consider it so, but injury happens here
Vested right applies: right under State A has already been vested in

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Vested right applies: right under State A has already been vested in
the victim so anywhere he goes, the vested right apply
X: if the law where the action is filed says that the law where the
injury happened governs,
Savigny: situs
Manicini: nationality theory

IN RP:

Sources of PRIL
Comments of ma'am on treaties: before, more of PIL
-now, there are treaties which provides PRIL rules

Judicial decisions: bulk of conflict law

Jurisdiction

PRIL Page 13
Cont part III and part IV
Long-arm of the law
Thursday, November 12, 2009
-enumerate the contacts, when these are present,
9:20 PM
justify the application of the court

Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter


1. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER (competence) -competence
-conferred by law or consti -provided in the Constitution and the law
-based on the nature of the controversy -not subject to agreement of the parties
-it is necessary that said power to try be properly invoked…by filing a petition
-cannot be conferred by consent of parties: decision is void if court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in IDONAH V. PERKINS
rendering it -stocks of a Philippine Company, doesn't matter if
the parties are domiciled elsewhere

Ways of Dealing with Conflicts Problem


BEFORE: just apply local laws
NOW: more attuned to PRIL

OPTIONS OF THE COURT


1. Dismiss the case
a. No jurisdiction
b. Has jurisdiction, but dismisses it anyway
based on FORUM NON CONVENIENS
2. Assume Jurisdiction - decides on the merits
a. Apply forum law (local law)
b. Apply Foreign law

When Forum non Conveniens


*would cause injustice to the parties
*if the suit was bought in a particular case only
because it gives a larger verdict - but so what?
e.g. there's a study that if the state is mostly
composed of Asians, the jury would give
lower amount of damages. Why?
-Disparity in the GDP and standard of living
of Asians and Westerners. Asians think its
already a big amount of value but
Westerners don't think so.
Asians are happier, and can live with, less
things.
…so this ground, on its own, is not a ground. But if
there are other factors which would make it
inconvenient for the forum to exercise jurisdiction,
then dismiss case
*harass the other party: choose forum most
inconvenient to the other party
*global forum shopping: files numerous cases
before several forums - different (and maybe
conflicting) decisions
…that's why we have CNFS
*forum shopping vs. forum non conveniens: forum
shopping only one of the reasons why dismiss…

HEINE v. NY INSURANCE COMPANY


-even if the court has jurisdiction, the US court still
refused to exercise jurisdiction because of several
factors that would make it inconvenient for it to
exercise such:
1. Parties are Germans
2. Contracts were made in Germany
3. Payment made in German marks
4. Documents needed for the litigation are in use in
A. WAYS OF DEALING WITH CONFLICTS PROBLEM
the Germany Office
1. DISMISS CASE 5. The COA arised in Germany
Doctrine of Forum non conveniens *US court only had jurisdiction because the
-courts may decline to try the case on the ground that the controversy may be more suitably tried company was incorporated in US
elsewhere >It is the court's discretion to hear or not to hear a
-literal interpretation: forum is inconvenient case

*Usual grounds when this was used by the court: In Re: Union Carbide
>When plaintiff made the choice of the forum primarily to harass defendant by inflicting upon him -accident happened in INDIA. Plant in India needed
to be inspected. Only thing in US are the plans and
unnecessary expense and hardship in pursuing the remedy
the mother company…
>Where non-resident plaintiff chose the forum because he felt that the jury verdicts were larger than -so dismiss based on forum non conveniens
in other for a *court explains that even if we have jurisdiction,
>When such would be burdensome on the court or taxpayers we don't want to because of all the things we
>When the parties are non-residents and there was a severe backlog of cases when it perceived that mentioned
jury duty, when compulsory, should not be foisted on a community with no link with or interest in the *also shows that the community most affected -
litigation India
>when the court's local machinery was inadequate to effectuate a right, such as when it had no way of >Indian people would not want to be
securing evidence and the attendance of willing witnesses inconvenienced just to participate in the
proceedings...
Union Carbide Case (short summary, as mentioned)
Wing On Company v. Syyap
-thousands of residents of Bhopal, India filed suit for damages in NY as a result of a large scale accident -the court shall not disturb the preference of the
in a Union Carbide Bhopal's chemical plant. plaintiff as to the venue UNLESS it is strongly in
H: US Court dismissed case based on forum non conveniens doctrine favor to the defendant

English and Scottish courts Grounds used to dismiss based on forum non
-applied forum non conveniens when there was another available and ore appropriate forum, in which conveniens evolved…
the ends of justice would be better served, by eliminating the vexatious or oppressive character of the As to public interest: not waste judicial time,
pending proceedings and by removing any unfairness to either party which would result from trial in considering the interests of the private litigants
the forum seized of the case
WHEN THE COURTS ASSUME JURISDICTION
*Avoid global forum shopping: filing of repetitious suits in courts of different jurisdiction over a case When forum law applied
-would result to different decisions by different courts 1. When forum law says so
2. When foreign law not properly pleaded and proved
First Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals(short summary, as mentioned) *ignorance of the law excuses no one: but this is
-forum-shopping originated from PRIL, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the only applicable to Philippine Law

PRIL Page 14
-forum-shopping originated from PRIL, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the only applicable to Philippine Law
forum or place wherein to bring the suit Why need to plead it? Court cannot take judicial
-why: notice of foreign law
*to secure procedural advantages -laws are effective only w/n its territory. So outside
*to annoy and harass defendant their territory, they have no legal effect. If we want
it to be effective outside its jurisdiction, it has to be
*to avoid overcrowded dockets
proven as a fact (proven by evidence).
*select a more friendly venue How to prove:
-public document
Wing On Company v. Syyap -copy duly certified by the officer who has custody
-plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the + an attestation that he has custody of it (by the
defendant" consulate office with official seal)

3. When the foreign law falls into the exception

Fleumer v. Hix

Philippine Trust Co. v. Bohanan


-even if it is common knowledge that US does not
apply compulsory legitimes, still need to prove it
-in this case, it was proven

PRIL Page 15
Summary: should consider both public and private interests
Private interests:
*relative ease of access to source of proof
*Availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses
*cost of obtaining and attendance off willing witnesses
*possibility of viewing the premises if appropriate
*all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive

Public Interest
*administrative difficulties encountered when courts are congested
*jury duty: burden on community
*appropriateness of having the trial in a court that is familiar with the applicable state law rather than
getting another forum enmeshed in a complicated conflict-of-laws problem

WHEN CAN'T REFUSE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION:

PRIL Page 16
WHEN CAN'T REFUSE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION:
*when the forum is the only state where jurisdiction over defendant can be obtained
*when the forum provides procedural remedies not available in another state

2. ASSUME JURISDICTION
GR: apply law of the forum
1. A specific law of the forum decrees that internal law should apply
Civil Code
Article 16: makes real and personal proerty subject to the law of the country where they are situated
Intestate and testamentary succession: governed by lex nationale of the person whose succession is
under consideration
Article 829: makes revocation done outside the Philippines valid according to the law of the place
where the will was made or lex domicilli
Article 819: prohibits Filipinos from making joint wills even if valid in the country where they were
executed

2. The proper foreign law was not properly pleaded and proved
-no Judicial notice of foreign law
Relevant rules of evidence:
» To prove written foreign law: follow requirements in Sec 24-25, Rule 132
» May be subject of judicial admission
» Processual presumption - no proof nor admission, foreign law presumed to be the same as that in the Philippines

Rule 132
Section 19 - CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
For the purpose of their presentation evidence,
documents are either public or private.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS are:
a. The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
c. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
therein.
All other writings are PRIVATE.

Section 24 - PROOF OF OFFICIAL RECORD


The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Section 25 - WHAT ATTESTATION OF COPY MUST STATE


Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove unwritten foreign law – Sec 46, Rule 130

Section 46 - LEARNED TREATISES


A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible
as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness
expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.

• Requisites:
1. The court takes judicial notice thereof
2. The same is testified to by a witness expert in the subject
• C A took judicial notice of the Ballantyne Scale of Values [1]
Legal treatises also included

PRIL Page 17
3. The case falls under any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law:
...when foreign law is
(1) contrary to an important public policy of the forum
(2) penal in nature
(3) procedural in nature
(4) purely fiscal/administrative in nature
(5) (will) work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum
(6) case involves real/personal property situated in theforum
(7) application of foreign law might endanger vital interest of the state (forum)
(8) contrary to good morals

PRIL Page 18
Chapter V. Choice of Law
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
3:55 PM

A. Correlation between jurisdiction and Choice of Law


1. Factors that will justify jurisdiction may be the same factors that will determine WON it is proper for the forum to apply its own internal law (same
factors for exercise of jurisdiction and internal law application)
2. If forum applies internal law because it has real interest in the case, plaintiff will bring suit in state which has real interest in applying its law (real interest
determines jurisdiction and choice of law)
3. More likely forum would apply own internal law, so plaintiff would file before forum, internal law of which is favorable to him (where internal law
favorable to him, choose that court)

*But there may be instances where no exercise of jurisdiction but internal law applies, or exercises jurisdiction but its int ernal law does not apply

B. Approaches to choice of law


2 important questions:
1. What legal system should control
2. What extent should chosen legal system regulate the situation

Ideally, choice-of-law theories should advance both:


*Justice
*Predictability

Classification of Choice of Law: Von Mehren and Trautman


1. Traditional Approach
-emphasize principles of simplicity, convenience and uniformity
2. Modern Approach
-relate to reaching appropriate results in particular cases

I. TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Vested-Rights Theory - Beale
-choice of law rules that are simple in form and capable of easy administration would promote uniformity of result, enhance pr edictability and discourage
forum-shopping
-an act done in a foreign jurisdiction gives rise to the existence of a right if the laws of that state provides so, and this right is vested on the plaintiff and he
could enforce it in any forum he chooses to bring suit.
-applies LAW FO THE PLACE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ACT necessary to complete the COA

(so pano un, basta away mag-asawa wala lang. wala kaming pakialam sa inyo!)

PRIL Page 19
***

Gray v. Gray: court automatically applied the law of the place of the wrong, rejecting a choice -of-law method based on reason, justice and expediency
-but should have looked behind the policy why prohibit suits between spouses

CRITIQUES to VESTED RIGHT THEORY


1. failure to resolve conflicts cases with reference to considerations of policy and fairness
2. Counterintuitive, arbitrary

Dr. Jovito Salonga:


a. Self-delusion of reasoning: when say that it is NOT the foreign law but the rights under it which are enforced by the courts
b. Not all rights acquired under foreign law are protected elsewhere, their protection not always desirable
c. Protection of rights and interests not the only factors to be considered
d. Not only protect vested rights but also foreign legal relationships which may result to extinction of duties and charges or invalidity of acts
e. Difficult to apply when the material aspect of a transactions equally touch two or more states

Local Law Theory: Walter Wheeler Cook


1. the power of a state to regulate w/n its territory has no limitations EXCEPT such as may be imposed by its OWN POSITIVE LAW
2. In conflict of laws problems the court does not enforce a foreign right but a right created by its own law by treating a case as a purely domestic case that
does not involve a foreign element

CRITIQUE:
It tends to the "narrow-minded who may be inclined to depreciate the practical and equitable consideration that should control the adjudication of co nflict
cases in favor of an exaggerated local policy on the gound that they and the sovereign which they represent can do as they pl ease"

Principles of Preference - David Caver


-choice of law should be determined by considerations of justice and social expediency and should not be the result of the mec hanical application of a rule or
principle of selection
-steps that must be done by the court:
1. Scrutinize the event or transaction
2. Compare carefully the profferred rule of law + result wich its application might work (vs. rules of forum)
3. Appraise results from standpoint of justice and social policy
-principle of preference: conceived to provide a fair accommodation of conflicting state policies and afford fair treatment to the parties caught up in conflicting
state policies
-territorialist: look to the place where the significant events occurred or where the legal relationship is centered

I. MODERN APPROACHES
Place of the Most significant relationships - Willis Reese (2nd Restatement)
-plurality of factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems
(b)relevant policies of the concerned states
© relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those in the determination of the particular issu e
(d)the protection of justified expectations of the parties
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result
(g) ease in the determination and the application of the law to be applied

Consider factual contacts! Depends on the relative importance and relevance to the issue at hand

Torts:
1. Place where injury occurred
2. Place where the negligent conduct occurred
3. Domicile, residence or nationality of the parties
4. Place where the relationship between the parties is entered

Contracts:
1. Law chosen by the parties and in the absence thereof
2. Place of contracting
3. Place of negotiation of the contract
4. Place of performance

PRIL Page 20
3. Place of negotiation of the contract
4. Place of performance
5. Domicile, residence, or nationality, or place of incorporation and place of business of parties

Illinois

PRIL Page 21
***
Restatement 2d: state of the most significant relationship
Auten v. Auten: "center of gravity", "place of the most significant contacts", "Grouping of contacts"

Auten Haag
The wife's home was the center of gravity The husband's home was the center of gravity

CRITIQUE:
*used to support virtually any result, hamper sound development of common law
*how to determine (standard) which of the contacts were significant and how to evaluate relative importance of a group of con tacts

Interest Analysis - Brainered Currie


-look at the policy behind the laws of the involved states and the interest each state had in applying its own law
-factual contacts alone did not determine the outcome of a case UNLESS they reflected a state policy which would be advanced b y application of the
substantive state law
-determine which state had the real interest in having its law applied

****
Babcock: application of NY Law advanced the policy reflected in that law, while the failure to apply Ontario law did not impa ir the policy behind the law.

Critique:
*conflicts cases were ordinarily concerned only with private and not governmental interests
*unworkable, it will require the court to decide each case in an ad hoc basis
*not all state legislatures published committee reports that explained the background and purpose of the laws - courts speculate
*not all laws reflected policy or had a purpose other than to decide cases

PRIL Page 22
Comparative Impairment - William Baxter
-subordination of the state objective which would be least impaired
-courts weigh conflicting interests and apply the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not f ollowed

Functional Analysis - Donald Trautman and Arthur Von Mehren


-after determining the concerned jurisdiction or interested state
-looked into:
> the general policies of the state beyond those reflected in its substantive law
>policies and values relating to effective and harmonious intercourse between states
e.g. *reciprocity
*advancement of multistate activity
*protecting justifiable expectations
*evenhandedness in dealing with similar cases
*effectiveness
-then consider the relative strength of a state policy (policy -weighing)
e.g.
Miliken v. Pratt (1981)
Facts: Daniel Pratt, resident of Massachusetts, was sued by Miliken and Co. as a guaranty on his wife's loan, as required by the company.
-loan executed in Maine
Massachusetts law Maine Law
Spouse can't act as surety for the other's obligation Spouse can be a surety for the other's debt
-suit brought in Maine
HELD: DANIEL LIABLE
-contract was complete when Miliken received Daniel's guaranty and extended credit on the strength of his guaranty
-place of contracting was Maine

Trautman and Von Mehren comments: at the time the decision was made, restrictive policy on the right of women was on the wane in Massachusetts so at
that time, the contract was made not based on a strongly held policy.
-functional analysis: consider WON the law of a state reflects an "emerging" or "regressing" policy

Choice-Influencing Considerations - Robert Leflar


(1) predictability of results
(2) maintenance of interstate and international order
(3) simplification of judicial task
(4) application of the better rule of law
(5) advancement of the forum's governmental interests

Vs. interest analysis which apply a particular rule of substantive law in order to implement a policy reflected therein

-courts would prefer rules of law whether they are forum law or another state's law as long as they make "good socioeconmic se nse for the time the court
speaks and are sound in view of present day conditions

Critique: absence of principled and objective standards by which superiority of law over another may be determined.

PRIL Page 23
PFR review
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
5:42 PM

B. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

MARRIAGE MAY BE ANNULLED, WHEN:


Under Art. 45:
1. One of the parties is 18 or above but below 21, and there is no parental consent.
2. Either party was of unsound mind (insanity).
3. The consent of either party was obtained through fraud (different from mistake in identity):
a. through non-disclosure of a previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
b. through concealment of the wife of the fact that she was pregnant by another man;
c. through concealment of a sexually-transmitted disease, even if not serious or incurable;
d. through concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality/lesbianism. (Art.46)
4. The consent of either party was obtained through force, intimidation, or undue influence.
5. Either party is physically unable to consummate the marriage (impotence) (different from sterility).
6. Either party has a serious and incurable sexually-transmissible disease, even if not concealed.

*In Buccat v Buccat, the Supreme C ourt refused to grant annulment filed by the husband because his wife gave birth to a baby a mere 89 days after their marriage. It held
that it is unbelievable that the wife could have concealed the fact that she was 6 months pregnant at the time of the marriage.

*However, in Aquino v Delizo, the Supreme C ourt granted annulment because the wife concealed the fact that she was 4 months pregnant during the time of the marriage.
It argued that since Delizo was “naturally plump,” Aquino could hardly be expected to know, by mere looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of the marriage.

GROUND FOR WHO CAN FILE PRESCRIPTION HOW TO RATIFY (Art. 45)
ANNULMENT (Art. 47) (Art. 47)
(Art. 45)
Lack of parental consent 1. Underage party 1. 5 years after attaining 21. Free cohabitation after attaining age of 21.
2. Parent or guardian 2. Before child reaches 21.

Insanity 1. Sane spouse with no knowledge of the 1. Any time before the death of insane party Free cohabitation of insane party after
other’s insanity coming to reason
2. Legal guardian of insane party
3. Insane party 2. During lucid interval or after regaining sanity,
and before death
Fraud Injured party (defrauded party) Five years after discovery of fraud Free cohabitation after having full knowledge
of fraud
Force, intimidation, undue Injured party Five years after disappearance of force or Free cohabitation after the force has ceased
influence intimidation or disappeared
Impotence Healthy party Five years after marriage Deemed ratified when action prescribes
STD Healthy party Five years after marriage Deemed ratified when action prescribes

A. LEGAL SEPARATION

BED AND BOARD SEPARATION MAY BE DECREED WHEN THERE IS (Art. 55):
1. Repeated violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner.
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious or political affiliation.
3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce petitioner, a common child, or child of petitioner, to engage in prostitution or connivance in such corruption or
inducement.
4. Final judgment sentencing respondent to imprisonment of more than 6 years, even if pardoned (executive pardon, not pardon from offended party).
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of respondent.
• When it existed from the time of celebration, and concealed from petitioner, can be a ground for annulment of marriage. When it occurred only after the marriage, it
is only a ground for legal separation, whether concealed or not.
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of respondent.
• ditto on rules on drug addiction.
7. C ontracting by respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines of abroad.
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion.
9. Attempt on the life of petitioner by respondent.
• There is no need for criminal conviction.
10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

PRIL Page 24
Summary table: Choice of Law approaches

Traditional approach
-emphasize principles of simplicity, convenience and uniformity

Na me Author Content Case where applied Critique


Vested rights Jos eph Beale -a n a ct done in a foreign jurisdiction gives rise to the Gray v. Gray: a ppl ied l aw where the injury was done 1. fa i l ure to resolve conflicts cases with reference to
theory (1s t exi s tence of a ri ght if the laws of that state provides so, a nd (i n this case, a pplied Ma ine law which barred spouses cons iderations of policy a nd fairness
res ta tement) thi s right i s vested on the plaintiff and he could enforce i t in from fi ling s uits vs . the other) 2. Counteri ntuitive, arbitrary
a ny forum he chooses to bring s uit.
-LAW of THE PLACE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ACT Alabama Great Southern RR Co. vs. Carroll: a ppl ied Dr. Jovito Salonga:
necessary to complete the COA the l aw where the injury was sustained (i n this case, a . Sel f-delusion of reasoning: when say tha t it is
the l aw of Mississippi which prohibits a n EE from NOT the foreign law but the ri ghts under i t which
cl a iming damages from ER when damage ca used by are enforced by the courts
negligence of other co-EE) b. Not a l l ri ghts a cquired under foreign law are
protected elsewhere, their protection not a lways
des irable
c. Protecti on of rights a nd i nterests not the only
fa ctors to be considered
d. Not onl y protect vested ri ghts but also foreign
l egal relationships which may result to extinction
of duti es and charges or i nvalidity of acts
e. Di fficult to a pply when the material aspect of a
tra ns actions equally touch two or more states
Local Law Walter Wheeler 1. the power of a s tate to regulate w/n i ts territory has no It tends to the "narrow-minded who may be i nclined to
Theory Cook l i mitations EXCEPT s uch as may be i mposed by i ts OWN depreciate the practical and equitable consideration that
POSITIVE LAW s hould control the a djudication of conflict cases in favor
2. In conflict of laws problems the court does not enforce a of a n exaggerated local policy on the gound that they
forei gn right but a right created by its own law by treating a nd the s overeign which they represent can do as they
a case as a purely domestic case that does not i nvolve a pl ease"
forei gn element
Principles of Da vi d Caver -choi ce of law should be determined by considerations of
Preference jus ti ce and social expediency a nd should not be the result of
the mechanical a pplication of a rule or principle of s election
-s teps that must be done by the court:
1. Scruti nize the event or tra nsaction
2. Compa re ca refully the profferred rule of law + result
wi ch i ts application might work (vs. rules of forum)
3. Appra ise results from standpoint of justice a nd s ocial
pol icy
-pri nciple of preference: conceived to provide a fair
a ccommodation of conflicting s tate policies and afford fair
trea tment to the parties ca ught up i n conflicting state policies
-terri torialist: l ook to the place where the significant events
occurred or where the l egal relationship is centered

Modern approaches
-rel ate to reaching appropriate results in particular ca ses
Place of Wi l lis Reese -pl urality of fa ctors: Auten v. Auten: "center of gra vity", "place of the *us ed to s upport vi rtually a ny result, hamper sound
the Most (2nd (a) the needs of the interstate and international sys tems mos t s ignificant contacts", "Grouping of contacts" development of common l aw
Res tatement) (b)relevant policies of the concerned states -the place where there were more fa ctual contacts *how to determine (standard) which of the contacts
significant © rel evant policies of other i nterested s tates and the wa s England, as the only contact wi th US is the were s ignificant and how to evaluate relative i mportance
relationship rel ative interest of those i n the determination of the execution of the contract, and i t only happened i n US of a group of contacts
s parti cular issue beca use the husband was i n US
(d)the protection of justified expectations of the parties
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law Haag vs. Barnes: i n thi s case, the place where there
(f) certa inty, predictability, a nd uniformity of result were more fa ctual contacts was Ilinois (the home of
(g) ea se in the determination and the application of the the da d)
l a w to be a pplied

Cons ider factual contacts! Depends on the relative


i mportance a nd relevance to the i ssue at hand

Torts:
1. Pl a ce where i njury occurred
2. Pl a ce where the negligent conduct occurred
3. Domi cile, residence or nationality of the parties
4. Pl a ce where the relationship between the parties is
entered

Contra cts :
5. La w chosen by the parties and in the a bsence thereof
6. Pl a ce of contracting
7. Pl a ce of negotiation of the contract
8. Pl a ce of performance
9. Domi cile, residence, or nationality, or place of
i ncorporation and place of business of parties
Interest Brainered -l ook at the policy behind the laws of the i nvolved s tates a nd Babcock v. Jackson: a ppl ication of NY Law a dvanced *confl icts cases were ordinarily concerned only with
Currie the i nterest each state had in applyi ng its own law the policy reflected i n that law, while the failure to pri va te a nd not governmental interests
Analysis
-fa ctual contacts alone did not determine the outcome of a a pply Ontario l aw did not impair the policy behind the *unworkable, it will require the court to decide each
ca s e UNLESS they reflected a state policy which would be l a w. ca s e i n a n ad hoc basis
a dva nced by a pplication of the substantive state law *not a l l state legislatures published committee reports
-determine which s tate had the real interest in having i ts law tha t explained the background a nd purpose of the laws -
a pplied courts s peculate
*not a l l laws reflected policy or ha d a purpose other
tha n to decide ca ses
Comparativ Wi l liam Baxter -s ubordination of the state objective which would be least
e i mpaired
-courts weigh conflicting interests and apply the l aw of the
Impairmen s tate whose interest would be more i mpaired if its law were
t not fol lowed

Functional Donald -a fter determining the concerned jurisdiction or i nterested Mi l i ken v. Pra tt (1981)
Tra utman and s ta te Fa cts : Daniel Pra tt, resident of Ma ssachusetts, was
Analysis
Arthur Von -l ooked into: s ued by Mi liken and Co. as a guaranty on his wife's
Mehren > the general policies of the s tate beyond those l oa n, as required by the company.
refl ected in its substantive law -l oan executed i n Maine
>pol icies and values relating to effective and Ma s sachusetts law Ma i ne La w
ha rmonious i ntercourse between states

PRIL Page 25
Ma s sachusetts law Mai ne Law
ha rmonious i ntercourse between states
e.g. *reci procity Spouse ca n't act as Spouse ca n be a
*a dva ncement of multistate activity s urety for the other's s urety for the other's
*protecti ng justifiable expectations obl igation debt
*evenhandedness i n dealing with s imilar ca ses -s uit brought i n Maine
*effectiveness HELD: DANIEL LIABLE
-then consider the relative strength of a state policy (policy - -contract was complete when Miliken received
wei ghing) Daniel's guaranty and extended credit on the
s trength of his guaranty
-pl ace of contracting was Maine

Tra utma n a nd Von Mehren comments: at the ti me


the decision was made, restrictive policy on the
ri ght of women was on the wane i n Ma ssachusetts
s o a t that ti me, the contract was made not based
on a s trongly held policy.
-functi onal analysis: consider WON the law of a
s ta te reflects a n "emerging" or "regressing" policy
Choice- Robert Leflar (1) predi ctability of results a bs ence of principled a nd objective standards by which
Influencing (2) ma i ntenance of i nterstate and international order s uperiority of l aw over another ma y be determined.
(3) s i mplification of judicial ta sk
Considerati (4) application of the better rule of law
ons (5) advancement of the forum's governmental i nterests

-courts would prefer rules of l aw whether they are forum law


or another state's law as l ong as they make "good
s oci oeconmic s ense for the ti me the court speaks and are
s ound in vi ew of present day conditions

PRIL Page 26
*PRIL Lecture Notes: December 1
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
1:40 PM

There are 3 distinct but interrelated concepts in PRIL


1. Jurisdiction
2. Choice of law
3. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment

*the fact that the court exercises jurisdiction, does not automatically follow that it would apply its own forum law...
*usually, in Family law cases and torts cases, courts would apply forum law instead of foreign law because of policies and va lues. As opposed to contract law, which most
of jurisdictions share common provisions and basic principles, not value -laden laws so even if apply foreign law, as if you're applying local law…
e.g. other countries have divorce, while in Philippines, not allowed…
-these laws reflect the values of that society…
*In the world, only RP and Malta have no divorce!

VARIOUS APPROACHES
1. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
-more territorial
-laws have effect only w/n a certain territory

2. MODERN APPROACHES

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
1. VESTED-RIGHTS THEORY
-Which law applies: Occur in the place where the last act giving rise to a COA
e.g. torts: ACT + INJURY
If both happen in 1 state: domestic
If 2 different places: conflicts-torts case

e.g. Tortuous conduct happens in state A, injury happens in State B.


-last act: place of injury
How vested right? Right = right to enforce a COA
-if State B allows the act to be actionable, he can bring a suit in any forum with a COA irrelevant if the other forum does no t make it actionable

GRAY V. GRAY
-wife sued husband because of the injury she incurred because of her husbands driving.
-they lived in NH /New Hamp-shir/ - which allowed suits between spouses
-the incident happened in Maine - which does not allow suits between spouses
-Wife sued husband in NH

HELD: wife cannot sue husband because in the place where the injury occurred, she has no right to sue her husband
Law 1: can't sue even if there's a COA because they are husband and wife
Law2: can't sue because there's no COA in the first place, incidental lang status nila as spouses - which applies in this case!!! Broad prohibition
*what if law 1: can sue in another forum which allows suits between spouses BECAUSE THE WIFE HAS A COA!

Probable policy why disallow suits between spouses: marital harmony, may resolve dispute by themselves

ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R.R. CO V. CARROLL


-Carroll was hired as a breakman by AGS RR Co - both parties are from ALABAMA
-Employment contract entered in ALABAMA
-HOWEVER, injury to Carroll happened in MISSISSIPPI - which does not allow suits by EE vs. ER for negligent acts of "fellow servants"
-so Carroll sued in Alabama, where there is no such prohibition

HELD: CARROLL CANNOT SUE ER!


-COA arose in Mississippi
-as to the contract: only relevant to determine the relationship between the EE-ER
-the COA arose not from the EE-ER but from the negligence of co-Ees

***
Vested rights theory simple. SUC of results.
PROs: anticipate outcome of the case because uniform…
CONS: unjust
-plus so much uncertainty in your rights. If you're riding a moving vehicle, if you cross a border you have a right but after crossing another border, you lose such right to
sue...
Cf. Principle of preference

LOCAL LAW THEORY


-using purely domestic law, or the "local law" to determine the rights of the parties. Disregards the foreign element of the c ase
-this is considered TERRITORIAL: the forum applies its local laws
>local law determines when it cannot apply local law
>local law gives rise to a right in a conflicts of law case

PRINCIPLES OF PREFERENCE
-social expediency + justice
-3 steps:
1. Scrutinize transaction
2. Compare foreign law vs. domestic law (effects)
3. Which effect would be in accordance with justice and social expediency
-even if still territorial, considers other factors too…
-gives a character of a modern approach

PRIL Page 27
-gives a character of a modern approach
Traditional law: justice is in the uniformity of decisions, even if the approach results to an unjust result

MODERN APPROACHES
MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
-forum would look at where the most RELEVANT + IMPORTANT FACTUAL CONTACTS occur!!!! Not the number of contacts

AUTEN V. AUTEN
-Auten spouses married in England, had children in England, lived there for 14 years…But husband left them, went to NY
-Mrs. Auten followed Mr. Auten in NY, compelled him to enter a SEPARATION AGREEMENT wherein Mr. Auten would give support (£50 ) to family, would live separately,
and Mrs. Auten cannot sue him in connection with their separation

HELD: Apply ENGLAND LAW, which has the most concern in prescribing and governing the obligations of Mr. Auten to family…
-apply the law which the parties intends or expects to be applied: here ENGLISH LAW
***
If traditional approach applied, would the result be different?
>>>YES. Law of place of contracting so NY Law applies (place of execution of the contract)
>>>si Ma'am: Breach was in NY because it is where Mr. Auten refused to pay the support (place of enforcement)
...The acceptance of the agreement was in NY

HAAG V. BARNES
-Illinois lawyer and NY Legal secretary had an illegitimate child born in Illinois. They entered into a SUPPORT AGREEMENT wher ein the Illinois lawyer would pay
$275/month for support. NY Legal secretary sued separately
CRITIQUE: Different application of the MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
-difference in determining what contact is significant and relevant
-very individualistic: the judge alone would determine what law would apply, what contacts would be relevant….depends on the j udge

INTEREST ANALYSIS
-look at the policy behind the law of the states, not merely the significant factual contacts in the dispute; apply the law of the state which has more real interest in
applying its law
-"Interest" of the STATE, not the individual, not the litigants
TRUE CONFLICT: where both states are both interested
Cf: Alabama and Mississippi case
ALABAMA: liability of ER for damages to Ees… (to compel the Ers to be more vigilant in making sure that the Ees would do thei r jobs well…)
MISSISSIPPI: protect ER from liability arising from the negligence of co -EEs of the complainant EE - protect rin Ees…because the ER would get back at the Ees in one way or
another

In Grey v. Grey decided using interest analysis, would the result be the same?
NH: allows suits vs. spouses - interest
Maine: does not allow suits - interest in preserving harmonious relationship of their own citizens
***

BOBCOCK V. JACKSONS
-neighbor Bobcock was seriously injured because of an incident wherein Mr. Jackson drove the vehicle
-Bobcock sued Jackson
-Jackson, as a defense, alleged that Ontario law does not allow suits unless the owner or driver of the vehicle is engaged in the business of carrying passengers for
compensation…
…basta alam mo na un...

PRIL Page 28
Chapter VI: The Problem of Characterization
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
1:30 AM

A. Characterization and the Single-Aspect Method


Single-Aspect method Multi-Aspect Method
Concentrate on 1 element of a situation in All important factors of the case, both territorial and non-territorial, are analyzed
order to connect the case to a particular legal
community
e.g. issue as CONTRACTUAL: place of Applicable law arrived at by rationally elaborating and applying
contracting ...the policies and purposes underlying the particular legal rules that come in question
TORTIUS: law of place where the tort occurred ...as well as the needs of interstate or international intercourse
Foster simplicity, convenience, and uniformity Reach a just solution for case
of results

In RP: Single-Aspect Method


e.g. NCC
Art15: if
*family rights and duties
*status
*condition
*legal capacity of persons
>nationality determines law applicable (if Filipino, Philippine law wherever he is)

Art16: If property,
>Where property located.
If succession issues such as
○ order of succession
○ Amount of successional rights
○ Intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
>national law of person whose succession is under consideration
(irrelevant location of property and what property is involved)

Art 17: forms and solemnities of contractual agreements


>laws of country in which they were executed

Problem with Single-aspect method: inherently rigid and unjust decisions may result from their application
How to avoid: resort to escape devices
• Renvoi
• Characterization

EAP notes
Marriage - lex loci celebrationis
Contracts - lex loci contractus
Torts - lex loci delicti
Property - lex situs
Succession - lex loci nationalii

1. Subject Matter Characterization


Characterization
-process by which a court at the beginning of the choice-of-law process assigns a disputed question to an area of substantive law (torts/contracts/family law/property)…
-part of legal analysis
-becomes pervasive in conflict-of-laws situations since AT LEAST 2 JUDISDICTIONS W/DIVERGENT LAWS are involved

2 TYPES OF CHARACTERIZATION
1. SUBJECT-MATTER CHARACTERIZATION
-classification of a factual situation into a legal category
-the legal category to which an issue is assigned determines the governing law…
e.g. Torts, contracts, family law or property
CON: Problem pervasive since at least 2 jurisdictions w/ divergent laws are involved

GIBBS V. GOV'T OF PI
FACTS:
-Eva Gibbs and husband Allison Gibbs were citizens of California
…domiciled in California
-they owned 3 parcels of land in MANILA, forming part of the conjugal partnership
-Eva died
-Allison was appointed as administrator
-Allison filed an ex parte petition wherein he alleged that in accordance with California law, all the conjugal properties would redound to the surviving spouse upon death
of one. He now seeks to be adjudicated as the SOLE AND ABSOLUTE OWNER of the lands [SEC1401, CIVIL CODE OF CALIFORNIA]
TC: FOR ALLISON, ISSUED A DECREE ADJUDICATING HIM AS HE PRAYED (sole and absolute owner of the property)
-Allison presented the decree to the Register of Deeds of Manila to demand a TCT
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA: refused to register because INHERITANCE TAX NOT YET PAID
-so Allison filed Petition for mandamus to compel Register of Deeds to issue TCT w/o payment of inheritance tax
CFI: should pay inheritance tax first
SC: Sc remanded the case to CFI for presentation of evidence regarding:
(1) pertinent Californian law at the time of Eva's death
(2) evidence w/ re reference dates of acquisition of the property
(3) California law at the time of acquisition

WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Administrative Code should apply ?

PRIL Page 29
WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Administrative Code should apply ?
Lex Rei Sitae. Therefore Philippine Law
-Real property is subject to the lex rei sitae. The respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptual contract, are determined by the
law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or of the place where the marriage was celebrated.
-HERE: since the properties were found in RP, Philippine law apply
-Applying NCC, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband,
subject t the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband.
-Wife had descendible interest, equal to that of her husband. That descendible interest is transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission is taxable
under RP Administrative Code.
-CHA: The court characterized the case as involving real property, thus, the land would be governed by lex situs. Since the lex situs makes the wife co-owner, upon her
death, her share is transferred by inheritance to the heirs so Husband would be liable to inheritance tax upon the transfer.
Disposition: 1/2 of the estate was taxed.

EAP notes
If characterized as succession case, law of domicile of decedent would apply - Allison would not have to pay tax

*~*~*~*
2. Substance-Procedure Dichotomy
-directs the court to the extent it will apply foreign law
-if issue SUBSTANTIVE: court may apply foreign law
-if issue PROCEDURAL: apply law of the forum
>why: rights and duties of parties arising from a legal situation shall not be substantially varied because of the forum in which an action is brought to settle
disputed questions arising out of the situation.
>If parties were frequently exposed to hazards and unknown requirements of foreign law, international commerce would hardly continue
>so courts seek to reference to the foreign law deemed appropriate, to protect parties against a substantial change of position because of the fortuitous
circumstance that suit is brought in that particular state
>if refer to foreign law, a heavy burden would be thrown upon the courts of the forum and the orderly administration of justice would be hampered an
delayed; makes administration of the foreign law by the local tribunal impractible, inconvenient, or violative of local policy

EAP notes
Why apply law of the forum if procedural issue: Due process + practicality (we can't presume to know what the procedure of the other state (foreign state) is)

GRANT v. MCAULIFFE
Facts:
-All the parties are Californian citizens, but the injury happened in Arizona
-Pullen, the negligent party, died - Mcauliffe appointed as his administrator. So the Plaintiffs claimed against estate of Pullen before California courts
>MTD by Mcauliffe: under Arizona law (law of the place of injury), action is barred
Arizona law California law
A tort action which has not been commenced before the death of the Causes of action for negligent torts survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be
tortfeasor must be abated maintained against the estate
TC: granted MTD, dismissed case

WON the claimants could claim against the estate (i.e. WON California law should apply)?
YES. Since Survival of COA is governed by the law of the forum (being merely procedural)
-Survival of COA is not an essential part of the COA itself but relates to the procedures available for the enforcement of thelegal claim of damages
-also applied most significant contacts approach: in this case
*decedent's estate is located in California
*letters of administration were issued to Mcauliffe in California
>the responsibilities of Mcauliffe as administrator of Pullen's estate, for injuries inflicted by Pullen before his death aregoverned by the law of California: forum law retains
control of the administration of the estate

*~*~*
Reactions to Grant Case: Negative!
-based on erroneous characterization that was greatly influenced by "sympathy factors"
-correct result, dubious method: it would be better if the court state explicitly the considerations that led them in the first place to determine what the result should be,
and indicate clearly how these considerations will be appraised in other cases

*problem: 'procedure' and 'substance' are so closely connected that in many cases a refusal to accept the foreign rule as to a matter falling into the doubtful class will
defeat the policy involved in following the foreign substantive law

2 problematic areas re: classification into procedure and substance


1. Statute of Frauds
-considered...
...substantive: words forbid the creation of obligation
...procedural: forbids the enforcement of the obligation
>so in RP: statute of frauds is procedural
WHY: if these conditions not complied w/, not enforceable (but contract may still exist - if oral evidence is not objected to)

MARIE v. GARRISON
Facts: Marie & Garrison entered into a contract of sale of interest in a land
-the said contract is declared void by NY statute of Frauds
Garrison Marie
NY Statute of frauds affected the remedy of the contract by prescribing evidence Substantive - goes to the existence of the contract
-rule of forum -law of contracting (not NY because it was executed outside NY)
WON the contract declared void by a statute still subsists as a contract with the only effect of depriving the party of a remedy or a mere word of evidence?
It was a word of substance.
-statute provided that the contract of sale of any interest in land shall be void unless it was in writing

2. Statute of Limitations and Borrowing Statutes


-traditionally classified as "procedural": bared only the legal remedy without impairing the substantive right involved
PROBLEM: a suit can still be maintained in another forum where it is not yet barred
-when substantive: if provides for a shorter period for certain types of claims that fall w/n a wider classification covered by a general statute of limitations

PRIL Page 30
-when substantive: if provides for a shorter period for certain types of claims that fall w/n a wider classification covered by a general statute of limitations
TEST to determine WON statute of limitations is procedural or substantive: SPECIFICITY TEST (Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co, Ltd)
>substantive: limitation directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right
Translation: there's a general rule which usually allows [the action to proceed], but there's a more specific rule which doesnot allow it

Borrowing statutes: bar the filing of a suit in the forum if it is already barred by the statute of limitations in the placewhere the COA arose
BUT in Cadalin v. POEA: although the statute of limitations of the place where the COA arose already barred the action, sinceit was against public policy, the action
was allowed to proceed

PRIL Page 31
VII. Problem of Renvoi
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
11:11 PM

A. DEFINITION OF RENVOI
Renvoi
-procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the conflict of laws rules of the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of law rules of which, in turn, refers the matter
to the law of the forum or a third state
-2 types:
• REMISSION: reference back to the law of the forum
• TRANSMISSION: reference to a 3rd state
-When usually employed:
*where domiciliary and nationality laws are applied to the same individual in issues involving
>succession
>domestic relations
>real properties

B. VARIOUS WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF RENVOI (GRISWOLD)


1st. REJECT RENVOI: FORUM COURT REFER TO THE "INTERNAL LAW" (law that would be applied to a domestic case that has no conflict -of-laws complications) OF ANOTHER
STATE
(forum: conflicts of law refer to foreign forum's INTERNAL LAW - so it would itself resolve the conflict, just apply substantial internal law of the other country without referring the
case to another forum)
2nd. ACCEPT RENVOI: FORUM COURT REFER TO THE "WHOLE LAW" OF ANOTHER STATE (includes choice -of-law rules - di ba conflicts of law rules?)
(FORUM: refer to foreign forum's WHOLE LAW) > FOREIGN: WHOLE LAW would include INTERNAL LAW + CONFLICTS OF LAW> if Conflicts o f Law rules of foreign forum
refers case back or to another forum….)

AZNAR V. GARCIA
Facts:
-Decedent: Edward Christiansen
>Citizen of the US, State of California at the time of death
>BUT was living in the Philippines at the time of death (domicile)
>and his Properties are in the Philippines
-Will of decedent:
>P3,600 to Maria Helena Christiansen-Garcia (the acknowledged natural child of decedent)
>The rest of the estate to Maria Lucy Christiansen-Daney (daughter)
-testate proceedings in PHILIPPINES
>>>HELENA GARCIA opposed: Philippine Law should apply!
LAW OF CALIFORNIA LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES
*California Probate Code: testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he Art16, NCC: National law of the person
desires (+ In re Kaufman) whose succession is in Question
*Art946, Civil Code of California: "If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
his domicile" (conflict of law rule for Californian citizens abroad)
TC: California law applies
MR/Appeal by Garcia: the conflicts of law rule of California reverts the issue back to the Philippines, thus, Philippine law should apply (thus
she is entitled to her legitime)

HELD: Apply PHILIPPINE LAW


(flow of the ruling)
1. What does forum law provide? Article 16: "national law" of the person whose succession is in question
2. What is the NATIONAL LAW of Edward Christiansen, who was a Californian citizen: in US, each state has its own private law so it can refer to
no other than the private law of the State of California.
3. If it is Californian Law, what law would be applicable in the disposition of Personal property (if real property and Philippi ne law the place
where the estate lies pede venue?)? 2 laws to be considered [see above]
"If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended a nd appropriate
sphere, the principle cited in In Re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
4. Since Edward Christiansen, though a Citizen of California, lives outside California, the court applied Article 946. But accor ding to appellees,
the said article provides that "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where property is situated…the aw of his domicile" applies
means that if the properties are situated in the Philippines, and if there is a law in the Philippines which provides that la w other than the
decedent's domicile would apply, then the Californian law should be applicable. They argue that since Article 16 of the NCC m akes the law of
the nationality (not the law of the domicile) applicable, then the Californian law should be applied:
"the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the Californian Civil Code, i.e ., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of law rules in Califo rnia, Article 946, Civil
code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philipp ines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue inc apable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the countr y of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile."
5. As Philippine INTERNAL law should apply, Natural Children legally acknowledged are forced heirs of the parents recognizing th em, therefore,
Helen should be entitled to her share in their father's estate.

****
Ma'am: by accepting the renvoi, and applying forum law (as the foreign forum referred the case back to the forum), the Court rendered justice to the natural child of the
decedent by granting her her legitimes.

3rd. DESISTANCE/MUTUAL DISCLAIMER OF JURISDICTION. Forum court refers to foreign court's law. Foreign law does not have a conflict of law rule which apply to non-nationals
so still apply forum law.
(same as accepting renvoi, but since foreign law not applicable when outside the foreign state, forum court desists in applying foreign law)

4th. FOREIGN COURT THEORY. Forum court would assume position of the foreign court, i.e. forum court would apply the law that the foreign court would apply if it had assumed
jurisdiction.

Note: In all the explanation given in the book, it appears that in Renvoi, there is no actual transfer of the case to another court. The forum court still exercises jurisdiction over the dispute
but just use renvoi to use other law or to desist from using foreign law.

DISADVANTAGE OF RENVOI: if both courts follow the same renvoi theory: no end to the case
Resembles…
…revolving doors

PRIL Page 32
…revolving doors
…a game of lawn tennis
...A logical cabinet of mirrors
…circulus inextricabilis

ANNESLEY , DAVIDSON V. ANNESLEY


-Testatrix:
*British subject
*lived in France
*have properties in France and Britain
*made a will in English form, executed in France, giving ultimate residue of her estate to her daughter absolutely
*also made a codicil in English form, executed it in France
*both Will and CODICIL contained provisions wherein testatrix emphasized her intent to remain a British subject and not to fix her domicile in
France
…she died
British law French Law
Testatrix is domiciled in France Testatrix should first comply with formal steps to acquire French domicile
No law on how to dispose of estate Testatrix could only dispose of 1/3 of property
-probate proceedings before English courts

WON the domicile of the Testatrix is England or France?


FRANCE.
1. English law provides 2 requirement to determine where domicile is:
1. Factum of residence (in France)
2. Animus Manendi [intent to stay there permanently?]
2. Testatrix complies with the 2 requirements and SO, in the English court (forum), she has her domicile in France (irrelevant if she failed to comply
with French law in acquiring French domicile)
3. Since France is where she is domiciled, what French law should apply?
French municipal law: if not legally domiciled in France + not a French National: law of that person's nationality (so British law applies)
4. So what does the British law provide: apply the law of the domicile (French Law)
5. So would French law accept it back? Yes, apply French Municipal law
HELD: According to French Law, French courts would apply French Municipal Law in administering the movable property of a deceased foreigner
(who according to his own law is domiciled in France and whose property must, in accordance to French law, be applied in accordance with the
law of the country in which he was domciled)…in short, apply FRENCH law then can only dispose of 1/3 of her estate by will!

C. USEFULNESS OF RENVOI
-avoid unjust results

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO V. DATER


-GEORGE Dater (and his wife, Nellie Dater) and JOHN Price (and his wife, CLARA Price) obtained a loan for $75k in CHICAGO
-the loan is secured by a property in CHICAGO owned by George and John Price.
-the checks for the loan were payable and was cashed in Chicago
-the debtor couples signed the trust mortgage and notes in Michigan (they were residents of Michigan), then delivered the documents back at
Illinois, Chicago
-upon death of Mr. Price, Mrs. Clara Price became the actual and record owner of at least 1/2 of the mortgaged property.
-Loan was not paid. So property was sought to be foreclosed by University of Chicago? In Chicago…
-George Dater was held liable while Clara Price (the widow) was absolved, no COA
-UNIVERSITY of CHICAGO appeals

WON Mrs. Price has the capacity to enter into an obligation in the state of Michigan (so as to make her liable)?
NO.
-dispute does not involve construction/force/effect of instruments BUT OF MRS. PRICE'S CAPACITY.
-(not sure): apply law of the place of performance (here it's Michigan)

Michigan law Illinois law


Mrs. Price has no personal liability on the note, recoverable from her separate estate The case is governed by Michigan law…Burr Case
Burr v. Beckler: the wife, who was in Florida, executed a note and trust deed in Florida to her husband who was in Chicago. As the note was
complete when delivered from Florida (thus, already completed in Florida), Florida law would apply, and since Florida law holds that she is not
competent to enter into a contract, her note and trust deed were void.
-Burr case and this case:
*manual delivery complete: already signed when delivered to the mortgagee
*no engagement to make the loan prior to delivery (money cashed after execution of mortgage)
*no advance payment of money

HELD: MICHIGAN LAW applies. MRS. PRiCE NOT LIABLE. A married woman cannot bind her separate estate through personal engagement for
the benefit of others.

***
University of Chicago v. Dater case is sound:
-Michigan protected Michigan wife; Illinois not interested in applying its law
-application of renvoi promoted uniformity of results inspite of discrepancies in the choice-of-law rules

OBJECTIONS TO RENVOI
1. CON: place the court in a perpetually enclosed circle from which it would never emerge and that it would never find a suitable body of substantive rules to apply to a particular
case - only workable if 2 states does not have same renvoi theory and if only 1 rejects renvoi
PRO: Dean Griswold
>False premise: the "chain" would stop if remission is to the state's INTERNAL LAW ALONE
>Allowed for necessity and expediency

2. CON: Courts may be unnecessarily burdened w/ the task of identifying the choice-of-law rules of another state
PRO: forum court would not use renvoi if it cannot ascertain what the conflict-of-law rules of the foreign state in the first place…

INAPPLICABILITY OF RENVOI IN A FALSE CONFLICT


False conflict: where only 1 state is interested in applying its law, the other state has no issue in its law not being applied
-Renvoi was held inappropriate in Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.:
NJ and Connecticut have identical substantive laws, Iowa has no interest in ensuring that its law be applied -so false conflict, no need to resort to renvoi as the application of NJ
law is like applying also Connecticut law

PFAU v. TRENT ALUMINUM CO.

PRIL Page 33
PFAU v. TRENT ALUMINUM CO.
Pfau
-domiciled in Connecticut
-Student of Iowa (Parsons College, Iowa)
Trent
-domiciled in NJ
-also a student of Iowa (Parsons College)
-Trent agreed to drive Pfau to Missouri using a car registered in NJ, insured in NJ, and insured by a carrier in NJ
-car collision (NJ registered car driven by Trent collided with Joseph Davis car when Trent failed to negotiate a curve) occurred in IOWA. Pfau
incurred injuries.
-Pfau sues before an NJ court

IOWA Guest Statute NJ and Connecticut Guest Statute


A host-driver is not liable to his passenger-guest for ordinary guest-passengers can recover from their host-divers for ordinary
negligence negligence
TRENT'S DEFENSE: he would not be liable PFAU's argument: Trent is liable
>as Pfau is a domiciliary of Connecticut, it appears that Connecticut would have a significant interest in applying it's substantive law
>TRENT RAISES IOWA LAW AS A DEFENSE: Iowa law should apply. If apply Connecticut law, should apply conflict of law rules. As Connecticut
adheres to LEX LOCI DELICTI, the law of the place where the incident happened should govern, i.e. Iowa law.

HELD: For PFAU!


1. Not definite that Pfau would be unable to recover in either Connecticut or Iowa
2. No reason for applying Connecticut's choice of law, as Connecticut's choice -of-law does not identify Connecticut's interest in the matter; does
not relate to a state's interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.
"since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and since the substantive laws of Connecticut and NJ are the same, this case presents a false
conflict and the Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to maintain an action for ordinary negligence.

***

BELLIS V. BELLIS
Amos Bellis
-born in Texas
-citizen of Texas
-executed a will in RP: all his property...
-had 2 marriages and some illegitimate children

Mary Mallen (1st wife)


-5 legit children in 1st marriage, 1 pre-deceased dad

Violet Kennedy (2nd wife)


-3 legit children

3 illegit children
-Oppositors-appellants

-Amos executed a will in the Philippines: estate to be divided as follows:


a. $40k to 1st wife
b. $120 to 3 illegit children ($40k each)
c. Remainder goes to 7 surviving children (it must be big!)

-will admitted for Probate in MANILA


-illegitimate children opposed project of partition: deprived of legitime as compulsory heirs

CFI: applied law of the nationality of the person whose succession is in question - Texas law

Texas law Philippine law


Did not provide for legitimes Provided for legitimes

W ON Texas law should apply? YES


-No renvoi in this case: same nationality, same domicile (both in Texas); besides, the opponents do not even rely on renvoi
-assuming there's a conflict-of-law rule in Texas providing that
...the law of the domicile should apply, still apply Texas law
…situs theory: properties are in RP so apply RP law
>>>but no proof that Texas has conflict-of-law situs theory
-defense 1 of oppositors: Art17, Par3 (which provides that Prohibitive laws in the Philippines shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments of foreign countries) is an exception to Art 16, par2 and A1039, which on the other hand provides that the national law of the
decedent applies with regard 4 items:
(1) order of succession
(2) amount of successional rights (thus, legitimes)
(3) intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
(4) capacity to suceed
>SC: Congress deleted in what supposedly is Art17 the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" which means
that their purpose was to make the 2nd paragraph of Article 16 a specific provision in itself to be applied to testate and intestate successions
*whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has no intention to extend the same to the
succession of FOREIGN NATIONALS. Specific provisions should prevail over general ones
-defense 2 of oppositors: decedent made 2 wills, supposedly 1 would govern Texas property and the other Philippine property. Thus, he intended
Philippine law to apply to his Philippine estate
>SC: as was held in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law (and not the law of his nationality) is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Art10
and Art16 provides.

PRIL Page 34
*PRIL December 8 Lecture
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
9:08 PM

Renvoi
-one of the escape devices resorted by the court to escape the injustice brought about by the mechanical application of a theory
*but you can see that the courts would do what they want to do: you can't really predict what the court would do
Article 15, NCC: national law governs personal law of a person
(family law, status…)

-when renvoi, foreign law would apply either forum law's state,
Or a third state.
e.g. in marriage
Example 1:
Husband is a national of country 1
Wife is a national of country 2
Marriage was celebrated in country 3

Example 2:
Husband and wife are nationals of country 1
They live in country 2

If forum is Philippines, not just look at Family code, can also look at:
*Civil Code
*Constitution (as to ownership of a foreigner of real properties in RP)

Example 3:
Citizens of Canada
Married in Australia
Properties in the Philippines
What if Canadian national law: Absolute Community Property
Australia provide CPG
…both provides that both husband and wife jointly own the properties…
But in RP where the property is located, prohibit foreigners from owning property!

APPROACHES IN DEALING WITH RENVOI


e.g. Forum court: state A >>>>refers jural matter to State B (not yet renvoi)
State B's law would either be Internal law or choice of law/conflict of law rules
*if State B refers to State A following its internal law, State A rejects renvoi
*if State B refers to State A following its conflict of law rules, State A is accepting renvoi

"referral of State B" not really referral, we don't know anyone from State B. So lawyer of party arguing laws of State B are applicable, lawyer sho uld do the research. Law would be pleaded and proved before the forum court. Court
would then have option of accepting or rejecting the foreign law.

Aznar v. Garcia
-will gave only P3600 to acknowledged natural child, while the rest was given to the other legitimate daughter. Acknowledged n atural child opposed, arguing her legitimes (in accordance with Philippine law) was denied of her. So what
law applies?
H: In the end, Philippine law applied.
_Philippine court refers to California law (place of nationality)
_California court refers to Philippine law (place of domicile)
_Philippine law would now apply its internal law = legitimes protected!
*Court accepted the renvoi to protect the rights of a natural child acknowledged by the decedent
CON: It's up to the courts when to apply renvoi - subject to abuse!

MUTUAL DISCLAIMER
-laws are passed to apply to a certain group of people - the citizens of that state!

FOREIGN COURT APPROACH


-forum court acts as if it's the foreign court
-Difficulties of Renvoi: How would the forum court know how the foreign law would rule

ANNESLEY V. ANNESLEY
-English subject lives in Francem, executed a will in France wherein she disposed more than 1/3 of her estate in favor of her daughter. However, French law does not allow such disposition of property
H: French law would apply - only dispose 1/3 of her estate through the will
-English law referred case to law of the domicile (French law)
-French law referred case to law of nationality (English law)
-English law referred it back to law of domicile (French law)
-Now English law thought of how French courts would have decided - and concluded that it would apply its own law - thus testatrix is limited to 1/3 disposition of her estate through a will
*shows why renvoi is criticized: eternal reference from one law to another!

USEFULNESS OF RENVOI
-avoid unjust results

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO V. DATER


-2 couples entered a trust agreement and mortgage with a Chicago creditor. The loan was performed in Chicago, but the agreemen ts were perfected (was signed by the parties) in Michigan.
-After death of husband, the wife was deemed by the creditor to substitute her husband. When they failed to pay the loan, fore closure of the properties was initiated and the debtors, including Mrs. Price, was being held liable.
H: Not liable, irrelevant if Michigan law or Illinois law applies

*use of renvoi in this case: court interested in protecting their own citizens.
-prevent injustice
…thus shows that it is an escape device

WHEN RENVOI INAPPLICABLE


False conflict: apparently, there's conflict between the laws in 2 states but not both states have interest in applying its own laws

PFAU (FAW) V. TRENT ALUMINUM CO.


-Pfau domiciled in Connecticut, Trent domiciled in NJ, both students in Iowa, injury happened in Iowa. Pfau got injured from n egligence of Trent, so sued Trent before NJ courts.
-NJ and Connecticut law both allows recovery from injuries resulting from ordinary negligence
H: Used MODERN APPROACH: determined which state has more interest in applying its laws - in this case, Connecticut (to protect its domiciliary)
-did not use Renvoi

*false conflict because the 2 places where the closer and most significatn relationship to the parties as well as to other fa ctors, those 2 places had no conflicting laws

BELLIS V. BELLIS
-domiciliary and national of TEXAS, owned properties (personal property) in RP
H: No real conflict!

PRIL Page 35
VIII. NOTICE AND PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
9:09 PM

A. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE


*the party whose COA or defense depended upon the foreign law HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FOREIGN LAW.
*foreign law treated as a QUESTION OF FACT to be properly pleaded and proved in conformity with the law of evidence of the st ate where it is presented.
*why treat it as a question of fact: the judge is not authorized to take JN of a foreign law and is presumed to know ONLY DOM ESTIC LAW

X: Delgado v. Republic: JN may be taken of a foreign law with which the court is evidently familiar. Familiarity with the foreign law may be because
(1) the law is generally known, e.g. Spanish or American law from which RP law was derived
(2) judge had previously ruled upon it in other cases

US: courts are allowed to take JN of the law of sister states as required by the full faith and credit clause of US Consti

B. PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW


Present either of the following:
(1) official publication of the law (R130.46)
(2) a copy of the law
…attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy
…if record not kept in the Philippines: must be accompanied w/ a CERTIFICATE that such officer has the custody.

*if actionable document executed abroad comprise the COA:


>public document: duly authenticated by Philippine consul attaching his consular seal to be admissible before RP Courts
>depositions (R23.11): list of persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries
a. On NOTICE: secretary of embassy/legation
…consul general
…consul
…vice consul
…consular agent of RP
b. Person/officer appointed by COMMISSION or under letters rogatory
c. Person which parties have stipulated IN WRITING

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIB) V. ESCOLIN


*this is a case discussed in Succession under Fideicommisary Substitution (which Sir Danicon said to have been ruled correctl y, i.e. no
fideicommisary substitution)
Facts:
-Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (husband and wife) provided mutually in their respective will a provision wherein they would g ive all their
estate to the surviving spouse, and upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of what has been inherited by the s urviving spouse
from the earlier deceased spouse would be bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the later deceased.
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator and later executor of the will. No liquidation was mad e.
-Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was initially also Mr. Hodges' estate b ut PCIB took
over. Probate proceedings for both estate initiated, the two administrators (PCIB and Magno) differed in the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in
their conjugal partnership property that she could have bequeathed to her heirs.
PCIB Magno
The estate left by Mrs. Hodges < 1/2 of her share Texas law applicable, wherein no system of legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges
in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine law), could not be less than her share or (?) >1/2
notwithstanding Art16 of our Civil code which
mandates the application of Texas law, Mr.Hodges
being a citizen of Texas
-there was also an allegation on the part of Magno (for the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges) that Mr. Hodges made a renunc iation of the
inheritance in a manifestation to the US inheritance tax authorities (probably to escape inheritance tax liabilities), which was allegedly
ratified by the heirs in the Philippines.

(court, though, did not rule on alleged renunciation. For purposes of the discussion, Court assumed that renunciation was not upheld)

WON Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be applied and not Texas law?
Texas law applies, but because of estoppel (?) and it is yet to be proven…

*note: in Succession, it was held in this case that there was no fideicommissary substitution so the 1st heir instituted (Mr. Magno) had no
obligation to preserve the properties inherited from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other heirs (the siblings)

*no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas (although it was arguing that RP laws apply), there
is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjgal estate
>>>so PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it (which is initial ly at least 1/2 of
the estate), for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other
controverted fact, create estoppel.

ISSUES THAT CAN BE DECIDED BY THE COURT:


1. Regardless what law is applicable and WON Mr. Hodges did renounce his share, it is clear from the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges
himself as executor of his wife's estate that there are properties which constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges which should b e distributed
among her heirs pursuant to her will
2. It is now beyond controversy that whatever be the provisions of Texas Law applicable, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1 /4 OF THE
CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES
-Existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant
to the law of Texas, should only be 1/3 of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes and admission of fact, and conseq uently, it would
be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to
be the actual provisions of Texas law...
3. Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should proceed, there having no prop er and legal
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate
4. Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs. Hodges's estate

WHAT CANNOT BE DECIDED:


1. WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share
2. WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of the conjugal property
>>>case is remanded to trial court to allow the parties to present evidence in relation to these issues

PRIL Page 36
RULING THAT MRS. HODGES'S ESTATE CANNOT BE LESS THAN 1/4 OF THE CPP VS. FINDING THAT NO EVIDENCE YET OF TEXAS
LAWS? Court said that evidence should still be presented re: what Texas law contains but PCIB now cannot allege that the esta te is less than
1/4…

*Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in di spute between the
parties in any proceeding, with the rare exceptional n instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge o f the court,
such as when they are well and generally known, or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of th e parties
concerned claim otherwise.

IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
Emil Johnson (decedent)
-native of Sweden
-Citizen of US (Illinois)
-resident of RP at time of death
-made a WILL
>holographic
>signed and written by him
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not conform with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippines, which requir ed 3
witnesses)

-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will was executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois (he was a citizen of Ill inois)
TC: declared the will to be legal and admitted it to probate
--after will probated, her alleged daugher, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree, saying that the will was not executed in
accordance with Illinois law, and that the decedent was not a resident of the state of Illinois

1. W ON Decedent a national of Illinois (to warrant the application of Illinois law)


YES. Proof adduced before TC showed he was indeed a national of Illinois. Petition merely contests the residence of the decedent t o be in the
Philippines, but not the nationality

2. W ON will executed in conformity with the State of Illinois


NOT REALLY SURE, BUT THE PETITIONER CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.
-Courts cannot take JN of Foreign laws: TC merely relied on the presentation of Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois as
exhibited in a volume of an annotation and assumed that he could take JN of the laws of Illinois. But it was WRONG!!!
-proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinati ve of the issues in
any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
-still,
(1) petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court fou nd
(2)petition did not raise any assignment of error to question the supposed taking of JN of the court

***

EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO PLEAD AND PROVE FOREIGN LAW


3 alternatives to the forum courts:
1. Dismiss the case for inability to establish a COA
2. Assume that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum
3. Apply the law of the forum

I. DISMISS THE CASE FOR INABILITY TO ESTABLISH COA


-court rests on the party relying on the foreign law the burden of introducing proof of the contents of such law.
-forum court would, upon proof of law, enforce a right existing under that foreign law. Hence, failure to prove its content re sults in failure to establish a prima face case

W ALTON V. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO.


Walton
-citizen and resident of Arkansas
-seriously injured while temporarily in Saudi Arabia by a truck owned by Saudi ARAMCO

Saudi ARAMCO
-incorporated in Delaware
-licensed to do business in NY
-engaged in extensve business activities in Saudi Arabia

-Walton sued Saudi Aramco in NY.


-no evidence of Saudi Arabian law alleged by plaintiff, nor did the defendant offered to prove it.
NY TC: no JN of Saudi Arabian law, directed verdict in favor of defendant
(so labo, di ba NY law ang basis nya or something? Is Walton claiming under Saudi Arabian law???)

HELD: Affirm. Absolve defendant Saudi Aramco


1. Apply NY Conflict of law rules
-substantive law applicable to alleged tort is the LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE ALLEGED TORT OCCURRED - so should apply Saudi
Arabian law…
2. BUT Saudi Arabian law was not proved.
-A federal court must receive evidence if it is admissible according to the rules of evidence of the state in which the court sits.
-Siegelman v. Cunard W hite Star: in this case, Court took JN of foreign law but this is an exception because US Court can easily
comprehend of ENGLISH decisions, which are like those of any state in US
-IN THIS CASE HOWEVER, it involved Saudi Arabian Law: Comprehension of foreign "law" is, to say the least, not easy, then, acc ording to
the somewhat narrow interpretation of the NY Statute by NY courts, a court "abuses" its discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes
judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not pleaded, and surely does so unless the party, who would otherwise have had the burden of
proving that "law", has in some way adequately assisted the court in judicially learning it
3. NO PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: In countries where the common law does not prevail, our doctrines relative to negligence, and to a
master's liability for his servant's acts, may will not exist or be vastly different. So Walton can't argue that the rudiment ary tort principles
should have been presumed to be recognized in Saudi Arabia.
4. May hugas kamay paragraph from the court: though it deemed unjust, as this involves both US citizens, the court said it shoul d strictly
enforce its laws

II. APPLY FORUM LAW


-parties who fail to introduce proof as to the content of a foreign law acquiesce to the application of the forum law
-theory: basic law is forum law; when foreign law not proved, then apply forum law

LEARY V. GLEDHILL

PRIL Page 37
LEARY V. GLEDHILL
-both parties were acquainted in the military service
-in the past, they had corresponded, resulting to Leary purchasing $1,000 worth of stock
-Gledhill invited Leary to France, wherein Gledhill told him that he needed $4,000 and he could already raise $2,000, but need ed Leary's help
to raise the $4,000. No mention of selling plaintiff shares of stock
-Leary returned to Germany. From there, he sent Gledhill $1,500 w/o indicating on the check or in the accompanying letter what the money
was for.
-Later, Leary sued Gledhill for recovery of the $1,500 before NJ courts, which was allegedly a loan to Gledhill
-Gledhill's defense: he didn't borrow money from Leary
>Moved to dismiss:
(1) no promise to repay
(2) no demand for repayment
(3) no pleading or proof of the law of France where the transaction occured

HELD: Apply NJ law


-transaction occurred in France
-France is not a common law jurisdiction (Court took JN): so inappropriate to presume that the principles of common law prevai l there.
*BUT HERE (cf. W alton v. Saudi Aramco): even if did not present French law, not deemed to have lost COA and the court could
presume any the ff:
(1) French law same as law of forum
(2) French law recognizes certain fundamental principles, e.g. that the taking of a loan creates an obligation upon the borro wer to make
repayment
(3) parties by failing to prove the law of France have acquiesced in having their dispute determined by the law of the forum
-so TC presumed that the law of France in common with that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability to make repayme nt under the
facts here present, and its decision is not w/o substantial merit
-CON: difficult to determine WON the question presented was of such a fundamental nature as reasonably to warrant the assumption th at it
would be similarly treated by the laws of all civilized countries
-here: the presumption # 2 (that forum law applies when parties fail to prove foreign law) is universally applied regardless o f the nature of
controversy
***

ZALAMEA V. CA. Court rigorously applied the rule requiring proof of foreign law, held that since foreign law pleaded but not proven, private respondent's conduct was
excused

ZALAMEA V. CA
(case of bumping off, WON overbooking is allowed in US)
-Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila agent of Tans World Airlines Inc. - 2 on 75% discount, and one
full-fare. All tickets confirmed in Manila and re -confirmed in NY
-Probably in NY, the 3 were wait-listed as their seats were already taken. As Mr. Zalamea was holding the full -fare ticket, he was allowed to
board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea and their daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to Manila from other airlines
-Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based on breach of contract of carriage before RTC Makati
-RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD + Atty's fees
-CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking being an accepted practice in US Airlines so no fraud nor bad faith on the part of Tran sWorld
Airlines

WON MD should have been awarded for BF on part of TransWorld Airlines? YES. Overbooking = BF
1. US law allowing overbooking never proved. Just presented statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather (customer service agent) in her de position
wherein she said that OVERBOOKING WAS ALLOWED based on the Code of Federal Regulations fo the Civil Aeronautics Board.
-what is required to be able to prove foreign law:
*official publication
*copy of the written law attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or his deputy + certificate that su ch officer has
custody + seal of the office of the officer who made the certification
>who can make the certification:
…secretary of an embassy or legation
…consul general
…consul
…vice consul
…consular agent
…any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
-here, none presented to prove contents of the Code of Federal Regulations for the Civil Aeronautics Board
-so CA erred in finding that overbooking is allowed under US laws
2. Even if there is such US law existing allowing overbooking, it's irrelevant!
-lex loci contractus applies: tickets sold, issued in RP so RP law applicable
3. Overbooking = BF
-where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case al l of them would
show up for check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenge r is entitled to
an award of moral damages
-even if overbooking allowed, TWA still guilty for not informing its passengers beforehand
***
Under venue in Warsaw: Art28
1. Court of the place of domicile of the carrier
2. Court of the principal place of business of the carrier
3. Court where the transaction occurred
4. Court of the place of destination

III. PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION/ PRESUMED-IDENTITY APPROACH


-forum presumes that the foreign law is the same as forum law

MICIANO V. BRIMO
*this is also a case in succession where decedent wants RP law, instead of Turkish law, to apply, and one of brothers was thr eatened to be
disinherited
Joseph Brimo
-Turkish National
-but had properties in the Philippines
-and executed will in the Philippines, which contained a provision which provided that the disposition of his properties shoul d be done in
accordance with Philippine laws, and that an heir who opposes such will would be deprived of his share.
-Andre Brimo, his brother, opposed the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator of Joseph's estate on the g round that the
will was not in accordance with the laws of Turkey, thus void for violating Art. 10, NCC:
"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the succes sional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated."

PRIL Page 38
be situated."

-no proof presented


…that the will was not executed in accordance with Turkish laws
…of the Turkish laws applicable

HELD: Turkish law should be applied so provision in the will void. Brimo would not be disinherited, because of the impossibil ity of
the condition imposed upon him.
1. Court presumed that Turkish laws were the same as RP laws (processual presumption)
2. Since under our law, the project partition was valid, it should be upheld.
3. However, provision of the will with regards application of RP law instead of Turkish laws is void (but still used RP laws in distributing the estate of the
decedent, but with the excuse that the Court was just presuming Turkish laws to be the same as RP laws…)

Xxx
*use of most significant relationship theory/disingenuous characterization: same conclusion w/o flouting testator's intention (to use RP law)

Xxx

SUNTAY V. SUNTAY
*again, a succession case…but I cannot find the digest…maybe it's under another subject…hmmm…
Jose Suntay
-Filipino Citizen
-resident of the Philippines
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China
-left properties in RP, and a house in China
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd wife and child of 2nd marriage

-2 proceedings:
*intestate proceedings, one of the children of the 1st marriage appointed as administrator of the estate
*Testate proceedings, by the widow showing a will allegedly executed in 1929 in RP
>denied: loss of will before hearing
>appealed: further proceedings, deposition of witnesses to a will taken : still dismissed
-Pacific war ensued

-after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino) presented the alleged will of his father in Chinese Characters executed and signed by him in 1931
and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in Amoy, China
-presented petition for probate of either the 1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931 will - both DISALLOWED

W ON EITHER OF THE W ILL COULD BE PROBATED? NO…NONE COULD BE PROBATED


1. AS TO THE 1929 PHILIPPINE W ILL: not proved by Credible witnesses
-Silvino failed to present 2 credible witnesses to prove the provisions of the lost 1929 will
-CREDIBLE Witnesses: competent witnesses, not rely on hearsay

2. AS TO THE ALLEGED PROBATED 1931 W ILL: was not established


-Rule 78.1: if will probated in another country, if could be allowed, filed and recorded by proper CFI
-Rule 78.2: copy of will + allowance is filed before CFI, court shall fix time and place for hearing, and cause notice to be given as in case of
original will
-Rule 78.3: if will allowed in RP, court shall issue certificate of allowance, signed by Judge, attested by the seal of the court, file d and
recorded by clerk, and will would have same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court
-in this case: failed to prove…
…Municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court
…law of China on procedure in probate or allowance of wills in 1931
…here, just presented the unverified answers of Consul General of RC (depositions) which are INADMISSIBLE:
>Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds the Chinese law an expert of Chinese law on procedure in proba te
matters
>if admitted, adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross -examine witnesses
-plus: proceeding in Amoy, China court were not probate proceedings, but was conducted for the taking of the testimony of 2 at testing
witnesses to the will

3. PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court, it may be presumed that
the proceedings in the probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those in RP Courts
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices through personal service or service by publication
-so since no notice of the proceedings before Amoy, China that it was a probate proceeding, it cannot be deemed as a probate
proceeding and is deemed as merely a deposition or perpetuation of testimony

Xxx

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FISHER


WATLTER STEVENSON
-born in RP
-but parents both Brit
-married to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson (also British) in 1909
-instituted his wife as sole heiress
-initially field inheritance and estate tax returns covering the whole estate but later filed an amended return (made it small er)
-CIR: assessed taxable net deduction: used Article 124, NCC: property relation of spouses determined by national law (law of E ngland)
And English law does not recognize legal partnerships between husband and wife, all properties acquired during marriage belon g to
husband exclusively
BOTTOMLINE: assess estate tax based on the whole property of Walter (which would have been just 1/2 if based on RP law)
CTA: apply RP Law - no proof of English law, no prenuptual agreement: so applying laws of RP, contracting parties presumed to have adopted
the system f conjugal partnership as to properties acquired during the marriage

W ON RP law should be applied? No. But not proved so presumed that RP Laws same as English law
Presume that English law is the same as RP laws = only asses estate and inheritance tax on 1/2 of the estate.
1. W hen stevensons married during 1909, old civil code still applies.
Old civil code New civil code
Nationality theory of determining property relation of Same
spouses where one is a foreigner, no prenuptual
agreement: follow husband's nationality
Limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land Includes marriages celebrated in RP and aborad
…but both only applies to mixed marriages. Here, both spouses are Brits!

PRIL Page 39
2. Manresa said English law (the law of the husband's nationality) should be used.
3. But no proof of English law presented by CIR. So apply processual presumption, presume English law = RP laws

Xxx

BOARD OF COMMISIONERS (CID) V. DELA ROSA


-deportation proceedings where initiated against WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, with CID alleging that he failed to prove the legality of the marriages
of his Filipino grandfather (Santiago) to his grandma as well as the marriage of his Father (Francisco) to his mom, both of which were
celebrated in China (his grandma and mom were Chinese citizens).
-no evidence to prove that under Chinese law (which was not also proved), the marriages were valid.
-as no evidence that William Gatchalian was born in a valid marriage(ie born outside marriage), he is deemed to have followed the citizenship
of his mom (CHINESE) - same thing with his dad!

W ON W illiam Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen? NO.


1. Apply processual presumption: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on particular subject are presumed to be the same
as RP laws
-here, no proof of Chinese laws applicable, so use RP laws
2. W hy no proper evidence presented: only presented Hearsay evidence which is admissible as proof of pedigree
*granddad's marriage certificate was allegedly destroyed or lost during the Japanese occupation, and Citizenship Investigatio n Bureau just
listened to his testimony.
*Francisco was also just required to give testimonies before Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth,
and relationship to each other
-the said testimonies are ADMISSIBLE as statements or declarations regarding family tradition or reputation in matters of pedi gree (in
accordance with the NCC, FC and ROC)
3. Philippine law: Lex loci celebrationis
-all marriages performed outside RP in accordance with the laws in force in the country were performed and valid there shall a lso be valid in
this country
-all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family
-he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our laws bear the burden of proof to present the foreign law
4. MARRIAGE OF GRANDPA AND PAPA VALID: CID failed to prove that it was invalid in accordance with Chinese laws
-since the rule is that a legitimate child follows the citizenship of is father, his father is a Filipino citizen as the marri age of his grandpa with
grandma is valid. As his father's marriage to his mother is also valid, William Gatchalian is also a legitimate child, thus w ould follow
citizenship of dad, thus Filipino
****
(note: at first, it was Gatchalian who was required to prove the existence of Chinese law to prove that the marriages of his g randpa and papa were valid. But with the presumption in
favor of the solidarity of families, the burden of proving that the marriages were not valid, thus, of proving the Chinese la w which says so, was transferred to CID )

FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DECIDING EITHER TO APPLY DOMESTIC LAW OR TO DECIDE CASE AGAINST PARTY WHO FAILED TO PROVE FOREIGN LAW FROM WHICH HIS
CLAIM ARISES:
1. Degree of public interest involved in the dispute
2. Accessibility of foreign law materials to the parties
3. Possibility that plaintiff is merely forum shopping
4. Similarities between forum laws and foreign law on the issue in point
(usually forum law only applied when issue involves marriage and family relations)

C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW


GR: look into application of foreign law and apply it
Basis: comity and reciprocity
X: 3 MAIN CATEGORIES (look at previous notes)
(1) local law expressly provides
Civil Code
Article 16: makes real and personal proerty subject to the law of the country where they are situated
Intestate and testamentary succession: governed by lex nationale of the person whose succession is under consideration
Article 829: makes revocation done outside the Philippines valid according to the law of the place where the will was made or lex domicill i
Article 819: prohibits Filipinos from making joint wills even if valid in the country where they were executed

(2) failure to plead and prove foreign law or judgments


-as seen above

(3) case falls under exceptions to rule of comity


-Art17, Par3: PROHIBITIVE LAWS concerning
*persons
*their acts
*or property0
*and those which have for their object
…public order
…public policy
…and good customs
…shall not be rendered inefffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
In a foreign country

UNDER EXCEPTIONS:
1. FOREIGN LAW IS CONTRARY TO IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM
Public policy:
-principle of law
...which holds that no subject or citizen
...can lawfully commit any act
...which has a tendency to be
>injurious to the public or
>against public good.

Public Policy Technique


-situation in which the court declines to give due course to a claim existing under a foreign law
..because it considers the nature of the claim unconscionable
or its enforcement would "violate a
>fundamental principle of justice,
>some prevalent concept of good morals,

PRIL Page 40
>some prevalent concept of good morals,
>some deep-rooted tradition of the commonwealth.
-dismissal through this method is technically not dismissal on the merits BUT in reality, plaintiff cannot get jurisdiction in any other court

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION (PIA) V. OPLE


PIA
-foreign corporation licensed to do business in RP
-hired IN THE PHILIPPINES 2 FILIPINAs as stewardess, the contract containing provisions
...that they have a right to terminate the services of the Filipinas upon notice and
...that the agreements shall be construed under and by laws of Pakistan and ONLY THE COURT OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN shall have
jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the agreement
-instead of the 3year contract, the 2 stewardess were terminated 1y4m before the expiration of their contract
-2 Filipina employees filed a COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND NONPAYMENT OF COMPANY BENEFITS AND BONUSES vs. PIA
before Ministry of Labor and Employment
-as defense, PIA invoked the provisions of its contract (that Pakistani law should apply, and that the case should have been filed befor e
Karachi courts)

W ON the contract provisions should be followed (i.e. W ON Pakistani law should apply and the case brought before Pakistani Cou rts)?
NO
1. PIA cannot invoke Par10 (venue and applicable law) of its contract to prevent application of labor laws and regulations of th e
Philippines because
*the EER is a relationship affected w/ public interest
*In accordance with Art17.3: RP Labor laws cannot be rendered illusory by parties agreeing upon some other law to govern thei r relationship

2. PIA cannot invoke that Karachi court is the sole venue for the dispute: court used place of significant contacts approach
*contract executed in RP
*contract was between Philippine citizens and a corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines (therefore a Resident Company)
*though the Filipina stewardesses were assigned in the Middle East and Europe, they were based in the Philippines in between assignments
-Par10 cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law
3. PIA did not invoke the Pakistani law applicable: so presume as same as Philippine law (applied Processual Presumption)

Xxx
CRITIQUES TO THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
*ulitimate escape device: Court can disregard the applicable law to arrive at its desired result without having to provide th e rigorous level of analysis required to explain
the shift
*intolerable affectation of superior virtue
*court of the forum sits in judgment over the wisdom and soundness of the applicable foreign law

Test when the public policy exception is properly invoked : WHEN THE FOREIGN COURT IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE FOREIGN LAW IS
*BARBAROIUS IN ITS PROVISIONS OR
*FRIGHTFULLY UNJUST IN THE PARTICULAR CASE
XXX

2. THE FOREIGN LAW IS PROCEDURAL IN NATURE


Why: Judicial convenience
-impractical for the court of the forum to adopt the procedural machinery of another state
Problems: characterization of the foreign law into procedural or substantive
e.g. Statute of Frauds and Statute of Limitaitions

3. ISSUES ARE RELATED TO PROPERTY (LEX SITUS)


*IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE IT IS LOCATED
-in the NCC: we included Personal property in the Lex Situs rule (Art17)

When Lex situs applicable:


*sale
*exchange
*barter
*mortgage
*any form of alienation of property (SEBMA)

3 reasons why lex situs governs property:


a. Land and everything attached to it are w/n the exclusive control of the state: only State officials can lawfully deal with th em physically - their consent necessary
b. Immovables are of greatest concern to state
c. Demands of certainty and convenience

Exceptions to lex situs rule: to follow

4. THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN CLAIM IS FISCAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE


GR: state is not obliged to enforce the revenue law of another
e.g. BANCO DE BRAZIL V. AC ISRAEL COMMUNITY CO: court deny enforcement of tax claims by foreign countries on local residents

View that Fiscal laws = Penal laws (JUDGE LEARNED HAND)


MOORE V. MITCHELL: Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning (as penal laws); they affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its criminal laws. No court
ought to undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute w/o determining whether these laws are consonant w/ its own notions o f what is proper

View that Fiscal law ≠ Penal laws: (PROFESSOR LEFLAR)


Tax laws are not passed to punish people. Its an obligation of the citizen who enjoys the protection of government to share t he expense of maintaining the government.

5. FOREIGN LAW OR JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO GOOD MORALS ( CONTRA BONOS MORES)


-the determination of what is contrary to good morals is left to the forum court trying a particular case
Contra Bonos Mores (American definition) : acts
*having mischievous or pernicious consequences
*against true principles of morality
e.g.
>hiring for killing
>bribery of public officers
>marriage between ascendants and descendants (incest!)

PRIL Page 41
>marriage between ascendants and descendants (incest!)

CRITIQUE: inherent subjectivity

6. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW WILL WORK UNDENIABLE INJUSTICE TO THE CITIZENS OF THE FORUM
7. THE FOREIGN LAW IS PENAL IN CHARACTER
Chief Justice Marshall: Courts of no country execute penal laws of another.

What is penal? HUNTINGTON V. ATTRILL: whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforece it to be, in its essential character and effect, a pubish ment of
an offense against the public
LOZADA V. POSADAS: when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state which under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon
>>>this definition however was broadened in common use as penal statutes were understood to include
>"all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation"
> impose a penalty for their commission

What is a penalty? Restatement of Conflicts of laws: a sum of money exacted as punishment for a civil wrong (there's a claim or right)
Vs. compensation: for loss suffered by injured party

Penal laws and Revenue laws: deemed as different, but there are views holding Revenue laws as penal in character

EXTRADITION
Basis: jurisdictional cooperation + assistance among States in the enforcement of their criminal laws
Scope: all offenses except Political or religious
What happens: when a person indicted for a penal offense or a convict serving sentence ESCAPES to another country, the receiving country ha s legal obligation to
surrender escapee to the State from which he escaped

8. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW MIGHT ENDANGER THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE STATE

PRIL Page 42
*PRIL December 10 Lecture
Thursday, December 10, 2009
10:59 PM

Philippine laws
-should be published…
>15 days after publication: effectivity

Civil Procedure - review


PCIB v. Escolin:
GR: Can't take JN of foreign law
X: * familiar with court
* Court already ruled using same law

*shows that Foreign law, even if it is really the law applicable, cannot be applied if not properly proved

In Re Estate of Johnson: how to prove foreign law


-but failure to prove - can't do anything about it
-here, only presented an annotation of the alleged applicable law and lower court took JN of it. However, the party failed to raise this as an error AND did not prove what
foreign law contained, SC cannot invalidate the probate of the will

3 possible effects of failure to prove foreign law


1. dismiss: failed to establish COA
2. apply law of the forum
3. processual presumption

I. Failed to prove what foreign law is and you are using it as your source of claim. If fails to do so, no COA

Walton vs. Saudi Aramco


-dismissed case because failed to present laws of Saudi Arabia, which is not familiar with the US court, thus, which cannot be taken JN of US Courts
Problem: both parties are American citizens. Plus Saudi Aramco was more in the position to know what Saudi Arabian law is, Walton being a mere transient of the place
*Can't argue "rudimentary principles" because there would only be common sense if there's a shared experience

2. Apply FORUM LAW (through Acquiescence)


In filing case before the forum, deemed to have been prepared to comply with forum law

Leary v. Gledhill
-Leary sued Gledhill but Gledhill averred that since transaction occurred in France, French law should apply. US Court said that even if French law was not proven, it can
be assumed that the parties acquiesced to the application of forum law, and under forum law, Leary can recover.

Zalamea v. CA
-Zalameas were bumped off their flight back home. Upon coming home, they sued for Damages. Ca removed MD, taking JN of US law allowing overbooking. Court held
that CA erred, the alleged Federal law applicable not being properly proved. But actually irrelevant because law of the place of transaction should have been applied, i.e.
RP laws, wherein overbooking is deemed BF
-In US, it is a practice that overbooking is allowed because many often does not appear

3. Processual presumption
Miciano v. Brimo
-Turkish national executed a will making RP laws apply to the disposition of his estate. Court held that Turkish law should be applied, thus making the provision in his will
void. BUT since failed to prove Turkish law, presume that RP law same as Turkish law so in the end, applied RP laws in distributing the estate among the heirs

Suntay v. Suntay
-the 2nd will presented before the court was allegedly probated already in China. The GR is that if the will is duly admitted and probated in another country, it would be
recognized in RP. However, should first prove that the said court is a probate court and also prove what Chinese Probate laws are. However, none given so presumed that
probate proceedings in China same with RP probate procedures. In accordance with RP Probate proceedings, should send notices

CIR vs. Fisher


-CIR wanted to apply English law to collect more from the widow of Fischer, but failed to prove what English law provides (as regards the community property of the
spouses) so Court presumed English law to be the same as RP Law, therefore, only 1/2 belongs to the deceased husband. CIR collects only based on 1/2 of the estate.

After Fisher tumalon si ma'am sa exceptions to the application of foreign law


3 main categories
4. Forum law expressly provides that forum law applies
5. Foreign law is not proved
6. Case falls under exceptions
a. Foreign law is contrary to important public policy of the forum
-court would decline to rule upon a case when recognizing that would violate the forum's public policy
Pakistan International Airlines Corp v. OPLE: Court would not use foreign law if the said application would run counter to the Philippine state's policy of protecting
labor
-in this case, the contract provides venue and choice of law:
In the Philippines, the law of the contract is the intent of the parties (lex loci contractus)
*Justice Feliciano is a PRIL person
*used here most significant relationship (choice of law), not minimum contact (on jurisidiction)
-here, if refer to RP law, should have looked at choice of law rules (therefore, look at the intended law to have been applicable by the parties - Pakistani law). But
here, Justice Feliciano looked at the internal law of the Philippines
b. Foreign law is procedural
-for the convenience of administration of justice
c. Foreign law is penal
-the State is the aggrieved party
-laws of extradition remedies this limitation of application of foreign law
-if we use modern approach, would this remain an exception (interest analysis + Comparative impairment test): pede, if interest of foreign law (in applying its own
penal law) is greater than the interest of the forum law (where no penal law was violated, he's just found there)

PRIL Page 43
penal law) is greater than the interest of the forum law (where no penal law was violated, he's just found there)
e.g. Polanski: had many sexual relationship with young women, and was found guilty of having sex w/14 years old. Escaped fromthe place where it happened, after
several years, was extradited back.
d. Issues related to Property
Reasoning:
i. Land and everything attached to it are w/n the exclusive control of the state: only State officials can lawfully deal with th em physically - their consent
necessary
ii. Immovables are of greatest concern to state
iii. Demands of certainty and convenience\
-an exception!
e.g. Foreigner marries a Filipina. However, here, he's not allowed to own real property in RP. So still follow law of situs, i.e. Philippine law
e. Foreign law is revenue/fiscal/administrative law
"taxes are the lifeblood of the state"
-mark of sovereignty
f. Foreign law is contrary to good morals
g. Foreign law's application would work injustice to the citizens of the forum
h. Foreign law might endanger vital interests of the state

PRIL Page 44
Part 3: PERSONAL LAW
Monday, December 14, 2009
4:14 PM
IX. NATIONALITY
A. IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL LAW
-an individual's nationality or domicile serves as a permanent connection between the individual and a
state
-personal law would allow courts to exercise jurisdiction or determine the governing choice-of-law rule
on a specific situation or transaction involving him

Personal law
-follows an individual wherever he is
-governs transactions which affect the individual most closely
e.g. marriage
Divorce
Legitimacy
Capacity to contract

History:
*Medieval City States of Italy: commercial activities ensued between inhabitants of different cities of
different sovereign states = DOMICILE AS BASIS FOR PERSONAL LAW
*Code of Napoleon (1803) and Austrian Code (1812): LAW OF NATIONALITY

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF NATIONALITY AS PERSONAL LAW


Merits:
*establish requisite link between individual and state because the laws of each state was presumed to
be made for an ascertained population (based on that's population's physical and moral qualities)
*individual's nationality easily verifiable from documents

Demerits:
*does not solve problems relating to
>stateless individuals
>individuals w/ multiple nationalities
*does not give decisive solution in states w/ diverse legal systems (US - no single law)
*person's ties with a nation may be attenuated (national of State A but lives most of his life in State B -
see Nottebohm) - no shared identity or belonging with a particular state

IMPORTANCE F NATIONALITY IN THE PHILIPPINES


National law theory
-it is the nationality or citizenship of the individual that regulates his
*civil status
*capacity
*condition
*family rights and duties
*laws on succession
*capacity to succeed
-Ellis v. Republic: a conflict of laws theory by virtue of which jurisdiction over the particular subject
matter affecting a person (such as status of a natural person) is determined by the latter's nationality
-in RP conflicts of law: nationality = citizenship
But in Political law, different
Citizens Nationals
Enjoy full political and civil Don't enjoy such rights BUT owe allegiance to the state, entitled to
rights the state's protection
Art15, NCC: Nationality principle in RP
-laws relating to:
1. Family rights and duties
2. Status
3. Condition
4. Capacity of persons
…binding upon Filipino citizens even though living abroad
-origin of nationality theory: French laws
-individual's private rights should be determined not by his physical location BUT BY HIS POLITICAL
ALLEGIANCE
-national identity as born in French revolution and Italian struggle for national unity

B. DETERMINATION OF NATIONALITY
-depends on the municipal laws of each state
HAGUE CONVENTION ON CONFLICT OF NATIONAL LAWS:
Art1: "It is for each state to determine who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States
insofar as it is consistent with international convention, international customs, and the principles of law
generally recognized w/ regard to nationality"
Art2: Questions as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state "shall be
determined in accordance with the law of that state."

1987 CONSTI: ARTICLE IV: WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS


1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of the 1987 Consitution (ratification on Feb 2, 1987;
effective Feb 11?)
2. Fathers and mothers are Filipino citizens
3. Born before January 17, 1973 + Filipino mothers + elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching age of
majority
4. Naturalized according to law
*note: #s 1-3 are considered NATURAL-BORN Citizens

1. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS


-those who are citizens of a particular state w/o having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
citizenship
Jus soli principle Jus sanguinis principle
Looks to the law of the place of one's birth Rule of descent or blood
You're a citizen of the place of your birth Your citizenship depends on your parents
Followed in common law countries Followed in the Philippines
Aznar v. COMELEC (see later parts): presume that an individual is Filipino if he has a Filipino father

PRIL Page 45
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1991)

PRIL Page 46
x-----------------------------------------------------------*-----------------------------------------------------------x
2. CITIZENS BY NATURALIZATION
Naturalization
-confers to an alien a nationality
after birth
by any of the means provided by law
-in RP: by judicial method under CA no. 473
-during Martial Law (LOI No. 276): not applicable anymore
-removed:
*filing of Declaration of Intention
*filing of Income Requirements
*Language requirement: as long as able to speak and write Filipino/English/Spanish/any principal
Filipino language

QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPLICANTS FOR NATURALIZATION (note: iba pa DISQUALIFICATIONS) (Section 2,


CA 473)
1. AGE: Not less than 21 on date of HEARING the petition (so could file while 20 y.o.)
2. RESIDENCE: resided in RP + Continuously + not less than 10 years
3. Good moral character
Believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Consitution
Must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in RP in his relations w/ the constituted government + community in which he is living
4. ECON: Own real estate + in RP + worth NOT LESS THAN p5K
+ must have some lucrative trade/profession/lawful occupation
5. LANGUAGE: able to SPEAK & WRITE English/Spanish/any one of the principal Philippine languages
6. CHILDREN & SCHOOL: enrolled minor children of school age
…in any PUBLIC or PRIVATE SCHOOL recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools
…where PHILIPPINE HISTORY
GOVERNMENT\
And CIVICS are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum
…during the entire period of the residence required of him (not less than 10 years)
…PRIOR TO HEARING of his PETITION for naturalization as citizen

More discussion:
*On 10 yr-continuous residence requirement
Ratio: enable government to
*observe applicant's conduct
*ensure that applicant has imbibed the principles and spirit of our Consti
When reduced to 5 years: Applicant… (Section 3, CA 473)
1. honorably held office under Gov't
2. Established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in RP
3. Married to a Filipino woman
4. Engaged as a teacher (public or private - but not int'l school) for 2 years
(note however YEE V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 7 SCRA 832: only Filipino citizens can be
public school teachers)
5. Born in RP

*On CHARACTER
-requires:
+Good Moral character
+conducted self in a PROPER + IRREPROACHABLE manner
Proper and Irreproachable conduct
-higher standard of morality than good moral character
-moral character of the highest degree, not enough to be a law-abiding citizen (Dy Lam Go vs. Republic)
-EVIDENCE: testimony of 2 character witnesses
>well known in the community and enjoy such a high reputation for probity (honesty/integrity),

PRIL Page 47
>well known in the community and enjoy such a high reputation for probity (honesty/integrity),
their word may be taken on its face value
>can't be employees of the petitioner
>must have known applicant for the period prescribed by law
>had opportunity to observe him personally
>can attest to the possession of the applicant of the qualifications - e.g. proper and irreproachable
conduct during the entire period of residence

-on consti requirement: not merely recitation BUT BELIEF!

*ON ECONOMIC REQUIREMENT


>REAL ESTATE worth P5k (min)
>lucrative trade, profession, lawful occupation

YU KIAN CHIE VS. REPUBLIC (1965)

x---------------------------------------------------x
(econ requirement continued)
Lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
-substantial gainful employment or the obtaining of tangible receipts
-appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate support for himself and
his family in the event of sickness, unemployment or disability to work
-his financial condition must be such as to permit him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization
-regard w/ caution if family business

Real estate requirement


-at odds with Article XII, Section 7 of 1987 Consti: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain"

GR: Aliens can't own lands


X:
1. Intestate succession (Section 2, BP 185, effective 1982): allowed natural-born citizen who had lost his
Filipino citizenship to be a transferee of a private land for residential purposes
...as long as it did not exceed 1,000 m2 (urban)
1 ha (rural)
Why intestate: if otherwise, it would allow aliens to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land

2. In pari delicto: vendor (who knew that he was selling to an alien) cannot file suit to void sale to an alien
(who cannot own land, and must have known it)
3. Foreigner later naturalized as a Filipino:purpose of prohibition is to prevent the patrimony of our
nation for future generations of Filipinos; since vendee already a Filipino, end would not be frustrated

*ON LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS


-not enough that applicant understands

*ON MINOR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS


Ratio: for the children to learn and imbibe customs and traditions and ideals of Filipinos to prepare
them for a life of responsible and law abiding citizenship
-should be complied with and proven
-insufficient finances not an excuse for failing to comply with this requirement
-initial failure to comply with this requirement is a BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PETITION even if during 2nd
petition, child no longer of school age (meaning, nakapag-aral na sa ibang school not under the law)
-not allowed if predominantly composed of children of a specific race (e.g. Chiang Kai Shek mostly caters
Chinese children)
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION


GR: state that has the burden of proving disqualification of applicant for citizenship
X: if applicant claims that he is Filipino, has burden of proof…weird to actually

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;

PRIL Page 48
during the period of such war;
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

Moral turpitude
-act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social life in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary law of right and duty between men
or conduct contrary to honesty, modesty, or good morals

Co-mingling requirement
-can't qualify if kept wife and children in a neighboring country, merely visiting them

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

C. PROCEDURE FOR NATURALIZATION


1. File declaration of intention to become a citizen (unless exempted)
2. File petition for naturalization
3. Publication: in OG or newspaper of general publication
4. Hear petition
5. If approved: rehearing after 2 years after promulgation of judgment awarding naturalization
6. Take oat of allegiance to support and defend Consti + Philippine laws

Declaration of Intention
WHEN: 1 year prior to filing of petition
WHERE: w/ OSG
CONTENTS: it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of RP

Exemptions:
1. Born in RP + received primary and secondary education in public schools/private schools
recognized by Government, not limited to any race or nationality
2. Resided continuously in RP for min 30 years before filing their petition
3. Widow and minor children of an applicant for naturalization who died pending petition for
naturalization
-if exempted, still has to file a statement as to his exemption and the reasons therefor to apprise the
public, especially those officers charged with notice of the application, of the reasons advanced to
support exemption claim, to prepare them to contest it - FAILURE TO DO SO IS FATAL

WHO HEARS THE PETITION: RTC of the province in which petitioner has resided for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition
-RTC has exclusive jurisdiction

EFFECT OF NATURALIZATION ON WIFE AND CHILDREN (SECTION 15, CA 473)


WIFE:
-married (before or after naturalization of husband/citizen of Philippines)
-herself lawfully qualified to be naturalized (issue: WON comply with Qualifications ONLY or both
QUALIFICATIONS and DISQUALIFICATIONS)
MINOR CHILDREN
a. Born in RP: considered RP Citizen
b. Born outside RP, in RP at time of naturalization of parent: AUTOMATIC RP citizen
c. Born outside RP, not in RP at time of naturalization of parent: deemed RP Citizen ONLY during
minority
-considered to continue being such after being of age if he begins to permanently reside in RP
while still a minor
d. Born outside RP, AFTER naturalization of parent: considered RP Citizen IFF
*w/n 1 year after reaching age of majority…
*registers as a Philippine Citizen AT THE AMERICAN CONSULATE of the country where he resides
*takes necessary oath of allegiance

VIVO V. CLORIBEL

PRIL Page 49
X---------------------------------------------X

x-------------------------------------x

Moy Ya Lim reversed Burca v. Republic

NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP


Not through
*action of declaratory relief
*summary procedure under A412, NCC for correction of error in the entry in the Civil Registry
>>>may be granted provided that an appropriate action is made wherein all the parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified and represented
...and there is a full blown adversary proceeding.

D. LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP


CA 63, amended by RA 106: ways through which a Filipino may lose his citizenship:
1. naturalization in foreign countries
2. Express renunciation of citizenship
3. Upon reaching 21 years or more, subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of a foreign country, subject to exceptions
4. Rendering service/accepting commission in armed forces of a foreign country
5. Having declared by competent authority a DESERTER of AFP in time of war, unless plenary pardon
or amnesty granted
6. WOMAN: marriage to a foreigner (if laws of her husband makes her their national)
7. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization

• NATURALIZATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRY


FRIVALDO V. COMELEC (1989)

PRIL Page 50
*then the matalinhagang phrase…page 186 (matampuhin ang RP Citizenship, di basta-bastang pede itapon…)
x----------------------------------------------x

x----------------------------------------------x

x----------------------------------------------x

• EXPRESS RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP

• ON CANCELLATIONOF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION (so applies to naturalized RP Citizens)


-SOLGEN files motion for cancellation
-filed before Judge
-Judge cancel naturalization certificate
-can register w/ Civil registry
-reasons:
a. Naturalization certificate obtained through fraud/illegally
b. Naturalized person returns to his native country/some other foreign country w/n 5 years following
issuance of naturalization certificate
Staying 1 year in native country/2 years in other country = prima facie intention of establishing

PRIL Page 51
permanent residence there
c. Invalid declaration of intention
d. Minor children failed to graduate in a school required by law through fault of parents
>neglect to support
>transferring to another school
e. Naturalized citizen allowed himself to be used as a dummy
-if granted: clerk of court forward copy of decree of cancellation to:
*OP
*OSG
-No defenses of estoppel or res judicata: mere grant of political privilege. If fraudulent, not res judicata

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

E. PROBLEMS IN APPLYING NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE


1. DUAL OR MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP
Hague Convention on Conflict of National Laws: each state determines who its own nationals are
-so it is possible that in accordance with the internal laws of 2 states, an individual is considered a citizen
of both states
e.g.
○ application of jus soli and jus sanguinis: country of parents apply jus sanguinis, country where born
apply jus soli
○ Filipino citizen marries an alien whose laws provide that the spouse of their citizens also becomes
their citizens (but note, as in Aznar's case: if no express renunciation on the part of the Filipino,
still considered a Filipino Citizen)
○ Naturalized in another state but no express renunciation of the native state

Article IV, Section 5: Discourage dual or multiple nationalities: dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt withby law

"Effective Nationality": test to determine rights of an individual who may claim multiple nationality in a
third state

Frivaldo:
Why is it that if he is naturalized, and even if he claims that he loses his
citizenship, he can still not hold office…
Frivaldo 2: liberal interpretation, Taking oath (repatriated) retroacted to the
time he filed a COC since law is not clear when citizenship requirement
required

What's the difference between Frivaldo and Labo cases?


Labo: only application for REPARTRIATION during the time he filed his COC -
application not granted yet!!!!
Vs. Frivaldo: he only lacked the taking of oath (assume that his application for
repatriation was already granted)

EDU MANZANO CASE (ok lang tumakbo even if dual citizen!)


-filed VM of Makati, won
-qualifications questioned as to citizenship - there's proof that he was an
American Citizen (born in states)
H: He possessed dual nationality - but this is different to dual allegiance!
-taking oath in COC renounces other citizenships aside from RP - dual
allegiance prohibited
DUAL ALLEGIANCE: citizenship w/ positive act to acquire citizenship
DUAL NATIONALITY: mere citizenship w/o doing anything,
e.g. (1) born in a jus soli country but has jus sanguinis country
(2) if follow dad's nationality
(3) marriage of Filipinas to foreigners

PRIL Page 52
(3) marriage of Filipinas to foreigners
*act of voting not enough, running for office enough to show that you did not
have allegiance
---similar to Aznar case: as long as no positive act to renounce citizenship,
considered still a Filipino citizen - filing of COC is enough

Common element ng other grounds: abandonment of allegiance to the


Philippines by positive acts

On rendering service to the Armed Forces of another country: defend


another state
x----------------------------------------------x Accepting a commission: apply with AFP: means you are ready to defend a
country, and you won't offer your life to another country if you don't believe
to the interest of that country

LI Yao Case
-tax amnesty did not erase the fact that he did not have good moral
character during the pendency of his naturalization proceeding
>>>opportunity to make up for their mistakes

*maybe this results from the fact that he was Chinese

Nottebohm Case
-when there are some issues which are to be determined by one's state laws,
apply the law of the effective nationality

(weh..okay, my turn)
Kookooritchin Case
-stateless individual
…so better to follow the law of the domicile (where you live better provides
conditions which are closer to you)

FPJ CASE
-political law - includes citizenship - does not distinguish between legitimate
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x and illegitimate children
2. STATELESSNESS
2 senses:
a. De jure: individual stripped of his nationality by his own former government w/o having an opportunity DOMICILE
to acquire another Merits and Demerits
b. De facto: individual possessed a nationality but whose country does not give them protection outside Merits: person and particular state
own territory (i.e. refugees) -so how more appropriate? See under Kookooritchin
-escaped from their countries w/o any travel documents, identity papers or any form of identification
normally granted by their government Demerits:
e.g. Vietnam war: Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laos 1. Should show factum et animus
Fact: physical presence
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees: basic rights of stateless persons Animus
1954 UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness >manendi: intention to remain
1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: enumerates conditions under w/c an individual > revertendi: intention to return - means that you're actually in another place
would not lose his nationality upon the risk of becoming stateless:
*marriage IMELDA MARCOS CASE
*divorce -the case where the justices insist that the election qualifications intended to
*adoption mean "domicile" since in election law, domicile = residence
*naturalization Cf. CAASI v. COMELEC: what if Miguel lived in Pangasinan since birth and
*expatriation intends to return and stay there? Would his green card mean a thing?
-prohibits deprivation of identity as punishment or as discriminatory instrument for political, religious or Ma'am: she became a Metro Manila Governor. How could she have not
ethnic reasons intended to have her domicile in Metro Manila then? Or else she would not
-jus sanguinis country should grant nationality to those born in their countries qualify as Governor of Metro Manila
-jus soli country should consider its national stateless persons when one of the latter's parents is a
national of their country (i.e. parent born in that country) Separate opinions: manner by which Tacloban residence was acquired.

"by my watch it's not yet 2 o'clock so you're watch is wrong…my watch is
expensive"

4 principles of DOMICILE

PRIL Page 53
PRIL Page 54
The Nottebohm Case
Monday, December 14, 2009
4:14 PM

Individuals as objects of Int'l Law Case: The Nottebohm Case (1955; ICJ)

Facts: Nottebohm was born in Germany, and was a German citizen, although he lived in Guatemala
since 1903, and conducted a prosperous business there, but never became a citizen of Guatemala. In
1939, he applied to become a citizen of Liechtenstein. The application was approved even though a
requirement was that he be in residence there for at least 3 years, but there was an exception and he
became a citizen of Liechtenstein. When he tried to re-enter Guatemala in 1943, he was refused entry
(probably because of his original German citizenship and because of WWII). Liechtenstein offered
Nottebohm protection against the government of Guatemala and sued Guatemala in the International
Court of Justice. However, the government of Guatemala argued that Nottebohm did not gain
Liechtenstein citizenship for the purposes of international law.

Issue: Whether the conferment of the Lichtenstein citizenship is not contrary to int'l law, and if
Lichtenstein's claim on behalf of Nottebohm is admissible in court. -

No.

Holding: The court agreed with Guatemala and held that claims by Lichtenstein were inadmissible .

Reasoning: Although the Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to determine its own
citizens and criteria for becoming one in municipal law, such a process would have to be scrutinized on
the international plain in questions of diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the principle of effective
nationality, where the national must prove a meaningful connection to the state in question. This
principle was previously applied only in cases of dual nationality to determine which nationality should
be used in a given case. However, Nottebohm had forfeited his German nationality and thus only had
the nationality of Liechtenstein.

Notes • Here the individual cannot bring the claim himself (objective view) • Lichtenstein trying to get
damages on behalf of Nottebohm ○ Guatemala doesn’t recognize his citizenship • Nottebohm was
under Lichtenstein laws, a citizen. ICJ says ok it might be fine under Lichtenstein's laws, but not ok under
int'l law • ICJ looking for real links in Lichtenstein. Must show there is a real connection before
Lichtenstein can act on your behalf. • Pg. 343 - first full paragraph • Reasoning: ○ What sources of law
were looked at? § Arbitration and judicial decisions § Opinions of writers ○ Nationality is a legal bond
having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties (pg. 345) • Problem: Which state
will represent him? Guatemala won't. So now that's why individuals are given the right for individuals to
bring rights on their own.

PRIL Page 55
Comparison of Citizenship from RP Consti
Monday, December 14, 2009
7:31 PM

1935 1972 1987


1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at 1. Those who are citizens of
the time of the adoption of this Constitution the Philippines at the time of the
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign adoption of this Constitution.
parents who, before the adoption of the 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
Constitution, had been elected to public office in citizens of the Philippines
the Philippine Islands 3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of the
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of Constitution of nineteen hundred and
the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of thirty-five
majority, elect Philippine citizenship 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. with law.

PRIL Page 56
Talaroc v UY
Monday, December 14, 2009
8:07 PM

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. L-5397 September 26, 1952
LAURETO A. TALAROC vs. ALEJANDRO D. UY

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5397 September 26, 1952
LAURETO A. TALAROC, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO D. UY, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Justiniano R. Borja for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The election of Alejandro D. Uy to the office of municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on
November 13, 1951, brought the instant action of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of that
province. The petitioner was Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same office,
and the grounds of the petition were that the respondent is a Chinese national and therefore
ineligible. The court below found the petition well-founded and declared the position in question
vacant.
The personal circumstances of the respondent as found by the court are not in dispute. They are as
follows:
Estan establecidas por las pruebas, y admitidas por las partes, que Alejandro D. Uy nacio en Enero
28, 1912, en el municipio de Iligan, provincia de Lanao (Exhibito A), de padre Chino, Uy Piangco, y
de madre Filipina, Ursula Diabo, cuando convivian estos como marido y mujer, pero despues
contrajeron matrimonio eclestiastico el Marso 3, 1914, en dicho pueblo (exhibito 9). Tuvieron siete
hijos, siendo el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy el 5. hijo. Uy Piangco nativo de Chuitao, Amoy, China,
nunca se ausento desde que llego hacia 1893 o 1895, en Filipinas hasta su fallecimiento el Febrero
17, 19l7, en Iligan, Lanao, donde estuvo residiendo continuamente. Ursula Diabo sin contraer
nuevo matrimonio, murio con posterioridad, el Agosto 29, 1949, en el municipio de Manticao,
Misamis Oriental (Exhibito 3). Aparece tambien que el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy nunca fue a China
y ha votado en las anteriores elecciones verificades en el pais, y ha desempenado empleos como
Inspector del "Bureau of Plant Industry" en 1943 (Exh. 4), en los años 1935, 1946 y 1947, maestro
bajo el Bureau of Public Schools, en Manticao District (Exhs. 5 y 5-a); filing clerk en la Tesoreria
Municipal de Initao, en 1935 al 1945 (Exh. 4); y acting Municipal Treasurer de Lagait, en 1942 a
1943 (Exh. 6); ademas de haber servido al 120th Infantry Regiment de la guerrilla, y algun tiempo
"tax collector" del gobierno de ocupacion Japonesa, en esta provincia de Misamis Oriental.
These facts also appear uncontroverted in evidence: One of the respondent's brothers, Pedro D. Uy,
before the war and up to this time has been occupying the position of income tax examiner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. His other brother, Jose D. Uy, is a practicing certified public accountant,
and before the war was the accountant of the National Abaca and Fiber Corporation p73 (NAFCO).
His other brother, Dr. Victorio D. Uy, is a practising physician, and before the war, was charity
physician in Initao and later a physician in the provincial hospital. During the war, Dr. Uy was a
captain in the Philippine Army. His younger brother was a lieutenant in the 120th Infantry Regiment
of the guerrillas. All his brothers married Filipino girls and they were never identified with any
Chinese political or social organization. Respondent's father acquired properties in Lugait. His
mother, who never remarried, campaigned for woman suffrage in 1935 and voted in the subsequent
elections.
The respondent's contentions, which the court below rejected, were that his father was a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899 by virtue of Article 17 of the Civil Code; that his mother ipso facto reacquired
her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband on February 17, 1917, and the child followed
her citizenship; and that the respondent is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of his birth
therein. His honor the Judge noted that, while under the Roa doctrine (Roa vs. Insular Collector of

PRIL Page 57
therein. His honor the Judge noted that, while under the Roa doctrine (Roa vs. Insular Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil., 315), Alejandro D. Uy would be a Filipino citizen regardless of the nationality of
his parents, yet, he said this doctrine was abandoned in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, (79 Phil.,
249.), Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, (79 Phil., 249), decided with Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor and Villahermosa vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil., 541.
It may be recalled that in the case of Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, supra, the petitioner was
born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines on July 6, 1899, his father being a native of China and his
mother a Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country up to the year 1895 when he went to
China and never returned, dying there about 1900. In May, 1901, Roa, was then a minor, was sent
to China by his widowed mother for the soul purpose of studying and returned in October, 1910,
being then about 21 years and 3 months of age. He was denied admission by the board of special
inquiry, whose decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance in habeas corpus proceedings.
This Court held that Article 17 of the Civil Code "is sufficient to show that the first paragraph affirms
and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli." Citing various decisions,
authorities, and opinions of the United States Attorney General, it found that the decided weight of
authority was to the effect that the marriage of an American woman with an alien conferred his
nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the
husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts showed that
she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that where the widowed mother herself thus
reacquired her former nationality, her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her
nationality with the proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.
The Roa decision, promulgated on October 30, 1912, set a precedent that was uniformly followed in
numerous cases. The long line of decisions applied the principle of jus soliup to September 16,
1947, when that principle was renounced in the cases of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor and Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines cited in the appealed decision.
These two decisions are not, in our opinion, controlling in this case.
Article IV, entitled "Citizenship", of the Constitution provides:
1âwphï l.nê
t

SECTION 1. The following are the citizens of the Philippines:


(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
xx x xx x xxx
On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro D. Uy undoubtedly was considered a full-fledged
Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the constitution, when jus soli had been the
prevailing doctrine. "With it", as Mr. Justice Laurel said in Ramon Torres, et al. vs. Tan Chin, 69 Phil.,
519, "the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the Constitutional Convention were also
aware of this rule and in abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus
sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not
intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were citizens of the Philippines by
judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." "This," the Court went on to say,
"is apparent from the following excerpt of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention when
Article IV of the Constitution was discussed:
Delegate Aruego. — Mr. President, may I just have one question? May I ask Mr. Roxas if, under this
proposition that you have, all children born in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution
was included?
Delegate Roxas. — No, sir: that is to say, if they are citizens in accordance with the present law,
they will be citizens.
Delegate Aruego. — But as I have said they are citizens by judicial decisions.
Delegate Roxas. — If they are citizens now by judicial decisions they will be citizens.
Delegate Aruego. — I should like to make it clear that we are voting on the proposition so that it will
include all those born in the Philippines, regardless of their parentage, because I have heard some
objections here to the incorporation in toto of the doctrine of jus soli. There are many who do not
want to include as citizens, children of Chinese parents but they are included in the proposition we
are voting upon . . .
I should like to find out from the gentleman from Capiz if that proposition would make Filipino citizens
of children of Chinese parents born last year or this year.
Delegate Roxas. — No, because by the laws of the Philippine Islands, they are not Filipino citizens
now. (Record of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Session of November 26, 1934.)
Unlike the Tan Chong case, the herein appellant Uy had attained the age of majority when the
Constitution went into effect, and had been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public
office, and to take the oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth Government or Republic of the
Philippines.
The Tan Chong decision itself makes this express reservation: "Needless to say, this decision is not
intended or designed to deprive, as it can not divest, of their Filipino citizenship, those who have
been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the

PRIL Page 58
been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle of res adjudicata." Certainly, it would neither be fair nor
good policy to hold the respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship and
the Government had confirmed his Philippine citizenship on the faith of legal principle that had the
force of law. On several occasions the Secretary of Justice had declared as Filipino citizens persons
similarly circumstanced as the herein respondent. (Opinion 40, series of 1940, of the Secretary of
Justice. See also Opinion No. 18, series of 1942, of the Commissioner of Justice, 1942 Off. Gaz.,
September.)
Cut out of the same pattern and deserving of the same consideration is the proposition that
Alejandro D. Uy became a Philippine citizen at least upon his father's death.
It has been seen that, according to the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to
Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise and that there
after her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother's. This rule was not
changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until Commonwealth Act No.
63 went into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for
regaining Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such cases. It is to be noted that when
Commonwealth Act No. 63 was passed Ursula Diabo had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro
D. Uy had been of age 3 years, and that the new law carries the provision giving it retroactive effect.
This conclusions make superfluous consideration of the rest of the several assignments of error by
the appellant upon which we refrain to express on opinion.
The decision of the lower court is reversed and the respondent and appellant declared a Filipino
citizen and eligible to the office of the municipal mayor. The petitioner and appellee will pay the costs
of both instances.1âwphï l.nê
t

Bengzon, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.


Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PABLO, M., concurrente:
Opino que Alejandro D. Uy nacio como ciudadano filipino en 28 de enero de 1912 en Iligan, Lanao,
porque su madre Ursula Diabo no esaba legalmente conUy Piangco, pues el hijo natural sigue la
ciudadania de su madre (Serra contra Republica de Filipinas, G.R. No. L-4223, mayo 12, 1952);
pero al casarse ella con Uy Piangco en 3 de marzo de 1914, Alejandro D. Uy quedo legitimado por
subsiguiente matrimonio (Art. 120, Cod. Civ. Esp.) ipso factos se habia hecho ciudadano chino
porque como menor de edad, tenia que seguir la nacionalidad de su padre legitimo (Art. 18, Cod.
Civ. Esp.), como Ursula siguio la de su marido (Art. 22, Cod. Civ. Esp.).
Al fallecimiento de Uy Piangco en 17 de febrero de 1917, Ursula Diabo no se hizo automaticamente
ciudadana filipina, pues el articulo 22 del Codigo Civil Español entonces vigente dispone que la
española (filipina) que casare con extrnjero podra, disuelto el matrimonio, recobrar la nacionalidad
española (filipina llendo los requisitos expresados en el articulo anterior, y estos requisitos son: (a)
volviendo la viuda al Reino (repatriacion); (b) declarando su voluntad de recobrar la ciudadania
filipina; y (c renunciado la proteccion del pabellon del pais de su marido. La primera condicion esta
practicamente cumplida proque Diabo no salio nunca de Filipinas; pero no esta probado que
hubiese declarado ante el registrador civil de su residencia que era su intencion recobrar la
ciudadania filipina, ni que hubiese renunciado la proteccion de la bandera china. Desde el 26 de
noviembre de 1930 en que se establecio el registro civil en Filipinas, siendo registrador civil local el
tesorero municipal, hasta el 28 de agosto de 1949 en que fallecio — mas de dieciocho
años — Ursula Diabo tenia amplia oportunidad de hacer la declaracion que exige el articulo 21 del
Codigo Civil, pero no lo ha hecho; su silencio de lugar a la presuncion de que deseo continuar
gozando de la ciudadania de su marido. Para recobrar la ciudadania filipina, la viuda de un
extranjero debe ejecutar ciertos actos que demuestren su deseo indubitable de readquirir su antigua
ciudadania y perder la de su finado marido; por tanto, Alejandro D. Uy tampoco readquirio la
ciudadania filipina por el mero hecho de haber quedado viuda su madre.
Es principio universalmente aceptado que la expatriacion es derecho inherente a todos. los hijos de
un extranjero nacidos en Filipinas deben manifestar al encargado del Registro Civil dentro del año
siguiente a su mayor edad o emancipacion, si desean optar por la ciudadania de su pais natal (Art.
19, Cod. Civ. Esp.). Aunque no aparece que ha hecho tal manifestacion al registrador civil,
Alejandro D. Uy ejercito, sin embargo, el derecho de sufragio "en las anteriores elessiones
verificadas en el pais" al tener edad competente para votar. Con ello demostroque queria adoptar la
ciudadania del pais de su nacimiento,prefiriendola a la de su padre. Cuando en 1935 Alejandro D.
Uy sirvio al gobierno como maestro de escuela bajoel Departamento de Instruccion Publica,
despues escribiente en la tesoreria municipal de Initao en 1937, y mas tarde tesorero de Lugait en
1942 a 1943, y cuando, con expocision de su vida, ingreso en las filas del 120.0. Regimiento de
infanteria de las guerillas, demostro de una manera clara e inequivoca que preferia ser ciudadano
filipina a ser ciudadano chino.

PRIL Page 59
filipina a ser ciudadano chino.
Alejandro D. Uy, de acuerdo con el Codigo Civil antiguo, es ciudadano filipino porque opto serlo al
llegar a mayor edad. Tambien es ciudadano filipino por dispsicion constitucional. Al votar en las
elecciones verificadas en el pais al llegar a la mayor edad, demonstro que quiso abrazar la
ciudadania filipina. La Constitucion dice asi: "Son ciudadanos filipinos: . . . (4) los que, siendo hijos
de madres de ciudadania filipina, optaren por esta al llegar a la mayor edad." (Art. 4, Titulo IV,
Constitucion). Bueno es hacer constar que existe error en esta disposicion: debe decirse "madres
de nacionalidad filipina" y no "madres de ciudadania filipina." La filipina que se casa con un
extranjero sigue la ciudadania de su marido; por el simple hecho del matrimonio pierde la
ciudadania filipina y se hace extrnjera: no puede continuar en la condicion de ciudadana filipina por
expresa disposicion de la ley, pero no pierde la nacionalidad filipina.
Por la razones expuestas, y no por otras, Alejandro D. Uy adquirio la ciudadania filipina.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I would rest the judgment in this case on the undisputed fact that the respondent was born out of
wedlock in Iligan, Lanao, on 28 January, 1912 of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father who were
married on 3 March, 1914 and that his father died on 17 February, 1917. He was a Filipino citizen,
became Chinese citizen when his father and mother were married and reacquired his original
citizenship on the death of his father, because being under age he followed the citizenship of his
mother who reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband and never remarried.
I do not agree to the proposition that persons born in this country of alien parentage or whose father
is an alien must be deemed Filipino citizens under and by virtue of the doctrine laid down in the case
of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Precisely, the judgment in the cases of Tan Chong
vs. The Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, 45 Off.
Gaz., 1269, holds that as the doctrine laid down in the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra,
is in conflict with the law in force at time it must be abandoned. Jose Tan Chong invoked also the
benefit of the doctrine in the Roa vs. Collector of Customs case. There is only an exception to the
rule laid down in the cases of Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs. The
Commonwealth of the Philippines, supra.
Labrador, J., concurs.

Pasted from <http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:68bRMlDAFHMJ:www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1952/sep1952/gr_l-5397_


1952.html+%22Ursula+Diabo%22&cd=1&hl=tl&ct=clnk&gl=ph>

PRIL Page 60
Monday, December 14, 2009
8:11 PM

Comparison of Philippine Citizenship Laws

A. Spanish Laws on Citizenship


Not all the laws of Spain on citizenship were made applicable to the Philippines. Those that were effective were extended by Royal
decrees. [1] Four can be traced back as early as the 1800s.
According to Law 3, Book 6, Title II, of Novisima Recopilacion promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805, the following were considered
citizens:
All foreigners who obtained the privilege of naturalization those who were bornin these kingdoms; those who, residing therein may be converted
to the holy Catholic faith; those being self-supporting, established their domicile therein; those who ask for and obtain residence in any town
thereof; those who marry native women of said kingdoms and domiciled therein; and in case of a foreign woman who marries a native man, she
thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acquires the same domicile as her husband; those who establish themselves in the country by
acquiring real property; those who have trade or profession and go there to practice the same; also those who practice some mechanical trade
therein or keep a retail store;... those who reside for a period of ten years in a home of his own; and also foreigners who, in accordance with the
common law, royal orders and other laws of the kingdom, may have become naturalized or acquired residence therein...

Though it is unclear whether or not the Philippines would have been within the scope of these laws, some authors and Supreme Court
justices later argued that the Philippines, as a colony would have been included as one of the “kingdoms” in that law:
Moreover, the Government of the Spanish Monarchy, in encouraging the multiplication of her subjects during the period of her glory and in
granting citizenship by birth in “these kingdoms” which were carried forward in the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, under the same policy of the
multiplication of her subjects, can have no other intention than to apply said law to the inhabitants of its dominions, colonies and territories
under its sovereignties.[2]

Another law of Spain which involved citizenship was the Order of the Regency of 14 August 1941. Some provisions stated that:
Foreigners who desire to gain Spanish citizenship should apply for it by means of an application filed with the Governor-General who was
empowered in the interest of the nation to grant or deny the same. Compliance with this Royal Decree has been declared absolutely essential for
the acquisition of citizenship with a view to acquire the status of a Spanish subject in the Philippine Islands prior to the change of sovereignty.[3]

The Royal Decree of 23 August 1868, promulgated specifically for the Philippine Islands, provided for the political status of children
of foreigners born in the Philippines. The following were considered foreigners:
First, the legitimate and recognized natural children of a father who belongs to another independent State, and the unrecognized natural, and
other illegitimate children of a mother belonging to another State born outside of the Spanish dominions; Second- The children specified in the
preceding paragraph, born in the Spanish dominions or on board Spanish vessels on high seas if they do not, on attaining the age of majority
fixed in the laws of the kingdom, elect Spanish nationality; Third- Those being Spaniards, acquire another nationality, as well by renouncing the
first as be accepting employment from another government without authority of the sovereign; Fourth- The woman who contracts marriage
with the subject of another state.[4]

Finally, there was the Law of 4 July 1870 – the “Ley Extranjera de Ultramar” which was expressly extended to the Philippines by Royal
Decree of 13 July 1870, and published in the Official Gazette on 18 September 1870:
Art. 1. These are foreigners: (a) All persons born of foreign parents outside of the Spanish territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanish
territory of foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not claim Spanish nationality; (c) Those born in Spanish territory of foreign
parents, or foreign fathers and Spanish mothers, while they do not make that claim; (d) Spaniards who may have lost their nationality; (e) Those
born outside of Spanish territory of parents who may have lost their Spanish nationality; and (f) The Spanish woman married to a foreigner. For
purposes of this article, national vessels are considered a part of Spanish dominions.

Art. 2. Foreigners who under the laws obtain naturalization papers or acquire domicile in any town in the Spanish provinces of the Ultramar are
considered Spaniards.

B. Treaty of Paris
To end the six-month hostilities between Spain and the United States following the declaration of war by the United States in 25
April 1898, Commissioners met in Paris on 1 October 1898 to produce a treaty that would bring an end to the war. The treaty was
signed on 10 December 1898 whereby Spain yielded possession of the Philippines, along with Puerto Rico, Guam and Cuba, to
the United States. The treaty tackled the disposition of the Islands ceded by Spain to the United States
Article IX of the Treaty of Paris defined those who were the citizens of the Philippines. The provision read:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject thereof
to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratification of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they may reside.

The civil and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories thereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.[5]

Under the Treaty, native subjects and Spanish subjects who did not exercise their option to leave the Philippines, but remained in
the country and adopted the nationality of the Philippineswere considered citizens of the Philippines. However, those Spanish subjects
who remained in the Philippines, but who declared before a court of record their intention to preserve their allegiance to Sp ain within a
year and a half from the date of ratification of the treaty (11 April 1900) retained their Spanish nationality.

PRIL Page 61
In the case of Bosque v. U.S., 1 Phil.88 (1908) it was held that the absence of a Spanish subject from the Philippines during the entire
period allowed by treaty for making a declaration of his intention to preserve allegiance to the Crown of Spain prevented the loss of
his Spanish Nationality by his failure to make such a declaration. It was opined that under the treaty it was necessary that he had a
residence de facto in the Philippines for the eighteen months following the ratification of the treaty.
A child under parental authority whose father did not take advantage of the right of declaration of Spanish citizenship as provided
for by the treaty also was considered a citizen of thePhilippines.[6] However, if the child had no parents or guardians in
the Philippines or Puerto Rico at the time the treaty was ratified, he would retain his Spanish nationality without the necessity of
declaring such to be his intention.[7]

C. The Philippine Bill


The Philippine Bill was enacted by the Congress of the United States on 1 July 1902. It was the composite report of two Philippine
Commissions, the work of the War Departments of theUnited States, hearing before the committees of U.S. Congress and legislative
conferences. The act was originally thought out to be a temporary one. It was meant to prepare the Filipinos for independence and
self-governance for a period of at most eight years. However, it became the guide for the administration of civil government of
the Philippines for fourteen years. It has little character of a constitutional act. Those provisions which one would expect to find in a
constitution, such as establishing the framework for government, limiting governmental powers, and providing for the political
organization of the executive, legislative and judicial branches, were lacking[8]. An assembly was, however, authorized for a future
date. Most of the sections concerned general legislation on commerce, the sale and lease of public lands, utilization of forests,
granting of mining claims, municipal bonds and franchises. The Bill of Rights was also extended.

Section 4 of the Philippine Bill defines who the citizens of the Philippines were. It stated:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except as such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the united States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight: Provided, That the Philippine legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Island who could become citizens of the United States if
residing therein.[9]

All those that were considered citizens of the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris were deemed to be citizens under the Philippine
Bill.
All those born after 11 April 1899 to parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in
the Philippines were ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. In effect the doctrine of jus soli, citizenship by place of birth,
which prevails in the United States, was extended to the Philippines.[10]
A woman of foreign nationality who married a citizen of the Philippines was also considered a Philippine citizen as she followed her
husband’s citizenship.[11]
Children born of Chinese fathers and Filipina mothers within the Philippines, with certain exceptions, were also citizens of
the Philippines. Even though the Chinese father and mother of the child were not legally married, the child was nevertheless
presumed prima facie to be a citizen of the Philippines, inasmuch as under the law he followed the status of his legally recognized
parent, who is his mother, a Filipina. If such children were taken to their father’s country during their minority, they still remained
citizens of the Philippines. However, if their fathers’ origin claimed them as citizens under the principle of jus sanguinis, they were
then considered as possessing dual nationality.
Children born in the Philippines of Chinese parents were also considered citizens of the Philippines.[12] A child born of alien parents,
who went to his father’s native land at a tender age and remained there during minority, on becoming of age, he should elect
Philippine citizenship if he desires to be a citizen of the Philippines. A failure to express such desire within a reasonable period of
time should be regarded as a strong presumption of his purpose to become definitely identified with the body politic of his father’s
country. [13]
Citizenship may be lost by the action of a person, either express or implied. Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation of one’s
nationality and allegiance by becoming a citizen of another country.[14] Actual renunciation may not be necessary in order to forfeit
citizenship; a mere absence for a prolonged period, without an intention to return may be sufficient. The rule of the Department of
State of the United States government was adopted, whereby, a continued residence abroad for three years, after attainment of
majority, produces a loss of citizenship, unless it is clearly proved that animus revertendi existed. Commission of certain crimes may
also cause the loss of citizenship[15].

D. The Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones’ Law)


The Philippine Bill was later on superseded by Philippine Autonomy Act. The latter was superior in various ways to the former. It
essentially mirrored a constitution as it provided for a framework of government, Bill of Rights and certain positive powers and
prohibitions. It, however, retained in toto the same provision on citizenship as its predecessor. Section 2 of the Act stated:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed citizens of the Philippine Islands, except as such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provision of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for theacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possession of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.[16]

As the above-stated provision is just a re-enactment of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill, all persons considered as citizens under the
former law were also considered as such under the Philippine Autonomy Act. However, it was only in the latter that the proviso,
also found in the Philippine Bill, providing for suppletory law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship was given effect by the
enactment of Act No. 2927 by the Philippine Legislature in 1920. The said law constituted the Naturalization Act of the Philippines.

PRIL Page 62
Under the law citizenship may now be acquired by the following groups of people:
a. natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof;
b. natives of insular possessions of the United States; and
c. citizens of the United States, or
d. foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the later country if residing therein.[17]

E. 1935 Constitution
In the 1935 Constitution, Filipino citizenship was defined, classified and regulated by Article IV, which stated that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of the Constitution, had been elected to public office
in the Philippine Islands
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.[18]

Those who were considered citizens at the time of the adoption of the constitution included those deemed citizens under the Jones
Law: “all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1989, and then residing in the
said islands, and their children born and subsequent thereto...” This was in turn a reproduction of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902.[19]
Those who were naturalized according to the Naturalization Law of Act No. 2927 (March 26, 1920), come under the scope of
Section 1(1). Under this Act, the privilege of naturalization was given to the following persons:
(1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens of the Philippines, because they were not living in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and
were not subjects of Spain on that date, not were they children of Filipino citizens born after that date; (2) natives of the insular possessions of
the United States, such as natives of Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands; (3) residents of the Philippines who were citizens of the
United States; and (4) residents of the Philippines who could become citizens of the United States under the American laws ifresiding there.[20]

As can be seen from the previous citizenship laws, the principle of jus sanguinis was not applicable prior to the 1935 Constitution.
Before Section 1, which considered citizens those whose fathers were Filipino citizens, the prevailing doctrine had beenjus soli. [21] By
recognizing the principle of jus sanguinis, it was recognized that a blood relationship would serve “as a better guarantee of loyalty to
the country of one’s parents”[22] than jus soli.
Section 1(2), at the time the Constitution was framed, was said to be inserted for the benefit of Delegate Fermin Caram of Iloilo.
Since Caram was born of Syrian parents and had not been naturalized, an “anomaly of the Constitution being signed by one who is
not a citizen” would have been an issue, if thus subsection had not been included. However, the Supreme Court has held that the
delegates would not have added such a provision without considering its effect on others.[23]
Section 1(4) contemplated a situation where only the mother was a Filipino citizen, and gave the child an opportunity to elect
Filipino citizenship only when he reached the age of majority. Prior to his reaching such an age, he at most has an inchoate right to
Filipino citizenship.[24] The provision is also applicable to mothers who were Filipinos before acquiring the nationality of their
foreign spouses. To restrict its interpretation in such a way that the time of election was considered controlling as to the status when
the mother should be a Filipina would have nullified the particular provision.[25] For illegitimate children however, this provision
would not have been applicable, since the citizenship of the father would not then be material, since an illegitimate child as a rule
follows the nationality of the mother.[26]
The right to elect is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 652, which states the requirements and procedure for election, and must
be express:
Option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be expressed in a statement to be filed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oath and shall be filed with the nearest civil registrar. The party elected must likewise accompany the aforementioned
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Where the party concerned resides abroad, he
must make the statement before any officer of the government of the Philippines authorized to administer oaths and must forward such
statement together with his oath of allegiance to the civil registrar of Manila.[27]

On the naturalization of non-citizens, Section 1(5) possessed great significance. Desirable aliens are welcomed, but a balance must be
created wherein the law “bars undesirables without unduly discouraging the worthwhile aliens desirous of becoming Filipinos.”
[28] Naturalization has been defined as the “legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that belong to a natural

born citizen. Naturalization may be obtained through a general law of naturalization applied through a judicial process.”[29]

F. 1973 Constitution
Article III, Section 2 enumerates the following as citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The purpose of the first paragraph of the provision was to protect the continued enjoyment of Philippine citizenship to those who
already possess the right as of 17 January 1973.
The Section 2(2) followed the principle of jus sanguinis. However, unlike the 1935 Constitution, Filipino mothers were placed by the
1973 Constitution on equal footing with Filipino fathers as far as the determination of the citizenship of their children was
concerned. The father or mother may be a natural-born Filipino or a Filipino by naturalization or by election. The only important
consideration here was that the mother must be a Filipino at the time of the birth of the child. It must be reiterated that this rule
applied only to those born of a Filipino mother on or after 17 January 1973.
As the 1973 Constitution followed the doctrine of jus sanguinis, it disregarded the place of birth of a person. As long as one was born
of Filipino parents, he was considered a Filipino. If he was born in a country where the rule of jus soli was the prevailing principle, it
would be a case of dual citizenship.

PRIL Page 63
would be a case of dual citizenship.
The Section 2(3) defined the status of individuals who elect Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution. Under the said
Constitution, a child born of a Filipina mother married to an alien was considered an alien unless he elected Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority. However, if his mother reacquired her Philippines citizenship during
his minority there was no need for election since by operation of law, he is a Filipino citizen.
Section 2(4) provided for a means by which even individuals, who were not Filipino citizens by virtue of birth or of Filipino
mothers, may become citizens of the Philippines through naturalization.

G. 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution builds on the previous Constitutions, but modifies provisions which cannot be found in the 1973 and 1935
Constitution. Those who were citizens during the adoption of the new Constitution were considered citizens. However, this does
not rectify any defects in the acquisition of such citizenship under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. “If a person’s citizenship was
subject to judicial challenge under the old law, it still remains subject to challenge under the new – whether or not the judicial
challenge had been commenced prior to the effectivity of the new Constitution.”[30]
The principle of jus sanguinis still applies, and in following the lead of the 1973 Constitution, the Filipino woman is placed on the
same footing as Filipino men in matters of citizenship. It is essential, however, that the mother is a Filipina when the child is
born.[31] The principle of parental authority is still applicable in the new Constitution, so this article only applies to legitimate
children, not to adopted or illegitimate ones. Mothers have parental authority over illegitimate children. Adopted children, on the
other hand, as they are not related by blood, do not follow their adoptive parents’ citizenship, despite being under their parental
authority. [32]
As for those who were born after the adoption of the 1973 Constitution of Filipino mothers, the 1987 Constitution still provides the
transitory provision that was also in the 1973 Constitution: “Those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.”[33]
Naturalization still remains one of the ways by which a person may acquire citizenship. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
natural born citizens:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens

In the 1973 Constitution, the second sentence was not yet included. Furthermore, even under the 1935 Constitution, it was not
settled whether the child of a Filipino mother who elects Philippine citizenship was a natural-born Filipino or a naturalized one. A
liberal view was adopted by the 1987 Constitution, based on the argument that the election retroacts to the moment of birth, since it
was such that gives him potential to make the election.[34]
However, if a person loses his citizenship and subsequently reacquires such citizenship, that person would no longer be considered a
natural-born Filipino but a naturalized one (whether under the 1973 or the 1987 Constitution). An exception to this rule is
reacquiring one’s citizenship through repatriation, where one regains one’s former citizenship.[35]
Section 3 states that “Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.”[36] The loss of citizenship is
governed by two laws, Commonwealth Act No. 63 (for natural-born and naturalized citizenship) and Commonwealth Act No. 473
(for naturalized citizenship). Under C.A. No. 63, citizenship may be lost: “through naturalization in a foreign country, by express
renunciation of citizenship, by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, by rendering service in the armed forces of a foreign country,
and by being a deserter of the armed forces.” Under Commonwealth Act No. 473, one’s certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if “found to have been fraudulently obtained, by permanent residence in the country of origin within five years of
naturalization, or when petition is found to have been made on an invalid declaration of intent, or upon failure to comply with the
requirements for the education of minor children, or if the person allows himself to be a “dummy” for aliens.”[37]
Reacquisition may happen either through naturalization or repatriation.
Section 4, which states that “citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission,
they are deemed under the law, to have renounced it,”[38] modifies the 1973 Constitution by “making no reference to sex... on the
chance that some country might have a law which divests a foreign husband of his citizenship.”[39]
In Section 5, the Constitution “recognizes the problem of dual allegiance, but leaves concrete ways of dealing with it to Congress.”
[40] The same may be said of dual citizenship, which is not contemplated in the provision, it being a “seldom intentional and perhaps

never insidious...condition that arises from the fact that Philippine law cannot control international law, and the laws of other
countries on citizenship.”[41] Dual Citizenship is covered by RA 9225, which provides that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their citizenship after taking the
oath mentioned therein.
As can be seen, though there had been changes from the Spanish Laws to the Philippine Constitutions, continuity has been
maintained. Each Constitution usually includes a provision to accommodate previous ones. Major changes include the transition
from jus soli to jus sanguinis in the 1935 Constitution, the equalization of men and women (fathers and mothers) as regards citizenship
in the 1973 Constitution, and the classification of children of Filipino mothers who needed to elect citizenship as natural-born, the
retention of citizenship upon marriage to foreigners, and the recognition of the problem of dual allegiance in the 1987 Constitution.

[1] LEON T. GARCIA, PROBLEMS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES 3 (1949).


[2] Id. at 5.
[3] Sy Joe Lieng, etc. v. Sy Quia, etc., 16 Phil 181
[4] GARCIA, supra note 1, at 7.
[5][5] TREATY OF PARIS, ART. IX (1900)
[6] In re Arnaiz, 9 Phil 705 (1906)
[7] Rivera v. Pons, 4 Porto Rico Fed 177 (1908)
[8] GEORGE A. MALCOLM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 222 (1920)
[9] PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902 § 4 (1902) amended by ACT OF MARCH 23, 1912
[10] Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912)
[11] Martinez de Hernandez, 2 Porto Rico Fed. 519(1907)

PRIL Page 64
[11] Martinez de Hernandez, 2 Porto Rico Fed. 519(1907)
[12] U.S. v. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917)
[13] Lim Teco v. Collector of Customs, 24 Phil 84 (1913)
[14] Roa, 23 Phil 323
[15] Id.
[16] THE PHILIPPINE AUTONOMY ACT § 2 (1916)
[17] MALCOLM, supra note at 8, 393

[18] PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §1-2 (1935).


[19] LORENZO M. TAÑADA & ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 648-649 (1953)
[20] Id. at 653.
[21] Id. at

649-652.

[22] Id. at 658.


[23] Id. at 655-656.
[24] Id. at 560.
[25] Id. at 659.
[26] Id. at 661.
[27] Id. at 660-661.
[28] Id. at 662
[29] JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 615 (2003).
[30] Id. at 611
[31] Id. at 612
[32] Id.
[33] PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §1(3) (1987)
[34] BERNAS, supra note 11, at 620.
[35] Bengson v. Cruz, 357 SCRA 545, (May 7, 2001).
[36] PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §3 (1987)
[37] BERNAS, supra note 11, at 622.
[38] PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §4 (1987)
[39] BERNAS, supra note 11, at 627.
[40] Id. at 629.
[41] Id. at 628

Pasted from <http://www.angelfire.com/art3/consti_citizen/Comparison.html>

PRIL Page 65
*Ma'am Beth's Crammed lecture on domicile
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
1:59 PM
Frivaldo:
Why is it that if he is naturalized, and even if he claims that he loses his citizenship, he can still not hold office…
Frivaldo 2: liberal interpretation, Taking oath (repatriated) retroacted to the time he filed a COC since law is not clear when citizenship requirement required

What's the difference between Frivaldo and Labo cases?


Labo: only application for REPARTRIATION during the time he filed his COC - application not granted yet!!!!
Vs. Frivaldo: he only lacked the taking of oath (assume that his application for repatriation was already granted)

EDU MANZANO CASE (ok lang tumakbo even if dual citizen!)


-filed VM of Makati, won
-qualifications questioned as to citizenship - there's proof that he was an American Citizen (born in states)
H: He possessed dual nationality - but this is different to dual allegiance!
-taking oath in COC renounces other citizenships aside from RP - dual allegiance prohibited
DUAL ALLEGIANCE: citizenship w/ positive act to acquire citizenship
DUAL NATIONALITY: mere citizenship w/o doing anything,
e.g. (1) born in a jus soli country but has jus sanguinis country
(2) if follow dad's nationality
(3) marriage of Filipinas to foreigners
*act of voting not enough, running for office enough to show that you did not have allegiance
---similar to Aznar case: as long as no positive act to renounce citizenship, considered still a Filipino citizen - filing of COC is enough

Common element ng other grounds: abandonment of allegiance to the Philippines by positive acts

On rendering service to the Armed Forces of another country: defend another state
Accepting a commission: apply with AFP: means you are ready to defend a country, and you won't offer your life to another country if you don't believe to the interest of
that country

LI Yao Case
-tax amnesty did not erase the fact that he did not have good moral character during the pendency of his naturalization proceeding
>>>opportunity to make up for their mistakes

*maybe this results from the fact that he was Chinese

Nottebohm Case
-when there are some issues which are to be determined by one's state laws, apply the law of the effective nationality

(weh..okay, my turn)
Kookooritchin Case
-stateless individual
…so better to follow the law of the domicile (where you live better provides conditions which are closer to you)

FPJ CASE
-political law - includes citizenship - does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children

DOMICILE
Merits and Demerits
Merits: person and particular state
-so how more appropriate? See under Kookooritchin

Demerits:
1. Should show factum et animus
Fact: physical presence
Animus
>manendi: intention to remain
> revertendi: intention to return - means that you're actually in another place

IMELDA MARCOS CASE


-the case where the justices insist that the election qualifications intended to mean "domicile" since in election law, domici le = residence
Cf. CAASI v. COMELEC: what if Miguel lived in Pangasinan since birth and intends to return and stay there? Would his green card mean a thing?
Ma'am: she became a Metro Manila Governor. How could she have not intended to have her domicile in Metro Manila then? Or else she would not qualify as Governor of
Metro Manila

Separate opinions: manner by which Tacloban residence was acquired.

"by my watch it's not yet 2 o'clock so you're watch is wrong…my watch is expensive"

4 principles of DOMICILE
On domicile relative to purpose: depends on purpose

In re Dorrance Estate
-expression of desire to have a domicile in one state does not void the fact that he has performed acts (had a presence in the other domicile) and has intention to stay in
another place

*length of time is not determinative of domicile


-but it can help!
-so it's difficult to determine intent to stay or return

How to determine intent if not by length of time? By the acts of the person
-not time per se, not motive (reason why you're in one place or another)

PRIL Page 66
-not time per se, not motive (reason why you're in one place or another)
-difficulty with acts: acts does not always correspond with words...

Review guidelines for adoption!!!!

PRIL Page 67
CA 473
Monday, December 14, 2009
11:53 PM

COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473


AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND
TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Revised Naturalization
Law."
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as
well as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education 1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:
1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of
the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school
not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or
race, in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to
Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice 4 a
declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such
declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign
residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he
came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been

PRIL Page 68
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued.
The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education5 of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,
during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of
himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in
the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or
those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those
who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before
filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon
complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that
which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his
children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the
widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.6
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file
with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner,
setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the
place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her
arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of
the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act,
specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act;
that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are
citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also
set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must
be made part of the petition.
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the
duty of the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the
hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is
located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date
and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes
to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall
not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as
soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and
other pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of Justice,8 the Provincial
Inspector9 of the Philippine Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace10 of the
municipality wherein the petitioner resides.
Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any
election. The hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor-General, either himself or through his
delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the Commonwealth11 of the
Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view
of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the
disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied with all requisites herein established, it shall
order the proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization
certificate in the proper civil registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand
seven hundred and fifty-three.12

PRIL Page 69
seven hundred and fifty-three.12
Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to
the Supreme Court.13
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.—If, after the lapse of thirty days from and
after the date on which the parties were notified of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon
appeal, the decision of the court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, 14 and the said decision
has become final, the clerk of the court which heard the petition shall issue to the petitioner a
naturalization certificate which shall, among other things, state the following: The file number of the
petition, the number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed in
the presence of the clerk of the court, the personal circumstances of the person naturalized, the
dates on which his declaration of intention and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting
the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of the petitioner
with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, must be affixed to the
certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the following
oath:
"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Commonwealth 15 of the Philippines;
[and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of
America in the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; 16 and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
"So help me God."
Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court shall keep two books; one in which the petition
and declarations of intention shall be recorded in chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof
from the filing of the petition to the final issuance of the naturalization certificate; and another, which
shall be a record of naturalization certificates each page of which shall have a duplicate which shall
be duly attested by the clerk of the court and delivered to the petitioner.
Section 14. Fees.—The clerk of the Court of First Instance shall charge as fees for recording a
petition for naturalization and for the proceedings in connection therewith, including the issuance of
the certificate, the sum of thirty pesos.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each appeal and for the services rendered by him
in connection therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case,
he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the

*************************** MISSING PAGE "#329" ***********************

the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be
forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Department of the Interior20 and the Bureau of Justice.21
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation
of the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify,
forge, change, alter, or cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and
assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate for the
purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or

PRIL Page 70
purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or
persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a naturalization
certificate in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in the case that the
person convicted is a naturalized citizen his certificate of naturalization and the registration of the
same in the proper civil registry shall be ordered cancelled.
Section 20. Prescription.—No person shall be prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense
implying a violation of the provisions of this Act, unless the information or complaint is filed within five
years from the detection or discovery of the commission of said offense.
Section 21. Regulation and blanks.—The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations
for the proper enforcement of this Act. Naturalization certificate blanks and other blanks required for
carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor-General,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 22. Repealing clause.—Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended
by Act Numbered Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled "The Naturalization Law", is
repealed: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any prosecution, suit, action,
or proceedings brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or existing before the
taking effect of this Act, but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts, things, or
matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed or amended by this Act are continued in force and effect.
Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.—This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, June 17, 1939.

Pasted from <http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/comacts/ca_473_1939.html>

PRIL Page 71
XI. Domicile
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
2:05 PM

A. DEFINITION
Domicile
-MUNICIPAL LAW:
*natural persons (Art 60, NCC): For exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations = PLACE OF
HABITUAL RESIDENCE
*Juridical persons (Art51, NCC):
GR: determined by the LAW CREATING OR RECOGNIZING IT
(if none): PLACE WHERE THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATION/PLACE OF BUSINESS

-CONFLICT OF LAWS:
*place with which a person has a settled connection for certain legal purposes
…either because his home is there
…or because that place is assigned to him by law
JUSTICE STORY: true, fixed permanent home and principal establishment and to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning
*Technical meaning:
(1) intention to make it one's domicile
(2) physical presence

Vs. RESIDENCE: bodily presence enough

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

PRIL Page 72
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
B. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF DOMICILE
MERITS
In common law countries
*satisfies the very purpose for having a personal law
*adequate basis to exercise rights and for the state to impose duties on him ( Lawrence v. State Tax
Commission)
In federal system
*law of the domicile is the law of the place where the individual lives

DEMERITS
1. Domicile is NOT ASCERTAINABLE W/O FIRST RESORTING TO THE COURTS TO ESTABLISH WON THERE IS
ANIMO MANENDI
2. Notion of domicile differs widely w/ some states distinguishing between domicile and residence or
attributing different meanings of domicile for different purposes
3. Same problem as attenuated connection in use of personal law

Instances when our courts refer to the domicile of an individual in order to determine his rights or
obligations:
1. Where litigant = alien (country follows domiciliary principle):
*Personal status
*capacity
*condition
*family rights
-determined by the law of his domicile
2. If it concerns stateless persons/ persons w/ dual or multiple nationalities
3. When an alien domiciled in RP executes a will abroad: law of the domicile governs the formalities of the
will
4. Revocation of will outside RP: validity of revocation follows law of the domicile of the testator (Art 829)

C. GENERAL RULES ON DOMICILE


One. no person shall be w/o a domicile
Two. A person cannot have 2 simultaneous domicile since the very purpose for identifying one's domicile is to
establish a connection between the person and a definite legal system.
But since different notions of domicile in different courts:
A person can have only one domicile for a given purpose or a given time under the law of a particular
state, but it should not be assumed that that determination will be binding on other states or on the
same state for other purposes (domicile relative to the purpose)
Three. Domicile establishes a connection between a person and a particular territorial unit
Four. The burden of proving a change of domicile is upon whoever alleges that a change has been secured.
(favor continuance of existing domicile)

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
Frivaldo:
Why is it that if he is naturalized, and even if he
claims that he loses his citizenship, he can still
not hold office…
Frivaldo 2: liberal interpretation, Taking oath
(repatriated) retroacted to the time he filed a
COC since law is not clear when citizenship
requirement required

What's the difference between Frivaldo and


Labo cases?
Labo: only application for REPARTRIATION
during the time he filed his COC - application
not granted yet!!!!
Vs. Frivaldo: he only lacked the taking of oath
(assume that his application for repatriation was

PRIL Page 73
(assume that his application for repatriation was
already granted)

EDU MANZANO CASE (ok lang tumakbo even if


dual citizen!)
-filed VM of Makati, won
-qualifications questioned as to citizenship -
there's proof that he was an American Citizen
(born in states)
H: He possessed dual nationality - but this is
different to dual allegiance!
-taking oath in COC renounces other citizenships
aside from RP - dual allegiance prohibited
DUAL ALLEGIANCE: citizenship w/ positive act to
acquire citizenship
DUAL NATIONALITY: mere citizenship w/o doing
anything,
e.g. (1) born in a jus soli country but has jus
sanguinis country
(2) if follow dad's nationality
(3) marriage of Filipinas to foreigners
*act of voting not enough, running for office
enough to show that you did not have
allegiance
---similar to Aznar case: as long as no positive
act to renounce citizenship, considered still a
Filipino citizen - filing of COC is enough

Common element ng other grounds:


abandonment of allegiance to the Philippines by
positive acts

On rendering service to the Armed Forces of


another country: defend another state
Accepting a commission: apply with AFP: means
you are ready to defend a country, and you
won't offer your life to another country if you
don't believe to the interest of that country

LI Yao Case
-tax amnesty did not erase the fact that he did
not have good moral character during the
pendency of his naturalization proceeding
>>>opportunity to make up for their mistakes

*maybe this results from the fact that he was


Chinese

Nottebohm Case
-when there are some issues which are to be
determined by one's state laws, apply the law of
the effective nationality

(weh..okay, my turn)
Kookooritchin Case
-stateless individual
…so better to follow the law of the domicile
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* (where you live better provides conditions
which are closer to you)

FPJ CASE
-political law - includes citizenship - does not
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
children

DOMICILE
Merits and Demerits
Merits: person and particular state
-so how more appropriate? See under
Kookooritchin

Demerits:
1. Should show factum et animus
Fact: physical presence
Animus
>manendi: intention to remain
> revertendi: intention to return - means that
you're actually in another place

IMELDA MARCOS CASE


-the case where the justices insist that the
election qualifications intended to mean
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* "domicile" since in election law, domicile =
residence
Cf. CAASI v. COMELEC: what if Miguel lived in

PRIL Page 74
Cf. CAASI v. COMELEC: what if Miguel lived in
Pangasinan since birth and intends to return
and stay there? Would his green card mean a
thing?
Ma'am: she became a Metro Manila Governor.
How could she have not intended to have her
domicile in Metro Manila then? Or else she
would not qualify as Governor of Metro Manila

Separate opinions: manner by which Tacloban


residence was acquired.

"by my watch it's not yet 2 o'clock so you're


watch is wrong…my watch is expensive"

4 principles of DOMICILE
On domicile relative to purpose: depends on
purpose

In re Dorrance Estate
-expression of desire to have a domicile in one
state does not void the fact that he has
performed acts (had a presence in the other
domicile) and has intention to stay in another
place

*length of time is not determinative of domicile


-but it can help!
-so it's difficult to determine intent to stay or
return

How to determine intent if not by length of


time? By the acts of the person
-not time per se, not motive (reason why you're
in one place or another)
-difficulty with acts: acts does not always
correspond with words...
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

D. KINDS OF DOMICILE
3 KINDS:
1. Domicile of origin
2. Domicile of choice
3. Constructive domicile

*DOMICILE OF ORIGIN
-person's domicile at birth
-legitimate child: follow domicile of father
-illegitimate child: follow domicile of mother

*DOMICILE OF CHOICE/VOLUNTARY DOMICILE


-place freely chosen by a person sui juris (emancipated)
-concurrence of:
1. Physical presence in the new place
2. Unqualified intention to make that place one's home

Domicile of origin Domicile of choice


Staunchest presumption in favor of its
continuance,
More enduring,
Less easily shaken
Not lost by mere abandonment an remains until Acquired upon concurrence of amimo et facto (fact
replaced by a domicile of choice and intention)
Deemed extinguished by removal of intent even
prior to acquisition of a new domicile
>domicile of origin is presumed to have been
revived (revival doctrine)
critique to reverter/revival doctrine: violates fundamental principle of domicile: a person retains his old
domicile until a new domicile of choice is secured and established upon concurrence of fact and
intention
-applied by US courts when person en route to his domicile of origin

Problem in deciding domicile of choice:


*degree of permanence of abode
-kaya state intention in the negative: as long as there is NO INTENTION to return to the old domicile, a
new domicile is created, whether the intention to remain is for the rest of one's life or for an indefinite
period or for the time being at least

*length of time and motive that prompted a person to change his domicile: irrelevant in determining
WON a new domicile has been acquired
-motive only relevant to gauge the genuineness of the intent to acquire a new domicile

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

PRIL Page 75
VELILLA V. POSADAS
-Moody resided in RP for 25 years, established a business
in RP, but had leprosy. Allegedly on the motive of evading
confinement in the Leper Colony, he stayed in India and
allegedly intended to stay in Paris (he actually stayed there
for 3 months for treatment in the Pasteur Institute) and
made a statement that he intended to not stay in the
Philippines anymore. He died in India, giving all his shares
of stocks to sister. Estate was being assessed inheritance
tax. Sister argues that no inheritance tax should be levied,
Moody not being a resident alien of the Philippines.
H: RP is his domicile. His 3 month stay in Paris and the fact
that no evidence was shown that he intended to stay in
Paris DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE INTENDED TO STAY IN
PARIS AND INTENDED TO ABANDON RP AS HIS DOMICILE
-here, his alleged "motive" of not staying in RP was
examined. However, motive is generally not made basis in
determining the place of domicile. No wrong or right
motive (court said that it would be a bad motive not to
come back to RP because he was going to be confined in
the leper colony, thus, he should not be allowed to use it
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* to determine that he intends to leave RP). It's not for the
court to decide this
Critiques to Moody's case: -why not India? No evidence that he intended to stay
1. ON intent of Moody to never live in Manila again: Isn't it sufficient to establish animo non revertendi? there. Though it was the place where he wrote the letter
2. WON justified to dwelve into motive of not wanting to live in Manila (i.e. evade confinement in Leper where he said that he had no intention to stay in RP
Colony) -in short: no evidence to show that he intended to stay in
3. On length of stay in Paris (3 months): Isn't it enough to comply with actual residence requirement to either Paris or India + short time of stay in Paris (25 years
acquire new domicile in RP vs. 3 months in Paris) which is also a deviation in the
general rule that the length of time is not an important
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* factor in determining the place of domicile
-Court is conservative here, but then again, this is about
taxes

*if Abandoned old domicile (indicator: selling home) + en


route to new domicile = new domicile is deemed to be the
new domicile of the person (US COURTS)

WHITE v. TENNANT
Facts: Mr and Mrs White lived in West Virginia but decided
to transfer to Pennsylvania, even selling their farm in West
Virginia, took all their properties and livestock, and
transferred to Pennsylvania. However, upon coming their,
Mrs White contracted typhoid fever so they went back to
West Virginia. Mrs White stayed in West Virginia but Mr
White tended to their livestock in Pennsylvania during the
day. Mr. White later contracted typhoid fever, and died.
WV law Pennsylvania
Wife gets all 1/2 to wife, 1/2 to siblings
-siblings wanted Pennsylvania law to apply?

WON the domicile of Mr. White is Pennsylvania, thus, its


law would govern the administration of the decedent's
estate? YES
-even if they stayed there for a very short period of time,
since there was ACT (of staying in Pennsylvania and even
selling all their properties in WV) + INTENT to abandon old
domicile and establish new domicile

*vs. Moody: the length of time is short so no intent to stay


here
In US Courts: even if stayed for the time being, considered
sufficient to consider it one's domicile
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
*in RP, we're not that mobile. People all want to live in the
*CONSTRUCTIVE DOMICILE cities so domicile is not really a problem for them
-domicile assigned by operation of law to persons incapable of choosing their own domicile

a. MINORS or INFANTS
-follows domicile of their parent:

PRIL Page 76
a. MINORS or INFANTS
-follows domicile of their parent:
LEGIT: father
ILLEGIT: mother
AFTER DEATH OF FATHER: mother
AFTER DEATH OF FATHER, MOTHER REMARRIES: now, under A212, FC, even after mother
remarries, no effect on parental authority so minors still follow domicile of their mother
...BEFORE:Art 328 (1) provides that if widow mother remarries, she loses parental autorithy over
her kids) - kids retained the domicile they had before his widowed mother remarried until he
voluntarily changed it upon reaching majority age
-basis: parental authority

b. PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITY (idiot/insane)


GR: if with mental disability, cannot acquire domicile of choice because of inherent inability to decide
where to make his home
X: if it is shown that a person with mental disability is capable of understanding his act and its
consequences = can acquire domicile of choice, though not competent to enter into all aspects of civil
life

SPECIAL PROBLEMS INDOMICILE OF CHOICE VIS-A-VIS CONSTRUCTIVE DOMICILE


a. Person under compulsion
-no freedom of choice so cannot have domicile of choice
e.g. military personnel
Prisoners
Persons with disabilities who are confined in institutions

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

Review guidelines for adoption!!!!

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
*recent rulings of US courts on people under compulsion: they could now develop required unqualified
intention to establish his permanent abode in such place, i.e., to make the place where he was
compelled to stay his domicile of choice
-to hold otherwise amounts to curtailment of a constitutionally protected liberty of a person to choose
his domicile

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

b. Married Women
-basis: unity of identity of spouse + gender-based presumption that the identity was determined by the
husband so wife follows the husband
-today: this is deemed archaic, invidious stereotype, gender -based discrimination = violates EPC
-in RP today: Art 69, FC: husband AND wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, Court
would decide. No need to follow the other spouse.
…but no new case over right of wife to establish her own domicile

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

GO CHEN AND GO LEK V. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF CEBU (1932)


(Chinese wife re-married again. Now she wanted to bring her children from 1st marriage to RP)
-Go Tuan and Tan Bon were married, had 2 children, Go Chen and Go Lek
-Go Tuan died, Tan Bon remarried another Chinese
-Tan Bon and her new husband came to RP, Tan Bon admitted as a wife of a Chinese Merchant
-the latter lived in Cebu for the past 8 years. Tan Bon had her eldest son with her in Cebu.
-now the 2 Children Lek and Chen aged 20 and 18, was petitioned to join their mother in Cebu
-Collector of Customs did not allow them to go to RP

WON A CHINESE WIDOW WHO WAS ADMITTED TO AND ACQUIRED A RESIDENCE IN RP AS WIFE OF A
CHINESE MERCHANT (2ND HUSBAND) WAS ENTITLED TO BRING INHER MINOR CHILDREN BY 1ST
MARRIAGE? NO.
1. A man's domicile is also the domicile of his wife and minor children
Ration: he (husband) is duty bound to protech, support and keep them in his company
2. Tan Bon merely entered RP by virtue of the right of her husband. She does not belong to the privileged
class.
3. Since Go Chen and Go Lek are not children of the 2nd husband, they are not entitled to enter

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

PRIL Page 77
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
If this case decided using MODERN VIEW, dispense with any presumption that the wife's domicile is the
same as her husband's as each party establishes his or her own domicile completely independent of
each other.

PRIL Page 78
*PRIL January 5 lecture
Tuesday, January 05, 2010
12:02 AM

Review on Domicile
-domicile is permanent; different from residence
-establish Physical presence (may not be continuing) + intend to return/remain in such place

Kinds of Domicile:
1. DOMICILE of ORIGIN: domicile at birth (not place of birth)
Legitimate: father - but the father's domicile may not be the place of birth of the child - so domicile of origin is the domicile of the parent concerned at the time the child
is born
Illegitimate: mother
2. DOMICILE of CHOICE: animo et facto
-person should be of sui juris (capacity to act)
*minor cannot make a domicile of choice because no capacity to act yet. But in adoption, if the parent giving up the child to be adopted is a minor, nothing stated that the
minor parent is not capacitated SO LONG AS SHE/HE IS THE BIOLOGICAL PARENT!!!! (no requirement that the parent of the minor parent (therefore the grandparent)
would sign first - this is a special law that qualifies the special law on the capacity of minors to contract as stated in the Civil code)

WON domicile of choice and domicile of origin is the same: no


(see table in own notes)
-domicile of origin is not easily shaken of. In case of doubt, domicile of origin is presumed to be the domicile of the person
-if made clear that they abandoned their old domicile, but nothing stated where they intend their new domicile be, what is the domicile of the person?
>>>>proposed solution: doctrine of REVERTER/ REVIVAL DOCTRINE (domicile of origin is considered revived when the present domicile is given up) - why? Rule that no
person shall be w/o domicile
>>>criticism of REVIVAL DOCTRINE: violates fundamental principle of domicile: a person retains his old domicile until a new domicile of choice is secured and established
upon concurrence of fact and intention
…the criticism stems from the principle that A PERSON DOES NOT LOSE ITS OLDER DOMICILE UNTIL A NEW ONE IS ESTABLISHED - so why revert to domicile of origin!

VELILLA V. POSADAS
-Moody resided in RP for 25 years, established a business in RP, but had leprosy. Allegedly on the motive of evading confinement in the Leper Colony, he stayed in India
and allegedly intended to stay in Paris (he actually stayed there for 3 months for treatment in the Pasteur Institute) and made a statement that he intended to not stay in
the Philippines anymore. He died in India, giving all his shares of stocks to sister. Estate was being assessed inheritance tax. Sister argues that no inheritance tax should be
levied, Moody not being a resident alien of the Philippines.
H: RP is his domicile. His 3 month stay in Paris and the fact that no evidence was shown that he intended to stay in Paris DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE INTENDED TO STAY
IN PARIS AND INTENDED TO ABANDON RP AS HIS DOMICILE
-here, his alleged "motive" of not staying in RP was examined. However, motive is generally not made basis in determining the place of domicile. No wrong or right motive
(court said that it would be a bad motive not to come back to RP because he was going to be confined in the leper colony, thus, he should not be allowed to use it to
determine that he intends to leave RP). It's not for the court to decide this
-why not India? No evidence that he intended to stay there. Though it was the place where he wrote the letter where he said that he had no intention to stay in RP
-in short: no evidence to show that he intended to stay in either Paris or India + short time of stay in Paris (25 years in RP vs. 3 months in Paris) which is also a deviation in
the general rule that the length of time is not an important factor in determining the place of domicile
-Court is conservative here, but then again, this is about taxes

*if Abandoned old domicile (indicator: selling home) + en route to new domicile = new domicile is deemed to be the new domicile of the person (US COURTS)

WHITE v. TENNANT
Facts: Mr and Mrs White lived in West Virginia but decided to transfer to Pennsylvania, even selling their farm in West Virginia, took all their properties and livestock, and
transferred to Pennsylvania. However, upon coming their, Mrs White contracted typhoid fever so they went back to West Virginia. Mrs White stayed in West Virginia but
Mr White tended to their livestock in Pennsylvania during the day. Mr. White later contracted typhoid fever, and died.
WV law Pennsylvania
Wife gets all 1/2 to wife, 1/2 to siblings
-siblings wanted Pennsylvania law to apply?

WON the domicile of Mr. White is Pennsylvania, thus, its law would govern the administration of the decedent's estate? YES
-even if they stayed there for a very short period of time, since there was ACT (of staying in Pennsylvania and even selling all their properties in WV) + INTENT to abandon
old domicile and establish new domicile

*vs. Moody: the length of time is short so no intent to stay here


In US Courts: even if stayed for the time being, considered sufficient to consider it one's domicile

*in RP, we're not that mobile. People all want to live in the cities so domicile is not really a problem for them

3. CONSTRUCTIVE
-governs:
*minors
*mentally disabled persons
*married women
-law provides what their domicile is

*CHILDREN: domicile of parents (stems from Parental authority of parents)


*MARRIED WOMEN: what the?
"When you are single, you can think, but when you get married, you get stupid!"
-this was relaxed in other jurisdictions - deemed discriminating!!!

PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION


*military personnel
*prisoners
*persons w/ disabilities confined in institutions

CARABALLO vs. REPUBLIC


-Caraballo was a staff sergeant of the US Air force temporarily assigned in Clark Airbase. During his stay, he petitioned for the adoption of a Filipino child, but was

PRIL Page 79
CARABALLO vs. REPUBLIC
-Caraballo was a staff sergeant of the US Air force temporarily assigned in Clark Airbase. During his stay, he petitioned for the adoption of a Filipino child, but was
contested by the Provincial Fiscal, he being not a resident alien which the Civil Code requires.
H: Since he is a nonresident alien not qualified to adopt, he cannot adopt
-since he was temporarily staying in RP, his stay not from his own volition, he cannot be deemed to have established his domicile in Clark (RP)
-mam: the law does not provide that the adopter should be in his domicile of choice: as long as he has a domicile - the domicile which was assigned to him

In US CASES: more lenient - the person under compulsion could prove that even after compulsion, he intends to stay in the place where he is compelled to stay

MARRIED WOMEN
-in the Imelda case, court confused as regards residence and domicile
-married women are previously assumed to follow the domicile of the husband
-FC: both husband and wife decide on where FAMILY domicile should be.

GO CHEN v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS


-Children of Chinese woman who was allowed to enter RP due to her being a wife of a Chinese merchant wanted to enter RP too.
H: Since Married Chinese was just allowed to enter RP as a wife of a Chinese merchant and not due to her own right to enter such, the children not allowed
-Mam: Court probably did not allow the children to enter because they were not minors anymore
-if this case be decided now, and the children are younger, they would follow the domicile of their mother - thus, RP
-sad. Woman considered appendage to husband. So what happens now if they get separated

DE LA VINA v. VILLAREAL
F: Wife left Husband who was adulterous, established domicile far from the family domicile and filed divorce there. Husband said that she should have filed case in the
place of family domicile.
H: Husband gave reason for the wife to establish her own domicile - adultery of the husband
-in US, no presumption that the wife and the husband are domiciled in the same place; dispense with any presumption that the wife's domicile is the same as her
husband's as each party establishes his or her own domicile completely independent of each other.

(next meeting: before divorce and separation)

PRIL Page 80
CXI: PRINCIPLES ON PERSONAL STATUS AND CAPACITY
Wednesday, January 06, 2010
3:24 PM

A. DEFINITION
Personal status: general term
-includes both condition and capacity
-embraces:
○ Beginning and end of human personality
○ Capacity to have rights in general
○ Capacity to engage in legal transactions
○ Protection of personal interests
○ Family relations:
 Husband and wife
 Parent and child
 Guardian and ward
○ Transactions of family law:
 Marriage
 Divorce
 Separation
 Adoption
 Legitimation
 emancipation
○ Succession
-taken from ROMAN DOCTRINE OF
Status libertates: freedom
Status Civitates: citizenship
Status familiae: position as head of the house/ free person subject to the pater familia

Capacity (in accordance w/ A37, NCC):


JURIDICAL CAPACITY CAPACITY TO ACT
fitness to be subject of legal relations (PASSIVE) Power to do acts with legal effects (ACTIVE)
Inherent in every natural person acquired
Lost only through death May be lost

ART 15, NCC: NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE - PERSONAL LAW determines


Art. 15. Laws relating to
*family rights and duties,
*or to the status,
*condition and
*legal capacity of persons
>National law - RP Law - applies to Filipinos wherever they are
>ALIENS: depends on WON they are citizens of states that follow domicile law or national law (depend upon personal law)

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

B. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION


*status, once established by the personal law of the party, is given universal recognition. (UNIVERSALITY OF STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B is bound to attribute to a person of Country A the status that is established in Country A
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce exceptions or qualifications that are not set in Country A

If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts


*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant to status and capacity (JUDICIAL JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)

PRIL Page 81
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*






-
-

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
If this case be decided now in RP: no absolute divorce: Divorce is considered violation of public policy. Therefore: courts could no longer try actions for divorce even if
brought by nationals whose laws allow it

C. BEGINNING AND END OF PERSONALITY


BEGINNING: depends on personal law
○ GERMAN CIVIL CODE: completion of person's birth
○ SPANISH CIVIL CODE: after person be alive for at least 24 hours
○ PHILIPPINE CIVIL CODE: Birth determines personality
 If born normal (9 months): if born alive at time completely delivered from mother's womb (even if dies later after a few hour s)
 If w/ intra-uterine life of 7 months: alive at least 24 hours after complete delivery from maternal womb
 If fetus: considered a person for all purposes favorable to it, provided it be born later (depends on the intra -uterine life - see above)
ART 40: Birth determines personality; But the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article.
ART 41: For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies w/n 24 hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
TOLENTINO: before birth, the fetus is not a person but merely a part of the internal organ of the mother.
-because of the expectancy that it may be born, the law protects it and reserves its rights, making its legal existence, if it should be born alive, retroact to the moment of
its conception

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
EXTINGUISHMENT: upon death
-declaration of death issued by a competent court is considered valid for all purposes
-effect of death: some of the rights and obligations may be extinguished, some may be passed on to the successors

PRIL Page 82
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*

D. ABSENCE
-no uniform treatment
-steps to deal w/ absence:
1. There's a rebuttable presumption that a person is dead when he has been absent for a number of years
2. A person's unexplained absence is judicially investigated and established which results in legal effects similar to those of death
3. A judicial decree shall have to be issued declaring the person dead before legal effects of death take place

Civil Code Presumptions:


ART 390. After the absence of 7 years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of 10 years. If he disappeared after the age of 75 years, an
absence of 5 years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
ART 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for 4 years since the loss of the vessel or airplane
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for 4 years
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known, for 4 years
Family Code Presumptions (for purposes of Marriage):
ART41. reduced the 7 years to 4 years, then the 4 years for special circumstances to 2 years
-but the spouse present must first institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse w/o w/c the subsequent marriage is
void ab initio

Summary of periods
GR: 7 years (for all other purposes)
X:
1. Succession
GR: 10 years
X: if lost when above 75 y.o.: 5 years
2. Special circumstances: 4 years:
a. On board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, not been heard of
b. On board a plane which is missing, not been heard of
c. Was in the armed forces and has taken part in war, missing
d. Has been in danger of death under other circumstances, existence not been known
3. For purposes of contracting a subsequent marriage
GR: 4 years
X: 2 years
WHY Shorter period? More modern means of communications

What are determined by personal law:


*legal effects of absence
*restrictions on the absentee's capacity to act

E. NAME
B4: not a problem because persons are free to assume a name and change it at will
NOW: determined by law, cannot be changed w/o judicial intervention

ART 364-366, NCC: rules that govern the use of surnames of legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated and adopted children; married women; separated and widowed women
-make distinctions between the right of women whose marriage has been annulled to use her former husband's name depending on WON she gave cause for the
annulment of the marriage.

ART 376, NCC: no person can change his name or surname w/o judicial authority

Some of the grounds alleged when the courts have allowed petitions:
1. Ridiculous or tainted w/ dishonor or extremely difficult to pronounce
2. Change is necessary to avoid confusion
3. The right to a new name is a consequence of a change in status
4. Sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality w/c unduly hamper social and business life

Change of name: personal law determines WON he could validly change name

F. AGE OF MAJORITY
-determined by one's personal law
-effects of emancipation:
○ Parental authority ceases
○ Now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life
Exceptions: A46, PD 603

PRIL Page 83
Exceptions: A46, PD 603
-RA 6809: age of majority lowered to 18 from 21 BUT parental consent still needed for marriages of couples below 21

G. CAPACITY (TO ACT)


GR: governed by personal law because it is in the best position to decide what RESTRICTIONS may be imposed on the individual
-restrictions determine legal position of the person
*INCAPACITIES ATTACHED TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF AN INDIVIDUAL GO W/ HIM WHEREVER HE IS (because it depends on his personal law)
○ But all persons must first ascertain the legal capacity of the other party before contracting with him (but this is nearly impossible)
X:
1. TORT: law of the place of the tort
2. MARRIED WOMEN: some jurisdictions subject restrictions on the capacity of married women to contract - does not follow personal law of the wife but the law
which govern the marital relations of the spouses
3. A person may be capacitated to act in accordance with his personal law but the place where the contract is to be performed does not consider him capable of
contracting

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*




*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
If Frank's Capacity to act is made basis in deciding this case, thus the courts would refer to his personal law - the law of Illinois - the case would be decided the same way
because in accordance with the law of Illinois, he is capacitated to contract

PRIL Page 84
*PRIL Lecture: January 7
Friday, January 08, 2010
12:45 AM

Juridical capacity vs. Capacity to act


-see notes

In PRIL: WON a person who has acquired capacity to act in accordance with his personal law can bring the effects of this capa city in other places

RECTO v. HARDEN
F: Mrs. Harden sought Recto's services to protect her interest in the conjugal property in preparation for a divorce proceedi ng in US. She won but on appeal, the SPS
mutually agreed to desist claiming from each other. Since Recto's AF's is 20% of Mrs. Harden's part in the conjugal property, he now contests the agreement. As a
defense, the American sps. Claimed divorce is not valid in RP, thus, invalid object of contract, thus, cannot be enforced in RP
H: RECTO can still recover. Object valid (not really for divorce)
Cf: Barnuevo v. Fuster - both are ruled before RP became a republic so DIVORCE

BARNUEVO v. FUSTER
F: Spanish couple wanted divorce in RP. RP court initially granted but husband contests it.
H: Even if RP can't grant divorce, since properties and the parties are in RP, the CFI has jurisdiction over them, even if su bject matter not w/n RP's power to grant
-shows LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION: laws of country with respect to the issue
Vs JUDICIAL JURISDICTION: what the laws of the country provide which court and what procedure should exercise jurisdiction
*Jurisdiction vs. Choice of law
*the court may have jurisdiction to hear the case but may apply another law (law of the parties - legislative jurisdiction)

BEGINNING AND END OF PERSONALITY


BEGINNING: BIRTH
END: DEATH

*problem:
Beginning: depends on the personal law of the individual
E.g. if the transaction involves several international elements
-State A does not have conditional personality (requires actual birth for personality to attach). If a grandfather excited ove r the pregnancy of his daughter, and writes
in his will that the conceived child be given 1M, grandfather child
GR (succession): heir should be born alive
If child RP citizen: pede provided follow conditions
If child not RP citizen, law provides that should first be born to be a person: cannot inherit

NAME
Conflicts problem: if a Filipino citizen wanted to change his name, did so in another country and that country granted (but h e did not qualify under RP Law) - such
change of name is not valid

Silverio case: had sex change in another country, became a woman, wanted that her passport reflect her new sex, TC allowed ch ange - on appeal court did not grant it
(not looking on Constitutional grounds)
-in US: it's rather easy to change one's name (for as long as not to evade legal obligation)
-issue: name given to Filipino Children - follow surname of father if legitimate, follow name of mother if illegitimate
--but this depends if you're born in RP (even if your parents are Filipinos)
-In German: no middle name, then follow the surname of the mother - in courts: Absence of middle name allowed. Ma'am's case: court followed foreign law but
infused RP law…

AGE OF MAJORITY AND CAPACITY TO ACT


-age of majority removes the incapacity of minors to act

INSULAR GOVERNMENT V. FRANK

Ung necklace ni ma'am merong ganun mommy ko. :)

Boo! Natawag so not so much notes….

Marriage…
-usually apply law of the forum: because marriage issues concern family and the law governing it shows the values of the socie ty

Extrinsic and Intrinsic validity


-why necessary to determine: because the applicable law depends on it

ADONG v. CHEONG SEE GEE


-Chinese died, 2 parties claims:
1. Wife
2. Alleged legitimate child borne out of a marriage contracted in China (as proven by a letter)

HELD: Child not legitimate - failed to prove validity of the Chinese marriage

WONG WOO YU v. VIVO


-this is the marriage in China which was celebrated by a Chinese Village leader - but no law shown that there was Chinese law that authorizes such person to
solemnize marriage
H: Marriage not sufficiently proven

P v. MORA DUMPO
-consent of father not acquired which was deemed an essential requisite of the validity of marriage

PRIL Page 85
P v. MORA DUMPO
-consent of father not acquired which was deemed an essential requisite of the validity of marriage
H: 2nd marriage not valid
If under FC - under formal requisites of marriage (extrinsic) - and under FC, if defects in formal requisite, marriage still valid

Addt'l case (for divorce and Separation):


Republic v. Obrecido III 472 SCRA 414 (2005)
San Luis v. San Luis GR 133743 Jan 6, 2007

PRIL Page 86
P4: Choice of law problems; CXII: Choice of law in Family Relations
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
2:02 PM

Intro
*Mobility of people led to transactions and relations which are conneted to more than 1 legal system,
leading to interstate or international families

Legal consequences:
*validity of marriage
*personal and property relations between parties
*status and rights of children

Family Law
-reflects strong politicies of the sate anchored on values and mores highly held by its society
-one of the most complicated and sensitive areas to be dealt with in PRIL

A. MARRIAGE
Art1, FC: Marriage defined
-a special contract
-of permanent union
-between a man and a woman
-entered into in accordance with law
-for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
-It is the foundation of the family
-and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation,
Except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within limits
provided by this Code

Art15, NCC: LEX NATIONALII governs questions of:


• Family rights
• Duties
• Status
• Conditions
• Capacity

AS A CONTRACT: a mere declaration by the contracting parties


…in the presence of a solemnizing officer and 2 witnesses of legal age
-that they take each other as husband and wife

AS A SPECIAL CONTRACT:
(1) entered by a man and a woman
(2) contracting parties must be at least 18 years of age
(3) solemnized by a person specially authorized by law
(4) a permanent union
unless one of the parties dies
Or marriage is annulled or declared void in special circumstances
(5) it cannot be abrogated, amended or terminated by one or both parties at will
(6) the nature and consequences as well as the incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation by the parties (will of the parties not paramount)
(7) violation of marital obligations may give rise to penal or civil sanctions (unlike ordinary contracts,
which at most could lead to action for damages)

1. PHILIPPINE POLICY ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY


ArtXV, Sec2, 1987 Consti: Marriage as an inviolable social institution is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state.

Art220, NCC: Presumption of validity of marriage


"In case of doubt,
All presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus every intendment of law or facts leans towad the
• Validity of marriage
• The indissolubility of marriage bonds
• The legitimacy of children
• The community of property during marriage
• The authority of parents over their children
• And the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression

Highlight:
• Solidarity of the family
• Importance of ffamily
• Paramount interest of the state in preserving it

2. EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE


Extrinsic validity Intrinsic validity
Lex loci celebrationis/law of the place of celebration (as also mentioned in ART2, Personal law of
HAGUE CONVENTION ON CELEBRATION AND RECOGNITION OF THE VALIDITY OF the parties
MARRIAGES)

Art26, FC:
"all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
In accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized
And valid there as such,
Shall also be valid in this country."
Formalities Capacity of the
External conduct required of the parties or 3p necessary to the formation of a parties to marry

PRIL Page 87
External conduct required of the parties or 3p necessary to the formation of a parties to marry
legally valid marriage (see it later)

Art3, FC: Formal requirements of marriage:


1. Authority of solemnizing officer
2. Valid marriage license except in cases provided in Chapter 2
3. Marriage ceremony:
a. Appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
b. Personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than 2 witnesses of legal age

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Letter merely showed to prove Chinese marriage

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PRIL Page 88



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There may be instances where even if the marriage is allowed to be celebrated in accordance with the
law of the state (extrinsic requisites all complied with), the marriage is still void for lack of capacity to
the parties to contract the marriage (intrinsic requisites) in accordance with their personal laws. This is
allowed though because:

Extrinsic validity Intrinsic validity


Lex loci celebrationis Lex nationalii

Examples:
CC:
1. Bigamous
2. Polygamous
3. Incestuous

FC (adds):
a. If under aged (below 18)
b. Bigamous/polygamous
c. Subsequent marriage after annulment/declaration of nullity w/o recording in Civil Registry and Registry
of properties the JUDGMENT, the partition and distribution of properties of spouses and delivery of
children's presumptive legitimes
d. Mistake in identity of contracting parties

PRIL Page 89
d. Mistake in identity of contracting parties
e. Psychological incapacity
f. Marriage is incestuous
g. Void by reason of public policy

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3. INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE


Intrinsic validity:
-capacity/general ability of a person to marry (age, parental consent)
-controlled by personal law

In RP:
1. At least 18 years old
2. Not barred by any impediment to marry each other
3. Consent freely given in the presence of authorized solemnizing officer
MATRIMONIAL CONSENT: parties are not ignorant that the marriage is a permanent union

VOID MARRIAGES ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY: ART38, FC:


1. Collateral BLOOD relatives, legit or illegit, up to 4th civil degree (includes 1st cousins…)
2. Step-parents and stepchildren
3. Parents-in-law and children-in-law
4. Adopting parent and adopted child
5. Surviving spouse of adopting parent and adopted child
6. Surviving spose of adopted child and adopter
7. Adopted child and legitimate child of adopter
8. Adopted children of same adopter
9. Between parties where one killed the spouse of the other so that the latter would be his or her spouse

Marriage of 1st cousins


-used to be incestuous and void but now not deemed incestuous BUT STILL VOID for being against public
policy
-not considered void in some countries, it's even allowed under the Code of Canon Law of the Catholic
Church PROVIDED there's DISPENSATION + it's allowed in the country
-since capacity to marry is governed by lex nationalii in RP + presumption of validity of marriage, if the
first cousins who got married are foreigners and their law allows such marriage, then it should be
considered valid

HAGUE CONVENTION ON VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE: WHEN STATE ALLOWED TO REFUSE VALIDITY OF


MARRIAGE:
1. One of the spouses was already married (unless previous marriage subsequently dissolved or
annulled)
2. Spouses are related to one another, by blood or by adoption, in the direct line or as brother or
sister
3. One of the spouses has not attained the minimum age required for marriage
nor acquired the necessary dispensation
4. One of the spouses did not have mental capacity to consent
5. One of the spouses did not freely consent to marriage (okay, pikot…)

PRIL Page 90
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Public Policy
Christianity: prohibits
*polygamous
*incestuous marriages (if the general consent of all Christiandom deems it to be such)

Public Policy Escape Device


-an excuse a state may use to deem a marriage void

PRIL Page 91
GR: marriages which are manifestly incompatible w/ the ordre public of the state of which the parties
are nationals may be refused recognition.
X: the existence or non-existence of the foreign marriage is merely a PRELIMINARY QUESTION that
arises incidentally (issue does not profane the mores of the forum - tax, property, succession)
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IN RE DALIP SINGH BIR'S ESTATE (1948)

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Marriages Celebrated by a Consular Officer
ART9, Hague Convention on Validity of Marriages:
marriage celebrated by a diplomatic agent/consular official
…in accordance w/ his state law (State A's)
…shall be considered VALID
…as long as it is not prohibited by the state of celebration (State B)

RP law on Marriages celebrated by Consular officer:


Who can celebrate:
• Consul general
• Consul
• Vice consul
-formal and intrinsic requirements under RP law will have to be followed
Formal:
 Valid marriage license
 Due publication and registration

If 1 party is an Alien:
 Alien should comply with marriage requisites under his national law
 Should submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issue by his diplomatic or
consular office
If it concerns Stateless persons/ refugees: instead of certificate from diplomatic/consular office, submit
an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such legal capacity to contract marriage

4. EFFECTS OF MARRIAGES
Personal Relations Between the Spouses
personal relations
*mutual fidelity
*mutual respect
*cohabitation
*support
*right of wife to use the husband's family name
--governed by NATIONAL LAW

If different nationalities:
GR: national law of husband
X: contrary to law, customs, good morals of the forum

ART 69, FC: Both husband and wife has right to fix family domicile
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~

~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
2nd Restatement: Wife who lives w/ her husband has same domicile UNLESS special circumstances of
wife make such unreasonable
*critique: gender bias

Property Relations of Spouses


HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES:
1. internal law designated by spouses before marriage (prenuptial agreement)
2. If #1 none: internal law of the state in which both spouses fix their 1st habitual residence

In RP: Art 80, FC:


GR: Property relations of spouses governed by RP Law regardless of place of celebration of marriage and
their residence (even if they went abroad to celebrate marriage, even if they stayed there)
X:
1. Both spouses are ALIENS

PRIL Page 92
1. Both spouses are ALIENS
2. Extrinsic validity of contracts: property located outside RP (in State A) + contract executed in state
A
3. Extrinsic validity of contracts: property in State A whose laws require different formalities for
extrinsic validity of contracts + contract executed in RP
…generally follow lex rei situs (as stated in Article 16, NCC)
…as long as at least 1 of the spouses is Filipino (if both are aliens, then under exception!)
…PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY: even if the Filipino changed nationality after marriage, property regime
will remain unchanged - in accordance w/ ART7, HAGUE CONVENTION ON MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
REGIMES: the applicable law continues notwithstanding any change of nationality or habitual residence

B. DIVORCE AND SEPARATION


DIVORCE
1. Absolute: termination of the legal relationship between spouses by an act of law
2. Relative divorce/ legal separation: separation from bead and board
-does not effect the dissolution of the marital ties
-relieve spouses of duty of living w/ each other
-not necessarily affect economic rights and duties: court may order one to provide for the support
of the other or of their common children (so Court should have personal jurisdiction over
respondent spouse + property sought to be affected)

PRIL problems:
• Recognition of the divorce decree
• Division of marital property
• Claim to custody of the children
• Provisions for the support of a dependent spouse and children

DIVORCE JURISDICTION: domicile of one of the parties (Matrimonial domicile): reasons why:
-divorce, being a matter of concern of the state, should be controlled by the law of the place w/ w/c the
person is most intimately concerned, the place where he dwelleth and hath his home
-substantial contact w/ relationship

HAGUE CONVENTION RELATING TO DIVORCE AND SEPARATION of 1902 -granting of divorce/separation


must comply w/:
 the national law of the spouses
 law of the place where the application for divorce is made

Codigo Bustamante & Siamese Law:


Right to separation/divorce: national law
Grounds for divorce: law of the forum provided spouses are domiciled there

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE: lex fori (determined by the law of the forum)

1. DIVORCE DECREES OBTAINED BY FILIPINOS


-not valid
-not recognized in RP
-BUT if it is between Filipino + alien: Alien can obtain divorce if susceptible to it (ONLY THE ALIEN CAN
OBTAIN THE DIVORCE, NOT THE FILIPINO)
Effect: Alien, as well as Filipino, can remarry
- ART26, FC
- partial recognition of absolute divorce in RP
-remedies the situation wherein even if Filipino is already divorced from Alien spouse and
alien spouse has already remarried, Filipino still remains married to the said alien spouse
under RP law

FOR ADDITIONAL CASES SUMMARIES, CLICK ON THE FF LINK (but once reposted on Blogger, these links
would need to be rechecked)
• San Luis v. San Luis
• Republic v. Obrecido

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PRIL Page 93
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VAN DORN V. ROMILLO

PRIL Page 94
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2. VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FOREIGNERS


HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE AND LEGAL SEPARATION
: when foreign divorce is recognized by a contracting state: *Jan 19 PRIL Lecture notes
a. Respondent/petitioner had habitual residence in that state Review: Divorce between Filipino citizens is not allowed
b. Both spouses were nationals of that state If mixed marriages: Partial divorce allowed in RP, provided that the
c. Petitioner national + habitual resident Alien is the one who secures divorce abroad
>>>problem: if Former Filipino citizens, one became naturalized
In US: full faith and credit clause of consti: …may be recognized in RP provided former Filipino citizen already
>if BOTH Souses domiciled in 1 state, can recognize divorce decree by a sister state became naturalized when divorce decree issued
>if only 1 spouse: additional conditions
>if divorce decree by a foreign country: Not covered but would recognize divorce provided that the WAYS to go around anti-divorce law in RP:
parties are domiciled in that State 1. Be a muslim
2. A36
IN RP: no law recognizing foreign divorce but under international comity, it is recognized as long as not 3. Report the husband missing! Hahaha!
violate strongly held policy of RP
IF both aliens: look at their personal law if it allows absolute divorce
C. ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY
-affect STATUS & DOMESTIC RELATIONS of parties Divorce Annulment/nullity
DIVORCE ANNULMENT/NULLITY After marriage At the time of
Ground Occurs after marriage celebration Defects are present at the time of celebration celebration
Lex fori On validity of marriage Grounds depend on the law of the Grounds depend on ???
forum
CHOICE OF LAW APPROACH: grounds for annulment and nullity e.g. State A: specific grounds of marital fault
State B: No fault - can apply for irreconcilable differences
TRADITIONAL POLICY-CENTERED
Lex loci Law of the state of marital domicile - considered to have the most significant H & W are domiciliaries of State B, but filed for divorce in
celebrationis interest in the status of the parties State A.

WHO MAY CLAIM JURISDICTION *on Art 36: grounds during marriage, not during the
*place of celebration of marriage celebration of the marriage
*place of marital domicile

WHEALTON v. WHEALTON: even if court acquires only personal jurisdiction (not the place of celebration
nor the place of marital domicile?), the court may grant annulment decree

How all these concepts would come about: example ni ma'am:


G & B are both 18 years old
They are domiciliaries of State A
They get married in State B, w/o parental consent
B (later H - Husband) resides in State C.
Jurisdiction: States A, B, and C can all claim jurisdiction
Choice-of-law:
State A (domicile): people of age can marry
State B (place of celebration of marriage): parental consent needed for marriage to be valid
State C: (place of residence of H): actually irrelevant
-argue Whealton? Not applicable. The court there just acquired jurisdiction but did not use it's own law.

D. PARENTAL RELATIONS
LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD
-depends on the personal law of the parents
-usu: personal law of the father - and this is shared by many for "preservation of the stability of the
family"

INCLUDES
* Paternity -Civil status of the father/mother w/ respect to the child begotten by him (or her)
*Filiation - status of the child in relation to his parents

IN RP

PRIL Page 95
Legitimacy of child
-same nationality: national law of parents
-different nationalities: national law of the father (Art 15, NCC)

1. DETERMINATION OF LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD


Art. 163 - 165:
ART 163: TYPES OF FILIATION
a. By Nature: legitimate or illegitimate
b. By adoption

ART 162: KINDS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN


a. CONCEIVED AND BORN NATURALLY
-during the marriage
b. CONCEIVED AS A RESULT OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Who's sperm:
○ Husband
○ Donor
○ Both
Conditions:
i. Both H & W should execute and sign a WRITTEN INSTRUMENT authorizing or ratifying the
insemination
ii. The instrument should be made BEFORE the birth of the child
iii. The instrument should be recorded in the Civil Registry together w/ the birth certificate of the
child Is there any provision in the FC providing that the FATHER
should be followed?
ART 165: ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN YES. On property relations of spouses, on the parental authority
-born outside a valid marriage

Personal law of the child


Legitimate: governed by the personal law of the father
Illegitimate: governed by the personal law of the mother

PRIL problem
2. Common law: usually children born w/n lawful wedlock are legitimate
-modified:
○ Offspring of invalid marriages may be considered legitimate (even if the marriage are invalid,
children born when their parents were together are still considered legitimate)
○ Offspring originally born illegitimate may be legitimated - subsequent marriage by parents or
recognition on the part of either or both
-problem: if parents (who are not married) have different personal laws, different rules govern as
regards legitimacy of the child

2ND RESTATEMENT:
Sec 287: LAWS GOVERNING LEGITIMACY
child legitimate if considered such under local law of the state where either
a. Parent domiciled when child's legitimacy is claimed to have been created
b. Child domiciled when parent acknowledged child as his own
Sec 288: INCIDENTS OF LEGITIMACY CREATED BY FOREIGN LAW
-same treatment by forum - forum recognizes the status recognized by the foreign law

3. PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE CHILD


-derived from Roman concept patria potestas
-usually personal law of father determines rights and duties of parents and children
-in RP: ART21, FC: JOINT PARENTAL AUTHORITY by mother and father

Scope of parental authority:


• Care for and rearing of the children for civic consciousness…
• Action a parent may file vs. other parent for custody
• Requirements for parental consent to child's marriage
• Discipline and chastisement - though restrained by law and practices

E. ADOPTION
Def: the act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between
persons not so related by nature
-judicial act which creates between 2 persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and affiliation
-in GREEK, ROMAN and JAPANESE CULTURES: means of perpetuating the ancestor's cult threatened by
birth extinction - pamparami ng lahi! So usually adopted a male

Goals of adoption
B4: supply solace to those who had no children so that the void which exsited in childless homes may be
filed
NOW: extend to orphan or indigent child the protection of society in the person of adopter

PROCESS of ADOPTION: governed by Lex domicili


Problem: which would exercise jurisdiction? What law would be applied?
GR: Child's personal law determine validity of adoption, regardless of jurisdiction State A provides that the father shall have sole custody over
-why: main object is to provide for the welfare of the child, ensure that his interest is well -protected illegitimate child (father's domicile) while State B provides
-problem: when personal law does not create substantial contacts with child (law of domicile but child is joint custody observed by both parents over the illegitimate
merely constructively domiciled in that place or law of nationality but the child does not actually reside child. H & W are not married, had a child, lived in State B.
in the state considering him a national), thus the court in that state whose law is applicable cannot Could W & H stipulate that upon death of W, H would
competently protect the interests of the child exercise sole parental authority and custody over the
--so use Adopter's personal law illegitimate child?
-on ma'am's initial question vesting custody and parental
WON an Alien may adopt a child in the Philippines? authority over the child: it's in the best interest of the child
GR: NO
-different family orientation, cultures, customs, and traditions which could pose a problem for Filipino
children to adapt themselves to a completely strange environment Upon separation of the parents,
X: A184: aliens w/ some relationship w/ adopted child

PRIL Page 96
Upon separation of the parents,
X: A184: aliens w/ some relationship w/ adopted child GR: agreement as to custody would be valid
X: if they don't agree:
*RA 8552: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 *below 7: mother
○ ArtIII, Sec7b: aliens can adopt, provided: *above 7: best interest of the child, preference of the
 Resided in RP for at least 3 consecutive years prior to time of filing application for adoption child
 Maintains residency in RP until adoption decree issued
 Submission of a certification from the alien's country w/c Question of Public policy question: Would an agreement
□ attests to his/her legal capacity to adopt between the partners be valid as to the custody of the
□ States that their law allows adopted children into the adopter's country child?
*these requirements may be waived when child to be adopted is a relative by consanguinity or There is no strong public policy on agreements as between
affinity of the adopter/spouse of the adopter parents as to custody of the child, provided that the child's
interest is protected (which is best protected if the child
*RA 8043: governs adoption by other aliens would have link with both parents)
-before this law, adoption was practiced pursuant to Rules and regulations on Foreign Adoption,
implementing Child and Youth Welfare Code… ADOPTION
GR: Law of the domicile of the child
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~ X: law of the domicile of the adopter

NOW: ADOPTION
Domestic Adoption law provides that ALIENS can adopt
Filipino children, provided
1. Resided in the Philippines for 3 years prior to the
application
2. Aliens reside in RP during the pendency of the petition
-problem: some aliens' stay cannot be extended…what if
the process is longer than their allowed stay?
…it usually takes long for adoption process
○ -benefit: magulo lang because there are many hearings but
○ it is easier to have children adopted here vs. Intercountry
○ adoption

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
-Filipinos permanently residing abroad governed

What if an OFW not permanently residing abroad wants to


adopt in RP? What law would apply?
Ma'am: permanent residency is subject to the place of
present residence of the person in question




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EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
-governed by the law w/c created the adoption
-RP Courts: Adoption relates to civil right, does not affect changes in the political rights of the adopted
child including child's eligibility to acquire citizenship of adopter

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PRIL Page 97
PRIL Page 98
*Pril Lecture Jan 12
Saturday, January 16, 2010
2:31 PM

PRIL Lecture Jan12


Formal requisite : lex loci celebrationis
Intrinsic requisite: personal law
-law of the domicile/law of nationality: presumed to have closest relation to the person
*one of the criticisms of nationality: ties may be attenuated
e.g. still a child when brought to US by Filipino parents (so he's a Filipino) but grew in US, blah blah blah…so he would be more
connected with US law… But if it involves those in Art15 of NCC, then being a Filipino, RP law would be applied

GR: follow traditional approach (which is above)


X: modern approach (when it is not certain what the applicable law is)

As to consent of parent: IN RP, mere part of validity of a marriage license - so any defect in it merely makes the marriage license
questionable but would not render the marriage void

PFR Review
*if there's defect in
>formal requisite: administrative remedy
>essential requisite: voidable
*if there's lack of essential or formal requisite: void

APT v. APT
-German nationals, one located in England and the other in Argentina. Marriage was by proxy marriage, celebrated in Argentina. Wife
in England contests the validity of the marriage. Court held that the marriage was valid in the place where it is celebrated, thus it
should be deemed valid wherever it is (here, the question was only as regard the celebration of the marriage - a formal requisite)
-physical presence of the parties during celebration of marriage: formal requisite
If this case was brought in the Philippines, Apt and Apt both Filipinos, how would the court decide the case?

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n )

*so Some argue that both the formal and essential requisite require physical presence of the spouses. So is it merely a defect or
absence?
Under Art 2(2): It requires presence just to show that consent is freely given - and not essential but merely a formality. You only have
to be present for a marriage to be done
…but there's not RP case on this and there's ambiguity as to how our laws were written so we could argue that proxy marriages are
allowed in RP
-BUT WHY HAVE A PROXY WEDDING if persons want to spend much just to have a wedding?
"You should know how to invent…"
e.g. If you're Catholic, you would want to give birth to a legitimate child so marriage first before getting birth…

IN RE MAY'S ESTATE
Uncle and niece got married under Jewish customs in Rhode Island, but were residents and domicilaries of NY. Upon death of the wife,
husband petitioned for letters of administration but their daughter contested the validity of their marriage, it being prohibited in NY
(but allowed under law of Rhode Island). Court used the case of Van Voorhis v. Brintall, where GR is that a marriage valid in accordance
with the law of the place where it is celebrated, it is valid everywhere. The two exceptions mentioned there not being present (i.e. no
positive law governing marriages outside NY + not deemed incestuous under natural law), the marriage was considered valid
Dissent: NY law made law to govern people w/n their jurisdictions _ only went to Rhode island to get married (applied modern
approach - more contacts w/ NY than Rhode Island)
-so allow people who can afford to go outside RP to contravene our law…pro-rich: EPC denied
If in RP: void for being against public policy
-where family relationships are protected

PRIL Page 99
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES
In RP: RP law applies to property relations of Filipino spouses
X: where aliens or where property located outside RP
-change of nationality of spouses does not affect the law that governs their property relations
e.g. If in RP, husband and wife should support each other
If husband became naturalized in a country where support is the sole obligation of supporting, there would have been a change but
under the ….

DIVORCE and SEPARATION


Divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos
GR: Not valid in RP
X: Art26.2
a. If one of the spouses is an alien who obtains a valid divorce in accordance with its personal law
b. If one of the spouses was a former Filipino who became naturalized, deemed an alien who is allowed to divorce (Republic vs.
Obrecino III)

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO
-Tenchavez and Escano married discretely, Escano's family objected it so Escano still lived with her parents until she left for the US,
obtained divorce there, married a US Citizen, and later became a US Citizen. Tenchavez filed for legal separation and damages. Court
held that he has grounds for legal separation and damages, the 2nd marriage contracted by Escano being bigamous (adulterous). A
divorce decree between Filipinos deemed not valid in RP.

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO


-Alien spouse obtained divorce decree, then later wanted to manage the alleged conjugal property of the two. Court used US case (+
A15, nationality principle) to rule that when there's a divorce decree, no marital ties so unfair if one spouse is still bound to the
marriage when the other does not consider the other his or her spouse.

"On Housewife: not to be mean but they are not wives and they don't have a house"

REPUBLIC V. OBRECIDO
A former Filipina who allegedly was naturalized allegedly obtained divorce so Filipino husband filed a petition for authority to remarry.
Court did not grant such petition, failing to prove that the wife was indeed naturalized and obtained a valid divorce decree. However,
using A26.2, FC, naturalized Filipinos are considered aliens so can validly obtain divorce.
-ma'am: wrong. Should have used A15, NCC to validate the divorce since now, the naturalized citizen's national law is the law of the
state where he or she was naturalized, thus, if that state allow divorce, he or she could acquire divorce decree.
-J. Coquia: anti-rich ruling. Those who can go abroad, then be naturalized there, can validly obtain divorce decree.

SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS


-Governor married 3x, 1st wife died before him, 2nd wife is an alien who divorced him before Hawaiian courts, and the 3rd a Filipina
who lived w/ him until he died. ("With whom he died" - Edel :)) Children of the 1st marriage contests the claim of the 3rd wife, claiming
that the said marriage was bigamous, there being a subsisting 2nd marriage. Court held that, even w/o FC, Van Dorn etc. already ruled
that divorce decree obtained by aliens vs. their Filipino spouses are considered valid in RP, thus 3rd marriage is considered valid, if
proven (REMAND - merely produced photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and annotated text of Family Law Act of California -
where they were married). On question of venue, residence here is considered in the popular sense, the Romualdez cases being not
applicable as the said cases are election cases where residence and domicile are the same.

VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FOREIGNERS


-follow personal law
-they can sue in RP for divorce, but as to recognition, should prove foreign law allowing it + divorce decree validly obtained

…next meeting: Finish Chapter then property, letter B (End of Letter D)

PRIL Page 100


San Luis v San Luis (2007)
Sunday, January 10, 2010
6:02 PM

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DEC I SI O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and
January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custodyon
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of dministration8 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

PRIL Page 101


On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term"place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a personas
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return.They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.


Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

PRIL Page 102


required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
***

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule
in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December
22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

PRIL Page 103


Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xx x x

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added) Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st
spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly American citizen who divorced him, then remarried
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1awphi1
.n
et

the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing


Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case. and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the
validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse.
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated: proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its spouse to present further evidence on this.
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should Facts
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is 1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he
to render justice.
did in 1963
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while 2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias,
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to granted in 1973
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a 3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974,
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
Alabang residence
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." -when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION
xx x x OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and administration before RTC Makati
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its -petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, for 2 grounds:
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.However, the records show death)
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well 2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. (Family Code provision cannot be applied
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
retroactively as it would impair their vested rights
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or in accordance with Article 256, FC)
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not ---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper to MTD, showing evidence of the ff:
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in ○ Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71 home in Alabang - to prove proper venue
○ Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As capacity to sue
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
alleged and proved. 73 CA: reversed and set aside
1. Place of residence should be understood in as the
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. personal, actual or physical habitation so petition
was properly filed
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we 2. Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as Filipino to remarry under Philippine law
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. 1. WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: cases.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must -there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes

PRIL Page 104


SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must -there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is,
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75 the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. However, for
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
and consistency.
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union isprima facie presumed 2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners a. As the legal wife: even if FC not applied
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77 retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985)
sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which
and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the were in Ma'am's book)
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 -it look at the legislative intent of FC provision
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows: assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally which validates a divorce decree obtained by an
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
to remarry again
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be ---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce,
presumed to be equal. Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad.
xx x x However, as the marriage between Felicidad and
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co- Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous the case to RTC
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property b. Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could
is essential. x x x still petition for a letter of administration as an
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner
weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81 of properties owned by persons living as husband
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters and wife but whose marriage is void.
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Pasted from <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_133743_2007.html>

PRIL Page 105


Republic v. Obrecido
Sunday, January 10, 2010
6:02 PM

/---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez ---\

[2005V1161] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,


Respondent.2005 Oct 51st DivisionG.R. No. 154380D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen .

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage ; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment
or for legal separation.*5+ Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[ 7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

.. .

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of

PRIL Page 106


his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those Short summary: Filipino husband left by Filipina wife,
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. Filipina wife was naturalized as an US citizen then divorced
him. He now wants a declaration allowing him to remarry
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was again. Court held that A26.2 is also applicable to cases
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was where the spouse who obtained divorce decree is a
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides: naturalized citizen of a State allowing divorce, provided the
law allowing such divorce is proven + divorce decree
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the proven. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is remarry.
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. mphasis supplied) Facts:
-Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at 1981
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties -Villanueva left for US in 1986, bringing son with them
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was -few years later, Villanueva was naturalized as US Citizen;
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American sometime in 2000, Orbecido found out through son that
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A. -Orbecido filed PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY
RTC: granted it
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ -MFR filed by OSG: Art26 only applies to mix marriages, not
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26: in one where both are Filipinos even if the other one was
naturalized
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re -marry, while the spouses of WON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can. REMEDY? YES
-action constitutes Petition for Declaratory Relief which is
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. granted if the ff are present:
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
widespread consultation. ( mphasis supplied.) interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
Legislative Intent the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of --here OSG and Orbecido are adverse parties - one for
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to protection of marriage while the other against it; then it is
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after ripe for judicial determination because if Orbecido decides
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. to remarry, he may face litigation wherein the validity of his
2nd marriage may be questioned
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] WHY NOT ANNULMENT OR LEGAL SEPARATION:
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held -Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties -legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization? would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the naturalized alien spouse.
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of WON ART26.2, FC APPLIES TO CASES WHERE BOTH
obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under SPOUSES ARE FILIPINOS BUT ONE WAS NATURALIZED AND
Philippine law and can thus remarry. WAS ALSO THE ONE WHO OBTAINED DIVORCE DECREE?
YES, provided already naturalized at the time divorce
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that decree was obtained
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the -as was cited in San Luis vs. San Luis
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a Brief Historical Background
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry -On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the 26 thereof states:
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12] were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35,
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse 37, and 38.
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino -On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
Article 26. into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as amended, it now provides:
follows: ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
and in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

PRIL Page 107


35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
latter to remarry. remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage CPCP opposed Art26.2 because it was discriminatory
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife (against Filipinos whose spouses who are in abroad) and
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the because it is the beginning of recognition of absolute
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” divorce.
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Legislative Intent
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse. allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13] and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, or intent
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically *note: decisions cite Quita v. CA on the court ruling that A
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
capacitated to enter into another marriage. longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
NOTE HOWEVER that this is just an obiter dictum, as
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code recognized in this case.
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. TWIN ELEMENTS FOR APPLICATION OF ART26.2:
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on 1. There is a valid marriage that has been
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
HOWEVER, HERE, THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
No pronouncement as to costs. REMARRY GRANTED BY TC WAS SET ASIDE BECAUSE
OBRECIDO FAILED TO PROVE THE FF:
SO ORDERED. 1. Wife validly obtained naturalization
2. Foreign law allowing divorce
3. Wife validly obtained divorce decree

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRIL Page 108


ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 20-22.

[2] Id. at 27-29.

[3] Id. at 21-22.

[4] Id. at 105.

[5] Id. at 106-110.

[6] Id. at 110.

[7] Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

[8] Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing
Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.

[9] Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.

[10] No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

[11] G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

[12] Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.

[13] Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.

[14] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.

[15] Id. at 451.

\---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez ---/

([2005V1161] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.,
G.R. No. 154380, 2005 Oct 5, 1st Division)

PRIL Page 109


!San Luis v. San Luis
Monday, January 11, 2010
4:04 PM

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who
divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the
standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law
(can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently
provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However,
as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on
this.

Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for
18 years in their Alabang residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S
ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence
at the time of his death)
2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be
applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff:
○ Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue
○ Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
1. Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed
2. Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law

1. WON Venue properly laid? YES


-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of
a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES


a. As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for
holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's
book)
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree
obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage
between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC
b. Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with
Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and
wife but whose marriage is void.

PRIL Page 110


Inter-Country Adoption
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
11:08 PM

Republic Act No. 8043


Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
(Promulgated June 7, 1995)
Article I. General Provisions
Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide every
neglected and abandoned child with a family that will provide such child with love and care as
well as opportunities for growth and development. Towards this end, efforts shall be exerted to
place the child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However, recognizing that inter-
country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens not presently allowed by law to adopt
Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by qualified Filipino citizens or aliens, the
State shall take measures to ensure that inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same
shall prove beneficial to the child's best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her
fundamental rights.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act. the term:
(a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a
foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside
the Philippines.
(b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner emancipated by
law.
(c) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development of the
Republic of the Philippines.
(d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
(e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State welfare agency or a licensed
adoption agency in the country of the adopting parents which provide comprehensive
social services and which is duly recognized by the Department.
(f) Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to
the Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
(g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to
promote a mutually satisfying parent-child relationship.
(h) Board refers to the Inter-country Adoption Board.
Article II. The Inter-Country Adoption Board
Sec. 4. The Inter-Country Adoption Board. — There is hereby created the Inter-Country
Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central authority in matters
relating to inter-country adoption. It shall act as the policy-making body for purposes of carrying
out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and coordination with the Department, the different
child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental
organizations engaged in child-care and placement activities. As such, it shall:
(a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other
practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the
child;
(b) Collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information about the child and the
adoptive parents;
(c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through authorized
and accredited agency;
(d) Prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter
improper practices contrary to this Act;
(e) Promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption;
(f) License and accredit child-caring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in the
placement of Filipino children;
(g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the placement of Filipino children in
their own country; and

PRIL Page 111


their own country; and
(h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring and placement agency or
adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation
of any provision under this Act.
Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. — The Board shall be composed of the Secretary of the
Department as ex officio Chairman, and six (6) other members to be appointed by the President
for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years: Provided, That there shall be appointed one (1)
psychiatrist or psychologist, two (2) lawyers who shall have at least the qualifications of a
regional trial court judge, one (1) registered social worker and two (2) representatives from non-
governmental organizations engaged in child-caring and placement activities. The members of
the Board shall receive a per diem allowance of One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for
each meeting attended by them: Provided, further, That no compensation shall be paid for more
than four (4) meetings a month.
Sec. 6. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) to prescribe rules and regulations as it may deem reasonably necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act, after consultation and upon favorable recommendation of the
different agencies concerned with the child-caring, placement, and adoption;
(b) to set the guidelines for the convening of an Inter-country Adoption Placement
Committee which shall be under the direct supervision of the Board;
(c) to set the guidelines for the manner by which selection/matching of prospective
adoptive parents and adoptive child can be made;
(d) to determine a reasonable schedule of fees and charges to be exacted in connection
with the application for adoption;
(e) to determine the form and contents of the application for inter-country adoption;
(g) to institute systems and procedures to prevent improper financial gain in connection
with adoption and deter improper practices which are contrary to this Act;
(h) to promote the development of adoption services, including post-legal adoption
services,
(i) to accredit and authorize foreign private adoption agencies which have demonstrated
professionalism, competence and have consistently pursued non-profit objectives to
engage in the placement of Filipino children in their own country: Provided, That such
foreign private agencies are duly authorized and accredited by their own government to
conduct inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the total number of authorized
and accredited foreign private adoption agencies shall not exceed one hundred (100) a
year;
(j) to take appropriate measures to ensure confidentiality of the records of the child, the
natural parents and the adoptive parents at all times;
(k) to prepare, review or modify, and thereafter, recommend to the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Memoranda of Agreement respecting inter-country adoption consistent with the
implementation of this Act and its stated goals, entered into, between and among foreign
governments, international organizations and recognized international non-governmental
organizations;
(l) to assist other concerned agencies and the courts in the implementation of this Act,
particularly as regards coordination with foreign persons, agencies and other entities
involved in the process of adoption and the physical transfer of the child; and
(m) to perform such other functions on matters relating to inter-country adoption as may be
determined by the President.
Back to top

Article III. Procedure


(Note: Please see the Supreme Court rule on inter-country adoption.)
Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. — The Board shall ensure that all
possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-
country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set up the
guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child
is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be
allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.
Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country
adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents

PRIL Page 112


adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents
must be submitted to the Board:
(a) Child study;
(b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
(c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
(d) Medical evaluation /history;
(e )Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
(f) Recent photo of the child.
Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file
an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than
the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by
nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent:
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited
counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral
values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations
issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in
other applicable Philippine laws.
Sec. 10. Where to File Application. — An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either
with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board,
through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited
agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in
accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be
promulgated by the Board.
The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially translated in
English.
(a) Birth certificate of applicant(s);
(b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable;
(c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age, in
the form of sworn statement;
(d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and
psychologist;
(e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the applicant(s);
(f) Police clearance of applicant(s);
(g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a
member of the immediate community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5)
years; and
(h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family;
The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings.
Sec. 11. Family Selection/Matching. — No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family
unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. The clearance, as
issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall form part of the records
of the child to be adopted. When the Board is ready to transmit the Placement Authority to the
authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all the travel documents of the
child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of them, shall personally fetch the child in
the Philippines.
Sec. 12. Pre-adoptive Placement Costs. — The applicant(s) shall bear the following costs
incidental to the placement of the child;
(a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the residence of the applicant(s)

PRIL Page 113


incidental to the placement of the child;
(a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the residence of the applicant(s)
abroad, including all travel expenses within the Philippines and abroad; and
(b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and psychological evaluation
required, and other related expenses.
Sec. 13. Fees, Charges and Assessments. — Fees, charges, and assessments collected by the
Board in the exercise of its functions shall be used solely to process applications for inter-
country adoption and to support the activities of the Board.
Sec. 14. Supervision of Trial Custody. — The governmental agency or the authorized and
accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the application for inter-
country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the child. It shall also
provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of
six (6) months from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall
a decree of adoption beissued in the said country a copy of which shall be sent to the Board to
form part of the records of the child.
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency or the
authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress
report of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into consideration in
deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system by which Filipino children sent abroad
for trial custody are monitored and checked as reported by the authorized and accredited inter-
country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the Philippines of a Filipino child whose
adoption has not been approved.
Sec. 15. Executive Agreements. — The Department of Foreign Affairs, upon representation of
the Board, shall cause the preparation of Executive Agreements with countries of the foreign
adoption agencies to ensure the legitimate concurrence of said countries in upholding the
safeguards provided by this Act.

Back to top
Article IV. Penalties
Sec. 16. Penalties. — (a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or carrying
out of an illegal adoption, in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more than Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200.000), at the discretion of the court. For purposes of this Act, an adoption is illegal if
it is effected in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or established State policies, its
implementing rules and regulations, executive agreements, and other laws pertaining to
adoption. Illegality may be presumed from the following acts:
(1) consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended by coercion, fraud,
improper material inducement;
(2) there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption;
(3) the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for adoption were not complied
with; and
(4) the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to danger, abuse and exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and
integrity of records, documents and communications of adoption applications, cases and
processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1)
day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not
more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated.
Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves two or
more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall merit the
penalty of reclusionperpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided shall be
in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under
other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. — Any government official, employee or functionary who

PRIL Page 114


other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. — Any government official, employee or functionary who
shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with
private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in
accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing
of a case, either administrative or criminal, said government official, employee or functionary
concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until the resolution of the case.
Article V. Final Provisions
Sec. 18. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The Inter-country Adoption Board, in
coordination with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and
the Department of Justice, after due consultation with agencies involved in child-care and
placement, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of
this Act within six (6) months after itseffectivity.
Sec. 19. Appropriations. — The amount of Five million pesos (P5,000,000) is hereby
appropriated from the proceeds of the Lotto for the initial operations of the Board and
subsequently the appropriations of the same shall be included in the General Appropriations Act
for the year following its enactment.
Sec. 20. Separability Clause. — If any provision, or part hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected, shall remain
valid and subsisting.
Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. — Any law, decree, executive order, administrative order or rules
and regulations contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
Sec. 22. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Pasted from <http://www.familymatters.org.ph/Relevant%20Laws/RA%208043%20Inter-Country%20Adoption.htm>

PRIL Page 115


Republic v. Obrecido
Monday, January 11, 2010
3:47 PM

Short summary: Filipino husband left by Filipina wife, Filipina wife was naturalized as an US citizen then divorced him. He now wants a declaration allowing him to remarry
again. Court held that A26.2 is also applicable to cases where the spouse who obtained divorce decree is a naturalized citizen of a State allowing divorce, provided the law
allowing such divorce is proven + divorce decree proven. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Facts:
-Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in 1981
-Villanueva left for US in 1986, bringing son with them
-few years later, Villanueva was naturalized as US Citizen; sometime in 2000, Orbecido found out through son that wife obtaine d a divorce decree and remarried
-Orbecido filed PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY
RTC: granted it
-MFR filed by OSG: Art26 only applies to mix marriages, not in one where both are Filipinos even if the other one was natural ized

WON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER REMEDY? YES


-action constitutes Petition for Declaratory Relief which is granted if the ff are present:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
--here OSG and Orbecido are adverse parties - one for protection of marriage while the other against it; then it is ripe for judicial determination because if Orbecido decides
to remarry, he may face litigation wherein the validity of his 2nd marriage may be questioned
WHY NOT ANNULMENT OR LEGAL SEPARATION:
-Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges
of validity.
-legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.

WON ART26.2, FC APPLIES TO CASES WHERE BOTH SPOUSES ARE FILIPINOS BUT ONE WAS NATURALIZED AND WAS ALSO THE ONE WHO OBTAINED DIVORCE DECREE?
YES, provided already naturalized at the time divorce decree was obtained
-as was cited in San Luis vs. San Luis
Brief Historical Background
-On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
-On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

CPCP opposed Art26.2 because it was discriminatory (against Filipinos whose spouses who are in abroad) and because it is the beginning of recognition of absolute divorce.

Legislative Intent
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it shou ld be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent
*note: decisions cite Quita v. CA on the court ruling that A Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry. NOTE HOWEVER that this is just an obiter dictum, as recognized in this case.

TWIN ELEMENTS FOR APPLICATION OF ART26.2:


1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizensh ip at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

HOWEVER, HERE, THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY GRANTED BY TC WAS SET ASIDE BECAUSE OBRECIDO FAILED TO PROVE THE FF:
1. Wife validly obtained naturalization
2. Foreign law allowing divorce
3. Wife validly obtained divorce decree

PRIL Page 116


Domestic Adoption Act
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
11:08 PM

Republic Act No. 8552


Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
(Promulgated February 25, 1998)

Note: Please the Supreme Court rule for the procedures in domestic adoption.

Article I. General Provisions


Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. —
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that every child remains under
the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding
and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. Only
when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the
child's extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall
be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United
Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to
Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention
on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.
Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through
foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish
his/her parental authority over his/her child;
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s);
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and
custody over his/her adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively
or judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as "legally available for
adoption" and his/her custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring
agency, which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement
of the child;
(iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive
environment for adoption;
(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector
agencies to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications, and
offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and
post-adoption education and counseling; and
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and culture in
his/her native land, and only when this is not available shall intercountry adoption be
considered as a last resort.
Sec 3. Definition of terms — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as:
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-
placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his/her biological parent(s)
or guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.
(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly
relinquishes parental authority to the Department.
(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial,

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permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial,
continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.
(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or
whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months
and has been judicially declared as such.
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial
relationship.
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to
provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving
applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents, and preparing the
adoption home study.
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that
provides twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned,
neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her biological mother,
causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
Back to top

Article II. Pre-Adoption Services


Sec. 4. Counseling Service. — The Department shall provide the services of licensed social
workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) — Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after
the birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted
before the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the
biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption
before the decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also
be offered to the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for
adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and
all alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been
provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) — Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars,
among others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible
adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee — Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she
understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on
adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.
Sec. 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-
placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
Sec. 6. Support Services. — The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program which shall
include, among others, the above mentioned services.
Article III. Eligibilty
Sec. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until

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years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity
to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Sec. 8. Who May Be Adopted. — The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or
judicially declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of
legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings
shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent
of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living
with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
Back to top

Article IV. Procedure


Note: Please see the Supreme Court rule on adoption procedures.
Sec. 10. Hurried Decisions. — In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that
the biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried
decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain that all measures to
strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her
own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
Sec. 11. Case Study. — No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed
social worker of the Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or any
child-placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biological
parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the
matter to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall
confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of

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confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of
the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the
concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and
that the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the
adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the adoption is in the best interest
of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case
studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and
records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by the Department.
Sec. 12. Supervised Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the
adopter(s) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6)
months within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each
other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority
shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the
same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the
period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial custody
except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through
a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall
enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed
with the prospective adopter(s).
Sec. 13. Decree of Adoption. — If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been
complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of
the case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence
submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the
adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be
entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall
also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect
the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known.
Sec. 14. Civil Registry Record. — An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil
Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of
the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. The original certificate of birth shall be
stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its
place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to
the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.
Sec. 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. — All hearings in adoption cases
shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating
to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for
purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the
adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes
for which it may be used.
Article V. Effects of Adoption
Sec. 16. Parental Authority. — Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Sec. 17. Legitimacy. — The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To
this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
family.
Sec. 18. Succession. — In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
Article VI. Rescission of Adoption
Sec. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the

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Sec. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following
grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article
919 of the Civil Code.
Sec. 20. Effects of Rescission. — If the petition is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of
the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee
and restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment
of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.

Back to top
Article VII. Violations and penalties
Sec. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud,
improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the
name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
.Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall
cooperate in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein
prescribed and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity
of records, documents, and communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2)
years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it
involves two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking
and shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided, shall be
in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under
other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence
and perpetually excluded from entry to the country.
.Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of
the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the
above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules
and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said

PRIL Page 121


and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension
until the resolution of the case.
Sec. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. — A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this
Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the
simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she has been
consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall
be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided,
finally, That such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and
other requirements as determined by the Department.
Article VIII. Final Provisions
Sec. 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. — There shall be established an Adoption
Resources and Referral Office under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor
the existence, number, and flow of children legally available for adoption and prospective
adopter(s) so as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information and
educational campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption proceedings; (d)
generate resources to help child-caring and child-placing agencies and foster homes maintain
viability; and (e) do policy research in collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption Board and
other concerned agencies. The office shall be manned by adoption experts from the public and
private sectors.
Sec. 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within six (6) months from the promulgation
of this Act, the Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil
Registry General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, and two (2) private
individuals representing child-placing and child-caring agencies shall formulate the necessary
guidelines to make the provisions of this Act operative.
Sec. 25. Appropriations. — Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law and thereafter.
Sec. 26. Repealing Clause. — Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter
of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.
Sec. 27. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Sec. 28. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in any newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.

Pasted from <http://www.familymatters.org.ph/Relevant%20Laws/RA%208552%20Domestic%20Adoption%20Act.htm>

PRIL Page 122


CXIII: Choice of Law in Property
Saturday, January 16, 2010
2:57 PM

A. THE CONTROLLING LAW


-depends on WON the property is movable or not

Immovable Movable
Lex situs: rights, May be:
interests of various • Lex domicili (mobilia sequuntur personam):they could be moved from place
person are determined to place, difficult to anticipate where they may be situated at a given time
by the law of the place • lex situs:
where the land is ○ Traditional reason: the state has the sole power to decide the validity
situated and effects of the transfer of property
○ Policy-oriented rationale: parties expect their transaction would be
governed by the law of the place where the property is located
• Lex loci actus (law of the place where the transaction was completed)
• Proper law of transfer: law of the state which has the most real
connections with the transfer
*January 26 PRIL Lecture
In RP: -volunteer daw
ART414: property is anything that may be an object of appropriation -in RP: lex situs for both movable and immovable properties (Art 16)
ART 16: irrelevant if real or personal property (as regards nationals) - lex situs applies Why: for simplicity and convenience
Problem: what if the place where the property is located distinguishes between rules applicable to
real and personal property and the applicable law is not their law? Difference if traditional reason or policy-centered approach?
Why RP adopted Lex Situs? Traditional approach: centers on the territory: since it is part of the territory of the state,
• Being physically part of the country, it [the property] should be subject to the laws thereof. it is the state's law which would govern
• The situs is the place most closely and significally related to the issue in question Policy-oriented: most significant contacts, state whose interest is less impaired
• Increase in the amount and variety of personal property not connected w/ the person of the owner, so
adopt lex situs even with movables. Other laws which may apply as to movable properties:
*lex domicili
B. CAPACITY TO TRANSFER OR ACQUIRE PROPERTY *Lex loci actus
-governed by LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED: LEX SITUS *proper law of transfer

*~*~*~
Anton volunteered to recite…ayaw ni ma'am. Baka kasi tangerine ang color scheme
nila. :p

Capacity to transfer or acquire property


-does the lex loci rule apply?
----review: general rule on capacity: the personal law of the person

*in Property: it's not the same, quite different (does not follow the personal law of the
person) = lex situs applies!

*Ma'am: it's merely TEMPORARY possession of property - not ownership


Why prohibit ownership of lands of aliens? To preserve properties in favor of Filipinos

-PFR review: administration and management of property is jointly exercised by spouses


…so what happens now?
---Aliens can't have conjugal properties, or else would contravene Consti provisions
prohibiting ownership of aliens
---possibly, alien spouse may still exercise share in conjugal properties if it is converted to
movable properties, i.e. cash!!!! - but as long as it is immovable, can't own anything

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity of Conveyances


-formalities: lex situs rin (follows general rule)

e.g. in RP, sale of property formalities:


*in public document
*registered
*signed by both parties

EXCEPTIONS
1. Transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the land
-lex intentionis or lex voluntatis
2. When transaction is merely an accessory to a principal contract
3. Succession
-personal law

Why not lex situs applied?


Li-je-dal

*since it did not directly relate to the transfer of title, law of the place of contracting
applies

PRIL Page 123



C. EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF CONVEYANCES


Formalities (extrinsic) Essential validity (intrinsic)
lex situs GR: lex situs
-treated as a question of contract and not of property X: lex intentionis clearly established

D. EXCEPTIONS TO LEX SITUS RULE (3)


1. Transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the land
Apply: lex intentionis or lex voluntatis

2. When transaction is merely an accessory to a principal contract (i.e. mortgage for a loan)
Apply: lex situs applies to the mortgage contract (thus, this is still not an exception) but law on
contracts govern the principal contract

3. Testate/Intestate Succession & capacity to succeed


Apply: national law of the decedent (A16.2, NCC)

On Movables:
Policy-centered approach: forum court not bound to look to the law of the situs when
*the situs is INSIGNIFICANT OR INCIDENTAL
e.g. place merely chosen for convenience of one of the parties, when they both know that the
property would be used somewhere else

PRIL Page 124


*when the issues involves considerations other than the validity and effect of the transfer itself
>>>APPLY: law of the place which has real interest in the property

RUDOW V. FOGEL: issue was WON the conveyance would result in a constructive trust among
family members all residing in another state (and not the title to the land)
>>>court applied the law of the domicile of the trustor and trustee instead of the lex situs of the
property

PRIL Page 125


*January 19: PRIL LECTURE
Saturday, January 16, 2010
3:07 PM

wah sabaw na recit. :(

*Jan 19 PRIL Lecture notes


Review: Divorce between Filipino citizens is not allowed
If mixed marriages: Partial divorce allowed in RP, provided that the Alien is the one who secures
divorce abroad
>>>problem: if Former Filipino citizens, one became naturalized
…may be recognized in RP provided former Filipino citizen already became naturalized when
divorce decree issued

WAYS to go around anti-divorce law in RP:


1. Be a muslim
2. A36
3. Report the husband missing! Hahaha!

IF both aliens: look at their personal law if it allows absolute divorce

Divorce Annulment/nullity
After marriage At the time of celebration
Grounds depend on the law of the forum Grounds depend on ???
e.g. State A: specific grounds of marital fault
State B: No fault - can apply for irreconcilable differences

H & W are domiciliaries of State B, but filed for divorce in State A.

*on Art 36: grounds during marriage, not during the celebration of the marriage
Is there any provision in the FC providing that the FATHER should be followed?
YES. On property relations of spouses, on the parental authority

State A provides that the father shall have sole custody over illegitimate child (father's domicile)
while State B provides joint custody observed by both parents over the illegitimate child. H & W are
not married, had a child, lived in State B. Could W & H stipulate that upon death of W, H would
exercise sole parental authority and custody over the illegitimate child?
-on ma'am's initial question vesting custody and parental authority over the child: it's in the best
interest of the child

Upon separation of the parents,


GR: agreement as to custody would be valid
X: if they don't agree:
*below 7: mother
*above 7: best interest of the child, preference of the child

Question of Public policy question: Would an agreement between the partners be valid as to the
custody of the child?
There is no strong public policy on agreements as between parents as to custody of the child,

PRIL Page 126


custody of the child?
There is no strong public policy on agreements as between parents as to custody of the child,
provided that the child's interest is protected (which is best protected if the child would have link
with both parents)

ADOPTION
GR: Law of the domicile of the child
X: law of the domicile of the adopter

NOW: ADOPTION
Domestic Adoption law provides that ALIENS can adopt Filipino children, provided
1. Resided in the Philippines for 3 years prior to the application
2. Aliens reside in RP during the pendency of the petition
-problem: some aliens' stay cannot be extended…what if the process is longer than their allowed
stay?
…it usually takes long for adoption process
-benefit: magulo lang because there are many hearings but it is easier to have children
adopted here vs. Intercountry adoption

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
-Filipinos permanently residing abroad governed

What if an OFW not permanently residing abroad wants to adopt in RP? What law would apply?
Ma'am: permanent residency is subject to the place of present residence of the person in question

Next meeting:
Intercountry adoption law
-procedure
-recognition of foreign judgment (if the adoption decree is issued by a foreign country) - look at the
Hague conference
-then continue with the next chapter

PRIL Page 127


Continuation: Choice of Law in Property…
Wednesday, January 20, 2010 SITUS OF PERSONAL PROPERTIES FOR
2:44 PM *TAX PURPOSES
-Can't apply mobilia sequuntur personam
-a state can tax everything found in its territory
E. SITUS OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES
mobilia sequuntur personam
1. SITUS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR TAX PURPOSES
(law, archaic) Common law doctrine holding that personal property held by a
-CAN'T apply mobilia sequuntur personam (had its origins in considerations of general person is governed by the same law that governs that person, so that if a
convenience and public policy) person who is legally domiciledin one jurisdiction dies with property in a
-STATE has right to tax property w/n its jurisdiction second jurisdiction, that property is legally treated as though it were in the first
-can't be applied if it would result in inescapable and patent injustice jurisdiction.

*MONEY

*DEBTS

-in this case: debt - follow law where the debtor can be found

*SHARES OF STOCKS
-found in the state where it is located - domicile of the corporation
>>>review in Capital Gains Tax!!!

Report of Mr. Del Puerto


-get copy from Jericho



Review:
Cf: Pennoyer vs. Neff: If personal actions, should give summons personally and not through
publication or else no jurisdiction over person of defendant
quasi in rem: (De Midgeley v. Ferandos: A quasi in rem action is an action between parties where
the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them or some interest therein.
Jurisdiction w as acquired because it w as a quasi in rem action, w here jurisdiction over the
person is not required and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of
complying w ith the requirement of due process.
In rem: w here the direct object is to reach and dispose of property ow ned by them. (i.e.
testamentary proceeding w hich is an action in rem par excellance)

2. SITUS OF MONEY

*cha: Only Checks were in the local branch, not money. Probably, the pleading prayed that
money, not checks were to be levied on or something. Boo… this case is labo

3. SITUS OF DEBTS
-still UNSETTLED in RP
-suggested that the law w/c governs the contract from which the debt arises should govern the
transfer of the debt
2 kinds of movable property:
1. Choses in possession: all kinds of TANGIBLE PHYSICAL OBJECTS
2. Choses in action: INTANGIBLE objects
a. Mere rights of action: debt arising from a loan
b. Rights represented by a document: capable of delivery, susceptible to negotiation as a
separate legal entity

PRIL Page 128


CRITIQUE TO THE CASE:
2 premises which led to the conclusion in the case:
1. Debt though intangible, is subject to seizure like tangible property
2. The debt is LOCATED where the debtor is - can be sued wherever he is
-BUT THIS MAKES THE CREDITOR HELPLESS TO FIX THE PERSONAL PRESENCE OF THE
DEBTOR AT ONE PLACE OR ANOTHER
…Unjust to submit the creditor's claim to the accident of the debtor's presence in one
state or another

4. SITUS OF CORPORATE SHARES OF STOCKS


Corporation Code: SEC 63
…shares of stock issued by the corp are PERSONAL PROPETY
…may be transferred by DELIVERY OF THE CERTIICATE OR CERTIFICATES INDORSED BY THE
OWNER OR HIS ATTORNEY IN FACT or other persons legally authorized to make the transfer
VALID TRANSFER
-valid between parties ONLY: not yet recorded
-when valid to everyone: recorded in the books of the corporation
…shows the names of the parties to the transaction
…date of transfer
...number of certificate or certificates
…number of shares transferred



F. PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAME, COPYRIGHT


Paris Convention of 1893 (Union Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property)
-RP became a party to it on September 1965
-protects TRADE NAME in all countries of the Union w/o obligation of registration, WON it forms
part of the trade name

PRIL Page 129


part of the trade name

RA 8293: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF 1998


-established the Intellectual Property Ofice
-does not allow corps to register as their trade names those which are
1. Well known internationally and in the RP, WON registered in RP (already used as a mark by
some other person)
2. Used for identical or similar goods or services
-allows a corporation w/c may not be engaged in business or is not registered in RP to still file suit
(civil or administrative) to protect its trade name (note: only owners of registered marks in RP can
recover damages for trademark infringement)

Digest from Corpo:


PHILIP EXPORT BV (PEBV), PHILIPS ELECTRICAL LAMPS (PHILIPS ELECTRICAL) AND
PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INC (PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL) VS. CA, SEC AND
STANDARD PHILIPS CORP (STANDARD PHILIPS)

FACTS:
PEBV:
-foreign corporation organized under laws of Netherlands
-though not engaged in business in RP, is the registered owner of TM Philips and PHILIPS SHIELD
EMBLEM under the Cert. of Registration issued by the Philippine Patents Office
-incorporated 1922 pa!

PHILIPS ELECTRICAL & PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL:


-authorized users of TM PHILIPS AND PHILIPS SHIELD EMBLEM
-incorporated 1956 pa!

STANDARD PHILIPS:
-issued Cert of Registration on May 1982

PEBV, PHILIPS ELECTRICAL AND PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL filed a complaint for cancellation of
the word Philips from STANDARD PHILIPS' corporate name before SEC
COA: (1) prior registration with Bureau of Patents by PEBV; (2) prior registration of PHILIPS
ELECTRICAL and PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL with SEC.
-Standard Philips refused to amend its Articles of incorporation

So PEBV, Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial (Petitioners na from hereon) filed a petition for
issuance of writ of PI before SEC
COA: Standard Philips' use of PHILIPS amount to infringement and clear violation of Petitioners'
exclusive right to use the same, considering engaged in same business
ANSWER:
(1) PEBV had no capacity to sue;
(2) no similarity if considered in entirety;
(3) its products (chain rollers, belts, bearings, cutting saw) are different from petitioners'
(electrical products)
SEC: for Standard Philips (did not issue injunction); subsequently dismissed the petition itself for
lack of merit: Sec 18 applicable only when corporate names in question are identical - here no
confusing similarity at Standard Philps contain at least 2 words different…
-MR denied

SEC en banc (on appeal): affirmed dismissal of appeal

CA: Reverse case (where it was held that when the other corporation's name constitutes a
dominant part of the complainant's corporate names, the former cannot be allowed to use it) not
for-square (di ba all fours?) with the present case because not involved in same business; unrelated

PRIL Page 130


and non-competing businesses - MR Denied

RULING: For Petitioners


ON corporate name = property
-a corporation's right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which
it may assert and protect against the world in the same manner as it may protect its tangible
property, real or personal, against trespass or conversion. It is regarded, to a certain extent, as a
property right and one which cannot be impaired or defeated by subsequent appropriation by
another corporation in the same field
-A name is peculiarly important as necessary to the very existence of a corporation. Its name is one
of its attributes, an element of its existence, and essential to its identity. The general rule as to
corporations is that each corporation must have a name by which it is to sue and be sued and do all
legal acts. The name of a corporation in this respect designates the corporation in the same manner
as the name of an individual designates the person; and the right to use its corporate name is as
much a part of the corporate franchise as any other privilege granted.
-A corporation acquires its name by choice and need not select a name identical with or similar to
one already appropriated by a senior corporation while an individual's name is thrust upon him. A
corporation can no more use a corporate name in violation of the rights of others than an individual
can use his name legally acquired so as to mislead the public and injure another.

ON CORPO CODE: SECTION 18


"No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if the proposed
name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any
other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.
Where a change in a corporate name is approved, the commission shall issue an amended certificate
of incorporation under the amended name."

*two requisites:
(1) that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name;
and
(2) the proposed name is either:
(a) identical; or
(b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name
already protected by law; or
(c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.

WHICH CORPORATION HAS RIGHT TO USE THE NAME: Priority of Adoption


-so PEBV (issued Cert of Registration 1922) Philips Electrical and Philips industrial (1956) adopted
the name "PHILIPS" first vs. Standard Philips (only in 1982, or 26 years after)

HOW TO DETERMINE WON THERE'S CONFUSING SIMILARITY IN CORPORATE NAMES:


whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person, using ordinary care and discrimination. In so
doing, the Court must look to the record as well as the names themselves
---HERE, Phips is indeed the dominant word in all the companies!

ON PROOF OF CONFUSION OR DECEPTION:


-Director of Patents, in denying Standard Philips' application for registration of the trademark,
ruled that PEBV imports to the RP included equipments, machines and other parts falling under
same category wherein the products of Standard Phips fall.
-primary purposes of Standard Philips, as indicated in its articles of incorporation, included the
buying, selling…of electrical wiring devices, electrical component parts, and/or complement
of…electrical supplies…which is also included among the primary purposes of petitioner Philips
electrical; SO SAME LINE OF BUSINESS! Making it appear that Standard Philips' intention was
to ride on the popularity and established goodwill of said petitioner's business throughout the world

ON THE ARGUMENT THAT 2 WORDS WERE DIFFERENT:


-What is lost sight of, however, is that PHILIPS is a trademark or trade name which was
registered as far back as 1922. Petitioners, therefore, have the exclusive right to its use which must
be free from any infringement by similarity. A corporation has an exclusive right to the use of its
name, which may be protected by injunction upon a principle similar to that upon which persons are
protected in the use of trademarks and tradenames (18 C.J.S. 574). Such principle proceeds upon the
theory that it is a fraud on the corporation which has acquired a right to that name and perhaps
carried on its business thereunder, that another should attempt to use the same name, or the same
name with a slight variation in such a way as to induce persons to deal with it in the belief that they
are dealing with the corporation which has given a reputation to the name. Notably, too, Private
Respondent's name actually contains only a single word, that is, "STANDARD", different from that
of Petitioners inasmuch as the inclusion of the term "Corporation" or "Corp." merely serves the
Purpose of distinguishing the corporation from partnerships and other business organizations.

ON ARGUMENT THAT OTHER COMPANIES ALSO USES "PHILIPS": So? The fact that there
are other companies engaged in other lines of business using the word "PHILIPS" as part of their
corporate names is no defense and does not warrant the use by Private Respondent of such word
which constitutes an essential feature of Petitioners' corporate name previously adopted and
registered and-having acquired the status of a well-known mark in the Philippines and
internationally as well

*As a general rule, parties organizing a corporation must choose a name at their peril; and the use
of a name similar to one adopted by another corporation, whether a business or a nonbusiness or
non-profit organization if misleading and likely to injure it in the exercise in its corporate functions,
regardless of intent, may be prevented by the corporation having the prior right, by a suit for
injunction against the new corporation to prevent the use of the name

PRIL Page 131


PRIL Page 132
*January 21 PRIL LECTURE
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
1:04 PM

RP vs. CA: American and his Filipina wife wanted to adopt the nephews and niece of Filipina wife. However, court held that since
the law requires joint adoption when one of the spouses adopting is an alien, and the said alien should thus also be qualified to
adopt, and here the alien is not qualified to adopt, then the adoption decree was not issued.
*this case was adopted using the FC
*if under the DOMESTIC ADOPTION LAW of 1998: ALIEN may adopt provided that before the filing of the petition, required to
reside 3 years before filing of petition plus residence until finalization of adoption (stranger adoption)
---however, there's a similar provision in the Domestic Adoption Law (related-persons adoption). What process does this serve?
Instead of requiring supervised child custody, if the alien is related, the adopter-alien could ask for a shorter period (and even a
waiver of the period - but still has to be a residence in RP for 3 years)
…if related, the importance of bonding between adopter and adoptee need not be established

Effects of Adoption
-grants the adoptee the same rights as the natural child

-is it required that the foreigner adopter's country would allow the adopted child to change his citizenship to that of the adopter's
country? NO

*Video on Madonna's adoption - dapat may subtitle!


-june 1995, in accordance w/ Hague Convention

Intercountry Domestic
-socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino Child by *filipino citizen
*alien *alien w/ residency requirements
*filipino residing abroad

Policy of the Law


-protect child, give him opportunity for growth and development
-best interest of the child: continuing care, necessary support needed

Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB)


-central authority in adoption matters
-sets rules and guidelines governing adoption
-highest authority in adoption process in RP (office: in Cubao)

Procedure
-last resort: only resorted to if not possible that adoption be in RP - all possibilities exhausted in RP
-shall not exceed 600/year granted
-under Muslim law: no adoption
1. Adoption application
2. Filing w/ RTC/ ICAB…
3. Family selection and matching
4. Pre-adoptive placement cost
5. Supervised Trial Custody
6. Issuance of decree of adoption

Who may adopt?


7. Alien
8. Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad (but issue on standard of permanence)

Qualifications: marami - see law!


*on age gap: no human trafficking, white slavery?

Who may be adopted?


-legally free child
-child legally available for domestic adoption (SC rule)

PRIL Page 133


Filing
*in RTC - however, rule on adoption provides that the court has the duty to transmit to ICAB for action after finding that the application is pr oper - so wala naman
palang trabaho ang RTC????
*in ICAB - if petition is filed abroad
-verified petition
-Allege….
-attach documents

Family selection/Matching
-on early decisions…?: not expressly provided that this must be taken, but it's recommended?
-child study: like a case study in the domestic adoption act
-purpose: make sure that the relationship to be created shall be for the best interest of the child, would work for the child' s welfare
-but since Domestic adoption considered first…after considering that domestic adoption is not in the best interest of the chil d, lipat sa intercountry - clearance by
ICAB
-adoptive parents mandated to fetch the adoptive child in RP (di pede padeliver ung bata)
-matching proposal: ICAB would determine if the adopter and the adoptee are compatible

Pre-adoptive placement cost


-borne by applicant
1. Cost of bringing child abroad
2. Cost of passport, etc.
3. Other fees
4. Application fees
5. Processing fees

Supervised Trial Custody


-licensed social worker shall oversee the welfare of the child in the custody of the adoptive parents
-6 months (mandatory vs. domestic adoption act: reduced if the adopter is a relative of the adoptee)
-administered by responsible agency
-parents make a progress report (ensure emotional readiness of child)
-only after lapse of 6 months shall decree of adoption be issued, if ICAB sees it fit for interest of child

Issuance of decree of adoption


-"I suppose they'll be happy" - mr. Sta. Maria

RECOGNITION OF ADOPTION
-in compliance w/ Hague Convention of 1993
-contracting parties should recognize the decree of adoption, solely based on their being signatories to the Hague Convention
-may only refuse if manifestl y contrary to its public policy (public policy escape device)

EFFECTS
1. Legal parent-child relationship (as if child is a legitimate natural child)
2. Parental responsibility/authority
3. Termination of pre-existing legal relationship
-depends on the contracting state
-if terminated (between child and natural parents): child shall enjoy equivalent child
-if not:
a. Receiving state should permit it
b. Adopter should consent?
c. Child's consent

"As a parting words…."


"At the end of it all…" - II

MA'AM:
-minimum age to adopt is 18…but in reality:
*late 20s
*at least 5 years marriage
*if less than 5 years: finding that they cannot conceive their own biological child (treatment to adopted child may change)
-16 year age difference same in intercountry and domestic.
-Difference w/ Hague Convention, there's a choice on where the decree is to be filed…
-but in reality, it's useless to file it w/ RTC because RTC would merely determine if the application is sufficient in form an d substance
-issuance of decree:
*the receiving state (the adopter's state) determines capacity of the adopting parents to adopt
*then matching done in RP
*then matched child's files sent in the receiving state

If case not filed in RP:


Domestic: always in receiving state
Intercountry: either in receiving state or ICAB (not really RTC)
-recognition of foreign judgment is the problematic area - for recognition

*it's just administrative now, with DSWD - declaration of abandonment


…now with legislative: with LGUs…but understaffed
-but better if file w/ court….faster pa even!

PRIL Page 134


*Jan 26 PRIL lecture
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
1:23 AM

*January 26 PRIL Lecture


-volunteer daw
-in RP: lex situs for both movable and immovable properties (Art 16)
Why: for simplicity and convenience

Difference if traditional reason or policy-centered approach?


Traditional approach: centers on the territory: since it is part of the territory of the state, it is the state's law which would govern
Policy-oriented: most significant contacts, state whose interest is less impaired

Other laws which may apply as to movable properties:


*lex domicili
*Lex loci actus
*proper law of transfer

*~*~*~
Anton volunteered to recite…ayaw ni ma'am. Baka kasi tangerine ang color scheme nila. :p

Capacity to transfer or acquire property


-does the lex loci rule apply?
----review: general rule on capacity: the personal law of the person

*in Property: it's not the same, quite different (does not follow the personal law of the person) = lex situs applies!

*Ma'am: it's merely TEMPORARY possession of property - not ownership


Why prohibit ownership of lands of aliens? To preserve properties in favor of Filipinos

-PFR review: administration and management of property is jointly exercised by spouses


…so what happens now?
---Aliens can't have conjugal properties, or else would contravene Consti provisions prohibiting ownership of aliens
---possibly, alien spouse may still exercise share in conjugal properties if it is converted to movable properties, i.e. cash!!!! - but as long as it is immovable, can't own anything

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity of Conveyances


-formalities: lex situs rin (follows general rule)

e.g. in RP, sale of property formalities:


*in public document
*registered
*signed by both parties

EXCEPTIONS
1. Transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the land
-lex intentionis or lex voluntatis
2. When transaction is merely an accessory to a principal contract
3. Succession
-personal law

Why not lex situs applied?


Li-je-dal

*since it did not directly relate to the transfer of title, law of the place of contracting applies

As to Exception # 2:
2 contracts:
 Principal contract (loan)
 Accessory contract (security)

"In the ideal world, your name should be worth something" - Ma'am Beth

EXCEPTIONS: the law DOES NOT CONSIDER here the property to be the main issue!

PRIL Page 135


*February 2 Lecture
Monday, February 01, 2010
10:51 PM

*note: no notes for this chapter. Boohoo.

All these are familiar…

Family law: usually won't apply foreign law because family law would apply the law which reflects the values held highly by s ociety of the forum
Vs.
Contract Law: not much attachment to the societies moral mores; reflect business practices

Extrinsic Validity Intrinsic Validity


Law of the place where the contract was entered Would depend:
1. Lex loci contractus
2. Lex loci solutionis
3. Lex loic intentionis

LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING


-where exactly: law of the place where the last act was executed
-is there anything in the Civil code as to these rules?
ART17, NCC: formalities governed by law of the place of contracting
ART 1319, NCC: when contract was through mail - offer: law of the place where OFFER was made

Why lex loci contractus binding:


*more stable
*easier to determine

Extrinsic Validity: formalities:


1. recognize justified expectations of the parties: at the time the parties entered into a contract, they had in mind that the p lace where they executed the contract
is the law which they intended or expected to apply to their transaction
2. Stability of commercial transactions: no progress if people cannot depend on the promises made by other persons

Intrinsic Valitidy
-nature, content, effects of agreements
1. Lex loci contractus: protect jusitified expectations of the parties + stability of the laws which govern their transactions - whenever there are controversies, you are
encouraging uniformity, simplicity, convenience and predictability
2. Lex loci solutionis: law of the place of performance

*Does RP always apply Lex loci contractus (traditional approach)?


-more as an option available, esp. when it is not clear what the parties agreed on

3. Lex loci intentionis


A1306: free to contract as long as...
A1371: intention of the parties paramount

MACMILLAN V. VALDERAMA & SONS


F: Valderama, through agent Splane, entered into a contract for delivery with Macmillan of railroad equipment to the Philippi nes from Canada, upon acquiring of
Valderama of the letter of credit (which was based on the procurement of an import license). Import license not acquired.
-Since no import license issued, Macmillan cancelled the freight engagement and incurred expenses. Sued Valderama for expenses .
-defense: It's not their fault if no import license issued + their agent was not fully authorized to enter contract in their b ehalf, so contract was perfected in RP (upon
their receipt of acceptance of their offer)
H: whatever law would be followed, law of Canada applicable
Law of contracting: Canada
Law of performance: Canada
*Valderama liable: the failure of Import Control Commission can't be a legal excuse

*Ma'am: there's only an apparent conflict because regardless of what law would be applied, law of Canada would govern

What is clear:
Validity of the contract - law of the place of contracting forever! (problem: where is the place of contracting)

Issues related to the performance:


• validity of the contract
• Substantial compliance w/ terms of the contract

Lex loci intentionis


-problem: if the parties' intention is unclear
-solution:
NCC: if clear, then apply literal interpretation of the contract;
If unclear, look at the overt acts of the parties, surrounding circumstances (simultaneous and contemporaneous acts)
-if you can't tell based on their actions what the parties intended: presume contract is valid
(you don't go through the process, undergo formalities, unless you don't have any other intention to carry it out)

CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE


-identify which court would have jurisdiction over the case
Vs. Choice of law: parties stipulate which laws would apply to their agreement

Campagnie de Commerce vs. Hamburg


-French Company had their goods shipped through German company. The cargo was never delivered, the goods perished and thus wer e sold and some were dumped

PRIL Page 136


-French Company had their goods shipped through German company. The cargo was never delivered, the goods perished and thus wer e sold and some were dumped
into the sea.
-French company sued German company in RP. As defense, German company said England Arbitration Board should have jurisdiction, not RP (in addition to filing of
counterclaim).
H: Contractual stipulations cannot oust RP courts of jurisdiction
-plus German defendant assailing the jurisdiction already prayed for affirmative reliefs (counterclaim)
*even if the parties choose a forum, the choice of forum would only be resorted to if the said forum clause is the sole forum and that you cannot go to any other state
unless you go to the forum which was stipulated

King Mau vs. Sycip


-Sycip's agent, King Mau, filed for claim for unpaid commission pursuant to agency contract entered in NY for the sale of coco nut oil emulsion to foreign companies.
H: Even if the contract was entered, and to be performed in NY, RP courts still had jurisdiction over the case because:
1. Personal action
2. No conflict of law case: issue is enforcing of obligation created from the contract

*ma'am on point that there's no conflict of law case: there's a foreign element so it's a conflicts of law case
-used layman's definition of conflict of law here
-issue of turf: the two cases shows how the court limits the agreement of the parties as to their choice of forum
-yeah sure, the jurisdiction is conferred by law; these choice of forum clauses is more of choice of venue because jurisdictio n cannot be subject to agreement of the
parties

HSBC vs. Shermann


F: agreement provided that any conflict would be resolved in Singapore but HSBC filed collection suit before RTC (RP)
H: RTC can exercise jurisdiction. Choice of forum clause does not provide for the SOLE forum, to the exclusion of the rest

*but if follow the choice of forum clause, it would appear that the court might not still recognize it even if it places SOLE LY, etc.

ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Arbitration clause: an agreement between the parties wherein the parties agree to undergo arbitration proceedings

PUROMINES case
-Arbitration clause provided that the parties should undergo arbitration first but the victim party filed suit in RTC
H: recognize validity of arbitration clause

*why enter into arbitration clause?


For parties to save and resolve cases swiftly

ADHESION CONTRACT
-one wherein dominant party draft the contract
-why still considered voluntary: when the adhering party enters into the contract, he is presumed to have read and understood the terms of the contract and have
agreed to be bound by it (there's real consent on the part of the party adhering)
X: Sweet lines case: not valid: no choice, plus passengers usually illiterate (no freedom of choice really)
-in this case, gave additional condition to the company to ensure that the passengers would understand the terms of the contra ct
Undue advantage to one party (language…)

Pan am world vs. Rapadas


-Rapadas, who did not want to check in his Samsonite briefcase but was compelled to do so in the end. It got lost. Panam wante d to compensate him with only $160k
but Rapadas wanted more.
H: Contract of adhesion in here (which provides for limited liability) is valid (but don't give it blind reliance), presume t hat the passenger, upon contacting w/ airline,
was expected to be vigilant…
-but court gave a bigger liability for Panam, treating the luggage as unchecked

*you just accept the terms of the contract, w/o looking at the ticket

PRIL Page 137


Choice of Law in Contracts
Monday, February 01, 2010
10:58 PM

Choice of Law in Contracts


*Parties intended applicable law: protect reasonable expectations
*interpretation rules: applicable only when intended law can't be ascertained

A. Extrinsic Validity of Contracts


-follows law of the place where the contract was made (lex loci celebrationis)
2nd Reinstatement, Art17: follow law of the country where instrument is executed for forms and solemnities
Locus regit actum: place governs the acts

If contracts entered through cablegram, telefax…


Art1319(2), NCC: Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offeror except from the time it came to his knowledg e
>ff law of the place where the offer was made

ENGEL vs. VELASCO: where telegraphic communications are followed by letters expressly referring to the telegrams and confirmi ng the same, such telegrams become
adminssible as part of correspondence between parties

B. Intrinsic Validity of Contracts


Elements (A1318):
a. Consent
b. Object
c. Consideration

There are 3 applicable laws:


1. Lex Loci Contractus
2. Lex Loci Solutionis
3. Lex Loci Intentionis

1. Lex Loci Contractus (law of the place of making)


TEST: look at the place where the last act is done w/c is necessary to bring the binding agreement into being so far as the a cts of the parties are concerned
ADVANTAGE:
• Relative ease in establishing the place of cotnracting
• The principal purposes of contract which are certainty and stability are achieved
DISADVANTAGE:
• If place merely incidental, no significant relationship with the contract or its performance

2. Lex loci Solutionis (law of the place of performance)


Scope:
• Time
• Place
• Manner of performance
• Sufficiency of performance
• Valid excuses for nonperformance
Advantage:
• Always connected to the contract in a significant way
Disadvantage:
• Gives extraterritorial effect to the laws of the former state (where the contract was made)
• Not helpful when the contract should be performed in 2 or more states w/ conflicting laws on validity

MACMILLAN AND BLOEDEL V. TH VALDERAMA AND SONS


Short Summary: Valderama entered into a contract w/ Macmillan in Canada through his agent, Splane. The contract required that Valderama acqu ire import license which
was necessary for the opening of letter of credit (by Macmillan in Canada). Since Valderama did not acquire import license, M acmillan cancelled the contract, and incurred
expenses in the process. Thus, sues Valderama. Court held that regardless is lex loci celebrationis or lex loci solutionis wo uld be applied in this case, the law that would be
applicable is that of Canada.

Facts:
(note that in the book, seller was said to be the one who's supposed to open the letter of credit)
-Valderama (who is residing in RP) was to buy railroad equipment from Macmillan who is in Canada. He authorized his agent, Spl ane, to represent him before Macmillan in
buying the equipment (as evidenced by a letter)
-in their countract, Valderama was to pay by letter of credit and would pay the freight charges. Macmillan would take care of shipping the equipment
-Valderama failed to acquire Import License from the Import Control Commission
-Appellee was forced to cancel the freight engagement contract and incurred expenses amounting to $21,260.59
-Macmillan filed action to recover the sum he paid
-Defense:
1. Splane was not authorized to enter into the contract in behalf of Valderama, thus the contract was perfected in Manila upon h is receipt of the approval of his offer by
letter
2. He is excused from acquiring a letter of credit because he failed to acquire Import License

WON Splane was an authorized agent of Valderama?


YES. There was a letter made by Valderama authorizing Splane to close the deal with Macmillan
-Splane closed the deal in Canada
-if Principal authorized agent to enter into a contract in another state, the place where the agent exercised his authority is the place of contract.
-if the agent has authority to make a binding contract of sale and undertakes to do so, it is clear that the place of executor y contract is the place where he exercises such
authority…

WON Valderama was legally excused from performing his obligation to secure a L/C? NO
*not in the digest but conclusion: Under RP Law (NCC): if the contract was not performed for reasons beyond the control of th e obligor (esp. if due to State action) then the
obligor is excused from performing the contract
-here, regardless if Lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis would be applied, Canadian law would be applicable

PRIL Page 138


-here, regardless if Lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis would be applied, Canadian law would be applicable

Lex loci contractus Lex loci solutionis


law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs w/ When law of contracting different from law of performance: law of place of performance
respect to: governs:
*nature • Validity
*validity • Nature
*obligation • Obligation
*interpretation • Effect of the contract
(even if the place of performance and place of contracting is different)
As to construction and validity of contract: law of the place where it is made Why: parties are presumed to contract with reference to the law of the place where the
Why: the municipal law of a state is the law of the contract made w/n that contract is to be performed, often restricted to situations where a contrary intent or
state, forms part of it and must govern whenever its performance is sought agreement does not appear.
to be enforced
-for the convenience of the courts
As would be seen from the first issue, the law of contracting is in Canada, Sale f.o.b. Vancouver: Macmillan was obligated to bring the goods subject of the sale to
because it is here where the agent of Valderama (Splane) perfected the Vancouver and load the same on the ship which was to take them to RP, at Macmillan's
contract with Macmillan expense - so place of performance in Vancouver
Sale c.i.f. Campomanes Bay, Negros Occidental:
>point of view of seller: still in Canada
... place of shipping is still considered the place of performance (because this is merely a
modified f.o.b.
>point of view of buyer: still in Canada
…Valderama was to open a L/C payable to Macmillan in Canada, confirmed by Canadian
Bank in Vancouver, which may be negotiated by the Canadian Bank of Commerce,
Vancouver, B.C.
…even if the L/C is to be opened in Manila, the place of the buyer's performance and of
shipment is still in Canada so its law would be applied
Questions as to elements + amount of damages procurable for a breach or
violation of a duty growing out of a contract: pertain to RIGHT, not a remedy
so governed by lex loci contractus

Governed by PROPER LAW:


○ Sanctions of non-performance
○ WON party is entitled to cancel a contract
○ Restitution due in case of breach
○ Measure of damages
○ Extent of penalties in case of non-performance or delay

WON procurement of import license is a condition of the contract? NO


-though it was a requirement imposed by RP at the time, it was not a condition of the contract (no evidence presented to show it)

DISPOSITION: the failure of the defunct Import Control Commission to act on the appellant's application for import license ca nnot constitute a legal excuse for his failure to
perform his obligations under the contract

3. Lex loci intentionis


-Dicey and Cheshire: intrinsic validity of contract should be governed by the law intended by the parties
-LEX LOCI INTENTIONIS: usually expressed in the choice -of-law provision of the contract
-why allowed:
• A1306, NCC: Contracting parties may stipulate whatever they want as long as not contrary to
 Law
 Morals
 Good customs
 Public order
 Public policy
• Check if A1307 or 1306: as to interpretation of intent of parties
GR: if terms clear, literal meaning will control
X: if terms unclear (words vs. intent): intent would govern - based on contemporaneous and subsequent acts
-how to determine INTENT: acts of the parties + surrounding circumstances
…assumes that their intentions are in harmony w/ such acts and circumstances
*but always assume the assumption that would make the contract VALID

D. Capacity to enter into contracts


-governed by the rules on status and capacity = PERSONAL LAW of the parties
*cf: Insular Gov't vs. Frank: the court should have looked at the capacity of Frank to contract (but the result would have be en the same anyway)

E. Choice of law issues in conflicts contracts cases


GR: parties have freedom to contract
Problematic areas: validity of the ff provisions
1. Choice of Forum Clause
2. Arbitration clause
3. Adhesion contracts

1. CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE


-stipulation in the contract for the venue in litigation

COMPAGNIE DE COMMERCE V. HAMBURG AMERIKA


Short summary: German company was contracted by French company to carry the latter's goods from Saigon to Europe. But even w/ orders to go t o a neutral port and not
go to Saigon anymore, the German boat still went on, carried the goods and went to Manila and stayed there (was not able to g o to Europe), resulting to the deterioration
of the perishable goods of the French company. Some of the goods were sold but some were thrown. French company sues for dama ges in RP, but German Company claims
that the litigation should have been initiated in England. Court held that RP courts cannot be ousted of Jurisdiction, absenc e a showing that it was a condition precedent to
file the case before the English Arbitration Board before a claim be filed in other courts.

PRIL Page 139


file the case before the English Arbitration Board before a claim be filed in other courts.

Facts:
-German Company Hamburg Amerika Paketfacht Actien Gesselschaft owned Samba
-French Company Compagnie de Commerce et de Navigation D'Extreme Orient procured the services of the German Company to transpo rt their goods from Saigon to
Europe
-However, there were rumors of impending war between European countries so German Company ordered the master of Samba to go to a neutral port (and not proceed to
Saigon, a French Port)
-Still, Samba proceeded to load cargo in Saigon and then obtained a bill of health to head to Manila
-Samba headed to Manila, stayed there. Goods of French company perished
-as a result, some of the cargo were sold and some were dumped into the sea
-French company now sues the German company for breach of contract in RP, praying for the recovery of the full value of the ca rgo
-German company filed a counterclaim for
1. freight due
2. Expenses for its maintenance
3. Wages of the crew
BUT alleged at the same time that RP courts did not have jurisdiction: Board of Arbitration in England was designated as the litigating body in the contract

WON RP courts divested w/ jurisdiction? NO


1. The said ground appeared on the first time on appeal - so already waived
2. The defendant sought AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF: filed a counterclaim
3. A contractual stipulation for a general arbitration cannot be invoked to oust the courts of their jurisdiction
4. Apply this doctrine even if contract was executed in England, in the absence of averment and proof that under the law of Engl and compliance w/, or an offer to
comply with such a stipulation constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of judicial proceeding for the enforcemen t of the contract

WON freight can be recovered? NO.


-under the terms of the contract of affreightment, the amount of the freight was made payable on deliver of the cargo at the d esignated port of destination
-since the port of destination was in Europe, and no delivery was made there, then no freight is chargeable

*~*~*~
King Mau v. Sycip
Short summary: Although the contract was entered and to be performed in NY, agent sued for collection of unpaid commission vs. his principal in RP. Court held that they
had jurisdiction, the defendant being located here.

Facts:
-King Mau Wu is the agent of Sycip
-the agency agreement was executed in NY
-under the agency agreement, King Mau was made the exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of Philippine Coconut oil and its deri vatives outside RP and was to be paid
commission for it
-King Mau alleges however that he was not paid commission for the sale he caused between Sycip and Jas Maxwell Fassett so he c laimed in RP against Sycip
-Sycip's affirmative defense: the said claim was covered by a separate contract + it was already paid
(and although not mentioned, it was allegedly one of the contentions that RP courts have no jurisdiction because the contract was executed in NY and not in RP)

WON King Mau could recover against Sycip in RP? YES


1. On JURISDICTION ISSUE: a nonresident may sue a resident in the courts of this country where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable upon
execution in case of a favorable, final and executory judgment.
-It is a personal action for the collection of a sum of money which the RP courts have jurisdiction to try and decide.
2. No conflict of laws: only a question of enforcing the obligation created by or arising from contract
HELD: Sycip liable
*~*~*~

HSBC V. SHERMAN
Short summary: HSBC executed an overdraft facility w/ a Singaporean Company, with guarantees executed by its directors as security in case o f default. Since the company
defaulted, HSBC went after the directors in RP. As defense, the directors alleged that the contract stipulated that the any d ispute should be brought before Singaporean
courts. Court held that stipulation does not make Singaporean courts the exclusive court to have jurisdiction so RP courts ca n exercise jurisdiction.

Facts:
-HSBC granted Eastern Book Supply Service an overdraft facility in the amount of $200k Singaporean dollars
-as security in case the company defaulted, the directors Jack Robert Sherman, et al. executed a Joint and Several Guarantee i n favor of Bank.
-Company failed to pay its obligation
-HSBC now demanded that the directors pay pursuant to the guaranty but failed to do so
-thus, HSBC filed action for collection before RTC
Defense: RP Courts have no jurisdiction because of the clause in the contract w/c provides:
"We hereby agree that the courts of the Republic of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this gu arantee"

WON RP COURTS ARE DIVESTED W/ JURISDICTION BECAUSE OF THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE? NO
1. The parties did not stipulate that ONLY COURTS OF SINGAPORE, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL THE REST, HAS JURISDICTION
2. The clause did not divest RP courts w/ jurisdiction:
-Jurisdiction is the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things w/n its boundaries subject to certain exce ptions
(plus the fact that parties cannot agree on jurisdiction of the courts; jurisdiction is vested by law)

*~*~*~
Ma'am's comments:
*King Mau saying that there's no conflict of law: wrong because conflict of laws cases encompass all cases which have at least one foreign element
-thus, in that case, there was clearly a foreign element
-and there must have been only apparent conflict: RP, using the interest analysis approach, may have no interest in applying i ts laws. Thus, there's a false conflict and the RP
courts may exercise jurisdiction but should have applied the law of the interested state which is lex loci celebrationis

*on stipulation as to venue:


GR: plaintiff has option to choose the venue where the suit is to be filed in action in personam
-if case arises from contract w/ forum clause: only apply forum clause if it is specifically identified as the only venue
>Compagnie de Commerce vs. Hamburg Amerika: forum clause not applied because it was not shown that it was a condition precede nt for the enforcement of the contract
>HSBC case: the choice of forum clause did not expressly stipulate on the court of only one state to the exclusion of the res t

*2nd Restatement:

PRIL Page 140


GR: follow forum clause
X:
1. Court is required by statute to entertain the action
2. The plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state for other reasons than the delay in bringing the action
3. The other state would be a substantially less convenient place for the trial of the action than this state
4. The agreement as to the place of action was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, abuse of economic power or unconscionable means (test: WON the choice of
forum agreement was contained in an adhesion clause)
5. It would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the agreement

2. Contracts w/ arbitration clause


-issue: WON parties can compel the other to submit to arbitration
Meacham v. Jamertone…: Arbitration clause which provided that the decision of the arbitrator is final and conclusive between the parties thereto and parties waive
all rights of action was held to be contrary to policy of the courts
*~*~*~
Puromines vs. CA
Short summary: Puromines wanted their prilld Urea shipped to Iloilo and Manila. However, when the shipment arrived, it was damaged so Puro mines sued the shipper in
RP Courts. Shipper alleged that the contract contained an arbitration clause which made London the place of arbitration. The court upheld the Arbitration clause.

Facts:
-Puromines and Makati Agro Trade entered into contact w/ Philip Brothers Oceanic Inc for the sale of Urea in bulk.
-their contract provided that arbitration be done in Europe for any dispute arising between the parties
-The Urea was shipped but upon arrival to the ports of destination, the Urea was in bad order and condition, caked, lumpy and contaminated w/ rust and dirt
-Puromines and Makati Agro filed for complaint of breach of contract of carriage vs. Shipper and charter of the vessel.
-Philip's brother's defense: the arbitration clause in the bill of lading (contract of affreightment + sales contract) provide s that the parties first undergo arbitration in Europe

WON the dispute is arbitrable - thus subject to arbitration proceedings first? YES
(case discussed WON the contract between Puromines and Philip Brothers is a bareboat charter or an affreighment contract beca use Philip Brothers' liability would depend
on the contract entered. If it is a demise or bareboat charter, the shipper and not Philip brothers (which is only the charte rer) would be liable. If it is a contract of
affreightment, then Philips Brothers would be liable)
-whether the liability of respondent should be based on the same contract or that of the bill of lading, the parties are never theless obligated to respect the arbitration
provisions on the sales contract and/or the bill of lading. Petitioner being a signatory and party to the sales contract cannot escape from his obligation under the arbitration
clause as stated therein.
-also, the court already previously held (the case cited many jurisprudence) that arbitration was already held valid and const itutional
-RULE NOW:
GR: courts would look w/ favor upon amicable settlements and will only interfere w/ great reluctance to anticipate or nullify the action of arbitration
X: agreement absolutely closes the doors of the courts against the parties (contract void)

*~*~*~

The Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Company


Short summary: Shipper sued by the company whose rig was damaged as it was being towed by the shipper's company during a storm. Company sued in place which was
not agreed upon in the contract (sued in Tampa, Florida rather than in London). Court held that the forum clause should be fo llowed unless its unreasonable or unjust.

Facts:
-Zapata (Houston Corporation) owned an ocean -going, self-elevating drilling rig Chaparral. It wanted the rig to be towed from Louisiana to Ravena, Italy.
-Zapata contracted the services of Unterweser, a German corporation, for the said towing
-their contract contained a forum-selection clause: "any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice"
-while the rig was being towed by Unterweser's deep sea tug (the Bremen), a severe storm arose which caused the rig to be seri ously damaged. The rig was thus brought to
the nearest port of refuge, which was in Tampa, Florida.
-Zapata sued Unterweser before Tampa courts alleging negligent towage and breach of contract
>Unterweser's defense: forum clause = MTD or forum non conveniens
-Pending Tampa court's decision, Unterweser filed action for breach of towage contract before the London Court of Justice
> Zapata contested London court's jurisdiction
>>London court conferred jurisdiction
>> Tampa court: denied MTD of Unterweser:
…forum selection clause is uneforceable, using traditional view that "agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are
contrary to public policy - will not be enforced"

WON a forum selection clause is contrary to public policy, thus, unenforceable? NO


-forum clause should control absent strong showing that it should be set aside
-the lower courts placed burden on Unterweser to show that London courts (which was stated in the forum clause) would be more convenient. THIS IS WRONG!
-correct approach:
GR: enforce forum clause
X: it can be shown that enforcement of the forum clause would be
>unreasonable and unjust,
>clause was invalid for reasons like fraud or overreaching.
…here: not under exception

a. WON the forum clause is contrary to public policy? NO


-the case cited was not applicable, or was not shown to be applicable
b. WON the forum imposed by the forum clause is inconvenient? Not necessarily
-at the time the parties entered the contract, it may be reasonably assumed that they contemplated/foresaw the claimed inconv eninece (so they are deemed to have
acquiesced to the existence of said inconvenience, waived any right to complain)
-whoever claims inconvenience should bear burden of proving such inconvenience
HERE: London court was chosen by American company and German company to provide a neutral forum experienced and capable in th e resolution of admiralty litigation
HELD: lower courts wrong to have placed on Unterweser the burden of proving that London was a more convenient court. It is on Zapata to prove that London is not an
inconvenient forum. Case remanded

*~*~*~

1912: NY Arbitration Law passed: arbitration contracts made valid, enforceable and irrevocable
Miller v. AIC: arbitration clauses no longer considered offensive to public policy

3. Adhesion contracts

PRIL Page 141


-one not negotiated by the parties, drafted by the dominant party and usually embodied in standardized form
-The only participation of the other party is in affixing her signature or adhering thereto.
-"take it or leave it" contract
e.g.
 Insurance contracts
 Bills of lading
 Contracts of sale of land from real estate firms
 Airline tickets

Pan Am World vs. Rapadas


Short summary: Rapadas, who was reluctant to check in his attache case, was compelled to do so. His attache case was lost by Pan Am. Pan Am admitted liability, but
claimed that its liability was limited by the Warsaw Convention, which was made applicable to Rapadas by virtue of a clause i n the airplane ticket. Court held that although
the ticket was an adhesion contract which should not be blindly adhered to, the passenger was deemed to have accepted its ter ms and thus are bound by its terms.
However, court increased PanAm's liability, considering the luggage as an unchecked luggage.

PAL vs. CA
Short Summary: Mejia has asked PAL to ship her Microwave oven from SF to MLA but upon arrival, the front glass door was broke n and damaged. Mejia claimed for
damages from PAL but PAL disclaimed any liability, arguing that the claims were filed beyond the reglementary periods and no higher valuation was declared by the
passenger. The court held that although the air waybill was binding upon Mejia, the application of the provisions in the said adhesion contract should be interpreted by the
court based on equity and fairplay. In this case, PAL is still liable because of its indifference (failure to explain why the microwave glass was broken) and it cannot be
exculpated on pure technicality and bureaucratic subterfuge (on the reglementary period)

PRIL Page 142


Choice of Law in Wills, Successions and Administration of Estates
Thursday, July 01, 2004
8:48 AM

Will (A783, NCC):


-an act
Whereby a person
Is permitted,
With the formalities prescribed by law,
To determine to a certain extent the distribution of his estate
To take effect after his death
-Osorio v. Posadas: a disposition made by a competent testator in the form prescribed by law of property over which he has legal power of disposition
-PRIL perspective: INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER
Why? You voluntarily make a will but you do not die voluntarily (unless nagsuicide ka). Since properties are transferred only after death through the will, it's considered
an involuntary transfer

A. Extrinsic Validity of Wills


-law of the place where the will was executed (lex loci celebrationis)
-issue: lugi ba Filipino on what law may be used???
Filipinos abroad Aliens abroad
Art 17 + Art 815, NCC Art 816 and Art 817
• RP law • RP Law
• Law of the place where the will was made • Law of the place where the will was made
• Their own national law
But since Art 815 lang ang applicable talaga on making wills, it might be interpreted that So mukhang lugi ang Filipino kasi sa Aliens their will may be validated using
RP law cannot be applied either of 3 choices of law
TOLENTINO: Art 17 still applies, does, a will by a Filipino made abroad may conform to RP laws

U V
In re Estate of Johnson
summary: Past case. This is the case where one of the daughters in the first marriage wanted to invalidate the will so that intestate proceedings may
instead be conducted (i.e. she will be an heir). Will was earlier probated, allegedly in accordance with Illinois law (TC judge took JN of the law just based
on an annotation), and is sought to be nullified on the grounds that it was not made in accordance with Illinois law and that the decedent is an RP
resident. Court held that since no Illinois law showed (to prove that it was indeed not made in accordance with Illinois law) and since what matters is that
the decedent is a CITIZEN of Illinois and since she did not contest the taking of JN of the TC of a foreign law w/o the proof required, then deemed admitted
that the will was in accordance with Illinois law.

Facts:
Emil Johnson (decedent)
-native of Sweden
-Citizen of US (Illinois)
-resident of RP at time of death
-made a WILL
>in RP
>holographic
>signed and written by him
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not conform with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippines, which required 3 witnesses)

-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will was executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois (he was a citizen of Illinois)
TC: declared the will to be legal and admitted it to probate (TC judge relied on Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in
vol.3 of Starr & Curtis' Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed, p.426)
--after will probated, her daugher from first marriage, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree, saying:
1. will was not executed in accordance with Illinois law
2. the decedent was not a resident of the state of Illinois

1. WON Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to wills of aliens residing in RP?
Section 636: authorizes probate by our courts of a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, when
such will is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which the testator is a citizen of subject, and which might be proved under
the law of such state or country.
-IT IS APPLICABLE: the "state" would include US, and the operation of law is not limited to wills of aliens.
-if Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of US and of the state of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippines,
provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under laws of the State of Illinois

2. Decedent a national of Illinois (to warrant the application of Illinois law)


YES. Proof adduced before TC showed he was indeed a national of Illinois. Petition merely contests the residence of the decedent to be in the Philippines,
but not the nationality
Why contested residence: US naturalization laws require residence of at least 5 years in US and 1 year w/n the State or territory where the court
granting the naturalization papers is held to grant the certificate of naturalization
-still, no other proof to rebut the presumption that he was indeed naturalized as a US citizen (particularly of Illinois)

3. WON will executed in conformity with the State of Illinois


NOT REALLY SURE, BUT THE PETITIONER CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.
-Courts cannot take JN of Foreign laws: TC merely relied on the presentation of Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois as exhibited in a
volume of an annotation and assumed that he could take JN of the laws of Illinois. But it was WRONG!!!
-proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action
litigated in the Philippine courts.
-still,
(1) petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court fou nd
(2)petition did not raise any assignment of error to question the supposed taking of JN of the court

U V

Extrinsic Validity of JOINT wills

PRIL Page 143


Extrinsic Validity of JOINT wills
Art818: prohibition against Joint wills
Joint wills
-1 will made by 2 persons (in 1 document) for
○ Reciprocal benefit
○ Benefit of a third person
-considered VOID in RP: against PUBLIC POLICY
1. Will purely personal and unilateral act: di na ganito if 2 persons make 1 will
2. Wills should be revocable: If you're one of the testators and you revoked the will, the other testator would have no will left
3. This may expose a testator to undue influence and danger of death (papatayin nung isa ung isa) - PREVENT POTENTIAL OVERREACHING
 IF MUTUAL: there might be undue influence on the part of the more aggressive testator to dictate the terms of the will for hi s or her own benefit or for that
of 3P whom he or she desires to favor
 IF RECIPROCAL: one might kill the other
Dacanay v. Florendo: joint will (between husband and wife), even if admitted upon the death of the husband (erroneous though), the first probate only affects
estate of husband. Wife may either make a new will or die intestate.
-Prohibition, though, applies only to Filipinos: if aliens, may be probated AS LONG AS NO FILIPINO IS AFFECTED BY THE WILL

Extrinsic Validity of Holographic Wills


Art10: HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
-one entirely written
Dated
And signed by the hand of the testator himself
-not subject to any form
-Need not be witnessed
-may be made in or out of RP
-also called AUTOGRAPHIC WILL
-advantages:
• facilitates the secret expression of the desire of the testator
• guarantees absolute secrecy
-disadvantages (accdg to JBL Reyes): since validity would depend on the authenticity of the handwriting, how would one determine the authenticity of a very short
handwriting???

Succession review: validity of holographic wills


REQUISITES FOR A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
1. In writing (Art. 804, CC)
2. In a language or dialect known to the testator (Art. 804, CC)
3. Entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself (Art. 810, CC)

U V
Babcock Templeton v. Rider Babcock
Summary: A Californian citizen who resides in RP at the time of her death executed a holographic will which made principal beneficiaries the children of
Babcock Templeton. Brother who got something smaller (probably none at all - not clear from book) contests the validity of the will saying that she
did not acquire domicile in California (which laws would authorize RP courts to probate the will as a holographic will). Court held that it was the
decedent's intention to establish her domicile in California so California law would apply.

Facts:
Decedent: Jennie Rider Babcock
Beatrice Babcock Templeton (mother of 3 children who are principal beneficiaries of William Rider Babock (brother of Jennie)
the will)
• Jennie was a resident of California (though temporarily residing in RP) • Jennie never acquired domicile in California; or
• She acquired her domicile in California, and never lost it • If ever Jennie did, she lost it
Wanted the will probated in RP Contested the probate of the will (kasi di sha kasama/maliit part
nya)

"Will":
• Paper writing
• Testamentary character
• Not executed as a will under RP laws
• But alleged to be made in accordance with CALIFORNIAN Law (and both parties agreed that it may be proved in accordance w/ Californian law as her
holographic will)
-alleged to be authorized for probate under Section 636, Civil Procedure (see In Re Estate of Johnson)

WON Jennie, at the time the will was made, was a citizen of California (so that her will may be probated in accordance with California laws)?
YES
1. Citizenship: how determined here:According to 14th Amendment of US Constitution, citizenship of a person born in US is dependent upon the place of
residence or domicile of the person. - so it was essential to determine WON she had domicile in California
2. Jennie voted in California!Voting in a place is an important circumstance and , where the evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of
franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of his life does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which
he lives more than in the act of voting.
3. No evidence to refute the conclusion that Jennie obtained domicile in California

WON Jennie subsequently lost her domicile in California? NO


1. Intention [to establish domicile in one place] determines WON domicile has been abandoned; intention is revealed only in the acts and declarations of
the person concerned
2. No intention to establish domicile in NY: Short stay + repeated statements that she DID NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH DOMICILE IN NY
3. No intention to establish domicile in RP:
 even though she has been a resident of RP for a long time (place of permanent residence), she at no time had any intention of residing here
permanently but repeated declarations revealed a fixed intention of returning ultimately to US
 A citizen of US cannot acquire RP Citizenship by mere residence alone

*since she is not a Filipino Citizen, she is considered an alien whose will is provable as the will of a citizen of another state or country

Under which state should Jennie's will be proved? CALIFORNIA


1. Citizenship depends on domicile

PRIL Page 144


1. Citizenship depends on domicile
MASSACHUSETTS: place of her marital abode - but not alleged as her place of domicile here
CALIFORNIA: domicile of choice + residence

U V

B. Intrinsic Validity of Wills


Unitary system from Roman Law: national law of decedent
Art 16(2), NCC: national law of the decedent
• Order of succession
• Amount of successional rights
• Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
Miciano v. Brimo (case where the decedent wanted RP laws instead of his turkish law to apply to the intrinsic validity of his will and whoever contests it
loses his "mana" - note that in the end, RP laws still applied by the processual presumption as no evidence of turkish law presented) : Although Andre Brimo
opposed his brother's will, he's not deemed to have contested the legacy because the choice-of-law clause in the will was contrary to law
-but since there's a policy of giving primacy to the last will and testament of the testator, the court should have adopted apolicy centered approach instead of the
mechanical application of lex nationalii.
• MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH: decedent was a resident of RP, executed will in RP, intended RP law to apply, will concerned properties located in
RP - can justify application of RP Law
• DISINGENUOUS CHARACTERIZATION (applicable choice-of-law rule is determined by how the issue was characterized by the court. So if characterize the main issue
to call for the forum's application of its own susbtantive law): here, court could characterize the main issue as a property case instead of succession to justify the
application of RP laws - lex rei sitae

U V

Cayetano v. Leonidas
Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US which did not leave anything to her
father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made her will, US laws would apply
as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything)

Facts
Decedent: Adoracion Campos
Surviving heirs:
• Father: Hermogenes - only compulsory heir
• Sisters: Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina
-Hermogenes executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion
-11 months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
- An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes:
• will in question is a forgery
• intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void
• even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him
- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests): confirms validity of will
-TC: admitted last will and testament, allowed probate inRP
- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief:
• withdrawal of his opposition was secured through fraud
+ motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
-TC: dismissed: failed to present evidence in support of it

WILL:
• Adoracion was a US citizen, a permanent resident of Pennsylvania at the time she made the will
• She died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister
• Made in accordance with Pennsylvania law, probated and registered in Penn. after her death

WON the intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of the will? YES HERE.
GR: probate court's authority is limited only to:
• the extrinsic validity of the will
• due execution
• testatrix's testamentary capacity
• Compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law
X: where practical considerations demand intrinsic validity to be passed upon

WON the will is valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime? YES
1. It was sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident ofPhiladelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
2. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent: law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. [Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code]
3. Pennsylvania law: no legitimes, testator could give away entire estate to strangers!

WON the will (which completely deprived compulsory heir of share) is against public policy? NO
-used Bellis v. Bellis: whatever public policy or good customs may be involved, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals

U V

C. Interpretation of Wills
-governed by rules of interpretation of decedent's NATIONAL LAW

Ambiguity...
GR: where terms clear and unambiguous, lex intentionis should be followed (A1370)
X: ambiguous: intention of the party or the exact meaning may be inferred by
• referring to the context of the instrument itself
• Referring to testator's contemporaneous and subsequent acts in keeping with the nature of the document

PRIL Page 145


Presumptions…
• Interpretations of ambiguous phrase should be determined accordance w/ the laws and customs of the state most probably in themind of the grantor or testator
when he used the words, and which he is presumed to be most familiar [SPECIFIC LAW IN MIND]
• Different dispositions: interpretation by which dispositions would be operative shall be preferred [interpret for validity]
>>>presume that the testator intended a lawful will

D. Revocation
Art. 828: will revocable at any time before the death of testator
>>>cannot waive or restrict right to revoke a will
Art. 829:
Revocation done outside RP + domicile outside RP: validity depends on:
1. Law of the place where will was made (lex loci celebrationis)
2. Law of the place where testator had his domicle (lex domicili)
Revocation done outside RP + domicile in RP:
1. Law of the domicile
2. Law of the place of revocation

Art 830: When wills deemed revoked in RP:


1. By implication of law
2. By some will, codicil, or other writing, executed as provided in the case of wills
3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other persons in his presence and by his
express direction

Problem:
Testator domiciled in State A, already had a will. Revoked will in accordance with laws of State A.
Transferred domicile to State B, where revocation done in State A invalid. Died in State B.
Is the revocation valid?
Common law: apply law of domicile at time of death
RP: law of the place of revocation

E. Probate
-adjudication that the last will and testament of a person was executed with all the formalities required by law
-authentication of the will
-merely procedural: follow law of the forum
BUT: look at foreign law if suit made as to extrinsic requirements in the execution of the will

When will shall be disallowed (rule 76, section 9, ROC):


(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto.

-proving wills made in foreign country: prove


1. Will duly executed in manner required by law
2. Testator had testamentary capacity at the time of execution of will
TESTAMENTARY CAPAITY: capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner inwhich the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty [Jocson v. jocson]

-wills made and probated in foreign country in accordance with laws of that country [Rule 77, section 1]:
• should be filed and recorded in the proper RTC
• Due execution and testamentary capacity of testator does not need to be proved again (note: sabi ni Sir B it should still undergo probate proceedings in RP)

Art 817, NCC (same ~ similar to Sec 636 of old CivPro rules): A will made in the Philippines
...by a citizen or subject of another country,
...which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject,
...and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.

Common law:
○ Movable properties: will admitted to probate valid at the last domicile of the testator as valid everywhere
○ Immovable properties: probate of the will in his last domicile does not affect the conveyance of land which is subject to lexsitus

U V
Suntay v. Suntay, supra
Summary: Decedent left two families. Surviving spouse presented alleged will, and so did his son from the first marriage (2nd will made in China, allegedly in
accordance with Chinese law). Court held that neither of the will could be probated as the Philippine-made will was not duly proved, and the allegedly
already-probated China-made will was not sufficiently established.

Facts:
Jose Suntay
-Filipino Citizen
-resident of the Philippines
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China
-left properties in RP, and a house in China
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd wife and child of 2nd marriage

PRIL Page 146


-2 proceedings:
*intestate proceedings, one of the children of the 1st marriage appointed as administrator of the estate
*Testate proceedings, by the widow showing a will allegedly executed in 1929 in RP
>denied: loss of will before hearing
>appealed: further proceedings, deposition of witnesses to a will taken : still dismissed
-Pacific war ensued

-after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino) presented the alleged will of his father in Chinese Characters executed and signed by him in 1931 and that the
same was filed, recorded and probated in Amoy, China
-presented petition for probate of either the 1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931 will - both DISALLOWED

WON EITHER OF THE WILL COULD BE PROBATED? NO…NONE COULD BE PROBATED


1. AS TO THE 1929 PHILIPPINE WILL: not proved by Credible witnesses
-Silvino failed to present 2 credible witnesses to prove the provisions of the lost 1929 will
-CREDIBLE Witnesses: competent witnesses, not rely on hearsay

2. AS TO THE ALLEGED PROBATED 1931 WILL: was not established


-Rule 78.1: if will probated in another country, if could be allowed, filed and recorded by proper CFI
-Rule 78.2: copy of will + allowance is filed before CFI, court shall fix time and place for hearing, and cause notice to be given as in case of original will
-Rule 78.3: if will allowed in RP, court shall issue certificate of allowance, signed by Judge, attested by the seal of the court, filed and recorded by
clerk, and will would have same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court
-in this case: failed to prove…
1. Municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court
2. law of China on procedure in probate or allowance of wills in 1931
3. Law of China to prove due execution of the will
…here, just presented the unverified answers of Consul General of RC (depositions) which are INADMISSIBLE:
>Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds the Chinese law an expert of Chinese law on procedure in probate matters (because
they are appointed to attend to trade matters)
>if admitted, adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
-plus: proceeding in Amoy, China court were not probate proceedings, but was conducted for the taking of the testimony of 2 attesting witnesses to the
will

3. PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those in RP Courts
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices through personal service or service by publication
-so since no notice of the proceedings before Amoy, China that it was a probate proceeding, it cannot be deemed as a probate proceeding and is deemed as
merely a deposition or perpetuation of testimony

U V

VDA DE PEREZ v. TOLETE


Summary: Specpro case. Mother in law claims that since her son in law made her daughter the heir for all the remainder of the real and personal
property, wherever it was situated, she was the sole heir and so she should receive all the properties. Heirs of the son in law contested the acts of the
mother in law. Court held that the heirs of the son in law should be given notice of the proceedings in RP and the wills should be proven as made in
accordance with NY law in RP.

Facts:
-Jose and Evelyn Cunanan lived in NY w/ 3 children (already naturalized, working as doctors). Jose executed a will wherein he bequeathed all the
remainder of the real and personal property "wherever situated" to his wife
-if ever Evelyn dies first, Jose's properties would go to his children and grandchildren upon his death, with his brother Rafael as trustee
-Evelyn also executed her own will. In both wills, it was stated that if the two of them died at the same time, it would be presumed that Jose died first.
-Sadly, the whole Cunanan family died in a fire in 1982.
-Rafael filed separate proceedings for the probate of the 2 wills (Jose's and Evelyn's) in NY
-both wills admitted to probate, letters testamentary issued to Rafael
-in 1983, Salud Perez (mother of Evelyn) filed a petition to reprobate the wills, asked that she be appointed the administratrix
TC of Bulacan: Approved the petition, made her the administratrix of the Cunanan's properties
Acts of administration:
• Motion praying that the proceeds of the insurance made by Jose in favor of Evelyn and their children be delivered to her
• Motion that Rafael be ordered to give her bank deposits and certificates amounting to about P38k
-Rafael contested proceedings in RP:
• Salud is not an heir
• Wills of Jose and Evelyn, who were both American citizens, were executed in accordance with the formalities of NY law

WON the wills of the Cunanan spouses may be made effective in RP? YES, provided follow rules of court!
1. When are wills executed by aliens abroad effective in RP?Art 816: if made with the formalities prescribed
a. by the law of the place in which he resides
b. in his country
c. By NCC
2. Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
a. Due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws
b. Testator has his domicile in the foreign country (not in RP)
c. The will has been admitted to probate in such country
d. The fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court
e. The laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
3. HERE:all except first and last were proven by evidence
4. Why need to present evidence of the contents of the foreign law? RP courts cannot take JN of foreign laws
5. Wills of the Cunanan Spouses should be probated jointly (but it doesn't mean that it's a joint will):
a. construe rules liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding
b. No Joint wills: the Cunanan spouses executed SEPARATE WILLS. Since the 2 wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property
which in all probability are conjugal, joint probate na!
6. NOTICE should have been given by Mrs. Perez to the other Cunanan Heirs:
• they are also heirs of Jose Cunanan
• As regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for
the first time
Disposition: Remand case, submit evidence necessary (under item 2, a and e) and give notice to the other heirs

PRIL Page 147


U V

F. Administration of Estate
1. manage and settle decedent's debts
2. Distribute the residuum of the estate to the deceased's heirs
Executor Administrator
When there's a person named in the will When there's no person named, or the person named unqualified

Why appoint an administrator of the estate?


For the protection of creditors, incidentally only for the distribution of the estate

Scope of Title of domiciliary administration?


Only as regards properties w/n 1 state
ANCILIARY ADMINISTRATOR: one appointed by the court of the foreign country where the assets or property are located

U V
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Inc.
Summary: mere excerpt to show the relevance of ancillary administration

Facts:
-Decedent: Idonah Slade Perkins - left 2 stock certificates covering 33,002 shares in BCMI
-BCMI Stock certificates: in possession of Country Trust Company of NY (domiciliary administrator of Idonah's estate)
-ancillary administration proceedings instituted in Manila: appointed finally Renato Tayag
-BCMI was compelled by the court to deliver to Tayag the Certificates. BCMI did not comply

WON Tayag (and not Country Trust Company of NY) is entitled to administration of the BCMI Certificate of Stocks? TAYAG as ancillary
administrator
1. No contest that ancillary administrator has control and possession of all assets of the decedent w/n the jurisdiction of the Philippines
2. An administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country
3. Principal vs. Ancillary administration:
Principal administration: that which is granted in the jurisdiction of the decedent's last domicile
Ancillary administration: any other administration
Why? A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) have any effect beyond the limits of the countryin which it is granted.
When proper? When a person dies leaving property in a country other than that of his last domicile
4. BCMI, as a domestic corporation, owes full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of lower courts.
5. The situs of the shares of stocks is here in RP [Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. CIR]

G. Trusts
-right of property, real or personal, held by one party for the benefit of another
-may be created by deed during the lifetime of the settler or by will

PRIL problem: When properties are located in places other than where the trustor is domiciled and where the trust was made - does the effect of that trust extend
extraterritorially?
• Validity
• Essential propriety of the trust
• Compliance with formalities

Choice-of-law provision: courts of the place where trust is being administered will normally apply the chosen law (carry out intent of the trustor)
>if none: follow the law that will sustain the validity of the trust

Testamentary trusts :: contained in a will :: follow the law of the place to which extrinsic validity of the will depend (usu. Lex loci contractus)
But since it involves properties: lex situs

PRIL Page 148


*PRIL February 9 Lecture
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
9:33 AM

Succession different from administration of the wills


Succession - extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the wills

Extrinsic Validity of wills


-in RP, would depend if it is executed by a Filipino or an Alien if it was made abroad
-Aliens may use 3 kinds of law, but this does not mean that we're giving them more rights than Filipinos
-refer to NCC

In re Estate of Johnson
summary: Past case. This is the case where one of the daughters in the first marriage wanted to invalidate the will so that i ntestate
proceedings may instead be conducted (i.e. she will be an heir). Will was earlier probated, allegedly in accordance with Illi nois law (TC judge
took JN of the law just based on an annotation), and is sought to be nullified on the grounds that it was not made in accorda nce with
Illinois law and that the decedent is an RP resident. Court held that since no Illinois law showed (to prove that it was inde ed not made in
accordance with Illinois law) and since what matters is that the decedent is a CITIZEN of Illinois and since she did not cont est the taking of JN
of the TC of a foreign law w/o the proof required, then deemed admitted that the will was in accordance with Illinois law.
*Citizen in US is determined by the place where the person is domiciled
*Lower court relied on mere annotation - so wrong!

Joint wills - extrinsic validity - in RP VOID


Why not allowed? PUBLIC POLICY!!!
-potential overreaching
-how about
○ Filipinos who made joint will abroad (state allows it)
-VOID pa rin, law expressly provides so! (Art 819)
○ Foreigners who are allowed under their laws to make joint wills, even in RP
-if the properties governed are abroad, and the only act made in RP is the making of the joint will, applying "the most significant relationship test",
the will may be considered valid even in RP since the properties, the heirs and even the testators have more significant cont act than RP

Holographic Wills

Babcock Templeton v. Rider Babcock
Summary: A Californian citizen who resides in RP at the time of her death executed a holographic will which made principal beneficiari es the
children of Babcock Templeton. Brother who got something smaller (probably none at all - not clear from book) contests the validity of
the will saying that she did not acquire domicile in California (which laws would authorize RP courts to probate the will as a holographic
will). Court held that it was the decedent's intention to establish her domicile in California so California law would apply.
-Issue: What laws should apply: NY law/ California law/ RP law
…go back to lesson of domicile: abandonment of domicile only when there's abandonment of old domicile

Intrinsic Validity of Wills


-personal laws of the decedent apply
WHY: intent of the testator should be promoted, and the laws which are deemed to protect such intention is his own state's la w

On Miciano v. Brimo: ma'am's comments:


• The last will and testament is the last opportunity for the decedent to determine how his estate would be distributed. Howeve r, the court here
disregarded the will of the testator, but ended up applying RP law by processual presumption
• Using a modern approach, provide just result w/o shortcutting any legal step - and the court would still end up applying RP law
• What we see in this case is the application of the Universal Succession/unitary system in succession (the law applicable to the decedent is the same law
that would apply to the estate once he's dead - the estate is deemed to continue the personality of the testator for certain purposes; e.g. estate pay the
debts, etc.)
Effect: only 1 law that would govern both Movable and Immovable properties (especially in RP)

Cayetano v. Leonidas
Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US which did not leav e
anything to her father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made
her will, US laws would apply as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything)

-here: what is the intrinsic validity? As to the legitimes


Art 16(2), NCC: national law of the decedent
• Order of succession
• Amount of successional rights
• Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
-on public policy argument (that the rights of a Filipino citizen would be denied): Court held that whatever public policy the Philippines has, it cannot
apply to a foreigner! Court followed a traditional approach
--if interest analysis approach /comparative analysis approach applied, RP law may have been applied since RP may have more int erest in applying its
laws to protect rights of its nationals and exercise power over the properties w/n its territory

Interpretation of wills
-apply NATIONAL law of decedent
GR on interpretation
a. If will clear, apply it

PRIL Page 149


b. If unclear, look at the instrument itself or contemporaneous acts
c. If still unambiguous, apply law intended by testator to apply/ law to which he is familiar to
d. Interpret in favor of validity and legality

Revocation of will
Revocation done outside RP + domicile outside RP: validity depends on:
1. Law of the place where will was made (lex loci celebrationis)
2. Law of the place where testator had his domicle (lex domicili)
Revocation done outside RP + domicile in RP:
1. Law of the domicile
2. Law of the place of revocation (lex loci actus)
*but no clear reason why it's different. :(
*TIP in EXAM: apply the law of ______ (do not specify agad what law of the place would apply)

Probate
Suntay v. Suntay, supra
Summary: Decedent left two families. Surviving spouse presented alleged will, and so did his son from the first marriage (2nd will made in
China, allegedly in accordance with Chinese law). Court held that neither of the will could be probated as the Philippine -made will was not
duly proved, and the allegedly already-probated China-made will was not sufficiently established.
-this is a decision of a foreign tribunal. To give it effect in RP, show that the will was probated in a court which had juris diction

VDA DE PEREZ v. TOLETE


Summary: Specpro case. Mother in law claims that since her son in law made her daughter the heir for all the remainder of the real and
personal property, wherever it was situated, she was the sole heir and so she should receive all the properties. Heirs of the son in law
contested the acts of the mother in law. Court held that the heirs of the son in law should be given notice of the proceeding s in RP and the
wills should be proven as made in accordance with NY law in RP.
-Requirements that the court said should have been proven:
1. Due execution of will
2. Domicile of decedent is abroad
3. Will was admitted to probate abroad
4. Court is a probate court
5. Will was allowed in accordance with the foreign law
-all of these should be met

Laws Applicable to Administration of Estate


-law of the place where the properties are located

Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Inc.


Summary: The decedent has properties in rp in the form of certificate of shares of stock in a domestic corporation. Domiciliary
administrator has possession of such certificates but the ancillary administrator asserts his right to manage such properties . Court held
that since the situs of the shares is in RP and the administrator's power only applies w/n the jurisdiction of the court whic h granted such
power, the ancillary administrator is the one who should manage it.

Scope for Thursday: before alien tort act

PRIL Page 150


Choice of Law in Torts and Crimes
Tuesday, February 09, 2010
11:07 PM

Tort
-derived from French word torquere [to twist]
-an act or omission producing an injury to another w/ any previous existing lawful relation of which the
act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident
Anglo-American Law Spanish
includes Malice and Willful intent Non-contractual negligence
-Art 20, 2176, NCC: tortfeasor
…one who, contrary to law, by his act or omission, willfully or negligently causes damage to another and
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

A. POLICIES BEHIND CONFLICTS TORT LAW


2 important policies
a. Deter socially undesirable or wrongful conduct
b. Rectify the consequences of the tortuous act by distributing the losses that result from accident
and products liability
-most likely to be a strongly held policy of the state - the state would not easily displace its law w/ the
law of another state

How to determine applicable law: specific policy behind substantive tort law should be evaluated in the
light of the needs of interstate and international systems
e.g. policy of upholding justified expectations of the parties
Minimize the adverse consequences of subjecting party to law of more than 1 state
Discouraging forum shopping
Achieving decisional harmony

*on Justified expectations: in torts cases, the parties to an accident could not have relied on a particular
state law since accidents are fortuitous (thus, no intent to have one law applicable eh di naman nya
plinano)
-BUT they may nevertheless have anticipated that they may be held liable for some future act and insure
against it
-Corp: may expect that the laws of the state where it had continuous and systematic business activities
to be applicable in particular circumstances, but no way of complying w/ various laws w/o
reincorporating in each state
>>>court should lessen adverse effects of applying laws of several states on parties

Conflicts torts
-when tortuous conduct and place of resulting injury different + one state imposes higher standards
than the other state
-when there's difference in product liability laws and varying judicial interpretations of extent of liability

B. LEX LOCI DELICTI COMMISSI (law of the place where the alleged tort was committed)
-determines the tort liability in matters affecting conduct and safety
-Rules w/c regulate conduct w/n state's borders: traffic rules, speed limits
-PROBLEM: when the acts which would produce the injury happens in one state but the injury happens
in another

"Place of the wrong"

PRIL Page 151


common law concept Civil law concept
-looks at the place where the last event necessary to -place where the tortious conduct was
make an actor liable for an alleged tort occurs. committed
-adheres to the vested rights theory so that if the -premised on the principle that the legality or
harm does not take place then the tort is not illegality of a person's act should be
completed. determined by the law of the state where he is
-Negligence or omission is not in itself actionable at the time he does such act
unless it results in injury to another
Place where injury incurred Place where tortious conduct made

*but regardless, the traditional view is that an actor liable by the lex loci delicti is liable EVERYWHERE
>vested rights: damages arising from torts committed in one state are actionable in another state
>limits:
• When the forum court's public policy or law is contravened by the proper law
• When the forum does not impose liability on said tortuios act - but this is not a violation of public
policy of the forum

-negligent conduct happened in Alabama (where Employer's Liability act allowed recovery from
ER), but injury incurred in Mississippi (where no such law in force). EE claimed before Alabama
courts.
-Court held in this case that if the infraction creates a right of action in the forum, then it may be a
COA in that forum and may be enforced even outside the forum provided comity allows it. BUT if
the injury was inflicted outside the forum, the forum's laws does not allow recovery and since
the local law must be ascertained to determine what the claimant's rights are, claimant has no
COA in the forum.
…ulit: if COA (i.e. injury) incurred in Alabama where it is actionable by law, then EE had a COA. But
since the Alabama law only applies in Alabama, if the COA was incurred out of Alabama then there
would be no COA. Injury cannot be claimed in Alabama.

U V
Summary: Loucks killed in Massachusetts by negligent act of Standard Oil's
employees. However, his heirs are residents of NY, so they brought action before NY
courts. NY courts now resolves WON the action may be enforced in NY using
Massachusetts law as COA.NY Court held that it was not against NY's public
policy to allow the enforcement of a right of action which was
granted by a foreign law to the claimants as they had a vested right which the
court should help protect.

Facts:
-Everett Loucks was a resident of NY
-he had a wife and kids, who were also residents of NY
-while travelling on a highway in Massachusetts, he was run down and killed through the negligence of
defendant Standard Oil Co.'s employee then engaged in its business.
-Massachusetts law allow recovery, so does NY law though not in the same terms
Massachusetts NY
If a person or corporation…by negligence of its agents or servants while Gives a civil remedy
engaged in its business…causes the death of a person who is in the exercise of due where death is
care…it shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than $400, nor more caused in NY
than $10,000...
+ Constitution, Art 1, §18: there shall be some atonement for the wrong - civil remedy where death is
caused
-Administrat\ors of Loucks' estate filed action before NY courts

WON Loucks' estate may recover in NY courts on the basis of Mass. Law? YES
The heirs have a vested right: though the source of the obligation invoked is a foreign statute which is

PRIL Page 152


WON Loucks' estate may recover in NY courts on the basis of Mass. Law? YES
1. The heirs have a vested right: though the source of the obligation invoked is a foreign statute which is
not the law in NY, the said statute gives rise to an obligation which follows the person and may be
enforced wherever the person may be found.
2. On lack of similar legislation in NY: even if NY has no legislation on the subject, or not similar law, it
is not enough to show that public policy forbids NY court to enforce the foreign right
-right of action is property: the mere fact that NY does not give a like right is NO REASON FOR REFUSING TO
HELP THE PLAINTIFF IN GETTING WHAT BELONGS TO HIM.
-presence/similarity of legislation (in/w/ forum) shows that the foreign statute does not offend public
policy of the forum; BUT ABSENCE does not prove that it is against public policy
3. On discretion of the sovereign to aid to the foreign right: wrong!
-not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of judges
-TEST: not close doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of common weal.
4. Test applied: no violation of public policy
5. Thus, court would help them!
-even if NY cannot give the plaintiffs the same judgment (if it was brought before Mass. Courts -
probably NY law gives something lower) but it is not reason for refusing to give the plaintiffs what NY
courts can give.
-no need to compel plaintiffs to bring action to another state where defendant may not be found,
where suit may be impossible
6. Sui generis about death statutes (there's civil remedy for another's death): before it was not
that acceptable but is not becoming more acceptable in almost all states, tendency toward a larger
comity
7. Fundamental public policy of vested rights: rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained
and only exceptional circumstances should lead to the refusal of enforcement
-it would be unreasonable to apply lex loci delicti comissi uniformly independent of fairness to the
parties, thus frustrating the ends of justice

U V
C. MODERN THEORIES ON FOREIGN TORT LIABILITY
1. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP
-consider state's contacts w/ the occurrence and the parties:
 Place where the injuries were sustained
 Domicile of the victim/tortfeasor
 Residence of the victim/tortfeasor
 Nationality of the victim/tortfeasor
 Place where the relationship of the parties are centered
-after considering state's contacts:
a. Identify the interested state
b. Evaluate the relevance of the contacts to the issue in question
-not mechanical counting of factual contacts BUT localizing the state of the most significant
relation and assess the event or transaction in the light of the relevant policy considerations of
the interested states and underlying policies

-
F: the parties, the car registration, the garage of the car, et al. where all in NY but the accident,
and thus the injuries, happened in Ontario. Mr. Jackson, as his defense, claims that since lex loci
delicti comissi is in Ontario, and Ontario law provides that liability only attaches if the negligent
party is a public transpo operator, he being not a trasnpo operator, he is not liable
H: Other than the place of accident, all of the factors connected w/ the case other than the place
of accident occurred in NY. Since the guest-host relationship was formed in NY and involved a trip
that commenced and was to terminate there, the court held NY to be the state of the most
significant relationship as far as the question of guest-host immunity was in issue

U V
PRIL Page 153
U V
Summary: A Filipina stewardess was attempted to be raped by fellow male
attendants who were Saudi nationals in Indonesia. The complaint for attempted rape
was filed but when she got in Saudi Arabia, Saudi authorities questioned her and
forced her to drop the charges against the two Saudi nationals. Before she left for
Manila, she was brought by ER to courts and made to sign Arabic documents (all in
the pretense that it was routine procedure in dropping case against Saudi nationals)
but was instead sentenced for adultery and other violations of Islamic laws and
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and lashes. With assistance of RP embassy, Saudi
officials (*I want to curse here but since this would be posted online, I better
not…WTF…) admitted they wrongly accused Filipina. Still, Saudi Arabian Airlines
terminated the contract. Filipina filed for damages against airline company in RP
courts, which Saudi Arabian Airlines contested, saying that RP lacked substantial
interest in the case. Court held that RP courts have jurisdiction since both the
plaintiff and defendant claimed reliefs from RP courts, and that RP law is applicable
since the injury is in RP and it is of no consequence that the other acts happened
abroad (then goes the long long discussion on PRIL)


Eto na formally...
Facts:
-Milagros Morada is a flight atttendant for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA)
-while in Jakarta, she
• Went to disco w/ fellow attendants Thamer and Allah (both Saudi nationals)
• Agreed to have breakfast at Thamer's room where Thamer attempted to rape her after Allah
excused himself. Rape was not consumated when hotel staff heard Morada's cries. Thamer and
Allah were both arrested
• Saudi government made the Indonesian authorities deport the 2 Saudi nationals only after 2 weeks
of detention
• She was transferred to Manila (note: this until the next two paragraphs are important)
-during one of her trips to Jeddah (1992), she was brought to the police who took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Her passport was returned only after she agreed to drop
the case against the 2 Saudi nationals
-In 1993, before she was to return to Manila, a SAUDIA officer brought her to Saudi Court to sign an
Arabic document, then later interrogated through an interpreter…all these with the assurance of
SAUDIA that it was merely routine procedure necessary to drop the charges against 2
nationals. INSTEAD, SHE WAS SENTENCED TO 5 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND 286 LASHES FOR ADULTERY,
GOING TO DISCO AND LISTENING TO MUSIC AND SOCIALIZING W/ MALE CREW, ALL IN VIOLAITONOF ISLAMIC
LAW (wtf?)
-RP embassy assisted Morada, eventually Saudi authorities admitted that she had been wrongly
convicted
-SAUDIA terminated her contract before she was allowed to return to Manila
-Morada filed COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES vs. SAUDIA
COA: Art 19 & 21, NCC
MTD:

PRIL Page 154


MTD:
a. RP lacked substantial interest in the case
b. RP courts have no jurisdiction

WON Morada has a COA?


Yes. Though Art 19 merely declares a principle of law, Art 21 gives flesh to its provisions

WON RP Courts could exercise jurisdiction? YES


1. Allowed under Section 1 of RA 7691 (expanded jurisdiction of MTC)
2. Pragmatic considerations: Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed
-if dismiss, plaintiff would be compelled to bring her action in Saudi Arabia where she no longer
have any substantial connections, thus causing her fundamental unfairness
-no inconvenience and difficulty shown by SAUDIA
-SAUDIA has filed several MTDs on other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction of the court,
thus, asked affirmative relief from the court

WON RP Law is the choice of law applicable? YES


1. 2 important questions sought to be answered by choice-of-law problems:
a. What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts
occurred in two or more states
b. To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
2. Characterization/doctrine of qualification: process of deciding WON the facts relate to the
kind question specified in a conflicts rule
-purpose: enable the forum to select the proper law
…HERE: CHARACTERIZED AS A TORT
3. In tort, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where
the tortiuos conduct or lex loci actus occurred
HERE: RP is the place of tort
-Morada was already working in Manila but SAUDIA brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that
she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the 2 SAUDIA crew
members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta BUT INSTEAD, she was the one
made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and
tradition
-SO IT IS IN MANILA where SAUDIA deceived Morada
-Morada honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her her due and obeserve honesty and good
faith", but SAUDIA failed to protect her
-That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.
For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the
totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not
without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.
4. applied MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP rule
-what are the contacts to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance w/ respect to the particular issue
a. Place where the injury occurred
b. Place where the conduct causing injury occurred
c. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of parties
d. Place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
-as applied in the case:
 Place of injury is RP
 Plaintiff is resident, national of RP
 Respondent is a resident foreign corporation engaged in the business of international air
carriage engaged in RP
 Relationship between the parties were entered in RP
5. RP TORTS LAW have paramount application
-Plaintiff has no obligation to prove the applicable SAUDI ARABIAN LAW because her COA was Art 19
and 21 of NCC - it was SAUDIA who was invoking the applicability of Saudi Arabian law so it has the
burden to plead and establish it

U V
PRIL Page 155
U V
2. INTEREST ANALYSIS
-considers the relevant concerns that the state may have in the case and its interest in having its
laws applied on that issue
-Determine WON there's a true or false conflict
False conflict: if only 1 state has an interest in having its law applied and failure to apply the other
state's law would not impair the policy reflected in that law
True/Apparent conflict: if more than one state has an apparent interest in applying its law to the
case
-take a second look at the policies and interests of the concerned states
Cf.
In this case, there's only a false conflict:
Ontario law NY law
policy behind its guest statute:
• to protect the host from suits by ungrateful guests
• Protect insurance companies from collusive suits
No interest in applying its law when both victim and NY policy allows recovery to all persons
tortfeasor are non-domiciliaries and other contacts are injured even when its domiciliaries act
not in Ontario outside the state
*application of NY law doest not impair policies of Canada

3. CAVERS' PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENCE


*review from Chapter V:
-choi ce of law should be determined by considerations of justice and social expediency a nd s hould not be the result of
the mechanical a pplication of a rule or principle of s election
-s teps that must be done by the court:
1. Scruti nize the event or tra nsaction
2. Compa re ca refully the profferred rule of law + result which i ts a pplication might work (vs . rules of forum)
3. Appra ise results from standpoint of justice a nd s ocial policy
-pri nciple of preference: conceived to provide a fair accommodation of conflicting state policies a nd a fford fair
trea tment to the parties ca ught up i n conflicting state policies
-terri torialist: look to the place where the significant events occurred or where the legal relationship is centered

Caver's third principle of preference in torts


-deals w/ rules that sanction some kind of conduct engaged in by a defendant in 1 state and
extends the benefit of this higher standard of conduct and financial protection to the plaintiff even
if the state of injury does not create analogous liabilities

U V
Summary: Driscoll Hotel illegally sold liquor to Sorrensen in Minnesota,
causing the latter to be drunk so that the automobile driven by him wherein
Schmidt was a passenger, turned over and thus caused injuries to Schmidt in
Wisconsin. MTD for lack of COA: the law does not punish acts the result of
which happened in another state. Court held that since all the parties involved
are residents of Minnesota and the violation of the respondent occurred in
Minnesota, its wrongful conduct was complete in Minnesota, the plaintiff, who is
also a resident of Minnesota, should be allowed to recover.

Facts
-Johnson Sorrensen was illegally sold liquor by Driscott Hotel Inc. (doing business as Hook-Em-
Cow Bar and Café) in Minnesota. (probably Sorrensen is a minor)
-Sorrensen became intoxicated before he left the Café.

PRIL Page 156


Cow Bar and Café) in Minnesota. (probably Sorrensen is a minor)
-Sorrensen became intoxicated before he left the Café.
-Sorrensen, together with Herbert Schmidt (who is a minor), drove towards Wisconsin where the
vehicle they were riding turned over, thus causing injuries to Schmidt
-Schmidt, through his mother and natural guardian, sued Driscoll Hotel for selling the liquor
illegally to Sorrensen
COA: Minnesota Civil Damage Act
MTD: Unless the illegal sale in the state was followed by an injury IN THAT STATE, no
penalty by way of damages may be recovered (Minnesota laws DO NOT HAVE EXTRATERRITORIAL
EFFECT)
TC: Granted MTD

WON Schmidt could recover from the Corporation for its illegal act done in Minnesota
when the injuries incurred by him happened in Wisconsin? YES
GR: the place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place. The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury (Restatement)
-since here, the place of the last event is Wisconsin but Wisconsin has no similar law such as that
of Minnesota Civil Damage Act, then Driscoll Hotel should have not been held liable
(but wait…there's more!)

IN THIS CASE:
2 wrongs to schmidt:
1. By Driscott hotel: sold to sorrenson intoxicating liquors in violation of MSA - there's no
tort law applicable but even if there was, there was nothing to support a claim that a
defendant ever consented to be bound by Wisconsin law
2. By Sorrenson: negligence caused the car to turn over - there might be wisconsin tort law
applicable
-however, both interest of Wisconsin and Minnesota would be ineffective if this would be
the case!
Wisconsin Minnesota
Afford remedies it deems proper for those injured Admonishing a liquor dealer whose violation
there as a result of foreign violations of liquor of its statutes was the cause o such
laws injuries and providing the injured party a
remedy under Civil damages act

X: when the interests/policy behind the laws would be rendered ineffective!


Here:
 All parties are residents o f Minnesota
• Driscott Hotel was licensed under its laws and required to operate its establishment
in compliance w/ Minnesota law
• Plaintiff is a Minnesota citizen
 Violation of Minnesota statute occurred in Minnesota, when, as a result, sorrenson became
intoxicated before leaving its establishment

U V
Ma'am: Schmidt illustrates imposition of liability under a substantive rule of tort law that has a
strong underlying admonitory policy

AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONFLICTS TORT LAW


*determination of whether the law where the tort was committed or the law of the domicile of
the parties is the controlling law*
Law of where the tort was committed: proper law in questions involving regulation of conduct
Law of the domicile of the parties: governs in matters that relate to loss-distribution or financial
protection

ulit!
-illustration of loss distribution: the guest statute of NY
-parties' domicile would be the issue around which the grant or withholding of damages would
center

PRIL Page 157


center
-A state's loss distribution policy would benefit its domiciliaries even when they act outside the
state borders

D. FOREIGN TORT CLAIMS


"Tortiuous liability is Transitory"
-liability resulting from the conduct is "deemed personal to the perpetrator of the wrong, following him
wherever he may go, so that compensation may be extracted from him in any proper tribunal which
may obtain jurisdiction of the defendant's person
-right to sue not confined in the place where the COA arises
-in short: AN ACTION FOR TORT MAY BE BROUGHT WHEREVER THE TORTFEASOR IS SUBJECT TO SUIT

1. CONDITIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF TORT CLAIMS


When foreign tort given due course in the forum court:
a. The foreign tort is based on a civil action and not on a crime
b. The foreign tort is not contrary to the public policy of the forum
c. The judicial machinery of the forum is adequate to satisfy the claim
Problem: defendant often sued in a foreign court against his will
 Problem of legitimacy of the jurisdiction
 Problem of validity of the decision

2. PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF THE FOREIGN MANUFACTURER


Problem: differences in the laws of states on the
 Basis
 Extent
…of liability for defectively manufactured products

Different basis of liability:


• Negligence
• Strict liability
• Breach of warranty against hidden defects

U V
Summary: Californian citizen sued Taiwanese company for product liability,
allegedly because there's a defect in the make of the motorcycle. Taiwanese
company sued Japanese company (Asahi) for indemnification. Court held that
there was no minimum contact for the Californian court to exert jurisdiction
over the Japanese company for the claim of the Taiwanese company.

Facts
-Californian driver of a motorcycle lost control of his vehicle and collided with a tractor. As a
result, he sustained injuries and his wife, who was a passenger of the motorcycle, died
-Californian driver sued Taiwanese company, Cheng Shin, for product liability + death of his wife in
California Court
COA: accident was caused by a defect in the make of the motorcycle
-taiwanese company filed cross-complaint vs. the japanese company, asahi metal industry, for
indemnification
COA: Asahi was the manufacturer of the tire valve assembly which sold to Cheng Shin and
other tire manufacturers the tire valve assembly.
-Cheng shin and the Californian driver settled the case, so only the suit of Cheng Shin against Asahi
remains pending
-Asahi filed motion to quash the service of summons on them:
1. California courts could not exert jurisdiction over Asahi based on Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment (which provides that the defendant should have established by his
own acts minimum contacts with the forum state before the forum state could exercise

PRIL Page 158


own acts minimum contacts with the forum state before the forum state could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant)
2. Asahi never contemplated that its limited sales to the Taiwanese company in Taiwan would
subject it to lawsuit in California
-SC found that exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was consistent w/ due process clause so Asahi
appealed

WON California courts could exercise jurisdiction over Asahi, a Japanese corporation? NO
1. What does the Due Process Clause require: that the defendant PURPOSELY established
"minimum contacts" in the forum state *
2. Are there MINIMUM CONTACTS?
A. Definition: some act by which the defendant avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities w/n the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws
-the acts should be by the defendant itself
B. The placement f a product into the stream of commerce, w/o more, is not an act of
the defendant purposely directed toward the forum state!
• What could have been considered purposeful acts of the defendant corporation:
 Designing the product for the market in the forum state
 Advertising in the forum state
 Establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum
state
 Marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum
• Awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the
forum state DOES NOT convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream
into an act purposely directed toward the forum state
C. Cheng Shin failed to prove that Asahi purposely did acts to fully avail itself of the
California market:
• No office, agents, employees or property in California
• No advertisement or otherwise solicitation of business in california
• No distribution system
• No designed product for California market
3. Due Process clause forbids a state from exercising personal jurisdiction on a Foreign
defendant when it would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice
-unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal
jurisdiction over national borders
-HERE: Asahi had to travel all the way from Japan to California and submit its dispute w/ Cheng
Shin in a foreign nation's judicial system when
 Transaction on which the indemnification claim is based took place in Taiwan
 Asahi's components were shipped from Japan to Taiwan
 No demonstration that it is more convenient to try the case in California rather than either
in Japan or Taiwan

U V

Facts: Helicopter
• owned by English Corporation
• Manufactured by Aerospatiale (French Company), which sold its helicopters in Texas
• Serviced and operated by a Malaysian Company
• Crashed in Brunei, killing a Brunei resident
-widow of Brunei resident sued Malaysian and French company in TEXAS
Why: Texas law more favorable on products liability
+ higher amount of damages awarded
 Defendants filed MTD based on Forum Non Conveniens

PRIL Page 159


 Defendants filed MTD based on Forum Non Conveniens
 TC denied MTD
-French Company then filed IN BRUNEI proceedings to enjoin plaintiffs from continuing in Texas Case
(Injunction)

HELD:
1. Brunei was the natural forum for the Trial of the action
2. It would be oppressive for the plaintiffs (who were Brunei nationals) to continue w/ the Texas
Proceedings
3. French company would not be able to pursue Legal proceedings against Malaysian Company
(bakit?)

U V

Facts: Bier sued Mines de Potasse d' Alsac in Dutch courtalleging that the discharge made by Alsac in the
Rhine river caused pollution damage
-BIER: a Dutch Market gardener who used water from Rhine river to irrigate his field and nurseries in
Rotterdam

WON Dutch Courts can exercise jurisdiction in accordance w/ Art 5(3) of the Brussels
convention?
Cause of harm: in France
Effect of the cause: in Netherlands

DUTCH COURT: Dutch court had no jurisdiction ! - referred to European court


European Court: Bier could sue in Either the place where the damage occurred or where the commission
of the acts that gave rise to it were done, at his election

SOVEREIGNTY AS BASIS OF JURISDICTION


-judicial, legislative and administrative competence
-problem: when one state exercises jurisdiction over a person who is not its national
-Common law courts: used the SOVEREIGNTY MODEL to either
1. Justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant present w/n the territory, however short ( tag
jurisdiction)
2. Deny enforcement of a foreign court judgment over a defendant who was not present w/n the
court's jurisdiction
: No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons and property not w/n its territory

U V
Summary: Volkswagen

Facts:
-Sps Harry and Kay Robinson are residents of NY
=The SPs bought a AUDI from Seaway Volkswagen (Retailer Corp), a retailer of Worldwide Volkswagen
Corp (Intl Corp) in NY.
-Both Retailer and Intl Corp are incorporated and are doing business in NY
-the sps incurred injuries allegedly due to the defective design and placement of their automobile's gas
tank and fuel system in Oklahoma.
-the suit was brought before OKLAHOMA Court against Retailer and Intl Corporation
>MTD: no jurisdiction, violates Due Process clause (as was discussed earlier in the Asahi Case)
>TC: denied MTD

PRIL Page 160


>TC: denied MTD
>SC of Oklahoma: personal jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma's "Long-arm" statute
allowing an Oklahoma court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a tortfeasor who
causes injury in Oklahoma by an act or omission outside Oklahoma "if he regularly does or solicits
business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Oklahoma.

WON Oklahoma Courts could exercise jurisdiction? NO!


A State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as THERE EXIST
"MINIMUM CONTACTS" BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT ND THE FORUM STATE (citingInternational shoe)

1. Functions of Minimum Contact Concept


a. Protect the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant, inconvenient forum
-reasonableness or fairness should be observed (refer to Asahi case)
b. Act to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system
2. Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant w/ which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations
-it may sometimes divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment
3. HERE: TOTAL ABSENCE OF MINIMAL CONTACT
○ No sales
○ No services performed in Oklahoma
○ No privileges and benefits availed from Oklahoma
○ No business solicited either through salesperson or through advertising reasonably calculated
to reach the state
○ NO regular sales to Oklahoma customers or residents
○ Nor was it shown that the defendants sough to serve or are serving the Oklahoma market
CAN'T BASE JURISDICTION ON A SINGLE ISOLATED OCCURRENCE WHEN THE CAR PURCHASED BY NY RESIDENTS FROM
AN NY CORPORATION PASSED BY OKLAHOMA
4. Foreseeability argument not sustained: it was argued that because an automobile is mobile by its
very design and purpose, it was "forseeable" that the Robinsons' Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma -
but this was held to be not a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction

PRIL Page 161


*not yet posted
*FEBRUARY 11 PRIL LECTURE
Thursday, February 11, 2010
1:22 PM

Torts vs. QD
US: Torts include both intentional acts and negligent acts
Spanish: only negligence (no criminal intent)
RP: halo
Culpa aquiliana: no contractual relationship, no intent
DOLO: w/ intent

Policies behind TORT LAW (2)


• Deter socially undesirable acts (STANDARD OF CONDUCT) - preserve social order
e.g. Traffic Rules - prescribes certain speed, only a particular age can drive
What is the speed limit in Manila? (haha no one knows )
• Rectify consequences of these acts - distribute the losses - pay people

In determining applicable law: look at the policies of the states, uphold justified expectations of parties

Justified expectations: how?


If company: expect that when you deal continuously with something…
e.g. School bus company - expect that they might be an accident wherein they would be sued

Law of the place of torts


-either the place where the conduct which produced the injury or the place where the last act was made
(where injury sustained)
-BUT as long as there is an acknowledgment of the liability, the tortfeasor is liable everywhere
common law concept Civil law concept
-looks at the place where the last event -place where the tortious conduct was committed
necessary to make an actor liable for an -at the time of acting, we should know that it would give rise
alleged tort occurs. to certain liability; if it was not an actionable act, why expect
-adheres to the vested rights theory so that if that you would be punished?
the harm does not take place then the tort is
not completed.
-No COA w/o injury
Place where injury incurred Place where tortious conduct made

*Tort is transitory
-if a person has already been held liable in one place, he could be held liable anywhere he could be found

Summary: Loucks killed in Massachusetts by negligent act of Standard Oil's employees.


However, his heirs are residents of NY, so they brought action before NY courts. NY
courts now resolves WON the action may be enforced in NY using Massachusetts law as
COA.NY Court held that it was not against NY's public policy to allow the
enforcement of a right of action which was granted by a foreign law to the
claimants as they had a vested right which the court should help protect.

*On public policy: even if there's not the same law, and they would not get as much, since the claim is not a
violation of NY's public policy, then the claimants should be allowed to claim!
*highlight FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY - meaning not just public policy since all laws are presumed to
reflect public policy of the state under which it was created

Disadvantages of using TRADITIONAL APPROACH:


Alabama Railroad Case: if just follow the law of the place of injury, even if that place has no connection to the

PRIL Page 162


Disadvantages of using TRADITIONAL APPROACH:
Alabama Railroad Case: if just follow the law of the place of injury, even if that place has no connection to the
parties except the fact that the injury happened there, then may result in unjust results

MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP

Summary: A Filipina stewardess was attempted to be raped by fellow male attendants


who were Saudi nationals in Indonesia. The complaint for attempted rape was filed but
when she got in Saudi Arabia, Saudi authorities questioned her and forced her to drop the
charges against the two Saudi nationals. Before she left for Manila, she was brought by
ER to courts and made to sign Arabic documents (all in the pretense that it was routine
procedure in dropping case against Saudi nationals) but was instead sentenced for
adultery and other violations of Islamic laws and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
and lashes. With assistance of RP embassy, Saudi officials (*I want to curse here but since
this would be posted online, I better not…WTF…) admitted they wrongly accused Filipina.
Still, Saudi Arabian Airlines terminated the contract. Filipina filed for damages against
airline company in RP courts, which Saudi Arabian Airlines contested, saying that RP lacked
substantial interest in the case. Court held that RP courts have jurisdiction since both
the plaintiff and defendant claimed reliefs from RP courts, and that RP law is applicable
since the injury is in RP and it is of no consequence that the other acts happened abroad
(then goes the long long discussion on PRIL)
*2 issues: jurisdiction and choice of law
Jurisdiction: no forum non conveniens because they are a foreign resident corporation and no inconvenience
on their part
Choice of law: Philippine law
…had the court stuck to the traditional approach, Saudi Arabian law would apply (because there is where she
was fired - the last act that caused injury)
-good example to show that the modern approach is beneficial to the claimant and the automatic application
of the traditional approach would work an absolute injustice

INTEREST ANALYSIS
-look at which state/s has interest to protect or enforce its laws
False conflict vs. True conflict
Babcock Case: Even if accident happened in ONTARIO, all the parties are from NY and Ontario has no interest
in enforcing their law in this situation
Critique: here, it involves the interests of private litigants and not the interests of the state in making the said
law!!!
-the state is encouraged to exaggerate it's interest

CAVERS
-only when there's true conflict in applying its own laws
-states what to do when there's a true conflict (there's two or more states who claim that their laws should be
applicable)
e.g. State of Injury's liability laws are stricter
State of conduct more lenient
What law would be applied: apply higher standard of conduct - thus the stricter law????

Summary: Driscoll Hotel illegally sold liquor to Sorrensen in Minnesota, causing the
latter to be drunk so that the automobile driven by him wherein Schmidt was a passenger,
turned over and thus caused injuries to Schmidt in Wisconsin. MTD for lack of COA: the
law does not punish acts the result of which happened in another state. Court held that
since all the parties involved are residents of Minnesota and the violation of the
respondent occurred in Minnesota, its wrongful conduct was complete in Minnesota, the
plaintiff, who is also a resident of Minnesota, should be allowed to recover.
-what policy Minnesota law wants to uphold: not to give drinks to persons already drunk and intoxicated -
Drunk Shop Act
-whenever special controls are imposed by law, the benefits and protections are extended even outside their
territories (aaah…un pala un…haha yey!)

PRIL Page 163


PRIL Page 164
*PRIL Lecture February 16 (Tuesday)
Friday, July 02, 2004
2:00 AM

-Tort is transitory in nature


-problem is WON the court has jurisdiction
*Conditions for the enforcement of tort claims
1. Foreign tort = civil action, not criminal (because criminal law is territorial)
2. Not contrary to public policy of the forum
3. Judicial machinery adequate

Product liability
-arises from
• Negligence
• Strict liability
• Breach of warranty against hidden defects
Problem: differences in the laws of the states on the basis & extent of liability
…place of injury different from the place of tortiuos conduct - and there's difference between their product liability laws
e.g. food from abroad, causes injury here…

Summary: Californian citizen sued Taiwanese company for product liability, allegedly because there's a defect in the make of the
motorcycle. Taiwanese company sued Japanese company (Asahi) for indemnification. Court held that there was no minimum contact
for the Californian court to exert jurisdiction over the Japanese company for the claim of the Taiwanese company.
*on the allegation of Asahi that it did not foresee that their products would make contacts in US - so what could they have foreseen? They may have targeted
merely Asian Market
*Minimum contacts/ substantial connection: required by the due process clause of US
--"PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT": not just one person who brings it in the forum; they did not foresee that their products would be use d or reach a certain place
e.g. Item made of wool. The manufacturer of the RTW would not have foreseen that the wool would be used in a tropical country where it is impractical to wear
wool.
…product not just brought in
-what is a tire valve???

MB: "Who has been in South Africa?"


(tito raises his hand)
MB: "Where did you stay?"
(tito says some place…)
MB: "Yabang." :))

Problems w/ regard "Purposeful Availment"


*what about products sold in international fairs?
*what about products sold online?
e.g. MB: since they are marketing themselves to the world, they should reasonably foresee that a suit may be brought against them anywhere in the world
…the answer would depend on WON the product was suited for the market in the forum…(or so I think)
*PURPOSEFUL availment difficult to prove: is it totally a surprise to defend yourself against a suit in a certain jurisdictio n

Summary: Volkswagen was sued by a taiwanese corporation for the damages caused by the taiwanese motorcycle ...

Reasonableness and Foreseeability: court just looks for connecting circumstances

PRIL Page 165


*PRIL Feb 18
Thursday, February 18, 2010
1:20 PM

ACTA
-suit can be filed against:
1. Government official acting under colorable title
2. Private individual
3. State, if only it has waived its immunity from suits
4. Corporations
-far more success in filing suits against public officials (although they claim that these were under state
acts)

Defenses:
• Forum non conveniens
• Act of state
• No proximate cause (esp. in UNOCAL and Chevron)

ACTA: Both place of injury and place of conduct are not in the forum state; only connection is that the
defendant is there (and so is the plaintiff)
Critique: extraterritorial application of US law over conduct committed outside US

Time v. Reyes
-Time published an article wherein Ponce Enrile and Villegas were depicted as corrupt officials so the
two sued times in RTC Rizal. Court ruled that the venue where the case was filed was provided under a
special law - RA 4363 which should be followed (since they are officials of Manila, either in RTC of
Manila or the place where the article was published). On the argument that Times is not in Manila,
inconvenient to bring suit where they are, court ruled that the RP laws cannot extend its application
abroad.

If apply traditional approach: law of the place where the tort happened : place of publication: NY
If apply modern approach: Most significant relations: the plaintiffs is in Manila, the alleged acts imputed
on the two plaintiffs are in Manila, the effects are in Manila…harm of reputation in RP not in NY = so can
apply RP law

TORT vs. CRIME


TORT CRIME
Transitory: may be punished wherever the tortfeasor is located Territorial
Individual is the victim State is the offended party
Indemnify the victim Punish and reform

LEX LOCI DELICTI


=law of the place where the crime was committed
 It has to be a domestic law

Exceptions
1. When the defendant is immune from criminal liability
2. When the crime happened w/n territorial waters but on board a foreign vessel
3. When the defendant is a Filipino, under the exceptions in Article 2, RPC

*most recent convention on international crime: Rome Statute


-only applicable if the State consented to the application of the Rome Statute and Jurisdiction of ICC

PRIL Page 166


*most recent convention on international crime: Rome Statute
-only applicable if the State consented to the application of the Rome Statute and Jurisdiction of ICC

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY


Ratio: all states are sovereign equals and thus, cannot assert jurisdiction over one another
-covers acts allegedly performed in the official capacity (jure imperii), not private, commercial or
proprietary acts (jure gestionis)

LIANG v. RP
-Liang accused Cabal of theft and even called her a b*tch! So he was sued for grave oral defamation.
DFA gave an office of protocol making him immune from criminal liability so lower courts dismissed the
charges. Court held: (1) DFA determination not binding; (2) ADB officers only immune if in official
capacity; (3) Slander (imputation of a theft) not an official duty; (4) Vienna convention does not make a
diplomat immune from criminal liabilities.

WYLIE v. RARANG
-"Auring" was accused in the memo of the airbase of criminal acts which led to the investigation of
Auring for the alleged crimes. Auring sued the officials of the airbase. Court held that the officials cannot
claim immunity from crimes because doing criminal acts is not deemed a part of official duty.

CRIMES COMMITTED ON BOARD A FOREIGN VESSEL even if it is within the territorial waters of the
coastal state
>as long as no disruption of peace and order - see Art 27
FRENCH RULE: only prosecute if against peace and security of the coastal state
ENGLISH RULE: if w/n coastal waters, can prosecute criminal even on board foreign ship
• is there an actual difference in deciding what cases may be heard by PHILIPPINE COURTS? None. It's the
starting point which is different. If it pertains to internal affairs of the ship, it is w/n the jurisdiction of
the flag state. It would only fall under the jurisdiction of the country of the coastal state if it affects the
peace and order of the coastal state.

US v. FOWLER
-Fowler et al. stole bottles of champagne on a foreign vessel in the high seas. Victim filed suit in RP.
Court held that the applicable law then, Act 136, only confers jurisdiction to RP if the ship is registered
an licensed in RP. Lawton is not so registered.
-RP cannot exercise jurisdiction in the High seas

P v. WONG CHENG
-Wong Cheng smoked opium in a foreign vessel in territorial waters of RP. Sued in RP. Court said that
since we follow the English rule, only triable in the courts of the country w/n whose territory they were
committed. Court acquires juridiction.
-smoking opium w/n territorial jurisdiction of RP: w/n jurisdiction? But no showing that there's many
opium, blah blah…? Apparently, they smoked opium in open view of everyone. Encourages everyone to
violate the law

US v. LOOK CHAW
-Opium was landed in Cebu upon boarding of RP investigators of the ship. Court held that generally
mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in RP, abroad a foreign vessel in transit, does not constitute
a crime; X: when the ship is landed.

UNCLOS
-Art 27
Criminal jurisdiction of COASTAL STATE not exercised ON BOARD A FOREIGN SHIP passing through the
territorial sea…
(d) if such measure are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances...

PRIL Page 167


substances...

CRIMES COMMITTED BY FILIPINOS BUT NOT W/N RP JURISDICTION - ART 2, RPC


Why are these exceptions to the territorial rule: threats to national security and economy of the state -
national interest

Extradition: unjust to not be able to punish an act done just because he is not w/n the forum's
jurisdiction

On rapists of children: "How can you be kind to them, they're not human beings."

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*February 23 PRIL Lecture
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
8:49 AM

CHOICE OF LAW AFFECTING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER JURIDICAL ENTITLES


WHO ARE PERSONS:
• Natural
• Juridical persons - corporations

Legal effect of being considered a person -


1. Capacity to act
2. Capacity to be subject to legal relations
3. Capacity to own property

Corporations organize outside our state are more restricted

Personal law of a corporation


Domestic corporation: incorporated in RP
Foreign corporation: established under the laws of another country (as defined in the Corporation Code)
---tests:
US: where incorporated
Civil law country? : where principal activities are conducted (law of central administration/place of
business)
…in RP, though we inherited civil law, we follow place where corporations was incorporated (though the
common distinction is that civil law applies to private law and common law to public/political law)

Personal law - the law of the place where a corporation is incorporated

GRAY v. INSULAR LUMBER


F: Gray, a SH of Insular Lumber which is incorporated in NY but has license to do business in RP, is not a
holder of 3% stocks. He wanted to inspect the books and records of the company. So he filed case
before TC to compel corp to allow him to inspect.
H: NY law applied though it was doing business in RP (and Corpo code allows it) because it was not
earlier allowed as basis of COA for inspection of books + no showing that his intent to inspect the books
was necessary to protect his interest and for a specific or honest purpose.
-here, RP conferred upon him a right; but NY law does not. Lesson of this case: law which will govern is
the corporation's personal law - NY Law!

ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY ON CORPORATION


BANK OF AUGUSTA V. EARLE
1. Corporation, being a creature of law, has no legal status beyond the bounds of the sovereignty w/n
which it was created
-no legal status outside place of incorporation
-territorial
-if we follow this as an absolute rule: difficult for corporations to transacts with other corporations
outside the state - globalization would be impossible
--in the case, it allowed the corporation to sue so it implicitly allowed the status of the corporation as a
legal entity
-legal existence outside the state of incorporation is dependent on consent of the other state through
comity (see #3)
2. Can't exercise powers not granted by its corporate charter/laws of the state of incorporation
Can't add privileges or restrictions that are not provided by the law of the state of incorporation
3. State cannot be compelled to recognize comity (neither an obligation nor mere courtesy or whim)

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Can't add privileges or restrictions that are not provided by the law of the state of incorporation
3. State cannot be compelled to recognize comity (neither an obligation nor mere courtesy or whim)
COMITY: same privileges granted by State A may be granted by State B
Restrictions: not allowed in the State wanted to have comity recognized
4. State not obliged to grant to foreign corporation the privileges and immunities common to the citizen of
that state
-A foreign corporation is a person, but not a citizen which is entitled to privileges given to citizens
-if recognize a foreign corporation as a person, not necessarily give status as a citizen
CITIZEN (can vote, can fill out public officers - in San Jose Petroleum case)

EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON INCORPORATION


1. Statutory and constitutional limitations
CONSTI - see Art. 12
-constitution provides that when it comes to the Exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources, Filipino citizens are given priority if not sole power to exercise it
-if not, foreigners may be allowed to buy all our natural resources - how would RP exercise sovereignty
over it???

PALTING V. SAN JOSE PETROLEUM INC


F: SJP wanted to register the sale of shares of its capital stock in exchange of voting trust certificate, for
the financing of SJO. It was opposed.
H: NOT VALID contract, can't be registered
1. Owned by Panamanian corporation
2. NOT INDIRECTLY OWNED BY US CITIZENS
3. NO evidence that …

-since no showing of reciprocity/comity, it's useless


-it's impossible to go down infinitum

2. Control test during war


-citizenship of corp based on the nationality/citizenship of the controlling SH of the corporation

FILIPINAS COMPANIA DE SEGUROS V. CHRISTERN, HUENEFELD & CO


F:

-why is it that during the times of war, incorporation test is followed and not the incorporation test?
DAIMLER V CONTINENTAL TIRE: company incapable of loyalty or enmity so the qualities of its SH would
be made basis (during times of war, the corporation takes the characteristics of the SH who are running
and controlling it)
-business transactions cannot be subjected to whims and caprices of the SH who controls the
corporation

DOMICILE OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION


Art 51, NCC

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE V. CITIBANK NA

-can a foreign corporation acquire a different domicile from place of incorporation? YES
How about domicile?
IN NCC: if not stated, the domicile may be the residence of the corporation (place where it is doing
business)

For Thursday: we finish the chapter then additional cases for recognition and enforcement of foreign

PRIL Page 170


For Thursday: we finish the chapter then additional cases for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment

PRIL Page 171


*February 25 Pril Lecture
Thursday, February 25, 2010
1:09 PM

PLACE OF INCORPORATION - applicable law in RP


X:
1. Times of war - pierced corporate veil to see who controls the corporation (determines the policy of the
corporation)
2. Statutory and constitutional limitations
-areas of public interest reserved to Filipinos
PALTING CASE: application of grandfather rule (but not really much help, principle of reasonableness
was actually used to rule ifo of Palting)
GRANDFATHER RULE: look at subsequent ownership to determine who controls the corporation
HERE: reasonable extent was used
*difficulty: reasonableness subjective

NEDA: looks at WON a corporation has been used as a vehicle to circumvent restrictions of the
constitution

JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS


Are all foreign corporation allowed to sue in RP? NO
Foreign corporation allowed to sue:
GR: if licensed to do business
X:

*purpose of license requirement: establish existence of the corporation in RP


-allows the state to regulate the conduct of states in RP and to allow only corporation which had
complied with its restrictions to access our courts?
-simply for RP courts to acquire jurisdiction over the foreign corporation

HOME INSURANCE COMPANY V. EASTERN SHIPPING


F: HIC, though no license yet, entered a contract with domestic corporations for insurance of its goods.
Because it was not paid, it sued before RTC courts (and now has acquired license in RP).
H: Subsequent acquisition of license in RP cured the defect of the contract entered w/o license
-registration requirement only affects the capacity to sue, not the capacity to contract
*object of acquiring license: for the courts to acquire jurisdiction of foreign corporations

Exceptions to the license requirement:


1. Isolated transactions
2. Protection of TM through filing of unfair competition
3. Transactions outside RP
4. Petition merely corollary defense

ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS
-occassional, incidental, casual
-not of a character to indicate purpose to engage in business

EASTBOARD NAVIGATION V. JUAN YSMAEL


F: Eastboard, a Toronto based corporation, sues Juan Ysmael. JYC alleged Eastboard no license to do
business in RP
H: NO license required if only isolated instances
*not required that it be only 1 transaction

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ACTION TO PROTECT TRADEMARK, TRADE NAME, GOODWILL, PATENT FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION
-even w/o license to sue

LEVITON INDUSTRIES V. SALVADOR


F: Leviton Intl sues Leviton Industries for unfair competition (uses Leviton's Int'l's TM for its products).
H: If suing for unfair competition, foreign corp should still allege in its complaint the condition precedent
in RA 166 (owner/user of TM + comity)
*old decision: now IP Code does not require that the foreign corporation is a registered TM holder in RP
*why we allow it now: protect its name, property right…goodwill protected

AGREEMENTS FULLY TRANSACTED OUTSIDE RP


Ratio: policy of stablizing commercial transactions
UNIVERSAL SHIPPING LINES V. IAC: otherwise, our country would be a heaven for unprincipled
businessmen

HANG LUNG BANK V. SAULOG


F: Chinese corporation transacted w/ RP corporation in HK. But since RP Corporation did not comply
with agreement, Chinese corporation sued RP Corporation in RP. MTD: no capacity to sue but denied
H: GR is that foreign corporation should first obtain license in RP to sue;
X: if the transaction based on was transacted "WHOLLY or FULLY" outside RP (don't leave it out!)
Ratio: growth and development of business relations between Filipinos and foreign nationals
….or else, we would be allowing law to serve as a protective shield for unscrupulous Filipinos

PETITION IS MERELY A COROLLARY DEFENSE IN A SUIT AGAINST IT

DEFINITION OF TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN RP


--see Foreign Business Registration Act and Foreign Investments Act of 1991
soliciting
orders,
service contracts,
opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or
who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty
(180) days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity
or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial
gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the phrase
"doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by
a foreignentity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of
rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in
such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which
transacts business in its own name and for its own account.

Effect of failure to secure license


*penal sanctions
*can be sued but cannot sue

TOP WELD MANUFACTURING V. ECED


F: foreign corporation initially wanted to procure business with Top Weld, a domestic corportion. When
foreign corporation was about to breach its contract with Top Weld so the latter sued foreign
corporation not to transact with other corporations, or else it was dealing or doing business w/o a
license.
H: In pari delicto. Top Weld knew that foreign corporation had no license.

PRIL Page 173


H: In pari delicto. Top Weld knew that foreign corporation had no license.

MERRIL LYNCH FUTURES INC (MLFI) V. CA


F: Lara spouses contracted with MLFI but owed the corporation so MLFI sued them. MTD based on no
capacity to sue.
H: Even if no license and doing business in RP, Lara spouses are now estopped from denying corporate
existence of the corporation

*so what's the difference bet Top Weld and MLFI?

TOP WELD MLFI


In pari delicto Corporation by estoppel
But here, none was able to recover Foreign corporation was allowed to recover
*so SC Inconsistent!!!!

CRITICISM about estoppel rule: Foreign corporation allowed to recover even if it should not have been
granted relief by the RP Court
---so is there even corporation by estoppel in MLFI?
Both parties knew that MLFI did not have license in RP
So Lara's can't now alleged that it is not okay with them that MLFI did not have license
*trend today though is corporation by estoppel

FOR A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO BE DOING BUSINESS IN RP, IS IT REQUIRED TO HAVE ENTERED INTO
MORE THAN ONE TRANSACTION?
NO. rule is that even if the corporation has merely transacted an isolated transaction, if that transaction
is not casual (it is w/n their normal course of business) + intent to establish business in RP = doing
business

SPECIAL CORPORATIONS
1. RELIGIOUS SOCIETES AND THE CORPORATION SOLE: A corporation composed of a single entity
-how to determine nationality
Ung Siu Si Temple: nationality of controlling SH; the community who is the beneficiary of the
corporation sole
ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR of DAVAO: the community who is the beneficiary of the
corporation sole - not the nationality of the incumbent
*but if control test used, the incumbent who holds the money in trust is a foreigner so the corporation
sole would have had a nationality of the foreigner
*Ma'am: it should not be automatic - would depend

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