In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter

long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.s car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he
was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart
did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing.
Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so
near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body
across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries
which required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his
horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his
car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had
the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smiths car has approached
the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his
part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such should
be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.

Umali vs. Bacani

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H.
SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.
Esguerra, J.:

Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were
blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging
on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not
do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and
8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went
to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys
parents negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for
injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an
employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When
he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train
was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly
moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to
the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his
arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few
meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed
to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and
a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also
ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate
warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article
2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

PLDT v. CA
PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban
1989 / Regalado / Petition for review on certiorari of CA resolution
Defenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause

FACTS
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [ at
25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the
spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the
inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or
signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on
her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The
jeeps windshield was also shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their
own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who
should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of
their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the
negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the
accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate
signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses complaint, saying
that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in totoRTCs
decision. (SC declared this later decision null and void. The first decision already became final and
executory because no appeal was taken seasonably.)

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO

RATIO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not
imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen because
thejeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve
suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on

dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the accident
mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he
knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wifes injuries but goes to
thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the
spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part
of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act
would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost
everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the
presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this
case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented
was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene
of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report from the
hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General
Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier
by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his
car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown.
Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners
countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence in driving at high
speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents
own negligence
Held:
We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not
have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut
off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in
the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that
offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial
moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the
dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at
or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that
the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt
have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as
the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far
as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition"
which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump
truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and
for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to
pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall
fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who
blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed
to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though
the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been
in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act

or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages
on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except
the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

Vergara v. CA
Facts:
A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo
truck belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent
Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in
favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers
Insurance and Surety Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The insurance company was sentenced to pay to the
petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive accident
insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
Held:
It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the
case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission,
of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence
may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the
cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the
center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another
bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the
driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical
defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be
consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident
preventable.

RCPI vs. CA
Facts: 24th of January 1983 private respondent spouses sent a telegram of condolence to their
cousins through the herein petioner RCPI. The telegram was in perfect resemblance as to what
was intended by the spouses however, it was written on a birthday card and was sealed in on a
Christmasgram envelope. The spouses contended there was a breach of contract on the part
of the RCPI, they in turn filed complaint on the trial court where it rendered its decision in favor
of the spouses whereas, it was appealed in the CA where also the judgment in the lower court
was affirmed in toto. Thus, the RCPI came to this Court for relief contending issues that the CA
erred in rendering such judgment.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner committed a breach of contract?
Whether or not the RCPI are held liable for damages?
Held: The Court agrees with the appellate court in its decision and per endorsement of the trial
courts findings that the RCPI as a corporation dealing with telecommunication are engaged in
public interest and therefore rests in their shoulders an obligation to serve the public with care
and without negligence. The reason of shortage in their production of the appropriate envelope
is of no value to merit for it is their duty to have produced such. The negligence committed is
evidentially sufficient to recover damages because the spouses suffered from ridicule amongst
the people who have come to have knowledge of such activity

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic,
with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it
was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner
and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned
tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since
it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the
picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS
I, Ms. Aidi Marice Nofuente, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of Sucat,
MuntinlupaCity, after being sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose
and say:1. That I am an alumnae of Polytechnic University of the Philippines-Sta.
Mesa.2. That as such alumnae, was issued an Identification Card with the
student no. 2k4-025056-8 and a claim stub for Diploma and Transcript of
Records.3. That said Identification card and claim stub was in my possession from
the time of issuance but sometime on November 18, 2009 Wednesday or
thereabout, the same was lostand notwithstanding diligent efforts, the same cannot
be recovered or located.4. That I am executing this affidavit to attest the truth and
for whatever legal purpose itmay serve. ______________________ Ms. Aidi Marice
NofuenteAffiantSUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11
th
day of April 2012 in Sta. Mesa,Manila.Doc. No.______;Page No.______;Book
No.______;Series No. 2009.