In my five years now as a Court Attorney, I had, on several occasions, come across lower court decisions incorrectly

applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (I. S. Law) or Act No. 4103. It is seriously disturbing that despite its seeming
simplicity and brevity, some judges had been perpetually misapplying it.
The basic mandate of the I. S. Law is the imposition of an indeterminate sentence which is comprised by a MINIMUM
term and a MAXIMUM term. It is indeterminate in the sense that after serving the MINIMUM, the convict may be
released on parole, or if he is not fitted for release, he shall continue serving his sentence until the end of the MAXIMUM.
It is the fixing of the MINIMUM and MAXIMUM terms which generates a lot of confusion and is the constant source of
error of some judges.
There is not much difficulty in ascertaining the indeterminate sentence if the crime is a violation of a special law because
in such a case, the I. S. Law merely requires that the MAXIMUM term thereof shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the
special law while the MINIMUM shall not be less than the minimum prescribed therein. Accordingly, if a special law
imposes a penalty of three (3) to nine (9) years of imprisonment, the MINIMUM of the indeterminate sentence cannot
be less than 3 years while the MAXIMUM thereof cannot be more than 9 years. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence may be decreed as 3-9 years, 3 years & 9 months - 7 years & 8 months, 3-4 years, 3-5 years,
5-8 years, 8-9 years, etc., depending on the sound discretion of the judge.
However, it should be stressed that the reference to special law in this regard refer to those which provide for one specific
penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for eight years or for one year to
five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. Where the penalty in the special law
adopts the technical nomenclature and signification of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), such
as prision mayor, prision correccional maximum, etc., the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be
based on the rule intended for those crimes punishable under the RPC.
The rule for ascertaining the indeterminate sentence for crimes punishable under the RPC is much arcane and complicated
than the rule applied in those crimes punishable under a special law. In crimes punishable under the RPC, the
indeterminate sentence is arrived at by determining the MAXIMUM term, which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the MINIMUM term, which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense.
Prior to the effectivity of the I. S. Law, prison sentences were imposed and fixed as a straight penalty exactly as provided
for under the RPC, modified only by the applicable rules therein, to wit: Articles 46, 48, 50 to 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69,
and 71. The MAXIMUM term of the indeterminate sentence is determined exactly in that manner as if the Indeterminate
Sentence Law had never been enacted. Thus, same rules and provisions (except par. 5 of Art. 62) must be taken into
account in determining the MAXIMUM term of the indeterminate penalty. In determining the MAXIMUM of the
indeterminate sentence, the following questions may be asked by way of a guide or checklist: (a) What is the imposable
penalty for the crime?, (b) Is the convicted felon a principal, accessory or accomplice?, (c) Was the crime consummated,
frustrated or attempted?, (d) Is the crime committed a complex crime?, (e) Is the commission of the crime attended by any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances?, (f) Is the penalty for the crime indivisible or composed of three periods, i.e.
minimum, medium and maximum periods?, and (g) Is the accused entitled to a privilege mitigating circumstance?
For instance, if a person is convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide, the imposable penalty under Art. 249 of the
RPC is reclusion temporal, a divisible penalty. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
MAXIMUM of the indeterminate penalty will be taken anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal medium, i.e. from
14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. The emphasis is on the phrase within the range which means
that anywhere within that period may be fixed the MAXIMUM term of the indeterminate sentence. Thus, the judge, at his
sound discretion, may fix it at 14 years, 10 months and 26 days, 17 years, 2 months and 6 days, 16 years,
etc.
A greater difficulty in fixing the MAXIMUM term of the indeterminate penalty arises where the range of the penalty
provided for in the RPC is composed of only two periods. For example, in the crime of estafa under Article 315 of the
RPC, the imposable penalty is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. In such case, the total number of
years included in the two periods should be divided into three equal periods of time, forming one period for each of the

three portions. Thus: minimum period 4yrs., 2mos. & 1dayto 5yrs., 5mos. & 10days; medium period 5yrs., 5mos. &
11days to 6yrs., 8mos. & 20days; and maximum period 6yrs., 8mos. & 21days to 8yrs.
In determining the MINIMUM term of the indeterminate sentence, the I. S. Law mandates that the same be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. In this regard, wide latitude of discretion is
given to the courts to fix the MINIMUM of the indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower,without regard to any modifying circumstances and without reference to the periods into which it may be
subdivided. In the previous example involving the crime of homicide, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal. The penalty next lower would therefore be prision mayor. Within the range of prision mayor, the court may fix
the MINIMUM of the indeterminate penalty. Thus, the judge may fix it at 6 years and 1 day, 6 years and 5
months, 8 years, 12 years, etc. While ample discretion is given to courts in fixing the MINIMUM of the
indeterminate sentence, the determination thereof nonetheless presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical
determination of the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors
and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
The common practice has been to fix the MINIMUM of the indeterminate sentence exactly one degree lower to the
MAXIMUM arrived at. Thus, for example, if the MAXIMUM fixed by the court is reclusion temporal medium, the
MINIMUM is usually fixed at prision mayor medium, which is exactly a degree lower. While the MINIMUM arrived at in
that case is technically correct, such nonetheless ignores the theoretical signification of the phrase penalty next
lower under the I. S. Law.
Conscientious adherence to the provisions of the I. S. Law is an indispensable component of a fair and impartial judgment.
For what could be the difference of even only one day in the period of imprisonment of a convict could mean so much to
the precious and cherished liberty of the person.

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (ISLAW):

HOW TO DETERMINE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PENALTIES
(Act no 4103 as amended)
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory in all cases, EXCEPT if the accused will fall in any of the
following exceptions:
1. if sentenced with a penalty of death or life imprisonment
2. if convicted of treason, conspiracy, proposal to commit treason
3. if convicted of misprision of treason, sedition, rebellion or espionage
4. if convicted of piracy
5. if the offender is a habitual delinquent
6. those who escaped from prison or evaded sentence
7. those who violated the terms of conditional pardon of the chief executive
8. where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year (important!)
9. if convicted by final judgement at the time of the effectivity of Act No. 4103
10. if penalized with suspension or distierro
If accused fall in any of the foregoing exceptions. DO NOT APPLY ISLAW!
ISLAW applies to offenses punished by Special Law and Revised Penal Code.
Why is ISLAW mandatory?
In the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the judge will get the maximum penalty and likewise the
minimum penalty. If the accused was already able to serve the minimum term of his indeterminate sentence
and upon the approval of the Board, the accused now becomes eligible for parole. ISLAW is favorable to the
accused.
If the accused was granted parole and violated some conditions of the parole, What will happen?

A warrant of arrest will be issued by the court and the accused will be made to serve the rest of the remaining
or unexpired portion of his sentence. (But in probation you go back to number 1, serving of sentence will be
from the beginning)
Application of ISLAW:
How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Special Law:
1. The maximum penalty should NOT exceed the maximum provided for by that law.
2. The minimum penalty should NOT fall below the minimum provided by the law.
How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Revised Penal Code:
Example: In the crime of homicide, under the Revised Penal Code, the offender is sentenced to reclusion
temporal.
The maximum penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is reclusion temporal. But reclusion temporal is
a divisible penalty consisting of maximum, medium and minimum periods. Which period will we place the
maximum term of the Indeterminate Sentence?
Guide for determining the maximum penalty:
1. Determine the entire range of the penalty
2. Determine if there is mitigating or aggravating circumstance
Which period will the maximum penalty be placed?
In pursuant to art 64, when there is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, it should be placed at the
medium period. Thus, the maximum penalty for the example above is reclusion temporal in the medium period.
What is the minimum penalty now?
In getting the minimum penalty, the rule is to simply get the penalty one (1) degree lower from the maximum
penalty without taking into account the mitigating and aggravating circumstance. Thus, the penalty one degree
lower from reclusion temporal, without taking into account any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is
prision mayor. Prision mayor is now the minimum penalty for our example.
Important: If your maximum penalty is wrong, it follows that the minimum penalty will also be wrong.
Again, prision mayor is a divisible penalty. Which period can it be placed?
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it would depend upon the discretion of the court on which period to
place it. Thus, the minimum penalty is prision mayor in any of its period.
Factors that could affect the imposition of minimum penalty:
1. Age
2. Conduct during trial
3. Mental or physical condition
Suppose in the example above, 1 aggravating circumstance was proven. What is now the maximum penalty?
It would still be reclusion temporal, but it shall be placed in the maximum period because of the presence of 1
aggravating circumstance.
How about the minimum penalty?
It would still be 1 degree lower from reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. In which period? It shall be
discretionary upon the court.
(More examples)
1 mitigating but NO aggravating
maximum penalty: reclusion temporal in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision mayor in any period

2 mitigating, NO aggravating (privileged mitigating)

maximum penalty: prision mayor in the medium period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period
The preceding example is an exception to the rule. If there is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we take it
into account first in order to obtain the proper maximum penalty. Then, from that maximum penalty, we obtain
the proper minimum penalty by getting the penalty 1 degree lower. Same rule applies as to the period of the
minimum penalty.
Remember: It will never become a privileged mitigating circumstance if there is an aggravating circumstance
present. 8 mitigating and 1 aggravating will never become privileged mitigating circumstance.
3 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision mayor in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period
In the preceding example, there are 3 mitigating circumstance present and no aggravating circumstance. The
first two mitigating circumstance shall be a privileged mitigating circumstance. Thus, the penalty will be
reduced by 1 degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor. The 3rd mitigating circumstance shall place the
penalty in the minimum period.
4 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the medium period (2 privileged circumstance. Thus we lower by 2
degrees)
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period
5 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period
At most we can only lower by 2 degrees. Thus, if there are 6 mitigating circumstance and NO aggravating:
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period
How is Indeterminate Sentence Law applied in complex crimes (Article 48)?
A complex crime is punished by the most serious offense and shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Example: Estafa through falsification of public documents.
Under the Revised Penal Code, falsification of public documents (Article 171) is a more serious offense
punished by prision mayor than estafa (Article 315), punished only by prision correctional.
Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty for estafa through falsification of public
documents shall be prision mayor in the maximum period. Minimum penalty shall be prision correctional, any
period.
Suppose there was 1 mitigating circumstance proven. Maximum penalty would still be prision mayor in the
maximum period. In pursuant to Article 48, even if there is a mitigating circumstance present, it should still be
imposed at the maximum period.
How about if there are 2 mitigating circumstance and no aggravating?
The rule is, if it is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we lower by the penalty by one degree but still place it
at the maximum period. Thus, the maximum penalty shall be prision correctional in the maximum period.
4 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: arresto mayor in its maximum period

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

(Act No. 4103, as amended, Dec. 5, 1933)
The purpose of the law is to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness. (People v. Onate, 78 SCRA 43) As a rule, it is intended to favor
the accused particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and
moral record as a prisoner to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence.
Indeterminate sentence is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum benefit of a guilty person, who is not
disqualified therefore, when the maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeds one year. It applies to both violations of the
RPC and special laws.

COVERAGE:
1. Revised Penal Code

The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the MAXIMUM TERM of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Code, and the MINIMUM TERM which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
The maximum is the penalty imposed as provided by law, depending upon the attending circumstances. The minimum is
one degree next lower to the penalty prescribed for the offense. The latter is determined without considering the attending
circumstances to the penalty prescribed, and is left to the discretion of the court. (People v. Yco, 6545, July 27, 1954)
Example: Homicide with one mitigating circumstance. The maximum penalty prescribed by law is Reclusion
temporal. Since there is one mitigating and no aggravating it will be in the minimum or reclusion temporal minimum
period. On the other hand, the minimum is one degree next lower to reclusion temporal without considering the mitigating
circumstance and that will be prision mayor. The range of prision mayor will depend upon the discretion of the court.
Therefore, the indeterminate penalty is a minimum of prision mayor (within the range fixed by the court) to a maximum of
reclusion temporal minimum period.
2. Special Law
The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the MAXIMUM TERM of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the MINIMUM TERM prescribed by the same. (Q11, 1994 Bar)

Example: Penalty is one year to 5 years. Indeterminate sentence may be one year to 3 years or 3 years to 5 years.
This act shall not apply to persons:
1. Convicted of offenses punished with death or life imprisonment. (Q12, 1990 Bar)

2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage, or piracy.
3. Those who are habitual delinquents.
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaranilla, 28547, Feb. 22, 1974)
4. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
A minor who escaped from confinement in the reformatory is entitled to the benefits of the law because confinement is not
considered imprisonment. (People v. Perez, 44 OG 3884) (Q6, 1991 Bar)
5. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the President shall have violated the terms
thereof.
6. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year. (Q8, 1999 Bar)

The application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law. (People v. Hidalgo, 452, Jan.
22, 1962)
7. Those already serving final judgment upon the approval of this Act (December 5, 1933).

8. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension. (Q12, 1999 Bar)

Whenever any prisoner who shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him, said Board of Indeterminate
Sentence may, in its discretion, and in accordance with the rules and regulations adopted thereunder, authorize the
release of such prisoner on parole. If during the period of surveillance, such parolee shall show himself to be a lawabiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippines, the Board may issue a final certificate of release in
his favor. Whenever any prisoner released on parole shall, during the period of surveillance, violate any of the conditions
of his parole, the Board may issue an order for his re-arrest and shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence.
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory if the imprisonment would exceed one year. It would be
favorable to the accused. (People v. Judge German Lee, Jr., 86859, Sept. 12, 1984)

PROBATION LAW
(PD 968, as amended, July 24, 1976)
Probation is a disposition, under which a defendant after conviction and sentence, is released subject to the conditions
imposed by the Court and to the supervision of a probation officer.

The purpose of the law are:

1. Promote the correction and rehabilitation by providing the offender with individualized treatment.
2. Provide an opportunity for the reformation of an offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence.
3. Prevent the commission of offenses.
The trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction. (PD 1990) In other words, the filing of the application for probation is considered as a waiver of
the right of the accused to appeal. (Q9, 1992 Bar)
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. However, an outright denial by the court
is a nullity correctible by certiorari. (De Luna v. Hon. Medina, CA 78 OG 599) An accused must fall within any one of the
disqualification in order to be denied probation. (Balleta v. Leviste, 92 SCRA 719) (Q13, 1991 Bar)
The disqualified offenders are:
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years.
A penalty of six years and one day is not entitled to the benefits of the law. (Q3, 1995 Bar; Q12, 1990 Bar) In Francisco v.
CA, 243 SCRA 384, the Supreme Court held that in case of one decision imposing multiple prison terms, the totality of the
prison terms should not be taken into account for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the accused for the
probation. The law uses the word maximum term, and not total term. It is enough that each of the prison term does not
exceed 6 years. The number of offenses is immaterial for as long as the penalties imposed, when taken individually and
separately, are within the probationable period. (Q9, 1997 Bar)
2. Convicted of any crime against the national security (treason, espionage, piracy, etc.) or the public order
(rebellion, sedition, direct assault, resistance, etc.).
3. Who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than P 200. (Q2, 1993 Bar)
4. Who have been once on probation.
5. Who are already serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of the Decree.
Except for the reasons specified by the law, a trial court should not deny a petition for probation, especially when the
probation officer has favorably recommended the grant of probation.
Even if at the time of conviction the accused was qualified for probation but at the time of his application for probation, he is
no longer qualified, he is not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation must be determined as of the time the
application is filed in court. (Bernardo v. Judge Balagot, 86561, Nov. 10, 1992) Supposing, an accused was convicted of a
crime for which he was sentenced to a maximum sentence of 10 years. While affirming the judgment of conviction, the
appellate court reduced the penalty to a maximum of 4 years and 4 months taking into consideration certain modifying
circumstances. The accused now applies for probation. In this case, the accused is not entitled to probation. The law and

jurisprudence are to the effect that appeal by the accused from a sentence of conviction forfeits his right to probation.
(Bernardo v. Balagot, supra; Francisco v. CA; De la Cruz v. Judge Callejo) (Q3, 1995 Bar; Q17, 1994 Bar)
The probationer shall:

1. Present himself to the probation officer within 72 hours from receipt of probation order.
2. Report himself to the probation officer at least once a month during the period of probation.
The court, after considering the nature and seriousness of the violations of probation (if any), may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the probationer. He is then brought to the court immediately for hearing, which is summary. If violation is
established, the Court may revoke or continue the probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the probationer
shall be ordered to serve the sentence originally imposed and shall commit the probationer. The order of the court is not
appealable.
A final discharge of probation shall operate to restore to the probationer all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of the
conviction and to full discharge of his liability for any fine imposed. Under the Probation Law what is suspended is the
execution of the sentence, while under PD 603, as amended, what is suspended is the pronouncement of the sentence
upon request of the youthful offender. The suspension of the sentence, however, has no bearing on the civil liability, which
is separate and distinct from the criminal action. (Budlong v. Apalisok, 22 SCRA 935)
The provisions of the Probation Law should be liberally construed in order that the objective should be realized and
achieved. (Santos v. Hon. Pano, 55130, Jan. 17, 1983) In probation, the imposition of the sentence is suspended and
likewise its accessory penalties are likewise suspended. An order placing the defendant on probation is not a sentence but
is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an interlocutory
judgment in the nature of the a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation. (Baclayon v. Hon. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148)

Republic of the Philippines

Department of Justice
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
DOJ Agencies Bldg., NIA Rd., Cor. East Ave., Diliman, Quezon City
RESOLUTION NO. 24-4-10

RE: Amending and Repealing Certain Rules and Sections of the Rules on Parole and Amended Guidelines for
Recommending Executive Clemency of the 2006 Revise Manual of the Board of Pardons and Parole

WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President, except in cases of
impeachment or as otherwise provided therein, may grant reprieves, communications and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by the final judgment;
WHEREAS, in accordance with the above-cited constitutional provision, the President has the plenary power to grant
executive clemency, except on the following three (3) constitutional limitations to wit:

1. In cases of impeachment;
2. In cases involving of election laws, rules and regulations as provided for in Section 5, Paragraph C, Article IX
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution without the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections; and
3. In cases where the conviction is on appeal or has not become final and executor;
WHEREAS, the eight (8) disqualifications or exceptions enumerated and provided for in Section 5 of the Amended
Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency of the 2006 BPP Revised Manual are not in consonance with the
provisions of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, constitute as limitations on the pardoning power
of the President, and violate the time-honored principle of equal protection of the laws enshrined in the Bill of Rights, thus
defeating the primary purpose of restorative justice;
WHEREAS, Section 5, Paragraph a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive
Clemency discriminates against certain criminal offenders and denies them equal opportunity for executive clemency;
WHEREAS, under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines", enacted on June 24, 2006, persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as "The Indeterminate Sentence Law", as amended;
WHEREAS, under Executive Order No. 83 dated January 11, 1937, the Board of Pardons and Parole is mandated to assist
the President in exercising the power of executive clemency; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to the mandate of the law to redeem and uplift valuable human resources and prevent excessive
deprivation of liberty, there is a need to provide opportunities to qualified and deserving inmates in order to ease
congestion now plaguing the correctional institutions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board resolves, as it is hereby Resolved, to AMEND and REPEAL the
following provisions of the Rules on Parole and the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency of the
2006 BPP Revised Manual:
I. Rule 2.1. of the Rules on Parole is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
"RULE 2.1. Eligibility for Review of A Parole Case - an inmate's case may be eligible for review by the board provided:
a. Inmate is serving an indeterminate sentence the maximum period of which exceeds one (1) year;
b. Inmate has served the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence;
c. Inmate's conviction is final and executor;
In case the inmate has one or more co-accused who had been convicted, the director/warden concerned shall forward their
prison records and carpetas/jackets at the same time.
d. Inmate has no pending criminal case; and
e. Inmate is serving sentence in the national penitentiary, unless the confinement of said inmate in a municipal,
city, district or provincial jail is justified.
A national inmate, for purposes of these Rules, is one who is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
three (3) years or to a fine of more than five thousand pesos; or regardless of the length of sentence imposed by the Court,
to one sentenced for violation of the customs law or other laws within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs or
enforceable by it, or to one sentenced to serve two (2) or more prison sentences in the aggregate exceeding the period of
three (3) years."

II. Rule 2.2, Paragraphs i to l of the Rules on Parole are hereby DELETED for being inconsistent with the provisions of
Section 2 of the "Indeterminate Sentence Law", as amended. Further, said Rule is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
"RULE 2.2. Disqualifications for Parole - Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Indeterminate Sentence Law", parole shall not be granted to the following inmates:
a. Those convicted of offenses punished with death penalty of life imprisonment;
b. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason or espionage;
c. Those convicted of misprision treason, rebellion, sedition or coup d' etat;
d. Those convicted of piracy or mutiny on the high seas or Philippine waters;
e. Those who are habitual delinquents, i.e., those who, within a period of ten (10) years from the date of release
from prison or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, and
falsification, are found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener;
f. Those who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
g. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines shall have violated any of
the terms thereof;
h. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year or those with definite sentence;
i. Those convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences were reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of Republic Act No. 9346 enacted on June 24, 2006, amending Republic Act No. 7659 dated
January 1, 2004; and
j. Those convicted for violation of the laws on terrorism, plunder and transnational crimes."
III. Rule 2.3 of the Rules on Parole is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
"RULE 2.3. Review Upon Petition or referral by the correctional and/or other agencies - a parole case may be reviewed
by the Board upon petition or referral by the correctional and/or other agencies if inmate is not otherwise disqualified
under Rule 2.2."
IV. Section 1 of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency is hereby AMENDED to read as
follows:
SECTION 1. Plenary Power of the President to Grant Executive Clemency - Under Section 19 Article VII of the
Constitution, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided therein, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. Executive clemency rests
exclusively within the sound discretion of the President, and is exercised with the objective of preventing a miscarriage of
justice or correcting a manifest injustice.1avvphi1
These Guidelines are meant solely for the guidance of the Board of Pardons and Parole (hereafter the "Board") in the
performance of its duty to assist the President in exercising the power of executive clemency pursuant to Executive Order
No. 83 dated January 11, 1937. These Guidelines create no vested or enforceable rights in persons applying for executive
clemency."
V. Section 3 of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:

"SECTION 3. Extraordinary Circumstances - The Board shall recommend to the President the grant of executive
clemency when any of the following extraordinary circumstances are present:
a. The trial court or appellate court in its decision recommended the grant of executive clemency for the inmate;
b. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the penalty imposed is too harsh compared to the crime
committed;
c. Evidence which the court failed to consider, before conviction which would have justified an acquittal of the
accused;
d. Inmates who were over fifteen (15) years but under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense;
e. Inmates who are seventy (70) years old and above whose continued imprisonment is inimical to their health as
recommended by a physician of the Bureau of Corrections Hospital and certified under oath by a physician
designated by the Department of Health;
f. Inmates who suffer from serious, contagious or life-threatening illness disease, or with severe physical disability
such as those who are totally blind, paralyzed, bedridden, etc., as recommended by a physician of the Bureau of
Corrections Hospital and certified under oath by a physician designated by the Department of Health;
g. Alien inmates where diplomatic considerations and amity among nations necessitate review; and
h. Such other similar or analogous circumstances whenever the interest of justice will be served thereby."
VI. Section 4 of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency is hereby AMENDED to read as
follows:
"SECTION 4. Other circumstances - When none of the extraordinary circumstances enumerated in Section 3 exist, the
Board may nonetheless review and/or recommend to the President the grant of executive clemency to an inmate provided
the inmate meets the following minimum requirements of imprisonment:
A. For Commutation of Sentence, the inmate should have served:
1. at least one-third (1/3) of the definite or aggregate prison terms;
2. at least one-half (1/2) of the minimum of the indeterminate prison term or aggregate minimum of the
indeterminate prison terms;
3. at least ten (10) years for inmates sentenced to one (1) reclusion perpetua or one (1) life imprisonment,
for crimes/offenses not punished under Republic Act No. 7659 and other special laws;
4. at least thirteen (13) years for inmates whose indeterminate and/or definite prison terms were adjusted
to a definite prison term of forty (40) years in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended;
5. at least fifteen (15) years for inmates convicted of heinous crimes/offenses as defined in Republic Act
No. 7659 or other special laws, committed on or after January 1, 1994 and sentenced to one (1) reclusion
perpetua or one (1) life imprisonment;
6. at least eighteen (18) years for inmates convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972" or Republic Act No. 9165 also known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act

of 2002", and for kidnapping for ransom or violation of the laws on terrorism, plunder and transnational
crimes;
7. at least twenty (20) years for inmates sentenced to two (2) or more reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment even if their sentences were adjusted to a definite prison term of forty (40) years in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
8. at least twenty-five (25) years for inmates originally sentenced to death penalty but which was
automatically reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
B. For Conditional Pardon, an inmate should have served at least one-half (_) of the maximum of the original
indeterminate and/or definite prison term."
VII. Section 5 of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency is hereby REPEALED.
VIII. Section 10 of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency is hereby AMENDED to read as
follows:
"SECTION 10. Notice to the Offended Party - In all cases when an inmate is being considered for executive clemency, the
Board shall notify the offended party or, in the event that the offended party is unavailable for comment or otherwise
cannot be located, the immediate relatives of the offended party. Said persons shall be given thirty (30) days from notice to
comment on whether or not executive clemency may be granted to an inmate. Provided that, in matters of extreme urgency
or when the interest of justice will be served thereby, such notice may be waived or dispensed with by the Board. In such a
case, the Board shall explain the reason for the waiver of such notice in the Board resolution recommending executive
clemency."
IX. Section 11 of the Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency is hereby AMENDED to read as
follows:
"SECTION 11. Publication of Names of Those Being Considered for Executive Clemency - The Board shall cause
the publication once in a newspaper of national circulation the names of inmates who are being considered for
executive clemency. Provided, however, that in cases of those convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of Republic Act No. 9346, publication shall be once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks.
Any interested party may send to the Board written objections/comments/information relevant to the cases of
inmates being considered for executive clemency not later than thirty (30) days from date of publication.
Provided that, in matters of extreme urgency or when the interest of justice will be served thereby, above
publication may be waived or dispensed with. In such publication in the Board resolution recommending executive
clemency."
X. This Resolution shall take effect upon approval by the Secretary of Justice and fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Let copies of this Resolution be likewise sent to the Office of the President through the
Executive Secretary, and the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center.