Fem K Extras

Fem K - Agamben Link

Agambens notion of bare life ignores the role of women,
poor and people of color results in a sadistic population
Smith 11 professor of government at Cornell University, political
theorist, with research interests in the fields of jurisprudence and
normative political theory; distributive justice and socioeconomic
rights; public policy; education and poverty assistance; feminist theory
and feminist legal studies; critical race theory; and the rhetoric of
modern state power and citizenship, (Anna Marie, Neo-eugenics: A Feminist Critique of
Agamben, February 11, Stanford University, http://arcade.stanford.edu/occasion/neo-eugenics-feministcritique-agamben) //DS

Agamben, unlike Spillers, moves at such a distance from historical

specificities that he loses sight of institutionalized gendered dynamics . His
objective is not only to thematize Western discourse on a metaphysical level,
in the Derridean sense, but to establish a critical sociopolitical theory that can bring
to light the fundamental character of Western GOVERNANCE that has
purportedly endured, like a timeless essence, from Aristotles ancient Greece to post-9/11
American government. Like Spillers, Agamben underlines the fact that biopolitics constructs the
national population in a racially essentialist manner. But he cannot detect the
specificity of racial formations; he cannot help us to understand the ways in
which the anti-Semitism of the Nazis resembles, but also deviates from,
institutional racism in contemporary American society . Further, he completely fails
to grasp the centrality of gender to the biopolitical project of producing bare
life. For Agamben, the sovereign preserves for itself the natural right to do anything to anyone.[22] As
However,

the line between legitimate authority and the right of the sovereign in a state of exception to protect the
people by producing bare life is increasingly blurred, we become unable to identify any one clear figure
of the sacred man.[23] In effect, we are all virtually homines sacri.[24] Bare life is no longer confined
to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.[25]

The historical record, however, makes it crystal clear that it is the structurally
disempowered who are most vulnerable to the exercise of arbitrary state
power in the state of emergency. Women are placed in especially constrained
positions by the modern State when it devotes itself to population
management. In the context of positive eugenics, the fittest women of the
racial nation are asked to serve as the wombs of the people through
natalist propaganda and policies. Negative eugenics in turn promotes the
exclusion of the unfit through selective immigration controls, sterilization,
and the discouragement of child-rearing. Poor women typically bear the brunt
of these policies. In some eugenic contexts, the unfit woman is offered partial redemption, but only
insofar as she is rendered into a sterile worker, a prostitute, or a military servant.[26]

practical implications of Agambens failure to address the historically

specific and stratified character of the States targeting (i.e., the fact that in the
midst of an emergency, the State escalates its already established class, race,
ethnic, and gender profiling instead of striking out in an unpredictable
manner) are sobering. If we convinced ourselves that vulnerability is equally distributed, we would
The

implicitly reinforce our already excessive tendency toward bourgeois self-regard.[27] We would also
foreclose all radical attempts to hold the agents who actively participate in the establishment of eugenics

Out of our
bourgeois narcissism, we would refuse to face the Other and to receive the
Others inscrutable and yet insistent demand .[29] Instead of facing the Other, we
would merely fixate on THE IMAGE of the Others suffering. We would derive
policy, and those who benefit handsomely from its operation, collectively responsible.[28]

it would
become our fetish. We would congratulate ourselves for having the fortitude to commodify
suffering, and we would act as if we could exhaust our moral obligation by doing
so. Thus, we would forget that we had forgotten the Other and that we were
keeping our backs turned against the Others face. Fetishism, however, is not
solidarity.
compensation for our perceived vulnerability through our consumption of this image;

Feminist Judgment Writing

Rewriting court decisions shifts the way cases are
approached feminist perspective is key
Hunter, McGlynn, and Rackley 10 Rosemary Hunter is
Professor of Law and Socio-Legal Studies, a Fellow of the Academy of
Social Sciences, and the Chair of the Socio-Legal Studies Association.
Clare McGlynn is a Professor of Law with particular expertise in the
legal regulation of rape law and gender equality in the legal profession.
Erika Rackley is another professor of law who specializes in gender
equaliity (Feminist judgments: from theory to practice, 2010,
http://www.lawcourts.org/LPBR/reviews/hunter-mcglynnrackley1211.htm)//EM
Feminist Judgments is a work that strives to move from "theory to
practice." Feminist legal scholars, and a judge or two, analyze decided cases,
writing opinions from a feminist perspective to show what feminist theory would look like
if practiced in courts. Not surprisingly it puts forth alternative legal conclusions and
rulings that many in the world of law would consider radical. The whole notion of
moving from theory to practice describes the books focus. It serves as a guide for judges to properly
carry out rulings that are more consistent with feminism as the scholars involved with the Project re-write
the rulings that would be more consistent with their aims. Part I provides readers with an introduction to
the Feminist Judgments Project which analyzes the relevant cases from the: United Kingdom; Australia;
Canada; South Africa; United States; European Court of Human Rights and European Commission of
Human Rights; European Court of Justice; and the International Court of Justice. There is a comprehensive

The
title suggests that feminist judges are called on to do even more in order to
advance their respective causes, and others are called on to expand their
thinking about the possibilities of law. In the introduction, the legal scholars write, the
central issue debated in the literature is the extent to which judges make as
opposed to find the law and what resources they draw upon, or ought to
draw upon, in so doing (p.5). The English court cases that are featured are
directly relevant to their goals, and their theoretical revisionist rulings would make for
interesting case law in practice anywhere in the world. On the one hand, feminist scholars have
argued that women enhance professional roles as they seek to make more
interpersonal connections through collaborative effort s (Gilligan, 1982). On the other
hand, other feminists have advised that the subordination of any woman should be of primary
concern to all women (MacKinnon, 1985). This book calls for judicial activism and seeks the
activist judge to act alone in convincing other judges of a specific viewpoint
in order to reach a majority in the particular decision. The cases are
prominently featured within the chapters that are organized and well
developed by topic and area of law: parenting; property and markets; criminal law and
evidence; public law and equality. In nearly two dozen opinions, some written as
concurring or dissenting opinions and some as fictitious appeals, illustrate
alternative paths of the law. [*716] In the introduction, the editors introduce the Feminist
table of statutes and details about legislation which directly corresponds with the cases studied.

Judgments Project, which is made up of a collective of scholars that share a

common mission embodied in the following: impatient with the glacial
progress made to date in appointing women to the judiciary, and skeptical of
the capacity of the conservative efforts put in place to address womens
under-representation to achieve much more than tokenistic change, we
decided, quite literally to take the law into our own hands (p.8). Clearly, this
book serves as an urgent call for changes in the law ; it asks these feminist judges to
evaluate their own performances and to ascertain what more they can do to join them in solidarity,
adhering to their mantra to change the law and not turn our backs on it (p.8). The forward, written by
Baroness Hale of Richmond, represents one particular feminist Judge who answered their call and has been
awakened to new possibilities as a result of this book. Lady Hale, an unconventional trailblazer, is the first
and most senior female judge in the United Kingdom and many of her cases are featured throughout this

The book tacitly seems to suggest additional

advice for Lady Hale, and others, to pursue alternative courses of action in
future cases. It is also posited here that women in positions of power and
influence should use that prestige to consider a womans particular
circumstances and to go to extremes to help other women . What the scholars may
book directly and indirectly scrutinized.

take for granted is that there is only so much help that the feminist judge may render. In fact, most
training programs (approved by feminist organizations) strive for female judges to work solely toward
ensuring that vulnerable female witnesses are treated ethically (Rhode, 1994). In the introduction, Hunter,
McGlynn, and Rackley muse, we want to tackle laws understanding of rape directly, so that when a

most important dimension

of this work is that it depicts how the law has traditionally protected and even
favored male rights. In short, we learn that a feminist judge should target
specific facts (consistent with feminist principles) within a case and place
more emphasis on those facts. In this manner, we see how feminist judges think differently and
woman says, I was raped, the law says, I believe you (p. 9).

The

may achieve their own professional ends in a manner that is likely distinct from other judges. In doing so,
the contributors have authored revised legal opinions that do not always consider that judges often work
collegially, and have to build a consensus.