Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1NC
Interpretation--Domestic surveillance is the acquisition of nonpublic information
concerning US persons.
Small, Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress fellow, 2008
(Matthew, His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times
of National Crisis, http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/publications/presidential-fellows-program/18/289-a-dialogueon-presidential-challenges-and-leadership-papers-of-the-2007-2008-center-fellows)
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to narrow the
scope of the term domestic surveillance. Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be
understood in this context, is information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those
needs (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence,
domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence . The intelligence
community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning
United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
Violations---Section 702 only deals with non US persons outside the US.
McNeal, Pepperdine law professor and PhD, 2014
(Gregory, Reforming The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Interpretive Secrecy Problem, 11-13,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524067)
Section 702 authorizes the targeting of persons, and persons are defined in FISA. Persons are not only individuals, but also groups, entities, associations, corporations,
or foreign powers.27 As the PCLOB noted, the definition of person is therefore broad, but not limitless: a foreign government or international terrorist group could
qualify as a person, but an entire foreign country cannot be a person targeted under Section 702.28 Surveillance
Vote NEG:
1. Limitsmoving beyond domestic surveillance encompasses every surveillance activity
the government conducts multiplied by the number of potential foreign targets which over
extends the NEG.
2. Ground---forcing the AFF to focus on US persons is key to lock in core debates
concerning constitutional protections, privacy and national security.
A2: We Meet
Section 702 targets non-Americans believed to be outside the country.
Sales, Syracuse law professor, 2014
(Nathan, NSA SURVEILLANCE: ISSUES OF SECURITY, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY: ARTICLE:
Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy, I/S: A Journal of Law and
Policy for the Information Society, Summer, lexis)
The second program--known as PRISM or section 702--uses court orders issued under section 702 of FISA n18 to
collect the content of certain international communications. In particular, the NSA targets specific non-Americans
who are reasonably believed to be located outside the country, and also engages in bulk collection of some
foreign-to-foreign communications that happen to be passing through telecommunications infrastructure in the United States. n19 The FISA [*527]
court does not approve individual surveillance applications each time the NSA wishes to intercept these communications; instead, it issues once-a-year blanket
authorizations. n20 As detailed
below, in 2011 the FISA court struck down the program on constitutional and statutory
grounds after the government disclosed that it was inadvertently intercepting a significant number of
communications involving Americans; n21 the court later upheld the program when the NSA devised a technical
solution that prevented such over-collection. n22
Keiths distinction
between domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering can be read in at least two different ways. One way is to stress
the passage referring to the constitutional rights that come with being a citizen of the United States. Yet citizenship
itself generally does not mark the boundary of the Fourth Amendments protections; noncitizens prosecuted in U.S. courts enjoy
the Amendments protections just as citizens do. Another (perhaps more descriptively accurate and normatively attractive)
reading would treat the distinction as having to do with whether the governments actions have any
proximate connection to the domestic criminal justice system, without regard to the citizenship of those
involved. On this reading, the point is that the Fourth Amendment must apply fully to dissident domestic
organization[s] precisely because such organizations are subject to the domestic criminal justice system. [F ]oreign
power[s], on the other hand, are not likely to face prosecution in the U.S. courts. More generally, the domestic sovereigns relationship to them is qualitatively
different than it is to domestic individuals and organizations. Thus, it makes sense from this perspective to distinguish between domestic and foreign targets of the
governments surveillance efforts.
Domestic surveillance occurs when people who are not associated with foreign powers or
agents are monitored.
Morrison, NYU law professor, 2008
(Trevor, "The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, 11-20,
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=columbia_pllt)
Second, adopting the same basic distinction observed by Judge Keith and the Sixth Circuit, the Court stressed that
the instant case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no
opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents .174 The
Court dropped a footnote at that point, citing two lower court cases, as well as the ABA Committee whose standards Powell had earlier worked on, as examples of
authorities embracing the view that warrantless
Case Answers
Economy Adv
the devastating recovery years of 2009 and 2012, the cumulative rate of GDP growth
was nearly nine percent below the average growth rate for previous recoveries. (Source: Congressional Budget Office, last accessed,
May 14, 2015.) The so-called recovery has been pretty uneventful. In 2013, the U.S. reported annual GDP growth of 2.2%; last year it was just 2.3%. In the first
quarter of 2015, GDP came in at a dismal 0.2%. As
it stands, weak recovery, massive budget deficits, and high debt level could
push the fragile U.S. economy into another recession. China Economy Slowing Down China, the worlds second-largest
economy, is also losing steam. Since 2010, the countrys GDP has been steadily declining from 10.6% to 7.4% in 2014.
Not surprisingly, Chinas money supply grew and investment growth sank to the slowest pace in over 15 years. (Source: Reuters, May 13, 2015.) The future
remains bleak. For 2015, Chinas economy is forecast to climb at around seven percent; its slowest pace in 25 years
and well below historical averages. The Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) has lowered its benchmark interest rate for the third time in six months. By
lowering interest rates, the central bank is hoping to make borrowing cheaper and stimulate economic growth. Greek Debt Crisis Can Drive Eurozone Back into
Recession After
six years, Greece emerged from a recession in 2014. But that was short-lived; falling business
confidence, national debt, and deflation have driven Greece back into a recession. To make matters worse,
Greeces government has not been able to cut a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ease its debt
crisis. Greeces finance minister insisted on Thursday that he will reject any deal from international bailout creditors that does not help the country exit its economic
crisis. (Source: abcnews.com May 14, 2015.) All told, I think that the signs of deteriorating economic conditions are set to
emerge in late 2015 or early 2016. With this, dont expect stock markets to perform the way they have been
for some time.
Reserve has cut interest rates by a minimum of 5 percentage points. That kind of traditional stimulus is now completely ruled out, HSBCs Mr King writes. Meanwhile, budget deficits are still
While in the past, deep recessions have typically been followed by strong
recoveries, this time around, a deep recession has been followed by an insipid recovery: more L-shaped than Vshaped. Today, inflation isnt just low. It is, arguably, too low, he warns. When debt levels are low, interest rates
are high and budget deficits are small, dealing with recessions is relatively easy, he says. When debt levels are high,
interest rates are at zero and budget deficits are large, dealing with recessions is a lot more troublesome. Attempts in
uncomfortably large and debt levels uncomfortably high.
various global economies to rebuild their ammunition over the past six years have failed. The European Central Bank had egg on its face after trying to raise interest rates in 2011, only to be
The danger for policymakers is firstly, that its hard to know in advance what the next financial
crisis will look like; and secondly, that regardless where it comes from, none of the tools that have helped
governments pull themselves out are available this time.
forced to drop them again.
trends, analysts say, signal a great unravelling of an emerging markets debt binge
that has swollen to unprecedented dimensions. Importantly, the pain inflicted by this capital flight is being felt
beyond financial markets in the real economies of vulnerable countries and in a surging number of emerging market
corporations that are forecast to default on their debts. Certain parts of the world are looking really vulnerable, says Maarten-Jan Bakkum,
senior emerging market strategist at ING Investment Management. Places like Brazil, Russia, Colombia and Malaysia, that rely heavily on commodity exports, are
going to get hit even harder, while those countries that have borrowed most excessively like Thailand, China and Turkey also look risky. Analysts say that while
emerging markets have been the setting for several recent financial squalls, the current exodus of capital could herald more fundamental changes. Indeed, although the
taper tantrum of mid-2013 triggered by the US Federal Reserve signalling its intention to unwind its monetary stimulus caused turmoil in financial markets,
its impact on real emerging market economies was transitory. This time around, though, things look more serious. The International Monetary Fund said this week that
total foreign currency reserves held by emerging markets in 2014 a key indicator of capital flows suffered their first annual decline since records began in 1995.
Without steady capital inflows, emerging market countries have less money to pay their debts, finance their
deficits and spend on infrastructure and corporate expansion. Real economic growth is set to suffer this year,
analysts say. Capital Economics expects GDP growth in emerging markets to fall to 4 per cent from 4.5 per cent in 2014, as Russia slips deeper into recession, Brazil
continues to struggle and China is hampered by its ailing property market. Underlying
we see no
evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained
states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher
rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of
lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet
resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with
rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy
models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include
sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in
instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover,
other timelike rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar
empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of
evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but
varying variables,
have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered
approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and
stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly
consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural
crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large,
consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend
to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost
accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity
view. Moreover, we shouldnt mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same
correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and
anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result. Ultimately,
however, the fact that commodity price
shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets , but some effect on ongoing conflict,
suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One
possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that
the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If
findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict
literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of
select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures
of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis
(2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection
of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more
teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of
all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness
checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the
time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a file drawer problem (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that
discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or
empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate,
the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20
The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the
strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary
mechanisms, such as Mansfield and Snyders theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two
identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict.
most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory
must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish
decision making. The historical record, including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger evidence for a
standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified
most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less
frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but
scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain.
research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a
publics overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after
a
selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the
largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leaders skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same
time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces
increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase
when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because
victory would have been expected.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options
to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in
addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion . Weak
leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at
home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated dtente among the superpowers in
the early 1970s, Chinas concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial
liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian States and the Gulf
Cooperation Council.131
the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second,
of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism,
undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers
are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to
contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not
be reversed states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if
the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without
building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their
countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that
people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the
financial crisis, an
optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic
down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about
greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
Leading technology
companies continue to remain some of the most valuable in the world, with Apple, Google, and Microsoft each
holding three of the top five spots by market cap. These and other technology high-flyers have helped to maintain
impressive average EBITDA multiples, with the top 25 US technology companies touting approximately 11x in
2014. IPO activity in 2014 continued to increase to the next level, becoming the most active year since 2000 . In total,
there were 60 technology IPOs, an increase over the 51 posted in 2013, which was already the most active year since the last recession. Technology IPOs continued to
remain a key driver in the market, representing roughly 40% of IPO value and 20% of IPO volume (20% of value excluding the $21.8 billion Alibaba IPO). Proceeds
from new pricings neared $35 billion, and year-to-date performance returns approximated 22%, both factors that continue to reaffirm the long-term outlook for the
industry as a whole. IT
spending in 2014 posted a growth rate just under 2%, lower than prior estimates given exchange
rate movements, while projections anticipate an increase to approximately 2.4% growth in 2015. Cloud offerings,
mobile devices, and enterprise software have remained the focal points for IT investment over the past few years,
and 2015 is expected to continue along a similar path. Enterprise software is anticipated to remain the area of highest growth potential, though
challenged by increasing price pressure and competition as cloud and traditional providers battle for customers. Mobile devices are expected to remain a key growth
area and focal point of IT to enable their organizations, while some expect that PCs may make a comeback. In
over 20 percent per year. As discussed in the Winter 2014 BDO TECH Software Newsletter, SaaS models are becoming more and more relevant as the business
environment changes and the tech industry evolves. Traditionally, organizations purchased enterprise software, but on-premise solutions are becoming overpowered
by SaaS, especially with the increasing use of mobile devices and related applications. The software industry is quickly shifting from the traditional licensing model
to cloud-based offerings, such as Software-as-a-Service, to meet the overwhelming need for real-time responses and easy integration, said Hank Galligan, leader of
the Software Practice at BDO. As the business environment evolves, companies are acknowledging the pressure to upgrade or introduce cloud computing services
either through acquisitions or on their own. When looking at key drivers of acquisitions in todays tech market, one-third of CFOs believe increased revenue and
profitability will be the primary impetus for M&A activity in 2015, followed by improved market share (25 percent), gaining engineering and research capabilities (14
percent) and enhancing technology assets and intellectual property (13 percent), which dropped from 28 percent in 2014. Although
Legitimacy Adv
the grievances
toward the United States in this region run deep, and the source of that anger is not only drones. Don't forget: The
Middle East was exasperated with Washington long before droning, and it remains eager to blame America for just
about everything. The list of the Arab world's grievances go on and on: America is blamed for supporting the authoritarian Arab
kings, blindly backing Israel, not talking to Hamas, not intervening militarily in Syria, intervening militarily in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and, according to Egyptian liberals, for supporting Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood . And that's even
before we discuss the small but determined minority of Muslims who do, in fact, hate us because of who we
are -- not just because of what we do. No nuanced modulation of our approach on drone strikes or the closure of Gitmo
is going to change any of that.
out, one great benefit of the Senate report is that it has demonstrated the ability of the U.S. political system to subject itself to scrutiny a test that most democracies,
and all autocratic regimes, routinely fail. Taken as a whole, people arent nave. They understand governments do bad things and pursue their own selfish interests
abroad. So when a country confesses and tries to rectify the transgression, people are impressed. If the U.S. goes on to prosecute those who approved and used the
most extreme torture methods, that would do still more to repair the damage. But
surprisingly, the U.S. has very little backing worldwide for drone strikes. In Julys
edition of the Pew Global Attitudes Research Project, there was net support for the policy in only four of 44
countries: Israel, Kenya, Nigeria and the U.S. Majorities opposed the strikes even in staunch U.S. allies such as
Japan (82 percent), the United Kingdom (59 percent) and Poland (54 percent).
reactions are galling and they do real harm to U.S. credibility. But the fault lies not with those who released the report, as some critics
argue, but with those who permitted and perpetrated acts of torture, those who lied about it to Americas elected representatives, and those who willfully kept the
president and senior members of the Bush administration in the dark. Their
American protection, the ally would succumb to a rival power, either by force or threat of force, heightening the rivals capability and
danger to the United States. The other argument says that without the United States, the ally would enter a spiral of hostility with a neighbor, creating instability or war
that disrupts commerce and costs America more than the protection that prevented it. The main problem with the first argument is that no
hegemon today
threatens to unify Europe or Asia. Europe is troubled by debt, not conquest. Russian GDP is today roughly equivalent to that of Spain
and Portugal combined. Whatever Russias hopes, it has no ability to resurrect its Soviet Empire, beyond perhaps those nations in its near abroad that Americans have
no good reason to defend. Even today, the military capabilities of Europes leading powers are sufficient to defend its eastern flank, and they could increase their
martial exertions should a bigger threat arise. Asia is tougher case. South Koreas military superiority over its northern neighbor is sufficient to deter it from an attempt
at forcible reunification. By heightening North Koreas security, nuclear weapons may reinforce its capacity for trouble-making, but they do not aid offensive forays.
U.S. forces long ago became unnecessary to maintaining the peninsulas territorial status quo. Chinese
states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively
expensive. Indias mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future
Chinese aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security
alliances. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new strategic
partnership and expressing common strategic interests such as ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication. 8 This sort of multilateral
cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role. Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically produce freeriding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to balance China, it is
unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. Chinas territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing a few small exportoriented states slacken Chinas hunger for the dollars of American consumers. The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only
slightly more credible. One
problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazardemboldening
weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage
accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence. Another
point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly
to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent it. Neutrality historically pays.10 The larger problem with
the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms
competition provokes. Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical examples of arms races alone
causing wars are few.11 This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War Iseeing it as a
consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states. 12 Balances of power, as noted, are
especially liable to be stable when water separates would-be combatants, as in modern Asia. Japan would likely increase defense
spending if U.S. forces left it, and that would likely displease China. But that tension is very unlikely to provoke a regional
conflagration. And even that remote scenario is far more likely than the Rube Goldberg scenario needed to argue that peace in Europe requires U.S. forces
stationed there. It is not clear that European states would even increase military spending should U.S. troops depart. If
they did do so, one struggles to imagine a chain of misperceived hostility sufficient to resurrect the bad old days of
European history.
it might not be able to do as much as it used to, the US will still be able to accomplish more than
most. In effect, secondary powers are likely to reason that a weakened hegemon is still much better than no
hegemon. The hegemonic bargain will not be abolished. It will be adjusted in two important ways. Secondary powers will do more in areas
where their vital interests are at stake. This can be seen in the way France and Britain took the lead in the Libyan intervention. Or, in the way Turkey is
taking charge in responding to the Syria crisis. The US will play a very large supporting role. As every NATO operation in the post-Cold War era has demonstrated,
secondary powers must ultimately increase their own power capability. This is not to balance the US, but to make up the difference. Compensating for Americas
lesser role, firstly, requires that secondary powers spend more on defense. The necessity of doing so will become increasingly evident as various crises threaten the
interests of secondary powers and the US shows ever less enthusiasm for cleaning up the mess alone. Second,
main concern will not be the unilateral exercise of American power. Rather, secondary powers will worry about
Americas level of commitment to them moving forward. America will no longer be able to stack the deck in some
of the ways it has before. But happily, the US will find that it holds a number of high cards in negotiating the terms
of cooperation with eager secondary powers because this time the US can credibly threaten to stand by and watch. All of this suggests
that as the global field is leveled, secondary powers will not turn to balancing, but rather, they will adopt a
strategy of bonding. From time to time, weaker states have bandwagoned with more powerful or threatening states, either to appease or gain from the spoils
of a hegemons aggression.54 In this case, the US will grow less powerful and less threatening over time, suggesting altogether different motives. Bonding
involves both policy accommodation and efforts to move closer through deeper cooperative ties. The primary
concern of secondary powers will be to keep the US engaged. After World War II, the European allies were mainly concerned about US
abandonment. As Ikenberry explains, The evolution in American policywas a story of American reluctance and European persistence.55 In an era of
relative decline, American disengagement may again emerge as the principal problem facing many of the
worlds seconda0ry powers. This fear will move them to work ever harder to secure Americas commitment
and support.
States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive . The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated
important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified
Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding
territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the
wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors.
biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the
temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall. Nor is there
good evidence that reducing Washington's overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its
credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold
War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the
forces' repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship between Washington and Seoul. Calls for
Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese force s.
Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and
falling dominoes. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent
and ideological disputes remarkably mild.
hope to trade on their success are often met with increased skepticism or mistrust. What, then, does this mean for countries the United States and Russia included
that wish to harness soft power in their dealings with the world? First, they must acknowledge that a nations soft power is not kept in a vault at the White House or
Kremlin, but lies in the mind of every one of the billions of people around the world who has an opinion about the country. Secondly, they must realize that when
attempting to deploy soft power, your opinion isnt important; your audiences is. Therefore, those working on soft power campaigns must be able to step outside their
own cultural context and look at their country from a foreigners perspective. Third, what works for one country isnt guaranteed to work for another. India is able to
leverage soft power in the form of Bollywood movies, which are loved by millions around the world. China has no cultural equivalent; Chinese calligraphy and
ceramics will never be sufficiently relevant to a large enough number of people. Efforts focusing on promoting Chinas development projects or spectacular scientific
discoveries would likely have more success. And
finally, while there are few moral perceptions around the world that are
universally accepted, a near ubiquitous mistrust of power exists. Promoting a soft power narrative that
emphasizes success and dominance in a field or organization might not be as effective as one that focuses on a
disadvantaged city, region or group which exist in every country. In the final analysis, soft power lies in the allure one person feels for
another. And this is why the most enduring soft power strategies have been those founded on people-to-people
exchanges. Despite all the efforts of a state government to control its image through a soft power campaign, in the
end it comes down to winning the hearts and minds of individuals something that cannot be ordered from the top
down.
According to the strategy, winning the War on Terror means winning the
battle of ideas. The United States also singled out state sponsors of terror for its soft power campaign and declared that it desired to make clear that all acts of terrorism are
terrorists perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule.81
illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose.82 These were
serious statements of policy objectives. To isolate state-sponsors of terrorism, President Bush encouraged states to choose a position either with us or against us in the fight against terror."83 A
special task force on strategic communications was set up at the Defense Science Board that argued that the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas. 84 The
Board concluded that, policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent
judgments.85 To show the level of commitment the Bush administration made to the task of public diplomacy, President Bush appointed his trusted public relations manager, Karen Hughes, as
Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. 86 Under Hughess leadership, the State Department established regional media hubs offering U.S. spokespeople with language capabilities to
speak on America behalf in media outlets throughout the Middle East.87 The United States Government also increased the budget for the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), the U.S. agency responsible for dispensing foreign aid, by 60%, from 5 billion in 1998 to 8 billion in 2003.88 The United States funded a variety of pro-American media in the Muslim
world including H1 magazine, Radio Sawa, and the Al Hurra television station. 89 Furthermore, the United States established reeducation facilities, such as the House of Wisdom in Iraq, to
support for terrorism, the United States has made real progress on very few of its stated objectives. The United States has, since 9/11, avoided a major terrorist attack, and while the causes of this
can be debated, it is not likely the result of a waning of terrorist ideology globally as is evidenced by the string of attacks in other parts of the world. In recent years, terrorists have carried out
attacks in: Algeria, Great Britain, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Russia, Spain, and other countries.91 Despite heavy pressure from the United States in the form of hard and soft power, states still support
terrorism and Al Qaeda has even reconstituted terrorist training camps in South Asia. 92 Terrorist ideology continues to flourish globally with the help of the Internet.93 The low public opinion of
the United States in the Muslim world, often thought to be one of the factors contributing to terrorism against the United States, has not improved in recent years. In fact, a recent study found that
peoples attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy actually worsened slightly since they started listening to Radio Sawa and Al Hurra.94 Few observers believe that U.S. efforts to combat Al Qaeda
have been effective. In a recent worldwide poll, survey respondents in 22 out of 23 countries reported that the U.S.-led war on terror has not weakened Al Qaeda.95 The U.S. failure to use soft
power effectively in the War on Terror is even more pronounced in some of the most important countries. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example, 60% and 41% of the respective publics possess
either positive or mixed views of Al Qaeda.96 According to Doug Miller, chairman of the international polling firm Globescan, The fact that so many people in Egypt and Pakistan have mixed
or even positive views of al Qaeda is yet another indicator that the US war on terror is not winning hearts and minds.97 Why has the United States failed in its effort to use soft power to counter
ideological support for terrorism? Part of the reason is that the United States has not been able to compete in a functioning marketplace of ideas in most of the societies where a threat of jihadi
The lack of a functioning marketplace of ideas in this region contributes to the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories in the region from private households to the
highest levels of government.104 Due in part to these phenomena, public
with all of its hard and soft power is not well-equipped to persuade international audiences about the legitimacy of
terrorism as a tactic. There are undoubtedly other factors that helped to discredit the U.S. message on issues of terrorism. The U.S. military
intervention in Iraq and the related prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Grhaib, for example, alienated many in the broader
Middle East.112 But, these factors only further weakened U.S. credibility; the United States was never in a position to
be a persuasive messenger on the subject of terrorism in the Muslim worl d. In the War on Terror, however, individual attitudes have
had an important, though mixed, effect on international political outcomes. Ideas have a critical (but by no means exclusive) impact on individual decisions to join
terrorist organization, but attitudes are less important determinants of the state sponsorship of terrorism. Exposure
to radical ideology is an
important component leading an individual to become a terrorist. While containing an undeniable ideological component, however,
many of the factors that convince people to turn to terrorism are material in origin, not ideational, and, thus,
cannot be addressed with soft power tools. Social science research suggests that many factors may contribute
to the production of a terrorist. Few opportunities for political participation, low levels of social integration,
personal loss, and foreign occupation are among the variables that have been linked to a higher risk of
terrorism. 113 The United States can combat some of these risk factors through the application or withdrawal of
hard power, but few of them can be addressed through the application of soft power alone. Despite Americas soft
power campaign, the state sponsorship of terrorism also appears to be alive and well and driven by states core
material interests. Pakistan continues to walk the fine line of allowing terrorists to operate in the tribal regions while making occasional raids against terrorist
hideouts to placate the United States.114 And states that can gain through the active support of terrorism as an extension of their national power, such as Iran and
Syria, continue to do so.115 The United States has been unsuccessful, so far, in its attempt to use soft power to counter global ideological support for terror. This
failure is due, at least in part, to
the absence of the conditions necessary for an effective soft power strategy. Attitudes may be
influential in determining the strength of the international terrorist movement, but the United States was unable to
participate in debates in key regions in which terrorist ideology flourishes and a lack of credibility further hindered
U.S. efforts to change attitudes on important terrorism-related issues.