Prism Negative - Mndi 2015

Prism Neg MNDI BT 2015
Topicality - Curtail
Curtail = Decrease
1nc
Curtail means to prohibit
Friman and Andreas 99
(H. Richard Friman - associate professor of political science at

Marquette University. Peter Andreas - academy scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Google Books p. 76)
efforts of governments to curtail illicit financial flows today bear more

similarity to the initiatives of the 1920s that those at Bretton Woods. To begin with, international
efforts to prohibit capital flight have been almost nonexistent.
The
Violation 702 doesnt prohibit domestic surveillance

allows loopholes
TFA language in 702 allows NSA to bypass restrictions against
domestic surveillance
Donohue 15 --From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., Section 702 and the Collection of
International Telephone and Internet Content, Georgetown Law. n/a date.
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS
TFA and the assumptions that

mark the foreignness determination, undermine the protections
created for U.S. persons in Sections 703 and 704 of the statute. They make it
possible for the NSA to obtain significant amounts of American
citizens communications. Until the FAA, the surveillance of U.S. persons outside domestic
bounds took place under the weaker standards of Executive Order 12,333. Part of the purpose
of the FAA was thus to increase the protections afforded to U.S.
persons travelling abroad. 214 The way in which Section 702 is being
used, however, allows the NSA to bypass Section 703 by making
assumptions about legal status and location and potentially
subjecting U.S. persons to surveillance without meeting the
requirements of Section 703. The amount of information at stake is
not insubstantial. For years, the volume of intercepts under Section 702 has been one of the
The component statutory interpretations, particularly
principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently expressed unease
it is impossible to quantify how many

Americans communications have been implicated in the operation of
Section 702.215 What has gradually become clear is that the program significantly
more expansive than initially understood.21
about the intelligence communitys claim that
Vote neg destroys limits - aff justifies bi-directional plan

texts, which undermines core neg ground like terrorism
and politics DA and CPs that compete on not decreasing
Proves no solvency TFA language creates letter of the
law loophole
Topicality - Domestic
Domestic Surveillance = Data TFA

US persons for Coercive Purposes
1nc
Domestic surveillance means that it must target US persons not
just be collected within the US
McCarthy, 6 former assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. (Andrew, Its Not
Domestic Spying; Its Foreign Intelligence Collection National Review, 5/15, Read more at:
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collectionandrew-c-mccarthy
Eggen also continues the mainstream medias propagandistic use of the term domestic surveillance [or
'spying'] program. In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing i.e., eavesdropping on
A call is not considered domestic

just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just
as an investigation is not domestic just because some of the
subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country.
Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda.
Surveilling him had we done it would not have been domestic
spying. The calls NSA eavesdrops on are international, not
domestic. If that were not plain enough on its face, the Supreme Court made it
explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that
judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror
organizations, the Court excluded investigations of threats
posed by foreign organizations and their agents operating both
content of conversations is not domestic.
within and without the U.S.
That is, the Court understood what most Americans
understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge:
if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign

powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance.
It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence.
That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers
operating within the U.S. the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after badmouthing it for years as a rubber-stamp is called the FOREIGN Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court
permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the
wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security
purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not
domestic surveillance.
Surveillance is monitoring with preventive intent
Lemos, 10 - Associate Professor at Faculty of Communication at Federal University of Bahia, Brazil (Andre,
Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of Informational Territories,
http://www.irma-international.org/viewtitle/48348/
it is important to distinguish
between informational control, monitoring and surveillance so
that the problem can be better understood. We consider
control to be the supervision of activities, or actions normally associated with
government and authority over people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be
considered a form of observation to gather information with a view
Although they often appear to be synonymous,
to making projections or constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the action of following up and
evaluating data.
Surveillance, however, can be defined as an act intended
to avoid something , as an observation whose purposes are

preventive
or as behavior that is attentive, cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in
English and French the two words vigilant and surveillance, each of which is spelt the same way and
has the same meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts
associated with legal action or action by the police intended to provide protection against crime,
We shall define surveillance as actions that imply

control and monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance "implies something
respectively.
quite specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering of personal
information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8).
surveillance actions presuppose monitoring

and control, but not all forms of control and/or monitoring can
be called surveillance. It could be said that all forms of surveillance
require two elements: intent with a view to avoiding/causing
According to this definition,
something and identification of individuals or groups by name.

It seems to me to be difficult to say that there is surveillance if
there is no identification of the person under observation (anonymous) and no preventive
intent (avoiding something). To my mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example,
that the system run by my cell phone operator that controls
and monitors my calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here
there is identification but no intent. However, it can certainly
be used for that purpose. The Federal Police can request
wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records to monitor my telephone calls.
The same can be said about the control and monitoring of users by public
transport operators. This is part of the administrative routine of the
companies involved. Once again, however, the system can be used for
surveillance activities (a suspect can be kept under surveillance by the companies' and/or
police safety systems). Note the example further below of the recently implemented "Navigo "card in
France. It seems to me that the social networks, collaborative maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and
countless different databases that make up the information society do indeed control and monitor and
offer a real possibility of surveillance.
Violation PPD28 limits foreign information gathering, not

surveillance for coercive purposes on domestic people.
Voting issue for limits and ground. They explode the topic
(1) All information gathering is topical under their interpretation and
the negative loses security based disads and critiques
(2) Expanding domestic to cover immigration and foreign counterintelligence which are both big enough to be separate topics
AND, Extra-Topicality is illegit adding PPD 28 is necessary for their
solvency, which means they have unique advantage from the nontopical part of the plan. Reject the entire aff as not topical - dont
allow severance.
PPD-28 Regulates Foreign Surveillance

T- PPD 28 regulates foreign intel
Litt and Joel 14 (Robert Litt, he second General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and Alexander W. Joel, the first Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the U.S. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Interim Progress Report on Implementing PPD-28, October 17, 2014,
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/204-reports-publications-2014/1126interim-progress-report-on-implementing-ppd-28) // AW
PPD-28 reinforces current practices, establishes new

principles, and strengthens oversight, to ensure that in
conducting signals intelligence activities, the United States
takes into account not only the security needs of our nation
and our allies, but also the privacy of people around the
world. The Intelligence Community already conducts signals
intelligence activities in a carefully controlled manner,
pursuant to the law and subject to layers of oversight, focusing
on important foreign intelligence and national security
priorities. But as the President recognized, [o]ur efforts will only be
effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the United States respects their
privacy too. To that end, the Intelligence Community has been working hard to implement PPD-28
within the framework of existing processes, resources, and

capabilities, while ensuring that mission needs continue to be
met.
A2: We meet - American Companies are US

Persons
American companies irrelevant to 702 authority communication
content determines domestic persons, not holder of the data this
means NSAs interpretation of the plan would still allow for domestic
surveillance according to LETTER OF THE LAW
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS110hr6304pcs/html/BILLS-110hr6304pcs.htm)//LP
Requirement to adopt.--The
Attorney General, in consultation with the Director

of National Intelligence, shall adopt targeting procedures that are
reasonably designed to-- ``(A) ensure that any acquisition authorized under
subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States; and ``(B) prevent the intentional
acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all
intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be
located in the United States.
Especially true because, per the American companies, individuals
own data, not companies
Verizon 14 (Amicus Brief: U.S. Search Warrants Do Not Apply to Data Stored Overseas, 12/15/14,
http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/us-search-warrants-do-not-apply-to-data-stored-overseas )//LP
Today, Verizon filed an amicus brief in support of Microsofts appeal to reverse a federal courts decision
that allowed the U.S. government to use a warrant to compel Microsoft to produce a customers email
stored overseas. We were joined on our brief by Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, eBay, salesforce.com and Infor.
The case does not involve Verizon or any Verizon customers data. Indeed, Verizon has not received any
warrants from the U.S. government for customer data stored in our enterprise data centers outside the
United States and we do not expect to receive such demands. Still, we have submitted this brief in order to
turn back an unlawful overreach by the U.S. government. The law does not allow the U.S. government to
use a search warrant to obtain customer data stored overseas. The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated
many times that U.S. statutes are presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless Congress
clearly expressed its affirmative intention to the contrary.Congress
has not clearly

expressed its intention in any U.S. statutes that domestic warrants
should apply to data stored in other countries. And there is good reason for that.
For starters,the data at issue (the contents of private emails) belongs to a customer,
not to the provider. Moreover, if U.S. law were to require a U.S. business to
turn over customer data stored overseas it would conflict with the laws
of many other countries that protect the privacy of such data and limit disclosure outside the
country in which the data is stored. Furthermore, permitting the U.S. government to use a warrant to
obtain data stored overseas would just encourage foreign governments to claim that they can obtain data
stored in the U.S., which would threaten the privacy of Americans.
Domestic = In US Territory
1nc
domestic in the context of surveillance means collection of data in
US territory
Thompson, 13 -- Legislative Attorney (Richard M. Thompson II is writing for the congressional
research service, 4/3/13, http://www.pennyhill.com/jmsfileseller/docs/R42701.pdf) LP
the Supreme Court addressed

the use of manned aircraft to conduct domestic surveillance over
residential and industrial areas. In each, the Court held that the fly-over at issue was not a
In a series of cases that provide the closest analogy to UAVs,
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, as the areas surveilled were open to public view.
Domestic is only Domestic networks

Savage and McConnell 15 (John E. Savage, An Wang Professor of Computer Science Box 1910,
Computer Science Department Brown University Brown University, Bruce W. McConnell Bruce McConnell is
responsible for leading EWIs communications and networking with public and private sectors around the
world, Senior Vice President, January 20,2015 http://www.ewi.info/idea/exploring-multi-stakeholderinternet-governance accessed June 28, 15)PA
It is domestic when the data transits only domestic networks. It

can become an international issue when it crosses territorial
boundaries, for example, when data is encrypted.
Violation American companies store data internationally this is
the data that their internal links assume and it means that aff
restricts foreign surveillance
Voting issue for limits. They explode the topic
Expanding domestic to cover territory outside the US justifies
surveillance of US bases, embassies, and international drones.
Makes neg research burden impossible.
AND, Extra-Topicality is illegit they may restrict some domestic
servers, but they must also limit international servers to solve the
aff. Reject the entire aff - dont allow severance.
Data stored on non-US servers

Data is stored outside US territory by domestic companies
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai 6/12/14 http://mashable.com/2014/06/12/microsoft-u-s-government-dataforeign-servers/ Microsoft Fights U.S. Government Over Rights to Data on Foreign Servers Lorenzo
Franceschi-Bicchierai is a reporter at Mashable's New York headquarters, where he covers cybersecurity,
tech policy, privacy and surveillance, hackers, drones, and, more in general, the intersection of technology
and civil liberties. Before Mashable, Lorenzo was an intern at Wired.com, where he wrote for Danger Room,
and Threat Level. A recent graduate of Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism Lorenzo is also a Law
graduate at University of Barcelona.
Microsoft is challenging a data request from the U.S. government in an unprecedented case that could
have sweeping ramifications for online privacy around the world. In December 2013, the U.S. government
obtained a search warrant requesting information about an email user for an investigation apparently
involving drugs and money laundering. But Microsoft is refusing to cooperate because the data in question
is stored in Ireland, and the company argues the U.S. can't force it to hand over data stored outside
American soil. The case is a perfect example of how new technologies like cloud computing clash with preInternet laws. These are the answers to the most basic questions about the case. What is the government
The government is looking for data associated with an

Outlook.com email account, including the content of all emails and the identifying
requesting?
information of the account, according to the search warrant sent to Microsoft. The actual email address is
redacted in court documents, and the details of the case are still unclear. What did Microsoft say to the
request? Microsoft responded providing some information related to the account, but declined to turn over
that data is stored in a Microsoft server in

Ireland. The company then asked the judge to throw out the request, arguing that the U.S. government
doesn't have the authority to request data overseas with a search warrant. But a judge in New
York ruled in April that Microsoft was compelled to turn over the data
regardless of where it's stored. Microsoft disagrees and is still challenging the data request.
the content of the user's emails because
What are Microsoft's arguments? In a court filing made public on Monday, Microsoft argued that a search
warrant doesn't apply overseas. Since it doesn't give authority to "break down the doors of Microsoft's
Dublin facility," it shouldn't give the government authority to access data within that facility, Microsoft
argued. Moreover, the company argued, the warrant is too broad and vague, as it requests all content in
the user's account. "It is, in a sense, the broadest possible warrant that one literally can imagine in the
21st century," Brad Smith, Microsoft's general counsel, said at a conference in New York last week. Lastly,
Microsoft says that the government should use another, legal way to access this kind of data: a so-called
mutual legal assistance treaty, or MLAT. Thanks to this legal agreement with Ireland as well as many
other countries U.S. authorities can access data in that country but, in turn, have to comply with local
laws. Law enforcement authorities routinely use this kind of assistance to obtain evidence held in another
country. Whart are the government's arguments? The U.S. government argues that companies can't refuse
to comply legal requests "simply by storing the data abroad," as Preet Bharara, United States attorney for
the Southern District of New York, said in a court filing. The danger, Bharara continued, is that criminals
could skirt investigations by lying about their locations and thus forcing Microsoft to store data outside the
U.S., and far from American law enforcement's reach. The judge in the case, James Francis, agreed with the
government, arguing that the
search warrant issued in this case applies to data

in Ireland because it's more of an hybrid between a warrant and a
subpoena. What this means: the request would be legal since
subpoenas have reach outside the U.S. But legal experts don't agree with this
interpretation. The relevant law in the case, the oft-maligned 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), clearly requires warrants when accessing content information, and subpoenas have different
requirements. "It's a bad interpretation
professor at New York University,told Mashable.
of the statute," Christopher Sprigman, a law
Non-US data is stored on US servers

Dean Wilson January 23, 2014 http://www.techradar.com/us/news/internet/microsoft-to-store-foreigndata-on-non-us-servers-amid-nsa-controversy-1218010 Irish journalist and author
Microsoft will begin allowing non-US customers to store their personal

data on servers located outside the US, following leaks of extensive
government snooping by the National Security Agency (NSA). The move will give
consumers and business customers the option to shift their information
to local data centres, such as those based in Ireland, which will take them
outside the NSA's jurisdiction. "People should have the ability to know whether their data are being
subjected to the laws and access of governments in some other country and should have the ability to
make an informed choice of where their data resides," Brad Smith, general counsel at Microsoft, told the
Financial Times. Surveillance shake-up Revelations over the past year about the NSA's widespread internet
and phone surveillance have strained relationships between the US and its allies. Some countries that were
the victims of spying, such as Brazil, are now bringing in new laws to prevent citizen data from being
stored outside their own country. Many rival companies are opposed to the idea of letting customers
choose where data is stored, which will likely be cost prohibitive, but Microsoft's decision will possibly
cause some to change their minds.
The move was welcomed by privacy advocates.
Ex Post CP
1nc
Text: The United States federal government should require ex post
review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of NSA
surveillance targeting criteria, establish a public advocate at the
FISC, and establish a cabinet-level privacy agency.
The CP restore domestic and international confidence in US
surveillance without restricting the scope of NSA activities instead
it conducts post-surveillance minimization
Margulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137, April, lexis)
While I have concluded that U.S. surveillance policy does not violate the ICCPR, further reforms
could highlight this point and silence persistent doubts here and abroad. These
reforms could also remove any barriers to cooperation
between the United States and foreign states, such as those in Europe, which are
subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. This section identifies reforms
that would add a public advocate to FISC proceedings, enhance
FISC review of the criteria used for overseas surveillance,
establish a U.S. privacy agency that would handle complaints
from individuals here and overseas, and require greater
minimization of non-U.S. person communications. These
reforms would signal U.S. support of evolving global norms of
digital privacy.
Although President Obama's speech in January 2014 proposed a panel of independent lawyers who could
A
public advocate would scrutinize and, when necessary, challenge the
NSA's targeting criteria on a regular basis. n162 Challenges
would be brought in the FISC, after the NSA's implementation
of criteria. The NSA would be able to adapt the criteria on an
exigent basis, subject to ex post review by the FISC at the public advocate's
behest. A public advocate and enhanced FISC review would serve
three valuable functions: (1) ensure that the FISC received the
best arguments on both sides; (2) serve as a valuable ex ante
check on the government, encouraging the government to
adopt those criteria that could withstand subsequent scrutiny;
and (3) promote domestic and global confidence in the
participate in important FISC cases, n161 further institutionalization of this role would be useful.
legitimacy of processes governing NSA surveillance .A U.S.

cabinet level privacy agency would also bolster the legitimacy
of surveillance . The agency could provide more regular recourse to subjects of surveillance, as
the ECHR requires. That change would ease the barriers to continued
U.S.-Europe cooperation on counterterrorism. A national
agency would also work hand in hand with privacy officers in
executive departments. It would increase the leverage of those
officials, who could advocate vigorously in internal debates,
knowing that their views would also have a champion in a free-standing executive department
independent [*2166] of the national security bureaucracy. There are downsides to this proposal, of
course. A new agency would add expense, and create some redundancy in government functions.
Moreover, current models that provide recourse, such as the approach currently taken by the Department
preserving
cooperation with Europe and enhancing the overall legitimacy
of U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification.
Each of these instrumentalities - a public advocate at the FISC and a new
privacy agency - could also work to strengthen minimization
requirements for foreign communications. The NSA says that it disposes of all
of Homeland Security, n163 have been criticized as unduly burdensome. n164 However,
irrelevant communications within five years. There may be ways to shorten this time and require even
more rigorous controls on sharing of information that lacks a clear link to terrorism or other foreign
More exacting minimization would also promote

U.S.-European information sharing and enhance global
intelligence matters.
legitimacy .
Net benefit is terrorism the plan restricts the collection of 702
surveillance data to individualized and specific threat categories.
That prevents the programmatic surveillance necessary for pattern
analysis that can identify future terrorist threats
Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law
and Policy for the Information Society, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the
NSA Controversy 10 ISJLP 523, Summer, lexis)
Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple

yet fundamental ways from the traditional forms of monitoring
with which many people are familiar--i.e., individualized or
particularized surveillance. Individualized surveillance takes place when authorities have
some reason to think that a specific, known person is breaking the law. Investigators will then obtain a
court order authorizing them to collect information about the target, with the goal of assembling evidence
that can be used to establish guilt in subsequent criminal proceedings. Individualized surveillance is
common in the world of law enforcement, as under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968. n23 It is also used in national security investigations. FISA allows authorities to obtain a court
order to engage in wiretapping if they demonstrate, among other things, probable cause to believe that
the target is "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." n24
By contrast,
programmatic surveillance has very different objectives and is conducted

in a very different manner. It usually involves the government collecting bulk
data and then examining it to identify previously unknown
terrorists, spies, and other national security threats. A good
example of the practice is link analysis, in [*528] which
authorities compile large amounts of information, use it to
map the social networks of known terrorists--has anyone else used the
same credit card as Mohamed Atta?--and thus identify associates with whom
they may be conspiring. n25 (It is also possible, at least in theory, to subject these large
databases to pattern analysis, in which automated systems search for patterns of behavior that are
thought to be indicative of terrorist activity, but it's not clear that the NSA is doing so here.)
Suspects who have been so identified can then be subjected to

further forms of monitoring to determine their intentions and capabilities, such as
wiretaps under FISA or other authorities. In a sense, programmatic surveillance is the mirror image of
individualized surveillance. With individualized monitoring, authorities begin by identifying a suspect and
go on to collect information; with programmatic monitoring, authorities begin by collecting information and
go on to identify a suspect.
Programmatic surveillance is a
potentially
powerful
counterterrorism tool . The Ra'ed al-Banna incident is a useful

illustration of how the technique, when coupled with old-fashioned police work,
can identify possible threats who otherwise might escape
detection. Another example comes from a 2002 Markle
Foundation study, which found that authorities could have
identified the ties among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers if they
had assembled a large database of airline reservation
information and subjected it to link analysis. n26 In particular, two of the
terrorists--Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdhar--were on a government watchlist after attending a January
2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. So they could have been flagged when they bought their tickets.
Querying the database to see if any other passengers had used the pair's mailing addresses would have
led investigators to three more hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, the plot's operational leader. Six others
could have been found by searching for passengers who used the same frequent-flyer and telephone
numbers as these suspects. And so on. Again, the Markle study concerns airline reservation data, not the
communications data that are the NSA's focus. But it is still a useful illustration of the technique's
potential.
The government claims that programmatic surveillance has been responsible for concrete and actual
Officials report that PRISM has

helped detect and [*529] disrupt about 50 terrorist plots
worldwide, including ten in the United States. n27 Those numbers
include Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb New York
City's subway system in 2009, and Khalid Ouazzani, who
plotted to blow up the New York Stock Exchange. n28 Authorities further
report that PRISM played an important role in tracking down David
Headley, an American who aided the 2008 terrorist atrocities in
Bombay, and later planned to attack the offices of a Danish
newspaper that printed cartoons of Mohamed. n29 The government also
counterterrorism benefits, not just hypothetical ones.
claims at least one success from the telephony metadata program, though it has been coy about the
specifics: "The NSA, using the business record FISA, tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect
contacts with a known terrorist overseas. . . . We were able to reopen this investigation, identify additional
individuals through a legal process and were able to disrupt this terrorist activity." n30 Quite apart from
foiling attacks, the government also argues that the
NSA programs can conserve
scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly spot

or rule out any foreign involvement in a domestic plot, as after the
2013 Boston Marathon bombing. n31 These claims have to be taken with a few grains of salt. Some
observers believe that the government could have discovered the plots using standard investigative
techniques, and without resorting to extraordinary methods like programmatic surveillance. n32 The
metadata program has elicited special skepticism: The President's Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies bluntly concluded that "the information contributed to terrorist
investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and
could readily have been obtained [*530] in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders." n33
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reached the same conclusion. n34 (Judicial opinion is split
on the program's value. One judge has expressed "serious doubts" about its utility, n35 while another has
concluded that its effectiveness "cannot be seriously disputed.") n36 Furthermore, we should always be
cautious when evaluating the merits of classified intelligence initiatives on the basis of selective and
piecemeal revelations, as officials might tailor the information they release in a bid to shape public opinion.
even if specific claimed successes remain contested,

programmatic surveillance in general can still be a useful
counterterrorism technique. As these examples imply, effective
programmatic surveillance often requires huge troves of
information--e.g., large databases of airline reservations, compilations of metadata concerning
telephonic and internet communications, and so on. This is why it typically will not
n37 But
be feasible to limit bulk collection to particular, known

individuals who are already suspected of being terrorists or
spies. Some officials have defended the NSA programs by pointing out that, "[i]f you're looking for the
needle in a haystack, you have to have the haystack." n38 That metaphor doesn't strike me as terribly
helpful; rummaging around in a pile of hay is, after all, a paradigmatic image of futility. But, the idea can
Programmatic surveillance cannot be

done in a particularized manner. The whole point of the
technique is to identify unknown threats to the national
security; by definition, it cannot be restricted to threats that
have already been identified. We can't limit programmatic [*531]
surveillance to the next Mohamed Atta when we have no idea
who the next Mohamed Atta is--and when the goal of the exercise is indeed to identify
be expressed in a more compelling way.
the next Mohamed Atta.
Solvency Legitmacy
Incorporating oversight in the surveillance process boosts U.S. cred
and legitimacy and also gives a voice to U.S. citizens
Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan Alexander,
Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy, 8/12/14,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 16-17 , accessed: 6/23/15, JR)
In addition to oversight by outsiders, a programmatic surveillance

regime also should feature a system of internal checks within the
executive branch, to review collection before it occurs, after the fact, or
both. As for the ex ante checks, internal watchdogs should be charged
with scrutinizing proposed bulk collection to verify that it complies with
the applicable constitutional and statutory rules, and also to ensure
that appropriate protections are in place for privacy and civil liberties.
The Justice Departments Office of Intelligence is a well known example. The unit, which presents the
governments surveillance applications to the FISA court, subjects these requests to exacting scrutiny with
the goal of increasing the likelihood of surviving judicial review.65 Indeed, the office has a strong incentive
to ensure that the applications it presents are airtight, so as to preserve its credibility with the FISA
Ex post checks include such commonplace mechanisms as

agency-level inspectors general, who can audit bulk collection
programs, assess their legality, and make policy recommendations to
improve their operation, as well as entities like the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, which perform similar functions across the
executive branch as a whole. Another important ex post check is to
offer meaningful whistleblower protections to officials who know about
programs that violate constitutional or statutory requirements.
Allowing officials to bring their concerns to ombudsmen within the
executive branch (and then eventually to Congress) can help root out
lawlessness and also relieve the felt necessity of leaking information
about highly classified programs to the media.
court.66
Cabinet-level privacy agency key to gut unnecessary data collection

http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 17, accessed: 6/23/15, JR)
These and other internal checks can achieve all three of the benefits promised by traditional judicial and
executive branch watchdogs can veto surveillance they

conclude would be unlawful, the mere possibility of such vetoes can
chill overreach, and increasing the costs of monitoring can redirect
scarce resources toward truly important surveillance. External and internal
legislative oversight
checks thus operate together as a system; the two types of restraints are rough substitutes for one
another. If outside players like Congress and the courts are subjecting the executives programmatic
surveillance activities to especially rigorous scrutiny, the need for comparably robust safeguards within
if the executives discretion is

constrained internally through strict approval processes, audit
requirements, and so on, the legislature and judiciary may choose not
to hold the executive to the exacting standards they otherwise would.
In short, certain situations may have less need to use traditional
interbranch separation of powers and checks and balances to protect
privacy and civil liberties because the executive branch is subject to an
the executive branch tends to diminish. Conversely,
internal separation of powers67 that can accomplish much the same

thing.
The CP solves miscalculation- it allows for a broader scope of expert
data analysis
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 9 , accessed: 6/23/15, JR)
Programmatic surveillance thus can help remedy some of the difficulties

that arise when monitoring covert adversaries like international terrorists. FISA
and other particularized surveillance tools are useful when authorities
want to monitor targets whose identities are already known. But they are
less useful when authorities are trying to identify unknown targets. The
problem arises because, in order to obtain a wiretap order from the
FISA court, the government usually must demonstrate probable cause
to believe that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power.39 This is a fairly straightforward task when the targets identity is already knowne.g., a
diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. But the task is considerably more difficult when the
governments reason for surveillance is to detect targets who are presently unknowne.g., alQaeda
How can you convince the FISA court that

Smith is an agent of a foreign power when you know nothing about
Smithhis name, nationality, date of birth, location, or even whether
he is a single person or several dozen? The government typically wont
know those things unless it has collected some information about
Smithsuch as by surveilling him. And theres the rub. Programmatic monitoring
helps avoid the crippling Catch-22 that can arise under particularized surveillance
members who operate in the shadows.
regimes like FISA: officials cant surveil unless they show that the target is a spy or terrorist, but
sometimes they cant show that an unknown target is a spy or terrorist

unless they have surveilled him.
A public advocate solves the perception link and spurs global
compliancePresident Obamas willingness to be transparent on
surveillance is key
Margulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (Peter, The NSA in Global
Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism II. THE LEGAL MERITS OF
NSA SURVEILLANCE ABROAD UNDER THE ICCPR, pgs. 16-17, 1/23/14,
http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_82/Margulies_April.pdf, accessed: 6/23/15, JR)
Having determined that the ICCPR applies as a threshold matter, we next
ask whether NSA
surveillance abroad is arbitrary or unlawful under Article 17. I assume in what

follows that most surveillance conducted on non-U.S. persons outside the
United States is lawful under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and U.S. statutes. Therefore, this section focuses on whether NSA surveillance is
arbitrary. I conclude that NSA surveillance is not arbitrary under Article 17,
because it targets terrorists, national security threats, and espionage in
a tailored fashion. In reaching this conclusion, I rely on the principle of complementarity, which
seeks to harmonize a body of international law with other international law doctrine and with the
To integrate all of the relevant international law

doctrines, I read Article 17 in tandem with the law of armed conflict and U.N. Security Council
prerogatives of states.
resolutions on counterterrorism. To reconcile Article 17 with these norms and with sovereign prerogatives, I
advance a model of procedural pluralism that gives states flexibility in
creating protections if they honor core principles such as notice,

oversight, and minimization but does not mandate the same itemized menu of safeguards
required in European Union (ECHR) jurisprudence. In fact, as I note, ECHR jurisprudence permits exceptions
to procedural safeguards, including exceptions designed to preserve the effectiveness of national security
certain reforms
of NSA surveillance, such as a public advocate, would further
strengthen compliance, affirming that NSA programs are consistent
with the ICCPR. President Obamas initiatives, including a clearer
articulation of the bases for U.S. surveillance abroad, buttress this
case.
surveillance, that are not radically different from U.S. practice. I note, however, that
CP allows for domestic and foreign legitimacy - reforms and

minimization of surveillance in CP solve
Margulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137,
http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_82/Margulies_April.pdf)//MR
U.S. surveillance policy does not violate the ICCPR, further

reforms could highlight this point and silence persistent doubts here and
abroad. These reforms could also remove any barriers to cooperation between the United States and
While I have concluded that
foreign states, such as those in Europe, which are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights.
reforms that would add a public advocate to FISC

proceedings, enhance FISC review of the criteria used for
overseas surveillance, establish a U.S. privacy agency that
would handle complaints from individuals here and overseas,
and require greater minimization of non-U.S. person
communications. These reforms would signal U.S. support of
evolving global norms of digital privacy. Although President Obamas speech in
This section identifies
January 2014 proposed a panel of independent lawyers who could participate in important FISC cases,161
A public advocate would

scrutinize and, when necessary, challenge the NSAs targeting
criteria on a regular basis.162 Challenges would be brought in
the FISC, after the NSAs implementation of criteria. The NSA would be
able to adapt the criteria on an exigent basis, subject to ex post review
by the FISC at the public advocates behest. A public advocate
further institutionalization of this role would be useful.
and enhanced FISC review would serve three valuable

functions : (1) ensure that the FISC received the best
arguments on both sides; (2) serve as a valuable ex ante check
on the government, encouraging the government to adopt
those criteria that could withstand subsequent scrutiny; and (3) promote
domestic and global confidence in the legitimacy of processes
governing NSA surveillance. A U.S. cabinet level privacy agency
would also bolster the legitimacy of surveillance. The agency
could provide more regular recourse to subjects of
surveillance, as the ECHR requires. That change would ease the barriers
to continued U.S.-Europe cooperation on counterterrorism.
national agency would also work hand in hand with privacy officers in executive departments. It would
increase the leverage of those officials, who could advocate vigorously in internal debates, knowing that
their views would also have a champion in a free-standing executive department independent of the
national security bureaucracy. There are downsides to this proposal, of course. A new agency would add
expense, and create some redundancy in government functions. Moreover, current models that provide
recourse, such as the approach currently taken by the Department of Homeland Security,163 have been
criticized as unduly burdensome.164 However, preserving cooperation with Europe and enhancing the
Each of these
instrumentalitiesa public advocate at the FISC and a new privacy agencycould also
work to strengthen minimization requirements for foreign
communications. The NSA says that it disposes of all irrelevant
communications within five years. There may be ways to
shorten this time and require even more rigorous controls on
sharing of information that lacks a clear link to terrorism or other foreign intelligence matters. More
exacting minimization would also promote U.S.-European
overall legitimacy of U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification.
information sharing and enhance global legitimacy.
Net Benefit - Links

Programmatic techniques avoids restrictions that stagnate
surveillance of terrorism
NSA Controversy, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/
08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR
Programmatic surveillance thus can help remedy some of the

difficulties that arise when monitoring covert adversaries like
international terrorists. FISA and other particularized surveillance tools are useful when
authorities want to monitor targets whose identities are already known. But they are less useful when
problem arises because, in order

to obtain a wiretap order from the FISA court, the government usually
must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.39 This is a fairly
authorities are trying to identify unknown targets. The
straightforward task when the targets identity is already knowne.g., a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in
But the task is considerably more difficult when the

governments reason for surveillance is to detect targets who
are presently unknowne.g., al- Qaeda members who operate in the shadows. How can
Washington, DC.
you convince the FISA court that Smith is an agent of a foreign power when you know nothing about Smith
his name, nationality, date of birth, location, or even whether he is a single person or several dozen? The
government typically wont know those things unless it has collected some information about Smithsuch
Programmatic monitoring helps avoid

the crippling Catch-22 that can arise under particularized
surveillance regimes like FISA: officials cant surveil unless they
show that the target is a spy or terrorist, but sometimes they
cant show that an unknown target is a spy or terrorist unless
they have surveilled him.
as by surveilling him. And theres the rub.
Net benefit - Impacts True

Using programmatic surveillance is successful it undermined 50
terrorist plots
NSA Controversy, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR
Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple yet fundamental ways from the traditional
forms of monitoring with which many people are familiari.e., individualized or particularized surveillance.
Individualized surveillance takes place when authorities have some reason to think that a specific, known
person is breaking the law. Investigators will then obtain a court order authorizing them to collect
information about the target, with the goal of assembling evidence that can be used to establish guilt in
subsequent criminal proceedings. Individualized surveillance is common in the world of law enforcement,
as under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.23 It is also used in national
security investigations. FISA allows authorities to obtain a court order to engage in wiretapping if they
demonstrate, among other things, probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.24 By contrast, programmatic surveillance has very different objectives and is
conducted in a very different manner. It usually involves the government collecting bulk data and then
examining it to identify previously unknown terrorists, spies, and other national security threats. A good
example of the practice is link analysis, in which authorities compile large amounts of information, use it to
map the social networks of known terroristshas anyone else used the same credit card as Mohamed
Atta?and thus identify associates with whom they may be conspiring.25 (It is also possible, at least in
theory, to subject these large databases to pattern analysis, in which automated systems search for
patterns of behavior that are thought to be indicative of terrorist activity, but its not clear that the NSA is
doing so here.) Suspects who have been so identified can then be subjected to further forms of monitoring
to determine their intentions and capabilities, such as wiretaps under FISA or other authorities. In a sense,
programmatic surveillance is the mirror image of individualized surveillance. With individualized
monitoring, authorities begin by identifying a suspect and go on to collect information; with programmatic
monitoring, authorities begin by collecting information and go on to identify a suspect. Programmatic
surveillance is a potentially powerful counterterrorism tool. The Raed al-Banna incident is a useful
illustration of how the technique, when coupled with old-fashioned police work, can identify possible
threats who otherwise might escape detection. Another example comes from a 2002 Markle Foundation
study, which found that authorities could have identified the ties among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers if they
had assembled a large database of airline reservation information and subjected it to link analysis.26 In
particular, two of the terroristsNawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdharwere on a government watchlist
after attending a January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. So they could have been flagged when they
bought their tickets. Querying the database to see if any other passengers had used the pairs mailing
addresses would have led investigators to three more hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, the plots
operational leader. Six others could have been found by searching for passengers who used the same
frequent-flyer and telephone numbers as these suspects. And so on. Again, the Markle study concerns
airline reservation data, not the communications data that are the NSAs focus. But it is still a useful
illustration of the techniques potential. The government claims that programmatic surveillance has been
responsible for concrete and actual counterterrorism benefits, not just hypothetical ones. Officials report
that PRISM has helped detect and disrupt about 50 terrorist plots worldwide, including ten in the United
States.27 Those numbers include Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb New York Citys subway system
in 2009, and Khalid Ouazzani, who plotted to blow up the New York Stock Exchange.28 Authorities further
report that PRISM played an important role in tracking down David Headley, an American who aided the
2008 terrorist atrocities in Bombay, and later planned to attack the offices of a Danish newspaper that
printed cartoons of Mohamed.29 The government also claims at least one success from the telephony
metadata program, though it has been coy about the specifics: The NSA, using the business record FISA,
tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect contacts with a known terrorist overseas. . . . We were
able to reopen this investigation, identify additional individuals through a legal process and were able to
disrupt this terrorist activity.30 Quite apart from foiling attacks, the government also argues that the NSA
programs can conserve scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly spot or rule out any
foreign involvement in a domestic plot, as after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.31 These claims have
to be taken with a few grains of salt. Some observers believe that the government could have discovered
the plots using standard investigative techniques, and without resorting to extraordinary methods like
programmatic surveillance.32 The metadata program has elicited special skepticism: The Presidents
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies bluntly concluded that the information
contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to
preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section
215 orders.33 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reached the same conclusion.34 (Judicial
opinion is split on the programs value. One judge has expressed serious doubts about its utility,35 while
another has concluded that its effectiveness cannot be seriously disputed.)36 Furthermore, we should
always be cautious when evaluating the merits of classified intelligence initiatives on the basis of selective
and piecemeal revelations, as officials might tailor the information they release in a bid to shape public
opinion.37 But even if specific claimed successes remain contested, programmatic surveillance in general
can still be a useful counterterrorism technique.
Minimization regulations ensure the NSA data collection and transfer

is only collected with the instances outlined in 702
NSA Controversy, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR
While the NSA programs feature several important safeguards to help protect privacy and civil liberties,
there is room for improvement. Policymakers should consider altering the minimization rules to better
prevent mission creep, adding an adversarial element to certain aspects of the FISA courts proceedings,
and enacting new legislation to place the telephony metadata program on a more stable statutory footing.
First, the minimization rules that govern the section 702 program allow intelligence officials to share
information with federal law enforcement if it contains evidence [of] a crime.96 The government ecently
has clarified that nonpublicly available signals intelligence that the United States collects in bulk may
only be used to counter certain enumerated national security threats, as well as [t]ransnational criminal
threats.97 Even with that restriction, however, the rules seem too permissive. On their face, the
minimization rules permit the fruits of PRISM surveillance to be used in investigations of even minor
federal offenses, such as mail fraud and theft, so long as they have some [t]ransnational aspect. The
problem is that the relative costs and benefits of surveillance depend on the magnitude of the offense
under investigation. Just because were willing to countenance the use of extraordinary methods to
prevent terrorism, it doesnt mean the same techniques should be used to combat tax delinquency.
Policymakers should tighten the list of crimes for which sharing is allowed. Of course, intelligence officials
certainly should be able to tell their law enforcement counterparts when they come across evidence of
terrorism, espionage, and other national security threatsthe need for cops and spies to share more
counterterrorism information is one of the enduring lessons of 9/11.98 And other serious crimes like those
involving risk of death or serious bodily injury, or child exploitation, should be on the list as well. At the
same time, we should not overestimate the NSAs enthusiasm for sharing the intelligence it gathers.
Regardless of what the minimization rules permit, the NSA will have strong incentives to resist sharing
information with or otherwise helping its bureaucratic rivals.99 Indeed, the New York Times recently
reported widespread frustration among law enforcement officials over the NSAs reluctance to assist their
investigations of routine offenses like money laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement;
their requests are usually denied because the links to terrorism or foreign intelligence are considered too
tenuous.100 (Note that the story addresses NSA resources in general, not telephony metadata and
PRISM data in particular.) In short, institutional self-interest and legal restrictions on sharing can be rough
substitutes. And while self- interest will often lead the NSA to refuse access to sensitive intelligence in
garden-variety criminal cases, these naturally occurring bureaucratic incentives should be supplemented
with strong minimization rules that prevent inappropriate mission creep.
A2: Perm do both

Perm links to the net benefit -- stopping bulk collection of data abolishes pattern analysis,
making it impossible for the U.S. to detect terrorists thats Sales in the 1nc
A2: Perm do CP
Perm is severance severance illegit makes the aff a moving target
destroying CP and DA ground
a) Public advocate requirement is outside PPD authority
Lawfare 2014 (Benjamin Wittes; chief of Lawfare, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings
Institution, member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law, The President's
Speech and PPD-28: A Guide for the Perplexed, 1/20/2014, http://www.lawfareblog.com/presidentsspeech-and-ppd-28-guide-perplexed)//MR
Obama's speech announces reforms and changes beyond those outlined in

the PPD. The president announces more routine declassification review of FISC opinions---which is both
good and unsurprisingly. He also announces, in a carefully-worded part of the speech, that he is
"calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel
of advocates from outside government to provide an independent voice in
significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." The wording here is
important. Obama stops short of endorsing the Public
Advocate idea , which has constitutional difficulties and to whose strong form the Judicial
Conference has objected. By describing these lawyers as "outside government," he seems to be leaning
more towards an amicus model of adding adversarial process to FISC proceedings. But he leaves this point
a bit vague, intentionally I think. And basically kicks the matter to Congress.
b) CP doesnt include 702 authority to limit domestic surveillance

c) CP doesnt apply PPD use restrictions
Here is a list of the use restrictions for reference:
White House 14 (Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence
Activities, 1/17/14, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directivesignals-intelligence-activities)
The limitations contained in this section do not apply to signals intelligence data that is temporarily
acquired to facilitate targeted collection. References to signals intelligence collected in "bulk" mean the
authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data which, due to technical or operational
considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.).
only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed
by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to
the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the
development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats;
(5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal
threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section.
In no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk be used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening
criticism or dissent; disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or
religion; affording a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially; or
achieving any purpose other than those identified in this section.
Case Debate
Solvency
General
No solvency - Cant get data from overseas servers major
companies have information on servers abroad
No solvency- 702 still allows for overreach- vague implementation
LoConte 10. (FISA Amendments Act 2008: Protecting Americans by Monitoring International
Communications - Is It Reasonable; LoConte, Jessica. 2010 Pace Int'l L. Rev. Online Companion 6 (2010) Vol
I:6. Pg 6. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/piliewco2010&id=7&size=2&collection=journals&terms=702&
termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=)//LP
The procedures used are consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.20
in order
to obtain a warrant from the FISA court, it is not necessary for the
Attorney General or the DNI to specify who the target of surveillance
will be. In fact, the statute specifically states that any "certification
made under this subsection [section 702] is not required to identify the
specific facilities, places, premises or property at which an
acquisition ... will be directed or conducted.'22 Nor does the statute state that the
If the FISC finds that the above requirements are met, then it will issue a warrant.21 Note that
government must have a reasonable belief that the targets of surveillance have a connection to criminal or
Although section 702 requires the government to adopt

minimization procedures, the FISC is not provided with any details
regarding the specific minimization procedures to be implemented,
which limits the court's review of the ways in which intelligence
agencies will use the intercepted intelligence data in the future.
Another provision that causes concern is section 702(g)(1)(B) of the
FAA, which provides a temporary exception to the warrant
requirement: surveillance may begin under the authority of the
Attorney General and DNI without court authorization if "time does not
permit the submission of a certification."
terrorist activities.
Circumvention
No solvency multiple reasons -a) TFA language in 702 allows NSA to bypass restrictions against
Donohue 15 --From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., Section 702 and the Collection of
TFA and the assumptions that

mark the foreignness determination, undermine the protections
created for U.S. persons in Sections 703 and 704 of the statute. They make it
possible for the NSA to obtain significant amounts of American
citizens communications. Until the FAA, the surveillance of U.S. persons outside domestic
bounds took place under the weaker standards of Executive Order 12,333. Part of the purpose
of the FAA was thus to increase the protections afforded to U.S.
persons travelling abroad. 214 The way in which Section 702 is being
used, however, allows the NSA to bypass Section 703 by making
assumptions about legal status and location and potentially
subjecting U.S. persons to surveillance without meeting the
requirements of Section 703. The amount of information at stake is
not insubstantial. For years, the volume of intercepts under Section 702 has been one of the
The component statutory interpretations, particularly
principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently expressed unease
it is impossible to quantify how many

Americans communications have been implicated in the operation of
Section 702.215 What has gradually become clear is that the program significantly
more expansive than initially understood.21
about the intelligence communitys claim that
b) Foreign Program goal requirement -- NSA can collect data about

any U.S. citizen as long as the program has a foreign goal
Donohue 2015. From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., Section 702 and the Collection of
Speier, a California Democrat, continued: The
bottom line is, this FISA bill

permits the collection of Americans emails and phone calls if
they are communicating with someone outside of the U.S.235
Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ), a member of HPSCI, opposed the bill on similar grounds: It permits
massive warrantless surveillance in the absence of any standard for defining how communications of
innocent Americans will be protected; a fishing expedition approach to intelligence collection that we know
will not make Americans more safe.236 Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) opposed the legislation for
the same reason: Theres
no requirement for the government to seek

a warrant for any intercepted communication that includes a
U.S. citizen, as long as the program in general is directed
towards foreign targets.237 Kucinich added
c) Server location foreign routing or servers allow NSA surveillance
What is clear is that the inclusion of about communications significantly expands the volume of Internet
intercepts under Section 702. By 2011, NSA was acquiring approximately 26.5 million Internet transactions
per year as part of its upstream collection.179 Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the
First, to obtain about

communications, because of how the Internet is constructed,
the NSA must monitor large amounts of data.180 That is, if the NSA may
resulting surveillance deserve notice.
collect not just e-mail to or from the targets e-mail account (badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other
communications happening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collection point, then the
NSA is monitoring a significant amount of traffic.181 And the agency is not just considering envelope
information (for example, messages in which the selector is sending, receiving, or copied on the
communication) but the actual content of messages. 182
Second, wholly domestic

conversations may become swept up in the surveillance simply
by nature of how the Internet is constructed. Everything one does online
involves packets of information. Every Web site, every e-mail, every transfer of documents takes the
information involved and divides it up into small bundles. Limited in size, these packets contain
information about the senders IP address, the intended receivers IP address, something that indicates
how many packets the communication has been divvied up into, and what number in the chain is
represented by the packet in question.183 not, include the other packets of information contained in the
message. If a roadblock or problem arises in the network, the packets can then be re-routed, to reach their
final destination. Domestic messages may thus be routed through international servers, if that is the most
efficient route to the final destination. What this means is that even if the NSA applies an IP filter to
eliminate communications that appear to be within the United States, it may nevertheless monitor
In this manner,
a student in Chicago may send an e-mail to a student in Boston
that gets routed through a server in Canada. Through no intent
or design of the individual in Chicago, the message becomes
international and thus subject to NSA surveillance. Third, further
domestic conversations by nature of them being routed through foreign servers.
collection of domestic conversations takes place through the NSAs intercept of what are called
multicommunication transactions, or MCTs. It is important to distinguish here between a transaction and a
communication. Some transactions have only single communications associated with them. These are
referred to as SCTs. Other transactions contain multiple communications. If even one of the
communications in an MCT falls within the NSAs surveillance, all of the communications bundled into the
MCT are collected. The consequence is of significant import. FISC estimated in 2011 that somewhere
between 300,000 and 400,000 MCTs were being collected

annually on the basis of about communicationwhere the active
user was not the target. So hundreds of thousands of communications
were being collected that did not include the target as either
the sender or the recipient of the communication.184
d) Lack of specific targeting requirements allows NSA broad
parameters in determining domestic surveillance allows for general
data gathering
The FAA is largely silent about what burden must be borne by

the government to establish whether the target is a U.S.
person. Instead, Section 702 directs the Attorney General to adopt
targeting procedures
reasonably designed (a) to ensure acquisition is limited to persons
reasonably believed to be outside U.S.; and (b) to prevent the acquisition of domestic communications.186
In other words, the statute only requires that the NSA not know (a) that the target is in the U.S.; or (b) that
There is nothing in the

targeting requirements requiring intelligence agencies to take
certain steps to ascertain whether the target is a U.S. person or
it is intercepting entirely domestic communications.
what must be done to ascertain the targets location. Sections 703 and 704, which are designed to deal
with U.S. persons, say nothing in turn about what is required to demonstrate whether a target either is or
is not a U.S. person.187 Instead, these provisions address situations where the applicant has probable
databases or other surveillance systems that could be consulted to determine whether the target is a U.S.
the document uses the word maythe

present tense articulation of a mere possibility. As an auxiliary verb, it adds
person or a non-U.S. person,
a functional meaning to the resultant clausespecifically, in the case of may, to intone possibility in a
The NSA thus may consult

its databases to determine whether a target is a U.S. person. It
also may decide not to. At no point does the document itself
suggest what the NSA must do.192
manner that equally incorporates the possibility of may not.
Ext. Circumvention - TFA

The NSA is exploiting the to, about, for policythey have used this
to collect domestic data.
The most concerning aspect of the NSAs targeting practices

under the FAA is the inclusion of TFA. Together with generous assumptions with
regard to foreignness and the vague requirements embedded in the foreign intelligence determination,
TFA has allowed the NSA to collect data beyond what might
otherwise be considered incidental. Congress may not have
anticipated this possibility in 2008. But by 2012 the
information had been made available to any Members inclined
to read it. The legislature, however, did not take steps to end
programmatic collection. Nor did FISC play a strong role with regard to the legality of
knowingly collecting entirely domestic conversations. The courts decision encouraged willful blindness: as
long as the NSA did not develop sophisticated technologies, it could collect more information and fit within
the statutory bounds. Critique of these developments could be read as simply a complaint that the law
went the other way. After all, three branches of government appear to have given the NSA their blessing:
Congress through renewal of the FAA, the FISA Court of Review via its approval of certification, targeting,
and minimization procedures, and the AG and DNI in their oversight capacities. But the burden borne by
the government in the realm of national security is one that requires the public authorities to be consistent
It is concerning that what is being done in practice

looks very different than what the law says on its face.
with practice.
Their own author concedes that statute is not adequate
Eoyang and Bishai, 15
Eoyang is Director of Third Way's National Security Program,

Chief of Staff to Representative Anna Eshoo (D-CA), and Defense Policy Advisor to Senator Kennedy/Bishai
is National Security Fellow at Third Way and previously served as the press director at the Embassy of Iraq
and a news producer at Al Jazeera English (Mieke and Chrissy, Restoring Trust between U.S. Companies
and Their Government on Surveillance Issues, Third Way, 3/19/15,
http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoring-trust-between-us-companies-and-their-government-onsurveillance-issues)//CT
Of course, FAA Exclusivity wouldnt solve every problem . It would not
prevent foreign governments from collecting information themselves and then providing it to U.S.
FAA
provides inadequate civil liberties protections for Americans.
This proposal says nothing about the adequacy of that statute
in this respect. What it says is that for data held by an American company about a target that is
intelligence agencies, as U.S. law cannot bind a foreign government. And some may argue that
not a U.S. person, the checks within FAA are stronger than those solely under E.O. 12333.
A2: Multi-Stakeholder Model Good/Data

Localization Bad
US-centric model rejected now Russia and China want data
localization plan doesnt restrict surveillance of foreign intelligence
which is what their internal links assume is primary concern for
other great powers
Multistakeholder model will fail Western control
Marks 14 (JOSEPH MARKS Joseph Marks covers cybersecurity for POLITICO Pro. He previously covered
government technology issues for Nextgov, part of Atlantic Media, and covered local and state politics and
higher education for the Grand Forks (N.D.) Herald and the Albert Lea (Minn.) Tribune. He interned for
Congressional Quarterlys Homeland Security section and The Associated Presss Jerusalem Bureau. He
holds a bachelors degree in English from the University of Wisconsin in Madison and a masters degree in
international affairs from Georgetown University. 07/17/14
http://www.politico.com/morningcybersecurity/0714/morningcybersecurity14668.html)PA
Some developing
nations have a legitimate beef with the multi-stakeholder
model of Internet governance that the U.S. champions, the
State Departments ambassador to the Internet acknowledged
yesterday. The current slate of stakeholders just isnt diverse
enough, Daniel Sepulveda said. In theory, the multi-stakeholder model
means major decisions about how the Internet is organized are
made by technical specialists at ICANN and other consensusbased non-profits rather than by national governments or
multi-national organizations such as the United Nations. In practice,
however, those non-profits are inordinately filled with Western
government representatives, Western companies and Western
civil society members, Sepulveda said on the sidelines of yesterdays Internet Governance
THE WEST DOMINATES INTERNET GOVERNANCE, BUT THAT CAN CHANGE
Forum meeting at The George Washington University.
China already rejecting US-centric control of internet wants

internet sovereignty
Mozur and Jie 14(Jun 23, 2014 Paul Mozur writes about technology from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing
bureau and Yang Jie computer scientist whose research interests include multimodal human-computer
interaction (modeling and learning), computer vision, and pattern
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/06/23/chinas-lays-out-argument-for-internet-sovereigntyconvinced/ China Argues for Internet Sovereignty. Is It a Good Idea? accessed 06/28/15)PA
As the Internet becomes more and more crucial to the day-to-day

operations of government and multi-national companies, its no
surprise its geopolitical import is growing to rival that of other
industries like energy that dominate foreign policy. In a full-page spread on the
Monday, the Communist Partys mouthpiece newspaper laid out Chinas
position on how the Internet and its supporting infrastructure should be
dealt with across the globe. The page featured interviews with five Chinese
experts, including the so-called father of Chinas Great Firewall Fan
Binxing. The upshot: They believe each country should have ultimate power
to determine what Internet traffic flows in and out of its territory. Its a
concept China has termed Internet sovereignty, and though the opinions of each
expert in the article varied, the core message is that each nation should have the right to govern the
Internet as it sees fit. The addendum is
that the U.S. has too long exerted too much
control over the Internet, and the revelations of former National Security Agency contractor
Edward Snowden exposes U.S. hypocrisy in calling for a more open Internet while simultaneously
U.S. government recently

said it plans to give up control over the body that manages Internet
names and addresses, in a move designed to assuage concerns following Mr.
Snowdens leaks and also to encourage international cooperation over management of the Web.
monitoring foreign governments, companies and individuals. The
Still, a number of U.S. hardware and Internet companies continue to control huge swathes of the globes
Internet traffic. Internet
sovereignty is an idea that is in line with

the rules of international law, the Peoples Daily said. From a
practical point of view, each country should have the right to
implement its own Internet policies and regulations according
to its needs. Other countries have no right to interfere with
this. On the flip side, some have argued that a smaller role for the U.S. could result in the
Balkanization of the Internet making the Chinese Internet, for example, even more cut off from the rest of
the web than it already is. Outrage over U.S. cyberspying is set to continue, but the more salient question
at this point is whether the world would be better off with a

less U.S.-centric Internet, even if that means the risk of an
Internet in which more countries take steps to censor and
block content.
Internet sovereignty solves better than multi-stakeholder
Lewis 13 (James A. Lewis is the Director and Senior Fellow of the Technology and Public Policy Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. OCTOBER 2013
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no4.pdf Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions
accessed 06/28/15)PA
a
problem appears, the current multi-stakeholder approach fails to
address it, and governments seek other solutions using their
national authorities. There will be no rush to a global treaty, where
the UN suddenly takes control of the Internet. Instead, nations will
take steps to establish rules and penalties for behaviour on
the Internet that are consistent with their national laws; over
time this will aggregate into a new sovereign framework .
The extension of Westphalian sovereignty into cyberspace has been incremental and gradual:
Governments are unlikely to be involved in the day-to-day operations of the Internet, but they will put new
rules in place for its operation. The process will leave proponents of the current governance structure
confused and complaining as they are increasingly hemmed in by a range of national controls .
This
extension of sovereignty is not the balkanization of the
Internet a pejorative term coined by defenders of the status
quo. The definition of borders in cyberspace is no more a balkanization
than the existence of borders in the physical world; only those who still believe in
the one-world global commons could interpret this as such. There will still be a global
network where the primary motives Internet Governance: Inevitable
Transitions for design and architecture are commercial and the primary differences among nations will be
This extension is shaped by the larger

debate over sovereign authority versus universal human rights, but it
was naive to think that technology would trump politics and that
nations would meekly surrender control to some US construct
reflecting US values.
over the treatment of content and expression.
Data localization inevitable

Root cause- Countries have seized this opportunity to compete with American markets, not b/c
snowden.
Hill 14. International affairs consultant, Worked on National security Staff in the White House as
cybersecurity coordinator. (Jonah Force Hill, THE GROWTH OF DATA LOCALIZATION POST-SNOWDEN:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND BUSINESS LEADERS, 5-1-2014. Pg. 8-9,
The Hague Institute for Global Justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430275)//TS
Powerful business interests undoubtedly see data localization

as an effective and convenient strategy for gaining a
competitive advantage in domestic IT markets long dominated
by U.S. tech firms. To localization proponents of this stripe, the NSA programs
serve as a powerful and politically expedient excuse to pursue
policies protective of domestic businesses. As an illustration, data
localization in Germany presents clear economic benefits for a
most powerful industry advocate for localization, Deutsche Telekom (DT).
Whether by way of its email made in Germany system or the Schengen area routing arrangement, DT
looks poised to gain from efforts to reduce the prominence of American tech firms in Europe. It is no
wonder that the company has been spearheading many of the localization proposals in that country. As
telecommunications law expert Susan Crawford has noted, DT has been seeking to expand its cloud
computing services for years, but has found its efforts to appeal to German consumers stifled by
competition from Google and other American firms. 79 T-Systems International GmbH, DTs 29,000employee distribution arm for information-technology solutions, has been steadily losing money as a
result.80 Moreover, Crawford suggests that DT would not be content with gaining a greater share of the
German market; she points out that through a Schengen routing scheme, Deutsche Telekom undoubtedly
thinks that it will be able to collect fees from network operators in other countries that want their
Similarly, companies and

their allies in government in Brazil and India look to profit from
data localization proposals. Indeed, the governments of both
nations have for years sought to cultivate their own domestic
information technology sectors, at times by protecting homegrown industries with
customers data to reach Deutsche Telekoms customers.81
import tariffs and preferential taxation. Brazilian President Rousseff has on numerous occasions stated that
her government intends to make Brazil a regional technology and innovation leader; in recent years the
government has proposed measures to increase domestic Internet bandwidth production, expand
international Internet connectivity, encourage domestic content production, and promote the use of
domestically produced network equipment.82 India, more controversially, has at times required foreign
corporations to enter into joint ventures to sell ecommerce products, and has compelled foreign companies
Brazil
and India are, of course, not alone in this respect. Indonesian firms
are constructing domestic cloud service facilities with the help of
government grants, 84 while Korea is offering similar support to its own firms. 85 For the
governments and corporations of these nations, long
frustrated by their inability to develop a domestic IT industry
that can compete on an even playing field with the U.S.
technology giants, data localization is one means to confront,
and perhaps overcome, the American Internet hegemony.
to transfer proprietary technology to domestic firms after a predetermined amount of time.83
Data Localization is inevitable -- European companies benefit from it.

that there are actually a wide variety of

forces and interest groups driving the data localization
movement, and many of these forces and groups have objectives
beyond the professed goals of data protection and counterNSA surveillance. One can easily discern in foreign governments interest in data localization a
The problem for U.S. tech companies is
combination of anti-American populism, a desire for greater ease of foreign (and domestic) surveillance,
the Snowden backlash presents

an opportunity to cultivate domestic cloud and other tech
services industries, industries that have long been outcompeted by American tech companies
and a sense among policymakers and business that
in their home marketsold-fashioned protectionism tailored for the digital age. A quick look at four select
U.S.
technology firms as well as those organizations and individuals abroad who also recognize the
problems data localization laws would introduce are having such a difficult time
arguing their case, despite the logic working in their favor and
against the policies they are contesting.
localization studies25 reveals this complex mix of purposes, and helps to explain why
Data localization pushed to protect domestic businesses not

because NSA
Upon first glance, the preceding case studies present a consistent narrative:
for the nations now considering localization for data, the Snowden
revelations exposed an NSA that had overstepped the boundaries of
acceptable surveillance, violated citizen privacy, and catalyzed public and government
opinion in favor of forceful action in response. For policymakers, data
localization offers a seemingly simple and effective solution. Under
closer examination, however , a more complicated picture emerges. The

localization movement is in fact a complex and multilayered
phenomenon, with the objective not onlyor even primarilyof
protecting privacy. Depending on the country in which it is being advanced, localization
also serves to protect domestic businesses from foreign
competition, to support domestic intelligence and law enforcement
ambitions, to suppress dissent and to stir up populist enthusiasms
for narrow political ends. Direct evidence of these other
objectives for which privacy seems to be a pretext is by its
nature difficult to uncover: rarely to policy-makers admit to seeking protectionist goals,
to spying on their populations, to suppressing dissent or to exploiting populist emotions . Yet, by
viewing the localization movement in the context of other
state and corporate interests and activities, it is possible to
uncover these other, less exalted ends.
Countries already passed data localization laws Snowden
revelations only furthered pre-existing movements
Gross 15 (Grant Gross, Two years after Snowden leaks, US tech firms still feel the backlash, Channel
World, 6-10-15. http://www.channelworld.in/news/two-years-after-snowden-leaks,-us-tech-firms-still-feelthe-backlash#sthash.lhuYY7rA.dpuf)//TS
In addition to the upcoming Russian regulation, France and

Germany are creating their own dedicated national networks,
and other countries, including China, Australia and India, have
passed data localization laws, the ITIF report said. Asked during the conference about
ITIF's new estimates, Erich Andersen, deputy general counsel at Microsoft, questioned them. Even
before Snowden's leaks, many countries had begun to press
for new laws dealing with data security and privacy, and the
leaks "galvanized" the debate, he said. Panel moderator Robert Boorstin, senior
vice president at Albright Stonebridge Group, suggested that it's difficult for governments to pass laws that
keep up with the constantly changing technology industry. But Andrea Glorioso, counselor for the digital
economy for the European Union's delegation to the U.S., defended the EU's efforts to protect privacy and
pass other consumer-protection regulations. Some tech companies argue against regulation, saying they
want "frictionless innovation," he said. "When you're in a car, friction is a very good thing, because it's
what allows you to brake," Glorioso said. "A world without friction is a world in which you just go ahead,
and you cannot stop, even when you want to."
Credibility/Soft Power
General
FAA solves perception - Any evidence about U.S. legitimacy before
June 15 is irrelevant the U.S. already restoring its legitimacy
Legitimacy K
The Vietnam War proves that adopting the false mindset of
credibility leads to bad decision making, resulting in useless
conflicts with harmful consequences.
Fettweis 07. Assistant professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at
the U.S. Naval War College. ( Christopher J. Credibility and the War on Terror, winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell
Publishing Ltd.)//TS
The credibility imperative had become firmly embedded in the

psyche of the U.S. foreign policy establishment by the time
some of the crucial decisions regarding the war in Vietnam
needed to be made. Without the imperative, the war would not
have been fought. More than any other single factor, a fear of
the message that a communist victory would send to the
neighboring (and not-so-neighboring) states compelled the United States
to try to prop up the corrupt, unpopular, Roman Catholic South Vietnamese rulers.
In a 1965 memo released with the Pentagon Papers, Secretary of Defense John
McNaughton described the reasons that the United States was
in Vietnam as 70 percent to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to
our reputation as guarantor), 20 percent to prevent communism from overtaking South
Vietnam, and only 10 percent to help the people of South Vietnam. 23 The damage that a failure in
Vietnam could do to the reputation of the United States was potentially catastrophic. President Lyndon
Johnson warned his cabinet that if we run out on Southeast Asia, there will be trouble ahead in every part
of the globenot just in Asia, but in the Middle East and in Europe, in Africa and Latin America. I am
convinced that our retreat from this challenge will open the path to World War III. 24 Kissinger agreed,
warning that if South Vietnam were allowed to fall, it would represent a fundamental threat, over a period
Only when framed inside the

prism of the credibility imperative did victory in Vietnam
become a vital national interest. Skepticism grew steadily as the war dragged on,
and as the credibility imperative drove policymakers to believe
that withdrawal from what seemed to be an unwinnable war
would lead to national catastrophe. Intellectuals in the anti -war movement led the
of time, to the security of the United States. 25
way, expressing moral outrage that a war would be fought primarily for the messages it would send to our
Academic skepticism about the importance of

credibility grew alongside questions about the tangible interests at stake, especially
after it became clear that the costs in blood and treasure were
not proportional to any potential benefits that could conceivably be gained
enemies and allies. 26
from the survival of an anti-communist South Vietnam. To prominent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and
Kenneth Waltz, intervention in isolated, resource-poor Vietnam was irrational, moralistic, and mistaken.
Only if developments in Vietnam might indeed tilt the worlds balance in Americas disfavor, argued
Waltz, would the war be worthwhile.27They did not, of course, since from a purely material perspective,
Vietnam was next to irrelevant to U.S. national security. The cost of
a loss t o U .S. credibility, however, appeared incalculable. The war in Vietnam marked the beginning of the
current debate over the importance of credibility, and the point of divergence between scholars and
the United States not only

withdrew its forces from Southeast Asia but also cut back on its aid and watched North
practitioners. Despite dire warnings from many of its leaders,
Vietnamese troops overrun Saigon in 19 75.Since this cut-an d-run and subsequent loss of an ally were
presumably a
string of foreign policy setbacks should have followed. If
undoubtedly unmitigated disasters for the credibility of the United States,
international actions are truly interdependent, as policymakers believe, then the 1970s would probably
have seen evidence of allies beginning to question U.S. commitments, dominoes falling where the
reputation of the United States maintained the status quo, an d increased levels of Soviet activity in the
third world. The conventional wisdom suggests that the humiliating rooftop helicopter evacuation of the
However, no
such string of catastrophes took place. Perhaps most
obviously, there is no evidence that any allies of the United
States were significantly demoralized, or that any questioned the wisdom of
U.S. embassy in Saigon should have heralded a dark period for U.S. foreign policy.
their allegiance. If anything, many of Washingtons closest allies seemed relieved when the war ended,
since many of them had doubted its importance in the first place and had feared that it distracted the
United States from other, more pressingissues.28Certainly no state, not even any client states in the
The damage to U.S.

credibility also did not lead to the long-predicted spread of
communism throughout the region, as even Kissinger today grudgingly
acknowledges. On the contrary, in the ten years that followed the fall
of Saigon, the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia
enjoyed a period of unprecedented prosperity.30The only dominoes that
third world, changed its geopolitical orientation as a result of Vietnam.
fell were two countries that were even less relevant than Vietnam to the global balance of power
Cambodia and Laos, both of which were hardly major losses for the West, especially given the tragedies
that followed. Nationalism proved to be a bulwark against the spread of communism that could not be
overcome by any loss of confidence in U.S. commitments.
US Credibility doesnt affect other countries reactions - Cold War and

Vietnam prove
the U.S. Naval War College. (Christopher J. Credibility and the War on Terror, winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell
Cold War history

contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the
superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence
others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the
There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons.
fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed
from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence
theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and,
reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of

individual actions.39While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about
therefore, that
their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise.
Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational,

dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form
lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent
events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely
put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40Mercers larger conclusions were that
states cannot control their reputations or level of credibility , and

that target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own
perceptions. Sending messages for their consideration in future crises, therefore, is all but futile.
These arguments echoed some of the broader critiques of the credibility imperative that had emerged in
response to the war in Vietnam, both by realists like Morgenthau and Waltz and by so-called area
specialists, who took issue with the interdependence beliefs of the generalists. As Jervis observed, a
common axis of disagreement in American foreign policy has been between those who focus on the
specific situation and the particular nations involved (often State Department officials or area experts), and
those who take a global geopolitical perspective (often in the White House or outside foreign policy
generalists). The former usually believe that states in a region are strongly driven by domestic concerns
and local rivalries; the latter are pre-disposed to think that these states look to the major powers for their
cues and have little control over their own fates.4
Other Countries base their perceptions on national interests basing

US decisions the myth of legitimacy causes ineffective policy
responses
the U.S. Naval War College. ( Christopher J. Credibility and the War on Terror, winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell
Press argues that national capabilities and interestsnot past behavior
provide the foundation for the formation of perceptions . However, the

credibility imperative has a powerful intuitive logic behind it , based upon
lifetimes of interpersonal experience. There are therefore significant impediments infront of those who
This divergence in
conventional wisdom between policy and scholarship would not be a
major issue for twenty-first-century international politics if policies
that are primarily based upon the need to appear credible were not
often counterproductive, costly, and dangerous. The imperative has
clear effects upon policy, and is employed in debates in predictable,
measurable, and uniformly unhelpful ways.
would challenge the wisdom of the policymakers obsession with reputation.
Warming
No impact and its not anthropogenic
Lupo 08 (NAPSA, Anthony R. assistant professor of atmospheric science at the University of Missouri
at Columbia and served as an expert reviewer for the UNs Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Global Warming Is Natural, Not Man-Made, 2008,
http://www.napsnet.com/pdf_archive/34/50144.pdf) //AW
One of the fundamental tenets of our justice system is one is innocent until proven guilty. While that
doesnt apply to scientific discovery, in the global warming debate the prevailing attitude is that human
induced global warming is already a fact of life and it is up to doubters to prove otherwise. To
there is no credible evidence to

demonstrate that the climatological changes weve seen since
the mid-1800s are outside the bounds of natural variability
inherent in the earths climate system. Thus, any impartial jury should not
complete the analogy, Ill add that to date,
come back with a guilty verdict convicting humanity of forcing recent climatological changes. Even
the most ardent supporters of global warming will not argue this point. Instead, they argue that
humans are only partially responsible for the observed

climate change. If one takes a hard look at the science
involved, their assertions appear to be groundless. First,
carbon dioxide is not a pollutant as many claim. Carbon
dioxide is good for plant life and is a natural constituent of
the atmosphere. During Earths long history there has been
more and less carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than we see today. Second,
they claim that climate is stable and slow to change, and we are accelerating climate change beyond
Climate change is generally a

regional phenomenon and not a global one. Regionally,
climate has been shown to change rapidly in the past and
will continue to do so in the future. Life on earth will adapt
as it has always done. Life on earth has been shown to thrive
when planetary temperatures are warmer as opposed to
colder. Third, they point to recent model projections that have shown that the earth will warm as
natural variability. That is also not true.
much as 11 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century. One should be careful when looking at model
models are crude representations of the real

atmosphere and are lacking many fundamental processes
and interactions that are inherent in the real atmosphere. The 11 degrees
scenario that is thrown around the media as if it were the
mainstream prediction is an extreme scenario. Most models
predict anywhere from a 2 to 6 degree increase over the
next century, but even these are problematic given the myriad of problems associated with
projections. After all, these
using models and interpreting their output. No one advocates destruction of the environment, and
indeed we have an obligation to take care of our environment for future generations. At the same time,
we need to make sound decisions based on scientific facts. My research leads me to believe that we
will not be able to state conclusively that global warming is or is not occurring for another 30 to 70
We simply dont understand the climate system well

enough nor have the data to demonstrate that humanity is
having a substantial impact on climate change.
years.
Cyberterror
Congressional oversight prevents NSA backdoors already - no link to
cyber terrorism.
Mazmanian June 6, 2015. ( Adam, CJS funding bill would limit high-tech surveillance, 6-6-15. The
Business of federal technology. http://fcw.com/articles/2015/06/04/cjs-funding-bill.aspx) // TS
The House passed a $51.4 billion Commerce, Justice and Science funding bill for fiscal 2016
on June 3 that would pare back the government's authority to
conduct surveillance on communications. Taken together, they constitute
something of a follow-on to the USA Freedom Act, just signed into law, which put new rules on the bulk
The bill, passed 242-183,

amendment by Ted Poe (R-Texas) that would prohibit funding
for government to require technology companies to build in
support for tapping encrypted communications. The provision would put
collection and searching of telephone metadata by spy agencies.
includes: *An
the brakes on efforts by FBI Director James Comey to guarantee that law enforcement agencies have
access to encrypted communications. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. * An amendment by
Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) that would bar funding of efforts by federal law enforcement to use "stingray"
devices, which simulate the activity of cell towers to capture location and identifying information from
mobile phones, to collect data in bulk without a court order. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. *
An amendment by Jared Polis (D-Colo.) that would ban the Drug Enforcement Administration from
An amendment
by Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) that would bar the National Institute of Standards and
Technology from coordinating on encryption or computer security
standards with the CIA and the National Security Agency, except for
the purposes of improving information security. The Massie amendment was a
response to revelations from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and other
sources about collaboration between NIST and the intelligence
community to insert flaws into highly complex encryption
standards revelations that led NIST to ultimately disavow the standards. The amendment was
collecting phone records in bulk. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. *
adopted 383-43. "Don't you want the best security available that the minds in this country can create ... to
safeguard your health records, maybe to safeguard your gun records, maybe to safeguard your bank
accounts and your credit cards? We are more safe when we have better security and better encryption, so
it makes no sense for [NIST] to work with the NSA to weaken our encryption software," Massie said.
Supply chain, census, other IT measures The bill would renew federal policy requiring supply-chain
vetting for the acquisition of high-impact and moderate-impact IT systems, including an assessment from
the FBI or other appropriate agency to evaluate cyber risks posed by any system whose manufacture is
touched by firms controlled or subsidized by the Chinese government, or other sources identified by the
U.S. as posing a cybersecurity threat. The House bill would extend the language of the measure to
encompass the renewal as well as the acquisition of systems. Appropriators are worried about the looming
2020 census. The bill includes $848 million in funding for the count, but there are some strings attached
related to IT delivery. The bill would mandate that half the IT funding for the 2020 census be withheld
pending the Census Bureau's delivery of a spending plan for the large-scale Census Enterprise Data
Collection and Processing project, which would put all the census data gathering, analytics and
dissemination technology under a single system for the first time. The bill would deliver drastic cuts to the
National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, a Commerce Department program designed to fund
pilot projects to create new methods of online authentication that go beyond simple usernames and
passwords. Under the bill, funding of new grants would cease, and second-year awards under 2015 grants
would be canceled, with the allowed funding being used to wind up the program. The White House issued a
veto threat before the bill went up for a vote. On the IT side, the Obama administration is particularly
concerned about census IT funding, the NIST appropriation, Internet governance transition work being
performed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration at Commerce, funding for
Commerces digital service team, and budget requests by NASA and the National Science Foundation to
comply with the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act.
Big tech companies have installed encryptionsthe NSA cannot

access backdoors anymore.
Kharpal 2015. Citing Glen Greenwald who received a Pulitzer award for his work on the Snowden
revelations. (Arjun, iPhone encryption 'petrified NSA: Greenwald, CNBC, 3-18-2015.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102515972)//TS
Stronger encryption in Apple's iPhones and on websites like

Facebook has "petrified" the U.S. government because it has
made it harder to spy on communications, Glenn Greenwald, the writer who
first reported on Edward Snowden's stolen files, told CNBC. Former National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor Edward Snowden caused major shockwaves around the world in 2013 when he unveiled the
surveillance body's wide ranging spying practices, which included regularly attempting to snoop of data
held by major technology companies. Apple, Google, Facebook and Yahoo are some of the major
companies that have been in the spotlight after Snowden's revelations. Information from the Snowden
documents released earlier this month detailed how the CIA had been trying for a decade to crack the
Yahoo revealed that it was

threatened with a $250,000 per day fine if it didn't hand over
data to the NSA. The tech giants have been taking major steps
to make sure their communications are safe from spying , a move
security in Apple's products. And last year,
Greenwald who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the topic said was motivated by the fear of
losing customers rather than care for data privacy. "I don't (Think) they suddenly care about privacy,"
Greenwald said. "Ifyou're a Facebook executive or an Apple executive, you're extremely worried that the
next generation of usersare going to be vulnerable to the pitch from Brazilian, and Korean and German
social media companies where they advertise and say don't use Facebook and Google because they'll give
your data to the NSA." Snowden is due to address CeBIT later today. Glenn Greenwald, the man who
Silicon Valley companies have

bolstered the encryption on their products, thereby making it
harder for governments to eavesdrop. "They (Apple) are now
starting to put serious encryption technologies in their new iPhones in
their new releases and this has really petrified governments around the world," Greenwald
helped Snowden publish the documents, said that
told CNBC in an interview at tech fair CeBIT in Germany.
NSA surveillance is key to preventing cyber terrorism.

Weise 2015. (Elizabath, Experts: NSA efforts part of the battle in cyber-proxy war, USA Today, 6-72015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/06/04/nsa-warantless-surveillance-cybersecuritychina/28493013/)//TS
The United States is engaged in a proxy war with its enemies, a war
where cyberspace is the battlefield, cyber experts say. Because
of that, the National Security Agency's expansion of
warrantless surveillance of Americans' international Internet
traffic is necessary, said Tom Kellermann, chief cybersecurity officer with Trend Micro, a TexasSAN FRANCISCO
based computer security company. "Let's be fair. The National Security Agency's role is to protect national
This is not about violating Americans' privacy, this is

about spy hunting," Kellermann said. The revelation Thursday of NSA's broad program to
security.
scoop up Americans' Internet activities coincided with the government's disclosure that Chinese hackers
had breached the computer system of the Office of Personnel Management, potentially compromising the
data of 4 million current and former federal workers. "The
cyber civilization of the

United States is being undermined, not just by criminal
hackers but also by nation-states that have literally burrowed
into our companies, our cities and our networks," Kellerman said. The
type of proactive surveillance the NSA was conducting is
crucial, according to Jasper Graham, vice president for cybertechnology and analytics with Darktrace,
a Washington, D.C.-based cyber-security firm. " Sometimes hunting is the only way
you can catch people. Otherwise you're always in response
mode, waiting for something to strike you," said Graham, who worked as a
technical director at NSA for 15 years. Black-and-white distinction between criminal hackers and the
intelligence wings of other countries can be difficult to make. It's common in some nations for hackers to
be allowed to operate with impunity as long as they don't hack anything within their own country, experts
say. They're also expected to share information they come across that might be useful to their nation, and
to be "patriotic" and aid the state when called upon, Kellerman said. Intrusions often have multiple targets
and happen on multiple levels. Graham offered a hypothetical example: If a government wanted
information about specific types of employees at the Defense Department, it could hire or encourage a
hacking group to attack a financial institution or health care system in the Washington, D. C., area. That
would get them personal information about hundreds of thousands of individuals, some of whom may work
at the Defense Department. "They're hiding one attack in the noise of another, and everybody writes it off
as cyber-crime," Graham said. That's where looking at hacking activity broadly can pay off, Graham said.
"You don't know until you work your way up the food chain if they're working independently or they're a
small hacking group working with a government." For Herbert Lin, a Stanford University cyber-policy
expert, whether the NSA program was an effective strategy for detecting and stopping hacking by foreign
governments is the wrong question. "The question is really if the NSA program was helpful enough that it is
worth the expense and the cost," Lin said. "Personally I wish we didn't have to do it, but I think it's an
understandable response" given the current threat environment, he said. Other experts have their doubts
about whether the NSA program is helpful. "One need only open up a newspaper" to see that it's not
working, said Amit Yoran, CEO of the computer security company RSA. The needs of the intelligence and
law enforcement communities are often at odds with what businesses want and need, he said.
"Intelligence wants to monitor, to learn about the threat and how they work. Law enforcement wants to
collect information so they can prosecute," Yoran said. Victims of hacks want to rush in and clean up their
you were serious

about protecting the United States from these external cyber
threats, then absolutely this is the sort of thing you'd consider
doing." While Yoran doesn't think the potential ethical issues represent "a serious compromise," he
system. "So there's a very powerful divide," he said. In the end, he said, "if
knows that others might come to different conclusions if they don't trust the U.S. government to do what's
right. "If you fundamentally don't trust, you fundamentally don't trust. I can't prove a negative," he said.
For privacy advocate Marc Rotenberg, with the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington D.C.,
trust and oversight form the crux of the matter. " The
cost of government secrecy

will always be the lack of public trust," he said. "In the absence of meaningful
oversight, the NSA will push its surveillance authority beyond what the law allows."
Cyber warfare is a self-fulfilling prophecy
Valeriano and Manus 15 -- Brandon Valeriano has a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in Political Science
and Ryan C. Maness has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois in Chicago. (Brandon and
Ryan C., Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System 5/26/15. Oxford
University Press, Pg.20-21) //AHS
We now live in a digital era in whitch the speed,

interconnectedness, and level of computer interaction between
states and individuals is growing at an exponential rate. Choucri
(2012: 13) suggests that cyberspace has created new conditions for which there are no clear precedents.
As with most new things, this new reality brings fear since the infrastructure we depend on is thought to be
fragile and too complex.
We depend so much on digital communications

that it stands to reason that we are also vulnerable to threats
that originate from this realm. As Bowdens quote makes clear,
the fragility of what we most depend on is a source of
vulnerability for some. Rid (2013: vii) even suggests that we are addicted to the Internet,
and this is a source of concern as our habit is therefore fragile. The fragility, addiction,
and dependency we have on the Internet signals weakness for
some. Weaknesses offer are exploited by those who seek to gain, especially in a situation of historical
enmity. Yet, these ideas are assumptions; there is a perception of
fragility and of dependency that might not match the reality of
the situation. If the perceived weakness and fragility become the dominant frame, there is a
potential for the fear invoked to translate to the securitization notion of forthcoming conflict, exploiting this
weakness.
We argue throughout that the opposite might be true,
that the Internet and cyber interactions are more stable than
most believe and therefore this domain can be a source of
cooperation. Cyberspace will become the domain of conflict
only if we let the fear process take hold and dominate the
discourse; the perception of fear then becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The CNBC network in the United States produced a documentary on cyber warfare that
documents the typical securitized discourse in this arena. Their introductory statement is a typical
example of the hyperbolic statements associated with cyber conflict. In the United States, we are Internet
dependent. Our financial system, power grids, telecommunications, water supplies, flight controls and
military communications are all online making them vulnerable to countless cyber incidents by cyber
criminals. The goal could be a 10-minute blackout, a breach of national security, a stock trading glitch or
the theft of millions of dollars worth of intellectual property. In short, everything from our money to our
The question is to what extent these

extreme warning and fears are warranted. How vulnerable is
any given country to cyber malice, and what evidence do we
have for cyber conflict in the last decade? Should this fear be
the basis for reorganization in military structures and
doctrine?
water is vulnerable to infiltration.
Empirical outliers have been overhyped in cyber security discourse
Valeriano and Manus 15 -- Brandon Valeriano has a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in Political Science
and Ryan C. Maness has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois in Chicago. (Brandon and
Ryan C., Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System 5/26/15. Oxford
University Press. Pg.137) //AHS
cyber conflicts thus far are

over-hyped and that states practice a large degree of restraint
in using them. We find that the rate of conflict is not indicative of a
revolution in military affairs, but rather is a continuation of
espionage and nuisances otherwise common in international
affairs. The next question is, if we take a closer look at the process, content, and meaning of what
might be known as the prominent cyber conflicts, then what more do we learn? Do our
quantitative conclusions hold up in the context of what might
be called the outliers, or the black swans of the cyber security
discourse? We need to support our data investigations with the story of cyber conflicts in order to
reinforce the points asserted in previous chapters. Here we demonstrate that even the
most popular and well-known cyber incidents are not changing
the shape of the battlefield; they are a new technology, like
any other that we have seen in the past. Throughout history,
militaries and governments have adapted to and utilized new
technologies in the battlefield as well as for diplomacy, but
rarely have the changed the shape of international affairs. It
seems that cyber conflict falls into this category in that the technology alone by no
means changes the shape of relationships. We go even further with
our weekly events-based data investigation to suggest that, by and
large, the response to cyber incidents, when the do happen,
does not indicate that governments are disturbed or severely
troubled by the incidents (see Chapter 5). Some tactics provoke reactions, but mainly
cyber actions have been assimilated as a normal process of
Throughout this volume we have made the case that
international life, a claim widely divergent from the tone of the

general cyber security debate.
Cyber-attacks are just hype digital Pearl Harbor or cyber 9/11
have yet to materialize despite decades of warning
Gartzke and Lindsay 6/22/15 (Eric Gartzke is an associate professor at UC San Diego in the in the
Department of Political Science and Jon Lindsay is an assistant adjunct professor at UC San Diego and an
Oxford Martin Associate with the Oxford Global Cyber Security Capacity Center. (Eric and Jon R., Weaving
Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace,6-22-2015. Taylor and Francis group.
Pg323-324. Security Studies Vol 24, Issue 2.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188)//AHS
Where Are All the Attacks? If geographic, technological, or

organizational conditions make conquest feasible at low cost
or risk in comparison with the effort of defending the same
objectives, then aggressors should be more tempted to launch
an attack, the security dilemma and negative spirals should be
more intense, and greater uncertainty and secrecy should lead
to more miscalculation and war.21 According to a prominent body of international
relations theory, high levels of offense dominance, in general, should be tied to a heightened risk of war.22
The deficiencies of traditional protective strategies as summarized above should thus make cyber war the
the US Department of Defense

gets attacked ten million times a day; a US university receives
a hundred thousand Chinese attacks per day; and one firm
measures three thousand distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks per day worldwide.23 In reality, however, most of these socalled attacks are just routine probes by automated networks
of compromised computers (botnets) run by profit-seeking
criminals or spy bureaucraciesa far cry from terrorism or
military assault. The most alarming scenarios of a digital
Pearl Harbor or cyber 9/11 have yet to materialize despite
decades of warning. The Stuxnet worm caused limited and
temporary disruption of Irans nuclear program in the late
2000s, the only known historical case of infrastructure damage
via deliberate cyber attack, but this operation seems to reveal
more about the strategic limitations of cyber war than its
potency.24 The cyber revolution should presumably provide rivals with potent new tools of influence,
sum of all fears, as many have predicted. Indeed,
yet actual cyber disputes from 2001 to 2011 remain restrained and regionalized, not disruptive and
Computer espionage and nuisance cybercrime thrive, to

be sure, but they are neither as prevalent nor as costly as they
might be, leading skeptics to describe US losses as a
rounding error in a fifteen trillion dollar economy.26 It is possible in
global.25
principle that the same tools used for computer-network exploitation may one day be leveraged for more
destructive strikes. Yet even if the nontrivial operational challenges of cyber war can be overcome,
proponents of the cyber-revolution thesis have yet to

articulate convincing strategic motives for why a state or nonstate actor might actually use cyber capabilities effectively.27 A
considerable shortage of evidence in the study of cyber
conflict is thus a source both of concern and relief.
Low risk of cyberterrorism - interconnectedness now proves Aff not

necessary to solve our ev postdates
Lindsay 15 (Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is an officer in the
U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security
affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and innovation and their
impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering
political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron is a professor of
national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. He specializes in
strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and Cybersecurity,
4/1/15, Google Books, pg343)PA
Yet government remedies also can introduce problems. Unity of commands in an American principle of
warfare, but actual coordination of different organizations and agencies has proven to be extremely
difficult, not least because cybersecurity is more about economic incentives than warfare. Chinas
fragmented authoritarian system has fared little better and potentially worse in cyber policy integration, as
discussed in the introduction. Furthermore, innovation in the commercial information technology sector
moves far more rapidly than the pace of policymaking in any state. The opportunities for making mischief
online emerge faster than government regulators can adjust on desirability of doing so. The
profusion of cyber threats might appear to support

technologist interpretations of cyber space as an autonomous
domain with its own deterministic logic. The interpretation
overlooks a broad international consensus that the continuing
buildout of the Internet economy is a good thing for commerce
and development, consistent with liberalist expectations.
Cyberspace is a man-made construct, after all, and connection to it is voluntary. Disconnection remains
unattractive as long as the benefits of being online continue to be so great and the risks comparatively
Liberalist expect the repeated interaction and deep

interference of cyberspace to act as a restraint on more severe
forms of cyber harms: states stand to gain much from much
from their Internet interdependence and much to lose from
conflict. The fact that the Internet exists at all, a fabric of
international interconnection, means that liberalist views
should be taken seriously. However, there are limits to this implicit liberal consensus, and
minor.
explicit normative framework for international cyberspace may be beyond them.
Bilateral Talks
Pakistan/Proliferation Scenario
No Indo-Pak war - deterrence prevents
Ganguly 2008, Professor of Political at Indiana University, (Sumit Nuclear Stability in South Asia,
International Security, Volume 33, Number 2, 11/21/8, Muse AS)
nuclear deterrence is robust in

South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of
full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons
As the outcomes of the 1999 and 200102 crises show,
capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to
respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to
enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially
to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners [End Page 65] can fashion such a calibrated
strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article's analysis of the 1999 and
nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far

from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific
200102 crises does suggest, however, that
forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a
serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan's willingness
to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period
from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that
equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India's internal affairs
particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict
with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in
turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian
political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from
clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80
Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to
establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of
India did respond with considerable

force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the
intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response,
India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict
instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing
objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to
a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Second,
Pakistani ground fire.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a
wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident
at another level. During the last war in [End Page 66] Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the
Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces
successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore.
The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the
country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor,
Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian
military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People's Republic of China.83
Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand,
had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the
indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a
second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a SinoPakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to
Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the
scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a selfconfident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus.
Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve
disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state
of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these
significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope
of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political
The awareness on both sides of a nuclear

capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons
at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of
commentator, wrote in 1993: [End Page 67]
In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its "Operation Gibraltar" and sent in
infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly
points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once
again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan,
India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send
its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87 Subrahmanyam's argument takes on
additional significance in light of the overt acquisition of nuclear
weapons by both India and Pakistan.
India.
Tactical proliferation solves conflict

Pillalamarri, 3/24/15 - an assistant editor at the National Interest (Akhilesh, Confirmed: Pakistan is
Building Battlefield Nukes to Deter India, The Buzz 3/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/confirmed-pakistan-building-battlefield-nukes-deter-india-12474 //JD
As the world remains focused on preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, South Asias
General Khalid
Kidwai, a top advisor to the Pakistani government, said this week that Pakistan needed shortrange tactical nuclear weapons, also known as battlefield nukes to deter
nuclear archrival India. Kidwai said that having tactical weapons would make
war less likely, at a conference on nuclear security organized by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington. Kidwai administered Pakistans nuclear and
missile weapons program for fifteen years. Pakistans tactical weapon
development includes the Nasr Missile, which has a range of around 37 miles
dangerous nuclear rivalrybetween India and Pakistangrows ever more deadly.
(60 kilometers) and reflects concerns in Pakistan that Indias larger military could still wage a
conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear
weapon.Pakistan especially fears and aims to neutralize Indias Cold Start doctrine, a type of blitzkrieg
that aims to advance fast enough into Pakistan to seize key installations before a retaliatory nuclear strike
US-China Scenario
China wont accept US-centric stakeholder model based in human
rights agenda
Lindsay 15 (Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is an officer in the
U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security
affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and innovation and their
impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering
political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron is a professor of
national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. He specializes in
strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and Cybersecurity,
4/1/15, Google Books, pg343)PA
perceived severity of the threats above has generated

numerous calls for improved international cooperation on
cybersecurity. Jason Healey, for example, sees a flurry of organized and unorganized violence
in the cyber domain but anticipates new norms and regimes will keep
cyberspace generally as stable as the air, land, space, and
maritime domains, containing localized conflict from
disrupting the international system. It is notable that the Chinese authors in this
The
volume appear more optimistic about the potential for the international cooperation than many of the
Western authors. Li Yuxiao and Xu Lu write that a China-U.S. cybersecurity communication mechanism is
important to improve mutual trust and enhance research and defense capabilities and recommend
working toward a set of common rules for the network society in order to promote the process of global
informatization. Senior Colonel Ye similarly writes that we have to reject the logic that there must be
fierce hostilities between the traditional, established superpowers and rising powers, and instead
recognize that mutual respect, mutual understanding and cooperation between nations should be the
International
cooperation on cybersecurity is desirable, but there are certain
obstacles. Any notion of a cyber arms control treaty or the
establishment of cyber norms must be reconciled with actual
cyber activities and government interests in promoting or
tolerating them. Sarah McKune points out the cyber exploitation of ethnic
minorities and Internet censorship by the Chinese state stand
in stark contrast to cosmopolitan visions of an open Internet
with string normative protection for human rights. The US
Department of State Internet freedom agenda works to
advance Internet freedom as an aspect of universal rights of
freedom of expression and the free flow of information. As part
of the initiative, the US government and activists from nongovernmental organizations develop and deploy technologies
that dissidents can use to subvert controls on Internet
content. This essentially means hacking the Great Firewall.
China perceives this to be provocative interference in its
domestic affairs and an attack on its information security
architecture. China, together with Russia, would prefer to shift
governance of the Internet to the United Nations with the
stronger norms of Internet Sovereignty and noninterference;
foundation of Asia-Pacific and world security, including cybersecurity.
Europe and the United States prefer to maintain the current

multistakeholder arrangement while strengthening norms of
openness and human rights. While there may be agreement that international norms
are desirable, there is sharp disagreement on the content of those
norms. The Obama administrations decision to transfer the
internet Assigned Named Authority (IANA) function from the Department of
Commerce of the international community may be a sign of
Chinas and Russias effective diplomacy or at least a sign that the United
States recognizes the damage done to its international reputation. The challenge of international policy
coordination is exacerbated by intra-states disorganization and disconnects between public and private
threats are too broad, the actors too

numerous, to knowledge levels too unequal, the risks too easy
to avoid internalizing, the free-rider problem too prevalent,
and the stakes too great to believe that markets alone will be
adequate to create the right incentives or out-comes.
actors. As Fred Cate writes, The
China doesnt want US-centric internet governance -- US

constitutional imperatives
Submarainan 8-5-13 B.Sc. in Applied Sciences, 1980, Madras University, India; P.G. Honors Dip. in
Management, 1984, XLRI, India; M.B.A., 1990 and Ph.D., 1992, Rutgers University) is a ISP Fellow at the
Yale Law School, and the Gabriel Ferrucci Professor of Computer Information Systems at the School of
Business, Quinnipiac University, Connecticut. . He published The book Computer Security, Privacy and
Politics: Current Issues, Challenges and Solutions Ed. Subramanian, was published in 2008 by IRM Press.
Internet Governence: A Developing Countrys perspective
http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1223&context=ciima AS )
the Multistakeholder forums, policies and procedures

have not assuaged some of the fears and concerns of other
countries that still fear control of the Internet by the U.S.
government. Over the years, there have been numerous calls for separating ICANN from its
However,
connection to the U.S. Department of Commerce. In addition, as more and more nations join the Internet,
Some governments such as China and

Russia fear that the U.S. constitutional imperative to protect
free expression at all costs could impinge on their own
sovereignty and security. Civil society has increasingly asked for
equal status in policy decision making, as in many forums they
do not yet have those rights. In the discussion that follows, I
turn the focus of Internet governance to India, considered by
many analysts to be a rapidly developing economy.
these calls have only increased.
Lack of trust between China and the US means no cooperation
Lindsay 15 (01 April 2015 Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is
an officer in the U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia,
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and
national security affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and
innovation and their impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid1980s to 2002 covering political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron
is a professor of national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College.
He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and
Cybersecurity (Google Books) pg343)PA
American espionage against China, to include Chinese information technology companies, is unlikely to
abate just because of public indignation in Chinese media or diplomatic protest without more serious
consequences. Likewise, the cybersercurity firm Mandiant notes that recent observations of China-based
despite the
Obama administrations specific warning that Chinas
continued cyber espionage was going to be [a] very difficult
problem in the economic relationship between the two
countries. This situation highlights a major obstacle to the establishment of international norms .
It is hard to establish an agreement over activities that the
parties do not admit conducting. It is hard to enforce
compliance with an agreement when the proscribed activity is
intentionally designed to be undetectable. Many governments
have the technical means and expertise to conduct covert
operations online and have thus far shown little restraint in
doing so both the incentives espionage and the inability of
liberal norms and institutions to contain it.
APT activity indicate that the PRC has no intention of abandoning its cyber campaigns,
No SCS escalation interdependence solves

Hong 13 senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI), National University of Singapore. Before
joining EAI, he was professor at the Research School of South East Asian Studies, Xiamen University, China,
teaching International Political Economy, Big Power Relations, and ASEAN Economy. (Zhao, THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND CHINAASEAN RELATIONS 6/12/13,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2012.760785 AS)
at this stage there is no reason to regard military

confrontation as likely or inevitable. Economically, China and
ASEAN countries have become increasingly interdependent, as
China is currently the second largest trade partner of ASEAN ,
and ASEAN is the third largest trade partner of China . In the light
of increasing economic ties and mutual desire for regional
peace and stability, China and ASEAN-related countries are likely to
make every effort to stabilise their bilateral relations.
President Aquino stated during his state visit to China in August 2011 that ChinaPhilippines relations will not be affected by the dispute over
the South China Sea, reiterating the need to deal with the
disputes through peaceful dialogue, and to continue to
maintain regional peace, security and stability, creating a
favorable environment for economic growth.43 And it is important to note
that some procedural progress was made in 2011. In November 2011, China made a
goodwill gesture of providing US$ 475 million to establish the
China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, and there are
several working groups now in place. Indeed, the expansion of
economic ties and the growth of common interests have laid
the foundation for partial settlement or management of the
territorial disputes.
However,
Activism
General
Data localization wont prevent coalition building- people will find a
way to communicate
Coldewey 11. (People, Not Things, Are The Tools Of Revolution Feb 11, 2011 by Devin Coldewey- a
Seattle-based writer and photographer. He has written for TechCrunch since 2007 and is currently a
contributor at NBC News. http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/11/tools-of-revolution/)//LP
Warmest congratulations to the Egyptian people, whose truly grassroots revolution

has reminded the world what political action is supposed to look like. Although the work is far from done,
and reconstituting a government by the people and for the people is perhaps the more difficult phase, it is
they, and the world, should take a moment to reflect on a job

well done. Some are using that moment to praise the social media
tools used by some of the protesters, and the role the internet played
in fueling the revolution. While its plain that these things were part of
the process, I think the mindset of the online world creates a risk of
overstating their importance, and elevating something useful, even
powerful, to the status of essential. The people of Egypt made use of what
means they had available, just as every oppressed people has in
history. Twitter and Facebook are indeed useful tools, but they are not
tools of revolution at least, no more than Paul Reveres horse was.
People are the tools of revolution, whether their dissent is spread by
whisper, by letter, by Facebook, or by some means we havent yet imagined. What we, and
right that
the Egyptians, should justly be proud of, is not just those qualities which set Egypts revolution apart from
the last hundred, but those which are fundamental to all of them. Malcom Gladwell has become the
whipping boy of the internet for having suggested however long ago it was that the social web is
something that breeds weak connections and requires only a minimum of participation. He was right then,
and hes right now; he wrote a short post the other day defying the gloating masses (sensibly, but
haughtily), and concluded with something commentators of the Egyptian revolution should take to heart:
People with a grievance will always find ways to communicate with

each other. How they choose to do it is less interesting, in the end,
than why they were driven to do it in the first place. Its one thing to
give credit where credit is due and admire the rapidity and resilience of
internet-based communication. The new uses to which the younger generation is putting
the internet are very interesting and point to shifts in the way people are choosing to share information.
Its another thing to ascribe to these things powers they dont have,
powers that rest in the people who use them. It sounds like quibbling, but its an
important distinction. Facebook greased the gears, but it isnt the gears, and
never will be. The revolution has been brewing for decades, and these
same protesters have been in the streets countless times, after
organizing by phone, by word of mouth, or simply as a shared reaction
to some fresh enormity.
Democratic Peace Theory Wrong

Democratic peace theory false- competing interests
Larison 12. (DANIEL LARISON- published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News,
Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week.
He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago. April 17, 2012. Democratic Peace Theory Is
False http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/)//LP
Fabio Rojas invokes democratic peace theory in his comment on Rachel Maddows new book, Drift: The
Unmooring of American Military Power (via Wilkinson): The idea is simple for whatever reason,
democracies almost never fight each other. Of course, democracies go to war against non-democracies.
But for some reason, democracies just dont fight each other. Whats the policy implication of all this? First,
the sorts of rules that Maddow proposes are useless. People will just ignore the rules when they want to
when they want war. Second, you have to reduce the population of non-democracies. Thus, if the Federal
government wants to protect the United States by preventing war, the best, and cheapest, way to do it is
to provide support and assistance for indigenous movements for democracy and tolerance. Once people
have a genuine democracy at work, they just dont want to fight with each other. They just dont. Rojas
claim depends entirely on the meaning of genuine democracy. Even though there are numerous
examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that
little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably dont qualify as genuine democracies and
democratic peace theory draws

broad conclusions from a short period in modern history with very few
cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I
understand it is that democratic governments are more accountable to their
populations, and because the people will bear the costs of the war they
are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This supposedly keeps
so cant be used as counter-examples. Regardless,
democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional
checks on government power.
One small problem with this is that it is rubbish.

Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality
and voting do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing
states. Democratic peace theory doesnt account for the effects of
nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic nations
think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for them are
often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that
waged the South African War (against two states with elected
governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a
huge majority in the Khaki election that followed. As long as it goes well and
doesnt have too many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is
costly it may still be popular if it is fought for nationalist reasons that
appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking
that there is an intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their
country can gain something at relatively low cost by going to war, the
type of government they have really is irrelevant. Unless a democratic public
believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to welcome the outbreak
Setting aside the flaws and failures of U.S.-led

democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the
number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy.
Clashing interests between states arent going away, and the more
democratic states there are in the world the more likely it is that two or
more of them will eventually fight one another.
of a war that they expect to win.
Middle East
Plan cant solve outside influence not needed and alt causes to
effective transitions
KHOURI 2011 (THE LONG REVOLT BY RAMI G. KHOURI. Wilson Quarterly, SUMMER 2011.
http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2011-a-changing-middle-east/the-long-revolt/)//LP
as they are experiencing these momentous changes, Arab

countries must deal with four enormous and simultaneous challenges:
maintaining security, rekindling economic growth, creating legitimate
and participatory governance systems, and preventing mass
discontent sparked by unfulfilled expectations from pushing countries
back toward autocratic rule. The liberated Arab lands that are able to
slowly establish more democratic political governance systems will
each take on a different tone and color as they create their own formulas from the
Even
possibilities before them: tribal values, pan-Arab sentiment, narrow nationalism, corporate globalism,
Arab democracies will look very

different from Western ones, and the world should have the patience
and composure to let the people of this region find their own
sustainable balances between religiosity and secularism, statecentered and pan-Arab nationalism, and traditional and modern forms
of governance.
Islamist influences, and roles for the military.
US democracy promotion in the Middle East cause terrorism and

instability- no popular support
Harsanyi 15 (David Harsanyi- a Senior Editor at The Federalist FEBRUARY 19, 2015 Obama Is Wrong.
Democracy Is The Last Thing The Middle East Needs Right Now
http://thefederalist.com/2015/02/19/obama-is-wrong-democracy-is-the-last-thing-the-middle-east-needsright-now/)//LP
President Barack Obama gave a speech at White Houses Countering Violent Extremism summit
yesterday crammed with predictable feel-good ideas for combating the imaginary root causes of Islamic
in the midst of arguing that radicalism was principally driven

by anger over colonialism, illiteracy, and unemployment, Obama
proposed an idea that we should have been abandoned trillions of
dollars and many years ago: more democracy. Heres how the president laid it out
extremism. And
in the Los Angeles Times: Efforts to counter violent extremism will only succeed if citizens can address
legitimate grievances through the democratic process and express themselves through strong civil
does Obama really believe that extremists have

legitimate grievances? Are the disaffected youth recruited from the slums of Paris (but,
societies. First of all,
curiously, not from the slums of Rio or Beijing) concerned that France doesnt offer a strong enough civil
society? Are the radicals beheading Christians in North Africa ticked off over a lack of womens rights in
Yemen? Are extremists who target Jews and free-speech enthusiasts in Copenhagen worried about the
its the grievances themselves that are

the root of the problem. In most Arab countries, the authoritarian
leadership is in some ways more liberal than the majority of the
citizenry. As bad as these regimes are and we coddle and enable
many of them almost every time the democratic process has been
tried in the Islamic world, its produced more extremism and factional
violence. So which nation does the president propose would benefit
most from more democracy? Pakistan? Iraq? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? How would Christians
health of democratic institutions in Europe? No,
and Alawites fare in a democratic Syria, do you think? Perhaps as well as minorities do in a democratic
Libya, a place Obama argued Americans had to intervene militarily or the democratic impulses that are
dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship. Turns out that
democratic impulses can also lead to darkness. There is no Gadhafi

regime, but there is anarchy, a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists and
a country where Copts can be executed without too many hassles and American consulates can be sacked
without any repercussion. All of it enabled, in part, by the presidents unauthorized war (and Congress
the
administration punishes the Egyptian government for putting an end to
the extremism empowered by democratic impulses. It is Egypts al-Sisi no great
friend of liberty, granted whos spoken out most forcefully about the future of Islam . Yet the
administration has withheld aid from that government until it can
certify that Egypt is taking steps toward democracy. As if insuring a
larger role for the Muslim Brotherhood was in the U.S.s or the worlds
best interests. To put our confused priorities in perspective, the United States condemned the
implicit approval of that war) that was meant to help facilitate democracy. At the same time,
Egyptians for bombing ISIS targets in Libya over the summer, complaining that outside interference in
Libya exacerbates current divisions and undermines Libyas democratic transition. (Incredulous italics
mine)
Egypt is not only dealing with ISIS in democratic Libya, it is dealing

with terrorism originating from democratic Gaza, where Palestinians
were offered autonomy and a chance to build a strong civil society, but
put Hamas in charge instead. In the West Bank, where the moderates of the PLO run the
show, Mahmoud Abbas cant even hold elections because the will of the people is too extreme for Fatah. In
Turkey and in Pakistan, the military is counterbalance to the democratic impulses that would allow
Democracy cant work now.

Three reasons why: 1. In a open political environment, extremists will
always be willing to resort to violence to grab power. 2. Institutions
tasked with protecting society from that extremism will no longer be
democratic once they react. 3. The populace doesnt have any real
desire for a secular democracy, anyway. According to Pew Research
Center polling, given a choice between a leader with a strong hand or a
democratic system of government, most Muslims choose democracy. For
theocrats to become members of NATO or nuclear powers.
us, democracy is shorthand for all the things we like about liberalism, but overwhelming percentages of
Muslims believe that Islamic law should be the official law of their own nations, which, as weve seen, does
not coexist with our notions of self-determination. With apologies to the president, this knotty situation
does not exist because Americans arent sensitive enough. But Im sympathetic to Michael Gersons
contention that presidents dont have the freedom to be honest, constrained by sensitivities and realities
of the world. He writes: Most of those urging Obama to assert that Islam is somehow especially flawed
among the great faiths have never been closer to power than a fuse box. There is no possible circumstance
in which a president could say such a thing. It would cause a global firestorm, immediately alienating
Muslim allies and proxies whom we depend on to help fight the Islamic State and other enemies. The
problem is that the president goes far beyond niceties. For starters, Im not sure anyone has ever implored
him to say Islam is inherently flawed or doomed. But shouldnt we non-politicians be more sympathetic to
referring to Islamist terrorists merely

as violent extremists constitutes a dangerous attempt to hide from
reality? The administration claims it doesnt want to confer ISIS a group that Graeme Wood says
M.G. Opreas argument that, among other things,
derives its philosophy from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam the credibility of being
This fantasy forces the administration to concoct offensive

rationalizations and preposterous moral equivalencies that drives
disjointed, ineffective policies. Much like our Middle East democracy
fantasy ends up bolstering the power and reach of the very same
extremists we claim to want to stop.
called Islamic.
Democratic internet promotion is destabilizing- its a valuespromoting agenda

Mead 4/9 (WALTER RUSSELL MEAD - Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council
on Foreign Relations. The American Interest, Volume 10, Number 5. April 9, 2015 The Paradox of American
Democracy Promotion http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-paradox-of-americandemocracy-promotion/)//LP
America is and always has been by nature a revolutionary force in world affairs. This is not primarily or
only because our moral values compel us to become the avatars of a global transformation. It is rather
the way American society works is profoundly destabilizing to the

rest of the world. When Al Gore invented the internet he did as much
to destabilize the Middle East as George W. Bush did when he invaded
Iraq. More seriouslyand with apologies to the former Vice Presidentthe internet started out as a
because
DARPA project to facilitate the secure sharing of classified information. No one in DARPA, the Defense
Department, or anywhere else in America was thinking about how to flatten hierarchies or challenge the
social status quo everywhere in the world once the technology went commercial. The concern was about
how to communicate effectively, how a company could use a corporate website to its competitive
advantage, and so on. But the internet turned out to be a profoundly revolutionary force in politics around
the world, and it poses huge problems to cultures and governments with foundations different from our
own. Technology is not and has never been socially or politically neutral; it embodies and usually transmits
the attitudes, economic endowments, moral priorities, and even the aesthetics of the societies that create
it. It is very hard to simply adopt the machine and not the less tangible biases that go with it.In the same
way, Hollywood movies have helped to create a situation in which many young people, for instance, no
longer think they should marry whomever their parents tell them to marry. There are all kinds of ways in
which the American presence in the world has been and remains culturally subversive. In the 19th century
we were seen on the Continent as a dangerous nation. The United States wasnt sending armies out into
the world to overthrow other regimes, but the mere existence of a successful, stable, large, powerful, and
economically effective democratic society was a terrible example from the perspective of Europes rulers
and religious traditionalists, who argued that their hierarchical positions were necessary to the effective
governance of society as a whole. The United States was a living, thriving reproach to the political
legitimacy of autocracies abroad. Inevitably, therefore, the friends of stability and authority around the
world tended increasingly to be as anti-American as they were formerly anti-British, and for similar
reasons. The British, of course, did send military forces out into the world, but their real disruptive power
derived from the revolutionary impact of a wider and eventually more market-based global trading system
that rewarded efficiency and creativity and punished institutionalized privilege and all related arguments
from authority. Forces that wanted to see social change in their countries tended to be pro-American. We
still see this pattern today. The United States is revolutionary by being as well as by acting.The United
States is revolutionary by being as well as by acting. Any foreign policy that doesnt take this into account
will run into trouble. Consider Google and other major Silicon Valley companies, whose business models
depend on a relatively open internet, with freedom of association and freedom of communication. In
important ways the boundaries of Chinese, Iranian, or Russian power are the boundaries that limit where
For commercial reasons alone, much of American

business is pushing the U.S. government toward the promotion of a
liberal model for internet governance and of freedom of
communication in ways that are parallel or equivalent to a valuespromoting foreign policy. The government of a country with global trading interests like the
their business model can reach.
United States must prioritize questions like contract law in foreign relations; the contracts that American
companies have entered into abroad must be enforceable in transparent and honest courts of law.
All
kinds of people who do not think of themselves as democratic

reformers in the history of American foreign policy have been
consistently pushing all kinds of reform agendas around the globe that
are self-interested in motivation but expansively liberal in
consequence. There is every reason to believe that this kind of commercially based liberal policy
will endure, and, with the information revolution shifting the worlds economic center of gravity away from
the production and exchange of physical commodities toward the production and exchange of design and
ideas, the importance of liberal values to American commerce is likely to grow.
Democratic movements are suppressed- Sectarianism
Miranda 4/23 (Alba Benito Miranda- Intern at the Elcano Royal Institute. International Relations and
Translation & Interpreting (Comillas Pontifical University). 23/04/2015 Sectarianism in Bahrain and the
New Middle East Cold War http://www.blog.rielcano.org/en/sectarianism-in-bahrain-and-the-new-middleeast-cold-war/)//LP
The current Middle East seems to be on the verge of collapse

and the revival of the Sunni-Shia divide appears to be the main culprit.
The Arab Spring uprisings have altered the existing balance of power
and accentuated the sectarian differences in the region. In this context, some
states have lost no time in exploiting religious differences to their advantage, and in using
sectarianism as a political weapon to pursue political and geostrategic goals. Both Iran
and Saudi Arabia have taken the lead in this power politics game, turning the Gulf region into the
battlefield of what has been referred to as the new Middle East cold war. Similarly to regional hegemons
in the Cold War, and in the Arab Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia and Iran have not engaged
in direct confrontation with each other, but have used neighbouring countries as battlefields to settle their
Given the multicultural, sectarian and transnational identities in

the Gulf, the exploitation of the Sunni-Shia divide has become a key
tool in the foreign policies of some states. The repression of the 2011 uprising in
rivalries.
Manamas Pearl Roundabout is particularly illustrative, since it involved the use of a sectarian discourse by
Although democratic and crosssectarian in nature, Bahrains Arab Spring was immediately depicted as
sectarian and portrayed as part of an Iranian plot to overthrow the AlKhalifa regime and threaten the balance of power in the Gulf. It was
perceived both as an external and internal threat to the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states due to the risk of contagion and
spillover. Shia-led calls for reforms challenged not only the sovereignty
of the autocratic leaders, but also Sunni hegemony in the region, since
they empowered both Iran and the Shia communities in the Gulf. Saudi
the governments of both the Al-Khalifa and the Al-Saud.
Arabia was the most affected state, given its animosity towards Iran and the outbreak of Shia unrests in its
oil-rich Eastern Province. In order to suppress Bahrains February 2011 uprising, Saudi Arabia led the
military intervention of the Joint Peninsula Shield Force within a month of the outburst of the protests. It
was the first time that the GCC intervened militarily in one of its member states to suppress an internal
revolt, as its founding treaty only considers intervention in the case of a foreign threat. Sectarianism made
possible the externalization of the threat posed by the Pearl Roundabout uprising, as it was used by the
By picturing the revolts as sectarian,

Manama and Riyadh delegitimized and silenced Bahrainis political
demands, hence safeguarding the sovereignty of their regimes. And by
GCC states as a weapon for self-defence.
accusing Iran of participating in the revolts, they triggered a quick response and a joint pre-emptive action
by the GCC, thus protecting Saudi and Sunni hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Both Saudi Arabia and
Iran have taken advantage of this sectarian discourse to preserve their power in the region. Given the
strong ties between Manama and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has promoted the use of sectarianism in Bahrain (a
close ally) in order to protect its own internal political and economic stability (especially in the Eastern
Province) and its hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has also benefitted from this portrait of the
Bahraini uprising. Even though there is no evidence of direct Iranian meddling in the unrest, Iran has made
no efforts to deny these claims. In fact, it has strongly criticized Saudi military intervention and has
provided media coverage favourable to the protestors. It has done so motivated by the possibility of
sectarianism has become a

powerful political weapon used not only in Bahrain but also in Syria,
Iraq and Yemen. Since rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran are
played out within the political arena of multicultural neighbouring
countries, the exploitation of the Sunni-Shia divide has emerged as
much more than a soft power foreign policy tool. However, sectarianism has proven
increasing Shia leverage in the region. In this cold war context,
to be a double-edged sword and its overuse is giving rise to important security concerns, as identity is
easier to exacerbate than to control. Given the existing transnational identities in the Gulf and the role of
sectarian sensitivities in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran should be more careful when using sectarianism
as a means to justify their pursuit of realpolitik interests, since the over-empowerment of identity may end
up blurring state boundaries and changing the perception of security threats in the Middle East.
Cant solve democratic transition- requires experienced leadership

Joffe 6/1 (Prof George Joffe - a Research Fellow at the Centre and Visiting Professor of Geography at Kings
College, London University. He specialises in the Middle East and North Africa and is currently engaged in a
project studying connections between migrant communities and trans/national violence in Europe. He is
also a lecturer on the Centre's M.Phil. in International Relations. 01 June 2015. Resentment, anger and
violence https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/guest-writers/18957-resentment-anger-andviolence)//LP
There are, perhaps, two other lessons to be drawn from the Algerian experience and the events of 2011.
democratic transition is a difficult and lengthy process and that

cultural authenticity and moral authority are not, in themselves,
guarantors of success. Thus, an-Nahda in Tunisia was able, eventually, to
operate effectively within a nascent democratic environment because
its leadership had spent two decades in exile observing how
democratic systems, despite their imperfections, actually worked. It
understood the compromises that formal empowerment by an
electorate still required, both in its own understanding of the political
process and in its relations with coalition partners and even its political
opposition. Those were lessons that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt either ignored or of which it was
Firstly,
unaware, and it was this that stimulated the Tamarrud movement which the Egyptian army command
adroitly exploited to remove it from power.
China
Chinas human rights improving already Chinas National Human
Rights Action Plan
PRC 15 (June 08, 2015 Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014
http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0608/c90785-8903658.html)//LP
The basic rights of the Chinese people became better protected, and
China's constitutional principle of "respecting and safeguarding human
rights" was implemented in a better way. In 2014, China made steady progress in
comprehensively completing the building of a moderately prosperous society. By the end of the year,
among all the 29 countable or measurable indicators for economic and social development set forth in the
12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), 12 had been over-fulfilled, three had been nearly fulfilled and 11 had
The mid-stage assessment of

China's National Human Rights Action Plan (2012-2015) was carried
out in December 2014, and the result showed that most of the targets
set in the plan had been reached, and a larger part of the quantitative
indices had been half or even more achieved. In the same year China's efforts for
made smooth progress, accounting for 90 percent of the total.
law-based governance reached a new take-off stage. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central
Committee of the CPC approved the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Major Issues
Concerning Comprehensively Advancing the Law-Based Governance of China, drawing up a clear blueprint
The fundamental
purposes of the blueprint are to protect civic rights, to defend human
dignity and to put basic human rights into practice.
for building a socialist law-based country with Chinese characteristics.
PRC improving -- womens rights proves
Li 2000. (Women s Movement and Change of Women s Status in China Journal of International
Womens Studies: Vol. 1 Issue 1. January 2000. Yuhui Li. http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1626&context=jiws)
This study examines history of womens movement and gender stratification in urban areas in
there have been many changes in the PRC that

have significantly reduced the gender inequality in China compared
with the past in the thousands of years of Chinese history. Many of the
changes were institutionalized from the top and were fairly effective.
The central government has been directly involved in designing many
policies and implementing them to protect women. Womens labor
force participation was for some time brought to almost the saturated
level. There has been significant increase in the level of general
publics awareness over the issue of gender inequality. Gender gap has
become smaller in the areas of educational achievement, labor force
participation and occupational distribution.
contemporary China. Undeniably,
Womens Movements
Internet activism wont succeed on a large scale- opposition and
internal fights
Carmon 15 (IRIN CARMON - a national reporter at MSNBC, covering gender and politics. FEBRUARY 17,
2015 What Women Need http://prospect.org/article/what-women-need)//LP
Something on the surface, if not in the structures of things, has shifted in recent years. Until a few years
ago, even sympathetic celebrities and politicians cringed at anything feminist or even tangentially insistent
on womens rights. Perhaps things needed to get worsewith right-wingers talking about legitimate rape
and everything suggested by itbefore they could get better, particularly for the female voters courted by
the parties.
The Internet also allowed a critical mass of feminists to come

out of hiding and speak on their own terms, among them Girls creator Lena Dunham,
whom Swift credited as her feminist mentor. These are mostly symbolic victories, though
they matter, too, and feminists have been starved for them. Whether the groundswell can
be channeled into something more sustainable and profound is another
question. Not only is the opposition fierce, there are also deep
fractures among those who call themselves feminists. Divisions across
age, race, class and ideology have complicated efforts to establish
common priorities, writes Deborah L. Rhode in What Women Want.
Cant solve- free internet is still misogynistic
Vagianos 14 (Alanna Vagianos- an Associate Editor for HuffPost Women. She graduated from Elon
University in North Carolina. 10/03/2014 This Is What It's Like To Be A Woman Online
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/19/what-its-like-to-be-a-woman-onlinebuzzfeed_n_5849052.html)//LP
Being a woman on the Internet is no easy feat. Anyone who's ventured

onto the World Wide Web has likely witnessed -- or been on the receiving end of -comments thrown at a woman simply because, well, she's female. In a video
titled "What It's Like To Be A Woman Online," Buzzfeed interviewed nine women who are visible and active
on social media about their experiences on the Internet. The comments they've received run the range
from horrifying and offensive to downright weird. Whether left in the comments section of an article or
the responses the women featured in the video

received online all share a general theme of misogyny. From outrageous
fired off as direct tweets,
comments on appearance such as Ugly Jewish whore and For your age, youre looking great, to
mansplaining, rarely can a woman publish a few words on the Internet without receiving unsolicited,
irrelevant commentary from the world's biggest peanut gallery .
Hearing women read idiotic

commentary aloud brings some humor to a rather depressing reality,
but the abuse women receive online everyday cuts much deeper than
the few tweets and comments highlighted in the three-minute clip.
Women routinely receive death threats, rape threats and even bomb
threats when they have a public presence online. And the fact that we have come
to view this behavior as somewhat "inevitable" is terrifying. No woman should ever have to live by the rule:
"Block if [the commenter] get scary, ignore if it's just annoying."
No widespread empowerment even with free internet- lack of

infrastructure, illiteracy
UN 2005 (Women2000 and Beyond. Gender equality and empowerment of women through ICT
September 2005. UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2000-09.05-ict-e.pdf)//LP
The
so-called digital divide is actually several gaps in one. There is a

technological dividegreat gaps in infrastructure. There is a content
divide. A lot of web-based information is simply not relevant to the real
needs of people. And nearly 70 per cent of the worlds websites are in
English, at times crowding out local voices and views. There is a
gender divide, with women and girls enjoying less access to
information technology than men and boys. This can be true of rich
and poor countries alike. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Statement to the
World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, 10 December 2003. While the potential of
ICT for stimulating economic growth, socioeconomic development and effective governance is well
recognized, the benefits of ICT have been unevenly distributed within
and between countries. The term digital divide refers to the
differences in resources and capabilities to access and effectively
utilize ICT for development that exist within and between countries,
regions, sectors and socio-economic groups. The digital divide is often
characterized by low levels of access to technologies. Poverty,
illiteracy, lack of computer literacy and language barriers are among
the factors impeding access to ICT infrastructure, especially in developing
countries. Internet usage figures collected by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 2003
in 2003, the United States reported 5,558

Internet users per 10,000 persons, compared with 690 users per
10,000 persons in Asia and 156 users per 10,000 persons in Africa.
illustrate this gap in access. For instance,
No definitive case studies ICTs benefits on Womens movements

Bonder 02. (Gloria Bonder- an Argentine researcher and gender activist. Founded the Center for Women's
Studies (CEM) and coordinated the International Working Group on Women and ICT field of the United
Nations. UN meeting on Information and communication technologies and their impact on and use as an
instrument for the advancement and empowerment of women. 11 to 14 November 2002. From access to
appropriation: Women and ICT policies in Latin American and the Caribbean.
http://www.mujeresenred.net/zonaTIC/IMG/pdf/GBonder.pdf)//LP
Access to information, to knowledge and the interaction between cultures and social groups have never
been so within the reach of humanity, nor as valued as in the last decades .
The continuous
innovation and global spreading of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) appear like a fundamental resource in order to
reach these goals and inaugurate a change of era known as Information Society
or Knowledge Society. However, in its current phase of development, we must
clearly differentiate the potentialities (informative, educational, cultural, political,
economic, etc.) offered by these technologies, from their manifestations and
actual impact on the various contexts and social groups. This type of analysis
is still at a beginning stage in the LAC Region. Therefore , the understanding of the role
currently played by these technologies in our societies is usually based
on impressions, good wishes and, in the best of cases, on some
partial studies.
Economy
Econ Decline Wont Cause War

Econ Decline Doesnt Cause War
Ferguson 6
Niall Ferguson, a Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a

Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The Next War of the World, 2006,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2006-09-01/next-war-world
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most
familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the
outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in
Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were
no general
relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for
the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of
growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences
of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises
were not followed by wars.Many trace responsibility for the butchery to extreme
taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact,
ideologies. The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm calls the years between 1914 and 1991 "an era of
religious wars" but argues that "the most militant and bloodthirsty religions were secular ideologies." At
the other end of the political spectrum, the conservative historian Paul Johnson blames the violence on
"the rise of moral relativism, the decline of personal responsibility [and] the repudiation of Judeo-Christian
values." But the rise of new ideologies or the decline of old values cannot be regarded as causes of
Extreme belief systems, such as anti-Semitism, have existed

at certain times and in certain places
have they been widely embraced and translated into
violence.And as tempting as it is to blame tyrants such as Hitler, Stalin, and Mao for the century's
violence in their own right.
for most of modern history, but only
bloodletting, to do so is to repeat the error on which Leo Tolstoy heaped so much scorn in War and Peace.
Megalomaniacs may order men to invade Russia, but why do the men obey? Some historians have
attempted to answer the novelist's question by indicting the modern nation-state. The nation-state does
indeed possess unprecedented capabilities for mobilizing masses of people, but those means could just as
easily be harnessed, and have been, to peaceful ends.Others
seek the cause of

conflict in the internal political arrangements of states. It has
become fashionable among political scientists to posit a causal link between democracy and peace,
extrapolating from the observation that democracies tend not to go to war with one another. The corollary,
of course, is that dictatorships generally are more bellicose. By that logic, the rise of democracy during the
twentieth century should have made the world more peaceful. Democratization may well have reduced the
incidence of war between states. But waves of democratization in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s seem to
have multiplied the number of civil wars. Some of those (such as the conflicts in Afghanistan, Burundi,
China, Korea, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, and Vietnam) were among the deadliest
conflicts of the century. Horrendous numbers of fatalities were also caused by genocidal or "politicidal"
campaigns waged against civilian populations, such as those carried out by the Young Turks against the
Armenians and the Greeks during World War I, the Soviet government from the 1920s until the 1950s,
and the Nazis between 1933 and 1945 -- to say nothing of those perpetrated by the communist tyrannies
of Mao in China and Pol Pot in Cambodia. Indeed, such civil strife has been the most common form of
conflict during the past 50 years. Of the 24 armed conflicts recorded as "ongoing" by the University of
Maryland's Ted Robert Gurr and George Mason University's Monty Marshall in early 2005, nearly all were
civil wars.
AFF Answers
FYIs About Aff

FYI- 702 procedures (read to understand 702 restriction)
Donohue 15 (Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 38.1 (Winter 2015): 117-265. Laura K, Professor of
Law A.B., Dartmouth; M.A., University of Ulster, Northern Ireland; Ph.D., Cambridge University; J.D.,
Stanford,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/1658465073/341393F9D9AC4223PQ/2?
accountid=14667) // AW
FISA Section 702 empowers the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
jointly to authorize, for up to one year, "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information."64 Five limitations apply. Acquisition may not
intentionally (a) target a person known to be located in the United States;65 (b) target an individual
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, if the actual purpose is to target an individual
reasonably believed to be located in domestic bounds;66 (c) target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be
outside domestic bounds;67 or (d) obtain wholly domestic communications.68 In addition, (e), all
acquisition must be conducted consistent with the Fourth Amendment.69 Procedurally, five steps must be
followed for acquisition to commence. First, the AG and DNI must adopt targeting and minimization
procedures consistent with the statutory requirements.70 Second, the two officials must provide FISC with
a written certification and any supporting affidavits, attesting that there are procedures in place
reasonably designed to ensure that the acquisition is limited to targeting individuals outside of the United
States and to prevent the intentional acquisition of domestic communications, and that the minimization
procedures meet the requirements of the statute.71 They must guarantee that guidelines have been
adopted to ensure compliance with the statutory limitations.72 They also must attest that "a significant
purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information."73 Third, the targeting and
minimization procedures must be provided to the Congressional intelligence committees, as well as the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.74 FISC is limited in the role
it can play with regard to reviewing the certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures.
As long as the certification elements are present, the targeting procedures are reasonably designed to
ensure that acquisition targets persons are reasonably believed to be outside the United States and do not
knowingly intercept domestic communications, the minimization procedures are statutorily consistent, and
the procedures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, "the Court shall enter an order approving the
certification and the use, or continued use ..." of an acquisition.75 The FAA created numerous reporting
requirements. At least twice a year, the Attorney General and DNI must assess compliance with the
targeting and minimization procedures and submit the assessments to FISC, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the House
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary.76 The inspectors general of DOJ and the IC agency using Section
702 authorities are authorized to review compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures, and
required to review (a) the number of intelligence reports containing U.S. persons' identities disseminated
to other agencies; and (b) the number of targets later determined to be located in the United States.77
The IG reports are provided to the AG, the DNI, and the same Congressional committees receiving the AG
and DNI targeting and minimization reports.78 In addition, the head of each IC agency obtaining
information under Section 702 must annually review the programs to ascertain whether foreign
information has been, or will be, obtained from the acquisition.79 The annual review must also consider
the number of intelligence reports disseminated to other agencies containing references to U.S. persons,
the number of targets later ascertained to be located within the United States, and a description of any
procedures approved by the DNI relevant to the acquisition, the adequacy of the minimization
procedures.80 This review must then be provided to FISC, the Attorney General, the DNI, the Congressional
intelligence committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.81 Finally, every six months, the Attorney General must inform the intelligence and judiciary
committees of any certifications submitted consistent with Section 702, the reasons for exercising the
authority, any directives issued in conjunction with the acquisition, a description of the judicial review
during the reporting period of the certifications as well as targeting and minimization procedures (including
copies of orders or pleadings submitted in connection with such reviews that contain a significant legal
interpretation of the law), any actions taken to challenge or enforce a directive issued, any compliance
reviews, and a description of any incidents of noncompliance.
FYI- IC Procedures
Office of the Press Secretary (The White House, Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence
Activities, January 17, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policydirective-signals-intelligence-activities) // AW
The IC has long recognized that effective oversight is necessary to ensure that we are protecting our
national security in a manner consistent with our interests and values. Accordingly, the policies and
procedures of IC elements, and departments and agencies containing IC elements, shall include
appropriate measures to facilitate oversight over the implementation of safeguards protecting personal
information, to include periodic auditing against the standards required by this section. The policies and
procedures shall also recognize and facilitate the performance of oversight by the Inspectors General of IC
elements, and departments and agencies containing IC elements, and other relevant oversight entities, as
appropriate and consistent with their responsibilities. When a significant compliance issue occurs involving
personal information of any person, regardless of nationality, collected as a result of signals intelligence
activities, the issue shall, in addition to any existing reporting requirements, be reported promptly to the
DNI, who shall determine what, if any, corrective actions are necessary. If the issue involves a non-United
States person, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the head of the notifying
department or agency, shall determine whether steps should be taken to notify the relevant foreign
government, consistent with the protection of sources and methods and of U.S. personnel.
Topicality
Domestic
Domestic refers to only internal affairs of a country
Wild 06 (SUSAN ELLIS WILD has been a practicing attorney since 1982, when she graduated with honors
from George Washington University Law School. Webster's New World Law Dictionary p. 128 accessed
06/24/15)PA
Domestic adj.
pertaining to the internal affairs of products of a
country; relation to matters of the family.

Domestic is of your country
Merriam-webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domestic)PA
domestic : of, relating to, or made in your own country : relating to or involving
someone's home or family : relating to the work (such as cooking and cleaning) that is done in a person's
home
Domestic relates to a home

BLACK, M. A. 1991 (HENRY CAMPBELL was the founder of Black's Law Dictionary, the definitive legal
dictionary first published in 1891. He was also the editor of The Constitutional Review from 1917. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 6th edition p.484 accessed 06/24/15) PA
Domestic, adj. Pertaining, belonging,
the place of birth, origin, cre- ation, or transaction
or relating to a home, a domicile, or to
Curtail
Empirically, curtail means a decrease in surveillance measures
United States v. United States District Court (No. 70-153) 1972
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/407/297 LP
In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in
cases vitally affecting the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had authorized Attorney
General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters "involving the defense of the nation," but it is
questionable whether this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion. The nature and
extent of wiretapping apparently varied under different administrations and Attorneys General, but,
except for the sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the latter
years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance has been used both
against organized crime and in domestic security cases at least since
the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.
Contextually, curtail means a decrease in surveillance

Healy 03 -- senior editor at the Cato Institute (Gene, Beware of Total Information Awareness, 1/20/03,
http://truthseek.info/pdf/bewareoftotalinformationawareness190820061008.pdf LP
The Army's domestic surveillance activities were substantially curtailed

after the end of World War I. But throughout the 20th Century, in periods
of domestic unrest and foreign conflict, army surveillance ratcheted up
again, most notably in the 1960s.
Curtail is to limit
Merriam-webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail)PA
Curtail :
to reduce or limit (something)
Curtail is to cut short
Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/curtail)PA
verb (used with object)
to cut short; cut off a part of; abridge; reduce; diminish.
Curtail is to cut off

BLACK, M. A. 1991 (HENRY CAMPBELL was the founder of Black's Law Dictionary, the definitive legal
dictionary first published in 1891. He was also the editor of The Constitutional Review from 1917. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 6th edition p.383 accessed 06/24/15) PA
Curtail. To cut off the end or any part of; hence to shorten, abridge, diminish, lessen,
or reduce; and term has no such meaning as abolish. State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 21 So.2d 624, 625.
Empirically, curtail means to regulate

Friman and Andreas 99 (H. Richard Friman - associate professor of political science at Marquette
University. Peter Andreas - academy scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard
The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Google Books p. 76)
Indeed, the link between decisions to liberalize capital controls and regulatory initiatives to
curtail illicit transactions in the new liberal environment has often been very close. In the
European Community, for example, initiatives to curtail tax evasion and
money laundering began to be pursued at the very same time that member
University.
countries had agreed to abolish capital controls.
702 doesnt authorize domestic surveillance
Clapper and Holder 12.
(James Clapper and Eric Holder, DNI and AG. 2/8/2012. A letter too
Speaker Boehner and Leaders Reid, Pelosi, and McConnell.
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2012/11/08/02-08-12-fisa-reauthorization.pdf)//LP
702, authorizes surveillance directed at non-U.S.

persons located overseas who are of foreign intelligence importance. At the same time, it
One provision. section
provides a comprehensive regime of oversight by all three branches of Government to protect the privacy
and civil liberties of U.S . persons.
Under section 702, the Attorney General and

the Director of National Intelligence may authorize annually , with the
approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), intelligence collection
targeting categories of non-U.S. persons abroad, without the need for a
court order for each individual target. Within this framework, no
acquisition may intentionally target a U.S. person. here or
abroad. or any other person known to be in the United States.
The law requires special procedures designed to ensure that all such acquisitions target only non-U.S.
persons outside the United States_ and to protect the privacy of U.S. persons whose nonpublic information
may be incidentally acquired. The Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence conduct extensive oversight reviews of section 702 activities at least once every sixty days,
and Title VII requires us to report to the Congress on implementation and compliance twice a year.
A2: Legitimacy K
Reputation matters its embedded in crisis analysis
Yarhi-Milo 2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, Revisiting Reputation: How
Past Actions Matter in International Politics, August. Princeton.
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS
Does reputation for resolve matter? Our findings provide

strong evidence that it does. While studies by reputation critics
are correct to argue that realist variables like power and
interests play an important role in states behavior during
crises, past actions do have significant consequences.
Countries that have backed down are substantially more likely
to face subsequent challenges. We argue that the discrepancy
between our results and those advanced by reputation critics may
stem from their focus on crisis decision-making, where
information gleaned from past action will already have been
incorporated into broader estimates of interests and hence is less
likely to be referenced directly, as well as from their failure to recognize that
reputation acts through estimates of an opponents interests. At the same time, our results do not provide
unequivocal support in favor of the strong version of reputation associated with Thomas Schelling. Rather,
we observe that the effects of past actions remain, but are weaker, when the subsequent interaction less
closely resembles the dispute in which the country in question earned its reputation. Thus, we find that
past actions have a less substantive effect on the probability of a new dispute when the inferences are
drawn by observers who were not involved in the previous dispute. Further, we find that lessons from
territorial disputes are much more strongly associated with subsequent territorial challenges than are
lessons from non-territorial disputes. At the same time, however, we find that reputation for resolve is not
leader-specific, indicating that leader turnover in a country with a bad reputation should not significantly
lower the 29 probability that such a country will be challenged again. Important questions about reputation
remain. We find that reputation for resolve exists and is fairly general, but that leaves unanswered
questions about the generality of reputation for other traits like honesty and reliability. Separately, while
we find little change in reputation after leadership turnover, further research would be needed to
definitively establish the degree to which reputations affix to leaders or to states. It is not implausible that
both the generality of reputation and the degree to which inferences are drawn about specific leaders or
Our results confirm what

leaders already intuitively suspect: reputation for resolve is
worth having in international politics. While we certainly do not mean to imply
about states in general would vary by regime type or over time.
that backing down is always the wrong thing to do, leaders who contemplate doing so should be aware of
the associated costs.
Legitimacy is real evaluations of credibility are factored into selfinterests
explanations and evidence that reputation critics provide

have serious limitations.6 Press argues that power and interest are more important than
reputation for resolve. Yet past actions matter in formal models of
reputation by affecting uninformed players estimates of opponents
interests (Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988, Nalebuff 1991). A country that backs
down in a crisis is deemed to have a relatively low valuation
The
for the political issue at stake or a relatively high subjective cost of fighting. To the
extent that lessons about an actors resolve from one crisis carry over to another, then, they do so in the
form of statements about that actors interests. Once this lesson is learned, however, there is no
guarantee that leaders will refer back to the prior incident that led them to conclude that their opponent
was resolved, instead merely observing that it has high interests in the political stake. In short,
juxtaposing reputation to a realist power and interests story is

inappropriate if estimates of interests depend in part on past
actions. Press (2005, 21) briefly acknowledges this possibility, observing that a situation in which a
decision maker uses an adversarys history of keeping
commitments to assess the adversarys interests or military power, and hence
credibility, would be evidence that reputations matter. In practice, however, his empirical work
focuses on whether or not leaders justify predictions about adversary behavior based on actions in past
crises, while paying much less attention to the indirect route identified here in which
past actions
affect beliefs about interests, which in turn affect predictions about future behavior.
Game theoretic models of reputation formation indicate, however, that this indirect path in
fact should be the primary route by which past actions should
influence current behavior, and hence by which reputations
should operate.
Legitimacys created through reviewing past actions deterrence
proves countries that information to determine reactions
Moreover, there is the problem, noted most prominently by Fearon (1994, 2002), that within crises leaders
are likely to focus primarily on new information, such as that gleaned from crisis negotiations or military
Past actions are

by definition observable prior to a specific crisis. As such, we should
expect their influence on opponents perceptions to be most
readily visible prior to the crisis as well.7 In the context of a
significant crisis, leaders certainly debate the level of an
opponents resolve (i.e. interests), taking into account all the available information. By the
time that they do so, however, information gleaned from past actions
reputation will have been folded into the general assessment
of interests, alongside other pertinent sources of information such as what has been learned from
the opponents crisis behavior in the current crisis. Thus, while it would not be inconsistent with
our argument for leaders to reference past action in the context of an ongoing crisis,
it would not be surprising if such references did not appear.
The place to look for the effect of past actions on future
expectations is at the level of general deterrence.
mobilization, rather than the information that was available prior to the crisis.
Good reputation reduces conflict risks --- loss of reputation reduces negotiating power
What then are the implications of these arguments for international politics? The clearest prediction
countries that have earned a bad reputation

will be more likely to be challenged, while those who have
earned a good reputation will be less likely to face challenges.
concerns general deterrence:
bad reputation leads observers to believe that they

can convince the country in question to make more significant
political concessions than they otherwise would have been
willing to make. This inference has two effects: countries that would have initiated a crisis
More precisely, a
anyway now ask for more than they otherwise would have, and countries that would not have initiated a
A similar relationship applies in

reverse for countries with a good reputation, who are less
attractive targets, meaning that some who would have started
a dispute anyway demand less from them, while others who
would have made a demand now opt not to do so. While statistically
dispute now believe that it is worthwhile to do so.
testing predictions about the size of demands (especially relative to an unobservable counterfactual in
which the target had behaved differently in the past) is not possible, predictions about the frequency of
challenges are more straightforward to examine.

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Prism Neg MNDI BT 2015

Friman and Andreas 99

(H. Richard Friman - associate professor of political science at

efforts of governments to curtail illicit financial flows today bear more

Violation 702 doesnt prohibit domestic surveillance

TFA and the assumptions that

it is impossible to quantify how many

Vote neg destroys limits - aff justifies bi-directional plan

Domestic Surveillance = Data TFA

A call is not considered domestic

within and without the U.S.

That is, the Court understood what most Americans

if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign

Surveillance, however, can be defined as an act intended

to avoid something , as an observation whose purposes are

or as behavior that is attentive, cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in

We shall define surveillance as actions that imply

surveillance actions presuppose monitoring

something and identification of individuals or groups by name.

Violation PPD28 limits foreign information gathering, not

PPD-28 Regulates Foreign Surveillance

PPD-28 reinforces current practices, establishes new

within the framework of existing processes, resources, and

A2: We meet - American Companies are US

Attorney General, in consultation with the Director

has not clearly

the Supreme Court addressed

Domestic is only Domestic networks

It is domestic when the data transits only domestic networks. It

Data stored on non-US servers

The government is looking for data associated with an

that data is stored in a Microsoft server in

search warrant issued in this case applies to data

of the statute," Christopher Sprigman, a law

Non-US data is stored on US servers

Microsoft will begin allowing non-US customers to store their personal

The move was welcomed by privacy advocates.

legitimacy of processes governing NSA surveillance .A U.S.

More exacting minimization would also promote

Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple

programmatic surveillance has very different objectives and is conducted

Suspects who have been so identified can then be subjected to

counterterrorism tool . The Ra'ed al-Banna incident is a useful

Officials report that PRISM has

NSA programs can conserve

scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly spot

even if specific claimed successes remain contested,

be feasible to limit bulk collection to particular, known

Programmatic surveillance cannot be

the next Mohamed Atta.

In addition to oversight by outsiders, a programmatic surveillance

Ex post checks include such commonplace mechanisms as

Cabinet-level privacy agency key to gut unnecessary data collection

executive branch watchdogs can veto surveillance they

if the executives discretion is

internal separation of powers67 that can accomplish much the same

Programmatic surveillance thus can help remedy some of the difficulties

How can you convince the FISA court that

sometimes they cant show that an unknown target is a spy or terrorist

ask whether NSA

surveillance abroad is arbitrary or unlawful under Article 17. I assume in what

To integrate all of the relevant international law

advance a model of procedural pluralism that gives states flexibility in

creating protections if they honor core principles such as notice,