Professional Documents
Culture Documents
property and the fruits thereof pendente lite, but the motions
were denied.
When the records of the case were returned to the lower
court, the parties reiterated their motions, which the trial
court also denied on the ground that it is either the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Director of Lands who
should ask for the possession of the property.
On October 22, 1956, after the Bureau of Lands had
completed its investigation of the land controversy ordered
by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary denied the
claims of Julian Rodriguez and his daughter Monina to
the 29.3298 hectares and it improvements. Further, it
declared the land in question vacant, the steps leading to
its sale, including the improvements, in a public bidding to
be forthwith taken.
The Office of the President affirmed the Secretary's ruling
in toto.
On December 8 1958, the Director of Lands moved to
intervene in Civil Case 268 before the lower court and
prayed that the receivership be dissolved after the
receiver shall have rendered an accounting. The motion
was granted and the final accounts of the receiver were
approved.
Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez filed a
motion asking for the possession of the property and
discharge of the receiver and later, together with the
plaintiff-appellant, moved that the proceeds of the property
be delivered to and divided between them equally. The
motions were denied.
Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez
appealed to SC, imputing that the trial court erred in
declaring the litigated land already reverted to the
State; the State's ownership of the land as carrying with it
the right to possession; in not declaring defendants entitled
to the material and physical possession of the land; and in
not terminating the receivership.
On October 31, 1962, the Court affirmed the judgment
appealed from, ruling that the reversion is self-operative
and separate action need not be instituted by the
Government for that purpose.
Neither could the parties claim for the proceeds of the
property pendente lite because "all rights in and interest to,
and the improvements and crops upon, land for which an
application has been denied or cancelled or a patent or
grant refused, or a contract or concession rescinded or
annulled, shall also be forfeited to the Government."
(Section 98, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Instead, the
property as well as the fruits thereof pendente lite should be
delivered to the Director of Lands, who had intervened in
Civil Case 268.
xxx
xxx
IGNACIO MESINA,
vs.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.,
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Ignacio Mesina claims
Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957
(amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141),
provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceeding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
x------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration,
claiming
insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider pertinent
laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals categorically stated that there was a
preponderance of evidence showing that the subject lot is
within the timberland area.
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
relying on the DENR officer's testimony. It claims that the
testimony was a mere opinion. Such opinion was premised
on the officer's construction of a provision of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Those still to be classified under the present system
shall continue to remain as part of the public forest.14
Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May
1975, or long after the issuance of the free patent and title
in question. Thus, the provision stating that all public lands
should be considered as "part of the public forests" until a
land classification team has declassified them is applicable
only after the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot be
made retroactive to cover and prejudice vested rights
acquired prior to the effectivity of said law, petitioner
concludes.
It adds that if the subject lot was encompassed by the term
"public forest," the same should have been designated as a
"Timberland Block," not as Cadastral Lot No. 1434, CAF315-D, Sibonga Cadastre which was the designation made
by the Republic prior to 1972.
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals' reliance on
the land classification map (L.C. Map) presented by
respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C.
Map No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that "the plaintiff has
not duly proved the authenticity and contents." According to
petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither a
certified true copy nor one attested to be a true copy by any
DENR official having legal custody of the original thereof,
and thus should not have been made the basis of the
cancellation of the free patent and title.
and the title declared null and void, such declaration cannot
nullify the mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.
All told, a reversion suit will no longer be allowed at
this stage.
(3) The court found that the instant action for reversion is
already barred by res judicata. Res judicata now
effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of
registrability of petitioners lot.
Whether the land covered by the titles of petitioners is
under water and forms part of Manila Bay at the time of
the land registration application in 1974. If the land was
within Manila Bay, then res judicata does not apply.
Otherwise, the decision of the land registration court is a
bar to the instant reversion suit.