G.R. No.

L-59180 January 29, 1987

CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and RESOLUTION L. RUGAY,
petitioners, vs.THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT, PROVINCE OF
AGUSAN DEL SUR and ITS MUNICIPAL OFFICERS,
respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article
XI of the 1973 Constitution, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 56, enacted
on 1 February 1980, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province
of Agusan del Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56 read:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga,
Tabontabon, Perez, Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa Maria, San
Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan Mahayahay, and San
Vicente, all in the Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del
Sur, are hereby separated from said municipality to form and
constitute an independent Municipality of Sibagat without affecting
in any manner the legal existence of the mother Municipality of
Bayugan.
Sec. 2. The boundaries of the new Municipality of Sibagat will be:
Beginning at the point of intersection of the Cabadbaran-Old
Bayugan and Surigao del Sur boundaries; thence in a southernly
direction following the Old Bayugan and Cabadbaran, Old
Bayugan and Butuan City, Old Bayugan and Las Nieves
boundaries, until it reaches the point of intersection of Old
Bayugan, Esperanza and the Municipality of Las Nieves; ...
Sec. 3. The seat of government of the newly created municipality
shall be in Barangay Sibagat.
Sec. 4. Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws, now or
hereafter applicable to regular municipalities shall be applicable to
the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to be conducted in the area or areas affected within a
period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the
President (Prime Minister) shall appoint the Mayor and other

Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat.

Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with
petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal
officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been
infringed, is reproduced hereunder:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted
provision, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to
determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city,
municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code
had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that
statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when
respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.
It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only
on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code
was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a
plebiscite had been conducted among the people of the unit/units
affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed
approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created
Municipality had been appointed and had assumed their respective
positions as such.
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local
Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor
was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create
municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the
Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local
Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a
municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new
municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local

Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is that

once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution
of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid
down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the
legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the
new local government unit should be approved by the people
concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said
requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the
unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new
local government unit (parag. 5, Petition; p. 7, Memorandum). In
fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The
officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of
office and are performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus
been created.
lwphl@it

It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a

municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the
absence of any constitutional limitations a legislative body may
Create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
3rd ed., 509). The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was
a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973
Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142
SCRA 727 [1986]), striking down as unconstitutional BP Blg. 885
creating a new province in the Island of Negros known as the
Province of Negros del Norte, and declaring the plebiscite held in
connection therewith as illegal There are significant differences,
however, in the two cases among which may be mentioned the
following. in the Tan case, the Local Government Code already
existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Blg. 885
in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new
province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in
contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the Local
Government Code that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or
units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a
plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." In fact, as previously
stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of the
plebiscite conducted. Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite

area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in
BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality
has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the
enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite
thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of
legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified
in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM,
GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR.
petitioners, vs.HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A.
No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was
held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of

Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A.

No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911
voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No.
7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional
for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its
own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in
the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The
remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San
Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No.
7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as
enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in
the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal
subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not
germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law
treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section
49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law,
the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections
5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed

by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the
assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the
House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec.
5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the
effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative"
(Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional
mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for
the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49
of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No.

7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a

Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288
[1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been
further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to
wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"
(emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by
petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law
of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify
their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not
suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act
enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not
required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain
all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said
laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit
on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as

aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not

absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do
not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed
Section 49 of R.A.No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts,
the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook
the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section
49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675,
petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been
made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is
bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.
The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change
of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has
resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating
legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not
worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the
assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development

could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented

by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
the
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES
(DENR),
CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his
capacity as the Regional Executive
Director of DENR-Region XI and ENGR.
BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his
capacity as the Regional Director of the
DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB),
Region XI, petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF
DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C.
DE GUZMAN, City Mayor, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review[1] on certiorari

assailing the decision[2] dated May 28, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which
granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of
respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the
Republic, represented by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court also

directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage

in favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application
for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed
project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI.
Attached to the application were the required documents
for its issuance, namely, a) detailed location map of the
project site; b) brief project description; and c) a
certification from the City Planning and Development
Office that the project is not located in an environmentally
critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the
application after finding that the proposed project was
within an environmentally critical area and ruled that,
pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586,
otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement
System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No,
1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy,
the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with
the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of NonCoverage, respondent filed a petition for mandamus and
injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao,
docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that
its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical
project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it
was outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was
the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region
XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon
submission of the required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor
of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as

follows:
WHEREFORE,findingthepetitiontobemeritorious,judgment
grantingthewritofmandamusandinjunctionishereby
renderedinfavorofthepetitionerCityofDavaoandagainst
respondentsDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources
andtheotherrespondentsby:
1)directingtherespondentstoissueinfavorofthe
petitionerCityofDavaoaCertificateofNonCoverage,
pursuanttoPresidentialDecreeNo.1586andrelatedlaws,in
connectionwiththeconstructionbytheCityofDavaoofthe
ArticaSportsDome;
2)makingthepreliminaryinjunctionissuedon
December12,2000permanent.
Costsdeoficio.
SOORDERED.[3]
The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD
1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No.
1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA
system), which requires local government units (LGUs) to
comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including
government owned or controlled corporations, as well as
private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go
through the EIA process for their proposed projects which
have significant effect on the quality of the environment. A
local government unit, not being an agency or
instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed
excluded under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the
certifications of the DENR-Community Environment and

Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data

gathered from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports
Dome was not within an environmentally critical area.
Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It
therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the
EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for
CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements for its
issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a
writ of mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however,
the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for
review.
With the supervening change of administration,
respondent, in lieu of a comment, filed a manifestation
expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it
needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It thus
rendered the instant petition moot and academic.
However, for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS
law and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the
bench and bar,[4] we are inclined to address the issue
raised in this petition.
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, defines a local
government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed
with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and
proprietary. Governmental functions are those that
concern the health, safety and the advancement of the
public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.[6]
Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special
corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended
for private advantage and benefit.[7] When exercising
governmental powers and performing governmental
duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government.[8]
When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent

of the community in the administration of local affairs.[9]

Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is
the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a
balanced ecology.[10] Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the
City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage
of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental
functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the
environment, which is the very same objective of PD
1586.
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every
part of a statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part must be considered with other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
enactment.[11] The trial court, in declaring local
government units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS
law, failed to relate Section 2 of PD 1586 [12] to the
following provisions of the same law:
WHEREAS,thepursuitofacomprehensiveandintegrated
environmentalprotectionprogramnecessitatestheestablishment
andinstitutionalizationofasystemwherebytheexigenciesof
socioeconomicundertakingscanbereconciledwiththe
requirementsofenvironmentalquality;xxx.
Section1.Policy.ItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheState
toattainandmaintainarationalandorderlybalancebetween
socioeconomicgrowthandenvironmentalprotection.
xxxxxxxxx
Section4.PresidentialProclamationofEnvironmentally
CriticalAreasandProjects.ThePresidentofthePhilippines
may,onhisowninitiativeoruponrecommendationofthe
NationalEnvironmentalProtectionCouncil,byproclamation
declarecertainprojects,undertakingsorareasinthecountryas
environmentallycritical.Noperson,partnershiporcorporation

shallundertakeoroperateanysuchdeclaredenvironmentally
criticalprojectorareawithoutfirstsecuringanEnvironmental
ComplianceCertificateissuedbythePresidentorhisduly
authorizedrepresentative.Forthepropermanagementofsaid
criticalprojectorarea,thePresidentmaybyhisproclamation
reorganizesuchgovernmentoffices,agencies,institutions,
corporationsorinstrumentalitiesincludingtherealignmentof
governmentpersonnel,andtheirspecificfunctionsand
responsibilities.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative.[13] The Civil Code defines a person as
either natural or juridical. The state and its political
subdivisions, i.e., the local government units [14] are
juridical persons.[15] Undoubtedly therefore, local
government units are not excluded from the coverage of
PD 1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law
intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a
balance between socio-economic development and
environmental protection, which are the twin goals of
sustainable development. The above-quoted first
paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that this can
only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and
integrated environmental protection program where all
the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the
government and the private sectors. The local government
units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot
therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS
system.[16]
The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a
project, for which an Environmental Compliance

Certificate is necessary, is environmentally critical or within

an environmentally critical area. In the case at bar,
respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports
Dome will not have a significant negative environmental
impact because it is not an environmentally critical project
and it is not located in an environmentally critical area. In
support of this contention, respondent submitted the
following:
1.CertificationfromtheCityPlanningandDevelopment
Officethattheprojectisnotlocatedinanenvironmentally
criticalarea;
2.CertificationfromtheCommunityEnvironmentand
NaturalResourcesOffice(CENROWest)thattheprojectareais
withinthe1830%slope,isoutsidethescopeoftheNIPAS
(R.A.7586),andnotwithinadeclaredwatershedarea;and
3.CertificationfromPHILVOCSthattheprojectsiteis
thirtyseven(37)kilometerssoutheastofthesouthernmost
extensionoftheDavaoRiverFaultandfortyfive(45)
kilometerswestoftheEasternMindanaoFault;andisoutside
therequiredminimumbufferzoneoffive(5)metersfroma
faultzone.
The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence,
found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither is it an
environmentally critical project. It is axiomatic that factual
findings of the trial court, when fully supported by the
evidence on record, are binding upon this Court and will
not be disturbed on appeal.[17] This Court is not a trier of
facts.[18]
There are exceptional instances when this Court may
disregard factual findings of the trial court, namely: a)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the

inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or

impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; g) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and j) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[19] None of
these exceptions, however, obtain in this case.
The Environmental Impact Statement System, which
ensures environmental protection and regulates certain
government activities affecting the environment, was
established by Presidential Decree No. 1586. Section 2
thereof states:
ThereisherebyestablishedanEnvironmentalImpactStatement
Systemfoundedandbasedontheenvironmentalimpact
statementrequiredunderSection4ofPresidentialDecreeNo.
1151,ofallagenciesandinstrumentalitiesofthenational
government,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolled
corporations,aswellasprivatecorporations,firmsandentities,
foreveryproposedprojectandundertakingwhichsignificantly
affectthequalityoftheenvironment.
Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides:
EnvironmentalImpactStatements.Pursuanttotheabove
enunciatedpoliciesandgoals,allagenciesandinstrumentalities
ofthenationalgovernment,includinggovernmentownedor

controlledcorporations,aswellasprivatecorporations,firms
andentitiesshallprepare,fileandincludeineveryaction,
projectorundertakingwhichsignificantlyaffectsthequalityof
theenvironmentadetailedstatementon
(a)theenvironmentalimpactoftheproposedaction,
projectorundertaking
(b)anyadverseenvironmentaleffectwhichcannotbe
avoidedshouldtheproposalbeimplemented
(c)alternativetotheproposedaction
(d)adeterminationthattheshorttermusesofthe
resourcesoftheenvironmentareconsistentwiththe
maintenanceandenhancementofthelongtermproductivityof
thesame;and
(e)wheneveraproposalinvolvestheuseofdepletableor
nonrenewableresources,afindingmustbemadethatsuchuse
andcommitmentarewarranted.
Beforeanenvironmentalimpactstatementisissuedbyalead
agency,allagencieshavingjurisdictionover,orspecial
expertiseon,thesubjectmatterinvolvedshallcommentonthe
draftenvironmentalimpactstatementmadebytheleadagency
withinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofthesame.
Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the declaration of
certain projects or areas as environmentally critical, and
which shall fall within the scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586
quoted above.
Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued
on December 14, 1981, proclaiming the following areas

and types of projects as environmentally critical and within

the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System
established under PD 1586:
A.EnvironmentallyCriticalProjects
I.HeavyIndustries
a.Nonferrousmetalindustries
b.Ironandsteelmills
c.Petroleumandpetrochemical
industriesincludingoilandgas
d.Smeltingplants
II.ResourceExtractiveIndustries
a.Majorminingandquarryingprojects
b.Forestryprojects
1.Logging
2.Majorwoodprocessingprojects
3.Introductionoffauna(exotic
animals)inpublic/privateforests
4.Forestoccupancy
5.Extractionofmangrove
products
6.Grazing
c.FisheryProjects
1.Dikesfor/andfishponddevelopmentprojects
III.InfrastructureProjects
a.Majordams
b.Majorpowerplants(fossil
fueled,nuclearfueled,
hydroelectricorgeothermal)

c.Majorreclamationprojects
d.Majorroadsandbridges
B.EnvironmentallyCriticalAreas
1.Allareasdeclaredbylawasnationalparks,
watershedreserves,wildlifepreservesand
sanctuaries;
2.Areassetasideasaestheticpotentialtourist
spots;
3.Areaswhichconstitutethehabitatforany
endangeredorthreatenedspeciesof
indigenousPhilippineWildlife(floraand
fauna);
4.Areasofuniquehistoric,archaeological,or
scientificinterests;
5.Areaswhicharetraditionallyoccupiedby
culturalcommunitiesortribes;
6.Areasfrequentlyvisitedand/orhardhitby
naturalcalamities(geologichazards,floods,
typhoons,volcanicactivity,etc.);
7.Areaswithcriticalslopes;
8.Areasclassifiedasprimeagriculturallands;
9.Rechargedareasofaquifers;
10.Waterbodiescharacterizedbyoneoranycombinationof
thefollowingconditions;
a.tappedfordomesticpurposes
b.withinthecontrolledand/or
protectedareasdeclaredby
appropriateauthorities
c.whichsupportwildlifeandfisheryactivities
11.Mangroveareascharacterizedbyoneoranycombination
ofthefollowingconditions:

a.withprimarypristineanddense
younggrowth;
b.adjoiningmouthofmajorriver
systems;
c.nearoradjacenttotraditional
productivefryorfishinggrounds;
d.whichactasnaturalbuffers
againstshoreerosion,strong
windsandstormfloods;
e.onwhichpeoplearedependentfor
theirlivelihood.
12.Coralreefs,characterizedbyoneoranycombinationsof
thefollowingconditions:
a.with50%andabovelivecoralline
cover;
b.spawningandnurserygroundsfor
fish;
c.whichactasnaturalbreakwaterofcoastlines.
In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly
states:
EnvironmentallyNonCriticalProjects.Allotherprojects,
undertakingsandareasnotdeclaredbythePresidentas
environmentallycriticalshallbeconsideredasnoncriticaland
shallnotberequiredtosubmitanenvironmentalimpact
statement.TheNationalEnvironmentalProtectionCouncil,thru
theMinistryofHumanSettlementsmayhoweverrequirenon
criticalprojectsandundertakingstoprovideadditional
environmentalsafeguardsasitmaydeemnecessary.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come
close to any of the projects or areas enumerated above.
Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore,
that the said project is not classified as environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical area.

Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the

Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial
duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ
of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the
case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 28,1332000, granting the writ of mandamus and directing the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
issue in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of NonCoverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and
related laws, in connection with the construction of the
Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG,
DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI
MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER,
and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other
taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE,
DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
respondents.
G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner, vs.HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.
Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.

CORTES, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled
for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734,
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao."

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the
plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from
releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .
After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the
respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case
was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been
joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with
Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to
Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may
generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between
the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the
Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members
of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the
Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23,
1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the
southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and
enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time
provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter
provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,

cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by
this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family,
and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall,
within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall
be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance
with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall
be the responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was
enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of
arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the
Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding
international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the
Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been
entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign
state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule
on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the
Philippine Government whether under public international or
internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution
itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of

R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the

Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No.
6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the
effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming
for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding
treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of
the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to
R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines,
rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet.
253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of
the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a
determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the
Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional
questions which have been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates
an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which
make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of
the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of
R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the
purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above
provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute,
such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two
provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its
composition needs to be clarified.
Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the
conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region.
The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed
over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous

region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional

requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the
Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the
Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of
Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion
in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite,
and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The
provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No.
6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated
by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among
those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III
RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492
(1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval
"by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been
raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of
the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a
majority in each of the constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a
majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so
indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ...
Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the
autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para,
2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is
made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but
on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the
proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast,
they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that
used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent
units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units
put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also
the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided
under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the
people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner
Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which,
to his view, share common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of
the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-

Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the
cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess
such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly
share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not
strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner
claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous
region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down
the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas
should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these
constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas
that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do
without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v.
Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act
for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme
view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be
covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several nonMuslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include the
rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other
non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law,
and therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional
provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress
of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous
region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics,
would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As
earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas
should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region
constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom
may not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification
[People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372

(1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R.

No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated
differently from another where the groupings are based on
reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection
is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been
made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set
forth by the Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the
ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise
of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in
the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict
between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still
be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other
hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is
derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it
may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner
Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances
of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national
law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a
Muslim's religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition
precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy
between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43
SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between
real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of
religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be
called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section
13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite

do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in
the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the
power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the
Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to
merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged
as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is
the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the
National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization
Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by
Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are
not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the
Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is
not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no
conflict between the power of the President to merge
administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a
plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the
Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the
transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations,
and properties vested upon the regional government by the

organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that
the transfer of certain national government offices and their
properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a
schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such
transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the
organization of the regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are
unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval
in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight
committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect delay the
creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region
hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is
approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous
region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region
hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is
approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No.
6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do
not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the
organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to
the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.
The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained
as there is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R.
No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc,
supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978,
82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for
such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of

R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.