Duke University Press

New German Critique

The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment
Author(s): Jrgen Habermas and Thomas Y. Levin
Source: New German Critique, No. 26, Critical Theory and Modernity (Spring - Summer, 1982),
pp. 13-30
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/488023
Accessed: 14-10-2015 19:50 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Duke University Press and New German Critique are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to New
German Critique.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

TheEntwinement
ofMythandEnlightenment:
Dialecticof Enlightenment*
Re-Reading
Habermas
byJiirgen

The darkwritersofthebourgeoisie- such as Machiavelli,Hobbes

and Mandeville- had alwaysappealed to Horkheimer,whowas himselfinfluencedby Schopenhauer.Clearly,fromtheirworkstherestill
remainedtiesto Marx'ssocial theory.These connectionswerebroken
darkwritersofthebourgeoisie,foremostamong
bythereallynihilistic
themthe Marquis de Sade and Nietzsche. It is to them thatHorkheimerand Adornoturnin theDialectic
theirblackest,
ofEnlightenment,
mostnihilistic
book,inordertoconceptualizetheself-destructive
process of Enlightenment.
Althoughtheyno longerplaced hope on its
liberatingpower,inspiredby Benjamin'sironic"hope of thosewithout hope," theynonethelessrefusedto abandon thenow paradoxical
laborofanalysis.We no longersharethisattitude.However,underthe
writerssuch as
signofa Nietzscherestoredbysome post-structuralist
Derrida and the recentFoucault, attitudesare being disseminated
todaywhichappear as thespittingimageofthoseofHorkheimerand
It is the confusionof the two
Adorno in theDialecticofEnlightenment.
attitudesthatI wantto prevent.
is a strangebook. A substantialpartof
The Dialectic
ofEnlightenment
theworkwascomposedfromnotestakenbyGretelAdornoduringdiscussionsbetweenHorkheimerand Teddy in Santa Monica. The text
was completedin 1944 and publishedthreeyearslaterbytheQuerido
Press in Amsterdam.Copies of thisfirsteditionwere available for
almost twentyyears. The impact which Horkheimerand Adorno
made withthisbook on theintellectualscene oftheFederalRepublic
of Germanyespeciallyduringthe firsttwodecades afteritspublication,standsin curiouscontrastto the numberof itspurchasers.The
compositionof thebook is equally unusual; itconsistsofan essayof

*This essaywhichis published hereforthefirsttimewas deliveredas a lectureat

on March 25, 1982.
Boston University
13

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

14

Habermas
Jiirgen

and threeappendices whichconjust over fifty

pages, twoexcursuses
stitutemore thanhalfofthetext.The ratherobscuremannerof presentationmakesitdifficult
at firstglance to recognizetheunderlying
structureof the trainof thought.
I will thereforefirstexplain the two centraltheses(I and II). This
leads to the problemwhichconcernsme withregardto our present
situation:I am interested
in thesubtlestrategies
to radicallyenlighten
theEnlightenment
about itself(III).Nietzschewas themostsignificant
ofthecritique
model forwhatI willcall a totalizingself-transcendence
of ideology(IV). The comparisonof Horkheimerand Adorno with
directionsinwhichthe
Nietzscheshallilluminatenotonlythecontrary
two sides pursue theirculturalcriticism,but, in the end, shall raise
doubtsconcerningtherepeatedreflexivity
of Enlightenment
itself(V).
I.
Enlightenedthinkinghas been understoodas both a contrastto
because it countersthe
mythand as a forceopposing it.As a contrast
authorityof traditionwiththe non-coercivecoercion of the better
argument;as an opposing
forceto theextentthatitbreaksthecollective
spellofthemythical
powersbymeansofindividually
acquiredinsights
In thismanner,theEnlightenment
whichgain motivationalstrength.
was supposed tocontradictmythand therebyescape fromitspower.'
Challengingthisopposition,ofwhichenlightenedthoughtis so certain,Horkheimerand Adornoinsteadpropose a thesisofsecretcomand enlightenment
reverts
to
plicity:"Mythis alreadyenlightenment;
This thesis,announcedin theintroduction,
is developed
mythology."2
in thetitleessayand subsequentlysubstantiated
bymeansofan interpretationof the Odyssey.
Reflectedin theadventuresofthecunningcast-off
Odysseusis the
of
a
which
wrenches
itself
freefromthe
primal history
subjectivity
is
forces.
The
world
not
the
homeland
butratherthe
mythical
mythical
in
order
must
to
one
one's
from
which
gain
escape
identity.
labyrinth
The mythicalstoriesdo indeed call the individualback to his/her
but
originsmediatedgenealogicallythroughthechainofgenerations,
theseritualeventswhichare meanttobridgeand heal theguilt-ridden
distanciationfromthe originsalso widen thisgap at the same time.s
The primalmyththusinvolvesbotha sense of originand escape: the
dread of being uprootedand thesighof reliefat gettingaway.Horkheimer and Adorno thereforepursue Odysseus' cunninginto the
1. Klaus Heinrich,Versuch
Neinzu sagen(Frankfurt
am Main,
iiberdie Schwierigkeit
1964).
2. DialecticofEnlightenment,
trans.byJohn Cumming (New York, 1972), p. XVI;
referredto as DoE.
hereafter
3. Klaus Heinrich,Dahlemer
am Main, 1981),p. 122f.
Vorlesungen
(Basel/Frankfurt

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Mythand Enlightenment15

heartof the sacrificialrites:these contain an elementof deception

insofaras people attemptto redeemthemselvesfromthecurseofthe
of symbolicallyenhanced subvengefulpowersthroughthe offering
ambivalenceofa typeofconthe
to
of
myth
points
layer
This
stitutes.4
sciousnessforwhichritualpracticeis both real and imaginary.The
powerofa ritualreturntotheoriginsisvitalforthecollecregenerating
consciousness
because, as Durkheimhas shown, it guarantees
tive
characsocialcohesion;equallyvital,however,is themerelyimaginary
terof the returnto the originswhich,by developingthe egos of the
members of the tribal collective,simultaneouslyenables them to
escape theseoriginsas theymust.Thus in theprimalhistoryofsubjecsanctifiedand outtheprimalpowerswhichare simultaneously
tivity,
wittedalreadyconstitutea stageof Enlightenment.
If distancefromthe originsmeant liberationfromthe repressive
would be successful.However,the
genealogicalchain,Enlightenment
striven-after
the
Enlightenmentand conmythicpowers impede
are
which
the
to
the
ties
experiencedas captiviorigins
tinuallyprolong
newstage,thisprocess
at
that
claim
Adorno
and
Horkheimer
every
ty.
of gainingmasteryover the mythicalpowersinevitablybringsabout
The
is said to revertto mythology.
thereturnofmyth.Enlightenment
discover
to
in
order
authorsgo throughtheOdyssey
episode byepisode
at whatpricetheexperiencedOdysseusemergesfromtheadventures
he had encountered with an ego that is both strengthenedand
rigidified.
The episodes tell of danger,cunningand escape, and of the selfimposed renunciationthroughwhichthe ego (whichhas learned to
and atthesame timerelinquishes
masterdanger)gainsitsownidentity
the archaicunitywithboth innerand outernature.The song of the
Sirensrecallsa joy whichwas providedlong ago by the "fluctuating
relationshipwithnature";Odysseus yieldsto thetemptationsas one
who knowshimselfto be alreadyin chains: "Man's dominationover
himself,whichgroundshis selfhood,is almostalwaysthedestruction
ofthesubjectinwhoseserviceitis undertaken;forthesubstancewhich
is dominated,suppressedand dissolvedbyvirtueofself-preservation
is none otherthanthatverylifeas functionsofwhichtheachievements
itis,
findtheirsole definitionand determination:
of self-preservation
in fact,whatis to be preserved"(DoE, p. 54). This idea - thatpeople
bylearningtocontrolexternalnatureattheprice
developtheiridentity
4. "The discoverythatsymboliccommunicationwiththedeitythroughsacrificeis
thata
notactualmustbe an age-oldhumanexperience.The sacrificial
representation
has so exaltedcannotbe separatedfromthedeificationof
fashionableirrationalism
thehuman sacrifice- thedeceitofa priestlyrationalizationofdeathbymeans ofan
apotheosisof thepredestinedvictim"(DoE, p. 50 f.).

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

16

Habermas
Jiirgen

ofrepressingtheirinnernature- providesHorkheimerand Adorno

withthe model fora descriptionin whichthe processof EnlightenmentrevealsitsJanus-face:
thepriceofrenunciation,
ofself-seclusion,
oftheinterrupted
communicationoftheego withitsownnaturewhich
has become an anonymousId - all thisis interpreted
as the conseof
an
internalization
of
sacrifice.
The
which
quence
ego
originally
outsmarteditsmythicalfateby sacrificing
a substituteis again overwhelmedbythismythicalfateas soon as itis itselfforcedto internalize
thissacrifice.Thus, in termsofworldhistory,
thehuman specieshas
distanceditselfever further
fromitsorigins,throughthe processof
whilestillnotfreeing
fromthosemythical
itself
Enlightenment,
origins.
An almostcompletelyrationalizedmodernworldonlyseemsto be
on itrestsin factthecurseofdemonicobjectification
and
demystified;
fatalisolation.The symptomsofan emancipationrunningloose inidle
motionexpresstherevengeoftheprimordialpowersupon thosewho
triedtoemancipatethemselvesand yetcould notescape. The compulsion to rationallysubjugate the naturalforceswhich intrudefrom
withouthas engaged the participantsin a formativeprocess which
increasesthe forcesof productionad infinitum
purelyforthe sake of
while it allows the powersof reconciliation(which
self-preservation
transcendmere self-preservation)
to witheraway. Dominationof an
objectifiedexternalnatureand a repressedinnernatureare thehallmarksof Enlightenment.
Withthisthesis,Horkheimerand Adorno varyMax Weber'swellknowntheoryin whichtheold demystified
Gods are seen risingfrom
theirgravesin theformof impersonalpowersin orderto renewthe
irreconcilableconflictof thedemons.5
II.
The readerwho does notallow him/herself
to be overwhelmedby
therhetoricalpresentationof theDialectic
and instead
ofEnlightenment
takesa stepbackand seriouslyconsiderstheclaimsofthistext,can get
thefollowingimpressions:
- thatthethesiswhichis beingdevelopedhereis no less risky
thanNietzsche'sdiagnosisofnihilismwhichis formulated
in a
similarmanner;
- thattheauthorsare awareofthisriskand, contrary
toa first
their
impression,are makinga seriousattemptto substantiate
culturalcritique;
5. Max Weber,"Wissenschaft
als Beruf,"trans.as "Science as a Vocation,"in From
Max Weber:
trans.by H.H. Gerthand C. WrightMills (New York:
Essaysin Sociology,
OxfordUniversity
Press,1958),p. 148.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Mythand Enlightenment17

- but thatin doing so, theyput up withgeneralizationsand

which ultimatelythreatenthe plausibilityof
simplifications
theirproject.
I would like,firstof all, to examine iftheseimpressionsare correct.
Reason itselfdestroysthehumanitywhichithad made possible in
the firstplace - thisfar-reaching
thesisis substantiatedin the first
as we haveseen,withtheargumentthattheprocessofenlightexcursus,
enmentis fromtheverybeginningdependenton an impulseof selfwhichmutilatesreasonbecause itcan onlymakeuse ofit
preservation
in theformof purposive-rational
dominationof natureand instinct,
i.e., in the formof instrumentalreason. This does not yet prove,
however,thatreason remains subject to the dictatesof purposiverecent
eveninitsmost
i.e.,inmodernscience,in
rationality
manifestations;
the universalistconceptionsofjustice and morality,and in autonomous art.The titleessayon the"ConceptofEnlightenment,"
theexcursuson Enlightenment
and Morality,and theappendix on theculture
industryall serveto demonstratethatthisis indeed thecase.
First,Adorno and Horkheimerare convinced that,withlogical
science
has come intoitsownand has relinquishedits
positivism,
modern
emphatic claim to theoreticalknowledgein favorof technological
The earliercritiqueofthepositivistic
of
exploitability.
understanding
thesciencesis sharpenedand culminatesin theglobal reproachthat
the sciencesthemselveshave been absorbed by instrumental
reason.
Horkheimer
and
Adorno
want
to
demonstrate
Secondly,
througha
and theGenealogy
readingof theHistoire
ofMoralsthatreason
deJuliette
has been exorcizedfrommorality
andjustice.Withthedisintegration
of
and
world
all
normative
moral
standards
views,
religious
metaphysical
are said to have lost theircredibility
in the faceof the sole surviving
of
science.
De
Sade
and
Nietzsche
"have notpostulatedthat
authority
formalistic
reasonis morecloselyallied to moralitythanto immorality"(DoE,p. 118). The earliercritiqueofthemeta-ethicalreinterpretationof moralityturnsintoa sarcasticapprovalof ethicalskepticism.
Finally,in theiranalysisof mass culture,Horkheimerand Adorno
wanttodemonstrate
thatart,whenfusedwithentertainment,
isdrainedof
itsinnovativepowerand emptiedofall itscriticaland utopiancontent.
The earliercritiquehad concentratedon the affirmative
aspects of
bourgeoisculture;it now turnsintoan impotentrageovertheironic
whichmass cultureexecuteson art
justiceofan irreversiblejudgment
whichitselfhad alwaysalreadybeen ideological.
Thus, the argumentationfollowsthe same course withregardto
and art:alreadytheseparationoftheculturalspheres
science,morality,
and thedecayofthesubstantivereasonstillembodied in religionand
debilitatestheisolatedmomentsofreason,
metaphysicsso extensively
robbingthemof theircoherence,thattheyregressinto a purposive

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

18

Habermas
Jiirgen

rationalityat the service of a self-preservationgone wild. In cultural

modernity,reason is stripped of itsvalidityclaims and is assimilated to
sheer power. The criticalabilityto takea 'yes' or 'no' stand, to be able to
distinguish between what is valid and invalid, is undercut
by the unfortunate fusion of power and validityclaims. If one reduces the critique
of instrumentalreason to this core itbecomes clear why theDialecticof
flattensout the view of modernityin such an astonishing
Enlightenment
manner. The dignityspecific to cultural modernity consists in what
Max Weber has called the stubborn differentiationof value-spheres.
In fact,the DialecticofEnlightenment
does not do justice to the elements
of reason in cultural modernitywhich are contained in what Marx and
the Marxist traditioncall the bourgeois ideals (and became instrumentalized along with them): I mean the internal theoretical dynamic
which constantlypropels the sciences - and the self-reflexionof the
sciences as well - beyondthe creation of merely technologically exploitable knowledge; furthermore, I mean the universalist foundations of law and morality which have also been embodied (in no
matterhow distortedand imperfecta form) in the institutionsof constitutionalstates,in the formsof democratic decision-making, and in
individualistic patternsof identityformation;finally,I mean the productivityand the liberatingforceof an aestheticexperience witha subjectivityset free from the imperatives of purposive activityand from
the conventions of everyday perception. Contained in the works of
avant-garde art, in the discourses of art criticism,and in the innovations of our vocabularies of values, such aesthetic experiences do have
somewhatof an illuminating effector at least provide an instructive
contrast.
If these suggestions were sufficientlyelaborated for the purpose of
my argument, theywould substantiate the intuitiveimpression which
a reading of thisbook affordsat firstglance: cautiously put, the presentation is at least incomplete and one-sided. The readerjustifiablygets
the feeling that the global pessimism of the DialecticofEnlightenment
ignores significantaspects of cultural modernity. This leads to the
and reasons which could have prompted Horkquestion of the motives
heimer and Adorno to make theircritique sofar-reaching
thatthe very
project of Enlightenment itselfwas threatened: indeed the Dialecticof
offershardlyany prospect of escape fromthe constraints
Enlightenment
of instrumental rationality. In attempting to provide a preliminary
answer let me firsta) locate the Marxian type of critique of ideology
within the process of enlightenment and then b) give some of the
reasons why Horkheimer and Adorno abandoned thiskind ofanalysis
in favor of a totalizing critique.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Mythand Enlightenment19

III.

onlyin terms
Up tillnowwe have examined themythicalmentality

of the ambiguous attitude of the subjects towards the primal powers,

thatis, in termsof the emancipation
which is central to the formationof
and
Adorno
conceive Enlightenment as the
Horkheimer
identity.
unsuccessful attempt to escape from the powers of fate.The desolate
emptiness of emancipation is the formin which the curse of the mythical figuresdoes in the end overtake those attemptingto flee. A different
aspectof the description of mythicalas well as enlightened thinkingis
only mentioned in the few places where the demythologization is
concharacterized as a transformationand differentiation
offundamental
into
a
all
of
force
The
mythincorporates
phenomena
totalizing
cepts.
network of correspondences, similarities,and contrasts. Myth owes
this force to fundamental concepts which categorically hold together
thatwhich the modern understanding of the world can no longer synthesize. Language, for example, as the medium of representation in
mythicalnarrative,is not so farremoved fromrealitythatthe conventional sign is completely divorced fromits semantic content and from
its referent;speech and world view remain in some way interwoven
with the order of the world. Mythical traditions cannot be revised
without endangering the order of things and the identityof the tribe
which is embedded in them. Categories of validitysuch as 'true' and
'false', 'good' and 'evil', are still linked to empirical concepts such as
exchange, causality, health, substance, and wealth. Magical thinking
allows for no fundamental distinction between things and people,
between the inanimate and the animate, between objects which can be
manipulated and agents to which we ascribe actions and spoken expressions. Only demythologization breaks thatspell which appears to
us today as a confusion between nature and culture. The process of
Enlightenment leads to the desocialization of nature and to the denaturalization of the human world; Piaget describes thisas thedecenteringoftheworldview.
In modern times, traditions become temporalized; the changing
interpretationsare clearly distinguished from the world itself.This
externalworld divides into the objective world of entitiesand the social
world of norms (or normativelygoverned inter-personalrelationships):
both are in turn silhouetted against the inner world of subjective
experiences. When, as is the case in the course of theWestern tradition,
rationalization does not stop before the fundamental theological and

metaphysicalconcepts,thesphereofmeaningand validityis notonly

purged of empirical admixtures but is also differentiatedin terms of
propositions, the rightness of norms, and the veracityof subjective
expressions or the authenticityof works of art.6
am
6. JiirgenHabermas, Theorie
des kommunikativen
Handelns,vol. 1 (Frankfurt
Main, 1981).

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

20

Habermas
Jiirgen

If one describes the process of Enlightenment from this point of

reference as the development of a decentered understanding of the
world, this allows one to also identifythe moment in the drama at
which the critique of ideology can make its entrance. The suspicion
that the autonomous validityclaimed by theoryis an illusion because
hidden interestshave crept into its pores - such a suspicion cannot
occur unless semantic and empirical, internal and external relations
are segregated; it cannot occur unless science, moralityand art each
specialize on one validityclaim, each followa logic oftheirown and are
each purged of cosmological, theological, and cultic residues. The
critique inspired by such a suspicion attempts to prove that the propositions forwhich thesuspected
theoryclaims validityin factexpress an
a tergodependency which the theorycould not admit withoutlosing its
credibility. The critique of ideology wants to demonstrate that the
validityof a theoryunder investigationhas not freed itselfsufficiently
from the context of its genesis. It wants to demonstrate that hidden
behind the back of this theory is an inadmissiblefusion ofpowerand

and thatitis moreovertothisfusionthatitowes itsrecognition.

validity
Semantic and empirical relations become confused on precisely that
level at which the explicit differentiationbetween such internal and
externalrelationshipsis constitutive.For modern thought,thecritique
of ideology is not itselfa theorywhich competes against others; but it
relies on certain theoreticalassumptions. Thus armed, itchallenges
the

truthofa suspicioustheoryby exposingitsuntruthfulness,

itslackof

veracity.The critique of ideology furthersthe process of Enlighten-

mentbyunearthing
a categorymistakewhichstemsfromthefusionof
declaredvalidityclaimswithhidden powerclaims.
WiththistypeofcritiqueEnlightenment
becomes reflexiveforthe
firsttime; it now carries out its projecton its own products,i.e., its
theories. But the drama of Enlightenment only reaches its peripeteia

or turningpointwhenthecritiqueofideologyitselfis suspectedofno
becomes
longerproducingtruths- itis onlythenthatEnlightenment
reflexivefor a second time. Let us find out why Horkheimerand
Adorno made thismove.
In one of theappended 'notes' on "Philosophyand the(Scientific)
DivisionofLabor" thereis a sectionwhichreadslikean intrusionfrom
the earlierperiod of CriticalTheory.The passage claims thatphilosophy's"immunityto theinfluenceofthestatusquo is due to thefact
thatit accepts
thebourgeois
idealswithout
examination.
These ideals
further
maybe thosestillproclaimed,thoughin distortedform,by the representatives
ofthestatusquo; orthosewhich,despiteall manipulation,
are stillrecognizableas theobjectivemeaningofexistinginstitutions,
whethertechnicalor cultural"(DoE, p. 243, emphasisadded; trans.
modified).Here Horkheimerand Adorno recallthenotionproperto
Marx's critiqueof ideologywhichpresupposed thattherewere two

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and Enlightenment
21
Myth

sides to thepotentialforreasonarticulatedin the"bourgeoisideals"

and in the "objectivemeaning of existinginstitutions":on the one
hand thispotentialgivestheideologiesoftherulingclassesthedeceptiveappearanceofpersuasivetheorieswhileon theotherhand itprovides a point of departureforan immanentcritiqueof these ideas
whichclaimtobe in theinterestofthegeneralpublicwheninfactthey
onlyservea dominatingsegmentofsociety.In theseinstrumentalized
and abused ideas, thecritiqueofideologydiscovereda piece ofexisting reason hidden to itself.It read theseideas like a directivewhich
would be carriedout throughsocial movementsto theextentthatthe
excess.
forcesof productiondeveloped sufficient
had
retainedsome trustin
the
1930s
the
critical
theorists
During
would be releasedby
for
reason
which
culture's
bourgeois
potential
the pressureof the developingforcesof production.The interdisciplinaryresearchprogramdocumentedin the nine volumes of the
Sozialforschung
(1932-41)wasalso based on thisconfidence.
Zeitschriftfiir
In an analysisof the developmentof earlycriticaltheory,Helmut
Dubiel, a youngGermansociologist,has describedwhythe stockof
trustwas depletedto suchan extentat thebeginningofthe1940s7 that
Horkheimerand AdornofeltthattheMarxistcritiqueofideologyhad
exhausted itself;theyno longer believed thattheycould
definitely
fulfillthepromisesof a criticalsocial theorywiththemethodsof the
social sciences.Instead theyattempteda radicalizationand totalizationof theircritiqueof ideologyin orderto enlightenthe Enlightenmentabout itself.The prefaceto theDialecticofEnlightenment
begins
withthefollowingconfession:"Even thoughwe had knownformany
yearsthatthegreatdiscoveriesofapplied scienceare paid forwithan
awareness,we stillthoughtthatin
increasingdiminutionoftheoretical
our contribution
could be restricted
to the
regardto scientific
activity
criticism
or extensionofspecialistcontributions.
at any
Thematically,
rate,we were to keep to thetraditionaldisciplines:to sociology,psyunitedinthisvolume
However,thefragments
chologyandepistemology.
show thatwe wereforcedto abandon thisconviction"(DoE,p. XI).
If thenow cynicalconsciousnessofthose"dark"authorsexpresses
thetruthabout bourgeoisculture,thenthecritiqueofideologyhas lost
itsfoundations.Moreover,iftheforcesofproductionare increasingly
withtherelationsofproductionwhichtheyat
mergingsymbiotically
one timeweresupposed to destroy,thenthereis also no moredriving
forceon whichcritiquecould setitshopes. Horkheimerand Adorno
therefore
considerthebasis ofthecritiqueofideologydestroyed;and
So they
yettheywanttohold on tothebasicpremiseofEnlightenment.
undpolitische
7. Helmut Dubiel, Wissenschaftsorganisation
(Frankfurt
Erfahrung
am
Main, 1978),Teil A.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

22

Habermas
Jiirgen

did to mythand turnitback onto the

takethatwhichEnlightenment
process of Enlightenmentitself.Critique becomes total:it turnsagainst
reason as the foundation of itsown analysis. The factthatthe suspicion

ofideologybecomes totalmeansthatitopposes notonlytheideologi-

cal function of the bourgeois ideals, but rationalityas such, thereby

extending critique to the veryfoundationsof an immanent critique of
ideology.
Now reason itselfhas fallen prey to the ill-fatedconfusion of power
and validity claims. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the concept of
"instrumentalreason" was not merelymeant to denounce the factthat
in the Kantian sense, had usurped the place of
understanding, Verstand
reason or Vernunft.s
The concept was at the same time to recall the fact
thatthe purposive-rationality,which had become total,eliminates the
differencebetween thatwhich claims validityand thatwhich only serves
the interests of self-preservation.By doing so instrumental reason
breaks down the barrierbetween truthand power and therebyannihilates that fundamental differentiationwhich the modern decentered
understanding of the world thoughtithad gained definitivelyby overcoming myth. Reason, once instrumentalized, has become assimilated to power and has therebygiven up its criticalpower - thisis the
final unmasking of a critique of ideology applied to itself.
This critique of ideology describes the self-destructionof the critical
faculty,however, in a paradoxical manner, because in performingthe
analysis it must make use of the same critique which it has declared
false. It denounces the totalitarian development of Enlightenment
withitsown means - a performativecontradictionofwhichAdorno was
well aware. Adorno's laterwork, especially his NegativeDialectics,reads
like an explanation of whywe should no longer attemptto resolve this
unavoidable performative
and why only the insistentand
contradiction,
incessant development of this paradox offersthe prospect of that
almost magically charmed "remembrance of nature in the subject in
whose fulfillmentthe unacknowledged truthof all culture lies hidden"
(DoE, p. 40). In the 25 years since the completion of the Dialecticof
Adorno has remained faithfulto his philosophical imEnlightenment
pulse and has not evaded the paradoxical structureof thinkingengaged in totalized critique. The grandeur of thisconsistencybecomes
evident in a comparison with Nietzsche whose Genealogy
ofMoralswas
the great model for the DialecticofEnlightenment.
Nietzsche repressed
the paradoxical structureand explained the assimilation of reason to
power with a theoryof power which, instead of truthclaims, retains
only the rhetoricalclaim of the aesthetic fragment.The comparison of
8. See esp. Max Horkheimer, Critiqueof InstrumentalReason, trans, by Matthew J.

O'Connell, etal. (New York:SeaburyPress,1974).

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

andEnlightenment
23
Myth
Horkheimer and Adorno withNietzsche demonstrates thata totalized
critique does not have its direction inscribed. Among the unswerving

theoreticiansof a finalunmasking,Nietzsche is the one who radicalizes thecounter-Enlightenment.9

IV.
Horkheimer and Adorno's opinion of Nietzsche is conflicting.On
the one hand, theyacknowledge thathe was "one of the fewafterHegel
who recognized the dialectic of enlightenment" (DoE, p. 44). They
accept, naturally,the identityof domination and reason, that is, the
basis fora totalizing self-transcendenceof the critique of ideology. On
the other hand, they cannot overlook the fact that Hegel is also
Nietzsche's greatestantipode. Nietzsche's treatmentof the critique of
reason renders it so affirmativethat even determinate negation (i.e.,
thatprocedure which Horkheimer and Adorno retainas the only valid
methodology once reason itselfhas become unreliable) loses its sting.
Nietzsche's critique consumes the criticalimpulse itself:"As a protest
against civilization, the master's morality conversely represents the
oppressed. Hatred of atrophied instinctsactually denounces the true
nature of the task-mastersT which comes to lightonly in theirvictims.
But as a Great Power or statereligion,the masters' moralitywhollysubscribes to the civilizing powers thatbe, the compact majority,resentment and everythingthat it formerlyopposed. The realization of
Nietzsche's assertions both refutesthem and at the same time reveals
theirtruth,which - despite all his affirmationof life- was inimical to
the spiritof reality" (DoE, p. 101).
The conflictingattitudetowards Nietzsche is instructive.It indicates
that the DialecticofEnlightenment
owes more to Nietzsche thanjust the
strategyofa totalizingcritique. It is stilldifficultto understand a certain
carelessness in their treatmentof,to put itquite blatantly,the achievements of Western rationalism. How can the two advocates of the
Enlightenment (which they always claimed to be and still are) so
underestimate the rational content of cultural modernity that they
observe in itselements only the amalgamation of reason and domination, of power and validity?Is itNietzsche who inspired them to derive
the standards of their cultural criticismfrom the radical but isolated
and somehow totalized experience of aesthetic modernity?
The similaritiesin content are striking." In thatdesign which Hork-

9. Like his 'new-conservative'

successors,he too behaves likean 'anti-sociologist'.
Cf. H. Baier,"Die Gesellschaft- ein langerSchattendes totenGottes,"in NietzscheStudien,10/11(1982), 6 ff.
10. See also PeterPiitz,"Nietzscheand CriticalTheory",in Telos,50 (Winter198182), pp. 103-114.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

24

Habermas
Jiirgen

heimerand Adorno takeas a basis fortheirprimalhistoryof subjecthereare pointforpointparallelswithNietzsche.Accordingto

tivity
Nietzsche,as soon as people,were robbed of their"most obvious"
instinctstheyhad to depend on their"consciousness,"thatis, on the
and makesavailableexternalnature:"They
apparatuswhichobjectifies
were reduced to thinking,inferring,
reckoning,co-ordinatingcause
and effect,theseunfortunate
creatures.""At the same timethe old
instincts
had tobe domesticatedand thenaturaldriveswhichcould no
longerdischargespontaneously,had to be repressed.Throughthis
of a reversalin the directionof impulses
process of internalization,
thesubjectivity
ofan innernaturedevelops
(UmkehrderAntriebsrichtung),
undertheinfluence
ofrenunciation
or of'bad conscience':"Allinstincts
thatdo notdischargethemselvesoutwardly
turninward- thisiswhatI
call theinternalization
ofman: thusitwas thatman firstdevelopedwhat
was latercalled his'soul' "(GoM,p. 520). Ultimately,
thetwoelements
of the dominationover externaland internalnaturecombine and
dominationofmen overmen. "The
solidifyintotheinstitutionalized
curse of societyand of peace" restson all institutions
because they
forcemen intorenunciation:"Those fearfulbulwarkswithwhichthe
freepoliticalorganizationprotecteditselfagainsttheold instincts-of
dom - punishments belong among these bulwarks - brought about

thatall theseinstinctsof wild,free,prowlingman turnedbackward

againstmanhimself'
(GoM,p. 520).
In thesame manner,Nietzsche'scritiqueofknowledgeand moralityanticipatesthecentralidea whichHorkheimerand Adornodevelop
intheircritiqueofinstrumental
reason:behindtheidealsofobjectivity
and the truthclaims of Positivism,behind the asceticideals and the
normativeclaimsofChristianity
and a universalist
arehidden
morality
but
of
and
domination.
A pragnothing imperatives self-preservation
matic theoryof knowledgeand a naturalisticcritiqueof morality
unmaskboththeoretical
and practicalreasonas merefictionsinwhich
claims to power achieve an alibi. This is realized withthe help of
imaginationand withthe aid of a "driveto metaphorize"forwhich
externalstimuliofferonlyoccasionsforprojectiveresponses:already
forNietzsche,the textis merelythe sum of itsinterpretations.
Unlike the DialecticofEnlightenment,
however,Nietzscheexplicitly
statesthepointofviewfromwhichheis observingmodernity.
And itis
only fromthispoint of view thatone reallyunderstandswhyobjectifiednatureand moralizedsocietycan be perceivedas degenerating
into correspondingmanifestations
of the same mythicalpower trans.and ed. byWalter
11. On theGenealogy
ofMorals,in BasicWritings
ofNietzsche,
Kaufman(New York: Modern Library,1968), p. 520; hereafterreferredto as GoM.
GoodandEvilare takenfromthesame editionand willbe referred
Quotes fromBeyond
to as BGE.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Mythand Enlightenment25

whetheritbe a pervertedwill to poweror instrumental

reason.This
perspectivewas firstestablishedby aestheticmodernity,
throughobstinateself-revelations
art)ofa deconstructed
(imposedbyavant-garde
freedfromall constraints
ofcognitionand morality
as well
subjectivity
as fromall imperativesof workand utility.Nietzscheis not onlyan
intellectual
ofMallarm6;'2he has notonlyabsorbedthe
contemporary
late-romantic
spiritof RichardWagner;he is thefirstto develop the
concepts of aestheticmodernityeven before the avant-gardeconsciousnessactuallymaterializedin theliterature,
paintingand music
ofthe20thcentury.The heightenedappreciationofthetransitory,
the
of thisspontaneityof
celebrationof dynamism,and theglorification
themomentand thenew- theseareall expressionsofan aesthetically
motivatedsenseoftimeand thelongingforan immaculate,suspended
presence.The anarchicalintentionof the Surrealiststo explode the
continuumof historyis already effectivein Nietzsche. Alreadyin
Nietzsche'swork,thesubversiveforceofan aestheticresistancewhich
will laternourishthe reflections
of Benjaminand even PeterWeiss,
thatis nororiginatesin theexperienceofrebellionagainsteverything
mative.It is thissame forcewhichneutralizesthemorallygood as well
as thepractically
useful,and also expressesitselfin thedialecticofmyscaused bydesecration.As
teryand scandal,in thepleasureat thefright
the major opponents,Nietzsche sets up Socratesand Christ,those
advocatesofa beliefin truthand theasceticideal: itistheywho "negate
theaestheticvalues." Nietzschebelievesthatonlyart"in whichprethewillto deception"(GoM,p. 589), and the
ciselythelieis sanctified,
terrorofthebeautifulare capable ofresisting
capturebythedeceiving
worldof scienceand morality.
Nietzscheenthronestaste,"the Yes and No of thepalate" (BGE, p.
341) as thesole organofknowledgebeyondTruthand Falsity,beyond
Good and Evil.He adoptsthepronouncementoftastebytheartjudge
as themodel ofvaluejudgment,or "value estimation"(Wertschitzung).
For Nietzschethe onlylegitimatemeaningof critiqueis thatof the
value judgment which establishesa hierarchy,weighs things,and
measuresthepowerswithwhichtheyare endowed.All interpretation
is valuation: the "Yes" expresses esteem, the "No" expressescontempt.Accordingto Nietzsche"High" and "Low" is whatwe mean
whenwe respond'Yes' or 'No' to claimsofvalidity.
Nietzscheundercutsthe
It is interesting
toobservehowconsistently
he devaluesthetruthof
of
To
Yes/No
with,
rationality
positions. begin
assertivesentencesand thevalidityofnormativesentencesby tracing
back to positiveand negativevaluejudgments.
validityand invalidity
12. Pointedout by Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche
unddie Philosophie
(Munich, 1976), p.
38ff.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

26

Habermas
Jiirgen

He reduces sentenceslike "x is true" or "y is right"(complex propositionswithwhichwe claim validityfordescriptiveor normative
statements)to simpleevaluationswithwhichwe expressour estimations,thatis,thatwe would liketo prefertrueoverfalseand good over
evil. Thus Nietzschefirstredefinesvalidityclaims like truthas preferencesand thenposes thequestion: "Suppose thatwe prefertruth
(andjustice):whynotratheruntruth(and injustice)?"(BGE,p. 199).So,
in the finalanalysisthe value of truthand justice is determinedby
judgmentsof taste.
Of course,therecould stillbe a rationalstructure
behindthesefundamentalvalue estimations.Nietzschecan onlyrealize his goal of a
complete assimilationof reason to power by also deprivingvalue
thattheYes/
judgmentsoftheircognitivestatusand bydemonstrating
No reactionsto value-judgmentsno longerexpressclaimsofvalidity;
of subjectivewill,of
theymust be exposed as sheer manifestations
interest,and of power.
In termsoflinguistic
analysisthenextstepintheargumenttherefore
attemptsto assimilatejudgments of tasteto imperatives,and value
judgmentsto expressionsofwill.Nietzschedeals withKant'sanalysis
of thejudgment of taste(GoM,p. 539f.) in orderto substantiatethe
thesisthatevaluationsare necessarilysubjectiveand cannotbe connectedwitha claim to intersubjective
validity.He maintainsthatthe
semblanceof disinterested
satisfaction
as wellas oftheimpersonality
and universality
of the aestheticjudgment can only be established
fromtheperspectiveofthespectator;however,fromthestandpointof
the producingartistwe recognizethatvalue-judgmentsand estimationsare inducedbytheproducersofvalue.The aestheticsofproductionunfoldstheexperienceoftheartistas geniuswho createsvalues:
fromhis point of view, all estimationsare dictatedby his "valuepositingeye" (GoM,p. 472). Value-positingproductivity
laysdownthe
lawsofestimation.Thus, thevalidityclaimedbythejudgmentoftaste
is merelyan expressionof"theexcitementofthewillbythebeautiful."
One willrespondstoanotherwill,one powerconquersanother.Thisis
how Nietzschecan getfromtheYes and No ofestimations- once he
- to
has cleansedthemofall theircognitiveclaimsofvalue-judgments
theconceptofthewillto power.The beautifulis the"stimulantofthe
willto power."The aestheticcoreofthewillto poweris thustheability
of a sensibility
whichallows itselfto be affectedin as manydifferent
waysas possible.'
13. The mediatingfunctionofthejudgmentoftasteis revealedin thereductionof
theyes/nopositionsincriticizablevalidityclaimstothe'yes'and the'no' ofimperative
expressionsofwill.This isalso demonstratedbythewayNietzscherevisestheconcept
ofpropositionaltruthalongwiththeconceptoftheworldbuiltintoourgrammar:"In-

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Mythand Enlightenment27

I willleave thisas itstandsand concentrateon theperformative

contradiction
whichresultsfromall that.Ifthoughtcan no longeroperate
in the realmsof truthand validityclaims,thenanalysisand critique
and negationcan henceforthonly
lose theirmeaning. Contradiction
tobedifferent."
mean "wanting
For Nietzscheto implementhis critique
ofculture,however,thisjust willnotdo. His critiquewas notsupposed
tobe a piece ofpropaganda,butwas ratherintendedtodemonstrate
why
or bad to accept thedominationoftheideals of
itis wrong,incorrect,
scienceand morality
whichthreatenlife.If,however,all properclaims
to validityare devalued and if the underlyingvalue-judgmentsare
mereexpressionsofclaimsto powerratherthanvalidity,
accordingto
It mustat leastbe
whatstandardsshould critiquethendifferentiate?
to be esteemed
able to discriminatebetweena powerwhichdeserves
and a powerwhichdeserves
to be disparaged.Nietzsche'stheory
ofpower
is intendedto provide a way out of thisaporia. Nietzsche cannot,
however,allow thistheoryofpowerto be a theorythatcan be trueor
false.Accordingto his own analysis,he himselfoperatesin a worldof
appearance in whichone can distinguishbetweenlighterand darker
This is a world
shadows but not between reason and irrationality.
inwhich
whichhas moreorlessintentionally
relapsedintomythology,
variouspowersexertinfluenceupon each otherand wherethereis no
elementleftthatcould transcendthe strugglebetweenthe powers.
This is thepointin Nietzsche'sworkwherethetotalizedcritiqueof
ideologyturnsinto thatwhichhe calls "genealogicalcritique."Once
thecriticalsense of negationhas been suspended and thepracticeof
negationhas been abolished, Nietzschereturnsto theone dimension
whichpermitsa distinctionthatextendsoverall
of mythicalthinking
inthechainofgenerations
otherdimensions;thatwhichisolderisearlier
it
is
therefore
consideredto be better.
to
the
and thuscloser
origins:
more
considered
is
morevenerable,respectable,
Thatwhichis
originary
as thecriteria
and origin
servesimultaneously
naturaland pure.Ancestry
of rankin the social as well as in the logical sense.
It is in thissense thatNietzschebases his critiquesof moralityon
Moral value estimation,whichplaces a personor a mode of
genealogy.
conduct in a hierarchybased on criteriaof validity,is attributedby
deed, whatforcesus at all to suppose thatthereis an essentialoppositionof'true'and
toassume degreesofapparentnessand,as itwere,lighterand
'false'?Is itnotsufficient
'values' to use thelanguageof
darkershadowsand shades ofappearance - different
us be a fiction?And ifsomebodyasks:
painters?Whycouldn'ttheworldthatconcerns
'but to a fictiontheresurelybelongs an author?' - couldn'tone answerbe simply:
why?Doesn'tthis'belongs'perhapsbelongtothefictiontoo? Bynowisone notpermitted to be a bit ironicabout the subjectno less thanabout the predicateand object?
Shouldn't the philosopherbe permittedto rise above faithin grammar?"(BGE, p.
236).

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

28

Jiirgen
Habermas

Nietzscheto the originand therebyto the social statusof themoral

"The signpostto theright
roadwas forme thequesjudge him/herself:
tion:whatwastherealetymological
ofthedesignationsfor
significance
'good' coined in thevariouslanguages?I foundthattheyall led back
- thateverywhere
to thesameconceptual
transformation
'noble,''aristocratic'in thesocial sense,is thebasic conceptfromwhich'good' in the
sense of 'witharistocraticsoul,' 'noble,' 'witha soul of high order,'
'witha privilegedsoul' necessarilydeveloped: a developmentwhich
alwaysruns parallelwiththatotherin which'common,' 'plebeian,'
'low' are finallytransformed
intotheconcept'bad' " (GoM,p. 463f.).
The genealogicallocalizationofthepowershas a criticalpurpose:the
aretheactiveand
powersofan earlierand moredistinguished
ancestry
creativeones, whereasthereactivepowersof laterand lowerdescent
expressa pervertedwillto power.WiththisNietzschehas in hishands
theconceptualmeanswithwhichhe can denounce theaccidentalsuccess of thebeliefin truthand theasceticideal, as wellas thebeliefin
science and morality.Althoughdecisive for the fateof modernity,
Nietzscheconsideredthisa contingentand reversiblevictoryof the
lowerand the reactivepowers.The latter,as is well known,are sup"fromthe protective
posed to have emergedout of theRessentiment,
instinctof a degeneratinglife"(GoM,p. 556).'4
V.
We havefollowedtwovariantsofthetotalizing,self-referential
critique. Horkheimerand Adorno findthemselvesin the same predicamentas Nietzsche:iftheydo notwanttogiveup thegoal ofan ultimate
ontheir
thentheymustpreserveat
unmaskingand wanttocarry
critique,
leastonestandardfortheirexplanationofthecorruptionofall reasonable standards.In thefaceofthisparadox,thetotalizingcritiqueloses
itsdirection.It has twooptions.
Nietzsche seeks refugein a theoryof power - a consistentstep
insofaras thefunctionofreasonand powerwhichis disclosedby his
critiquesurrenderstheworld- as ifitweremythical- totheirreconcilablestrugglebetweenthepowers.In structuralist
France,Nietzsche
hasjustifiablybecome influential
as a theoreticianof powerthrough
14. The structure
oftheargumentinterests
me here.Once Nietzschehas destroyed
thefoundationsofthecritiqueofideologythrougha self-referential
applicationofthis
critique,he retainsthepositionof theexposingcriticonlybyrecourseto a notionof
The ideologicalcontentof the Genealogy
thinking.
mythical-originary
ofMorals,howas is Nietzsche'sbattleagainstmodernideas in
ever,is somethingaltogetherdifferent,
general,forwhichthe educated among those contemptuousof societycontinueto
demonstratean unusual interest:R. Maurer,"Nietzscheund die KritischeTheorie";
Studien,10/11(1982), pp.
G. Rohrmoser,"NietzschesKritikder Moral," in Nietzsche
34ffand 323ff.

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and Enlightenment29
Myth

theworkofGillesDeleuze. In hislaterwork,Foucaultalso replacedthe

model ofrepressionand emancipationdevelopedbyMarxand Freud
witha pluralismof power/discourseformations.These formations
and succeed one anotherand can be differentiated
intersect
according
to theirstyleand intensity.
Theycannot,however,bejudged in terms
ofvaliditywhichwas possible in thecase oftherepressionand emanresolutions.'5
cipationofconsciousas opposed to unconsciousconflict
ClearlyNietzsche'sdoctrineof the activeand the merelyreactive
powersalso does not offera wayout ofthepredicamentofa critique
whichattacksthevalidityofitsownpremises:atbestitpreparestheway
As a theoryitis without
foran escape fromthehorizonofmodernity.
foundationifthecategoricaldistinctionbetweenclaimsofpowerand
workmusttakeplace. As a
theoretical
validityis thebasison whichevery
as
of
the
result, meaning unmaskingchanges well:theshockwhichin
mannerNietzscheproducesagainand againis not
an almostsurrealist
intoa confusionwhichthreatensidentity
caused by theflashofinsight
the
that
the
(in
way
'getting' punchline ofajoke causes catharticlaughand
de-differentiation
the
ter).Instead, shockis caused bytheaffirmed
account
can
alone
which
of
those
affirmed
the
categories
collapse
by
for categorymistakesof existentialrelevance.This regressiveturn
enlists the powers of emancipation in the service of counterenlightenment.
but an opposite
Horkheimerand Adorno tooknot onlya different
contradiction
route:no longerdesiringto overcometheperformative
thecontradiction
ofa totalizingcritiqueof ideology,theyintensified
insteadand leftit unresolved.At the level of reflexionachieved by
Horkheimerand Adorno,everyattemptto setup a theorywas bound
to lead into an abyss: as a result,theyabandoned any theoretical
approach and practicedad hocdeterminatenegation,therebyopposing thatfusionof reason and powerwhichfillsin all the cracks.The
praxis of negationis what remainsof the "spiritof... unrelenting
theory."And thispraxisis likea vowto "turnbackevenas itreachesits
goal" (DoE,p. 42; trans,modified),thedemon ofmercilessprogress.
Ifa positionwhichphilosophyonce held occupied withitsultimate
principlesnowleads toa paradox,thentohold thispositionis notonly
butcan onlybe done ifone can plausiblydemonstrate
uncomfortable,
thatthereis no wayout. Even theretreatfromsuchan aporia mustbe
barredbecause otherwisethereis a wayout - thatis,togo back.In the
issue here at hand, however,I believe thatthis latteralternativeis
possible.
ed., Aus"Michel FoucaultsAnalytikder Macht,"in F.A. Kittler,
15. H. Fink-Eitel,
Honneth,
A.
38ff.;
den
aus
1980),
p.
Geistes
(Paderborn,
Geisteswissenschaften
treibungdes
am Main, 1980),p. 123ff.
Natur(Frankfurt
H. Joas,SozialesHandelnundmenschliche

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

30

Habermas
Jiirgen

The comparison with Nietzsche is instructiveinsofar as he calls

attentionto the aesthetic horizon ofexperience which both guides and
motivates cultural diagnosis. Nietzsche refashions judgment into a
capacity for distinctionwhich is beyond true and false, beyond good
and evil. In thisway, Nietzsche gains standards fora critique of culture
which unmasks science and moralityas ideological expressions of a
perverted will to power in a manner similar to that of the Dialecticof
which considers them as embodiments of instrumental
Enlightenment
reason. This factmakes it highlyprobable thatHorkheimerand Adorno
perceived cultural modernity from a similar horizon of experience,
with the same heightened sensibility,and also with the same myopic
perspectivewhich made them insensitiveto the tracesand the existing
formsof communicative rationality.This is also indicated by the structureofAdorno's late philosophy in which NegativeDialecticsand AestheticTheory
support each other,the formerwhich develops the paradoxical
concept of non-identity,referringto the latter which deciphers the
concealed mimetic content in the most advanced works of art.
In one respect, the critique of ideology has inconspicuously continued the undialectical enlightenment of ontological thinking. It
remained caught in the purist belief thatthe devil resides in the internal relationships between genesis and validity,and thatthisdevil must
be exorcized so thattheory,once cleansed ofall empirical admixtures,
could operate in its own pure element. It is in the objective of a final
unmasking - to pull back with one swiftmotion the veil concealing
the confusion of reason and power - thatthe puristintentionbetrays
itselfeven more clearly.This purism is similar to the attemptof ontology to categorically separate essence and appearance with one blow.
However, as is the case with the 'context of discovery' and the 'context
ofjustification' in the growth of theories, both spheres of power and
validityare so interwoventhattheycan be separated only procedurally
and step by step through the mediation of thought. In the realm of
rational discourse, critique and theory,Enlightenment and justification are rightlyintertwinedeven if the participants in the discourse
must assume that in the inescapable pragmatic presuppositions of
rational discourse only the non-coercive coercion of the betterargument gets a chance. But they know, or at least theyare able to know,
that even that presupposition of an ideal speech situation is only
necessary because convictions are formed and contested in a medium
which is not 'pure' nor removed fromthe world of appearances in the
manner of the platonic ideals. Only a discourse which admits this
everlastingimpuritycan perhaps escape frommyth,thus freeingitself,
as it were, from the entwinement of mythand Enlightenment.
TranslatedbyThomasY. Levin

This content downloaded from 66.254.228.69 on Wed, 14 Oct 2015 19:50:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions