Professional Documents
Culture Documents
status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a
just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on
the employers caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
chanroble s law library
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 148, 31 better known as the "Women and Child Labor
Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 32
entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to
Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The
forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071
which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment
of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and
mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine
Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in
Zialcita, Et. Al. v. Philippine Air Lines, 33 a decision that emanated from the
Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that
prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be
automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void,
it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with
regard to discrimination against married women. Thus:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library
complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her
services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of
the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to
denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of
their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in
view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the
Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer
preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are
categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and
not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not
inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by
federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the
employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been
held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main
federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and
applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. 35
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but
just against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against
married women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the
discrimination is unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a
woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide
occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of
the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle,
such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of
that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage
rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as
unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the
flight attendants. 37
5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136
of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it
likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive
a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements,
terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39
Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners
policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that
the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely
contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the
same should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither
capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair
the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the
danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is
that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of
the nation. 42 That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs
against petitioner.
chanroble s lawlibrary : re dnad
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
30. Molave Tours Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Et Al., G.R.
No. 112909, November 24, 1995, 250 SCRA 325; see Art. 279, Labor Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.
31. Promulgated on March 13, 1973.
32. Approved on April 15, 1952. It was later amended by Republic Act No.
1131, which in turn was approved on June 16, 1954.
33. Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977.
34. CA-G.R. No. 52753-R, June 28, 1978.
35. 45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, Sec. 506, p. 486.
36. Ibid., id., id.
37. Ibid., id., Sec. 507.
38. Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1979 ed., 235; see
Art. 874, Civil Code.
39. Art. 1306, Civil Code.
40. Art. 1700, Civil Code; see Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive
Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 (1955).
41. Art. 1701. Civil Code.
42. The 1987 Constitution provides:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . . (Sec. 15,
Art. II).
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development (Sec. 1, Art. XV).
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State (Sec. 2, Art. XV).
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated SEP 19 2005.
G.R. No. 162994 (Duncan Association Of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A.
Tecson vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.)
For resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration dated 8 October 2004, filed by
petitioners who seek the reversal of the Court's Resolution1 dated 17
September 2004 denying the instant Petition for Review.
A brief recapitulation of the facts is in order. Petitioner Pedro Tecson
("Tecson") was employed in 1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
Inc. ("Glaxo") as a medical representative. He was assigned to market
Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Upon his
employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed,
among others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies; and if
management found that such relationship posed a possible conflict of
interest, to resign from the company.
Nonetheless, Tecson became romantically involved with Bettsy, an employee
of a rival pharmaceutical firm Astra Pharmaceuticals ("Astra"). The two
eventually married in September of 1998. The relationship, including the
subsequent marriage, was cause for consternation to Glaxo. On January
1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given
rise to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to
his wife's possible resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that
they preferred to retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet no
resolution came to pass. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to
Glaxo's milk division, but his application was denied in view of Glaxo's "leastmovement-possible" policy. Then in November 1999, Glaxo transferred
Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson
asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
The matter was then brought to the Glaxo Grievance Committee, and
subsequently to a voluntary arbitrator. On 15 November 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered itsDecision declaring as
valid Glaxo's policy on relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory. This Decision was assailed by petitioners
before the Court of Appeals and this Court, but for naught.
The present Motion for Reconsideration advances four main arguments: that
the Court erroneously relied on a conjectural presumption that Tecson's
relationship might compromise the interest of the company or allow a
competitor to gain access to Glaxo's secrets and procedures; that Glaxo's
policy regarding the marriage of its employees to employees of rival
companies is contrary to public policy, morals and good customs; that Glaxo
violated its own policy which authorized the transfer of the subject employee
to another department when it denied Tecson's application to transfer to the
milk division; and that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
One of the central anchors of the assailed Resolution was the holding that
Glaxo's policy on marriage did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution,2 as the constitutional guarantee does not encompass
discriminatory behavior engaged by private individuals. 3 Petitioners do not
challenge this holding of the Court, and we see no reason to revisit this
issue.
But before we engage in a renewed discussion on the validity of Glaxo's
policy itself, we should examine the claim that Tecson was constructively
dismissed. After all, assuming that the policy itself were declared invalid, a
finding nonetheless that Tecson was not constructively dismissed would still
render this petition futile. The Court has ruled Tecson was not actually
dismissed, and the Motion for Reconsideration adduces no substantial
reasons why this holding should be reversed.
The Resolution cited Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC 4 wherein the
Court upheld the prerogative of a drug company to reassign a medical
representative under its employ to a new territory. In the same vein, the
Court has consistently affirmed as a valid prerogative of the employer the
reasonable reassignment or transfer of an employee. As held in Philippine
Japan Active Carbon Corp. v. NLRC:5
It is the employer's prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of
its employees' qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them
around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain
where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An
employee's right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right
in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his
assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is
not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other
privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal.6
In Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana,7 the Court again
upheld the prerogative of management to reassign an employee to a
division, a step which, if resorted to, may have resolved the perceived
conflict of interest. Yet the procedure involved allows the transfer only if
mutually agreed upon, and besides, employees cannot generally compel the
employer to transfer them from one division to another, this being a
management prerogative.
And finally, if no mutual resolution is arrived at, termination and voluntary
resignation remain as viable options. Neither obtained in this case, and we
have already ruled that the transfer was valid and did not constitute
constructive dismissal. If Glaxo, or any employer with a similarly drawn-out
procedure, were to ultimately resort to termination, the burden would still fall
upon it to establish that such termination is in accordance with the just
causes as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Without such linkage,
the termination would be invalid.
The fact that there was no actual termination in this case obviates the need
for us to further apply Article 282 or the jurisprudential rules on illegal
termination to this case.
Still, should Glaxo retain the said policy, and another employee trek the same
trail as Tecson did, it cannot be foreordained that the Court would similarly
rule for Glaxo and against the said employee. As repeatedly emphasized, it
all depends on the particular circumstances of each case. And ultimately, if
dismissal, constructive or otherwise, is resorted to, the standards for
termination set by the Labor Code must still be complied with.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1 G.R. No. 162994, 17 September 2004, 438 SCRA 343.
2 See Section 1, Article III, Constitution.
3 "The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection
only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has
been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any
of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or
involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is
not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the
policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy.
Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and evenhanded manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee." Duncan
Association v. Glaxo, supra note 1 at 354-355.
4 G.R. No. L-76959, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 713.
5 G.R. No. 83239, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 164.
6 Ibid.
7 G.R. No. 76645, 23 July 1991, 199 SCRA 485.
8 See Rollo, pp. 76-77.
9 Castillo v. NLRC, 367 Phil. 605 (1999).
10 Rollo, p. 210.
11 We have held that a company policy prohibiting female employees from
contracting marriage during their employment is void for violating Article 136
of the Labor Code. SeePT&T v. NLRC, 338 Phil. 1093 (1997). However, the
American case of Emory v. Georgia Hospital Service Association, previously
cited in our Decision, is also worth noting. Therein, a female employee was
discharged by her employer, a health insurance firm, for having married a
salesman from a rival insurance company. The discharged employee brought
suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging unlawful discrimination
against her because of her sex. However, the Georgia District Court ruled
that plaintiff was validly terminated, as her termination was occasioned not
by reason of her sex, but by her violation of company policy prohibiting
marriage to employees of directly competing insurance businesses. Emory v.
Georgia Hospital Service Association (1971), DC Ga., 4 CCH EPD 7785, 4 BNA
FEP Cas 891, affd (CA5) 446 F2d 897, 4 CCH EPD 7786; Cited 45 Am Jur 2d
Sec. 469.
12 In this case, Articles 283 (governing dismissals for authorized causes),
and 284 (on dismissals on the ground of disease) would not have found
application.
13 "In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that
the transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds such
as genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to show that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It
must not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other
benefits. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the
employee's demotion shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal."
Globe Telecom v. Florendo-Flores, 438 Phil. 756 (2002).
14 "Loss of confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is
law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs. Such rights would
include the right to marry or the choice of whom to marry.
19 The grey area may exist in instances wherein the employer is a religious
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164774 : April 12, 2006]
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO &
SEBASTIAN CHUA,Petitioners, v. RONALDO D. SIMBOL,
WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA,Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether
the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in
the same company violates the rights of the employee under
the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a
corporation engaged in trading - principally of paper products.
Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC
in a Resolution11 dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent
court via Petition for Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the
NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)12 Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners' dismissal from employment and ordering
private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until
actual reinstatement; and
cralawlibrary
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working
in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy.
Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons
based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.17 These policies
focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of
favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the
same company. We note that two types of employment policies involve
spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same
company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate
family members, including spouses, from working in the same company (antinepotism employment policies).18
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination,19 there are twenty state statutes20in the United States prohibiting
marital discrimination. Some state courts 21 have been confronted with the issue
of whether no-spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status
and sex discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,
complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination:
the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an
employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer
from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of female employees, is
discriminatory on its face.22
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove
that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class.
For example, although most employment policies do not expressly indicate
which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often
disproportionately affects one sex.23
The state courts' rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope
of marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil
rights acts. Though they agree that the term "marital status" encompasses
discrimination based on a person's status as either married, single, divorced, or
widowed, they are divided on whether the term has abroader meaning. Thus,
their decisions vary.24
The courts narrowly25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's
status as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature
intended a broader definition it would have either chosen different language or
specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married
rather than to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination
to include only whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and
not the "identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse." These
courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate
the marital status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly26 construed the term "marital status" rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They
strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative
intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy
violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against
all spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect on the
individual's qualifications or work performance. 27 These courts also find the nospouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any
evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses
in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. 28 They hold that the
absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification29 invalidates a rule
denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove
that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on
marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employee's spouse. 31 This is
known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies
an employer's no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly
by these state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which
no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. 32 To justify a bona
fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that
the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.33
Petitioners' sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2)
or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity"38 is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to
the first paragraph of the questioned rule39 is evidently not the valid reasonable
business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they
were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a coemployee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did
petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda
Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married
Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on
the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we
uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create
policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the
expense of an employee's right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee
marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than coemployees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the
Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The
failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.40
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in
our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in
our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences
from the legislature's silence41 that married persons are not protected under our
Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.
Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable
business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling
on the singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own
handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The
respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily
resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she
was in dire need of money. We examined the records of the case and find
Estrella's contention to be more in accord with the evidence. While findings of
fact by administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given not only
respect but, at times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions, 42 as in the case at
bar.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was
dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign
the termination papers but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in
exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she
got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon
or talked about as immoral43 is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all.
Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for
reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part
of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella's dismissal is declared
illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73477 dated August 3, 2004 isAFFIRMED.
rbl rl l lbrr
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
The records do not state the exact date when the policy in question was promulgated. The date of reference is "sometime in 1995."
Ibid.
Ibid.
Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 11-12. See CA rollo, pp. 40-49.
Decision of Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario; CA rollo, pp. 40-49.
10
11
12
13
14
15
The questioned Decision also invokes Article II, Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
16
17
A. Giattina, Challenging No-Spouse Employment Policies As Marital Status Discrimination: A Balancing Approach, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1111
(Spring, 1987).
18
Ibid.
19
See Note 23, Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994,
September 17, 2004.
20
ALASKA STAT. - 18.80.200 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE - 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. - 46a-60 (1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, - 711 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. - 1-2512 (1981); FLA. STAT. - 760.01 (1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. - 378-2 (1985); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 68, '' 1 - 103, 2-102 (Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, - 16 (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. - 37.2202 (West
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. - 363.03 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. - 49-2-303 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. - 48-1104 (1984); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. - 354-A:2 (1984); N.J. REV. STAT. - 10:5-12 (1981 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. EXEC. LAW - 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp.
1987); N.D. CENT. CODE - 14-02.4-03 (1981 & Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. - 659.030 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE - 49.60.180 (Supp.
1987); WIS. STAT. - 111.321 (Supp. 1986). Cited in Note 34, A. Giattina, supra note 18.
21
State courts in Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, and Washington have interpreted the marital status provision of their respective
state statutes. SeeNote 10, A. Giattina, supra note 18.
22
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil Rights Comm'n, 425 Mich. 527, 390 N.W.2d 625 (1986); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v.
Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 300 Md. 75, 475 A.2d 1192 (1984); Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d
506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980); Thompson v. Sanborn's Motor Express Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (1977).
26
Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302 (1991); Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229 (1981); Kraft,
Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.1979); Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 586
P.2d 1149 (1978).
27
28
29
30
31
See Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 579, 69.
32
33
Richard G. Flood and Kelly A. Cahill, The River Bend Decision and How It Affects Municipalities' Personnel Rule and Regulations, Illinois
Municipal Review, June 1993, p. 7.
34
35
Ibid.
36
37
Ibid.
38
39
Ibid.
40
41
See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Compton in Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783 (1996).
42
In Employees Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 82976, July 26, 1991), the established
exceptions are as follows:
a) the conclusion is a finding of fact grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures;
b) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
c) there is a grave abuse of discretion;
d) there is misappreciation of facts; and
cralawlibrary
e) the court, in arriving in its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admission of the parties or the
evidence presented.
43
44
Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua, et al., G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164774 : April 12, 2006]
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on
labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting
labor. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not
get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision.
Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of
the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first
paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign.
The employee spouses have the right to choose who between them should
resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. Hence,
it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It
is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-thirddegree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management. 16
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working
in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy.
Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons
based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.17 These policies
focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of
favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the
same company. We note that two types of employment policies involve
spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same
company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate
family members, including spouses, from working in the same company (antinepotism employment policies).18
intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy
violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against
all spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect on the
individual's qualifications or work performance. 27 These courts also find the nospouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any
evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses
in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. 28 They hold that the
absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification29 invalidates a rule
denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove
that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on
marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employee's spouse. 31 This is
known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies
an employer's no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly
by these state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which
no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. 32 To justify a bona
fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that
the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.33
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our
jurisdiction. We employ the standard ofreasonableness of the company policy
which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the
recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson
v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,34 we passed on the validity of the policy
of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard
its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. We considered the
prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees reasonableunder the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company policy, we recognized
that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. 35
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she
got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon
or talked about as immoral43 is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all.
Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for
reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part
of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella's dismissal is declared
illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73477 dated August 3, 2004 isAFFIRMED.
rbl rl l lbrr
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
The records do not state the exact date when the policy in question was promulgated. The date of reference is "sometime in 1995."
Ibid.
Ibid.
Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 11-12. See CA rollo, pp. 40-49.
Decision of Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario; CA rollo, pp. 40-49.
10
11
12
13
14
15
The questioned Decision also invokes Article II, Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
16
17
A. Giattina, Challenging No-Spouse Employment Policies As Marital Status Discrimination: A Balancing Approach, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1111
(Spring, 1987).
18
Ibid.
19
See Note 23, Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994,
September 17, 2004.
20
ALASKA STAT. - 18.80.200 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE - 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. - 46a-60 (1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, - 711 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. - 1-2512 (1981); FLA. STAT. - 760.01 (1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. - 378-2 (1985); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 68, '' 1 - 103, 2-102 (Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, - 16 (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. - 37.2202 (West
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. - 363.03 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. - 49-2-303 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. - 48-1104 (1984); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. - 354-A:2 (1984); N.J. REV. STAT. - 10:5-12 (1981 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. EXEC. LAW - 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp.
1987); N.D. CENT. CODE - 14-02.4-03 (1981 & Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. - 659.030 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE - 49.60.180 (Supp.
1987); WIS. STAT. - 111.321 (Supp. 1986). Cited in Note 34, A. Giattina, supra note 18.
21
State courts in Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, and Washington have interpreted the marital status provision of their respective
state statutes. SeeNote 10, A. Giattina, supra note 18.
22
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil Rights Comm'n, 425 Mich. 527, 390 N.W.2d 625 (1986); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v.
Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 300 Md. 75, 475 A.2d 1192 (1984); Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d
506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980); Thompson v. Sanborn's Motor Express Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (1977).
26
Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302 (1991); Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229 (1981); Kraft,
Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.1979); Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 586
P.2d 1149 (1978).
27
28
29
30
31
See Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 579, 69.
32
33
Richard G. Flood and Kelly A. Cahill, The River Bend Decision and How It Affects Municipalities' Personnel Rule and Regulations, Illinois
Municipal Review, June 1993, p. 7.
34
35
Ibid.
36
37
Ibid.
38
39
Ibid.
40
41
See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Compton in Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783 (1996).
42
In Employees Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 82976, July 26, 1991), the established
exceptions are as follows:
a) the conclusion is a finding of fact grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures;
b) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
c) there is a grave abuse of discretion;
d) there is misappreciation of facts; and
cralawlibrary
e) the court, in arriving in its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admission of the parties or the
evidence presented.
43
44
Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua, et al., G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 168081 : October 17, 2008]
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the
airline company.
He is now before this Court via a Petition for Review on certiorari claiming
that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his
dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing
adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide
occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because
other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the
legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of
the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so
because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of
his moral character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5 8") with
a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised
him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March
4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet
the company's weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work.
But petitioner's weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay
from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal
weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty
effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim
down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He
was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician
should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on
July 3, 1989.2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered
that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds,
which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was
retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited
petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose
weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous
weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment 3 to reduce weight in a
letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in
full, reads:
Dear Sir:
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the
reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other
benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied 21 the Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution22 of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the
NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18
November 1998 as modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and
that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainant's
entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainant's
entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date
of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is
enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of
complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from
notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainant's
reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall
accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus,
are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight
uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in
itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight. 27
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be
reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that
petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should
have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain
his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL. 28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) via a Petition forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.30
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed 31 the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The
assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE.
The private respondent's complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC because it "looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations" 33 in
evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the
weight standards of PAL are meant to be acontinuing qualification for an
employee's position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is
an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of
the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as
the NLRC seemed to suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that
the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a
conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper." 36 In other words, "the
relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of
the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to
qualify under this standard."37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight
standards of PAL are reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. 39 It is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight. 40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the
weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in
case of violation, "justifies an employee's separation from the service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 Petition for Review, the following issues are posed for
resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER'S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER
PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE
"BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e)
the Labor Code.
44
of
Conscious of the fact that Nadura's case cannot be made to fall squarely
within the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet
invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura's illness occasional attacks of asthma - is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient
to convince anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as
an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all
the others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or
willful act of the employee. How Nadura's illness could be considered as
"analogous" to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no
claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his own voluntary
act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is
substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided
under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent inNadura, thus, the
rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a
miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner
was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the
dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the
issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to
meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not
accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was
given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner's claims
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to
1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is
could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer
is yes. I can do it now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of
expenses."50 However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of
PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to
report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid
explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower
rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental
Health, Retardation and Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of
Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and
from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at
the Ladd Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned
voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her
performance met the Center's legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook reapplied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood 5 2" tall and weighed
over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it
also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on
the basis of a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which incorporates the remedies contained in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that
morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the
Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus
plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook
based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both
the metabolic system and the neurological appetite - suppressing signal
system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the
musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court
stated that "mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of
the limitation flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability only
precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse
by behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before
1978 "at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate
of her height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320
pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner
was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of
his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His
obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA
correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely
attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or
controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross
and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)." 54
moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court
ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible. 100
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This
may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that
"[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner,
this is not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as
an act "social justice,"101 or based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is
required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does
not reflect on the moral character of the employee. 103
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2)
month's pay for every year of service.104 It should include regular allowances
which he might have been receiving.105 We are not blind to the fact that he
was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would
reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with
PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is
entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month's
pay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
MEN
HEIGHT
FEET inches w/o
shoes
Five 7
SMALL FRAME
MEDIUM FRAME
LARGE FRAME
128-137
134-147
142-161
132-141
138-152
147-166
136-145
142-156
151-170
10
140-150
146-160
155-174
11
144-154
150-165
159-179
Six 0
148-158
154-170
164-184
152-162
158-175
168-189
156-167
162-180
173-194
160-171
167-185
178-199
164-175
172-190
180-204
SMALL FRAME
MEDIUM FRAME
LARGE FRAME
Five 2
102-110
107-119
115-131
105-113
110-122
118-134
108-116
113-126
121-138
111-119
116-130
125-142
114-123
120-135
129-146
118-127
124-139
133-150
122-131
128-143
137-154
126-135
132-147
141-158
10
130-140
136-151
145-163
WOMEN
HEIGHT
FEET inches w/o
shoes
11
2
Rollo, p. 139.
10
11
12
134-144
144-159
153-173
Rollo, pp. 94-99; Annex "E." NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03078-96-A,
promulgated on November 18, 1998.
13
14
Id. at 99.
15
Id. at 96.
16
Id. at 96-98.
17
Id. at 98.
18
Id.
19
20
Annex "Q."
21
Annex "U."
22
Annex "R."
23
Annex "V."
Rollo, pp. 76-88; Annex "C." NLRC NCR Case No. 019725-99, promulgated
on June 23, 2000. Penned by Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo and
concurred in by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso.
24
25
Id. at 87-88.
26
Id. at 83.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 83-86.
29
Annex "E."
30
Annex "BB."
32
Id. at 64.
33
Id. at 60.
34
Id. at 61.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 62.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Annex "B."
42
Rollo, p. 70.
43
Id. at 659-660.
Id. at 60-61.
46
Id. at 663.
47
48
49
Rollo, p. 153.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 137.
52
53
Id. at 71.
55
56
57
Rollo, p. 669.
58
Id. at 670.
Constitution (1987), Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection
to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
59
61
3 SCR 3 (1999).
The focus is not on the validity of the particular standard but rather on the
validity of its more general purpose.
64
Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, id. at 242-243, citing Flood, R.G. and
Cahill, K.A., The River Bend Decision and How It Affects Municipalities'
Personnel Rule and Regulations (June 1993), Illinois Municipal Review, p. 7.
67
68
Id. at 243.
70
Id. at 84. "Observe that the reasonableness of the rule [i.e., the weight
standards of PAL] was already established with his [i.e., the Labor Arbiter]
finding - to which we agree - that the aim thereof is to maintain their agility
to as to assure the air safety of passengers, as well by his finding of the
parties unanimity in the correctness of the weight range that should be
observed by complainant as prescribed in the rule. x x x"
72
Id. at 61-62. "While the private respondent disputes in his position paper
the reasonableness of PAL's weight standards, the NLRC's assailed decision
finds the weight standard to be valid and reasonable. In our view, this is a
fair and correct assessment as the weight limits are not whimsical standards.
They are standards put in place by an air carrier for reasons of safety in
order to comply with the extraordinary diligence in the care of passengers
that the law exacts. x x x"
73
74
Not only that. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of
passengers cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the
77
79
Rollo, p. 673.
80
Id. at 63.
82
Rollo, p. 63.
83
Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA 1.
84
Id.
Constitution (1987), Art. III, Sec. 1. "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."
86
87
People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57, 65.
Id. at 67. The Court, in buttressing its ruling also cited the Sponsorship
Speech of Commissioner Bernas in the Bill of Rights; Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986, viz.:
88
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, - 799 citing District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 US 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973), reh g denied,
410 US 959, 93 S. Ct. 1411, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973) and on remand to, 489
F. 2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US 163, 92 S.
Ct. 1965, 32 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1972); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F. 3d 261, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290,
66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) - 43542, 1995 FED App. 147P (6th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2519, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 1044, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 64 (US 1996), ON REMAND TO,
128 F. 3d 289, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 115, 1997 FED App. 318P (6th
Cir. 1997); Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F. 3d 1442, 98 Ed.
Law Rep. 639 (10th Cir. 1995); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F. 3d 1452 (DC Cir.
1997), reh g denied, 113 F. 3d 219 (DC Cir. 1997).
90
Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W. 2d 808 (Mo. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 US 992, 95 S. Ct. 1999, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1975) and cert.
denied, 421 US 1016, 95 S. Ct. 2424, 44 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1975).
92
Rollo, p. 687.
94
Rollo, p. 684.
95
"In connection with our manifestation dated 25 January 2001 you are hereby
directed to physically return to work effective 01 March 2001. You are to
report to the Office of the Vice-President-Airport Services.
Pending appeal you are going to be assigned to a 'substantially equivalent'
position in accordance with the 18 November 1998 Decision of Labor Arbiter
Ramon Valentin Reyes as modified by the 23 June Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
Failure on your part to heed this order may be a ground to administratively
charge you in accordance with the Company Code of Discipline, policy, rules
and regulations.
CESAR B. LAMBERTE"
96
Id.
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003, 401
SCRA 424.
97
98
Id. at 430.
99
Id.
San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, 433 Phil. 890, 898 (2002); Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. L-80609, August 23, 1988, 164 SCRA 671, 682.
101
Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 107
(2000).
102
104
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-14827. October 31, 1960.]
CHUA YENG, Petitioner, v. MICHAELA ROMA, and her minor children
GUADALUPE, PILAR, ROSARIO, CORNELIO and GERARDO, all
surnamed ROMEO, Respondents.
Pedro B. Uy Calderon and A. Marigomen for Petitioner.
D. V. Nacua and J. D. Palma for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; WORKMENS COMPENSATION; ACTS
REASONABLY NECESSARY TO HEALTH AND COMFORT OF EMPLOYEE ARE
INCIDENTAL TO THE EMPLOYMENT; INJURIES SUSTAINED WHILE
PERFORMING SUCH ACTS ARE COMPENSABLE. Acts reasonably necessary
to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction
of his thirst (like in the present case), hunger, or other physical demands, or
protecting himself from excessive cold, are incidental to the employment,
and injuries sustained in the performance of such acts are compensable as
arising out of and in the course of the employment (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236, p.
742, citing numerous cases). The fact that the deceased employee was in the
kitchen of appellants house drinking water when he was bitten by the puppy
and not at his usual place of work does not bring the case out of the
operation of this rule, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to
that place through appellants fault in not providing an adequate supply of
drinking water at the warehouse.
2. ID.; ID.; INJURIES SUSTAINED WHILE PERFORMING ACTS RELATED OR
with his hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was
bitten by said puppy. On June 26, 1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia
from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by petitioner.
Appellant contends that, under the circumstances narrated, the death of the
laborer can not be considered to arise "out of and in the course" of his
employment.
We find no merit in this contention. The rule is well established that
"Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an
employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other
physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are
nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries sustained in the
performance of such act are generally held to be compensable as arising out
of and in the course of the employment." (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236, p. 742,
citing numerous cases.)
That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellants house and not at his
usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule
previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to
that place through the appellants fault in not providing an adequate supply
of drinking water at the warehouse.
Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos trying to take the
fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an
independent activity. We do not regard such act as a voluntary deviation
from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was practically an
instinctive one, that would naturally be expected from any person in his
position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a
desire to protect the latters property, that can not be deemed wholly foreign
to the duties of the laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held
that the act of saving the employees own property from an apparent danger,
is compensable (in re Brightman, 107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There,
it was said:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has
happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the
master, but that which the ordinary man required to act in such an
emergency might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty."
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Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the worker
was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in
an activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the
interest of his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring
outside of assigned territory, in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings
of a passenger, was compensable (Vergoza v. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305,
December 15, 1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a
truck to pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was
caught between the wheels (Ramos v. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474); likewise,
the death of a worker who tried to recover a piece of board which had fallen
into a molasses tank, and died from the deadly fumes therein (Estandarte v.
Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing,
an impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the employee
was acting in the interest of the employer.
To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking
water but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the
circumstances that impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate
reflection, we are not prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or
negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so fraught with potent danger as to
deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been said
". . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably do
a workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his
pipe, and he may reasonably pick it up again." (Ramos v. Poblete, supra,
citing MLauchan v. Anderson, S.C. 529.)
By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to
satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some
fried fish belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to
make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away.
At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions
under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that
there were no adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of
work; that petitioners workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well
at the back of the warehouse; that this well was out of order at the time of
the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to
petitioners house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards
which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more
proximate to, the place of work.
Finally, the Workmens Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in
line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof
should be liberally construed in favor of the workingman (Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc., v. Dayao, Et Al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping Co. v. Baens del
Rosario, Et Al., L-13130, October 31, 1959).
Wherefore, the decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez
David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26341. November 27, 1968.]
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., Petitioner, v. WORKMENS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and
in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all
surnamed PABLO, Respondents.
Luisito C. Hofilea for Petitioner.
Villavieja & Villanueva for respondent Workmens Compensation
Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor
children.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT; GRANT OF AWARD FOR
INJURIES SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT; SCOPE OF TERM
"EMPLOYMENT." Employment includes not only the actual doing of the
work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in
passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee
be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employers premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employers premises, the injury is one arising out of and
in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while
the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In
other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is
entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be
done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to
begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employers premises
where the work is to be done; "but it is clear that in some cases the rule
extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of
ingress and agrees with the express or implied consent of the employer"
(Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 72 L. ed. 507, Feb. 20, 1928).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INJURIES SUSTAINED BY AN EMPLOYEE IN AN "ACCESS
AREA" WHICH MAY BE TREATED AS PART OF THE EMPLOYERS PREMISES,
COMPENSABLE; CASE AT BAR. That part of the road where Pablo was
killed is in very close proximity to the employers premises. It is an "access
area" "so clearly related to the employees premises as to be fairly treated as
a part of the employers premises." That portion of the road bears "so
intimate a relation" to the companys premises. It is the chief means of
entering the IDEGO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The
IDEGO uses it, if extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of
passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual,
if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his
work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDEGO was
under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is,
against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these
dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper
security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDEGO is liable for
the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter
referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the
Workmens Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City,
and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo
(Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo)
the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial
expenses and P300 as attorneys fees, and to pay to the Commission the
amount of P46 as fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Workmens
Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 oclock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was
shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO
gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin
Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive
for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before
he could be tried for Pablos death. At the time of the killing, Pablos
companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had
finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main
IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias"
on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on
the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablos
death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose
out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule" ; and (3) in
holding that Pablos death was an accident within the purview of the
Workmens Compensation Act. The principal issue is whether Pablos death
comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and
"The very case of Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the
petitioner intimated that `we do not of course mean to imply that an
employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from
work. That depends on the nature of his employment. Considering the facts
found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not
under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working
hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 oclock in the
morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at
full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioners
factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of
work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the
zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof.
In Salilig v. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928,
referred to in the Comments on the Workmens Compensation Commission
Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury
received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a
path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latters
laborers."
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"It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130
(June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an
employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain,
slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factorys main gate and near the
same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its
proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove.
Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.
"In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is
no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the
employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the
decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company `had
taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees, neither
does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting
place of the employee, or that said place was particularly unsafe."
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"Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way
home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial
upheavals.
"The question here is limited to whether the injuries are `in the course of
and not `out of the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point.
Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other
similar questions deal with the risk of injury or `out of the employment. `In
the course of deals mainly with the element of time and space, or `time,
place and circumstances.
"Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within
one hundred feet of the employers premises, on sidewalks or public roads,
the question of `in the course of the employment is flatly raised.
"Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of `in the course of to
include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the
moment his foot or person reaches the employers premises, whether he
arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the
employment premises and define `premises very broadly, not only to include
premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or
used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent
private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the
employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any
employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises.
"There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for
a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a
reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employers premises.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn
any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker,
trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employers brick-making
premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over
the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his
employment when hit by an on-coming train fifteen minutes before his day
would have begun. So long as a causal relation to the employment is
discernible, no federal question arises.
"The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until
he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions.
off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle
owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employers
street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all
hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling for the
employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employees
time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the
employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed
salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his
place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally
justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances."
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jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"the proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an
employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while
coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of
his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at
an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical,
customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress, either on
land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the
express or implied consent of the employer."
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jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an
award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all
mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C.L. 804. And they
do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work
on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the
employers premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment, however, is one depending upon the facts of each
case, and in some cases, where an injury occurred while the employee was
going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employers
premises, it has been held compensable.
"Thus, in the reported case (BARNETT V. BRTILING CAFETERIA CO., ante, 85)
the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the
employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately
in front of the employers place of business, while on her way to report for
duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of
employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee
is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some
point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or
while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection
of the Workmens Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to
this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the
workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases,
but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is
at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at
bar, although the employee had not entered the employers place of business,
and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was infront of
the employers place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection
with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose
a part of the employers premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the
injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an
employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty,
was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within
a short distance from the employers plant, which was located at the dead
end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection
with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere
except to the employers plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it
in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions
under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no
option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the
employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the
purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which
he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments
of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and
that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and
environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment
and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for
which compensation has been provided by the Workmens Compensation
Law."
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jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"It is laid down as a general rule, known as the `going and coming rule,
that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual
circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by
an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury,
or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not
arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the
course thereof. "However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable
application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend
on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment,
the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury."
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"We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between offpremises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on
public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to
off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a
distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not
sound to say that while an employee is on a public highway he is always
there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right
conferred by his contract of employment; nor is it a complete answer to say
that while he is on his employers premises his presence there is by contract
right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not
one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the
law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by the law of trespass, licensee,
invitee or otherwise.
"A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of
employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to
the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks
may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there
is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways
and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference.
Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is
obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive."
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"We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule;
it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or
surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has
satisfied itself that there is a distinct `arising out of `or causal connection
between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the
premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of
employment extends as far as those conditions extend." (Larsons Workmens
Compensation Law, 1965 ed. vol. 1. pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employees death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is
considered an "accident" within the meaning of Sec. 2 of the Workmens
Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the
act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the
injured party is not legally responsible." 12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work- connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was
engaged in hauling the ships cable and in coiling it on the deck of the boat
preparatory to passing it down a hatchway. He found the space necessary for
coiling the cable party occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers.
This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava
expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so.
Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then,
with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point,
the passengers brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death
was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. v. Vda. de Mandaguit, 13 the truck which
Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction.
The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a
few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then
disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The
cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of
compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course
of employment.
In Galicia v. Dy Pac, 14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu
of another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his
labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to
intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly
thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was
held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused
by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that
the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause
in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the
assailant."
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In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the
assailant.
In A.P. Santos, Inc. v. Dabacol, 15 the death of an employee- driver who,
`In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is
physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the
provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given,
and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the
employee to injure or kill himself or another.
"This provision was largely copied from the New York section on
presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all
cases, not merely those involving an employees death or inability to testify.
"The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to
mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie
case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and
Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It
seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the
employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise the claimant
widow would have merely to say, `My husband, who was one of your
employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits, whereupon the
affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was
no connection between the death and the environment.
"It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employmentconnection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to
rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in
the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted
a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence
that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will
usually supply the `arising-out-of-employment factor. "Larsons Workmens
Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus
v. Gunderman & Sons : 22
"The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the
burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were
sustained in the course of his employment. `It is not the law that mere proof
of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under
Section 21 of the Workmens Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) that
the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the
contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must
be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries
did arise out of and in the course of the employment. Proof of the accident
will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection
appears between the accident and the employment."
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jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"The discussion of the coverage formula, `arising out of and in the course of
employment, was opened with the suggestion that, while `course and
`arising were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay
between the two factors should be observed in the various categories
discussed. "A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests,
in practice, have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some
extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost
tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work- connection: that a
certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the
`course quantity is very small, but the `arising quantity is large, the
quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the
`arising quantity is very small but the `course quantity is relatively large.
"But if both the `course and `arising quantities are small, the minimum
quantum will not be met.
"As an example of the first, a strong `arising factor but weak `course factor,
one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed of the
employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to
or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the
employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment
premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here,
by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since
the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the
unmistakeable character of the casual relation of the injury to the
employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the `course
factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line
of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in
hotels or bunk-houses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that,
although the `course factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound
asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the
conditions of employment as where a fellow logger runs amok, or a straw
falls into the bunk-house-inmates throat from the mattress above, or the
employee is trapped in a burning hotel will boost the case over the line to
success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips
in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak `course factor due to the absence of
any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present
decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an
award. It was also shown that when the `course element is strengthened by
the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable
sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on the
premises is not on call.
"A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a
borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or
going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is
unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to
the direct performance of the work.
"As an example of the reverse situation, a strong `course element and a
weak `arising element, one may recall the `positional cases discussed in
Section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other `neutra -cause cases.
Here the course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt:
the employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But
the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury whether
a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, an unexplained fall or death, or a
mistaken assault by a stranger is not distinctly associated with
employment conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the
argument that the injury would not have occurred to this employee but for
the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt.
Yet, since the `course element is so strong, awards are becoming
increasingly common on these facts.
"Incidentally, it may be observed that this `quantum idea forms a useful
yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding
compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the
above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal
connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a
broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric,
where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element
was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were
likewise very weak in OLeary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course
of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a
stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where
decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of
employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the
causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in
New York.
"But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course
and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not
found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an
employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch
negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts:
as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the
course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance;
and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Eack
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where
Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, that Commission said that "the
road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the
IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the
reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission
reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question,
there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the
respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make
it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that "the
shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the
premises, and therefore within the employment," and that "while respondent
allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the
ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary
precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
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library
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with
the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablos death did not originate from
his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of
ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that
the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely
two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the
IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its motion for
reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where
the incident happened was a public road, not less than (20) meters away
from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in
the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road
was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to
the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where
the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to
IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns
the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no
question that the assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did
indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and placed its
main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that
it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The
private road leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to use the road must
then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its
right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the
IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the
road. The IDECO owned its employees a safe passage to its premises. In
compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only the
road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also
have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The
point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main
IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stones throw therefrom. The spot is
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"Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured
while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employers, to or from his work by a way
over the employers premises, or over those of another such proximity and
relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employers premises, the
injury is one arising out and in the course of the employment as much as
though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point
of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the
place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule,
employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance
to the employers premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that
in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the
employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied
consent of the employer."
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The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal
and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECOs
premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent,
express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in
closed proximity to the IDECOs premises. It follows that Pablos death was in
the course of employment.
In Carter v. Lanzetta, 26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of
coverage to employees from the time they reach the employers premises
until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when
this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval" ; and that "under
exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may
be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or
leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it
would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer v. Rich Marine
Sales, 27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at
the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately
adjacent to the employers premises and one other located thereon, and the
general public used the street only in connection with those premises, and
the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within
the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business
establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO
premises which appear to be at the end of the private road.
We find in Jaen v. Chrysler Corporation 28 a meaningful statement of the
obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to
speak, a duty of `safe passage to an employee to the point where he can
reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without
question."
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noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant
for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train
at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does
here) that the decedents death did not originate in the work or business of
his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about
the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme
Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states
and especially Latters Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N.E. 637, 638, and arrived
at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were
compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing
bore so intimate a relation to the lumber companys premises that it could
hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The court pointed
out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was
used in connection with the lumber companys business, whether by
employees or by members of the public. In announcing the `access doctrine
Justice Greenwood said:
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`Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only
conduced to his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness
and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his
employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad
track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way)
when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of
the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place,
and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the employer.
"Again, in Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App., 53 S.W. 2d
327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the `access doctrine. In that
case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Bountiful Brick Company Et. Al. v. Giles, 276 U.5. 154, 48 S.Ct.
221, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A. L.R. 1402, as follows:
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`An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured
while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employers premises, or over those of
another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of
the employers premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of
the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and
in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached."
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the
road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employers
premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employees
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employers premises." That
portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the companys premises.
It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or
for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It
has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of
access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the
IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe,
that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of
these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the
proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is
liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death. As heretofore
stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed
before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the
statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be
shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the
hazard which resulted in the injury. 30 The following more modern view was
expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company v. Jones. 31
"While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must
be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries
to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121], Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been
somewhat more liberal, saying that, `to be compensable, injuries do not
have to arise from something peculiar to the employment. Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444.
`Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time)
the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred because it results
from a risk common to all others .. unless it is also common to the general
But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be
held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo
was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECOs
premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there
automatically arises the presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury
by assault arose out of the employment, i.e., there is a causal relation
between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal
from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employers main
gate, bring Pablos death within the scope of the course factor. But it may
logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters
from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule
still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean
v. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an
ingenious hypothetical situation put forth by the defendant therein:
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"We could, of course, say `this is not the case before us and utilize the old
saw, `that which is not before us we do not decide. Instead, we prefer to
utilize the considerably older saw: `Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof
(Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it
must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery
in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture
which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of
then-existing law." Since the Workmens Compensation Act is basically a
social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally
construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 32 Liberally
construed, Sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablos death. The Commission did
not err in granting compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioners costs.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
PHILD 997; Manila Railroad Co. v. WCC, L-21504, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA
98, 1967 PHlLD 676: ITEMCOP v. Reyes-Florzo, L-21969, August 31, 1966,
17 SCRA 1104.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-34228. February 21, 1980.]
SOTERO ARMAMENTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CIPRIANO
GUERRERO, Defendant-Appellee.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A case certified by the Court of Appeals pursuant to section 31 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended, on the ground that it raises purely questions of
law.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato (General Santos City) on January 27, 1967, seeking the
reconveyance of a parcel of land, or for the declaration of an implied trust
thereon, and for damages. The disputed property is Lot No. 974, PLS-247-D,
situated in Klinan 6, Polomolok, South Cotabato, with an area of
approximately 11 hectares. The property is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. V-16135 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cotabato pursuant to
Free Patent No V-19129 granted by the Director of Lands on July 20, 1961 in
favor of defendant, but which plaintiff claims was acquired by defendant
through fraud and misrepresentation.
Defendant raised the following affirmative defenses in his Answer: that
plaintiff has no cause of action; that the trial Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter; that the action has prescribed; and that it has not been
brought in the name of the real party in interest.
The trial Court, in an Order dated February 14, 1968, sustained defendants
affirmative defenses and dismissed the Complaint holding that plaintiff has
no cause of action against defendant; that if the action is to be based on
fraud, the action has prescribed; and that if the action is for cancellation of
title, plaintiff has no personality to bring the action, the proper party to
institute the same being the Republic of the Philippines.
From this Order, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the
following errors:
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I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXERCISING ITS EQUITY JURISDICTION
AS ENUNCIATED BY JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
"II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS CLAIM
OF POSSESSION AND OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION;
"III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION;
"IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DECLARATION OF AN IMPLIED TRUST,
AND DAMAGES HAS PRESCRIBED."
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In a Resolution dated July 24, 1971, and as previously stated, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to this Court because the appeal involves only legal
issues.
The Complaint alleges that plaintiff is the possessor-actual occupant of, and
the homestead applicant, over Lot No. 974, having continuously possessed
and cultivated the same since 1955 and having filed his Homestead
Application No. 37-31 therefor on July 7, 1959; that the aforesaid application
was approved by the Bureau of Lands on July 7, 1959 (the correct date is
January 6, 1964); that when he was following up his Homestead Application,
he was shocked to discover that defendant, through fraud and
misrepresentation, succeeded in obtaining Free Patent No. V-19129 and OCT
No. V-16135 by falsely stating in his Free Patent Application that he had
continuously possessed the lot in question since July 4, 1945 or prior thereto,
when, in truth and in fact, defendant was never in possession thereof. He
then prayed that the Court order defendant to reconvey the disputed lot to
him, or if reconveyance is improper, that the lot be declared in trust for the
benefit of the Republic of the Philippines, and for him, who is clearly entitled
thereto.
Defendant, in his Answer, denied that he was not in possession, alleging that
he had been in occupation of said lot and had even authorized Macario
Caangay to administer the same while he was temporarily away for
It is to be noted that the trial Court dismissed the case after a hearing on the
affirmative defenses. No trial on the merits was held. That dismissal was
based on the following grounds: that plaintiff has no personality to file the
action for reconveyance, the proper party being the Republic of the
Philippines; that plaintiff has no cause of action in the absence of privity of
contract between the parties; that defendants title, issued in 1962, has
become indefeasible, consequently, the Court is powerless to cancel the
same; and that even if the suit were based on fraud, the action has
prescribed.
It is true that the basic rule is that after the lapse of one year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to review or attack, although its issuance is
attended with fraud. 2 This does not mean, however, that the aggrieved
party is without remedy at law. If the property has not as yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. 3
"The sole remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in anothers name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, . . . but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." 4
This is exactly what plaintiff has done. He has instituted this action for
reconveyance alleging that defendant had succeeded in obtaining title
through fraud and misrepresentation by falsely stating in his free patent
application that he had continuously possessed the land since July 4, 1945
when, in truth and in fact, defendant had never been in possession. Plaintiff
has been unable to prove his charges of fraud and misrepresentation because
of the dismissal Order of the trial Court without benefit of a full-dress
hearing.
While plaintiff is not the "owner" of the land he is claiming, so that, strictly
speaking, he has no personality to file this action, 5 he pleads for equity and
invokes the doctrine of implied trust enunciated in Article 1456 of the Civil
Code as follows:
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Likewise to satisfy the demands of justice, the doctrine of implied trust may
be made to operate in plaintiffs favor, assuming that he can prove his
allegation that defendant had acquired legal title by fraud.
". . . a constructive trust is a trust raised by construction of law, or arising by
operation of law. In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from
a resulting trust, a constructive trust is a trust not created by any words,
either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but
by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It
does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation by law. (89 C.J.S.
726-727).If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy,
petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed
a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the
adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled:
In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as
Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were
caused to be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered
published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their
father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was
presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
rendered its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower
court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the
respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
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x"
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise,
the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subject of statutory construction. 7
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the
Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain
classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which
was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have
legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt
as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the
Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was
changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
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Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford
to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by
creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where
none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared
more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement
of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is
sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the death of petitioners
husband, Filomeno Vano is compensable under the Employees Compensation
Law.
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City.
On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his
motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in
Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching
Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its
passengers to be thrown overboard. Vanos head hit the bridges railing which
rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he
was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
Vanos widow, Crispina Vano, filed a death benefit claim under PD 626, as
amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On April
6, 1984, the GSIS denied the claim, citing the following reason:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"It appears on record that your husband was on his way to his station when
he died in a vehicular accident he figured in a Sunday, July 31, 1983.
"Obviously, the accident occurred outside of his time and place of work;
neither was he performing official duties at the time of its occurrence.
Accordingly, the conditions for compensability in accordance with the law
have not been satisfied, to wit:
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1. that the employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;
2. that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and
3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for his employer."
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Compensation).
"We note that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing
exceptions. In fact, the subject employees accident happened on a Sunday, a
non-working day. In the light of the foregoing, we cannot but affirm
respondents denial of the claim." (pp. 13-15, Rollo; p. 2, Decision, ECC Case
No. 2658).
The petitioner then came to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
She alleges that since her husband was precisely commuting from his
hometown to Tagbilaran City, where he would report for duty as letter carrier
the following day, when he met the accident, then his consequent death
should be compensated.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) reiterates its
views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is
different from that provided in the old Workmens Compensation Act and is
"categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the
workplace or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer. (Rollo,
p. 69).
For its part, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission stood
firm in asserting that the death of Filomeno Vano is not the result of an
employment accident as contemplated by law hence petitioner is clearly not
entitled to her claim for death benefits.
The case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees Compensation Commission (96
SCRA 260, 263, 264) supports petitioners contention of compensability. In
the said case, this Court held:
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"It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45
oclock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular
accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived,
to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the
principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his
possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve
of his death.
"The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a
point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and
from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course
of his employment."
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The same ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Alano v.
Employees Compensation Commission (158 SCRA, 669, 672):
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her
place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time.
There was nothing private or personal about the school principals being at
the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required
her to be there."
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We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in
these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioners
husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met
the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an
employment accident.
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WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the
Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sum
of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)) as death benefit and the sum of
One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
[G.R. No. 80157. February 6, 1990.]
AMALIA NARAZO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(Provincial Governors Office, Negros Occidental), Respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) dated 19 May 1987, 1 denying petitioners claim for
compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her
husband, Geronimo Narazo.
Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as Budget
Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His
duties included preparation of the budget of the Province, financial reports
and review or examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal
offices.
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On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57). His medical
records show that he was confined three (3) times at the Doa Corazon L.
Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain
and anemia. He was thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive
nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as
"Uremia."
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Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefits for the death of her
husband, under the Employees Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended).
However, said claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death of
Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease, and that there is no showing
that the position and duties of the deceased as Budget Examiner had
increased the risk of contracting "Uremia." 2 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of said decision, claiming that although the cause of her
husbands death is not considered as an occupational disease, nevertheless,
his job as Budget Examiner which required long hours of sedentary work,
coupled with stress and pressure, caused him many times to delay urination,
which eventually led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied
said motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision
of the GSIS on the ground that the ailments of the deceased could not be
attributed to employment factors and as impressed by medical experts,
benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men over fifty (50)
years of age, regardless of occupation, while uremia is a complication of
obstructive nephtropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy; 3 hence, this
petition.
Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and circumstances of the
occupation of the deceased were not considered in determining whether the
work of the said deceased had increased the risks of contracting the ailments
which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which required long
sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the risk of contracting the
disease leading to his hospital confinement and death. 4
In controversion, the ECC argues that petitioner failed to show proof that the
disease which caused the death of her husband is work-connected; and that
no credence could be given to petitioners claim that her husbands delayed
urination gave rise to the development of his ailments, for lack of medical
bases. All that petitioner has shown, according to the ECC, are mere
aggravation, and not work-connection causes. 5
Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, defines a "compensable sickness" as any illness definitely accepted
as an occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions. 6 The ECC is empowered to
". . . . It may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end,
and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with
their teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From human experience,
prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the
urine. This encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the
delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense
mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and survival of
micro-organisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. These
are predisposing factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may
concede that these illnesses are not directly caused by the nature of the
duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated
by their working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency."
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Under the foregoing circumstances, we are persuaded to hold that the cause
of death of petitioners husband is work-connected, i.e. the risk of contracting
the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that
petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for the death of her
husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission denying petitioners claim for benefits under PD
626, as amended, arising from the death of her husband, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
chanroble s lawlibrary : re dnad
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
10. Limjoco v. Republic, G.R. No. L-46575, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 202.
11. Garol v. ECC, G.R. No. 55233, 29 November 1988.
12. G.R. No. 55645, 2 November 1982, 118 SCRA 138.
[G.R. No. 132761. March 26, 2003.]
NORMA ORATE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (MANILA
BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.),Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the May 14, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42280, and its January 29, 1998 Resolution 3 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
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A) Doffing:
1) Obtain empty cones from storage prior to doffing; incl. patrol round trip.
2) Prepare empty cones to each spindle prior to doffing; incl. attention to
condition of empty cones.
3) Doff full cones to bank over machine.
4) Take empty cones by L. H. drop ends inside cone or wrap around cones
and load to spindle then start spindle.
B) Creeling:
4) Find end from running cone and joint-end from full cop; incl. keep clearer
free from accumulated cone.
5) Remove tail from empty bobbin when necessary. 20%
6) Stop spindles. (occasionally when stop motion malfunction. 10%)
C) Repair Breaks:
1) Patrol to break-end.
2) Stop spindle. (occasionally) 10%
3) Get end from full cop and thread to guides.
4) Find end from running cone by R.H. and joint ends by knotter on L. H.,
then start spindle; including keep cleaner free from accumulated cone.
D) Machine Cleaning Duties once per shift (start of shift):
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision (ECC Case No. MS7838-296) is hereby set aside; petitioner instead should be entitled to the
benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended, together with the medical-surgical
expenses, including doctors bill.
SO ORDERED. 16
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 17 arguing that it is the Labor
Code which should be applied to her case inasmuch as there is no evidence
that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred before January 1, 1975. She
claimed that the basis of the computation of her compensation benefits
should be the Labor Code and not the Workmens Compensation Act.
On January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied her motion for
reconsideration. 18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should
be compensated under the provisions of the Labor Code and not under the
Workmens Compensation Act.
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The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1)
What is the law applicable to petitioners claim for disability benefits? and (2)
Is she entitled under the applicable law to be compensated for disability
arising from breast carcinoma?
The first law on workmens compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428,
otherwise known as the Workmens Compensation Act, which took effect on
June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which
means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of
employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the
provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof
of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury
did not arise out of or in the course of employment. 19
On November 1, 1974, the Workmens Compensation Act was repealed by
the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). On December 27, 1974,
Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took effect on January 1, 1975) was
issued. It extensively amended the provisions of Title II, Book IV of the Labor
Code on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund. 20 The law as
it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing that the
illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. 21 It discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and
substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system
is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees
Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium
between the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the
employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.
22
In Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, Et Al., 23 we
explained the nature of the new employees compensation scheme and the
State Insurance Fund, as follows
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions
of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker
does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his
claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick
worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees Compensation
In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on
March 22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented as to when she
contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened
when P.D. No. 626 was already the governing law.
The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court
applied the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the
Workmens Compensation Act, even though the claim for compensation
benefit was filed after January 1, 1975. In the said cases, the symptoms of
breast cancer manifested before or too close to the cut off date January 1,
1975, that it is logical to presume that the breast carcinoma of the employee
concerned must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus
of the Labor Code govern. For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be
compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two
things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees Compensation; or (b) if the
sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the claimants working conditions. 32
There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational
disease under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such,
petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal
relationship between her illness and her working conditions.
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Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with
them. Such chemicals include aniline dyes, arsenic, asbestos, chromium and
iron compounds, lead, nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain products of coal,
lignite, oil shale, and petroleum. Unless industrial plants carefully control the
use of such chemicals, excessive amounts may escape or be released into
the environment. The chemicals then create a cancer hazard for people in
surrounding areas. (World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p. 119) 35
Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do
not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship
between her illness and her working conditions. Awards of compensation
cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. The claimant must prove a
positive proposition. 36 A perusal of the records reveals that there is no
evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that she was
dealing directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the company where she
worked did not implement measures to control the hazards occasioned by the
use of such chemicals.
Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a
persons employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a
lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in
water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the
victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar
worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area. 37
It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds
of cancer are not compensable. There are certain cancers which are
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, p. 101.
2. Special Second Division, composed of Associate Justices: Bernardo LL.
Salas (Ponente), Romeo A. Brawner (Member) and Angelina SandovalGutierrez (Chairman).
3. Rollo, p. 120.
4. Certification of Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., Rollo, p. 60.
5. Manila Bay Spinning Mills guidelines and routine duties for petitioner
(Rollo, p. 72).
6. Surgical Pathology Report of the Philippine General Hospital (Rollo, p. 62).
7. Discharge Summary, Philippine General Hospital (Rollo, p. 68).
8. Employees Notification, SSS Form B-300 (Rollo, p. 70).
9. Rollo, p. 73.
10. Rollo, p. 74.
11. Rollo, p. 75.
12. Rollo, 74.
13. Decision, Rollo, p. 77.
14. Rollo, p. 82.
15. Rollo, p. 101.
16. Rollo, p. 113
17. Rollo, p. 114.
18. Resolution, Rollo, p. 120.
19. Valencia v. Workmens Compensation Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. L41554, 30 July 1976, 72 SCRA 242, 247; citing Section 44 of Act No. 3428;
A.D. Santos, Inc. v. De Sapon, Et Al., 213 Phil. 630, 634 (1966); Naira v.
Workmens Compensation Commission, 116 Phil. 675, 677678 (1962).
20. This explains why the present law on Employees Compensation, although
part of the Labor Code, is also known as P.D. No. 626.
21. Raro v. Employees Compensation Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. 58445,
27 April 1989, 172 SCRA 845, 849.
22. Ibid., p. 850.
23. G.R. No. L-65680, 11 May 1988, 161 SCRA 312, 315317; citing De
Jesus v. Employees Compensation Commission, Et Al., 226 Phil. 33, 4041
(1986); Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, Et Al., G.R. No.
L-62207, 15 December 1986, 146 SCRA 276.
24. Gonzaga v. Employees Compensation Commission, Et Al., 212 Phil. 405,
In her Reply, petitioner cited the raison dtre for the passage of
Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act.
Petitioner stated that the Act provides for a comprehensive
pollution control policy that mainly concentrates on the
prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven
deleterious effect on the health of individuals.12 Petitioner
likewise attached a clipping from the newspaper Manila
Standard13 containing a report stating that if the present level
of diesel exhaust continues, the pollution could be expected to
cause more than 125,000 cases of lung cancer in 70 years.
On April 12, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the ECC, stating that the factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the ECC, if supported by substantial
evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their
expertise in their respective fields.14 Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration15 was denied for lack of merit.16
rll
Supra, note 3.
Id.
Rollo, p. 60.
Petition for Review filed with the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp.
24-32.
9
10
11
12
13
Rollo, p. 85.
14
15
Rollo, p. 94.
16
Rollo, p. 122.
17
19
21
22
Supra, note 5.
23
25
26
That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellants house and not at his
usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule
previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to
that place through the appellants fault in not providing an adequate supply
of drinking water at the warehouse.
Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos trying to take the
fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an
independent activity. We do not regard such act as a voluntary deviation
from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was practically an
instinctive one, that would naturally be expected from any person in his
position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a
desire to protect the latters property, that can not be deemed wholly foreign
to the duties of the laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held
that the act of saving the employees own property from an apparent danger,
is compensable (in re Brightman, 107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There,
it was said:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has
happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the
master, but that which the ordinary man required to act in such an
emergency might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty."
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Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the worker
was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in
an activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the
interest of his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring
outside of assigned territory, in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings
of a passenger, was compensable (Vergoza v. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305,
December 15, 1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a
truck to pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was
caught between the wheels (Ramos v. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474); likewise,
the death of a worker who tried to recover a piece of board which had fallen
into a molasses tank, and died from the deadly fumes therein (Estandarte v.
Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing,
an impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the employee
was acting in the interest of the employer.
To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking
water but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the
circumstances that impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate
reflection, we are not prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or
negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so fraught with potent danger as to
deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been said
". . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably do
a workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his
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This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier
case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar
factual background, this Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at
about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by
him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school
from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros
Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was
located and that at the time of the accident he had in his
possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death.
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SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-42627 February 21, 1980
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro,
concur.
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Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
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ART. 208. Applicability. - This Title (Title II, Book IV) shall
apply to injury sickness, disability or death occurring on or
after January 1, 1975 (New Labor Code).
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(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his
working hours;
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(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where
his work require 9 him to be; and
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Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toand-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293
(1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine
Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050
(1956); Onero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84
SCRA 695 (1978), were all decided under the regime of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), section 2 of
which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment", a clause
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toand-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293
(1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine
Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050
Endnotes:
2 Rollo p. 15.
3 Rollo, pp.15-16.
4 Philippine Fiber Processing Co Inc. vs. Fermina Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050; Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc,
vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366.
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by his official working hours; and that the place of the accident
is not where his work required him to be or so proximate
thereto as to be deemed a part of his workplace, he being not
on special errand for his employer at the time he met his
death, his possession of official papers notwithstanding. Thus,
we find that there is sufficient factual and legal bases for the
GSIS conclusion at the death in question is not the result of an
injury from an employment accident and, therefore, such
findings should not be disturbed. 3
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SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro,
concur.
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Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
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ART. 208. Applicability. - This Title (Title II, Book IV) shall
apply to injury sickness, disability or death occurring on or
after January 1, 1975 (New Labor Code).
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(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his
working hours;
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(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where
his work require 9 him to be; and
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Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toand-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs.
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Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toand-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293
(1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine
Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050
(1956); Onero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84
SCRA 695 (1978), were all decided under the regime of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), section 2 of
which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment", a clause
that is elastic and is susceptible of interpretation. In contrast,
not only has the Workmen's Compensation Act been expressly
repealed by the new Labor Code, but also, the grounds of
compensability in Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's
Compensation (based on PD No. 626, as amended by PD 850,
PD 865-A and PD 891) are specific and enumerate the
conditions that must be satisfied in order that an injury and
the resulting disability or death can be compensable.
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Endnotes:
2 Rollo p. 15.
3 Rollo, pp.15-16.
4 Philippine Fiber Processing Co Inc. vs. Fermina Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050; Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc,
vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro,
concur.
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Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
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ART. 208. Applicability. - This Title (Title II, Book IV) shall
apply to injury sickness, disability or death occurring on or
after January 1, 1975 (New Labor Code).
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(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his
working hours;
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(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where
his work require 9 him to be; and
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The present case does not fall under any of the exceptions
thus enumerated. Nor under any of the following
circumstances, which may well be considered as exceptions to
the general rule that injuries sustained by an employee outside
the premises of the employer, while going to or returning from
work, are not compensable. Thus, where an employee was
accidentally injured while he was running to his place of work
to avoid rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the
factory's main gate the ditch in itself being an obvious hazard
owing to its proximity to the gate and the employer's inaction
to remove the same had contributed in a special way to the
occurrence of the accident (Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs.
Fermina Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050 [1956]): where injuries are
sustained by a workman who is provided with transportation
while going to or coming from his work, they are considered as
arising out of and in the course of his employment and
therefore, are compensable (Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366, 367
[1967]); where the employer remunerates the employee for
transportation expenses and agreed to shoulder 75% of her
transportation expenses when employer assigned her to take
the place of another teacher in a different place not her regular
place of work, said employee was entitled to a disability
compensation for she was injured while performing an acttravelling home from school, which was a necessary incident to
her employment (Ollero vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 84 SCRA 696 [1978]); or where a school teacher
was on her way home from school and would continue to
perform other school work in connection with her employment
as school teacher, her taking the ride in that fatal vehicle can
be treated as a necessary incident to her school work, thus her
heirs were entitled to the benefits arising from her death as
having occurred in connection with her duty Bael vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission. 75 SCRA 181, 182
[1977]); or where the employee is on a special mission (Unite
vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 289, 313
[1979]).
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toand-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293
(1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine
Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050
(1956); Onero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84
SCRA 695 (1978), were all decided under the regime of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), section 2 of
which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment", a clause
that is elastic and is susceptible of interpretation. In contrast,
not only has the Workmen's Compensation Act been expressly
repealed by the new Labor Code, but also, the grounds of
compensability in Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's
Compensation (based on PD No. 626, as amended by PD 850,
PD 865-A and PD 891) are specific and enumerate the
conditions that must be satisfied in order that an injury and
the resulting disability or death can be compensable.
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Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his
working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where
his work require 9 him to be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official
functions.
In the light of the foregoing provision, petitioner's claim was
correctly denied by the Government Service Insurance System
on the ground that the death of Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the
result of an employment accident satisfying all the conditions
enumerated. He died due to injuries sustained by him in a
vehicular accident at 5:45 A.M. while he was on his way to
school.
chanroble s virtual law library
Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toand-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293
(1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine
Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050
(1956); Onero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84
SCRA 695 (1978), were all decided under the regime of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), section 2 of
which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment", a clause
that is elastic and is susceptible of interpretation. In contrast,
not only has the Workmen's Compensation Act been expressly
repealed by the new Labor Code, but also, the grounds of
compensability in Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's
Compensation (based on PD No. 626, as amended by PD 850,
PD 865-A and PD 891) are specific and enumerate the
conditions that must be satisfied in order that an injury and
the resulting disability or death can be compensable.
chanroble s virtual law library
entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be
done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to
begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employers premises
where the work is to be done; "but it is clear that in some cases the rule
extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of
ingress and agrees with the express or implied consent of the employer"
(Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 72 L. ed. 507, Feb. 20, 1928).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INJURIES SUSTAINED BY AN EMPLOYEE IN AN "ACCESS
AREA" WHICH MAY BE TREATED AS PART OF THE EMPLOYERS PREMISES,
COMPENSABLE; CASE AT BAR. That part of the road where Pablo was
killed is in very close proximity to the employers premises. It is an "access
area" "so clearly related to the employees premises as to be fairly treated as
a part of the employers premises." That portion of the road bears "so
intimate a relation" to the companys premises. It is the chief means of
entering the IDEGO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The
IDEGO uses it, if extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of
passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual,
if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his
work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDEGO was
under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is,
against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these
dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper
security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDEGO is liable for
the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter
referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the
Workmens Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City,
and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo
(Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo)
the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial
expenses and P300 as attorneys fees, and to pay to the Commission the
amount of P46 as fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Workmens
Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 oclock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was
shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO
gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin
Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive
for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before
he could be tried for Pablos death. At the time of the killing, Pablos
companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had
finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main
IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias"
on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on
the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablos
death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose
out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule" ; and (3) in
holding that Pablos death was an accident within the purview of the
Workmens Compensation Act. The principal issue is whether Pablos death
comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and
litigiously prolific" 1 phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment."
2 The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the
course of employment" are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied; 3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic
concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed
in the word, "word-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an
independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain
cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. 4 The words "arising out of"
refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. 5
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in
the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while
he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
6
The general rule in workmens compensation law known as the "going &
coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances,
an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is
excluded from the benefits of workmens compensation acts." 7 This rule,
however, admits of four well recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the
employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer;
(2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of
his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and
egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his
place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some
duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the
employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of
transportation to and from the place of employment. 8
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the
second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer,
but while using a customary means of ingress and egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co., Inc. v. Ampil. 9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m.,
while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped
and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of employers factory, as a result
of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the
accident which caused the employees death arose out of and in the course of
his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant, thus:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The very case of Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the
petitioner intimated that `we do not of course mean to imply that an
employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from
work. That depends on the nature of his employment. Considering the facts
found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not
under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working
hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 oclock in the
morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at
full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioners
factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of
work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the
zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof.
In Salilig v. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928,
referred to in the Comments on the Workmens Compensation Commission
Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury
received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a
path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latters
laborers."
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"Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way
home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial
upheavals.
"The question here is limited to whether the injuries are `in the course of
and not `out of the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point.
Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other
similar questions deal with the risk of injury or `out of the employment. `In
the course of deals mainly with the element of time and space, or `time,
place and circumstances.
"Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within
one hundred feet of the employers premises, on sidewalks or public roads,
the question of `in the course of the employment is flatly raised.
"Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of `in the course of to
include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the
moment his foot or person reaches the employers premises, whether he
arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the
employment premises and define `premises very broadly, not only to include
premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or
used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent
private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the
employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any
employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises.
"There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for
a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a
reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employers premises.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn
any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker,
trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employers brick-making
premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over
the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his
employment when hit by an on-coming train fifteen minutes before his day
would have begun. So long as a causal relation to the employment is
discernible, no federal question arises.
"The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until
he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions.
off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle
owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employers
street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all
hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling for the
employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employees
time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the
employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed
salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his
place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally
justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances."
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jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"the proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an
employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while
coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of
his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at
an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical,
customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress, either on
land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the
express or implied consent of the employer."
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jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an
award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all
mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C.L. 804. And they
do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work
on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the
employers premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment, however, is one depending upon the facts of each
case, and in some cases, where an injury occurred while the employee was
going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employers
premises, it has been held compensable.
"Thus, in the reported case (BARNETT V. BRTILING CAFETERIA CO., ante, 85)
the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the
employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately
in front of the employers place of business, while on her way to report for
duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of
employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee
is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some
point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or
while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection
of the Workmens Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to
this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the
workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases,
but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is
at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at
bar, although the employee had not entered the employers place of business,
and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was infront of
the employers place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection
with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose
a part of the employers premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the
injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an
employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty,
was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within
a short distance from the employers plant, which was located at the dead
end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection
with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere
except to the employers plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it
in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions
under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no
option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the
employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the
purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which
he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments
of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and
that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and
environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment
and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for
which compensation has been provided by the Workmens Compensation
Law."
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jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"It is laid down as a general rule, known as the `going and coming rule,
that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual
circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by
an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury,
or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not
arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the
course thereof. "However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable
application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend
on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment,
the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury."
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"We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between offpremises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on
public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to
off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a
distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not
sound to say that while an employee is on a public highway he is always
there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right
conferred by his contract of employment; nor is it a complete answer to say
that while he is on his employers premises his presence there is by contract
right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not
one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the
law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by the law of trespass, licensee,
invitee or otherwise.
"A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of
employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to
the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks
may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there
is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways
and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference.
Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is
obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive."
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"We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule;
it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or
surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has
satisfied itself that there is a distinct `arising out of `or causal connection
between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the
premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of
employment extends as far as those conditions extend." (Larsons Workmens
Compensation Law, 1965 ed. vol. 1. pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employees death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is
considered an "accident" within the meaning of Sec. 2 of the Workmens
Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the
act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the
injured party is not legally responsible." 12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work- connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was
engaged in hauling the ships cable and in coiling it on the deck of the boat
preparatory to passing it down a hatchway. He found the space necessary for
coiling the cable party occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers.
This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava
expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so.
Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then,
with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point,
the passengers brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death
was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. v. Vda. de Mandaguit, 13 the truck which
Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction.
The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a
few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then
disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The
cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of
compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course
of employment.
In Galicia v. Dy Pac, 14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu
of another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his
labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to
intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly
thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was
held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused
by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that
the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause
in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the
assailant."
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In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the
assailant.
In A.P. Santos, Inc. v. Dabacol, 15 the death of an employee- driver who,
while driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held
compensable by the Commission. However, the question of whether the
assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company v. Vda. de Rivera, 16 that question was
raised. While the employee-driver was driving the bus, a passenger boarded
it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which
the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the
passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent
proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the
incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision 17 ruled the
death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died
in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the
provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the
incident arose out of the workmans employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to
compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3)
The Commissioners declaration on the work-connection might be binding on
the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on
the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm
sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the
increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury
and the employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of
assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding
property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which
subject the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased
temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct contact
with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault
because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the
assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs
`In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is
physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the
provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given,
and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the
employee to injure or kill himself or another.
"This provision was largely copied from the New York section on
presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all
cases, not merely those involving an employees death or inability to testify.
"The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to
mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie
case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and
Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It
seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the
employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise the claimant
widow would have merely to say, `My husband, who was one of your
employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits, whereupon the
affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was
no connection between the death and the environment.
"It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employmentconnection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to
rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in
the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted
a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence
that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will
usually supply the `arising-out-of-employment factor. "Larsons Workmens
Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus
v. Gunderman & Sons : 22
"The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the
burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were
sustained in the course of his employment. `It is not the law that mere proof
of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under
Section 21 of the Workmens Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) that
the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the
contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must
be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries
did arise out of and in the course of the employment. Proof of the accident
will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection
appears between the accident and the employment."
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"The discussion of the coverage formula, `arising out of and in the course of
employment, was opened with the suggestion that, while `course and
`arising were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay
between the two factors should be observed in the various categories
discussed. "A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests,
in practice, have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some
extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost
tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work- connection: that a
certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the
`course quantity is very small, but the `arising quantity is large, the
quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the
`arising quantity is very small but the `course quantity is relatively large.
"But if both the `course and `arising quantities are small, the minimum
quantum will not be met.
"As an example of the first, a strong `arising factor but weak `course factor,
one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed of the
employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to
or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the
employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment
premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here,
by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since
the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the
means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course
of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection
between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the
Workmens Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of
assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to
the assault.
From these milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at
bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with
specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be
inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the
line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot
continue has been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where
Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, that Commission said that "the
road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the
IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the
reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission
reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question,
there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the
respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make
it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that "the
shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the
premises, and therefore within the employment," and that "while respondent
allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the
ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary
precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
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But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with
the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablos death did not originate from
his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of
ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that
the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely
two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the
IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its motion for
reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where
the incident happened was a public road, not less than (20) meters away
from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in
the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road
was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to
the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where
the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to
IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns
the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no
question that the assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did
indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and placed its
main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that
it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The
private road leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to use the road must
then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its
right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the
IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the
road. The IDECO owned its employees a safe passage to its premises. In
compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only the
road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also
have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The
point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main
IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stones throw therefrom. The spot is
immediately proximate to the IDECOs premises. Considering this fact, and
the further facts that Pablo has just finished overtime work at the time, and
was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is
squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place
where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place
of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within
the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course
thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the
course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault
arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
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"Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured
while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employers, to or from his work by a way
over the employers premises, or over those of another such proximity and
relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employers premises, the
injury is one arising out and in the course of the employment as much as
though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point
of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the
place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule,
employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance
to the employers premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that
in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the
employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied
consent of the employer."
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The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal
and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECOs
premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent,
express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in
closed proximity to the IDECOs premises. It follows that Pablos death was in
the course of employment.
In Carter v. Lanzetta, 26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of
coverage to employees from the time they reach the employers premises
until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when
this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval" ; and that "under
exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may
be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or
leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it
would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer v. Rich Marine
Sales, 27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at
the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately
adjacent to the employers premises and one other located thereon, and the
general public used the street only in connection with those premises, and
the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within
the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business
establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO
premises which appear to be at the end of the private road.
We find in Jaen v. Chrysler Corporation 28 a meaningful statement of the
obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to
speak, a duty of `safe passage to an employee to the point where he can
reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without
question."
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discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:
`Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only
conduced to his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness
and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his
employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad
track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way)
when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of
the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place,
and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the employer.
"Again, in Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App., 53 S.W. 2d
327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the `access doctrine. In that
case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Bountiful Brick Company Et. Al. v. Giles, 276 U.5. 154, 48 S.Ct.
221, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A. L.R. 1402, as follows:
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`An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured
while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employers premises, or over those of
another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of
the employers premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of
the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and
in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached."
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the
road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employers
premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employees
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employers premises." That
portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the companys premises.
It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or
for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It
has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of
access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the
IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe,
that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of
these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the
proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is
liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death. As heretofore
stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed
before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the
statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be
shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the
hazard which resulted in the injury. 30 The following more modern view was
expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company v. Jones. 31
"While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must
be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries
to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121], Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been
somewhat more liberal, saying that, `to be compensable, injuries do not
have to arise from something peculiar to the employment. Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444.
`Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time)
the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred because it results
from a risk common to all others .. unless it is also common to the general
public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place,
employment, or pursuit. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga.
App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga.
App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47. McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga.
App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473."
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But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be
held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo
was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECOs
premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there
automatically arises the presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury
by assault arose out of the employment, i.e., there is a causal relation
between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal
from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employers main
gate, bring Pablos death within the scope of the course factor. But it may
logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters
from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule
still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean
v. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an
ingenious hypothetical situation put forth by the defendant therein:
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"We could, of course, say `this is not the case before us and utilize the old
saw, `that which is not before us we do not decide. Instead, we prefer to
utilize the considerably older saw: `Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof
(Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it
must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery
in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture
which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of
then-existing law." Since the Workmens Compensation Act is basically a
social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally
construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 32 Liberally
construed, Sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablos death. The Commission did
not err in granting compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioners costs.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
and had already been paid, and although the employee had lingered for from
20 to 30 minutes talking to the employer.
27. 271 NYS 2d 514, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, April 29, 1966.
28. 140 NW 2d 756, Court of Appeals of Michigan, March 22, 1966.
29. 391 SW 2d 558, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, May 21, 1965.
30. Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, supra.
31. 140 SE 2d 113, Court of Appeals of Georgia, Nov. 24, 1964.
32. Abana v. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1278, 1968A
PHILD 997; Manila Railroad Co. v. WCC, L-21504, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA
98, 1967 PHlLD 676: ITEMCOP v. Reyes-Florzo, L-21969, August 31, 1966,
17 SCRA 1104.
The appeal raises issues facts and of law, but since findings of
the fact by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are
final, if supported by substantial evidence mission are final, if
supported by substantial evidence, (Batangas Transportation
Co.,vs. Galicano Rivera, et al., supra., p. 175; Laguna Tayabas
Bus Co., vs. Consuto, et al., 108 Phil., 62, and since the record
impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the
employee was acting in the interest of the employer.
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