PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

ANICETO BULAGAO,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 184757
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

October 5, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 and Crim. Case No.
198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate
Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, Province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge
of [AAA],[3] 14 years old, against the latters will and consent.[4]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001
That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge
of [AAA], 14 years old, against the latters will and consent.[5]

Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on

both counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the prosecution. AAA was
born on April 13, 1986. According to her late-registered birth certificate, her parents
are BBB (mother) and CCC (father). AAA, however, testified that BBB and CCC are
not her biological parents, as she was only adopted when she was very young.[6]
CCC died in December 1999.[7]
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of her brother
DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. With AAA in

the house were two other brothers, EEE and accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao,
and her younger sister, then six-year-old FFF (who were also the children of BBB and
CCC).[8]
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room which
had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody enter the room.
She recognized the accused-appellant as the intruder, and saw that he was holding
a knife. Accused-appellant poked the knife at AAAs neck, causing her to freeze in
fear. Accused-appellant removed AAAs clothes, and then his own. Both AAA and
accused-appellant were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the undressing. Accusedappellant kissed her neck and inserted his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this
moment, but accused-appellant did not stop and continued raping AAA for one hour.
[9]
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in
Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in
the second floor of the house, where there are no rooms. AAA was roused from her
sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing her. Accused-appellant
removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to resist, but
accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant then touched her breasts and
kissed her. Accused-appellant remained on top of her for half an hour.[10]
AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape incidents. Upon
learning of the same, BBB did not believe AAA and whipped her.[11]
During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the character and
chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse between her and
the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement in her affidavit that CCC took
advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still alive. This allegedly
happened five times, the first of which was when she was only seven years old.[12]
Answering a query from the court, AAA testified that she was currently in the
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).[13]
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan Richard Viray
as its second witness. However, the latters testimony was dispensed with upon the
stipulation of the parties on the fact of examination of AAA by Dr. Viray on
September 5, 2000, and the contents of the examination report,[14] which includes
the finding that AAA was in a non-virgin state.
When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year later, it
also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the prosecution.
This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between her and the accusedappellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of rape against the accusedappellant because she was supposedly angry with him. She also claimed that she
was instructed by the police officer who investigated the incident to say that the

accused-appellant used a knife. She also testified that she was raped by her father
CCC when she was seven years old. She was recanting her previous testimony
because she purportedly was no longer angry with accused-appellant.[15]
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape because
she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry work for him.
However, when asked if she consented and voluntarily submitted herself to the
accused-appellant when she had sexual intercourse with him, she answered in the
negative. She had been released from the custody of the DSWD and was alone by
herself for some time, but she now lives with the family of accused-appellant. [16]
On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force himself
upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in his mind. On recross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant was not her sweetheart.
[17]
Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist. She
conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12, 2002, and
found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ
of below 50.[18]
Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15, 2005,
claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He denied
pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was asking for P300
from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified that there was no legal
proceeding for the adoption of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang).[19]
On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case No. 197-M2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise
directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise
directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00.[20]

The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she testified for
the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accused-appellant after her
original testimony. It was during the time when she was back in the custody of the
accused-appellants family that she recanted her testimony for the prosecution.
According to the RTC, it is clear that she had no other place to go to as she was
completely orphaned and was dependent on the family of the accused, and it was
understandable that she may have recanted in order to remain in the good graces
of the accused-appellants family.[21]
As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental
retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-appellant
was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the complained of
incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the psychologist that accusedappellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said
incidents. Even assuming that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the
time of the incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the
capacity to discern right from wrong.[22]
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of the
RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages awarded. Accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in
each of the two (2) counts of rape. He is further directed to pay private complainant
the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of rape, in addition to the
civil indemnity awarded by the court a quo.[23]

Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties manifested

that they are waiving their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the same would
only contain a reiteration of the arguments presented in their appellants and
appellees briefs.[24]
In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the
prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAAs withdrawal of her
original testimony.
We have recently held that [c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions, because
they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier

declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the witness who has given
it later on changes his mind for one reason or another.[25] We have, in the past,
also declared that the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not necessarily
render the prosecutions evidence inconclusive.[26] In the often-cited Molina v.
People,[27] we specified how a recanted testimony should be examined:
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is
retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the
same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly
given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can
be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully
compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully
and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly
analyzed. x x x.[28] (Emphases supplied.)

These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is usually
the lone eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa,[29] where the rape victim later
disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her father, this Court held:

In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By the
very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to
testify for herself. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and marked
with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence
and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness
does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may
later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the
test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the
demeanor of the witness on the stand.[30]

In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAAs
accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made
in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in cases where recantations were
made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the opportunity to see the
demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details of the alleged rape
by her adoptive brother, but also when she claimed that she made up her previous
rape charges out of anger. As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial
court convicted accused-appellant even after examining the young witness as she
made a complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an
entirely new significance in this case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross
examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross examinations both as a
prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court found that the private
complainants testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of belief.
However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this Court which of
the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was concocted. AAAs testimony for the
prosecution, which was taken when she was in the custody of the DSWD, was clear,
candid, and bereft of material discrepancies. All accused-appellant can harp on in
his appellants brief was AAAs failure to recall the length of the knife used in the
assaults, a minor and insignificant detail not material to the elements of the crime
of rape. She remained steadfast on cross-examination even as defense counsel tried
to discredit her by bringing up her dark past of being sexually molested by the
accused-appellants father when she was seven years old. This is in stark contrast to
her testimony for the defense, where AAA, now living with accused-appellants
family, claimed that she fabricated a revolting tale of rape simply because accusedappellant made her do laundry. AAAs recantation even contradicts the testimony of
accused-appellant himself. While AAA claims in her retraction that she had
consensual sex with her brother, accused-appellant testified that they merely kissed
and that AAAs purported motive for the rape charges was monetary.
As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the crossexamination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was taken at a time when
AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with the family of accused-appellant
and upon a reliance on the familys implied commitment to send accused-appellant
to Mindanao:
PROS. JOSON:
Q: Where are you staying at present?
A: In our house, sir.
Q: And your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of the
accused?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you dont have any relatives where you can go and stay except from that
house?
A: None, sir.
Q: Where [are] your parents?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: Are they all dead or still alive?
A: They are deceased, sir.
Q: All?
A: Both are deceased, sir.
Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister?
A: They all separated, sir.
Q: Do you know where they were living?
A: No, sir.
Q: From the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by yourself?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter and
everyday foods [sic] from the family of the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you testify
today[, would] you admit for a fact that he [was] also staying in the house where
you are staying now?
A: No, sir.
Q: Where will he stay?

A: In Mindanao, sir.
Q: Because that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the
accused, is it not?
A: No, sir.
Q: And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay in the house, sir.
Q: Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto Bulagao to do the things that you
have complaint [sic] against him, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what you are isinusumbong is the case today against him, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.[31]

Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court
that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the
finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental condition accusedappellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was already
present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence.[32] Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accusedappellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a
complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the
accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at
the time of the commission of the crime.[33] Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.[34]
As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of death
for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It should be noted at
this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty,
the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would have warranted the
imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of moral damages and
civil indemnity to be increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence.[35]

In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with the use of a deadly
weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime was proven as
charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to have occurred on June
17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance was alleged in the
Information, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used a knife
on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000, the date of
Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.[36] As such, the crime that was proven in Crim. Case
No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any circumstance affecting criminal
liability. However, simple rape is also punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article
266-B.
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even without
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, both for each count of rape. [37] In addition, we have held that since
exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be awarded, not only in
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of
the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.[38]
This Court believes that the conduct of accused-appellant herein, who raped her
minor adoptive sister twice, falls under this category and is therefore liable for
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with
existing jurisprudence. [39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for each count
of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition to the
amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals, namely: civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both for each count of
rape; and
2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

NILO OROPESA,
Petitioner,

- versus -

CIRILO OROPESA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 184528
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

April 25, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure of the Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution[2]
dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances
affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the Order[4] dated November
14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP.
Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a
widower), and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians
over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was
docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already
having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and
memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that
even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly;
that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage
his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by
people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the
case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study
and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her
social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social
Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the
(respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony,
and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse,
Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006
resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to
have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his
Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the
Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the
Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus
Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July
23, 2006.[5] (Citations omitted.)

The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated

September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal
affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is
GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an
Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has
failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that
Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[7]

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal
was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are
AFFIRMED.[8]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court
of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence,
the instant petition was filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED
UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED
UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be
without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of
Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error
when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly
disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondents
incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the
wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards
property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require.
It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.[11]

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the

prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who,
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word incompetent
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,

cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary
standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should
be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum[13] the following
factual matters:
a.
Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for
over ten (10) years already;
b.
During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical
Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who
was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when,
as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks
sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
c.
Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care
and management;
d.
The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and
therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary
taxes;
e.
Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the
reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had
been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for
the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f.
Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name
and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;
g.
There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to
stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

h.
Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries
and furniture, despite protests from his children.[14]

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of
material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not
present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the
veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged
deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the
only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent
to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by
respondent in his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact favored
respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated
meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on
many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally
comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were
tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of
number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks
where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to
render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective
solutions to problem situations. x x x.[17]

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of
his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his
sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and
their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction).
These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead
it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal
offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of
title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-

owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on
their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is
the aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to
the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at
best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the
part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that
respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed
ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that where the sanity of a person is
at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial
judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will
suffice.[18]
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27,
2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own
documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court
made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that
Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity
to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs
on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of
mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report
concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for
mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19] (Citation omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a

petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.[20] We only
take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;[21]
however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be
disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to
great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of
the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents
demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation
of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action,

to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.[23] We have
also held that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the
case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief
sought.[24]
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for
guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely
because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a
cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence
since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166803

October 11, 2012

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners,

vs.
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH ROSE DE
GARCIA TERINGTERING, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision1 dated July H, 2004 and Resolution2 dated January 17,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, setting aside the
Resolutions dated February 20, 20033 and July 31, 20034 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the Decision5 dated February
12, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto
Teringtering (Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against
petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services for
the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages
and attorney's fees.
Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment
contract with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal Gulf Marine
Services, the details of which are as follows:
Duration of Contract

12 months

Basic Monthly Salary

US $385.00

Hours of Work

48 hrs/wk

Position

Oiler
:

Overtime

US $115.50

Vacation Leave with pay :

1 mo. leave after

12 months
Point of Hire :

Manila, Philippines

xxxx
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected to a
pre-employment medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work."
Thus, her husband joined his vessel of assignment and performed his duties as
Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health
of the United Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001
due to asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and sealing certificate was
issued after which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to the Philippines.
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the
payment of death compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial
expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00, as well as additional death compensation
in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach Rose de Gracia
Teringtering but was refused without any valid cause. Hence, a complaint was filed
against the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it is
enough that he died during the term of his contract and while still on board.
Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or Mood
Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his eventual
death. Respondent further asserted that her husbands death was not deliberate
and not of his own will, but was a result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable.
For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around 8:20
p.m. while at Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped into the
sea, but the second engineer was able to recover him. Because of said incident, one
personnel was directed to watch Jacinto.
However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr Oilfield
and went on standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around 11:00 p.m., the A/B
watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but despite efforts to revive him, he
was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being claimed,
because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement, however,

Teringtering was even given burial assistance in the amount of P35,800.00 and
P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise received the amount of US$792.51
representing donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner likewise argued that
Teringtering is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, because petitioner
had nothing to do with her late husband's untimely demise as the same was due to
his own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's report
on the incident, which we quote:
At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1 passenger.
2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat cast off from Nasr
Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and recover Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler.
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time informed
to GMS personnel about the accident, And we informed to A/B on duty to watch Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B watch man informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering
Tering jump again to the sea. And that time the wind NW 10-14 kts. and strong
current. And the second Engr. jump to the sea with life ring to recover Mr. Jacinto
Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel
and apply Respiration Kiss of life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to
take doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to check the
patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was already dead. Then
informed to GMS personnel about the accident.
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best of my
knowledge and reserve the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this statement at any
time and place, According to the law.6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed
the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto
Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of employment and that he
died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his deliberate or
intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter.

Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court
of Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20,
2003, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision dated February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine
Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally liable and, accordingly, are
directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely respondent
Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de Gracia, the Philippine
Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an additional amount of US$7,000, both
at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as petitioner,
raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES CORRECTION OF THE
NLRC'S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON
OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;
II
WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES
FOR THE COMFORT AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS,
WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE ASSAILED CA DECISION AND WHICH
ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF THE DECEASED,
BUT POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE
NOW BEING HELD LIABLE ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT
SOURCE OF OBLIGATION THAT IS PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS
PROVIDED UNDER OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR
CODE;
III

WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF A

DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO
THE DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED BY THE LABOR ARBITER
AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the
latter's death resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the employer
becomes liable once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of
his employment contract is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability
if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury
directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of
law in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a trier of
facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is
a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were
arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. This case is no
different.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident
but was deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was
on his second attempt that caused his death. The accident report of Captain Oscar
Morado narrated in detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The
circumstances of Jacinto's actions before and at the time of his death were likewise
entered in the Chief Officer's Log Book and were attested to by Captain Morado
before the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was
tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of committing suicide, testified
that despite his efforts to prevent Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Jacinto was
determined and even shoved him and jumped anew which eventually caused his
death.
Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence
presented as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual
findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by
the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
More so, when there is no showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record.

Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in this
case. For precisely, the issue for resolution here is the obligation of the employer to
its employee should the latter die during the term of his employment. The
relationship between the petitioner and Jacinto is one based on contract of
employment and not one of contract of carriage.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract
Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels"
(POEA-SEC), it is provided that:
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability
or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided,
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or
death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur
during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during
the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death
compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be
exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death
was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea.
Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband was
suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was
given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when
the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems may
result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the
mind of another, the state or condition of a persons mind can only be measured
and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person
was insane based on the witness own perception of the person, or who is qualified
as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.8 No such evidence was presented to support
respondent's claim.
The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from
which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court

is left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the
employer. Otherwise slated, while it is true that labor contracts are impressed with
public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed logically and
liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board
ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to
be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.9
WHEREFORE, the petition Is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 20,
2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in
NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176947

February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S.

Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation
to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18
August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution
as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which
denied Cordoras motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora
asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and
Annex B [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state,
among others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.3 (Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17
June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC):
[sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the
declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No.
9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as an American

Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and willfully

affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic requirements under No.
12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to which he seeks to be elected, when in
truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his own statements
before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that
Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen.
The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings
father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings
possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth.
Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and
has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his
loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of
Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in
Tambuntings certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his
residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting
contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint
against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. Cordoras reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration
that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support
his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate
opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner
Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen.
Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed
his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the
same arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February
2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence
to support probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an
election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambuntings
failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present
petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The
present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful
statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed
an Election Offense

There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that there
is no sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to
hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the
prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs
either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that
violation of Section 74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an
election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims
that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American
by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses

dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American
citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the
American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification
showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly,
Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship
did not disqualify him from running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano,
wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because
we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
"Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching
the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No
one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.1avvphi1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in
effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.
Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles
involve similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like
Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia.
Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it
is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his
certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individuals active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the

Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a

naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was
enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.12 Section 5(3)
of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship
and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases
for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and
Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement
because of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed
place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon
citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting
indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary,
Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him.
Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the
citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the

Commission on Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in
EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207264

October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013
which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The
14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to
make a determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the
Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass
upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having
denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1 (as originally
underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who
is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque."2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go

thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as
member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications
are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's
submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on
18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency
via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the point has
obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her
due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on
18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her
proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even
any attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to
proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission
En Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court
for a restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme
Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner.
That did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from
being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of
candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there
was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order
from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the
decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention
became even more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate
of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will
have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May
2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly
available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the
law into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the
COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory
five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule
18 in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL
AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves
from promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section
5 of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the
Commission or a division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice
shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very
date of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before
us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13.4 On that date,
she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to
remove the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a
proclamation two days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane

decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point MUST be on
permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the
petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted
proclamation as the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer
be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which
she directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with
her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by
Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the
COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all
administrative and judicial actions thereon, past and present. And by her
proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she sought to be a
candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the
objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by
virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing
legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET
which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives
is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because
she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her
proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed,
the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in
which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation,
was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the
COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013,
there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision
sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to
petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained
by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning
the COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision,
her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation
alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court
regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was
indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to
authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.

10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil
action for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed
by set rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily. The nature of
the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23,
Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who
are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence.
COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are
authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counteraffidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that this provision shall
likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are delegated
by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the
exercise of the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with
the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is
brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court
should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is
here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right

to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy
are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted
by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the
party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration.
(Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts:
(1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the ConsulGeneral of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack
of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden
to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation
dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder
of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner
was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to
present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed
to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in
her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish
that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual FilipinoAmerican citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run
for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon
her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she
submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner
admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a
dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply
to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with
rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's
explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules,
then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed
Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in
September 2012.1wphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office
as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not,
prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of
allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she

reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of
office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This
statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for
re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at
the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has
indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225,
petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with
her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time
before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath
of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as
certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as
the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned.
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due
course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who
can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a
continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an
original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but
on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En
Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to
the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based
proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET
jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is
original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the
proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be
the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of
repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the
House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings

are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting
from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner.
The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of
the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of
Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the
Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste
can be attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition
promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET
of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition
was done to pave the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its
constitutional role. The petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET,
but not as a sitting member of the House of Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the
motion was contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding
that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts
approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It
may well be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost
upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is terminated.9 When
petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact,
the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction
cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance,
undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of
withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal
effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes.
Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her
petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she
designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the
petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202809

July 2, 2014

DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the January 18, 2012 Decision1 and the July 23,
2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95120, which
reversed and set aside the November 18, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 45, Manila (RTCJ, by dismissing, without prejudice, the petition for
naturalization filed by Dennis L. Go (petitioner).
The Facts
On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.)No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,3 with the RTC,
where it was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-107591.
Petitioner made the following allegations in his petition: 1] that he was born on May
7, 1982 in Manila to spouses Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese nationals; 2] that he
was of legal age, Chinese national, single, with residence address at No. 1308-1310
Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where he had been residing since birth; 3] that
he spoke English and Tagalog and has spent his elementary, secondary and tertiary
education in Philippine schools where subjects on Philippine history, government
and civics were taught as part of the school curriculum; 4] that he believed in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, was of good moral character and
had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community; 5] that he is not opposed to organized
government or is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; 6] that he did not defend or
teach the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for
the success and predominance of mens ideas; 7] that he was neither a polygamist
nor a believer in polygamy; 8] that he had never been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude and was not suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases; 9] that he was not a citizen or subject of a nation at war with
the Philippines; 10] that it was his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign state or sovereignty, particularly to China of which he was a citizen; 11] that

he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the
petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship; and 12] that he
was exempt from the filing of the Declaration of Intention with the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)under C.A. No. 473, Section 5, as he was born in the
Philippines and received his primary, secondary and tertiary education in the
country.
On September 11, 2003, the RTC set the initial hearing of his petition on August 17,
2004. In compliance with the jurisdictional requirements under Section 9 of C.A. No.
473,4 the notice was published in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and was
posted in a conspicuous place at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the
requirements for naturalization and presented, as witnesses, Dr. Joseph Anlacan (Dr.
Anlacan), Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas (Dr. Tordesillas), Silvino J. Ong (Ong), Teresita M.
Go (Teresita),and Juan C. Go (Juan). Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the
psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric
abnormality at the time of the test.5
Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioners medical examination
results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioners family, stated that being their
neighbor in Sto. Cristo Street, he had known petitioner since childhood through his
association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita claimed that she had
personally known petitioner since birth because he was the son of her brother-inlaw. She described him as a peace-loving person who participated in activities
sponsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by
profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally and that he had
executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor.
After petitioner presented his evidence and formally offered the same,6 the
Republic, through the OSG, posed no objection as to the relevancy and competence
of his documentary evidence. The OSG further manifested that it had no evidence
to present and requested that the case be submitted for decision based on
petitioners evidence.7 The OSG, however, later moved for the reopening of trial for
the admission of its documentary evidence.8 It informed the RTC that it had
received a report, dated November 23,2006, issued by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI),9 tending to prove petitioners non-compliance with the
requirements of the law on naturalization.
On April 3, 2007, petitioner manifested to the RTC that he had a clearance issued by
the NBI as proof of his lack of criminal record, and that he was not the same Dennis
Go who was the subject of the NBI Investigation Report being offered in evidence by
the OSG.

After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing, the RTC issued its October 24, 2008
Order10 admitting the evidence adduced by both parties, but denying the motion of
the OSG to re-open trial.
On November 18, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for
naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law.
Among these were petitioners lack of a derogatory record, his support for an
organized government, his being in perfect health, his mingling with Filipinos since
birth and his ability to speak their language, and his being a law abiding citizen. The
RTC likewise found that petitioner presented convincing evidence that he was not
disqualified for naturalization as provided for under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473.11 The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition of DENNIS L. GO for Naturalization
as a Filipino Citizen is hereby GRANTED. Upon finality of this Decision, before a
Certificate of Naturalization may be issued to him pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act 530, Petitioner must take his oath of allegiance and fidelity to the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, the OSG moved for reconsideration and the reopening of trial for
the second time. This time, it sought to be admitted, as evidence, a background
investigation report13 issued by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) stating the
following reasons to oppose the petition, among others: that petitioners parents
remained as Chinese citizens up to the present; that petitioners aunt arrogantly
refused to allow them to engage in an interview while at their residence; and that
the retail business of petitioners family must be subjected to an investigation for
unexplained wealth and tax deficiencies.
On May 18, 2009, after an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the RTC denied the
OSGs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On appeal to the CA, the OSG raised the following arguments:
1) Evidence proving that petitioner did not possess the qualifications or was
disqualified from acquiring Philippine citizenship may be received anytime prior to
the finality of judgment granting the application for naturalization;
2) Petitioner failed to prove that he had all the qualifications entitling him to the
grant of Philippine citizenship;

3) Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses were credible;

4) Petitioners character witnesses failed to prove that he had all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for the grant of Philippine citizenship; and
5) Failure to state all former places of residence was fatal to petitioners application
for naturalization.
Petitioner countered that the RTC correctly denied the OSGs motion for
reconsideration as it was given several opportunities to present its evidence and
oppose the petition, but did not. The OSG may not file a motion for the purpose of
re-opening the case on a piece-meal basis on the pretext that the government
could, at all stages of the proceedings, raise the issue of non-compliance with
naturalization laws. In any case, the background investigation by the BOI yielded no
reasonable ground to deny the petition for naturalization because the citizenship of
his parents had nothing to do with it. The RTC decision contained an exhaustive
discussion showing that he possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided for by law.
In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed, without prejudice, the petition for naturalization. According to the CA,
while there was sufficient evidence from which petitioners ability to write English or
any of the principal Philippine languages, may be inferred, he failed to adduce
evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was not able to prove that
the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to
be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word
could be taken at face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner insists that the findings of facts by the RTC are fully supported by the
evidence extant in the records of the case, rendering its reversal by the CA, as
unwarranted and erroneous. The RTC was in a better position to examine the real
evidence and observe the demeanor of the witnesses presented.
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political
community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full
civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes
the duty of allegiance to the political community.14 The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievance.15

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens.16 Among
those listed are citizens by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the
present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative.
Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and
receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of
the proper naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil
registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9139 provides that aliens born
and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special
Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue
a certificate of naturalization.17 In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given
away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court,
that they have complied with all the requirements of the law.18 The reason for this
requirement is simple. Citizenship involves political status; hence, every person
must be proud of his citizenship and should cherish it. Verily, a naturalization case is
not an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is
supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Naturalization is not a right, but
one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed
only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.19
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show
substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant
must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and
present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations.20 In Ong v.
Republic of the Philippines,21 the Court listed the requirements for character
witnesses, namely:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;
2. That they are "credible persons";
3. That they personally know the petitioner;
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of
time required by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;

6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen
of the Philippines; and
8. That he "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization
Law.
In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness,
for purposes of naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he becomes an
insurer of the character of the candidate.22 The Court, in Ong, explained:
a "credible" person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not been
previously convicted ofa crime; who is not a police character and has no police
record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose "affidavit" or testimony is not
incredible. What must be "credible" is not the declaration made, but the person
making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the
community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner.
In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic,23 the Court
explained that the "law requires that a vouching witness should have actually
known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein
to give him the necessary competence to act as such. The reason behind this
requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of
petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in
deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent
and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and
moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not
intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him." The law, in effect,
requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of the
applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be
competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of
the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications.
In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioners failure to prove that his
witnesses are credible.
The Court agrees.

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioners
witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a
naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence proving that
the persons he presented were credible. In the words of the CA, "he did not prove
that his witnesses had good standing in the community, known to be honest and
upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at
face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner."24
While there is no showing that petitioners witnesses were of doubtful moral
inclinations, there was likewise no indication that they were persons whose
qualifications were at par with the requirements of the law on naturalization. Simply
put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the witnesses good standing in the
community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a
consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of
"credibility" demanded of in naturalization cases. This lack of "credibility" on the
part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioners claim of
worthiness. An applicant for Philippine citizenship would carefully testify as to his
qualifications, placing emphasis on his good traits and character. This is expected of
a person who longs to gain benefits and advantages that Philippine citizenship
bestows. Therefore, a serious assessment of an applicants witnesses, both as to the
credibility of their person and their very testimony, is an essential facet of
naturalization proceedings that may not be brushed aside.
Further, petitioners witnesses only averred general statements without specifying
acts or events that would exhibit petitioners traits worthy of the grant of Philippine
citizenship. For instance, a statement in their affidavits as to petitioners adherence
to the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution is not evidence, per se, of
petitioners agreement and zeal to Philippine ideals. These appear to be empty
declarations if not coming from credible witnesses.
It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of
petitioners witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While
almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew petitioner since birth and that
they had interacted with petitioners family in times of celebration, this did not
satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a genuine desire to learn and
embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports
cast doubt on petitioners alleged social interaction with Filipinos. The background
checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to the uncooperative
behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged
when asked for an interview by BOI agents.
To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions
and ideals.1wphi1 This leads to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner failed to
prove that he has all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine
citizenship. Filipino citizenship is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It
is indispensable that an applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the

Philippines as a country deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a

positive and unequivocal showing that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court
must selfishly decline to confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien in
principles and sentiment.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioner's failure
to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for
naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the inclusion of present and former
places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without which the
petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured by
evidence on the omitted matter at the trial.25
Here, a character witness had unwittingly revealed that he and petitioner were
neighbors in Sto. Cristo Street before the latter's family transferred to their declared
residential address in Oroquieta Street. This proves that petitioner's former
residence was excluded in his allegations contained in the published petition. In
effect, there was an unpardonable lapse committed in the course of petitioner's
compliance to the jurisdictional requirements set be law, rendering the trial court's
decision, not only as erroneous, but void.
WHEREFORE, the pet1t1on is DENIED. The January 18, 2012 Decision and the July
23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 95120 are AFFIRMED.
As stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dismissal is without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199113
March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated
October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner).
Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of
probable cause.

The factual antecedents:

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential
house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they
built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In
the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No.
266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October
11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he
bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject
property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same.
The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him
and private respondents family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7
finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and
recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that
petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was
denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of
falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner
notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a
third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for
Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012)
and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the
MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court
denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who
became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act
No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and
admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of
merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order
denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue
raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final
evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask
the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine
citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the
motion for reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He
asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a precondition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a
warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal
fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another
country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of
falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship

will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long
consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for
certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left
without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make
use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full
blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that
By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and
that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction
deemed not to have lost it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through
the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim
to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner
through his wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest
against him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due
process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioners argument regarding
the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that this Courts
rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on
Elections20 on the retroactivity of ones re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the
date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the
present situation, it will still not work for petitioners cause for the simple reason
that he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public
Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of
public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person be present. As to petitioners defense of good faith, such remains to be a
defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor
General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his
Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have
submitted his person to the said courts jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance.
Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitioners motion after a judicious, thorough and
personal evaluation of the parties arguments contained in their respective
pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for
falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions
of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioners motion for redetermination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29,
2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays

down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the
first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who
shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who
became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, reacquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of
Section 3 is Retention of Philippine Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally
employed the terms re-acquire and retain to describe the legal effect of taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from
the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63,
under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by
doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens
after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in
R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which
favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional
presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a
seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the
accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.
He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be
governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.

2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the
query of Representative Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate
version, Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall and so forth, ano, shall
retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship
by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have
reacquired
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are
considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their
Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to have
reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born
citizens who became, lets say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are
considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship
before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they
have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr.
Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention
and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that
we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future
instances. So thats the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here making
distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain
government positions, no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a
specific
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. Its one of the
provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is
our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship]
by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos
under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his
MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the
retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his
category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read
together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new laws effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any
reference to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is
likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused
following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not
a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article
17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or
commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph
1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1)

that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his official position;
(2)
that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC; and
(3)
that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is
a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was
then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification
was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding
probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as
ground for denying petitioners motion for re-determination of probable cause, as
the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required
for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v.
Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed
the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and
held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by
filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On
the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the

accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody
of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the
will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused.
It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in
narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes
of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for redetermination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the
MTCs order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11
(Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.