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Abstract. In this note, we present a simple, practical and easily implementable coverage test to backtest any spectral risk measure. Our
test gives a single decision at a specified confidence level and is perfectly
consistent with the binomial test for VaR. Particular attention is given
to the special case of Expected Shortfall.
Contents
1. Background and Motivation
2. VaR and Spectral Risk Measures
3. Deriving the Backtest Statistic and Coverage Test
4. Application to Expected Shortfall
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References
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3
4
9
10
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For each trading day i = 1, ..., N , let VaRi () denote the VaR at level
(i)
and XVaR () := 1{Li V aRi ()} {0, 1} denote the VaR failure indicator.
N () [0, 1] for level [0, 1] over N
We define the VaR failure rate XVaR
trading days as
N
XVaR
()
N
1 X (i)
:=
XVaR ()
N
(1.1)
=
1
N
i=1
N
X
i=1
N
Hence XVaR
is simply the average number of VaR breaches at level over
N
N trading days. By appealing to the Central Limit Theorem XVaR
is approximately normal under the null-hypothesis with expected value and
N
variance (1 )/N . Thus XVaR
admits a Z-test with Z-score
(1.2)
N
ZVaR
()
b N ()
X
VaR
p
(1 )
Despite the potentially prominent role of Expected Shortfall in Risk Management, accepted methods to backtest it are still elusive. Worse, there
have been growing concerns that ES is in fact not even backtestable and
thus should not be adopted as a risk measure. The claims that ES is not
backtestable range from mainstream articles [10, 11] to research articles [12].
The claim can be traced back to some observations that ES does not possess
some mathematical properties such as elicitability [14]. While it is true that
if a risk measure has elicitable structure there is particular way to backtest it
via the scoring function, lack of elicitability need not imply lack of backtestability. For example, as noted in [7], backtesting methods for VaR that are
used in practice do not use any structure from elicitability. In fact, recently
Acerbi & Szekely [2] make a strong argument that elicitability has nothing
to do with backtesting at all, but rather only model selection. Hence, the
mathematical property of elicitability may not be as important as thought
in the practical implementation of an backtesting algorithm.
In the midst of claims that ES is not backtestable, some backtesting
approaches have nonetheless been proposed. These include the censored
Gaussian approach introduced by Berkowitz [8], the functional delta approach used by Kerhoff and Melenberg [17] and the saddle-point technique
introduced by Wong [18] and later extended by Graham and Pal [15]. As
in every statistical method, each of these different approaches have their
strengths and weaknesses, and our method should be seen as complementary to these. In particular, our test gives a single decision at a specified
confidence level.
Z
(2.2)
M :=
(p)VaR(p)dp
0
(3.1)
(i)
XSR ()
Z
=
0
N
1 X (i)
XSR ()
N
i=1
N Z 1
X
1
(p)1{Li VaRi (p)} dp.
=
N
0
N
XSR
() :=
(3.2)
i=1
Remark 3.2. In contrast to VaR where failure is a discrete event with value
(i)
either zero or one (i.e. XVaR := 1{Li VaRi ()} {0, 1}) the corresponding
failure for Spectral Measures is a continuous variable with value between
R1
(i)
zero and one (i.e. XSR := 0 (p)1{Li VaRi ()} [0, 1]) and depends on the
severity of the failure.
To understand this better, we may alternatively write the Spectral Risk
Measure Failure Rate as
N
XSR
()
(3.3)
N Z
1 X 1
:=
(p)1{Li VaRi (p)} dp
N
i=1 0
N Z
1 X 1
=
(p)1{VaR1 (Li )p} dp
i
N
0
i=1
N Z
1 X 1
=
(p) dp
N
VaR1
i (Li )
i=1
N
1 X
(VaR1
=1
i (Li ))
N
i=1
where
= .
(i)
H0 : {X }N
i=1 i 6= j, and P [Li VaRi (p)] = p p supp
(i)
N
:= E[XSR
()] =
(p) p dp
0
and
(3.6)
1
N
2 := V[XSR
()] =
N
1Z p
(p)(q)qdpdq
2
0
2 !
Z
(p)pdp
(i)
Proof. To prove (3.5) we first consider a single trading day failure XSR and
compute
(i)
E[X ()]
Z
=E
0
1
Z
=
0
(3.7)
=
0
1
Z
=
(p) p dp
0
Thus
N
1 X (i)
N
XSR ()
E[XSR ()] := E
N
"
i=1
=
(3.8)
1
N
N
X
h
i
(i)
E XSR ()
i=1
N Z
1 X 1
=
(p) p dp
N
i=1 0
Z 1
=
(p) p dp
0
Hence the expected value of the average over N trading days is equal to the
expected value of a single trading day.
(i)
To prove (3.6) we again first consider a single trading day failure XSR and
compute
6
(3.9)
(i)
E[(XSR ())2 ]
"Z
=E
0
Z
=E
0
Z
= 2E
0
2 #
1Z p
Z
0
0
1Z p
=2
0
0
1Z p
(p)(q) q dp dq
=2
0
(i)
(i)
(3.10)
(p)pdp
2
Finally,
#
N
X
1
(i)
N
V[XSR
()] = V
XSR ()
N
i=1
N
X
X
1
(i)
(i)
(j)
V[XSR ()] +
corrhXSR (), XSR ()i
= 2
N
|
{z
}
i=1
"
(3.11)
i6=j
1
= 2
N
1
=
N
N
X
Z
(p)(q)qdpdq
2
0
i=1
= 0 under H0 (3.4)
1Z p
Z
(p)(q)q dp dq
2
0
(p)pdp
1Z p
0
2 !
2 !
(p)pdp
N admits a Z-test) The Spectral Measure Failure Rate X
Lemma 3.5. (XSR
(i)
(3.12)
D
N
N XSR
() N (0, 2 ).
N
lim kP
N +
i
N
N (XSR
) (/ )kL
= 0.
As usual, it would be interesting to get precise error bounds on the difN for finite N and its limiting distriference between the distribution of XSR
bution. This would allows us to control the error in some measure and let
us choose N to within some tolerance. For instance, since the third moment
N is uniformly bounded we can appeal to the Berry-Esseen theorem to
of XSR
N and the
give point-wise bounds on the difference between the CDF for XSR
limiting CDF. However, we do not pursue that direction here. We finally
arrive at our main Theorem.
Theorem 3.6. (Coverage Test for Spectral Risk Measures) Let and
be the mean and standard deviation of the Spectral Measure Failure Rate
N (3.2) under the null hypothesis given by
XSR
Z
(3.14)
(p) p dp
s
Z 1
2
Z 1Z p
1
=
2
(p)(q)q dp dq
(p)pdp
N
0
0
0
0
(3.15)
N defined by
Then the Z-score ZSR
(3.16)
N
ZSR
() :=
b N ()
X
SR
1
ES() :=
VaR(p)dp.
0
In order to use the Coverage Test in Theorem 3.6 to backtest ES, we need to
write (4.1) as a Spectral Risk Measure with a specific choice of risk spectrum
ES .
Definition 4.1. (Expected Shortfall) The Expected Shortfall is a special
case of a Spectral Risk Measure with risk spectrum given by
1
1
.
{0p}
Thus, the ES risk measure (4.1) can be written as
(4.2)
ES (p) :=
Z
(4.3)
MES () =
0
VaR(p)
dp.
Since ES is an admissible risk spectrum, MES enjoys all the mathematical properties of Spectral Risk Measures.
To derive the coverage test for ES, we recall Definition 3.1 and define the
N as
Expected Shortfall Failure Rate XES
(4.4)
N
XES
()
Z
N
1 X 1
:=
1
dp
N
0 {Li VaRi (p)}
i=1
N is
which is simply (3.2) with = ES (4.2). Hence by Theorem 3.6, XES
asymptotically normal and admits a Z-test. To calculate the Z-score we
N under the null-hypothesis.
need to calculate the mean and variance of XES
To do this we substitute the Expected Shortfall risk spectrum ES (4.2) into
(3.5) and (3.6) and obtain
1
Z
ES () =
ES (p)p dp
0
(4.5)
=
2
and
9
p dp
0
2
ES
()
=
=
(4.6)
=
=
Z 1Z p
1
2
ES (p)ES (q)q dp dq ES
2
N
0Z 0Z p
1
2
2
q dp dq ES
N 2 0 0
Z
1
2
1
1 2
p dp
N 2 0 2
4
4 3
N
12
Corollary 4.2. (Coverage Test for Expected Shortfall) The Expected Shortfall measure MES (4.1) admits a Z-test with Z-score
b N () ES ()
X
ES
ES ()
!
bES ()
2X
.
= 3N p
(4 3)
N
ZES
() =
(4.7)
This is clearly a test of the -tail in quantile space rather than dollar
space. We define a mapping between the two spaces in a subsequent paper.
5. Conclusions
In this note we presented a simple coverage test for any Spectral Risk
Measure, including Expected Shortfall. The test gives a single decision at
a specified confidence level and is complementary to other testing methods,
most notably the saddle-point techniques in [15, 18]. It would be interesting to compare the backtesting performance of our coverage test with the
methods mentioned in the Introduction.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Carlo Acerbi (MSCI) and Janos Pal
(BMO) for insightful discussions on backtesting risk measures, as well as
the anonymous referee for a critical reading of the manuscript.
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References
[1] C. Acerbi, Spectral measures of risk: A coherent representation of subjective risk
aversion, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26, (2002), 1505-1518.
[2] C. Acerbi & B. Szekely, Backtesting Expected Shortfall, to appear in Risk Magazine, 2014.
[3] C. Acerbi & D. Tasche, On the coherence of Expected Shortfall, Journal of Banking
and Finance, Volume 26, Issue 7, July 2002, Pages 1487-1503.
[4] P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.M. Eber, & D. Heath, Thinking Coherently, Risk,
Vol 10, No. 11, (1997) 68-71.
[5] P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.M. Eber, & D. Heath, Coherent Measures of Risk,
Mathematical Finance, Vol. 9, Issue 3, (1999) 203-228.
[6] Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Supervisory Framework for the use
of Backtesting in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk
Capital Requirements, January 1996.
[7] F. Bellini & V. Bignozzi, Elicitable Risk Measures, Preprint, December 2013.
[8] J. Berkowitz, Testing Density Forecasts, with Applications to Risk Management,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol 19, No 4, (2001) 465-474.
[9] S.D. Campbell, A Review of Backtesting and Backtesting Procedures, Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C., 2005.
[10] L. Carver, Mooted VaR substitute cannot be back-tested, says top quant, Risk,
March 08, 2013.
[11] L. Carver, Back-testing expected shortfall: mission impossible?, Risk, October 17,
2014.
[12] J.M. Chen, Measuring market risks under the Basel Accord: VaR, stressed VaR,
and expected shortfall,Aestimatio, The IEB International Journal of Finance, volume
8,(2014) pp. 184-201.
[13] Bank for International Settlements, Fundamental review of the trading book:
A revised market risk framework, Consultative Document, October 2013.
[14] T. Gneiting, Making and Evaluating Point Forecasts, SSRN Preprint, 2010.
[15] A. Graham & J. Pal, Backtesting value-at-risk tail losses on a dynamic portfolio,
Journal of Risk Model Validation, Volume 8, Number 2, 2014.
[16] P. Jorion, Value at Risk : The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk, 3rd
Edition, McGraw-Hill, 2007.
[17] J. Kerhof and B. Melenberg, Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital,
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol 28, No 8, (2004) 1845-1865.
[18] W.K. Wong, Backtesting trading risk of commercial banks using expected shortfall,
Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 32, Issue 7, July 2008, Pages 14041415.
E-mail address: Nick.Costanzino@gmail.com
Risklab Toronto, University of Toronto, 1 Spadina Crescent, Toronto,
ON, M5S 3G3
E-mail address: Michael.Curran@bmo.com
Bank of Montreal, 100 King St W, Toronto, ON, M5X 1A1
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