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YUVIENGCO VS Hon.

DACUYCUY and Dely Rodriguez, Felipe Cruz, Constancia Nogar,


et al. (GR No. L-55048 May 27, 1981)
FACTS: Petitioners own a property in Tacloban City which they intend to sell for 6.5M. They
gave the private respondents the right to purchase the property only until July 31, 1978.
Private respondents replied that they agree to buy the property and they will negotiate for
details. Petitioner sent another telegram informing respondents that their proposal is accepted
and a contract will be prepared.
Lawyer of the petitioners, Mr.Gamboa, arrived bringing a contact with an altered mode of
payment which says that the balance payment should be paid within 30 days instead of the
former 90 days. The original terms of the parties was: respondents will pay 2M upon
execution, and the remaining 4.5m after 90 days.
In essence, the theory of petitioners is that while it is true that they did express willingness to
sell to private respondents the subject property (land and building) for P6,500,000.00
provided the latter made known their own decision to buy it not later than July 31, 1978, the
respondents' reply that they were agreeable was not absolute, so much so that when
ultimately petitioners' representative went to Cebu City with a prepared and duly signed
contract for the purpose of perfecting and consummating the transaction, respondents and
said representative found variance between the terms of payment stipulated in the prepared
document and what respondents had in mind, hence the bank draft which respondents were
delivering to the representative was returned and the document remained unsigned by
respondents.
Hence, the action for specific performance filed by the private respondents. However, the
respondents, in their complaint, contended That on August 1, 1978 Pedro Gamboa arrived
Tacloban City bringing with him the prepared contract to purchase and to sell referred to in his
telegram dated July 27, 1978 for the purpose of closing the transactions referred to in
paragraphs 8 and 9 hereof, however, to the complete surprise of private respondents, the
petitioner without giving notice to plaintiffs, changed the mode of payment with respect to the
balance of P4,500,000.00 by imposing upon the private respondents to pay same amount
within thirty (30) days from execution of the contract instead of the former term of ninety (90)
days.
Ruling of the lower court and the respondent judge: The statute does not require a formal
contract drawn up with technical exactness for the language of Par. 2 of Art. 1403 of the
Philippine Civil Code is '... an agreement...or some note or memorandum thereof,' thus
recognizing a difference between the contract itself and the written evidence which the statute
require. ... The contract of sale sued upon in this case is supported by letters and telegrams
annexed to the complaint. The private respondents having alleged that the contract is backed
up by letters and telegrams, and the same being sufficient memorandum, the complaint states
a cause of action and they should be given their day in court and allowed to substantiate their
allegations.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale between the parties. (NO) and
Whether or not the claim for specific performance of respondents is enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. (NO)
HELD:
1st issue: There was no perfected contract of sale yet because both parties are still under
negotiation and hence, no meeting of the minds. Mr. Gamboa even went to the private
respondents to negotiate for the sale. Even though there was an agreement on the terms of
payment, there was no absolute acceptance because respondents still insisted on further
details.
2nd issue: The conclusion is inescapable that the claim of private respondents that petitioners
have unjustifiably refused to proceed with the sale to them of the property in question is

unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.


It is nowhere alleged in said paragraphs 8 to 12 of the complaint that there is any writing or
memorandum, much less a duly signed agreement to the effect that the price of P6,500,000
fixed by petitioners for the real property herein involved was agreed to be paid not in cash but
in installments as alleged by respondents.
The only documented indication of the non-wholly-cash payment extant in the record is that
stipulated, the deeds already signed by the petitioners and taken to Tacloban by Atty. Gamboa
for the signatures of the respondents.
In other words, the 90-day term for the balance of P4.5 M insisted upon by respondents
choices not appear in any note, writing or memorandum signed by either the petitioners or
any of them, not even by Atty. Gamboa. Hence, looking at the pose of private respondents
that there was a perfected agreement of purchase and sale between them and petitioners
under which they would pay in installments of P2 M down and P4.5 M within 90 days
afterwards, it is evident that such oral contract involving the "sale of real property" comes
squarely under the Statute of Frauds.
Respondent judge assumed that the requirement of perfection of such kind of contract under
Article 1475 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price", the Statute would no longer apply as long as the total price or consideration
is mentioned in some note or memorandum and there is no need of any indication of the
manner in which such total price is to be paid.
Thus, the SC held that in any sale of real property on installments, the Statute of Frauds read
together with the perfection requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood
and applied in the sense that the idea of payment on installments must be in the requisite of a
note or memorandum therein contemplated. Stated otherwise, the inessential elements"
relied upon by respondent judge must be deemed to include the requirement just discussed
when it comes to installment sales.
For the essence and thrust of the said monograph refers only to the form of the note or
memorandum which would comply with the Statute, and no doubt, while such note or
memorandum need not be in one single document or writing and it can be in just sufficiently
implicit tenor, imperatively the separate notes must, when put together', contain all the
requisites of a perfected contract of sale.
To put it the other way, under the Statute of Frauds, the contents of the note or memorandum,
whether in one writing or in separate ones merely indicative for an adequate understanding of
all the essential elements of the entire agreement, may be said to be the contract itself,
except as to the form.
CLAUDEL VS CA and HEIRS OF MACARIO (GR No 85240 July 12, 1991)
FACTS: As early as December 28, 1922, Basilio also known as "Cecilio" Claudel, acquired
from the Bureau of Lands, Lot No. 1230 of the Muntinlupa Estate Subdivision; he secured
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7471 issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of Rizal in 1923; he also declared the lot in his name. He dutifully paid the real estate taxes
thereon until his death in 1937. Thereafter, his widow "Basilia" and later, her son Jose, one of
the herein petitioners, paid the taxes.The same piece of land purchased by Cecilio would,
however, become the subject of protracted litigation thirty-nine years after his death.
Two branches of Cecilio's family contested the ownership over the land-on one hand the
children of Cecilio, namely, Modesto, Loreta, Jose, et al. and on the other, the brother and
sisters of Cecilio, namely, Macario, Esperidiona, Raymunda, and Celestina et. al. In 1972, the
HEIRS OF CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves.
Four years later, on December 7, 1976, private respondents SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, filed

Civil Case No. 5276-P as already adverted to at the outset, with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a "Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with Damages,"
alleging that 46 years earlier, or sometime in 1930, their parents had purchased from the late
Cecilio Claudel several portions of Lot No. 1230 for the sum of P30.00. They admitted that the
transaction was verbal. However, as proof of the sale, the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO presented
a subdivision plan of the said land, dated March 25, 1930, indicating the portions allegedly
sold to the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO. The Lower Court dismissed the case. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court 7. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of sale of land may be proven orally. (NO)
HELD: The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once consummated, is valid regardless of the
form it may have been entered into. For nowhere does law or jurisprudence prescribe that the
contract of sale be put in writing before such contract can validly cede or transmit rights over
a certain real property between the parties themselves.
However, in the event that a third party, as in this case, disputes the ownership of the
property, the person against whom that claim is brought cannot present any proof of such sale
and hence has no means to enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of Frauds was precisely
devised to protect the parties in a contract of sale of real property so that no such contract is
enforceable unless certain requisites, for purposes of proof, are met. The provisions of the
Statute of Frauds pertinent to the present controversy, state:
Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases, an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
xxx xxx xxx
e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real
property or of an interest therein;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of
obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by
requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced in Writing. 12
The provisions of the Statute of Frauds originally appeared under the old Rules of Evidence.
However when the Civil Code was re-written in 1949 (to take effect in 1950), the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds were taken out of the Rules of Evidence in order to be included under
the title on Unenforceable Contracts in the Civil Code. The transfer was not only a matter of
style but to show that the Statute of Frauds is also a substantive law.
Therefore, except under the conditions provided by the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the
contract of sale made by Cecilio with his siblings 13 cannot be proved.
SPOUSES ALFREDO vs SPOUSES BORRAS (GR No 144225 June 17, 2003)
FACTS: The Alfredo Spouses mortgaged the subject land situated in Brgy. Culis, Mabiga,
Hermosa, Bataan, to the DBP for P7,000.00, and in order to pay their debt, the Alfredo
Spouses sold the subject land to the Borras Spouses for P15,000.00. The Borras paid the
loan and its interest and the balance is to be paid by the Alfredos, and they (Alfredos)
delivered the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 284 to them (Borras).
Later, Borras discovered that the Alfredos had re-sold portiions of the land to several persons.
Borras filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan, and later they found out
that the Alfredos had secured a duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, the tax declaration and the
receipts of the realty. The Alfredos filed a complaint for Specific Performance, they claimed
that the sale, not being in writing, is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

ISSUE: W/N the contract of sale is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. (NO)
HELD: NO. The Statute of Frauds provides that a contract for the sale of real property shall
be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing
and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. The existence of the receipt dated 11
March 1970, which is a memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions
of the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either partially
or totally performed. Thus, where one party has performed ones obligation, oral evidence will
be admitted to prove the agreement. In the instant case, the parties have consummated the
sale of the Subject Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations
under the contract of sale. In addition, a contract that violates the Statute of
Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the contract.
Alfredo spouses benefited from the contract because they paid their DBP loan and secured
the cancellation of their mortgage using the money given by Borras. Alfredo also accepted
payment of the balance of the purchase price.
Alfredo spouses cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to deny the existence of the verbal
contract of sale because they have performed their obligations, and have accepted benefits,
under the verbal contract. The Borras spouses have also performed their obligations under
the verbal contract. Clearly, both the sellers and the buyers have consummated the verbal
contract of sale of the Subject Land. The Statute of Frauds was enacted to prevent fraud. This
law cannot be used to advance the very evil the law seeks to prevent.
SANTOS VS SANTOS (GR No 133895 October 2, 2001)
FACTS: Petitioner Zenaida M. Santos is the widow of Salvador Santos. Salvador Santos is a
brother of private respondents Calixto, Alberto, Antonio, and Rosa Santos-Carreon. The
spouses Jesus and Rosalia Santos are the parents of the 5 siblings.
They owned a parcel of land registered under TCT No. 27571 with an area of 154 square
meters, located at Sta. Cruz Manila. On it was a four-door apartment administered by Rosalia
who rented them out. The spouses had five children, Salvador, Calixto, Alberto, Antonio and
Rosa.
On January 19, 1959 Jesus and Rosalia executed a deed of sale of the properties in favor of
their children Salvador and Rosa. TCT No. 27571 became TCT No. 60819.
On November 20, 1973 Rosa in turn sold her share to Salvador which resulted in the
issuance of a new TCT No. 113221. Despite the transfer of the property to Salvador, Rosalia,
their mother, continued to lease and receive rentals from the apartment units.
November 1, 1979, Jesus died. January 9, 1985, Salvador died. After a month (Feb 1985),
Rosalia died.
Shortly after, petitioner Zenaida, claiming to be Salvador's heir (specifically, as Salvadors
widow), demanded the rent from Antonio Hombrebueno, a tenant of Rosalia. When the latter
refused to pay, Zenaida filed and ejectment suit against him with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 24, which eventually decided in Zenaida's favor.
On January 5, 1989 - private respondents instituted an action for reconveyance of property
with preliminary injunction against petitioner in RTC of Manila, where they alleged that the two
deeds of sale executed on January 19, 1959 and November 20, 1973 were simulated for lack
of consideration. They were executed to accommodate Salvador in generation funds for his
business and providing him with greater business flexibility.
Zenaida argued that Salvador was the registered owner of the property, which could only be
subjected to encumbrances or liens annotated on the title; that the respondents' right to
reconveyance was already barred by prescription and laches; and that the complaint state no

cause of action.
Ruling of the lower court: RTC decided in favour of private respondents:
a) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Rosalia Santos and Jesus Santos on January 19,
1959, as entirely null and void for being fictitious or stimulated and inexistent
b) Declaringthe deed of sale executed by Rosa Santos in favor of Salvador Santos on
November 20, 1973, also as entirely null and void for being likewise fictitious or stimulated
and inexistent
c) Directing ROD of Manila to cancel TCT#113221 registered in the name of Salvador Santos,
as well as, TCT# 60819 in the names of Salvador Santos, Rosa Santos and the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-27571 registered in the name of Rosalia A. Santos, married to Jesus
Santos, the same to be partitioned by the heirs of the said registered owners in accordance
with law
The trial court reasoned that notwithstanding the deeds of sale transferring the property to
Salvador, the spouses Rosalia and Jesus continued to possess the property and to exercise
rights of ownership not only by receiving the monthly rentals, but also by paying the realty
taxes. Also, Rosalia kept the owner's duplicate copy of the title even after it was already in the
name of Salvador. Further, the spouses had no compelling reason in 1959 to sell the property
and Salvador was not financially capable to purchase it. The deeds of sale were therefore
fictitious. Hence, the action to assail the same does not prescribe.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that in order for the execution of a public
instrument to effect tradition, as provided in Article 1498 of the Civil Code, the vendor shall
have had control over the thing sold, at the moment of sale. It was not enough to confer upon
the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his
control. The subject deeds of sale did not confer upon Salvador the ownership over the
subject property, because even after the sale, the original vendors remained in dominion,
control, and possession thereof.
ISSUE: WON there was DELIVERY by the Seller
HELD: Theres CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY but it was NOT EFFECTED.
Petitioner in her memorandum invokes Article 1477 of the Civil Code which provides that
ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive
delivery. Article 1498, in turn, provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, its execution is equivalent to the delivery of the thing subject of the contract.
Petitioner avers that applying said provisions to the case, Salvador became the owner of the
subject property by virtue of the two deeds of sale executed in his favor.
Nowhere in the Civil Code, however, does it provide that execution of a deed of sale is a
conclusive presumption of delivery of possession. The Code merely said that the execution
shall be equivalent to delivery. The presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. Presumptive delivery can be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
In Danguilan vs. IAC, 168 SCRA 22, 32 (1988), we held that for the execution of a public
instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must be placed in control of the thing sold. When
there is no impediment to prevent the thing sold from converting to tenancy of the purchaser
by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have
the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of it himself or through another in his
name, then delivery has not been effected.
Salvador was never placed in control of the property. The original sellers retained their control
and possession. Therefore, there was no real transfer of ownership.
In Norkis Distributors, Inc. vs. CA, the SC held that the critical factor in the different modes of
effecting delivery, which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention of the vendor to

deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is no tradition. In the
instant case, although the spouses Jesus and Rosalia executed a deed of sale, they did not
deliver the possession and ownership of the property to Salvador and Rosa. They agreed to
execute a deed of sale merely to accommodate Salvador to enable him to generate funds for
his business venture.

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