UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES, as

owner of BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, as Presiding
Judge of the CFI of Davao del Norte, and MELENCIO B.
DELENA and MAURO GEMENTIZA as Co-Executors of the
Testate Estate of DAVID, Jacobson, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a
resident of the Philippines for more than thirty years and up to
the time of his death in 1970. He left a will in which he
"devised and bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua
Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under Philippine
law in 1948. This corporation was the registered owner of a
tract of land in Pantuhan Davao del Norte, with a total area of
about 445 hectares acquired by virtue of a sales patent issued
to it in 1953.
Judge Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the
ground that it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural
land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the
Constitution of 1935. The finding was that the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital was owned by the United Church Board for
World Ministries (UCBWM) which was a non-stock corporation
organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by
the state legislature of Massachussets .
The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of the
1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners, including
Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands in this country
except only by hereditary succession.
United Church came to this Court, contending that the
constitutional provisions were not applicable because the
object of the legacy was not land but shares of stocks.
Moreover, even assuming that what was really involved was a
transfer of land, the petitioner was nonetheless qualified to
acquire it under the provisions of the Parity Amendment and
the Laurel-Langley Agreement.
The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the
legacy was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution and did not
come under any of the allowed exceptions. During the
protracted exchange of pleadings among the parties, however,
certain events transpired to considerably change the original
situation and, consequently, also the position of government.
The documents submitted in this case that at the time the will
was executed in 1966, the land on which the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital was situated was already registered in the
name of the Mindanao District Conference, an affiliate of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines (PUCC). It was this
non-stock corporation, organized in 1949 under Philippine law
with a 100% Filipino membership, that owned and was
operating the Hospital at the time of Jacobson's death. Later,
the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself incorporated as a
charitable institution, with Filipinos constituting the majority of
its membership, and on December 16,1970, became the
successor-in-interest of the UCCP to the devised parcel of
land.
To prove these Brokenshire presented the articles of
incorporation of the UCCP and the Hospital and their
corresponding certificates of registration issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the licenses issued by
the Board of Medical Sciences for the operation of the Hospital
to the UCCP from 1968 to 1972 and to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital, Inc. from 1973 to 1974, and the certificate
of title over the subject land in the name of the "Mindanao
District Conference, commonly known as the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital."

These facts were not brought earlier to the attention of the

probate court by the former counsel of the Hospital, Atty. Juan
V. Faune for reasons that do not appear in the record. It was
for such omission (the new counsel would call it
"misrepresentation") that Atty. Faune was replaced by Atty.
Rodolfo D. de la Cruz, who disavowed his predecessor's
representations. At any rate, the above-stated documents have
now made it clear that the United Church for Christ in the
Philippines and not the United Church Board for World
Ministries was the owner of the Hospital at the time of the
execution of the win in 1966 and of the testator's death in
1970. It is also not disputed that such ownership passed to the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital itself upon its incorporation in
1970 when it thus became the proper party-in-interest to claim
the property directly devised by Jacobson to it.
ISSUE: May Brokenshire be registered as the owner? YES
HELD:
Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner
of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will and that
the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in the
will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of
the property to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our
consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a ctitizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid.
Thus, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, where a Filipino
citizen sold her land to an alien who later sold it to a Filipino,
we held that the invalidity of the initial transfer to the alien was
corrected by the subsequent transfer of the property to a
citizen. A similar ruling was made in Godinez v. Fong Pak
Luen, involving a similar set of facts, where we also cited
Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap, and Herrera v. Luy King Guan. In
Yap v. Maravillas, we validated the sale of agricultural land to
an alien who, after the purchase, was naturalized as a Filipino
and so became qualified to acquire it. The facts were slightly
different in De Castro v. Teng, where, upon the death of an
alien who had purchased a residential lot, his heirs entered into
an extrajudicial partition of his estate and transferred the land
to one of his sons who was a naturalized Filipino. We also
sustained the sale.
WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is
hereby substituted for the United Church Board for World
Ministries as petitioner in this case and DECLARED to be
qualified to accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson. The
petition as thus modified is GRANTED. The order of the
respondent judge dated December 9, 1971, and his Resolution
dated December 9, 1971, are SET ASIDE. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA,

ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ
GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO
GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ
CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S.
GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased)
represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and children,
namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ,
ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y.
GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN
Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan)
Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO

G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land

Registration Commission, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that
12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez.
Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were
inherited by Jose Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to
divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to
the application, the trial court issued an order of general
default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The
decision became final and executory hence the court directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) to
issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the
12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was
already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law,
land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be
the subject of another registration. The lower court granted
Silverios recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land
Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the
issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title.
That once the judgment becomes final and executory under
Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of
course.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not to set aside the lower courts

initial ruling on approving the adjudication even
after it had became final and executory. YES
Whether or not the respondents Acting Land
Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio
Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration,
Land Registration Commission, have no
alternative but to issue the decrees of registration
pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and
the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6
October 1981, their duty to do so being purely
ministerial. NO

HELD:
1. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in
a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until
after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of
the final decree of registration. The Supreme Court
has held that as long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now
NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not
elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is
not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
2. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land
registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act
under the orders of the court and the decree must be
in conformity with the decision of the court and with
the data found in the record, and they have no

discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt

upon any point in relation to the preparation and
issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the
matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as
officials of the court and not as administrative officials,
and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings .
REPUBLIC V NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
FACTS:
On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas)
filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Oriental rendered a decision, acting as a cadastral
court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements
thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established
their title to their respective lots and their continuous
possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality
of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of
registration. One of these lots was adjudicated to Eugenia
Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion.
Nillas parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, by way of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, acquired the said lot through various
purchases they effected from the Eugenia and her heirs
between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were
evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in
favor of the Spouses Abierra.
In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from her parents through a Deed
of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite the rendition of the
1941 CFI Decision, no decree of registration has ever been
issued. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision
and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration.
On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in
the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of
the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based
on the 1941 Decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of
judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to
"special" proceedings such as land registration cases.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary
to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of
prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases.
The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes
that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues. Further, Section 6 of
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after
which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations.
ISSUE:
WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a
judgment in a land registration case. NO (What is the nature of
duty to issue Decree? Ministerial.)
HELD:
NO, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and instead affirmed
the assailed rulings of the lower courts.

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to

ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure but by some other specific law or legal
modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary
civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership
by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of
such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a
status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision
adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to
effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the
part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and
the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree
(PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of
final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the
contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense
ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason
being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ
of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration
cases in the first place.
Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that
interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the
issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is
imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor
even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court
(that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of
registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the
judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of
the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the
Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on
the officers charged with their performance and thus
generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do
their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot
oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither
the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities
can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared
towards the final and definitive determination of real property
ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional
burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration
case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration
cases become final is complete in itself and does not need
to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does
not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within
the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is
xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character
and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the
adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the
clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the
person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for
pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata
that barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates title over the
subject property. The Republic submits that said decision

would operate as res judicata only after the decree of

registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We
doubt that a final decisions status as res judicata is the
impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res
judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in
relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty
terminology aside, the Republics arguments on this point do
not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is
still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of
registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her
predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the
reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the
then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of
registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was
that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates
her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the
decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original
prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both
the trial court and the
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and
the Republic does not offer any compelling argument to
dispute such proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL
SANTOS, JR., petitioners,
vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J:
FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A
which was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of
petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to
issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the
LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A
which sought to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot
No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued.
Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a
transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue
the corresponding decree of registration sought by the
petitioners, it would result in the duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the
integrity of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by
mandamus to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence
that the subject land may already be included in an existing
Torrens certificate of title? NO
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A
second decree for the same land would be null and void, since
the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel
of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which
petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered
in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to

petitioners will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a

decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts
and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA
to issue a decree of registration.
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the
judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court
held inValmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable:
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or
cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before
the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of
amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where
the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation
therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit
the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los
Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration
must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the
certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical
description of the land. This requires trained technical
men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a
parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered
and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be
entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law
very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code,
section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can
hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said
Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an
administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an
administrative one .
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not
compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving
the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can
be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the
performance of the particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably
granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is
clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right
sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in
this case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act
upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be
enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. As stated
earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. The
court has to decide a question according to its own judgment
and understanding of the law.
It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a
decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits
and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to
direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality
whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT
No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin
within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which
the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the
facts and the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case
is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA,

on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a

report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in
the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days
from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration
court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the
decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as
herein discussed.

HEIRS OF MANUEL ROXAS VS CA

FACTS:
Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of
two parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In support
of its application for registration they presented a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida
Melliza as vendor who bought the property from Trinidad de
Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months earlier, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna
while Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified because
she was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or
adverse claimant. Publication was made in the Official Gazette
and the Record Newsweekly. After an Order of general default
was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case.
On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of
land had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of
Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no
decision has been made.
February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's
application for registration. Consequently RTC issued the
Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after it
ordered the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de
Leon dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked
to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de
Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in
Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for
review before the RTC to set aside the decree of registration
on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud, alleging that her signature was forged in both the Deed
of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun
Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse
claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for
registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could not
send her a Notice of Initial Hearing
RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud
and dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration
April 15, 1992. CA affirmed the findings of RTC, ruling that
Roxas failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or
extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a
prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a
decree of registration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun Corporation to
warrant the reopening and the setting aside of the registration
decree?
HELD:
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration
sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Actual Fraud; Defined.

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive

fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by
means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with
an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is
regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein,
and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is
not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also
actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or
extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to
be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration
reopened and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law
in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic,
which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the
RTC only the following names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose
Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found that the some
words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five
letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid.
However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differentlyworded application for the petition to review the application of
the Roxas where in instead of PROVINCIAL ROAD, the name
ROXAS appeared.The discrepancy which is unexplained
appears intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the
court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original
application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or
claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the
LRA in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the applicant for
registration to state the full names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known
and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them.
Maguesun Corporation failed to comply with this requirement.
Possession in OCENO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of
the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose
Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that the subject land was
unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family
caretaker resided in the subject property. Maguesun
Corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such
possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the
Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her
grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property.
It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the
property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the
current possessors or occupants could have been made
facilely.
Maguesun
Corporation
intentional
concealment
and
representation of Roxas interest in the subject lots as
possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud
justifying the reopening and review of the decree of
registration.

Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas

Mention of the late President's name as well as that of Trinidad
was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for
Maguesun Corporations tax declarations and as predecessorin-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what
the law requires to be stated in the application for registration.
Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and
possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the
time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons
concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will,
therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or
claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable
procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a
component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as
wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
adverse interest in the land subject of the registration
proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of
the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made
in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in
assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
Forgery and Discrepancies
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to
the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in
the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent
Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution
and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient
indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the
"innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the
law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the
sample signatures in several documents executed by Trinidad.
The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have
none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's
signatures characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the
general public, as well as the demise of the late President on
April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field,
Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to
have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit,
there is no reason why she should state facts other than the
unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.