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I. Rule 128 GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. Question of Fact
R128, Sec. 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
R128, Sec. 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as
otherwise provided by law or these rules.
PURPOSE
The purpose of evidence under the ROC is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact in a judicial proceeding.
Evidence is required because of the presumption that the court is not aware of the veracity of the facts involved in a
case. It is therefore incumbent upon the parties to prove a fact in issue thru the presentation of admissible evidence.
Truth as purpose of evidence
While the purpose of evidence is to know the truth, the truth referred to in the definition is not necessarily the actual
truth but one aptly referred to as the judicial or the legal truth. Actual truth may not always be achieved in judicial
proceedings because the findings of the court would depend on the evidence presented before it based on the
accepted rules for admissibility.
When is evidence required
Implied from the definition of evidence, it is required when the court has to resolve a question of fact. Where no
factual issue exists in a case, there is no need to present evidence because where the case presents a question of law,
such question is resolved by the mere application of the relevant statutes or rules of this jurisdiction to which no
evidence is required.
NOTE: Evidence is not also required on matters of judicial notice (Sec.1, R129) and on matters judicially admitted
(Sec. 4, R129)
FACTUM PROBANS V. FACTUM PROBANDUM
Both factum probans and factum probandum are facts. While factum probandum is the fact in issue, factum probans is
a collateral fact or a proving fact.
De Gala v. De Gala (1923)
FACTS: Sinforoso de Gala sued his putative father, Pedro de Gala, to compel the latter to recognize him as a natural
child. He presented several witnesses, including his half-brother and Pedros legitimate son, who all testified that he
had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but
the SC reversed this decision.
HELD: The SC found that the facts had been proven by a clear preponderance of evidence, since the defenses denials
cannot overcome the positive testimonies offered by the plaintiff. All other things being equal, affirmative testimony is
stronger than negative.
B. Relevance
R128, Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law of these rules.
R128, Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
REQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
For evidence to be admissible, two elements must concur:
1. the evidence is relevant; and
2. the evidence is not excluded by the rules (competent).

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Relevant Evidence
The matter of relevance under the ROC requires the existence of a fact in issue. Necessarily, this fact in issue must be a
disputed fact. Since relevant evidence necessarily relates to a disputed fact, evidence offered to prove an undisputed
fact is irrelevant, and, as such, is inadmissible.
Determining the Relevancy of Evidence
The existence of the relationship between the fact in issue and the offered evidence is one that is perceived only by the
mind without reference to a statute or a rule. It is, therefore, a matter of reasoning. It is a matter of reasoning because
relevance is a matter of logic.
Evidence does not prove logic, but addresses logic. Maam Tan
Competent Evidence
The question as to competence is: Is the evidence allowed by the law or by the rules? If it is allowed, the evidence is
competent. If it is not allowed, it is incompetent. (see C. Exclusions below)
COLLATERAL MATTERS
As a rule, evidence on a collateral matter is not allowed. It is not allowed because it does not have direct relevance to
the issue of the case. This rule, however, is not an absolute rule.
A collateral matter may be admitted if it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability
of the fact in issue. In other words, while the evidence may not bear directly on the issue, it will be admitted if it has
the tendency to induce belief as to the probability or improbability of the issues of the case as when it would have the
effect of corroborating or supplementing facts previously established by direct evidence.
Example: Although evidence of character is generally inadmissible (Sec. 51, R130), the accused may prove his good
moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. (Sec. 51(a)(1), R130).
ADMISSIBILITY VS. WEIGHT
The admissibility of the evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to
its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
Probative value is always a function of logic and human experience. Maam Tan
Knapp v. State (1907)
FACTS: Knapp was convicted of murder for killing the marshal of Hagerstown. He claimed self-defense, claiming to
have heard a story from some people that the marshal had previously beaten up an old man he was arresting,
leading to his death. The state proved by physician that the old man had actually died of natural causes. Knapps
counsel contended that the court shouldnt have admitted the physicians testimony because the question was
whether Knapp had heard the story, not whether the story was true or false.
HELD: The physicians testimony was competent and relevant, because it casts doubt on whether Knapp had actually
heard the story, thus discrediting him. The competency of testimony depends largely upon its tendency to persuade
the judgment. Relevancy is that which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis. The competency of a collateral
fact to be used as the basis of legitimate argument is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it
may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry, or
to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in truth.
Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co. (1929)
FACTS: Prats and Co. Bought a building and used it as a stockroom for the stocks of the partnership. The building was
razed in a fire and now they are trying to collect their insurance claims from Phoenix Insurance. Phoenix insurance on
the other hand claims that the fire was caused by Prats and his people and that they tried to collect more than the
actual value of the stocks inside the burned building
HELD: The 2 allegations of the insurance company were found to be correct and was not held liable for the insurance
claims. SC noted however that courts of first instance should be more liberal in admission of testimonies (or evidence)

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even if they seem doubtful. At the early part of the development of proof, it is impossible to know whether a testimony
is relevant or not, hence courts may, as a rule, safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the
proof offered will be connected later, otherwise an error may occur which can only be corrected by a new trial.
Note: the Similar Acts Rule was also briefly discussed in this case.
OCA v. Lerma (2010)
FACTS: 5 administrative complaints were filed against Judge Lerma. One of the complaints arose out of a criminal case
where Goyena filed an estafa case against Cuason. Goyena allegedly gave money to Cuason, and Cuason promised to
give him 2 condominium units. Goyena later discovered that the condominium units were non-existent. Judge Lerma
dismissed the criminal case saying that there was no probable cause, since the condominium units do exist as shown
by the certificates of title.
HELD: The case should not have been dismissed. The issue sought to be resolved is the existence of the condominium
units. The logical thing to do is conduct an ocular inspection instead of relying on the certificates of title. Relevant
evidence is any class of evidence which has rational probative value to the issue in controversy. Logic and human
experience teach us that the documents relied on by Judge Lerma do not constitute the best evidence to prove the
existence or non-existence of the condominium units.
Ilisan v. People (2010)
FACTS: Ilisan was charged with the murder of Joey Gaton. The prosecutions evidence consisted mainly of the 3
testimonies of eyewitness who were also somehow related to the victim (1 brother and 2 neighbors). The defenses
evidence consisted of the testimony of the accused and 2 of his relatives, who claimed that another person (Chito
Partisala) was the one who shot Gaton. They also claimed that the negative results of the paraffin tests prove his
innocence. The trial court convicted Ilisan of homicide, treachery and evident premeditation not having been proved.
The accused appealed, contending that the relationship of the prosecution witnesses to the accused impaired their
credibility, and that the paraffin tests should have been given more weight.
HELD: The SC held that relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor
diminish the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. A witness relationship to the victim would make his
testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating a crime to accuse
somebody other than the culprit. Also, paraffin tests are extremely unreliable. At most, it can only be taken as an
indication of a possibility or probability that a person has fired a gun. The absence of gunpowder nitrates on
petitioners hands does not conclusively establish that he did not fire a gun.
C. Exclusions
1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 12. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

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Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
RA 4200: Anti-Wiretapping Law , Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as
a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
RA 4200, Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE UNDER THE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW
The evidence considered inadmissible if obtained in violation of RA 4200 are spelled out clearly in the law:
a) any communication or spoken word,
b) the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the communication or spoken word or any
part thereof.
NB: Even the existence of the communication is inadmissible.
RA 4200 does not consider it unlawful to record open and public communications. What the law protects are private
conversations and communications. It is considered unlawful to secretly overhear, intercept, or record private
communication or spoken word when doing so is without authority of all the parties to such private communication.
RA 1405: Secrecy of Bank Deposits, Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired
or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor,
or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
RA 1405, Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person
other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
People v. Parungao (1996)
FACTS: Parungao was convicted as co-conspirator and principal by inducement in a jailbreak that killed two guards
and wounded another. His conviction was based on testimony of other prisoners who said that they had been told that
Parungao was the mastermind of the jailbreak.
HELD: The SC ruled that these testimonies, not being based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses, were hearsay
evidence. Since the defense failed to object to the testimony, they were admissible. However, admissibility didnt
mean that the testimony had probative value. Hearsay evidence violated the Constitutional right of the accused to
meet the witnesses face-to-face. Since his part in the jailbreak couldnt be proved beyond reasonable doubt, Parungao
was acquitted.

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Marquez v. Desierto (2001)
FACTS: Marquez, a manager at Union Bank, was required to produce bank documents by the Ombudsman in relation
to the latters ongoing investigation. Instead of complying with the orders, she filed a motion or declaratory relief
since complying with the order would be a violation of the law on secrecy of bank deposits.
HELD: The present case is not an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits. There is no pending case in court
which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. The exceptions to RA 1405 are:
A. As provided in RA 1405 itself:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation
5. Sec. 8, RA 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB v. Gancayco
B. The SC, in Union Bank v. CA, held that bank deposits are absolutely confidential except:
1. In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by
the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious
irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or
irregularity;
2. In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank;
3. Upon written permission of the depositor;
4. In cases of impeachment;
5. Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; or
6. In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Ramirez v. CA (1995)
FACTS: Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Garcia, after a heated confrontation in the latters office. In
support of her claim, Ramirez submitted a transcript, which she was able to do because she had secretly tape recorded
the confrontation. In response, Garcia filed a criminal case, charging Ramirez with violation of R.A. 4200 (AntiWiretapping Act), claiming that the latter was not authorized to record their conversation. TC quashed Garcias
information, holding that the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping a communication by a person other
than a participant to the communication. CA declared TCs order null and void, holding that the facts sufficiently
constituted an offense punishable under Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200.
HELD: Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person (whether a party to the
communication or a 3rd person) not authorized by all the parties to any private communication, to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of R.A.
4200, as what the law penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, interception, or recording private
communications. The phrase private communication in Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200 includes private conversation, and this
includes the confrontation between Ramirez and Garcia.
Zulueta v. CA (1996)
FACTS: Zulueta, wife of Martin, ransacked Martins clinic for documents tending to prove the latters infidelity to the
former for use in a legal separation case. Martin filed a case against Zulueta for recovery of the documents, damages,
and to declare the documents inadmissible.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Martin. The documents are inadmissible in evidence because of the constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable. Such is still applicable even if
it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. A person does not shed his
right to privacy as an individual just by contracting marriage.

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II. Rule 129 WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

A. Judicial Notice
R129, Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
R129, Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
R129, Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request
of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may
take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case.
PURPOSE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
The purpose of judicial notice is to abbreviate litigation by the admission of matters that need no evidence because
judicial notice is a substitute for formal proof of a matter by evidence. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of
equal force. Hence, it makes evidence unnecessary.
WHEN JUDICIAL NOTICE CANNOT BE USED
While the court has the power to dispense with proof of judicially cognizable adjudicative facts when the principles of
judicial notice are properly invoked, judicial notice cannot, however, be used to fill in the gaps in the partys evidence
(Hammond v. Doody) but judicial notice should not be used to deprive an adverse party of the opportunity to prove a
disputed fact.
WHEN JUDICIAL NOTICE IS MANDATORY
Judicial notice may either be mandatory (Sec. 1, R129) or discretionary (Sec. 2, R129). When the matter is subject to a
mandatory judicial notice, no motion or hearing is necessary for the court to take judicial notice of a fact because this
is a matter which a court ought to take judicial notice of.
The following are matters subject to mandatory judicial notice:
1. the Existence and territorial extent of states;
2. the POlitical history, forms of government and symbols of nationality of states;
3. the Law of nations;
4.

the Admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals;

5.
6.

the Political constitution and history of the Philippines;

the Official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines;

7.
8.
9.

the Laws of nature;

the (o)Measure of time; and
the Geographical divisions.

WHEN JUDICIAL NOTICE IS DISCRETIONARY

The principles of discretionary judicial notice will apply where the following requisites are met:
1. 1, the matter must be one of common knowledge;
2. the matter must be settled beyond reasonable doubt (if there is any uncertainty about the matter, then
evidence must be adduced); and

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3.

the knowledge must exist within the jurisdiction of the court (State Prosecutors v. Muro).

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: a) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or b) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of Common Knowledge
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mandkind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Matters Capable of Unquestionable Demonstration
Matters capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific knowledge.
Matters Ought to be Known to Judges
As to matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are
ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.
Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of
the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action.
Conversely, judicial notice is not limied by the actual knowledge of the individual judge or court. A judge must take
judicial notice of a fact if it is one which is the proper subject of judicial cognizance even if it is not within his personal
knowledge.
When Doubt Exists
Any reasonable doubt on the matter sought to be judicially noticed must be resolved against the taking of judicial
notice (State Prosecutors v. Muro).
WHEN JUDICIAL NOTICE MAY BE TAKEN
The court can take judicial notice of a fact during or after trial pursuant to the procedure in Sec. 3, R129:
a) DURING TRIAL: the court may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter. It may do so on its own
initiative or on the request of any party and allow the parties to be heard. This hearing is only for the purpose of
determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a certain matter.
b) AFTER THE TRIAL, but BEFORE JUDGMENT (may also be take ON APPEAL): the court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS
Our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Such must be alleged and proved.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption
In the absence of proof, the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as the laws of the jurisdiction hearing the
case.
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA (2010)
FACTS: BE San Diego filed an accion publiciana in order to recover possession of property from Matias. Matias pointed
out that the actual location of the property was different from the location of the property indicated in the TCT BE San
Diego presented as basis for its better claim. The TCT was for a property in Barrio Tinajeros, while the property
subject of the complaint was located in Barrio Catmon. In ruling for BE, the RTC took judicial notice of the fact that
Barrio Catmon was previously a part of Barrio Tinajeros, considering they were adjacent to each other. The CA
reversed the RTC decision, saying that the RTC should have required an expert witness explain the discrepancy.

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HELD: The SC agreed with the RTC. It said that the lower court had authority to take judicial notice of geographical
divisions of political units under Rule 129, BE San Diego was ultimately adjudged to have a better right to possess the
property.
Expert Travel & Tours v. CA (2005)
FACTS: KAL filed a case against ETI, with its legal counsel signing the verification and certificate against forum
shopping. ETI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of authority of the legal counsel. KAL alleged that the
legal counsel had authority from the BOD through a resolution approved during a teleconference between the BOD in
Korea and the legal counsel and KALs general manager in the Philippines. RTC took judicial notice. RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss, as well as the MR. ETI filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA. CA denied. ETI
appealed to the SC.
HELD: Although judicial notice may be taken of teleconferencing as a means of making business transactions, there is
no judicial notice that one was conducted in this particular case.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (1987)
FACTS: In several consolidated cases, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (the Commission) arrived at the
conclusion that the Ohio Bell Telephone Company (the Company) received excess earnings and ordered that it refund
the full amount to its subscribers. The Company protested stating that the trend percentages accepted in the
Commission's findings did not come from any official sources which the Commission had a right to notice judicially;
that they had not been introduced in evidence and thus, the Company had been denied a fair hearing.
HELD: The attempt made by the Commission as well as the Supreme Court of Ohio to uphold the decision as an
instance of judicial notice must fail for courts can only take judicial notice of matters which are of common knowledge.
Judicial notice can be made that there has been a depression and that a decline of market values is associated with it;
however, the degree of the decline from industry to industry can be known only to experts who may even differ
among themselves.
Gener v. de Leon (2001)
FACTS: De Leon and his wife Faustino filed a complaint for forcible entry against Gener, relying on the testimony of
several witnesses. Gener denied the allegations and claimed that it was in fact De Leon who forcibly entered the
property, as evidenced by two criminal cases he had filed against De Leons employees and relatives. The MuTC ruled
in favor of De Leon.
HELD: While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge, such rule is subject to
the exception that in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated. Defendants herein did not impugn or object to the evidence on the
existence of said criminal cases that sprung from the alleged forcible entry, thus, the MuTC should have taken judicial
notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior possession.
NOTE: Another exception to the rule that judicial notice may not be taken of records of other cases is when the
original record of the other case or any part of it is actually withdrawn from the archives at the courts discretion upon
the request, or with the consent, of the parties, and admitted as part of the record of the pending case. (Tabuena v. CA)
Jao v. CA (1987)
FACTS: Janice represented by her mother Arlene filed a case for recognition against Perico. The parties agreed to a
blood grouping test. The result of the test indicated that Janice could not have been a possible offspring of Perico and
Arlene. The trial court held that NBI was not in a position to determine the issue of parentage and ruled in favour of
Janice. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court.
HELD: Blood grouping tests are conclusive to non-paternity, although inconclusive to paternity. When the blood type
of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

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Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero (2003)
FACTS: Guerrero was trying to collect damages against the bank in connection with his account but the bank, in
response, argued that his account was governed by New York Law and that Guerrero cannot claim damages other
than actual damages. This answer was accompanied by an affidavit of a New York attorney supporting the claim of the
Bank
HELD: Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice, they must be alleged and proven. In this case, the affidavit is
not sufficient to prove a foreign law, hence the claim of the bank cannot stand.
People v. Travero (1997)
FACTS: Agnes Cuba filed a complaint charging Travero with Rape. Traveros defense was that they were sweethearts
and that their sexual congress was consensual.
HELD: Travero sought to portray Agnes as an aggressive and uninhibited young girl. The Court, however noted that in
rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence, and that
great caution is observed so that their reputation shall be untainted. Traveros conviction was affirmed.
Vi Ve Chemical Products, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs (1974)
FACTS: Vi Ve Chemical Properties Inc. (VVCP) imported 250 drums of glutamic acid for which it was made to pay a
certain amount as customs duties. Believing that it was only duty-bound to pay a smaller amount, it filed the
necessary protest. The case eventually reached the Court of Tax Appeals which still ruled against VVCP. VVCP
contended, among others, that the CTA committed error when it held that VVCP failed to produce evidence of the
value of 1964 and 1965 when importations for glutamic acid under the commercial name "propionic glycine" had
been made during those years. According to VVCP, the CTA should have taken judicial notice of the fact that the
chemical composition of glutamic acid and propionic glycine are the same.
HELD: The Court held that the chemical components of these articles are technical in nature and only persons
possessed of the required knowledge know their similarity or difference. It cannot be said that these objects are of
public knowledge or are of unquestionable demonstration to be the proper subject of judicial notice by the Court.
In Re: Marriage of Tresnak (1980)
FACTS: Jim and Linda were married and had 2 sons. The present case is a dispute over the custody of the children.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jim because Linda was planning to go to law school, and it was of the opinion that
Linda's going to law school would not be in best interest of the children since it would take up most of Linda's time.
The trial court is also of the opinion that Jim would be more suited to engage in various activities which the children
would be interested in.
HELD: The trial court erred in applying its personal opinion regarding law school to decide that such fact would be
inimical to the interest of the children. What the trial court said about going through a legal education are not matters
subject of judicial notice. Judicial notice is limited to what a judge may properly know in his judicial capacity, and he is
not authorized to make his personal knowledge of a fact not generally or professionally known the basis of his action.
While it is common knowledge that going through law school is demanding the requirements of a specific law school
curriculum are not generally or professionally known.
B. Judicial Admission
R129, Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
R9, Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.

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R18, Section 6. Pre-trial brief. The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner
as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial
briefs which shall contain, among others:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the purpose thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to
commissioners; and
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.
R118, Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
R10, Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However,
admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged
therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
R26, Sec. 3. Effect of admission. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the
pending action only and shall not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be used
against him in any other proceeding.
Family Code, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
Family Code, Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
CONSIDERATIONS IN JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
To be a judicial admission under Sec. 4, R129, certain elements must first be considered:
1. The same must be made by a party to the case. Admissions of a non-party do not fall within the definition of
Sec. 4, R129.
2. The admission, to be judicial, must be made in the course of the proceedings in the same case. An admission
made in another judicial proceeding is considered an extrajudicial admission for purposes of the other
proceeding where such admission is offered.
3. Sec. 4, R129 does not require a particular form for an admission. Such form is immaterial because the
provision recognizes either a verbal or written admission.
Judicial admissions bind the admitting party
As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him,
but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. In spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the
trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.
Admissions may be actual or implied
An admission in a pleading may be an actual admission, but may likewise be inferred from the failure to specifically
deny the material allegations in the other partys pleadings. For example, Sec. 11, R8 requires a defendant to
specifically deny the material averments of the other party, otherwise they are deemed admitted.

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The rules also provide averments in pleadings which are not deemed admitted even if the adverse party fails to make
specific denial of the same, like: immaterial allegations (Sec.11, R8), conclusions, non-ultimate facts in the pleading
(Sec. 1, R8) as well as the amount of unliquidated damages (Sec. 11, R8).
NB: When the rules require that an allegation be specifically denied under oath, failure to do so would also be deemed
an implied admission of the allegation. Recall CivPro: denial of an actionable document under Sec. 8, R8 and denial of
allegations of usury (Sec. 11, R8).
Admissions in Pre-Trial: Civil v. Criminal Cases
In civil cases, the parties are bound by the representations and statements in their respective pre-trial briefs,
submission of which being mandatory in a pre-trial of a civil case. The admissions of the parties during the pre-trial, as
embodied in the pre-trial order of the court, are likewise binding and conclusive on them unless there is a clear
showing that the admission was entered through palpable mistake.
In criminal cases, an admission made by the accused in the pre-trial of a criminal case is not necessarily admissible
against him. To be admissible, the agreement or admission entered during the pre-trial conference must be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. (Sec. 2, R118)
Admissions in Amended Pleadings
When a pleading is amended, the amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in
superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not
incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. (Sec. 8, R10)
Admissions in a superseded pleading are to be considered as extrajudicial admissions which must be proven. Thus, in
order for them to be utilized as extrajudicial admissions, they must be formally offered in evidence.
Admissions by Counsel
Admissions by counsel are generally conclusive upon a client. Even the negligence of counsel binds the client.
However, in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or when the interests of justice so
require, relif is accorded the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
Effects of Judicial Admission
Under Sec. 4, R129, the following are the effects of judicial admissions:
1. they do not require proof; and
2. they cannot be contradicted because they are conclusive upon the party making it.
This rule however, admits of two exceptions, namely:
1. upon showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake, or
2. when it is shown that no such admission was made.
Palpable Mistake
A showing that an admission was made through palpable mistake relieves the admitting party of the effects of his
admission. A palpable mistake is one that is clear to the mind or plain to see. It is a mistake that is readily perceived
by the senses or the mind.
No Such Admission Made
A party may also argue that he made no such admission. This argument may be invoked when the statement of a
party is taken out of context or that his statement was made not in the sense it is made to appear by the other party.
Here, the party upon whom the admission is imputed does not deny making a statement. What he denies is the
meaning attached to his statement, a meaning made to appear by the adverse party as an admission.
ADMISSIONS IN ITS BROAD SENSE
Note that judicial admissions under Sec. 4, R129 is a specie of admission in its broader sense. Admissions may be
judicial or extrajudicial, express or implied.
Admissions Distinguished from Confessions

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ADMISSION
An act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact (Sec. 26, R130)
There is merely a statement of fact not directly
involving an acknowledgment of guilt or the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which one is
charged
May be implied (ex: admission by silence)

CONFESSION
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein (Sec. 33, R130)
There is an acknowledgment of guilt

Cannot be implied. Should be a direct and positive

acknowledgment of guilt.

Admissions Distinguished from Declarations Against Interest

ADMISSION
Admissible even if the person making the admission
is alive and is in court
Made at any time, even during the trial
Admissible as long as it is inconsistent with his
present claim or defense and need not be against
ones pecuniary or moral interest
Admissible only against the party making the
admission
Not an exception to hearsay rule, admissible not as
an exception to any rule

DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

Declarant must be dead or unable to testify
Made before the controversy arises
Made against ones pecuniary or moral interest
Admissible against third persons
Exception to hearsay rule

Adoptive Admissions
An adoptive admission occurs when a person manifests his assent to the statements of another person. The admission
may be received in evidence if it can be show that a party adopted the statements as his own.
Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
1. expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;
2. hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
3. utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another
4. replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she
has heard the other make; or
5. reads and signs a written statement made by another.
Arroyo v. Taduran (2004)
FACTS: Arroyo and Taduran verbally agreed to form a corporation and acquire an office. Arroyo bought a condo
using money borrowed from Commercial Bank, and the loan was guaranteed by a time deposit in the same bank.
When the loan matured, Taduran applied the proceeds of the time deposit to pay it off. The unit was eventually
released to the Arroyos, so Taduran filed a case to recover the condo. Trial court decided, although he cannot recover
the condo itself, he is entitled to the payment of the proceeds of the time deposit used to pay off the loan. Arroyos
admit that they owe Taduran 500k, but argue that payment for the indebtedness should be made in another forum
since this relief wasnt prayed for in Tadurans complaint.
HELD: SC held that Arroyos admission of indebtedness is conclusive. Such admission needs no evidence, and it cannot
be contradicted except when it is shown that palpable mistake has been made or that there has been no admission.
The records do not show any attempt of the Arroyos to contradict their judicial admission using any of the
aforementioned grounds.
Abay v. People (2008)
FACTS: Abay and Darilag, having been convicted of Brigandage by the RTC and CA, questioned their conviction with
the SC arguing that the basis of their conviction was a coerced extrajudicial confession from Aban, one of their coconspirators.

Page 13 of 115
HELD: The SC found however that Abans extrajudicial confession was reiterated in his testimony in open court it
thus ceased to be hearsay but became a judicial admission admissible in evidence against those it implicates.
People v. Hernandez (1996)
FACTS: Hernandez was charged with illegal recruitment. During trial, a stipulation of facts was entered into, stating
that neither she nor her company had the requisite license and authority to recruit workers for employment abroad.
She was convicted. On appeal, she contests that such stipulation of facts does not relieve the prosecution of the burden
of proving such fact, and that a stipulation of facts is contrary to law and public policy.
HELD: The SC held that the prosecution actually did prove such fact. Also, a stipulation of facts is explicitly allowed
under Rule 118 on the rules on pre-trial. It is also allowed during trial itself, and is considered a judicial admission.
Ching v. CA (2000)
FACTS: Ching was charged with 4 counts of estafa. He filed a case to declare nullity of documents, and eventually, a
case for suspension of criminal proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question. Afterwards, Ching asked for leave
from the court to file an amended complaint, wherein he made an allegation that was inconsistent with allegations in
his original complaint. The RTC admitted the amended complaint.
HELD: Court held that there is no prejudicial question so the criminal proceedings should go on. Although the
allegations in the original complaint may be used in evidence against Ching, the same must be formally offered. Since
the original complaint was already superseded by the amended complaint, the allegations therein must be deemed
abandoned. The Court nevertheless emphasizes that they view Chings actuations with displeasure and abhorrence.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano (1960)
FACTS: Husband filed for legal separation after catching his wife committing adultery on two separate occasions.
When questioned by the Fiscal, wife admitted to such adultery and her willingness to be legally separated from her
husband. CA did not grant the petition for legal separation based on Art. 101 of the NCC on collusion.
HELD: SC ruled that legal separation should be granted. Article 101 does not exclude as evidence any admission or
confession made by the defendant outside of the court. Also, what the law prohibits is the granting of the separation
based on the confession alone. In this case, there was other evidence.

III. Rule 130 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

A. Object (Real Evidence)
R130, Sec. 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object
is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
Meaning of Object Evidence
Object or real evidence appeals directly to the sense of the court. Instead of relying on the recollection of the witness,
an object evidence will enable the court to have its own first-hand perception of the evidence.
Object evidence is not visual alone. It covers the entire range of human senses: hearing, taste, smell and touch.
Object evidence is of the highest order. It is more eloquent than a thousand witnesses. However, such is still subject
to authentication. People v. Sungco
No class on July 16. Maam Tan
Requisites for Admissibility of Object Evidence
The admissibility of object evidence, like any other evidence requires that the object be both relevant and competent
(Sec. 3, R128). To be relevant, the evidence must have a relationship to the fact in issue. To be competent, it must not
be excluded by the rules or by law.
For the object not to be excluded by the Rules, the same must pass the test of authentication. The threshold foundation
for real evidence is its being authenticated.

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In summary, the basic requisites for admissibility of an object or real evidence:
1. 1, the evidence must be relevant;
2. the evidence must be authenticated;
3. the authentication must be made by a competent witness;
4. the object must be formally offered in evidence.
How to Authenticate, Generally
To authenticate the object, it must be shown that the object is the very thing that is either the subject matter of the
lawsuit or the very one involved to prove an issue in the case.
To authenticate the object, there must be someone who should identify the object to be the actual thing involved in
the litigation. This someone is the witness. The witness must have capacity to identify the object as the very thing
involved in the litigation.
NB: an object evidence is not taken in isolation. It is weighed in relation to the testimony of a witness. Hence, the
importance of authentication.
Laying the Foundation
In authentication, the problem commonly lies in showing that the object sought to be admitted is in fact the real thing
and not a mere substitute or representation of the real thing. This problem of authentication is commonly called
laying the foundation for the evidence.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination cannot be invoked against object evidence. Recall Villaflor v. Summers.
Categories of Object Evidence
For purposes of authentication of an object or for laing the foundation for the exhibit, object evidence may be
classified into the following:
a) Objects that have readily identifiable marks (unique objects);
b) Objects that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique); and
c) Objects with no identifying marks and cannot be marked (non-unique objects)
If the object has a unique characteristic, it becomes readily identifiable. So long as the witness testifies that the object
has a unique characteristic, he saw the object on the relevant date, remembers its characteristics, asserts that the
object shown to him in court is the same or substantially in the same condition as he first saw it, and alleges that those
characteristics are those of the object he is identifying in court, the authentication requirement is satisfied.
If the object does not have a unique characteristic, is commonplace, and is identical with a lot of objects of the same
kind and quality, the witness may be able to identify the same in court ifhe claims that he made the thing acquire a
unique characteristic like placing identifying marks on it. All he has to do in court is to testify as to what he did to
make the object identifiable and that the object presented to him for identifaction in court has the characteristics he
made on the object.
As to the third category of objects, the proponent of the evidence must establish a chain of custody to guaranty the
integrity of the physical evidence and to prevent the introduction of evidence which is not authentic.
Demonstrative Evidence
Demonstrative evidence is not the actual thing but it is referred to as demonstrative because it represents or
demonstrates the real thing. It is not strictly real evidence because it is not the very thing involved in the case. This
category of evidence is not separately defined in the Rules and appears to have been incorporated under the general
term object evidence.
Examples: a photograph, a map, a diagram, audio recording, motion pictures.
The admissibility of this type of evidence largely depends on laying the proper foundation for the evidence. The rule
oils down to one basic question: Does the evidence sufficiently and accurately represent the object it seeks to
demonstrate or represent? If it does, the evidence would be admissible.

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View of an Object or Scene
Courts have recognized that there are times when a party cannot bring an object to the court for viewing in the
courtroom. In such a situation the court may take a view of an object. Example: it ay make an ocular inspection of a
contested land, or a crime scene, or a vehicle involved in an accident.
Other Applicable Rules
See also: Rules on Electronic Evidence and Rule on DNA Evidence
People v. Adamson (1946)
FACTS: Adamson was accused of murdering Stella Blauvelt. He contended that the evidence presented did not
sufficiently identify him as the perpetrator.
HELD: The Court, however, ruled that there was sufficient evidence identifying him as the perpetrator. Among the
evidence presented were stocking tops found in the house of the defendant, which- added to the fact that the victim
was found with a stocking missing and another one torn- served as a logical link in the evidence tending to identify
him as the murderer.
Sison v. People (1995)
FACTS:: a group of Marcos Loyalists Mauled a Cory supporter. Said supporter died because of the mauling.
Prosecution presented photographs as evidence. The accused objected to the admission of such evidence since they
were not properly identified by the ones who produced them
HELD: Photos, when presented as evidence must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified
as to the circumstances under which they were produced. Value lies in it being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original. Admissibility determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
In this case the accuracy of the photos were admitted by the accused themselves when they used said photographs for
their defense.
Note: Riano uses the same case to illustrate the fact that, while some courts insist on requiring the photographer to
testify, this view has been eroded by the tendency of modern courts to admit as a witness one who has familiarity with
the scene prortrayed.
Balian v. General Motors (1972)
FACTS: The Balians were driving their 1965 Chevrolet Impala when they heard some noise coming from under the
car. Shortly afterwards, the car became unsteerable and the Balians eventually hit a pole. Upon inspection after the
accident, it was found that the rivet was missing from the coupler. In a case filed against the Manufacturer, the main
position of the plaintiffs (who presented expert witnesses to buttress their claim) was that the loss of such part led to
the car being uncontrollable. The defendants witness denied this and even presented a video of a motion picture,
supposedly showing an experiment conducted under the same circumstances as the plaintiffs car.
HELD: Although it admitted the motion pictures into evidence, the court eventually ruled that the probative value of
such films was offset by several other factors, the strongest being that it unfairly surprised the plaintiffs, who had no
knowledge of such filming. According to the court, in order for such films to be admissible, plaintiffs should have been
given notice and opportunity to monitor the making of such films so that they will be able to present an effective
rebuttal during trial. The court also noted that the motion picture did not portray the actual automobile involved in
the accident or show plaintiffs operation and that it was virtually impossible to recreate the exact circumstances of
the accident.
The film here was self-serving evidence. They created their own evidence favoring them. Maam Tan
Note: Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the authentication process of motion pictures and recordings need not
involve the person who actually made the recording. It can be done by some other person as long as he is one who can
testify as to its accuracy. There is also a requirement that the recording be shown, presented or displayed to the court.
Torralba v. People (2005)
FACTS: 4 informations for libel were filed against Torralba. Lim, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, introduced
in evidence tape recordings of Torralbas radio program where, allegedly, he discredited the late Judge Hontanosas,
among other things, thereby exposing his family to dishonor. The tape recording containing such statements was

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presented as Exhibit D, which, as Lim admitted, was recorded by his adopted daughter. Torralba posed a continuing
objection to the admission of the tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person who actually made
the recordings. The RTC then convicted Lim with libel based mainly on Exhibit Ds contents.
HELD: The Court ruled that the lower court, in convicting Torralba, shouldnt have given considerable weight on the
tape recording because it was not duly authenticated by the person who made the recording. In this decision, the
court lays down requisites for the proper foundation for the admission of a tape recording. Considering that Exhibit D
was disallowed as evidence, the court finds that there is no sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict the
accused. Petition was granted and accused was acquitted.
NOTE: The following requisites must first be established before a tape recording may be admitted into evidence and
given probative value:
1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
6) identification of the speakers; and
7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.
Lesson? AUTHENTICATE! Maam Tan
Unchuan v. Lozada (2009)
FACTS: The sisters Anita and Peregrina sold two lots that they co-owned to their nephew, Antonio. When the Deed of
Sale was pending registration, Marissa Unchuan caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the lots stating that
Anita had donated an undivided share in the lots to her. This prompted Anita and Antonio to file a case against
Marissa for quieting of title. Among the pieces of evidence submitted by them was a videotaped statement by Anita
where she denied donating land to Marissa.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that object evidence such as the videotape must be authenticated by a special
testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction. Since such an authentication is absent in this case, the Court
excluded the videotaped statement from the evidence. Nevertheless, the Court came to the conclusion that Marissa
failed to prove that she had any right to the lands subject of this case.
NOTE: Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other
than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. Three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence:
a) absence of cross-examination;
b) absence of demeanor of evidence; and
c) absence of oath.
See also: note under Balian v. General Motors.
B. Documentary Evidence
R130, Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writing or any material containing letters,
words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents.
Requisites for Admissibility of Documentary Evidence
1. The document must be relevant;
2. The evidence must be authenticated;
3. The document must be authenticated by a competent witness; and
4. The document must be formally offered in evidence.
1. Best Evidence Rule
R130, Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

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(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
R130, Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of
the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
R130, Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
R130, Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the document is in the custody or
under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of its loss.
R130, Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of document is in
the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof.
R130, Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. A party who calls for the production of a
document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.
CONCEPT OF BEST EVIDENCE
Despite the word best the rule does not proclaim itself as the highest and most reliable evidence in the hierarchy of
evidence. The term best has nothing to do with the degree of its probative value in relation to other types of
evidentiary rules.
More accurately, it is the original document rule, or the primary evidence rule. For the only actual rule that the
term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be
produced. (Edsa-Shangrila Hotel v. BF Corporation)
Reasons for Best Evidence Rule
The basic premise justifying the rule is the need to present to the court the exact words of a writing where a slight
variation of words may mean a great difference in rights. An ancillary justification for the rule is the prevention and
detection of fraud. The rule is also justified by the need to avoid unintentional or intentional mistaken transmissions
of the contents of a document through the introduction of selected portions of a writing to which the adverse party
has no full access.
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE
The rule will come into play only when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. The rule cannot be
invoked unless the contents of a writing is the subject of judicial inquiry, in which case, the best evidence is the
original writing itself.
Example: If, in an action for collection on a promissory note, the sole defense is lack of consideration, then the best
evidence rule is not applicable (with regard to the promissory note) because the precise wording of the promissory
note is not disputed.

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NB: The subject of inquiry under the best evidence rule is the contents of a writing, not the truth thereof.
When Document is Merely Collaterally in Issue
When a document is involved in the inquiry but the document is only collaterally in issue, the best evidence rule does
not apply. A document is collaterally in issue when the purpose of introducing the document is not to establish its
term but to show facts that have no reference to its contents, like its existence, condition, execution or delivery.
Example: If a witness testifies that the victim was writing a letter when he was shot by the accused, a party who insists
on the presentation of the letter under the best evidence rule would likely be defeated because the letter is not the
subject of an important issue in the case and hence, is merely collateral.
Waiver of the Rule
The best evidence rule may be waived if not raised in the trial. However, even if there is a waiver, the probative value
of the evidence offered in substitute of the best evidence must still meet the various tests by which reliability is to be
determined.
IF ORIGINAL IS UNAVAILABLE
If the original of a document, the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, is unavailable, its unavailability must first
be justified in the manner provided for by the Rules, then its contents can be proven in some other manner (Sec.. 5,
R130).
Excuses for Not Presenting the Original
In the following cases, non-production of the original document, when its contents is the subject of inquiry, is excused:
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Use of Secondary Evidence
Secondary evidence may be admitted only by laying the basis for its production. Specifically:
1. The offeror must prove the execution and existence of the original document;
2. The offeror must show the cause of its unavailability; and
3. The offeror must show that the unavailability was not due to his bad faith.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents, although the order may be changed if
necessary at the sound discretion of the court. (Citibank N.A. v. Sabeniano)
NB: Before secondary evidence can be presented, it is imperative that all the originals of a deed must be accounted for.
(De Vera v. Aguilar)
How to Prove Due Execution
Due execution and authenticity of the document must be proved either:
a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or
b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Burden of Proving Loss
The burden of proof in establishing loss or destruction of the original is on the proponent of the secondary evidence.
The loss, however, need not be shown to be beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is
sufficient like by showing that there was a bona fide and diligent but fruitless search for the document.
Hierarchy of Secondary Evidence
After laying the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, the offeror may now be allowed to prove the
contents of the documents by secondary evidence. The presentation of evidence must be in the following order:
1. a copy of the original;
2. a recital of the contents of the document in some authentic document; or

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3.

by the testimony of witnesses.

The hierarchy of preferred secondary evidence must be strictly followed. The lower tier secondary evidence in the
hierarchy can only be admitted if the higher tier secondary evidence is absent.
IF ORIGINAL IS IN THE CUSTODY OF ADVERSE PARTY
A showing that the original document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party does not ipso facto
authorize the introduction of secondary evidence to prove its contents. The party who seeks to present secondary
evidence must lay a basis for its introduction:
a) that the original exists;
b) that said document is under the custody or control of the adverse party;
c) that the proponent of the secondary evidence has given the adverse party reasonable notice to produce the
original document; and
d) that the adverse party failed to produce the original document despite reasonable notice.
After laying the foundation thus, secondary evidence may now be introduced, following the hierarchy of secondary
evidence.
See also: Sec3(a), R29 in relation to Sec. 1, R27.
WHEN THE ORIGINAL CONSISTS OF NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS
Under this exception, secondary evidence is admissible:
a) if the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents;
b) they cannot be examined in court without great loss of time; and
c) the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole.
WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC RECORD
Because public records are generally not to be removed from the places where they are recorded and kept, the proof
of the contents of a document which forms part of a public record may be done by secondary evidence. This evidence
is a certified true copy of the original, to be issued by the public officer in custody of the public records.
MEANING OF ORIGINAL
Under the Rules, the original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry. Thus, when the rule
speaks of an original, the rule obviously does not refer to the original of an object evidence but an original of a
documentary evidence. In a documentary evidence, its contents are the subjects of the inquiry.
Under Sec. 4(b), R130, when carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of paper with the writing and the
signature on the first sheet being reproduced in the sheets beneath by the same stroke of the pen or writing medium,
all the sheets are deemed originals. Likewise, where a document is executed in duplicate or multiplicate form, each
one of the parts is primary evidence of the contents of the document, and the other need not be produced.
Under Sec. 4(c), R130, an entry repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of transaction, all other entries are equally regarded as originals. To be considered originals under this
provisions the following requisites must be complied with:
a) there must be entries made and repeated in the regular course of business; and
b) the entries must be at or near the time of the transaction.
See also: Originals under the Rules on Electronic Evidence
Government v. Martinez (1918)
FACTS: Julio claimed that he bought a land from Domenech who acquired it from Martinez. Martinez denied having
sold the land to Domenech. Julio did not present the original document of the sale between Martinez and Domenech
but presented a certified copy of an entry in the registry.
HELD: The sale between Martinez and Domenech was not proven. The original document of the sale was not
presented. The certified copy cannot be admitted as secondary evidence since Julio failed to prove the loss of the

Page 20 of 115
original document or that it was duly signed. Further, such certified copy does not prove whether the document of
sale was true.
De Vera v. Aguilar (1993)
FACTS: When a mortgage on Marcosa Bernabes land matured, the Spouses Aguilar redeemed the property and
Bernabe later sold it to them. The De Veras claimed that as co-heirs they were co-owners of the property, and that the
Aguilars had resold the property to Bernabe. They presented as evidence a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of sale in
Bernabes favor, and the RTC ruled in their favor.
HELD: The SC overturned the RTC decision and affirmed the CA, saying that while the De Veras had sufficiently
established the due execution of the deed, they were unable to prove that the document had been lost or destroyed.
They were only able to account for 3 of the four to five original copies of the deed. Thus, the Xerox copy, which was
secondary evidence, was inadmissible.
Municipality of Victorias v. CA (1987)
FACTS: Norma inherited land from her grandmother. She discovered that part of such land was being used by the
Municipality as a cemetery, so she filed a case for recovery of possession of property. The Municipality alleged that it
had bought the land from Normas grandmother. They were not able to present a Deed of Sale, but instead presented a
Certificate of the Notarial Register.
HELD: The SC held that the Certificate, together with testimonies and other corroborating evidence, was sufficient to
prove the Municipalitys claim, under the Best Evidence Rule. The details in the Certificate were enough to show the
identity and size of the land.
Compare with Government v. Martinez: According to Maam, the difference in the result is due to the fact that, in this
case, the plaintiff was not yet alive at the time the deeds of donation were executed, thus, her denial couldnt prevail
over the assertions of the Municipality.
Rodelas v. Aranza (1982)
FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Bonilla. She only presented a copy of the will.
Aranza, et. al. opposed, arguing that the holographic will itself must be presented, and that the copy thereof cannot be
used to prove the holographic will. The lower court dismissed Rodelas petition.
HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed, and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in the said will. If a copy is available, it can be
admitted because it can be used to compare with the handwriting of the testator; in other words, the authenticity of
the handwriting can be determined by the court.
Air France v. Carrascoso (1966)
FACTS: At the beginning of his Air France flight from Bangkok to Rome, Carrascoso was forced by the manager to
vacate the first class seat he was occupying, because a white man had a better right to the seat. Though he initially
refused, Carrascoso eventually gave up his seat. When he got home, he sued. The Manila CFI ruled in his favor, holding
that Air France had violated its contract of transportation with him, and that it had not proven the white mans
supposed better right. CA affirmed.
HELD: SC affirmed. It ruled that that Carrascosos transcribed testimony was admissible. He had testified that the
planes purser told him that he would record the incident in his notebook. Based on his testimony (corroborated by
the pursers entry and eyewitness testimony), the CA held that the purser had made such an entry. The SC agreed. The
subject of inquiry was not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Based on the transcript, when the dialogue
between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the incident was still fresh. Statements in this
environment are admissible as part of the res gestae, pursuant to Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court. It is not covered by
the hearsay rule.
Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano (2006)
FACTS: Sabeniano obtained a loan from, and also invested some money with, Citibank. She filed suit when Citibank
refused to honor her demands for the return of her deposits and the delivery of the proceeds of her investments.

Page 21 of 115
Citibank alleged that the proceeds of her investment payouts were applied to her loan. Citibank presented
photocopies and microfilm copies of promissory notes, managers checks and letters to prove Sabenianos loan.
HELD: The SC, in deciding the case, discussed the best evidence rule. Rule 130 provides that the best evidence rule
applies only when the issue is on the contents of the document. Since the documents contents were never at issue,
photocopies of documentary evidence were properly admitted. It held that where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
NB: According to Maam, when the inquiry is not directed towards the contents of the document, it does not make the
document object evidence. Recall the example of Mr. Tanggols medical certificate.
Whether evidence is object or documentary is not determined by the purpose for which the evidence is introduced. It
is determined by the characteristics of the evidence. Maam Tan
Following this line of thinking, whether or not the inquiry is directed towards the contents of the document only goes
into the applicability of the best evidence rule and not on whether the evidence is documentary or otherwise.
Compare: Rianos view is that for writings and materials to be deemed documentary evidence, the same must be
offered as proof of their contents (Sec. 2, R130). If offered for some other purpose, the writings or materials would
not be deemed documentary evidence but merely object evidence.
Riano gives an example: When a contract is presented in court to show that it exists or simply to establish its
condition, it is not offered to prove its contents and is therefore not documentary evidence but an object or real
evidence.
Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes (1931)
FACTS: The provincial fiscal filed 2 informations for libel against Andres Guevarra, due to a squib (satirical piece) that
he had written, and which was published in the weekly paper Ing Magumasid. The squib was written in the Pampango
dialect, but was not quoted in the information. Instead, a Spanish translation was included therein. At trial, the fiscal
tried to present, as evidence for the prosecution, Exhibits A, B, C, and D (copies of Ing Magumasid containing the
libelous article, another article published therein, and Spanish translations of the articles). Gueverras counsel
objected. Trial court sustained. The fiscal filed a petition praying for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to
admit the exhibits as evidence for the prosecution.
HELD: Exhibits A, B, C, and D are admissible as evidence for the prosecution. The best evidence rule is applicable to
the present case. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it. The copies of Ing Magumasid
where the libelous article was published, as well as its Spanish translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel
charged. Although Judge Reyes had discretion to admit or reject evidence offered by the fiscal, his refusal to admit the
exhibits amounted to an abuse of such discretion. The SC has jurisdiction to entertain an application for a writ of
mandamus to compel a CFI to permit the attorney of a litigant to examine the entire written communication, when
part of the same has been introduced in evidence by the other party.
Interpacific v. Aviles (1990)
FACTS: During the trial for estafa against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, photocopied documents were introduced to
support the theory of the prosecution. The defense objected, invoking the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, when the
photocopies were formally offered in evidence, the defense did not raise any objection. The trial court acquitted the
accused of the crime. It also held that the photocopies were inadmissible to prove the civil liability of the accused
against the complainant.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that the photocopies are essentially inadmissible because it was
not proved that the originals were lost or that any of the exceptions in the Rules of Court are applicable, it was
erroneous for the trial court to have excluded them. This is because of the failure of the defense to interpose an
objection when the photocopies were formally offered as an exhibit. The objection the defense made when the
photocopies were introduced is not equivalent to the objection when the evidence is formally offered.
Lesson? Object as soon as the basis thereof becomes apparent. Maam Tan

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People v. Hon. Tan (1959)
FACTS: In a criminal case for falsification of public documents, the prosecution presented a triplicate copy of a receipt,
marked as Exh. D-1, as evidence against the accused. The lower court said that triplicates can only be admitted when
the originals are lost and cannot be produced.
HELD: SC said that it had long been settled that duplicates and triplicates are admissible in evidence and possess all
the probative value of the original. Court ordered to proceed in the trial of the case in accordance with this ruling.
People v. Dimaano (2005)
FACTS: Dimaano was convicted of raping his daughter and sentenced to death. The special qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship that increased the penalty to death were proved in part by photocopies of the birth
certificate and marriage certificate.
HELD: The SC said that the photocopies were admissible to prove the circumstances, as the originals were public
records in the custody of a police officer. The admission of this secondary evidence was an exception to the best
evidence rule. Since Edgardo also failed to dispute the contents of the photocopies, they were deemed admitted and
he is bound.
2.1 Parol Evidence Rule
R130, Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Civil Code, Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof,
be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless
the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in
action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by
the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price,
names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein;
( f ) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

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Civil Code, Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol
evidence.
Civil Code, Art.1359. When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention
is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true
intention may be expressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper
remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.
Civil Code, Art. 1360. The principles of the general law on the reformation of instruments are hereby adopted insofar
as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
Civil Code, Art. 1361. When a mutual mistake of the parties causes the failure of the instrument to disclose their real
agreement, said instrument may be reformed.
Civil Code, Art.1362. If one party was mistaken and the other acted fraudulently or inequitably in such a way that the
instrument does not show their true intention, the former may ask for the reformation of the instrument.
Civil Code, Art. 1363. When one party was mistaken and the other knew or believed that the instrument did not state
their real agreement, but concealed that fact from the former, the instrument may be reformed.
Civil Code, Art. 1364. When through the ignorance, lack of skill, negligence or bad faith on the part of the person
drafting the instrument or of the clerk or typist, the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties, the
courts may order that the instrument be reformed.
Civil Code, Art. 1365. If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property, but the
instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the instrument is
proper.
Civil Code, Art. 1366. There shall be no reformation in the following cases:
(1) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed;
(2) Wills;
(3) When the real agreement is void.
Civil Code, Art. 1367. When one of the parties has brought an action to enforce the instrument, he cannot
subsequently ask for its reformation.
Civil Code, Art. 1368. Reformation may be ordered at the instance of either party or his successors in interest, if the
mistake was mutual; otherwise, upon petition of the injured party, or his heirs and assigns.
Civil Code, Art. 1369. The procedure for the reformation of instrument shall be governed by rules of court to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule only applies to contracts which the parties have decided to set forth in writing. When the
agreement is merely oral, the parol evidence rule should not be applied.
The term parol evidence means something oral or verbal but with reference to contracts, parol evidence means
extraneous evidence or evidence aliunde.
The basic question that would bring the parol evidence rule into play is: What have the parties agreed upon? The
appropriate answer would be: Look into the written agreement and not elsewhere because only the contents of the
written agreement are admissible in evidence.

Page 24 of 115
Rationale Behind the Rule
The parole evidence rule is designed to give certainty to written transactions, to preserve the reliability and to protect
the sanctity of written agreements.
Spoken words could be notoriously undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus,
under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
How to Introduce Parol Evidence
The rule prohibiting parol evidence is not absolute. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement by putting in issue any of the following:
a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
c) the validity of the written agreement; or
d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
Waiver of the Parol Evidence Rule
The parole evidence rule may be waived by failure to invoke the benefits of the rule. Failure to object to the parol
evidence presented by the adverse party operates as a waiver of the protection of the parol evidence rule.
Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos (1927)
FACTS: Zacarias Robles agreed to sell to Lizarraga Hermanos the hacienda he had inherited from his parents. In
cutting short his lease on the land for two years, he was promised indemnification for all the improvements he had
put on the land. Lizarraga did not make good on this promise, and so suit was filed.
HELD: The SC found that while the written contract made no mention of any agreement with regard to the
improvements, oral testimony was proof on this point. The oral evidence was properly admitted based on the rule on
parol evidence that, while generally, written contracts supersede all prior agreements made during negotiations,
proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract,
though it may relate to the same subject matter.
Palanca v. Fred Wilson &Co. (1918)
FACTS: Palanca, representing Song Fo and Co., sued Wilson and Co. for breach of contract, because the distilling
apparatus they bought from the latter did not produce 6,000 liters of alcohol as promised. According to them, Wilsons
representations to them was to the effect that the machine would produce 6,000 liters of alcohol. Wilson argued that
the contract stipulated that the machine would be able to treat 6,000 liters, not produce it.
HELD: The Court examined the words of the contract and found that the correct interpretation was the one forwarded
by Wilson. The contract made no mention of a capacity of 6,000 liters a day and Wilson & Co. only ever mentioned
capacity in reference to the description of the machine in the catalogue. Therefore, there was no breach.
Yu Tek v. Gonzales (1915)
FACTS: Gonzales borrowed a sum of P3,000 pesos from Yu Tek. In consideration of which, he was to deliver 600
piculs of sugar to Yu Tek, otherwise the contract would be rescinded and Gonzales would owe Yu Tek P3,000 + P1,200
as indemnity. Gonzales did not deliver the sugar on time, so Yu Tek brought suit against him for the collection of the
money. Gonzales, during trial, tried to prove by parol evidence that the sugar he was to deliver to Yu Tek should come
from his own crop, which became impossible because of the total failure of his crop.
HELD: The SC however held that the presentation of parol evidence should not be allowed in this case. Parol evidence,
it held, should not be allowed to add to or vary the terms of a written contract.
Laureano v. Kilayco (1916)
FACTS: Laureano conveyed a parcel of land to Kilayco allegedly with an agreement of reconveyance. Kilayco didnt
pay any of the agreed upon consideration for the parcel of land which prompted Laureano to ask him to execute a
reconveyance. Kilayco didnt. During trial, Laureano was prevented from introducing parol evidence that there was an
agreement to reconvey the property.

Page 25 of 115
HELD: Such parol evidence was not introduced for the purpose of changing the terms of a written instrument and
hence, was not prohibited. It only tended to prove that there was an agreement to reconvey and that the conveyance
could be defeated and terminated.
Note: Maam does not agree with this case. But, had they characterized the reconveyance agreement as a side or
collateral agreement, perhaps the rule in Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos would apply.
PNR v. CFI (1978)
FACTS: Salvacion Myrick and 4 others filed a complaint in the Albay CFI to annul a supposed conditional donation of
land made by her late brother Antonio to petitioner PNR. The ground for annulment was non-fulfillment of 5
conditions of the donation. But no deed of donation was annexed to their complaint. PNR set up the affirmative
defense that the donation was unconditionally made by Antonio. At the hearing, Salvacion identified a deed of
donation made by Antonio to PNR. The deed contained no conditions. When asked by her counsel why she didnt sign
the deed, she said it was because PNR should first comply with the promise in the donation. PNRs counsel firmly
objected to the question propounded, claiming it violated the parol evidence rule, but the CFI allowed the question.
PNR filed a case for certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
HELD: Under the pleadings and considering the defense of lack of cause of action interposed by PNR, the CFI
committed grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining PNRs counsels objection based on the parol evidence rule. In
order that parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to vary the terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection
thereof, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the partiers should be put in issue by the pleadings.
In the case at bar, the respondents did not expressly plead any of those exceptions! They merely alleged that the
donation was subject to 5 conditions, and prayed for annulment/rescission of the donation for noncompliance
therewith.
General Rule: the contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the
parties. Where there is no allegation in the complaint that there was mistake/imperfection in the written agreement,
or that it failed to express the true intent of the parties, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of the
agreement. But if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not
express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to prove such true agreement.
Lechugas v. CA (1986)
FACTS: Lechugas claims that the land was sold to her by Leoncia Lasangue and that defendants entered it by means of
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth. She used a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit A) to prove her ownership.
Defendants claimed that the land subject of litigation was theirs and that the land owned by Lechugas is further down
south. They produced Leoncia as a witness to testify that the 6 hectares she sold was not part of the land subject of
litigation. TC dismissed complaint. CA upheld dismissal. Lechugas alleged that the CA erred in subjecting the Deed to
parol evidence.
HELD: SC held that the parol evidence rule does not apply. It is not applicable where the controversy is between one
of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia in favor of Lechugas. The
dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents.
Filipinas Manufacturers Bank v. Eastern Rizal Fabricators (1987)
FACTS: Filipinas Manufacturers filed a complaint against ERF for non-payment on a promissory note. ERF admitted
its indebtedness but contended that the complaint was premature because Filipinas Manufacturers had agreed to
forbear on the note. Filipinas Manufacturers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that ERFs
contention was against the parol evidence rule. The CFI granted the motion, and rendered judgment against ERF.
HELD: The SC held that the CFIs judgment was improper. The parol evidence rule which prohibits the admission of
oral evidence to vary or contradict a written contract does not apply to or prohibit a subsequent modification by parol
evidence. Subsequent agreements to written contracts may be made orally and evidence in reference thereto does not
violate the parol evidence rule.
Lazatin v. Campos (1979)
FACTS: Petitioner Renato Lazatin sought to intervene in the estate proceedings of the deceased Margarita de Asis on
the theory that he is an adopted child. However, he never produced or proved the decree of adoption issued by a

Page 26 of 115
competent court. He, instead, produced parol evidence which evidence was excluded by the presiding judge. He
moved for the court to declare his status as adopted child as established, which motion the trial court rejected.
HELD: The SC agreed with the lower court, saying that the decree of adoption cannot be substituted by parol evidence
to prove the fact of adoption.
Ong Ching Po v. CA (1994)
FACTS: Ong Ching Po claimed that he was the real buyer of the land. Ong Ching Po contended that her sister-in-law,
Parian, was merely holding the title of the land in trust for him. He presented a photocopy of the deed of sale which
included an addendum that the seller had agreed to sign another document in favour of Parian for the purpose of
facilitating the issuance of a new title since Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen.
HELD: Parian was the true owner of the land. The express trust was not established since under the Civil Code, no
express trust concerning an immovable may be proved by parole evidence. Furthermore, Ong Ching Po cannot claim
ownership since, as an alien, he is disqualified by the Constitution from acquiring public or private lands.
Inciong v. CA (1996)
FACTS: A collection suit was filed against Inciong, Naybe, and Pantosas as co-signors of a promissory note. The
promissory note contained the typewritten figure P50,000 directly below the admitted signature of Inciong . Inciong
alleged that he signed the blank promissory notes with the understanding that he was binding himself only to the
payment of a loan for P5,000. He lost both in the TC and the CA. Inciong alleged that parol evidence could overcome
the contents of the promissory note.
HELD: Parol evidence cannot overcome the contents of the promissory note. The parol evidence rule is applicable
even when the written agreement is not a public document. The rule does not specify that the written agreement
needs to be a public document. What is required for the application of the rule is that the agreement be in writing.
2.2 Interpretation of Contracts
R130, Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. The language of a writing is to be
interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise.
R130, Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument, where
there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
R130, Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions. In the construction of an
instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent
with it.
R130, Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those who language he is to interpret.
R130, Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their
primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise
peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must
be construed accordingly.
R130, Sec. 15. Written words control printed. When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a
printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter.
R130, Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings. When the characters in which an
instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of
persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters
or the meaning of the language.

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R130, Sec. 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred. When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a
different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the
other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken
which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made.
R130, Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. When an instrument is equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted.
R130, Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to
determine its true character.
Civil Code, Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Civil Code, Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Civil Code, Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
Civil Code, Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
Civil Code, Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
Civil Code, Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in
keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
Civil Code, Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities
of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established.
Civil Code, Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity.
Civil Code, Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and
interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be known what may have
been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and void.
Civil Code, Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be
observed in the construction of contracts.

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C. Testimonial Evidence
Competency of Witnesses
Rule 130, Section 20
Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Competency generally
The term competent refers not only to the capacity of the witness to understand and express himself, but also to the
admissibility of his testimony. (Bautista)
Who may be witnesses?
GENERAL RULE: All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perceptions to others.
EXCEPTIONS: Persons specifically disqualified by law.
The qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses are determined as of the time such witnesses are produced for
examination in court, or at the taking of their depositions. (Regalado)
Compulsion of witnesses
Rule 21, Section 1
Subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. Subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend
and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent
authority, or for the taking of his deposition. It may also require him to bring with him any books, documents,
or other things under his control, in which case it is called a subpoena duces tecum.
Rule 21, Section 8
Compelling attendance. In case of failure of a witness to attend, the court or judge issuing the subpoena,
upon proof of the service thereof and of the failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the
province, or his deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or officer where his attendance
is required, and the cost of such warrant and seizure of such witness shall be paid by the witness if the court
issuing it shall determine that his failure to answer the subpoena was willful and without just excuse.
Rule 21, Section 9
Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a subpoena served upon him shall be
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued. If the subpoena was not issued by a
court, the disobedience thereto shall be punished in accordance with the applicable law or Rule.
Rule 71, Section 1
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as
to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both,
if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
The oath as a pre-qualification
United States v. Looper (1969)
FACTS: Looper was charged with failure to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States.
During trial, his counsel advised the court that Looper would testify in his own defense. But when Looper
refused (on account of his religious beliefs) to take the oath or affirmation prescribed by the court, the
district judge did not let him testify. Looper was subsequently convicted. He appealed.
HELD: The district judge committed reversible error in not permitting Looper to testify. The right to testify

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has been described as a constitutional right. The common law does NOT require an appeal to God or the
raising of a hand as a prerequisite to a valid oath. All that is required is a form or statement which impresses
upon the mind and conscience of a witness the necessity for telling the truth.
The oath as pre-qualification
GENERAL RULE: Under the Rules, the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be under oath or
affirmation. (Rule 132, Section 1)
EXCEPTION: The failure of a witness to take an oath prior to his testimony is a defect that may be waived by the
parties. (Bautista, citing People v. Zheng Bai Hi)
Purpose of oath
The modern theory of a witness oath is the subjective one of impressing on his conscience the necessity for speaking
the truth. (Wigmore)
Form of oath
There is NO prescribed form for such oath or affirmation. Theres no need for an appeal to God. Thus, atheists and
agnostics are competent to testify. Their incentive to tell the truth would be the avoidance of mental anguish, loss of
self-respect, and the possibility of being charged with perjury. (Bautista)
Compulsory process and due process
Washington v. Texas (1967)
FACTS: Washington was charged with murder. He wanted to present his co-participant in the crime as a
witness and for his testimony be used by the defense. However, said co-participant had already been convicted
in the same case at a separate trial. Texas laws prohibited the testimony of a co-participant to be used by the
defense.
HELD: The co-participants testimony should have been admitted. It was part of Washingtons right to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and the state arbitrarily denied him of this right when
the testimony of a witness which was relevant to his defense was not allowed to be admitted in court.
Under the Rules, certain classes of persons are disqualified from giving testimony on certain matters, rendering
certain witnesses incompetent. But the disqualification of a whole class of persons may violate the Compulsory
Process (Article III, Section 14(2)) and Due Process (Article III, Section 1) of the Constitution. (Bautista)
Interest in outcome of case
Tarapen v. People (2008)
FACTS: Tarapen was charged with homicide for allegedly killing Pangoden. The prosecution presented as
witnesses people who were present during the incident, and the doctors who examined the injury of the
deceased. The defense claimed self-defense, and presented as witnesses Tarapens co-workers who were
present during the incident. The trial court convicted Tarapen of homicide. Tarapen questioned the
appreciation of the trial court of the evidence against him.
HELD: His conviction must be upheld. The fact that 2 of the prosecution witnesses were friends of the
deceased does not make them biased. In fact, it would be unnatural for a friend, interested to vindicate the
victim, of accusing the wrong person. The discrepancies between the sworn statement of 1 witness and her
testimony in court do not discredit her. Sworn statements are usually incomplete, and often inaccurate. If
there is any inconsistency between the 2, the testimony in court prevails.
This case is consistent with the 2nd paragraph of Rule 130, Section 20, which provides that interest in the outcome of
the case is NOT a ground for disqualification of a witness (unless otherwise provided by law).
GENERAL RULE: The interest which a witness has in the subject matter of the action or in its outcome does NOT
disqualify him from testifying. His interest only affects his credibility, not his competency.
EXCEPTION: Dead Mans Statute, discussed infra.
Conviction of a crime
GENERAL RULE: A person convicted of a crime is not disqualified.

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EXCEPTION: Unless otherwise provided by law. Also, a witness must answer to the fact of a previous final conviction
(Rule 132, Section 3(5)) or such fact may be shown by his examination or the record of the judgment (Rule 132,
Section 11), since this may affect his credibility, not competency.
Whats an example wherein conviction of a crime disqualifies the convict?
Those convicted of falsification of a document, perjury, or false testimony, are disqualified from being witnesses to a
will (Civil Code, Article 821) and cannot testify in the probate thereof.
Disqualifications
Mental Capacity
Rule 130, Section 21
Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
Mental capacity generally
GENERAL RULE: For a witness to have sufficient mental capacity to be judged competent, at the time he is produced for
examination, he must have the ff. capacities:
1) Capacity to observe;
2) Capacity to remember; and
3) Capacity to communicate.
Some scholars have also added a 4th qualification, namely: an appreciation of a duty to report the truth. (Bautista)
EXCEPTION: With respect to children of tender years, their competence at the time of the occurrence to be testified to,
such that he could perceive correct impressions thereof, should also be taken into account, especially if such event
took place long before their production as witness. (Regalado, citing Republic v. CA, et al.)
Mental unsoundness
Mental unsoundness which affects the competency of a witness includes any mental aberration, whether organic or
functional, or induced by drugs or hypnosis. Mental unsoundness at the time the fact to be testified to occurred affects
only the witness credibility, not his competency. (Regalado)
As long as the witness can convey ideas by words or signs and give sufficiently intelligent answers to questions
propounded, he is a competent witness, even if he is
1) A mental retardate (People v. Espanola)
2) Deaf-mute (People v. Hayag)
3) A child (People v. Mendoza)
4) Insane (People v. Deauna)
Deaf-mute witnesses
In People v. Hayag, the Supreme Court cited jurisprudential rules (based on U.S. law) for verbalizing the perceptions of
a deaf-mute.
1) Deaf-mute persons are competent as witnesses if they are able to communicate the facts by a method which
their infirmity leaves available to them, and are of sufficient mental capacity to observe the matters as to
which they will testify and to appreciate the obligation of an oath.
2) On the other hand, where the deaf-mute person is not so educated, such that it is impossible to make him
understand the questions put to him, he cannot be considered a competent witness.
3) The method to be employed in eliciting the testimony of a deaf-mute person should be that which is best
suited to attain the desired end. An example of a method would be communication through an interpreter,
whose qualifications rest largely in the discretion of the trial court.
Child witnesses
Rule 130, Section 21(b) must be read in harmony with the Child Witness Rule, discussed infra.
GENERAL RULE: every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. (Child Witness Rule, Section 6)
EXCEPTION: when substantial doubt exists regarding the childs ability to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court, the court shall conduct a competency
examination of the child. (Child Witness Rule, Section 6) If the child is found to be incompetent, he is disqualified
under Rule 130, Section 21(b).

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In People v. Mendoza, the Supreme Court enumerated the requirements of a childs competency as a witness, as
follows (same requirements as those for mental capacity):
1) Capacity of observation;
2) Capacity of recollection, and
3) Capacity of communication.
Whats an example of when a child witness may be considered incompetent?
The childs testimony is punctured with serious inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that he was coached.
(Regalado)
People v. Espanola (1997)
FACTS: 4 persons were charged with rape with homicide. Joel, one of the accused, was discharged as state
witness. The 3 accused were found not guilty. On appeal, one of the issues raised by the accused was the fact
that Joel was mentally retarded and so he should have been disqualified as a witness.
HELD: Joel is not disqualified to be a witness. A mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness. As long as his senses can perceive facts and he can convey his perceptions in court, then he can be a
witness.
People v. Hayag (1980)
FACTS: A complaint for rape was filed by Esperanza Ranga, a deaf-mute woman, against Daniel Hayag. The
trial court had no choice but to use Esperanzas sister, Virginia, as the medium for communicating with the
victim because Esperanza did not study in the school for deaf-mutes and because there was no instructor in
that school available to be an interpreter. The trial court convicted Hayag.
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It found that Esperanzas story was
uncorroborated and that it was not clear, convincing, and free from suspicion. In its decision, the Court also
made pronouncements about the rules for verbalizing the perceptions of a deaf-mute.
People v. Mendoza (1996)
FACTS: A case for parricide was filed against Mendoza for allegedly burning his wife, which eventually
caused her death. In the trial, only 5-year old Paul Michael (the eldest son of Mendoza and his wife) was able
to testify on how Mendoza had burned his wife. In his appeal, Mendoza contended that Paul Michael
testimony is open to serious question and consideration.
HELD: Paul Michael is competent to testify. Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting
which he is examined. The court enumerated the 3 requirements of child competency as a witness and said
that it is up to the trial court to determine whether the child is of sufficient intelligence according to the
requirements. SC defers to such observation since the lower court had the opportunity to observe the
witness.
People v. Deauna (2002)
FACTS: Deauna was convicted of the rape of his daughter Josephine, based on her testimony. He contends
that her testimony should not have been given weight, because she was insane.
HELD: There was no conclusive finding of Josephines insanity as the time of the rape or at the time of her
testimony. Her testimonies were clear and comprehensible. She was only subsequently diagnosed as insane,
after Deaunas conviction. Even assuming that she was already insane during her earlier testimony, such fact
alone will not render her statements incredible or inadmissible in evidence. Her mental imbalance or
abnormal state of mind would not automatically affect her credibility. General rule: lunatics or persons
affected with insanity are admissible as witnesses, if they have sufficient understanding to apprehend the
obligation of an oath and are capable of giving correct accounts of the matters that they have seen or heard
with respect to the questions at issue.
Marital Disqualification

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Rule 130, Section 22
Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants
or ascendants.
Purpose of marital disqualification
This is based on an aversion to use judicial compulsion in a litigation to place spouses in an opposing posture that may
weaken or destroy their marriage. (Bautista, citing Lilly)
Reasons for the rule include:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other. (People v. Francisco)
Requisites of marital disqualification
In order for the marital disqualification rule to apply, it is necessary that the marriage is valid and subsisting as of the
time of the offer of testimony. (Regalado)
Who must be parties
In order for the marital disqualification rule to apply, the other spouse must be a party to the action. (Regalado)
When the rule applies
Where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit against her and her husband, she cannot be compelled to testify as an
adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud. (Lezama v. Rodriquez)
When the rule does not apply
1) Where the wife voluntarily chooses to testify against the husband (after a grant of immunity and assurances
of lenient treatment). The witness-spouse alone has the privilege to refuse to testify adversely. A witness may
be neither compelled to testify, nor foreclosed from testifying. (Trammel v. US)
2) When the accused imputes the commission of the crime to his wife, the wife may testify in rebuttal. The
husbands imputation is a waiver of his objection to her testimony. (People v. Francisco)
3) In a prosecution of the husband for the rape of the daughter, the wife may testify for the prosecution. The
crime is considered committed against the wife and the conjugal harmony sought to be protected by the rule
no longer exists. (Ordoo v. Daquigan)
4) In a prosecution for arson committed by the husband against the property of his sister-in-law (his wifes
sister), the wife may testify against him. Marital disqualification in criminal cases is limited to crimes
committed against the other spouse or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. This excludes siblings.
(Alvarez v. Ramirez)
5) In a prosecution for arson committed by the husband against the property of his sister-in-law (his wifes
sister), the wife may testify against him. When a spouse commits an act totally alien to the harmony and
confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect, which has the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. In such a case, identity is non-existent and there is no
longer any reason to apply the rule. (Alvarez v. Ramirez)
Marital Privilege
Rule 130, Section 24(a)
Disqualification by reason of privileged communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
Purpose of marital privilege

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This privilege is justified on the ground that it promotes marital harmony, to encourage spouses to share their most
closely-guarded secrets as a measure of intimacy and mutual support. (Bautista, citing Lilly)
Requisites of marital privilege
Marital privilege applies during or after the marriage, although the confidential communications were made during
the marriage. It is necessary that:
1) There is or was a valid marriage.
2) The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication between the spouses during said
marriage.
3) The spouse against whom such evidence is being offered has not given his or her consent to such testimony.
(Regalado)
During or after the marriage
Based on the reading of the provision as a whole, Rule 130, Section 22 was intended to cover cases in which a
marriage has been dissolved due to causes other than death of one of the spouses (e.g. by judicial decree). (US v.
Antipolo)
Who must be parties
The marital privilege would still apply even if the other spouse is not a party to the action.
Confidential communications
GENERAL RULE: Acts, as distinguished from communications, are not covered by the privilege.
EXCEPTION: The acts were done in reliance on the confidence arising from the marital relation. (Bautista, citing State
v. Robbins)
When the rule does not apply
The rule does not apply if the communication was not intended to be kept in confidence by the spouse who received
the same, as in the case of a dying declaration of a husband to his wife as to the identity of his killer. (US v. Antipolo)
Marital disqualification vs. marital privilege
Scope
1) Marital disqualification is broader. Marital disqualification prevents ALL adverse testimony between spouses,
and can even cover matters occurring prior to the marriage. On the other hand, marital privilege is limited to
confidential communications made during the course of the marriage.
2) Marital disqualification can only be invoked if one of the spouses is a party to the action, while marital
privilege can be claimed even if the other spouse is not a party to the action.
3) Marital disqualification applies only if the marriage is subsisting at the time the testimony is offered, while
marital privilege can be claimed even after the marriage has been dissolved.
How the 2 rules work together
1) Even if the communication between the spouses is not confidential (thus not covered by marital privilege) the
spouse who is a party to the action may still prevent the other spouse from testifying under the marital
disqualification rule. (Regalado)
2) Even if the spouse who is a party to the action does not object to the other spouse testifying (thus waiving
marital disqualification), he may still prevent the disclosure by the witness-spouse of confidential
communications covered by marital privilege. (Regalado)
When
applicable
Who must be
parties
Prohibited
testimony
Exceptions

Marital disqualification

Marital privilege

During marriage

During or after marriage

Only applies if the other spouse is a party to the

action

Still applies even if the other spouse is not a

party to the action
Any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage
Civil case by one spouse against the other
Criminal case for crime committed by one
against the other or the latters direct

Any testimony for or against the other spouse

Affected spouse consents
Civil case by one spouse against the other
Criminal case for crime committed by one against

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the other or the latters direct descendants or
ascendants

descendants or ascendants

Trammel v. US (1980)
FACTS: Trammel was convicted of importing heroin into the US, based on the adverse testimony of his wife.
He assailed the admissibility of her testimony. The District Court admitted her testimony, and the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed.
HELD: The Supreme Court traced the history of the sweeping privilege preventing the adverse testimony of a
person against their spouse, and found that its underlying reasons no longer applied. The Court held that the
witness-spouse alone had the privilege to testify adversely. The witness couldnt be compelled to testify or be
prevented from testifying, so long as the private confidences between spouses werent included in the
testimony.
US v. Antipolo (1918)
FACTS: Antipolo was accused of killing Fortunato. The defense tried to present the testimony of Fortunatos
widow, concerning the dying declaration of Fortunato regarding the circumstances of his injury. The
prosecution objected on the ground that a wife cannot testify without the consent of the husband. The trial
court did not allow the testimony of the widow, and it convicted Antipolo.
HELD: The trial court should have admitted the testimony. The reason for prohibiting spouses from testifying
without the other's consent is due to the confidential communications between the spouses. However, dying
declarations are not considered as such confidential communication. In fact, dying declarations are made for
the purpose that it may be communicated so that inquiry into the death of a person may be made.
Lezama v. Rodriguez (1968)
FACTS: The Lezama spouses managed an ice plant in Iloilo, which was placed under the receivership of
Dineros. Roque brought an action against the ice plant for the collection of a sum of money. But instead of
serving the summons against Dineros, it was served on the Lezama spouses. The court ruled in favor of
Roque. Dineros et al. sought annulment of the judgment, claiming that the Lezama spouses had colluded with
Roque. At the hearing, Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Mrs. Lezama to testify as a witness for
Dineros et al. The court granted the motion despite the Lezama spouses objection.
HELD: Mrs. Lezama cannot be compelled to testify. As a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against her and
her husband, she cannot be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in
the alleged fraud without violating Section 20(b) of Rule 130. She would be asked to testify on what actually
transpired during the meeting. Whether her testimony would turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own
interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of the 2 are necessarily
interrelated. A testimony against her own interest would show the existence of collusive fraud and she may
unwittingly testify against the interests of her husband.
People v. Francisco (1942)
FACTS: Francisco was charged with parricide for allegedly killing his son. During trial, he testified that it was
his wife who killed their son. The wife made a rebuttal testimony. Francisco contended that his wifes
testimony was inadmissible against him because of the rule which prohibits spouses from testifying against
each other.
HELD: By imputing the crime against his wife, Francisco waived the privilege granted by the rule. The State
has the right to rebut the new matters presented by Francisco. The wife also has the right to rebut testimony
of Francisco to protect herself from possible criminal prosecution, or from being suspected by society of
being guilty.
Ordoo v. Daquigan
FACTS: Ordoo was being tried for raping his daughter. The prosecution presented his wife as a witness. The
defense counsel objected to her competency, invoking the marital disqualification rule and claiming that
Ordoo had not consented to his wifes testifying against him. The trial court overruled the objection.
HELD: The trial court was correct in overruling the objection. When an offense directly attacks or directly and

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vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the marital disqualification rule invoked
by the defense. Thus, in the law of evidence, the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime
committed by him against his wife.
Alvarez v. Ramirez
FACTS: Maximo was accused of arson for burning his sister-in-laws house, knowing that his sister-in-law, his
estranged wife, and other family members were inside. During the trial, the wife was presented as a witness.
A few days later, Maximo asked that his wife be disqualified from testifying on the ground of marital
disqualification.
HELD: The rule on marital disqualification has certain exceptions that are backed by sound reasons that
outweigh those in support of the general rule on marital disqualification. One such exception is present in this
case: when the accused commits an offense that directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, the rule on marital disqualification doesnt apply. In this case, Maximo set the house on fire knowing
that his wife was inside. This act falls under the exception on marital disqualification. Esperanza must be
allowed to testify.
Dead Mans Statute
Rule 130, Section 23
Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Purpose of the Dead Mans Statute
The Dead Mans Statute is intended to guard against the temptation to give false testimony on the part of the surviving
party, and to put the parties to the suit on equal terms with regard to opportunity to produce evidence. The surviving
party should not be entitled to the advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained testimony. (Bautista)
Partial disqualification
Unlike the marital disqualification rule, which is a complete and absolute disqualification, under the Dead Mans
Statute, the witness is only partially disqualified, i.e. he is only prohibited from testifying on the matters specified
therein. (Regalado)
Scope
Unlike the marital disqualification rule, which may apply to both civil and criminal cases, the Dead Mans Statute only
applies to a civil case or special proceeding over the estate of a deceased or insane person. (Regalado)
Requisites of Dead Mans Statute
1) The witness offered for examination is a party plaintiff, or the assignor of said party, or a person in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
2) The case is against the executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased or insane person.
3) The case is upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased or insane person.
4) The testimony to be given is on a matter of fact occurring before the death or insanity of the deceased or
insane person.
Witness is a party plaintiff
The plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. Thus, the rule does NOT apply in cases where:
1) The witnesses are NOT parties to the case, their assignors, or persons on whose behalf the case is prosecuted.
2) The witnesses are nominal parties.
3) The witnesses are ffficers or stockholders of a plaintiff corporation. (Regalado)
The case is against the executor, administrator, or other representative of a deceased or insane person
The defendant should be sued in his representative capacity, and not in his individual capacity.
The rule applies regardless of whether the deceased died before or after the suit against him is filed, provided he is
already dead at the time the testimony is sought to be given. (Regalado, citing Babao v. Perez)

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The case is upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased or insane person
The rule does not apply when it is the administrator who brings an action to recover property allegedly belonging to
the estate. (Tongco v. Vianzon)
The testimony to be given is on a matter of fact occurring before the death or insanity of the deceased or insane
person
This includes any matter of fact which bears upon a transaction or communication between the witness and the
deceased or insane person, even though without the presence or participation of the latter. (Regalado, citing Stuart v.
Lord)
When the Dead Mans Statute does not apply
1) When the witness is a disinterested 3rd person, such as a county sheriff who took the deceased defendants
accident report and talked to him about how the accident happened. (Ziegler v. Moore)
2) Where the witness testimony is offered to prove a claim less than what is established under a written
document. (Icard v. Marasigan)
3) Where the witness testimony is offered to prove a fraudulent transaction of the deceased, although the fraud
must first be established by evidence other than the testimony of the survivor-claimant. (Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho;
Ong Chua v. Carr)
4) When the defendant cross-examines the survivor-claimant on the prohibited matters. (Tongco v. Vianzon)
This constitutes a waiver on the part of the defendant.
5) The rule does not apply in cadastral cases, since there is no plaintiff or defendant therein. (Tongco v. Vianzon)
6) Where the defendant has interposed a counterclaim, since the plaintiff would then be testifying in his defense.
(Sunga-Chan v. Chua)
Ziegler v. Moore (1959)
FACTS: Ziegler filed a case against Christ for damages, alleging negligence on the latter, resulting in a car
accident. Before trial began, Christ died. Part of Zieglers testimony and that of her witness (the country
sheriff) was excluded under the Dead Mans Statute.
HELD: The court held that the rule was not applicable to disinterested third persons such as the county sheriff,
so his testimony could actually be admitted.
Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho (1955)
FACTS: Go Chi Gun and Go Away sued the successors-in-interest of their deceased brother Paulino Gocheco,
claiming that many years ago, Gocheco had defrauded them in the distribution of their fathers properties
during intestate proceedings. Their main piece of evidence was their testimony that when Gocheco had still
been alive, he had told them that their father left no properties. The trial court admitted the testimony over
the defendants objection.
HELD: The SC ruled against Go Chi Gun and Go Away, saying that their testimonies shouldnt have been
allowed, because it violated the rule against testifying on any matter of fact involving the deceased while he
was still alive, if the case was against his estate. Since Go Chi Gun and Go Away were impugning Gochecos title
over certain properties, it was considered a claim against his estate and not against the defendants personally.
The SC also ruled that the exception wherein the testimony could be admitted if the decedent was guilty of
fraud didnt apply. The plaintiffs hadnt shown clear and convincing proof of Gochecos alleged fraudulent acts.
Icard v. Marasigan (1941)
FACTS: P39,478.16 was paid to Joseph for his personal share and the share of his deceased father George in a
mining venture. Joseph claimed P2000 against the estate of his father for services rendered in connection
with the mining claims. The administrator argued that Joseph should not be allowed to testify as to any
matter of fact which occurred before the death of George, under the Rules of Court.
HELD: Joseph can testify as to his claim. The reason for the law on prohibiting a plaintiff to testify to a fact
before the death of the defendant is to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the
possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. The law has no reason for its application in the present
case where the plaintiff is presumably entitled to of P39,478.16 but instead claims only P2,000.
Tongco v. Vianzon (1927)

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FACTS: Tongco died. His niece was named administratrix of his estate. His widow moved in cadastral
proceedings to have certain lots, which were titled in the name of the conjugal partnership, put in her own
name (cadastral case). The administratrix opposed, but the judge granted the motion, and new decrees and
certificates of title were issued over the lots, as the widows exclusive property. The administratrix filed an
action for recovery of property and damages against the widow (property case), but the judge absolved her.
She appealed to the SC, citing the Dead Mans Statute to assail the widows competence to testify.
HELD: The widow was competent to testify. The Dead Mans Statute, intended to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party,
does not apply to the case. The 2 actions were NOT brought against the administratrix of Marcelinos estate,
nor were they brought upon claims against the estate. The cadastral case was presented in cadastral
proceedings, where theres no plaintiff or defendant. The property case was one by the administratrix to
enforce demand by the estate.
Sunga-Chan v. Chua (2001)
FACTS: Chua filed an action for winding up of partnership affairs against his deceased partners wife and
daughter, who had allegedly been converting and misapplying partnership assets and income. The RTC and
CA ruled in his favor. Petitioners invoke the Dead Mans Statute, contending that the testimonies of Chua and
his witness should have been excluded, because the statute prohibits the surviving party to give his
uncontradicted statement if the other party is dead, insane, or otherwise mentally incapable.
HELD: The Dead Mans statute does not apply here, because the petitioners already filed a counterclaim, and
the witness testimony is not excluded because she is not an assignor of the case.
Ong Chua v. Carr (1929)
FACTS: Ong Chua sold properties to Carr subject to the right to repurchase of spouses Teck and Lim. The right
to repurchase, however, was not included in the document. Instead, the deeds were left in escrow to Moore
until the expiration of the period for repurchase, to protect the rights of Teck and Lim. Carr was able to take
get the deeds prematurely and had the properties titled in his name. Later, when Teck tried to repurchase,
Ong found out that the rights to repurchase were not embodied in the document. He brought suit for the
reformation of the instrument. Meanwhile, Carr died. CFI Zamboanga ruled in favor of Ong Chua. Carrs
substitute went to the SC, arguing, among others, that the dead man statute should be applicable and Ong
Chua should not have been allowed to testify by the lower court.
HELD: The Dead Mans Statute was not meant as a shield for fraud. It is not applicable when, such as in this
case, the fact of fraud is proved before facts occurring before the death are testified to by the opposing party.

Privileged Communication
Attorney-Client Privilege
Rule 130, Section 24(b)
Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity.
Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 15.02
A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
Canon 21
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated.

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Rule 21.01
A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates, or by judicial
action.
Purpose of attorney-client privilege
The privilege intended for the benefit of the client, to protect his freedom of consultation. Without the privilege,
clients would be deterred from seeking legal assistance or making full disclosure of the relevant facts. Thus, attorneys
would be deprived of the factual information necessary to provide effective legal representation. The privilege
facilitates the rendering of legal advice necessary for clients to assert their rights, defend themselves, and avoid
litigation. (Bautista, citing Wigmore)
Requisites of attorney-client privilege
For attorney-client privilege to apply, it is required that:
1) There is an attorney-client relation;
2) The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication between them in the course of
professional employment; and
3) The client has not given his consent to the attorneys testimony thereon, or if the attorneys secretary,
stenographer, or clerk is sought to be examined, that both the client and the attorney have not given their
consent thereto.
Attorney-client relationship
The attorney must have been consulted in his professional capacity, even if no fee has been paid therefor. This
includes preliminary communications made for the purpose of creating the attorney-client relationship. (Regalado,
citing Wigmore)
However, if the communications were not made for the purpose of creating the attorney-client relationship, they will
not be covered by the privilege, even if thereafter the attorney becomes the clients counsel in case involving said
statements. (Regalado, citing People v. Enriquez)
While the privilege applies even if the services provided by the attorney do not involve litigation, it does not apply if
the attorney is acting in some other capacity, e.g. business advisor, investment partner, claims adjuster, coconspirator, or lobbyist. (Bautista, citing Mueller & Kirkpatrick)
Confidential communications
These include verbal statements and documents or papers entrusted to the attorney, and of facts learned by the
attorney through the act or agency of his client.
The privilege does NOT apply to communications which are:
1) Intended to be made public;
2) Intended to be communicated to others;
3) Intended for an unlawful purpose;
4) Received from 3rd persons not acting in behalf of or as agents of the client; or
5) Made in the presence of 3rd parties who are strangers to the attorney-client relationship. (Regalado)
Fraud or crime exception
The attorney-client privilege only covers statements to an attorney relating to past misconduct. Statements seeking
the services of the attorney in respect to ongoing or future crimes or frauds are NOT privileged. Clients are not entitled
to use lawyers to help them in pursuing unlawful or fraudulent objectives. (Bautista)
When the attorney-client privilege does not apply
1) When the communication is not within the realm of legitimate professional counsel and employment, such as
when the accused, who has not yet been arrested much less charged with a crime, is advised by his lawyer on
how to dispose of the murder weapon. (Clark v. State)
2) When the confidential communication, such as a document containing admissions of a client, comes to the
hand of a 3rd party and reaches the adversary. (Barton v. Leyte Asphalt)

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When the attorney-client privilege applies
1) Where attorneys are called to testify before the grand jury to incriminate their undisclosed clients as to
privileged communications, perhaps to the point where their clients could be indicted, the attorney-client
privilege may be invoked. (US v. Jones)
2) When revealing the clients identity would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyers advice, the clients identity is privileged. (Regala v. Sandiganbayan)
3) When revealing the clients identity would would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the client of a crime, the clients identity is privileged. (Regala v. Sandiganbayan)
4) When revealing the clients identity would open the client to civil liability. (Regala v. Sandiganbayan)
Clark v. State (1953)
FACTS: Clark was convicted for the murder of his ex-wife. The prosecution presented as witness the
telephone operator, who testified that she had overheard the conversation between the accused and his
lawyer. She heard the accused tell his lawyer that [he] killed her. She heard the lawyer advise the accused
to Get rid of the weapon and sit tight and dont talk to anyone. The defense moved for this conversation to
be rendered inadmissible in evidence in light of the attorney-client privilege.
HELD: This conversation was admissible as not within the realm of legitimate professional counsel and
employment. When the accused conversed with his lawyer, he was not under arrest nor was he charged with
a crime. The rule of public policy which calls for the privileged character of the attorney-client
communication demands that the rule be confined to the legitimate course of professional employment.
No shield such as the protection afforded to communications between attorney and client shall be
interposed to protect a person who takes counsel on how he can safely commit a crime. This rule must
extend to one who, having committed a crime, seeks or takes counsel as to how he shall escape arrest and
punishment, such as advice regarding the destruction or disposition of the murder weapon or the victims
body.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt (1924)
FACTS: During the trial, one of the evidence presented by the counsel of Leyte Asphalt is a letter written by
Baron to his lawyer, Atty. Ingersoll. In the letter, Baron wrote that his profit from the San Francisco contract
would have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton. This was offered in evidence by counsel for Leyte Asphalt,
who, upon being asked regarding the source of the letter, said that it came from the former attorneys of the
defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession.
Bartons lawyer said that unless an explanation was given as to how the opposing counsel got hold of the
letter, he proposed to object the letters admission on the ground that it was a confidential communication
between client and lawyer.
HELD: Court held that even if the letter is within attorney-client privilege, the privilege was lost when it
came to the hands of the adverse party, and it makes no difference how the adverse party acquired it. The
law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the
legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third
party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. The prohibition in the attorney-client privilege
also does not extend to persons who overhear the communication or persons who surreptitiously read or
obtain possession of a document in original or copy.
US v. Jones (1975)
FACTS: Attorneys were subpoenaed by the federal grand jury investigating possible narcotics and income
tax violations by certain suspected individuals. They filed motions to quash and raised attorney-client
privilege when asked to disclose communications made with unnamed clients, and legal fee and bonding
arrangements with known clients. They were declared in contempt by the district court.
HELD: The US Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit reversed the lower courts ruling. It ruled that the attorneys
were called to testify before the grand jury to incriminate their undisclosed clients as to privileged
communications, perhaps to the point where their clients could be indicted. Thus, attorney-client privilege
was correctly invoked.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan (1996)

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FACTS: Regala et al were being impleaded in a civil case because of the legal services they performed for
their unnamed clients. PCGG imposed conditions for their exclusion from being impleaded in the case, this
included revealing the identity of their client. SB issued a resolution which denied their exclusion
HELD: The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client. But this case falls within 2/3 exceptions. That revealing the identity of clients would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice and that revealing the
identity of the client would provide the link between the crime and the client. But such privilege should be
distinguished from a case where the client seeks the expertise of a lawyer in how to go around the law in
committing a crime.
Patient-Physician Privilege
Rule 130, Section 24(c)
Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information
which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
Rule 28, Section 1
When examination may be ordered. In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may in its discretion order him to submit to a physical
or mental examination by a physician.
Rule 28, Section 2
Order for examination. The order for examination may be made only on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties, and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
Rule 28, Section 3
Report of findings. If requested by the party examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall
deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his findings and
conclusions. After such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled
upon request to receive from the party examined a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter
made, of the same mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the
court on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a
physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial.
Rule 28, Section 4
Waiver of privilege. By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by taking the
deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or any
other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or
may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical examination.
Purpose of privilege
Similar to attorney-client privilege, this privilege is intended to encourage full disclosure by the patient so the
physician may properly diagnose and treat him. It is also intended to protect the patients privacy.
Privilege of patient, not physician
The privilege is that of the patient and not of the physician, so the physician cannot claim it if the patient abandons it.
(Bautista)
Requisites of physician-patient privilege
1) The physician is authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics;

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2) The information was acquired, or the advice or treatment was given, by the physician in his professional
capacity for the purpose of treating and curing the patient;
3) The information, advice, or treatment, if revealed, would blacken the reputation of the patient; and
4) The privilege is invoked in a civil case, whether the patient is a party thereto or not. (Regalado)
Physician-patient relationship
It is not necessary that the physician-patient relationship was created through the patients voluntary act. The
treatment may have been given at the behest of another, the patient being in extremis. (Regalado)
When physician-patient privilege applies
1) The privilege applies only where the patient is seeking treatment and shares with his doctor information
pertinent to such treatment. If the examination was solely for the purpose of litigation, the privilege does not
apply, although the attorney-client privilege may apply if such examination was conducted upon request of
the attorney. (City and Country of San Francisco v. Superior Court)
2) The privilege applies only if the patient or physician reasonably believes the communication to be necessary
or helpful to enable the physician to make a diagnosis of the patients condition or to prescribe or render
treatment therefor. (Bautista)
3) The prohibition against disclosure applies only to the physician, not against 3rd parties. (Krohn v. CA)
When physician-patient privilege does not apply
1) The communication was not given by the patient in confidence;
2) The communication is irrelevant to the physicians professional employment;
3) The communication was made for an unlawful purpose, i.e. commission or concealment of a crime;
4) The information was intended to be made public, such as the results of the physical and mental examination
of a person (when ordered by the court pursuant to Rule 28) as well as the results of autopsies or postmortem
examinations. (Regalado)
5) There was a waiver of the privilege, such as when a party examined pursuant to Rule 28 obtains a report on
such examination or takes the deposition of the examiner. By doing so, he waives any privilege regarding any
other examination of said physical or mental condition conducted or to be conducted on him by any other
physician. (Regalado)
Krohn v. CA (1994)
FACTS: Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Ma. Paz on the ground of psychological
incapacity. During Edgars testimony, he tried to present the contents of a psychiatric report of a
psychological test done on Ma. Paz a few years prior. Ma. Paz objected on the ground that the psychiatric
report is covered by the patient-physician privilege.
HELD: Edgars testimony on the contents of the psychiatric report is not covered by the patient-physician
privilege. The privilege cannot be invoked against a person not duly authorized to practice medicine.
Lim v. CA (1992
FACTS: The husband in an annulment proceeding moved for an issuance of a subpoena against a doctor.
The wife opposed the motion claiming that the doctor examined, diagnosed and treated her for
schizophrenia and that the doctors testimony would be covered by the physician-patient privileged.
HELD: The doctors testimony is not covered by the privilege. The burden is on the claimant to prove that
all the requisites of the physician-patient privilege are present. In the present case the wife failed to
discharge such burden. Further since wifes counsel did not object to any question to the doctor during the
trial, then the wife is deemed to have waived such privilege. There is also authority that when a 3rd party is
present during the consultation, then the information obtained by doctor is not covered by the privilege.
State Secrets
Rule 130, Section 24(e)
Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.

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Purpose of state secrets privilege
This is a privilege against disclosure in respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic, and similar matters. It
is based on public interest of such paramount importance transcending the individual interests of a private citizen,
even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. (Almonte v. Vasquez)
Requisites of state secrets privilege
1) The communication was made to the public officer in official confidence; and
2) Public interest would suffer by the disclosure of such communication.
The role of the court
The court is the ultimate judge of whether what is sought to be withheld contains military or diplomatic secrets whose
disclosure would be harmful to the public interest. In evaluating a claim of privilege, the court may require an in
camera disclosure of the matter sought to be withheld. (US v. Reynolds)
When state secrets privilege applies
1) Military secrets, such as the Air Force official accident report and statements of surviving crew members,
regarding an accident in which the aircraft and the personnel were engaged in a highly secret mission of the
Air Force. (US v. Reynolds)
2) Diplomatic secrets (US v. Nixon)
When state secrets privilege does not apply
1) The privilege does not apply when no public interest would be prejudiced by the disclosure of the
communication, such as when the bank subject of documents sought to be produced has already closed.
(Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board)
2) When the documents sought to be produced do not qualify as classified information, such as documents
relating to Personal Services Funds and vouchers for the whole plantilla of a government agency (such as the
EIIB) for a certain year. (Almonte v. Vasquez)
3) When executive privilege is claimed on documents on the ground that they are confidential communications,
but without saying they are military or diplomatic secrets. (US v. Nixon)
US v. Reynolds (1953)
FACTS; A US aircraft crashed. 3 of the civilian observers on board died. Their widows sued the US
Government under the Torts Claims Act. They requested the production of the Air Force official accident
investigation report and the statements of the 3 surviving crew members, taken in connection with the
official investigation. The US filed a formal claim of privilege.
HELD: The SC held that the matter was privileged. The Court must be satisfied, from all the circumstances,
that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged. The Court should not jeopardize the security which the
privilege is meant to protect by requiring its disclosure, even if only to the Judge in his chambers. Here, The
aircraft and the personnel involved in the accident had been engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air
Force. The Court took judicial notice that it was a time of vigorous preparation for national defense. Air
power was one of the most potent weapons in the US scheme of defense. Newly developing electronic
devices greatly enhance the effective use of air power. Such electronic devices must be kept secret if their
full military advantage is to be exploited.

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US v. Nixon (1974)
FACTS: In 1974, when a grand jury returned an indictment charging 7 named individuals with various
offenses (including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice), President Nixon was
included as an unindicted conspirator. Upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was
issued to President Nixon, requiring him to produce tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, and other
writings, related to certain meetings between him and others. President Nixon released edited transcripts of
portions of some conversations included in the subpoena, and claimed executive privilege. But the District
Court ordered him to deliver all the subpoenaed items. President Nixon appealed.
HELD: The SC affirmed the District Courts order. Neither the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications nor the doctrine of separation of powers can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under ALL circumstances. The very integrity of the U.S.s
adversary system of criminal justice, and public confidence therein, depend on full disclosure of ALL the
relevant facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. Besides, President Nixon claimed executive
privilege on the ground that the subpoenaed items were confidential communications, but he did NOT say
that they were military or diplomatic secrets. Courts have traditionally shown deference with regard to
military and diplomatic secrets, but have never shown the same deference to a Presidents generalized
interest in confidentiality. When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use
in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cant prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.
Almonte v. Vasquez (1995)
FACTS: The EIIB was investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to an anonymous lettercomplaint that it received. In line with such investigation, a subpoena duces tecum was issued, ordering the
EIIBs Chief Accountant to produce all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and
all evidence, such as vouchers for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988 within 10 days from receipt hereof.
Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. Their motion was denied.
HELD: SC ruled that the petitioners could be ordered to produce the subject documents. They do not qualify
as classified information.
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board (1986)
FACTS: Banco Filipino filed a motion for the production, inspection and copying of certain papers and records
of the Monetary Board. The Makati RTC granted this motion, prompting the Monetary Board and the Central
Bank to file a petition before the Supreme Court to set aside the order to produce the documents. They
argued that the documents sought to be produced by Banco Filipino are privileged under Sec. 21, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
HELD: The Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting the
motion for the production of the documents. The respondents invocation of Sec. 21, Rule 130 of the ROC on
Privileged Communications is misplaced. This privilege is intended not for the protection of public officers
but for the protection of public interest. The respondents have not established that public interest would
suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by Banco Filipino. Considering that Banco
Filipino had already closed as of 25 January 1985, any disclosure does not pose any danger or peril to the
Philippine Economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets. Therefore, the
respondents reasons for resisting the order of production are tenuous and specious.
Privilege vs. Self-Incrimination
1987 Constitution
Article III, Section 17
No person may be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Nature of privilege against self-incrimination
The accused cannot be compelled to take the witness stand, but if he volunteers to do so, he may be cross-examined,
except that the cross-examination shall be limited to matters covered by his direct examination. (Rule 115, Sec. 1)
The failure of the accused to take the witness stand should not give rise to any adverse inference against him.
(Bautista)

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Claiming the privilege
If a witness under compulsion to make disclosures does so, instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not
compelled him to incriminate himself. If a witness desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will
not be considered to have been compelled. (Bautista)
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate
himself. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified. (Hoffman v. US)
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. (Hoffman v. US)
Accused v. non-accused
The privilege against self-incrimination applies to all persons, not just accused persons. But the right of an accused is
the right to refuse to take the witness stand altogether, while the right of a non-accused is merely to decline to answer
specific questions which he might consider incriminating. (Bautista)
Immunity statutes
Under immunity statutes, persons are immunized from prosecution based on their testimony.
Hoffman v. US (1951)
FACTS: Hoffman was called to testify before a grand jury. He was asked certain questions which he refused
to answer. He was adjudged in criminal contempt for his refusal to answer.
HELD: The SC reversed his conviction, holding that the right against self-incrimination extended not only to
answers that in themselves would sustain a conviction, but also those answers which would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute a person for a crime.
Newsmans Privilege
R.A. No. 1477
Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist, or duly
accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine, or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to
reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor, or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds
that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
Purpose of newsmans privilege
Newsmans privilege is justified by public policy which requires that the right of the people to information should be
protected. (Bautista, citing Jones)
In the absence of a privilege protecting the informants identity, the information probably would not be volunteered
because of the informants fear of reprisal. (Bautista, citing the University of Chicago Law Review)
The newsmans privilege has been held to be subordinate to the right of the accused to compel production of evidence
in his behalf. (Bautista, citing Matter of Farber)
In re: Emil Jurado (1995)
FACTS: Jurado wrote several articles regarding improprieties in the judiciary. In one article, he wrote that 6
SC justices went to vacation to Hong Kong with the said trip being paid for by a public utility firm. PLDT, at
that time, recently won a case in the SC. PLDT sent a letter to the Chief Justice saying that Jurado's article
alluded to PLDT, and that appropriate action must be taken. The matter contained in the letter was docketed
as an administrative case. Jurado was ordered to comment on the letter, and on the other articles he
published. Among other things, Jurado argued that under RA 1477, he cannot be compelled to reveal his
sources.
HELD: Jurado cannot claim protection under RA 1477. The law does not protect a journalist who deliberately
distorts the truth, but recognizes no obligation to establish the factual basis of such imputations, and refuses
to submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. The law confers no immunity from prosecution for libel or
for other sanction under law. All it does is give the journalist the right to refuse to reveal the source of his
information.

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Filial Privilege
Rule 130, Section 25
Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children, or other direct descendants.
Family Code
Article 215
No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except
when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
Nature of filial privilege
GENERAL RULE: Under Rule 130, Section 25, what is prohibited is compelled testimony. Thus, the family member has
the option of testifying against the other family member. (Bautista)
EXCEPTION: Under Article 215 of the Civil Code, a descendant may be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against
his parent or grandparent, when his testimony is indispensable in a crime against him or by one parents against the
other.
Filial privilege is all-encompassing. It covers communications, whether confidential or not, as well as acts. (Bautista)
Priest-Penitent Privilege
Rule 130, Section 24(d)
Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined
as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs.
Requisites of priest-penitent privilege
1) The communications were made pursuant to a religious duty enjoined in the course of discipline of the sect or
denomination to which they belong; and
2) The communications must be confidential and penitential in character or under the seal of the confessional.
(Regalado)
Admissions and Confessions
Party admissions
Rule 130, Section 26
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
Admissions generally
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which
he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. (Regalado, citing CJS)
Requisites for admissibility of admissions
To be admissible, an admission must:
1) Involve matters of fact, not of law;
2) Be categorical and definite;
3) Be knowingly and voluntarily made; and
4) Must be adverse to the admitters interests (otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible)
Nature of party admissions
Party admissions are made out of court, i.e. they are extrajudicial admissions. (Gardiner v. Magsalin) In contrast,
judicial admissions, while also made by a party, are made in the course of judicial proceedings in the same case. (Rule
129, Section 4)
Elements of a party admission
1) An act, declaration, or omission
2) By a party

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3) As to a relevant fact, and
4) Disserving at the time it is offered in evidence against the party-admitter
Form of party admissions
1) Act or conduct
GENERAL RULE: nonverbal action (e.g. fleeing from the scene of the crime) may constitute a party admission, usually
to demonstrate guilt
EXCEPTIONS: post-accident repairs; offers of compromise
2) Declaration or statement
GENERAL RULE: oral or written statements of a party may constitute party admissions (e.g. affidavit)
3) Omission
Party admissions must be disserving
Party admissions must be disserving. This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration
against himself, unless it is true. (Bon v. People)
Whether an admission is disserving is reckoned at the time it is used in evidence, not when it is made. (Rufina Patis
Factory v. Alusitain)
If the party admissions are offered in favor of the party-admitter, they are self-serving, and thus, hearsay. (Bautista,
citing Wigmore)
Admissions v. prior inconsistent statements
Party admissions are admissible in proof of their truth, i.e. as substantive evidence. In contrast, prior inconsistent
statements (Rule 132, Section 13) are admissible for impeachment purposes only and thus require for their
introduction into evidence the prior laying of a predicate. (Link v. Eastern Aircraft)
Admissions v. declarations against interest
Admissions
Need not be made against the proprietary or
pecuniary interest of the party
Made by the party himself; it is primary evidence
and competent though the party is available to
testify
Can be made any time

Declarations against interest

Must have been made against the proprietary or
pecuniary interest of the party
Must have been made by a person who is either
deceased or unable to testify
Must be made ante lite motam

Bon v. People (2004)

FACTS: Manuel visited his sisters farm to investigate reports that trees were being cut and stolen. He testified
that it was during this visit that Virgilio, the tenant of the land, admitted to him that he had ordered the trees
cut. Manuels testimony, along with other circumstantial evidence, was the basis for Virgilios conviction for
violating P.D. No. 705. Virgilio questioned the admissibility of Manuels testimony.
HELD: Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to
show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial
evidence necessary to convict the accused. Furthermore, Virgilio is barred from questioning its admissibility
since he failed to object to it when it was offered. Lastly, under the res inter alios acta rule, Virgilios admission
cannot be binding to his co-defendants since it does not fall under any exception to the said rule.

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Link v. Eastern Aircraft (1948)
FACTS: Link, an employee of Eastern Aircraft, got into an accident in the company cafeteria. However, his
version of the accident differed substantially from admissions he made to the attending physician and nurse
immediately after the accident. The Bureau held that in EITHER version, a case for compensability had been
established and found for Link. But the Court of Common Pleas reversed and dismissed Links petition. It
held that Eastern Aircrafts version could NOT be the basis for an award, because Links contradictory
statements were not competent to be used as substantive proof. They could only be used to affect the
witnesses credibility. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
HELD: New Jersey Supreme Courts judgment REVERSED. Bureaus judgment AFFIRMED. Prior contradictory
declarations of any party to the litigation who becomes a witness are admissible by the opposing party, to
neutralize the testimony of the declarant. But once admitted into evidence, such declarations may be used as
substantive proof for EITHER party. Such evidence is affirmative proof. In the case of non-party witnesses
(such as the company physician and nurse), it is NOT used solely to contradict, neutralize, or discredit. A
compensation award should NOT rest upon imagination, surmise, or conjecture. But where there are 2
different versions as to how an accident occurred (with admitted resultant injuries) and EITHER version
makes it a compensable accident, an award SHOULD be granted. From all the testimony submitted, there are
only 2 legally acceptable versions, and under the rules of evidence, either version requires a finding for Link.
Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain (2004)
FACTS: Alusitain filed a case with the NLRC against Rufina Patis Factory for alleged non-payment of
retirement benefits. Rufina Patis presented Alusitains letter of resignation and notarized Affidavit of
Separation to prove that Alusitain had resigned prior to the effectivity of the new law on retirement benefits,
and thus, he was not covered by it. Alusitain argued, on the other hand, that he only executed the mentioned
documents so he could avail of his SSS benefits, but that he had continued to be in the employ of Rufina Patis
until 1995. The LA, NLRC and CA all ruled in favor of Alusitain.
HELD: The SC reversed. The letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation were admissions against
interest. Even though they were beneficial to Alusitain at the time they were executed, whether an
admission is against interest is reckoned at the time it is used in evidence. Having failed to prove that he was
still employed with Rufina Patis until 1995, and thus failing to show that he qualified under the new
retirement benefits provision in the Labor Code, the SC ruled in favor of Rufina Patis.
Offer of compromise
Rule 130, Section 27
Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission
of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not admissible
in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.
Offers of compromise in civil cases
An offer of compromise in a civil case is NOT a tacit admission of liability and cannot be proved over the objection of
the offeror. (Regalado)
An offer to pay or the actual payment of the medical, hospital, or other expenses by reason of the victims injuries is
not admissible to prove civil liability therefor. These are humanitarian and charitable acts that should be encouraged
and rewarded.
Offers of compromise in criminal cases

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GENERAL RULE: An offer of compromise in a criminal case is an implied admission of guilt. However, the accused may
be permitted to prove that such offer was not made under consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the risks of
criminal action against him. (US v. Maqui)
EXCEPTIONS:
1) Prosecutions for violations of internal revenue laws. The law provides that payment of any internal revenue
tax and criminal violations may be compromised.
2) Rape cases can in effect be compromised, by actual marriage of the parties. But an offer of marriage by the
accused during the investigation of the rape case is an implied admission of guilt. (Regalado, citing People v.
Valdez)
3) Criminal cases involving criminal negligence, or quasi-offences contemplated under Article 365 of the RPC,
are allowed to be compromised, so an offer of settlement is not an implied admission of guilt. (Regalado)
Plea of guilty later withdrawn; unaccepted offer of plea of guilty to lesser offense
Rationale: the beneficent policy of allowing guilty pleas would be defeated if the accused would have to make them at
the peril of making evidence against himself. (Bautista)
Offer to pay or payment of medical, hospital, or other expenses occasioned by an injury
An offer to pay or the actual payment of the medical, hospital, or other expenses by reason of the victims injuries is
not admissible to prove criminal liability therefor. These are humanitarian and charitable acts that should be
encouraged and rewarded. (Regalado)
US v. Maqui (1914)
FACTS: Maqui was convicted of theft of large cattle. The lower courts accepted proof as to certain alleged
extrajudicial admissions made by the accused, which Maquis counsel now contends as erroneous. The
supposed admissions included offers to compromise.
HELD: The SC held that while there is no uniform practice as to admissibility of offers to compromise, it has
also been held that evidence can be offered to show offers of compromise, but permits the accused to show
that such were not made because of guilt, but merely to avoid the legal consequences of prosecution. In any
case, the SC is also convinced of the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Maqui.
Res inter alios acta
Rule 130, Section 28
Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet
The Res Inter Alios Acta Rule is the first part of the rule res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet (Things done
between strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties to them). The second part is found in Rule 130,
Section 34 (Similar Acts Rule)
Res inter alios acta generally
GENERAL RULE: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of a third person.
EXCEPTIONS:
1) The third person is a partner, joint owner, joint debtor, or has a joint interest with the party. (Rule 130,
Section 29)
2) The third person is a co-consiprator. (Rule 130, Section 30)
3) The third person is a privy of the party. (Rule 130, Section 31)
When res inter alios acta applies
1) In cases of conspiracy, the rule is only applicable to a conspirators extrajudicial confession, not his direct
testimony in open court. (Gardiner v. Magsalin)
2) Extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused cannot be utilized against the latter unless
repeated in open court. (People v. Valerio)
3) Pleadings in another related civil case are admissible as admissions. (Jelleff v. Braden)
4) Negative hearsay (e.g. evidence of lack of complaints about a product from other customers) cannot be
admitted, under the res inter alios acta rule. (Jelleff v. Braden)
Gardiner v. Magsalin (1941)
FACTS: Gardiner, as fiscal, sought to present Fernandez, one of the co-accused, as a witness to testify to the
alleged conspiracy between the other co-accused. The judge did not permit Fernandez to testify on the
ground that Fernandez being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declarationGardiner

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petitioned the SC for a writ of mandamus.
HELD: The SC granted the writ of mandamus, explaining that the rule invoked by the judge was
misunderstood by him. Such was an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and is only applicable to an
extrajudicial confession of the conspirator, not his direct testimony in court.
People v. Valerio (1982)
FACTS: Valerio, Castro, and de la Cruz hatched a plan involving the murder of a young boy and thereafter
claiming and dividing the proceeds of his life insurance. After the boy died and the death claim against the
boys insurance failed, Castro later made a sworn statement, saying that Elepano was the one who hit the
boys head before the latter died. This statement was later repudiated by Castro in open court.
HELD: Court said there was sufficient evidence to convict Valerio. As to Elepanos participation, the court
said that Castros repudiation erased any links of Elepano to the crime. Well-settled is the rule that
extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused cannot be utilized against the latter unless
repeated in open Court. A written extrajudicial statement of a person who was not presented as a witness to
be cross-examined on his supposed statement is not admissible in evidence under the principle of res inter
alios acta.
Jelleff v. Braden (1956)
FACTS: Blanche Braden purchased a smock from Jelleff. One day, while Braden was cooking, the smock
caught fire and she suffered third degree burns. She brought an action against Jelleff upon an alleged breach
of warranty of fitness. While this case was pending, Jelleff brought an action in Indiana against the
manufacturer of the garment, Barbieri. The Indiana complaint stated that Braden had brought suit against
Jelleff on account of the apparently flammable garment that the manufacturer sold to it. The Indiana
complaint was received in evidence over Jelleffs objection and the trial court eventually held it liable for the
breach of warranty.
HELD: The trial court correctly admitted the Indiana complaint in evidence. In paragraph 3 of the Indiana
complaint, it had been represented by attorneys for Jelleff that the fabric in the offending garment was
flammable, dangerous and not reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was intended. While the
allegation in the Indiana complaint did not prove that the garment was flammable, it was certainly evidence
that Jelleff claimed it was.
The Court also held that the lack of complaints from other customers who had bought the same garment
would not tend to prove that the garment was safe. Each single piece of evidence must have a plus value,
something more than a minimum in a probative sense. The fact that Mrs. Barbieri's garment did not take fire
does not prove that its material was the same as that in Miss Bradens garment or that the fabric in the latter
was more or less likely to become ignited and to burn. At most Mr. Barbieri could have said that he had
heard of no complaints of flammability from purchasers of such numbers of garments as had been made
from the same fabric that had been delivered to his company. Against the proposed vague, negative hearsay
as to possibly similar conditions or circumstances in other instances, Mr. Barbieri testified affirmatively that
his company did not run any flammability test on any of these goods.
Admission by agent
Rule 130, Section 29
Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence
against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
interested with the party.
Rationale behind exception
By the principle of agency, what is done by an agent within the scope of his agency is in legal effect done by the
principal. (Bautista, citing Estrada v. Desierto)
Requisites for exception to apply
1) The partnership, agency, or joint interest is established by evidence other than the act or declaration;
2) The act or declaration is within the scope of the partnership, agency, or joint interest; and

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3) Such act or declaration must have been made during the existence of the partnership, agency, or joint
interest. (Regalado)
When exception applies
1) A statement made by a driver to an investigating police officer at the scene of a vehicular collision is
admissible against his employer. (Martin v. Savage Truck Line)
2) A note and statement made by an employee to the president of a corporation are admissible against both the
employee and the corporation, provided that they were made by the employee when he was an agent or
servant of the corporation, they concerned a matter within the scope of his agency, or employment, and were
made during the existence of that relationship. (Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center)
Martin v. Savage Truck Line (1954)
FACTS: A statement of the truck driver after the accident was admitted as evidence. Savage was objecting to
this on the ground that it was not part of res gestae or that it was not admissible as a statement against
interest.
HELD: Admissible. To say that the statement was only admissible against the person and not the truck
company would result in denying the agency between the 2 which was inherently in existence when the
time the statement was made.
Daniel Joseph Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center (1978)
FACTS: A child was apparently bitten by a wolf. The District Court judge excluded as evidence certain
statements made by the defendant Mr. Poos where he said that the wolf had bitten the child, and also
corporate meetings minutes wherein the directors discussed the matter of the wolf biting the child. These
statements, if admitted, would constitute admissions. The judge had excluded them on the basis that they
amounted to hearsay. The Federal appellate court ruled for the admissibility of the statements.
HELD: Mr. Poos note and statement to WCSRC President Sexton were admissible against Mr. Poos and
against WCSRC. They were made by Poos when he was an agent or servant of the WCSRC, and they
concerned a matter within the scope of his agency, or employment, i.e., his custody of the wolf, and were
made during the existence of that relationship. However, the records of the WCSRC corporate meeting were
not admissible against Mr. Poos and were only admissible against WCSRC in a limited manner. Nothing in
the law suggests that records of a meeting can be used against a non-attending, non-participating employee
of that corporation, such as Mr. Poos. But the directors, as primary officers, had the authority to include
their conclusions in the record of the meeting.
Admission by co-conspirator
Rule 130, Section 30
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act of declaration.
Rationale for exception
Conspiracies, being usually secret enterprises, are difficult to prove. A co-conspirators statements may well provide
some of the best evidence. (Bautista, citing Allen & Kuhns)
Requisites for exception to apply
Acts of a conspirator are admissible against his co-conspirators if:
1) Such declaration must have been made during the progress of the conspiracy and not after the transaction
had ended; and
2) It must appear by competent evidence that the conspiracy actually existed and that the accused were
members of the conspiracy. (US v. Juan dela Cruz)
Proof of conspiracy
The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the statement of the conspirator. (Tamargo v. Awingan)
When the exception applies
The exception applies only to extrajudicial acts or statements, and not to testimony given on the witness stand (since
then the adverse party would have the opportunity to cross-examine). (People v. Janjalani)
US v. Juan dela Cruz (1908)
FACTS: A band of 5 persons robbed Jimenez in his house. When the band left, the constabulary attacked the
band and killed Dizon, a member of the band. Hours before he died, Dizon confessed his guilt and stated

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that Juan de la Cruz, et al. were members of the band.
HELD: Dizons declaration is not admissible. However, since other testimonies established the commission
of the crime by the accused, then they cannot be acquitted. The admission of dying declarations has always
been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder, and must proceed from the very
person alleged to have been killed. Acts of a conspirator are admissible against his co-conspirators if:
(1) Such declaration must have been made during the progress of the conspiracy and not after the
transaction had ended; and
(2) It must appear by competent evidence that the conspiracy actually existed and that the accused were
members of the conspiracy.
Tamargo v. Awingan (2010)
FACTS: Atty. Tamargo was killed. Garon executed an affidavit saying Columna told him that Columna was
one of the killers. After he was arrested, Columna executed an affidavit admitting he was the lookout and
saying that Awingan, et al. were the killers and masterminds. Columna affirmed his affidavit in preliminary
investigation. While in jail, Columna wrote a letter to one of the respondents saying he was tortured so he
would sign the affidavit. Columna executed a 2nd affidavit saying what he said in his letter was true.
Columna wrote a letter to the city prosecutor saying he wrote the letter (addressed to one of the
respondents) because his life was being threatened in jail. DOJ recommended informations to be filed
against Awingan, et al. Upon MR, DOJ recommended that the informations be withdrawn. The prosecutor
filed a motion to withdraw informations. The RTC judge denied the motion. The CA said the RTC judge
acted with GADALEJ.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the CA. It said that the RTC judge had committed GADALEJ in denying the
motion to withdraw the informations. It also said that Columnas 1st affidavit (with the extrajudicial
confession) was inadmissible against Columnas alleged co-conspirators for violation of the res inter alios
acta rule. It didnt fall under the exception in Rule 130 30, as aside from the confession, no other
independent evidence was given to prove the conspiracy.
People v. Janjalani (2011)
FACTS: A bus exploded along EDSA. Trinidad, Baharan, and Asali gave separate TV interviews admitting
their roles in the bombing. Asali admitted that Rohmat taught him how to make a bomb. They were charged
with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. During pre-trial, among the stipulations agreed to
was that Trinidad, Baharan, and Asali admitted to causing the bomb explosions, and that they admitted
their guilt to the multiple murder charge. Asali was discharged as state witness and he testified against his
co-accused. Trinidad, Baharan, and Rohmat were convicted.
HELD: The guilt of Trinidad and Baharan were proven by Asali's testimony, by their extrajudicial
confessions in the TV interviews, and by their judicial admissions in the pre-trial stipulations. Rohmats
guilt as a principal by inducement was also proven by Asalis testimony. While Asalis extrajudicial
confession is not admissible against his co-accused, when he repeated his statement in court, it becomes a
judicial admission admissible against his co-accused. Rule 130, Sec. 30 applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions, and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.
Admission by privies
Rule 130, Section 31
Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission
of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Requisites for exception to apply
1) There is a relation of privity between the party and the declarant;
2) The admission was made by the declarant, as predecessor-in-interest, while holding the title to the property;
and
3) The admission is in relation to said property. (Regalado, citing People v. Du)
Admission by silence

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Rule 130, Section 32
Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation
of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
Requisites for exception to apply
1) The party must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the other person;
2) He must have had the opportunity to deny it;
3) He must have understood the statement;
4) He must have an interest to object, such that he would have naturally done so if the statement was not true;
5) The facts were within his knowledge; and
6) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue. (Regalado, citing
several cases)
When the exception applies
When a police officer asks one of the accused who his companions were when the victim was killed, in the presence of
2 others and the accused answers that 2 others were his companions, to which imputation the 2 others remain silent.
This is an implied admission that accuseds answer to the question is true. (People v. Ancheta)
When the exception does not apply
1) When, in front of the investigating police officer, one of the accused pointed to 3 others as his companions in
the commission of a crime, and the 3 companions just stared at him and said nothing. The silence of an
accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially
when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be
considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. (People v. Alegre)
2) When the accused admits that he had lain with the complainant, but did not say that he used force, his
statement cannot be considered an admission/confession that he raped the complainant. (US v. Flores)
People v. Ancheta (1959)
FACTS: A patrolman of the police department of Davao City went missing. It was eventually found out that he
had been killed by several men, among whom was Manuel Ancheta. In separate sworn statements, Ancheta
and the other suspects admitted and confessed that they conspired with each other to kill the victim. The CFI
found them guilty of committing murder. On appeal, Ancheta Ancheta repudiated his sworn statement and
denied that he conspired with his co-defendants to kill Lao. He claimed that he was tortured by the policemen
in the city jail, prompting him to sign the affidavit.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld his conviction for murder. Anchetas repudiation of his sworn statement
cannot prevail over the disinterested testimony of the officer before whom he subscribed and swore his
statement. Furthermore, when Gacusan, one of the defendants, was asked, in Anchetas presence, who his
companions were when Lao was killed, he answered answered that Ancheta and another person were with
him. Despite this imputation, Ancheta remained silent. This is an implied admission that Gacusans answer to
the question is true.
People v. Alegre (1979)
FACTS: Melecio was apprehended in the act of pawning a stolen bracelet. In explaining how he came into
possession of the bracelet, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of the owner. On the basis
of his extrajudicial confessions, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against him and 3 others.
The only evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the 3 others were the testimonies of Sgt.
Isla and Hernando, a fellow inmate. Sgt. Isla testified that when he was investigating Melecio, the latter
pointed to Jesus, Mario, and Ramiro as his companions in the commission of the crime, and the latter just
stared at him (Melecio) and said nothing. Hernando testified that the 3 others admitted to him their
participation in the crime. CFI found all accused guilty and sentenced them to death. The case was elevated to
the SC for automatic review.
HELD: Judgment appealed from REVERSED. Jesus, Mario, and Ramiro are ACQUITTED. Melecios extrajudicial
confessions CANNOT be used as evidence and are NOT competent proof against Jesus, Mario, and Ramiro,
under the principle of res inter alios acta, there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. It was error for
the trial court to draw from Jesus, Mario, and Ramiros silence in the face of Melecios incriminatory

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statements the conclusion that the former had tacitly admitted their guilt. The silence of an accused under
custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused
is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from
his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against
self-incrimination.
US v. Flores (1913)
FACTS: Flores was charged and convicted of the rape of Albarda.
HELD: The SC reversed the decision and acquitted Flores. It held that Albardas testimony fell short of
establishing the commission of the crime because it lacked details. Flores admitted that he had lain with
Albarda, but did not say that he did so with force and threats. Such admission cannot be deemed to be an
admission that he had committed rape.
Confession
Rule 130, Section 33
Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
RA No. 7438
Section 2(d)
Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
Xxx
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be
in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid
waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor,
the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him;
otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
Confession
In a criminal case, a confession is a categorical acknowledgement of guilt made by an accused without any exculpatory
statement or explanation. If he admits having committing the act but alleges a justification, it is merely an admission.
(Regalado, citing US v. Tolosa)
In a civil case, a confession of judgment is an express admission by a party of his liability. (Regalado)
Judicial v. extrajudicial confessions
A judicial confession is one made before the court in which the case is pending and in the course of legal proceedings
therein. By itself, it can sustain a conviction even in capital offenses. (Regalado)
An extrajudicial confession is one made in any other place or occasion. It cannot sustain a conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti. (Rule 133, Section 3)
Requisites for admissible confessions
1) The confession must involve an express and categorical acknowledgement of guilt. (US v. Corrales)
2) The facts admitted must be constitutive of a criminal offense. (US v. Flores)
3) The confession must have been given voluntarily.
4) The confession must have been intelligently made.
5) There must have been no violation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Admissions v. confessions
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of
fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent
to commit the offense with which he is charged. (People v. Lorenzo)

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The statutory provision excluding evidence as to confessions until and unless the prescribed foundation is laid is not
applicable to admissions, which do not amount to confessions although they may be sufficient, when taken together
with other evidence of surrounding circumstances to sustain an inference of the guilt of the accused. (US v. Corrales)
Admissions
Do not involve an acknowledgement of guilt or
liability
May be express or tacit
May be made by 3rd persons
In certain cases, are admissible against a party

Confessions
Involve an acknowledgement of guilt or liability
Must be express
Can be made only by the party himself
In certain cases, are admissible against a partys coaccused

When the confession rule does not apply

1) Where the clerk of court substantially admit that he kept the money collected with his personal funds and
that he did not immediately turn it over to the auditor, it is only an admission and not a confession of
misappropriation. (US v. Corrales)
2) Where the verbal extrajudicial confession was made without counsel, but it was spontaneously made by the
accused immediately after the crime, it is not admissible under the confession rule. However, it is admissible
under the res gestae rule, discussed infra. (People v. Tampus)
People v. Lorenzo (1995)
FACTS: Dolores Lorenzo was accused of committing parricide for killing her husband with a bolo and fan
knife. During trial, she assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses (Liban and Eclipse), claiming that
Libans testimony must corroborate Eclipses testimony or her confession because without such
corroboration, Eclipses testimony would have no probative value. Also, according to the prosecution, she
allegedly declared to one of the witnesses, SPO1 Eclipse, that she killed her husband, and the trial court
characterized this as a confession.
HELD: As to Dolores claim, the Court said that her theory is a misunderstanding of Sec. 3, Rule 133 of ROC
because what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and NOT the testimony of the person to
whom the testimony is made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another
person who heard the confession, but the evidence of corpus delicti. Also, contrary to the trial courts ruling,
the Court said that her declaration was an ADMISSION and not a confession. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit
the offense with which he is charged.
US v. Corrales (1914)
FACTS: Corrales was then the clerk of court of the CFI of Misamis. A case of misappropriation was filed
against him. Corrales substantially admitted the fact that he kept the money collected with his personal
funds and that he did not immediately turn it over to the auditor. However his counsel contended that such
evidence was incompetent and could not be admitted as it was not first made to appear that it was
voluntarily and freely given.
HELD: SC ruled that such evidence, which was an admission, was not incompetent. Statutory provision
excluding evidence as to confessions until and unless the prescribed foundation is laid is not applicable to
admissions.
People v. Tampus (1980)
FACTS: Tampus, Avila, and Saminado were all prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison. One morning, Tampus
and Avila followed Saminado into the toilet and stabbed him repeatedly, killing him. Tampus and Avila
immediately surrendered to a guard and revealed their motive for the murder Investigator #1 investigated.
2 days later, Investigator #2 obtained extrajudicial confessions from Tampus and Avila. Tampus and Avila
pleaded guilty to murder, took the witness stand, affirmed their confessions, and testified to the manner
they assaulted Saminado. Tampus and Avila were convicted. Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila
received a lighter sentence. Because of the death sentence, Tampus case was automatically reviewed by the
SC.
HELD: The extrajudicial confession of Tampus was NOT taken in violation of Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973

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Constitution. The confession was voluntarily made. The investigator endeavored, according to his
understanding, to comply with Sec. 20. But even before such investigation, Tampus and Avila had already
confessed to a guard and revealed their motive. This spontaneous statement, elicited without any
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and constitutes a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of such
statement, they waived their rights to remain silent and to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their
extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty, and testimony in court.

Similar Acts Rule / Character Evidence

Rule 130, Section 34
Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.

Also known as the second part of res inter alios acta

General rule: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time.
Exception: Evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.
Boston Bank of the Phils. vs. Manalo (2006)
FACTS: XEI agreed to sell to Spouses Manalo a subdivision lot. They failed to execute a conditional contract of
sale. Boston Bank, as new owner of the subdivision, sought to eject the Spouses as they failed to pay the
purchase price of the land. Spouses sought to prove their right over the land by asserting that, as a matter of
business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay in installments or 120
months. In support of this, the Spouses presented Contracts of Conditional Sale between XEI and other lot
buyers.
HELD: General rule applied, similar acts inadmissible
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Offering party must establish
the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in
a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature.
The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit.
The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern must be numerous enough to base on inference
of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
Habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. It is only when
examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of
systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity
of response or ratio of reaction to situations.
US vs. Pineda (1918)
FACTS: Pineda sold barium chlorate to Santos instead of potassium chlorate. Santos sick horses died and
Pineda was convicted. He argued that the testimony of two doctors was inadmissible under the res inter alios
acta rule.
HELD: Exception applied, similar acts admissible --- similar acts close in time
If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly
excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there
is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
Nicolas vs. Hon. Enriquez (1955)
FACTS: Corazon filed crim case of concubinage vs. Jimmy and Priscilla. She sought to prove that the
defendants had a son but testimony referring to the child was objected to for being immaterial. She

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contended that prior sexual relations between Jimmy and Priscilla were admissible to show propensity to
commit the offense charged or disposition to maintain such relations even after marriage her marriage to
Jimmy.
HELD:General rule applied, similar acts/ testimony referring to the child is inadmissible --- act so far removed
from issue
Similar acts rule: What one did at one time is no proof of his having done the same or a similar thing at
another time. But the rule is not absolute, for it is subject to the exceptions. Testimony may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
This case did not fall under the exception. The previous sexual relations sought to be proved were far
removed in point of time from the illicit act now complained of.
People vs. Irang (1937)
FACTS: Irang was recognized (pockmarks!)and identified by the victims in two robbery incidents. Testimony
relating to other robbery incidents was admitted to identify Irang.
HELD: Exception applied, similar acts admissible to prove identity
Evidence of another crime is generally not admissible in a prosecution for robbery. However, such evidence is
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the
robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged,
or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.
Maam agrees with dissent though. Irang was not sufficiently identified. Witness initially remembered the
pockmarks but the next month remembered the scar on the left eyelid. Assailants were also disguised when
they committed the crime, making identification difficult, if not impossible.
People vs. Asinas (1929)
FACTS: Canuto and Eugenio Asinas killed their father with the help of Ogacho and Credo. Ogacho turned state
witness and confessed the whole incident. However, the only evidence is Ogachos testimony.
HELD: General rule applied, similar acts inadmissible
A defendant in a criminal action cannot be convicted on the evidence of the accomplice only. To attain a
conviction, there must be other evidence corroborating that of the accomplice which tends to show the guilt
of the defendant.
There was also evidence that in previous occasions, the brother had attempted or done violence on their
father (tied him to a papaya tree, tried to drown him in a river).
General Rule: Evidence which shows or tends to show that the accused in a criminal case has committed a
crime wholly independent of the offense in which he is on trial for is inadmissible.
Exception: If the relationship between the two is that the one tends to prove the other
Strangely, Court said that the previous acts did not tend to prove that the siblings killed their father.
US vs. Evangelista (1913)
FACTS: The building Ramona was leasing was set on fire on 2 occasions, May 31 and June 2. Information for
arson was filed for the 2nd fire. Ramona objected to the admission of evidence relative to the first fire.
HELD: Exception applied, evidence of similar act admissible to prove intent.
While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to direct evidence
against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged
in the information.
Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other

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similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the
accused.
Rule 130, Section 51
Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In criminal cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved
in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in
any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
(b) In civil cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a
issue of character involved in the case.

civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the

(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14.

Rule 132, Section 14
Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until
such character has been impeached.
RA 8505, Section 6
Rape Shield. - In prosecutions for rape, evidence of complainant's past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of
his/her reputation shall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds, that such evidence
is material and relevant to the case.
General rule: Character evidence is inadmissible
Exceptions:
1. Crim cases
Accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged
Prosecution may not prove bad moral character of the accused, unless in rebuttal
Offended party his/her good or bad moral character may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charges.
2.

Civ cases

Partys moral character admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case
Witness evidence of his/her good character is not admissible until such character has been impeached

Some principles as laid down in the cases:

The law does not invest the defendant with a presumption of good character; it simply closes the whole
matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution's case in chief. The defendant may
introduce evidence tending to prove his good reputation, but, if he does so, it throws open the entire subject,
and the prosecution may then cross-examine defendant's witnesses to test their credibility and qualifications,
and may also introduce contradictory evidence.
Both the propriety and abuse of hearsay reputation testimony, on both sides, depend on numerous and subtle
considerations, difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record. Therefore, rarely and only on clear showing
of prejudicial abuse of discretion, will appellate courts disturb rulings of trial courts on this subject.
A character witness may be cross-examined as to knowledge of rumors of defendant's prior arrest, whether
or not it culminated in a conviction.
It is not only by comparison with the crime on trial, but by comparison with the reputation asserted, that a
court may judge whether the prior arrest should be made the subject of inquiry.
Notwithstanding the difficulty which a jury might have in comprehending instructions as to the limited
purpose of such evidence, a defendant who elects to introduce witnesses to prove his good reputation for

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honesty and truthfulness and for being a law-abiding citizen has no valid complaint about the latitude which
existing law allows to the prosecution to meet this issue by cross-examination of his character witnesses.
On proving character
In theory, a trait of character may be proved in three ways:
(1) by testimony concerning the individual's
reputation in the community as to the trait;

universally acceptable in situationswhere character

evidence is permitted

(2) by testimony of those who have had an

opportunity to form, and have formed, an
opinion as to whether the individual possessed
the trait;
(3) by evidence of specific acts of the individual
under similar circumstances, from which the
existence of the character trait may be inferred.

not allowed in a number of states, but adopted by

some on the rationale that personal observation and
personal knowledge are a more trustworthy reliance
than general reputation
disapproved in some jurisdictions except in cases
where character is directly in issue; excluded not
because unconvincing, but because it has the
potential to surprise, to arouse prejudice, to multiply
the issues and confuse the jury, and to prolong the
trial

Michelson vs. US (1948)

FACTS: In a trial in a federal court for bribery of a federal officer, the defendant admitted the payment, but
claimed that it was induced by the officer, and the case hinged on whether the jury believed the defendant or
the officer. The defendant's character witnesses testified that they had known the defendant for from 15 to
30 years, and that he had a good reputation for "honesty and truthfulness" and for "being a law-abiding
citizen." In cross-examining them, the prosecutor was permitted to ask whether they had heard that the
accused had been arrested 27 years previously for receiving stolen goods. The trial judge had satisfied
himself in the absence of the jury that the question related to an actual occurrence, and he carefully
instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of this evidence.
HELD: In the circumstances of this case and in view of the care taken by the trial judge to protect the rights of
the defendant, permitting the prosecutor to ask this question was not improper. That the inquiry concerned
an arrest 27 years before the trial did not make its admission an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of
this case -- especially since two of the witnesses had testified that they had known defendant for 30 years,
defendant, on direct examination, had voluntarily called attention to his conviction of a misdemeanor 20
years before, and since no objection was made on this specific ground.
State vs. Miranda (1978)
FACTS: Miranda shot Germany and claimed self-defense at trial, offering Germanys prior convictions for violent
acts to show that the latter was the aggressor.
HELD: In a trial for homicide, the character of the deceased ordinarily is irrelevant to the accuseds guilt or
innocence. It is well-settled however, that an accused may introduce evidence of the violent, dangerous or
turbulent character of the victim to show that the accused had a reason to fear serious harm, after laying a
proper foundation by adducing evidence that he acted in self-defense and that he was aware of the victims
violent character.
Court deviated from this rule, however, and ruled that Evidence of a homicide victims violent character might
be offered by the accused to show that the victim was the aggressor in their encounter, irrespective of the
accuseds knowledge of the victims character. When competent evidence of character is offered to show that
the deceased was the aggressor (not the state of mind of the accused), it is admissible regardless of the extent of
the accused's knowledge of such character or of the particular evidence in question.

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Hearsay
Rule 130, Section 36
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
GENERAL RULE: A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge = those which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
o
o
o

The hearsay evidence rule applies also to affidavits when the supposed affiant never identified the affidavit
and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine him/her (People vs. Brioso)
The testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth
of the facts asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence. It is otherwise if the purpose is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made, or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Cusi)
The testimony of a witness on the confession made to him by the accused is not hearsay. He is testifying to a
fact which he knows of his personal knowledge (was testifying to the fact that the accused told him that he
stabbed the victim) and not to the truth of the statement of the accused (People vs. Gaddi)

Example of hearsay evidence:

o Testimony of a witness as to what he has heard another person say about the facts in dispute (People vs.
Reyes, Aldecoa & Co. vs. Warner Barnes & Co.)
o Affidavits (without presenting affiant in court) (Marisfosque vs. Luna, People vs. Pagkaliwagan)
Theory of the hearsay rule: When a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in it, the
credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and therefore the assertion can be received as evidence only
when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination.
Two concepts of hearsay evidence:
1. Second-hand information (not derived from personal knowledge of witness)
2. Testimony of witness derived from personal knowledge BUT the adverse party is not given the opportunity to
cross-examine
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative value depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.
3 reasons for excluding hearsay evidence:
(1) Absence of cross-examination
(2) Absence of demeanor of evidence / deportment
(3) Absence of the oath
Not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of evidence has been admitted by
courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity.
We all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons account of what happened. And verdicts are
usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no
objection was made.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Under thus structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the evidence.
The rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn
from the evidence.

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Richmond vs. Anchuelo (1905)
EVIDENCE IN ISSUE: Testimony of Jose Pastor that when Anchuelo returned from the doctors office, he stated
to Pastor that Dr. Richmond agreed to cure him for P200, and not to charge anything if no cure was effected
HELD: Evidence properly excluded for being hearsay.
Witness Pastor did not offer to testify to anything which the doctor had said. Rather he offered to testify to
what Anchuelo said that Dr. Richmond had said.
Estrada vs. Desierto (2001)
EVIDENCE IN ISSUE: Angara diary for the purpose of proving Estradas intent to resign
HELD: Angara diary not hearsay, and therefore admissible
1.

It was not an out of court statement + Estrada did not object to the use of the diary.

Diary was made part of the pleadings

Estrada cannot complain that he was not furnished a copy nor was he surprised by its use.
Diary was frequently referred to by BOTH parties in their pleadings. 3 parts of the diary were
published in PDI.
Estrada had all the opportunity to contest the use of the diary but he failed to do so.

2.

Even assuming that the Diary was an out of court statement, the use of the diary was still not covered
by the hearsay rule.

Rules on hearsay do not cover ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY. The Angara diary belongs to this class.
o Section 26: Act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him
o These admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.
o Partys declaration had a special value when offered against a party.
Admission discredits the partys statements with the present claim asserted I
pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory
statements.
Admissions pass the gauntlet f hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial
assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity to cross-examine because it is
the opponents own declaration and he does not need to cross-examine himself.
o Hearsay rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put
himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.
o A mans acts, conduct and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against
him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his
fault if they do not.

INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS/ASSERTIONS

Ban on hearsay does not cover IRS/A, which are statements which are relevant independent of whether they are true
or not.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that such statement had been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary, but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.
2 classes:
1. Those statements which are the very facts in issue = admissions
2. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue

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(a) Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief,
intention, ill will and other emotions
(b) Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like (made during time of
pain)
(c) Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is,
the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc of the latter
(d) Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question
(e) Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness
Illustration:
o
o

Inday was drinking with her friends. Inday told them that: My neighbor is a thief! Later on, Indays neighbor
is charged with theft. Prosecution calls as witness one of the drinking buddies. Drinking buddy testifies in
court saying: The accused is a thief because I heard Inday say so. ---------HEARSAY!
Supposing the neighbor filed a libel case against Inday. Drinking buddy serves as a witness for the plaintiff
and says: I heard Inday say that the plaintiff is a thief. ----------- NOT HEARSAY. The fact in issue is whether
the utterances were made by a particular person, regardless of the truth or falsity of the statement.
Cornejo vs. Sandiganbayan (1987)

EVIDENCE IN ISSUE: Exhibit B Certification by Pasay City Engineer Jesus Reyna to the effect that Alfredo
Cornejo was not authorized to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings. Cornejo said that TC erred
in admitting Exhibit B it evidence without the author thereof taking the witness stand and thereby depriving
him of his constitutional right of confrontation.
HELD: Exhibit B was properly admitted in evidence. It was not presented as an independent evidence to
prove Cornejos want of authority to inspect privately-owned buildings, but merely as part of the testimony of
the complainant that such certification was issued in her presence.
Where the statement or writings attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand are being offered not
to prove the truth of the facts therein but only to prove that such statements were actually made or such
writings were executed, such evidence is not covered by the hearsay rule. (Maam refers to this as according
to tenor)
Phil. Realty Holdings vs. Firematic Phils. (2007)
EVIDENCE IN ISSUE: PRHCs letter to Firematic which stated that Mr. John Kahren, Peerless Pumps Director
for International Sales, verbally advised that they have no access or capability to verify whether there is such
an organization named Technotrade operating in the USA. They can only confirm that they enver had direct
negotiation with Technotrade and as such, Techntrade is not a dealer of Peerless pump. Signatory of the
letters (E.L. Sta. Maria) was not presented to testify on the veracity of the contents of the letters.
HELD: Inadmissible, hearsay. Because of the failure to present the signatory, Firematic was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine him. It also appeared that the person who signed the letters had no personal
knowledge of the facts stated therein.
RULE: A private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never presented as a
witness. The same is true of letters. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by
the adverse partys counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value. Stated differently, the declarants of
written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. The lack
of objection may make an incompetent evidence admissible, but admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Indeed, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value.
NPC vs. Diato-Bernal (2010)
EVIDENCE IN ISSUE: Commissioners report on the fair market value of land being expropriated. The report
was assailed for being devoid of any supporting documentary evidence.

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HELD: A commissioners report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly
hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.
People vs. Cusi (1965)
EVIDENCE IN ISSUE: Testimony of police officer Bano regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by
one of the accused, Puesca, who admitted participation in the crime and revealed the names of the persons
who conspired with him in the commission of the offense. TC directed Bano to answer questions pertaining
to the conspirators, witout mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed an objection of
hearsay
HELD: Bano should have been allowed to answer the question in full. The purpose of the prosecution was to
establish the fact that Puesca told Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense,
without claiming that Puescas statement or the answer to be given by Bano would be competent and
admissible evidence to show that the named persons really conspired with Puesca. (according to tenor!)
Exceptions to Hearsay
Dying declaration
Rule 130, Section 37
Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending
death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death.
For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur:
(1) death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
(2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;
(3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to;
(4) the declarant thereafter dies; and
(5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.
People vs. Maramara (1999)
FACTS: Cresenciano Maramara shot and killed Miguelito Donato in a fight during a benefit dance. Maramara
was identified by Miguelitos brother Ricardo, who saw the shooting, and by Miguelitos father Regarder, to
whom Miguelito identified Maramara as his shooter right before Miguelito died
HELD: The Court held that Regarders testimony regarding Miguelitos identification of the Maramara as his
assailant certainly qualifies as a dying declaration. For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence,
these requisites must concur:
(1) death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
(2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;
(3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to;
(4) the declarant thereafter dies; and
(5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.
Connor vs. State (1961)
FACTS: Connor killed his wife by running her over with his automobile. She declared, upon her dying breath,
that Connor was the one who ran her over and that "it was no accident".
HELD: Dying declaration!
On the requisite of the declarants consciousness that his/her death is imminent, Court held that it is not
necessary to prove expressions implying apprehension of death, if it is clear that the person does not expect
to survive the injury. This expectation may be indicated by the circumstances of her condition, or by her own
acts such as asking for a priest. It was not necessary that the victim expected to die. It is sufficient if her
condition is such and that she was aware of it as to warrant an inference of impending death.
Even if the statement was in response to a leading question, it was admissible; A dying declaration may be

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made in answer to a leading question or urgent solicitation.
Declaration against interest
Rule 130, Section 38
Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons.
Requisites:
Declaration
1. Made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
2. Against the interest of the declarant
3. At the time it was made, fact asserted was contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true
May be received in evidence against himself, successors in interest, 3rd persons
People vs. Toledo (1928)
FACTS: Holgado and Morales got into a bolo fight over a parcel of land. Morales died. Holgado executed an
affidavit saying that the fight only involved him and Morales. Toledo is being accused of participating in the
killing of Morales.
HELD: An exception to the hearsay rule is admission against interest. Historically, this exception applies only
with respect to proprietary or pecuniary interest. In this case, it was made to apply to admission against penal
interest.
Massee Felton Lumber vs. Sirmans (1905)
FACTS: Sirmans filed an injunction against Lumber Company to stop it from cutting down trees on his land. He
presented an entry by the dead sheriff that the land was sold to him (Sirmans).
HELD: The entry is admissible, though it was partly an admission against interest and partly in interest as
regards the sheriff. Balancing the interests, the entry was mostly against interest.
To render such an entry or declaration admissible, it must be shown that:
1. The declarant is dead,
2. He possessed competent knowledge of the facts, or it was his duty to know them, and
3. The declaration was at variance with his interest.
People vs. Brown (1970)
FACTS: Brown was convicted of murder, but argued self-defense in his appeal. He said that the victim had a pistol
drawn when Brown shot him. According to witness Seals, Seals had picked up the gun which the victim had
dropped and used such gun to rob a bank. However, he refused to testify in court asserting his right against selfincrimination.
HELD: The fact that the declaration alleged to have been made would subject the declarant to criminal liability is
held not to be sufficient to bring it within the declaration against interest exception to the rule against hearsay
evidence. The basis of the rule, the absence of the witness or his inability to testify, must also be proved.
Absence, while usually meaning that the person is dead or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, must also
embrace unavailability of the witness because of the assertion of constitutional rights which might be fairly
common in the area of penal admissions.
Pedigree / Family Tradition
Rule 130, Section 39
Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect
to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it

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occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
Requisites:
Act or declaration
1. Of a person deceased or unable to testify
2. In respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage
3. Occurred before the controversy
Relationship between the 2 persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration
Pedigree relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, dates when and places where these facts occurred,
names of relatives, facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree
Rule 130, Section 40
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to
the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree.
Rule 130, Section 41
Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or
general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence.
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.
Garrett vs. Estate (1952)
FACTS: Garret dies intestate leaving a lot of money. A lot of people claim to be her relatives. The courts find 3
first cousins and declare that they are entitled to Garrets insanely huge estate. Gadle appealed alleging that her
fathers uncle is the father of Garret. She presented church records, statements of her father, and a statement of
her lawyer made to her during the proceedings.
HELD: Since the church records were not certified or proven to be required, they werent sufficient. Declarations
as to pedigree are admissible if: (1) the declarant is dead, (2) the declarations were made before the controversy
arose (ante litem motam),(3) and the declarant was related to the family of which he spoke, and this relationship
is proved by evidence dehors(supports) the declaration. The third requisite was not met. The statements made
to her by her lawyer are hearsay.
Gravador vs. Mamigo (1967)
FACTS: Gravador was sacked off as principal in a public school because the Superintendent of Schools said he
had already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. This was based on pre-war records which indicated
that he was born on 1987. Gravador presented post-war documents and contended that he was born in 1901.
The trial court held that the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the
correct date of birth was December 11, 1901. The court also took into account the verified answer in a cadastral
proceeding back in 1924 filed by the petitioner's deceased brother. It was stated Gravador was one of the coowners of a piece of land, who was at that time 23 yrs old.
HELD: Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as
he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family
tradition. (Related to the topic) December 11, 1901 is established as Gravadors date of birth not only by
evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam (before suit is brought) of a deceased
relative. The declaration of the petitioner's brother is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (presently Rule 39).
People vs. Alegado (1991)
FACTS: Alegado was charged with 2 counts of statutory rape for having raped a girl below 12 years of age. He

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contends that the victims actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not established with
certainty. He claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her
maternal grandfather as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 constitute hearsay evidence.
HELD: SC admitted the testimonies and ruled that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admissible on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree
testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might
arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.
Res gestae
Rule 130, Section 42
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
2 parts of res gestae:
1. Spontaneous statements statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof
2. Verbal acts statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,a nd giving it a legal significance
US vs. Napier (1975)
FACTS: Napier kidnapped and assaulted Mrs. Caruso before driving off with her car. She suffered brain damage
because of the assault and a week after coming back from the hospital her sister showed her a newspaper article
of the incident. Seeing Napiers picture she cried, He killed me, he killed me! On appeal Napier argued that this
spontaneous exclamation should not have been admitted because it was hearsay and could only fall under the
exception if Mrs. Caruso had said it during the assault.
HELD: Admissible. The display of the photograph qualified as a sufficiently startling event to render the
statement made in response thereto admissible.
Although in most cases the startling events which prompt spontaneous exclamations are accidents, assaults,
and the like, there is no reason to restrict the exception to those situations. This general principle is based on
the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may
be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then
occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the
external shock.
Mrs. Caruso, having never discussed the assault with her family, was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted
with a photograph of her alleged assailant, was undoubtedly startled, and the event was so sufficiently startling
so as to provide adequate safeguards against reflection and fabrication.
Zarate vs. RTC (2009)
FACTS: : Zarate was charged with frustrated murder for stabbing Guiritan. Guiritan was brought to the hospital
and was operated on the next morning. After his operation,SPO1 Alecho took his ante-mortem statement
wherein he stated that it was Zarate who stabbed him. Zarate put up a defense of alibi. TC and CA held Zarate
guilty of frustrated homicide.
HELD: Admissible. Ante-mortem statement of Guiritan is part of the res gestae. It was taken a few hours after the
operation when he regained consciousness. His statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual
impressions so that it was the shocking event speaking through him, and he did not have the opportunity to
concoct or contrive the story.
People vs. Ner (1969)
FACTS: Boy de Leon opened his door and was met with a hail of gunfire. His common-law wife, Angelina, came

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running out of their room while the last few shots were fired but apparently didnt see the shooter. Nonetheless,
when she was interviewed by Patrolman Tiong some minutes later she identified the shooter as Ner.
HELD: Admissible. The statements she made to Tiong were admitted as part of the res gestae because they were
made almost immediately after the event [she was still hysterical when they were talking] and she had no time
to even consider lying.
Casualty Insurance vs. Salinas (1960)
FACTS: [Case for workmens compensation.] Salinas was injured at work and made claims on his companys
insurer. The insurer presented doctors to show that Salinas was not seriously injured and was just faking his
injury. To counter the doctors testimony, Salinas tried to present evidence from three witnesses that heard him
complain of his aches and pains. The trial court excluded the testimony but the Court of Civil Appeals permitted
it on appeal.
HELD: Admissible. (2nd part of res gestae) The declarations of a party himself, to whomsoever made, are
competent evidence when confined strictly to such complaints, expressions, and exclamations as furnish
evidence of a present, existing pain or malady, to prove his condition, ills, pains, and symptoms, whether arising
from sickness, or from an injury by accident or violence.
Mutual Life vs. Hillmon
FACTS: In an insurance claim by the heirs of Hillmon, the insurance company claimed that the dead body alleged
to be Hillmon was actually a different person, Walters. It presented letters from Walters showing his intention to
leave his home and go to the place where the body was found.
HELD: Admissible. (2nd part of res gestae) A man's state of mind or feeling can only be manifested to others by
countenance, attitude or gesture, or by sounds or words, spoken or written. The nature of the fact to be proved is
the same, and evidence of its proper tokens is equally competent to prove it, whether expressed by aspect or
conduct, by voice or pen. When the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying an act, its connection
with that act must be shown, in order to warrant the admission of declarations of the intention. But whenever
the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by
contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party.
The existence of a particular intention in a certain person at a certain time being a material fact to be proved,
evidence that he expressed that intention at that time is as direct evidence of the fact, as his own testimony that
he then had that intention would be.
Business entries
Rule 130, Section 43
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Requisites:
Entries
1. Made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer
2. Made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated
3. Made by such person in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the regular course of
business or duty
Palmer vs. Hoffman (1943)
FACTS: There was a train accident and Hoffman brought suit against Palmer et al., winning damages for himself
and on behalf of his wifes estate. Palmer et al. tried to introduce in evidence a statement made by the engineer
of the train but the District Court excluded it. The Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed this decision.
HELD: Inadmissible. Although there was a statute which expressly provided that records made in the regular

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course of business were an exception to the hearsay rule, the engineers statement was not made in the regular
course of business as contemplated by the law. What the law had in mind were records made for the systematic
conduct of the business as a business, e.g. payrolls, accounts receivable, bills of lading [since the business was a
railroad], etc. The engineers statement was made for use essentially in court, i.e. for litigation, not railroading.
Canque vs. CA (1999)
FACTS: Canque contracted RDC for the latter to supply her with asphalt. Part of the agreement was that payment
would only be made upon presentation of delivery receipts. Instead of presenting such receipts, Socor presented
entries in their books of account. Canque refused to pay, but the RTC and CA ordered her to.
HELD: Inadmissible. The entries are not admissible, because the one who prepared them had no personal
knowledge of their truth or falsity.
The entries constitute entries in the course of business, suffiecient to prove the deliveries if the ff requirements
are met:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legel,
contractual, moral, or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Here, the entries do not meet the first and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, testified on
RDCs account; obviously she was not unable to testify. The underlying reason for acceptance of entries as
evidence is necessity. Because the person who should have been called to court is dead, the necessity arises of
the entries admission without the one who made them being called to court and subjected to cross. This is
permissible to avoid a failure of justice.
Official records / Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
Rule 130, Section 44
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated.
Requisites:
Entries in official records
1. Made in the performance of his duty
2. Made by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law
Public officer had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information
Res ipsa loquitur requisites
o Thing which caused the injury complained of is under the management of the defendant or his stewards
o Accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control used proper care
o No contributory negligence on the part of the injured party
Res ipsa loquitur affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
Africa vs. Caltex (1966)
FACTS: Explosion at a gas station. The claimant spouses tried to introduce into evidence reports from the Police
and Fire Departments.
HELD: Inadmissible There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule on official records: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made
by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty

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specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information
The material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. To qualify their statements as "official
information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only
must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.
US vs. Que Ping (1919)
FACTS: Que Ping was convicted of homicide by the CFI. While his appeal was pending, he filed a bail bond for his
release from imprisonment. SC affirmed CFIs conviction. When he was called by the CFI for his sentence, he was
nowhere to be found. Thus the bail bonds were forfeited. The sureties appealed claiming that Que Ping had died.
They presented two pieces of evidence: Certificate by the Municipal Secretary of San Pablo and a copy of Que
Pings certificate of death, given by the president of the municipal board of health of San Pablo, Laguna. CFI still
forfeited the bonds because Que Pings death had not been sufficiently proved.
HELD: The two pieces of evidence are in the nature of entries in public records, made in the performance of their
duty by public officers, and are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, such documents are
not conclusive evidence. Their probative value may either be substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence. In this case, the public officers who issued the certificates never saw Que Pings corpse. Hence Que
Pings death had not been sufficiently proven.
Commercial lists
Rule 130, Section 45
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to
prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
Requisites:
o Statements of matters of interests contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation
o Statements made to persons engaged in an occupation
o Compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
them by refrain
PNOC Shipping vs. CA (1998)
FACTS: MEFC's vessel was hit by PNOC's. Lower court awarded actual damages to MEFC based on the
testimony of its general manager and price quotations presented as documentary evidence.
HELD: Damages cannot be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. The price quotations are hearsay
without the author of these letters presented to testify on the contents and cannot be considered
commercial lists as an exception because of ejusdem generis.
Under Sec. 45, a document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Exhibits (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (h) are not commercial lists for they do not belong to the category of other
published compilations under Sec. 45.
Rule 130, Section 46
Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness
expert in the subject testifies, that the writer if the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized

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in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.
Rule 130, Section 47
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable
to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Bartlett vs. Kansas City Public Service (1942)
FACTS: Bartlett and her husband were travelling on the bus lines vehicle. She claimed that the bus suddenly
started forward as she was exiting it, and that she sustained a knee injury as a consequence. Jury decided in
favour of the bus line.
Bartlett moved for a new trial and this was granted because the TC admitted transcripts of 2 witnesses
testimony from a separate action for the loss of consortium of Bartletts husband. SC reversed the TC
judgment and remanded the case.
HELD: Hearsay evidence is objectionable because the person who makes the statement offered is not under
oath and is not subject to cross-examination. Where the former proceeding is between the same parties
involved in the subsequent case and the same issues are litigated, this objection too is not tenable. For the
party opponent has had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine at the time the testimony was first given.
Thus it is generally, though conditionally, recognized that under such circumstances, if at the time of the
second trial the witness is unavailable, his testimony may be read in evidence. ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF
PARTIES IS NOT REQUIRED. It is said to be sufficient if the party-opponent in the subsequent case is in
privity with the party-opponent in the former case. No error in admitting the testimony of the 2 witnesses.
New trial should not have been granted.
Tan vs. CA (1967)
FACTS: Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan filed an action for support against Francisco Tan. In the first case, the
mother moved for dismissal of the case after presenting evidence, claiming that they reached an amicable
settlement and that Francisco was not the father of her children. 1 year and 8 months later, the children, now
through their grandfather, filed the same case against Francisco Tan. The case was dismissed and the
testimonies of the witnesses in the 1st case were deemed inadmissible.
HELD: Testimony at a former trial. The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable
to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence. The witnesses did not fall under
those considered unable to testify because they merely refused to appear in court. SC ruled also that there
was lack of evidence to prove that Francisco was the father.
Opinion Rule
Rule 130, Section 48
General rule. The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following sections.
Rule 130, Section 49
Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience
or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
Rule 130, Section 50
Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
evidence regarding
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
General Rule: The opinion of a witness is not admissible (R130, 48)

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Except:
1.
Expert witness: opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he shown to possess (R130, 49)
2.
Ordinary witness: The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding
(a)
The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b)
A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c)
The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
(d)
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person. (R130, 50)
There is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been acquired. Scientific study
and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. Knowledge acquired by doing is no
less valuable than that acquired by study. (Dilag Co. vs. Merced, 1949)
Polygraph test has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or
deception. (People vs. Adoviso, 1999)
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their
testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise
unreasonable.(Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 126669)
Testimony of handwriting expert not indispensable to COMELEC. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. It was ruled by the
Supreme Court that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself
being sufficient. (Punzalan v. Commission on Elections)
Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes (2010)
FACTS: This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray. -J. Nachura. Two
sweethears, got married. Had a fall-out. The wife obtained a decree of nullity from the TC which was reversed
by the CA holding that the expert testimonies failed to prove that the husband was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
HELD: Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court
may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are
inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
Galian vs. State Assurance (1915)
FACTS: Galians house was covered by a State Assurance fire insurance policy. It burned. He made a list of
stuff that was lost after the incident to help determine the value. State Assurance said he did not have the
expertise to be able to determine the value.
HELD: SC said he did. What was on the list were merely normal household effects, which every common
individual knows the value of. No need to be an expert to appraise them. While the knowledge of some
persons on the subject may be greater than that possessed by others, this is true of all other branches of
knowledge and equally as true of experts. For these reasons we cannot subscribe to the proposition that none
but experts can testify as to the values of ordinary household articles.
US vs. Ridling (1972)
FACTS: Ridling was charged with committing perjury before the Grand Jury. He indicated his desire to present
the testimony of polygraph experts. A pretrial evidentiary hearing was conducted to determine the
admissibility of the tests and polygraph opinions.

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HELD: The scientific psychological basis for the polygraph examination is well established. So much so that
experts assert that the record of one polygraph examination may be satisfactorily interpreted by another
expert so long as the technique used in questioning is known. The evidence in reality is opinion evidence, i.e.
a qualified person interprets the results and that interpretation is in the form of an opinion.
The testimony to be admitted is the opinion of the expert that the subject is or is not telling the truth. It has
nothing to do with hearsay. The expert opinion is based on his own perception and his knowledge of
psychological responses of the body.
Seen differently, the fact that the expert needs to report to the jury the statements made by the subject in
order to make his opinion relevant to the issue may seem hearsay. However, since the very purpose is to
determine truthfulness, the evidence should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule because of its
high degree of trustworthiness.
The evidence of polygraph experts and their opinions will be admitted subject to the following terms and
conditions:
1. Parties will meet and will recommend to the Court three competent polygraph experts other than those
offered by the defendant.
2. Court will appoint one or more of the experts to conduct a polygraph examination.
3. Defendant will submit himself for such examination at an appointed time.
4. Expert appointed by the Court will conduct the examination and report the results to the Court and to the
counsel for both the defendant and the government.
5. If the results show, in the opinion of the expert, either that the defendant was telling the truth or that he
was not telling the truth on the issues directly involved in this case, the testimony of the defendant's experts
and the Court's expert will be admitted.
6. If the tests indicate that the examiner cannot determine whether the defendant is or is not telling the truth,
none of the polygraph evidence will be admitted.
In the event the defendant declines to participate or cooperate in the test, none of the polygraph evidence will
be admitted.

RULE 131 - BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

Section 1.
Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a)
Burden of proof: onus probandi
Obligation imposed upon a party who alleges the existence of facts necessary for the prosecution of his action or
defense to establish the same by the requisite quantum of evidence.
Note that the provision uses the word party which means that the burden lies not only on the one
establishing a claim but also to one who is establishing a defense.
Quantum of evidence required:
Civil cases: preponderance of evidence
Criminal cases: evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Administrative cases: substantial evidence (only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion)
The party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus/duty to prove his assertion in order to obtain a
favorable judgment
Plaintiff: burden to prove its positive assertions never parts
Defendant: an affirmative defense is that which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff cause
of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense.

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Test for determining where the burden of proof lies: ask which party to an action will fail if he offers no evidence
competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. The burden of proof lies with the
party who wants to establish a legal right in his favor.
Burden of proof is fixed by the pleadings. For the plaintiff, the claim which he must prove is in the complaint. While for
the defendant, the defenses he must prove are found in his answer to the complaint.
Burden of Evidence
This is the duty of a party to go forward with the evidence to overthrow the prima facie evidence against him. This
shifts from one side to the other as the exigencies of the trial requires.
Burden of proof

Burden of evidence

Doesnt shift remains throughout the trial w/ the party

upon whom its imposed

Shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies

of the case in the course of the trial

Generally determined by pleadings filed by a party

Generally determined by developments at the trial, or by

the provisions of the substantive law or procedural rules
w/c may relieve the party from presenting evidence on
the fact alleged (i.e. presumptions, judicial notice &
admissions)

What need not be proved

1. Facts w/c are of judicial notice (R129)
2. Facts w/c are judicially admitted (R129)
3. Facts w/c are presumed (R131)
Equipoise rule
Refers to a situation where the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or theres doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates. In such case, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof.
In a criminal case, the equipoise rule provides that where the evidence is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
An accused should be deemed to have not committed the crime if there is failure to meet the test of moral
certainty.
The doctrine is not applicable where the evidence presented is not equally weighty, such as where prosecution
evidence is overwhelming
Presumptions
Presumption: an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the actions
It is not evidence. They merely affect the burden of offering evidence (burden of evidence).
Distinction between inference and presumptions
Inference
Presumption
Factual conclusion that
can rationally be drawn
from other facts. It is a
result of the reasoning
process and need not
have a legal effect
because it is not

This is mandated by law

and establishes a legal
relation between or
among the facts. This
means that there is a rule
which directs that a
conclusion shall be made

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mandated by law

from proof of certain

facts.

Kinds of Presumptions
Presumptions of fact: when the assumption is made from the facts without any direction or positive
requirement of a law. Reason itself allows a presumption from the facts. (in effect a mere inference)
Presumptions of law: an assumption which the law requires to be made from a set of facts.
o Conclusive/absolute presumptions
o Disputable/rebuttable presumptions
Effect of presumption: a party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue.
Section 2.

Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(a)
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another
to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b)
The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them. (3a)
A presumption is conclusive when the presumption becomes irrebutable upon the presentation of evidence and any
evidence tending to rebut the presumption is not admissible. This is a rule of substantive law.
Conclusive presumptions are based on the doctrine of estoppel. The person making the representation cannot claim
benefit from the wrong he himself committed.
Sec. 2(a) is often referred to as estoppel in pais or estoppel by conduct. The essential element is reliance on the
representations or conduct of the person sought to be estopped.
Sec 2(b) shields the lessor from being questioned by the lessee regarding its title or better right of possession as
lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the lessee is barred from assailing the
lessors title of better right of possession. The relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the formers title but on
the agreement between the parties.
Section 3.
Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (see codal)
A presumption is disputable or rebuttable if it may be contradicted or overcome by other evidence. When evidence
which rebuts the presumption is introduced the force of the presumption disappears
(e)
No constitutional objection to a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and declaring what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption. Legislature may provide for prima facie evidence of guilt provided there be a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed. (People v. Mingoa)
Requisites for application of presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
1. The evidence is material
2. The party had the opportunity to produce the same
3. Said evidence is available only to said party
When this presumption doesnt apply
Evidence in question is equally available to both parties

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Evidence is merely corroborative, cumulative, or unnecessary

Suppression is not willful
The suppression is an exercise of a privilege

(i)
CC 1176 also lays down presumption that interest has been paid if the principal is received by the creditor without
reservation
Facts needed proven before an inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen goods can be made
1. The crime was actually committed
2. It was committed recently
3. Stolen property found in the possession of the accused
4. Accused is unable to satisfactorily explain his possession thereof
Necessary to conclusively prove possession that:
1. Possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin
2. Possession is fairly recent
3. Possession is exclusive
Similar rationale to par (j): if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taken
advantage of it and profited thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification (People v.
Sendaydiego)
For presumption in par (v) to arise, it must be proved that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid
and that it was actually mailed (Nava v. CIR), and if said letter wasnt returned to the sender, its presumed that the
addressee received it (Sebastian v. WCC)
R13.10 states that service of pleadings by mail is complete upon the expiration of 10 days after mailing, unless the
court provides otherwise, while service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the office w/in 5 days
from date of first notice, the service is complete at the expiration of such time. However, there must be conclusive
proof that a first notice was sent to the addressee as the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed does not apply to this situation. (Barrameda v. Castillo) If, however, the
postmaster certifies that such notice was sent, such presumption arises and overrides the addressees contrary claim.
(Ferraren v. Santos)
(w)
Except for subpar 4, this paragraph is taken from CC 390 & 391. A view is held that WRT the ordinary but continued
absence of 7/10/5 years contemplated in the first 2 subparagraphs, the absentee is presumed to have died at the end
of said period, but that in the qualified absence where the absentee was in danger of death under the contemplated
circumstances therein, the absentee is presumed to have died at the time he was exposed to such danger or peril at
the start of the 4-year period stated therein. The distinction assumes significance in questions of successional rights to
the absentees estate arising from his presumptive death.
(dd)
Par (dd) was taken from CC 259, which provided for presumptions of paternity, except that the former now includes
termination of the prior marriage for causes other than the death of the husband, in line with FC 168.
(jj)
Requirements for presumption of survivorship in par (jj) to arise
1. The deaths occurred in a calamity
2. There are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred that one died ahead of the other.
Thus, regarding the third rule, if one is a one-day old child and the other is 61 years old, it cant be presumed that the
child survived, in view of the second requirement.
(kk)

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The presumption is the same as the rule in CC 43 except that it omits the last clause therein w/c states and there shall
be no transmission of rights from one to the other, since said clause is a rule of substantive law as to the effect on the
rights of the parties.
Par(kk)

Par (jj)

Not required that the parties perished in a calamity

Parties mustve perished in a calamity

Only applies in questions of successional rights

Applies only where the deaths occurred during a

calamity and applies to cases not involving
successional rights

Provides a presumption of simultaneity in the deaths

of the persons called to succeed each other

Provides for presumptions of survivorship

Presumptions of Death
Absence of 7 years

If it is unknown whether or not the absentee is still

alive, he is considered dead for all purposes except for
succession

Absence of 10 years

Absentee considered dead for the purpose of opening

his succession only after an absence of 10 yrs.

Absence of 5 years

(in relation to absence of 10 years) if the absentee

disappeared after the age of 75, his absence for 5
years is sufficient for the purpose of opening his
succession. 10 year wait not necessary.

Absence of 4 years

Absentee deemed dead for all purposes under certain

extraordinary circumstances
-person on board a vessel that was lost during a sea
voyage or an airfract which is missing and has not
been heard of. 4 years since the loss of the
vessel/aircraft
-person is a member of the armed forces who took
part in armed hostilities
-person is in danger of death under other
circumstances and whose existence has not been
known for 4 years
-person is married and has been absent for 4 years,
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if
he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death provided above, only 2
years is required.

Section 4.
No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child
born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever
alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)

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Johnson v. Johnson
This was a special proceeding for partition. Defendants denied co-tenancy and pleaded sole seizin [sole ownership].
Plaintiffs, in reply, attacked the deed that was the basis of the defendants claim by alleging that it was a forgery, and
had not been signed, sealed and delivered. The trial court judge ruled that it was the defendants who had to prove that
the deed had been in fact executed. The defendants won anyway.
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the trial court judge was incorrect. The test to determine on whom the
burden of proof rests is if the party will lose on that particular issue if no evidence to either disprove or prove the
claim is given on either side. Here, under the pleadings at bar, it had been the plaintiffs who raised the issue of the
alleged forgery of the deed. Thus, if no evidence had been given either way, they would have been defeated on that
issue. They also failed to overturn the rebuttable presumption that when there is probate and registration, the
instrument had been duly signed, sealed and delivered by the purported grantor. The defendants still won; no harm
no foul.
Odea v. Amodeo
FACTS: John ODea was injured when riding in a car that was in a collision with another car that was owned by Charles
Amodeo but being driven by his Joseph. John filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries in the Superior
Court in New Haven County. Charles and Joseph both testified at trial that Charles had not given Joseph permission to
use the car before the accident and was unaware that Joseph had taken the car until after the accident. Charles
testified that he did not maintain the car for the general use of his family. Johns only evidence on the subject was the
fact that the son had been driving when the collision occurred. The Superior Court set aside the verdict against
Charles, finding that he had rebutted the presumption in General Statutes 1152b that the car was a family car, and
that John had failed to show additional evidence on the issue of the maintenance of the car. John appealed to the
Supreme Court of Errors.
HELD: The trial court erred in setting aside the verdict as regards Charles. Under 1152b, the presumption that the
car was maintained for the general use of the family continued until the trier of fact found that it was proven
otherwise, leaving the burden then upon the passenger to establish that the car was being operated at the time as a
family car. The court held that the jury was not required to accept as true the testimony of Charles and Joseph. The
case was remanded with direction to enter judgment upon the verdict against Charles.
Sansdstrom v. Montana
Sandstrom was charged with deliberate homicide, he admitted to the slaying but alleged that he did not do so
purposely or knowingly. His jury was given the instruction that the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts. The issue in this case is whether such instruction is constitutional
Instruction unconstitutional. The Jury may have interpreted it as a conclusive presumption which in effect overrides
his right of presumption of innocence. The jury may also have interpreted it as a burden shifting presumption, which
would relieve the state of proving all the necessary elements of the crime and Sandstrom is given the burden of
proving that he did not do it purposely or knowingly.
Enrico Santos v. NSO
Santos filed an unlawful detained case against NSO, for failing to pay rents and failing to vacate the property. NSOs
defense was that China Bank had already bought the property in a foreclosure sale. Thus, Santos had no right to claim
rents from it or ask it vacate. The lower courts (MTC and RTC) ruled in favor of Santos, ruling that a tenant cannot, in
an action involving the possession of leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. The CA and RTC held that
this rule on estoppel against tenants does not apply if the landlords title has expired, or has been conveyed to
another, or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of the lessor-lessee relationship
Metrboank v. Tobias
SHORT VERSION: Antonino Tobias obtained a loan from Metrobank, secured by a real estate mortgage. He defaulted
and the mortgage was foreclosed. The property was sold to Metrobank. Metrobank found out that the TCT Tobias
submitted was fictitious. An information for estafa through falsification of public documents was filed against Tobias.
This was later withdrawn. Metrobank appealed to the CA, contending that the presumption that the possessor of a
spurious document is its forger should apply.

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The Court disagreed and said that the presumption of authorship is a disputable one. It applies only in the absence of
satisfactory explanation. In this case, Tobias was sufficiently able to explain how he obtained the TCT. Hence, there
was satisfactory explanation and the presumption was overturned.
China Banking Copr v. CA
Facts: Avelina realized that her properties were mortgaged to secure a loan obtained by Kipte from Chinabank. She
said that she was asked to sign a document but was not able to read it because she was already blind but signed it
anyway because her sons common-law wife assured her that she was merely signing as a witness. She wants to annul
the mortgage and the foreclosure. Citibank argues that since these are notarial documents, they are clothed with the
presumption of regularity and due execution.
Held: While it is true that both the mortgage and surety agreement are public documents, notarization per se is not a
guarantee of the validity of the contents of a document. Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. However,
such presumption is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the present
case, the SC was convinced that Avelina was already blind during the time she allegedly signed the documents and
that she did not intend to be bound by it other than as a witness.
Capili v. Cardana
Jasmin, the daughter of Sps. Cardana, was walking along the perimeter of the school when a branch of a tree fell on
her, causing her instantaneous death. Sps. Cardana filed a case for damages against Capili, the school principal,
alleging that her negligence, as shown by her failure to remove the dead tree, caused the death of their daughter. TC
dismissed the case. CA reversed the decision, ruling that Capili was negligent.
Court held that Capili was negligent and therefore liable for the death of Jasmin. Generally, in tort cases, all the
elements for negligence have to be proven, However, the circumstances of the present case call for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This warrants a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the
dead and rotting tree, which caused the death of Sps. Cardanas daughter was a result of Capilis negligence, being in
charge of the school. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence. Upon proof of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, the partys negligence is
presumed. Such presumption may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence, and under appropriate circumstances
a disputable presumption, such that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. In this case, Capilis
explanation cannot exculpate her from responsibility. In the absence of proof that she acted willfully in bad faith or
with ill motive, however, moral damages cannot be awarded because the law presumes good faith.

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RULE 132 PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1.
Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
Section 2.
Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or
witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of
recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified
as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2a)
The examination of a witness should be done in open court. Answers should be given orally unless witness is
incapacitated to speak or the question calls for a different mode. This is so the court is given the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness and also allows the adverse party to cross-examine the witness
Testimonies which need not be given in open court
(under the Rules of Summary Procedure, affidavits of the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the
witnesses who executed such affidavits)
Civil Cases: can submit affidavits of their witnesses and other pieces of evidence on the factual issues,
together with their position papers, setting forth the law and the facts relied upon. Depositions need not be
taken in open court, they may be taken before a notary public or before any person authorized to administer
oaths
Criminal Cases: either party may utilize the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of the country, or one
who is unable to testify despite the exercise of due diligence, even if the testimony was used in another case
or proceeding , provided the same proceeding involved the same parties and subject matter and adverse
party had the chance to cross-examine the witness.
Oath or Affirmation
Witness has the option to choose whether to take an oath or an affirmation
Oath: outward pledge made under an immediate sense of responsibility to God or a solemn appeal to the
Supreme Being in attestation of the truth of some statement
Affirmation: substitute for an oath and is a solemn and formal declaration that the witness will tell the truth.
If the witness refuses to take an oath or give an affirmation, the testimony may be barred.
The rule is satisfied if the court takes pains to impress on the witness the need to testify truthfully and the
witness said he would.
What should be recorded
Questions asked to a witness and his answers
Statements by the judge, any of the parties or any of the counsels
Basically, entire proceedings of the trial or hearing must be recorded. Can be done by shorthand, stenotype
or any means of recording found suitable by the court
The official stenographer shall make a transcript of the record of the proceedings and shall be certified as correct.
Transcript shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the proceeding.
RIGHTS OF A WITNESS
Section 3.
Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his answer may
tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1)
To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2)
Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3)
Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;

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(4)
Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by
law; or
(5)
Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a
fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final
conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a)
A witness has an obligation to answer questions even if the answers may tend to establish a claim against him.
When he may validly refuse to answer:
1. Under the right against self - incrimination, if his answer will tend to subject him to punishment for an
offense; or
2. Under the right against self - degradation, if his answer will have a direct tendency to degrade his character
UNLESS
a. such question is directed to the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact at issue would be
presumed, or
b. it refers to his previous final conviction for an offense
An accused in criminal cases may refuse to take the stand altogether a mere witness however cannot altogether refuse
to take the stand. Before he refuses to answer, he must wait for the incriminating question.
ORDER OF CROSS EXAMINATION
Section 4.
Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in which the individual witness
may be examined is as follows;
(a)
Direct examination by the proponent;
(b)
Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c)
Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d)
Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Section 5.
Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (5a)
It is a procedure for obtaining information from ones own witness in an orderly fashion. It is information which the
counsel wants the court to hear. The purpose is to elicit facts about the clients cause of action or defense.
Section 6.
Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Examination of the witness by the adverse party. The scope is not confined to the matters stated by the witness in the
direct examination. The rule allows questions designed to test the accuracy and truthfulness of the witness, his
freedom from interest and bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue
Exception:
when the witness is an unwilling or hostile witness as declared by the court, counsel may only cross examine
witness only as to the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
Cross-examination has 2 purposes
1. to bring out facts favorable to the counsels client not established by the direct testimony
2. to enable counsel to impeach or to impair credibility of witness
in case witness dies before his cross-examination is over, his testimony on direct may be stricken out only with
respect to testimony not covered by cross-examination.
Absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking out of his testimony for failure to appear for further cross
where the witness has been sufficiently cross-examined, and the matter on which the cross-examination is sought is
not in controversy

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if the witness was not cross-examined due to the fault of the cross examining party and when the witness had always
made himself available for cross, his direct testimony shall remain in record and cannot be ordered stricken off
because the cross examiner is deemed to have waived the right to cross-examine the witness.
Section 7.
Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-examination of the witness has
been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given during
the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination,
may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (12)
Party who called the witness on direct may re-examine the same witness to explain or supplement his answers given
during the cross-examination. Counsel may elicit testimony to correct or repel any wrong impression or inferences
that may have been created in cross. Also an opportunity to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been
damaged. Court may even allow questions not touched in cross-examination.
Section 8.
Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party may
re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other matters as may be
allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)
Section 9.
Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may require. (14)
Section 10.
Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the answer which
the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a)
On cross examination;
(b)
On preliminary matters;
(c)
When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child
of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d)
Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e)
Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which
he has previously stated. It is not allowed. (5a, 6a, and 8a)
Leading question: one which indicates to the witness the answer desired by the party asking the question.
Not appropriate in direct and re-direct examinations however they are allowed in cross and re-cross examinations.
Exception (cases wherein leading questions are allowed in direct)
preliminary matters
when the witness is ignorant or a child of tender years or is feeble-minded or a deaf-mute and there is
difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from such witness
hostile witness
Adverse party witness, or when the witness is an officer, director, managing agent of a corporation,
partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Under the Child Witness rule, court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child under the
condition that the same will further the interest of justice, which modified the rule under the ROC which only allows
leading questions when there is difficulty eliciting direct and intelligible answers from the child.
Misleading question: one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness or contrary to that which he
has previously stated. Not allowed in any type of examination.

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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
Section 11.
Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honestly, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present, testimony,
but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
Impeachment is a technique employed usually as a part of the cross-examination to discredit a witness by attacking
his credibility. Destroying credibility is vital since it is linked with a witness ability and willingness to tell the truth
Witness may be impeached through the ff modes:
By contradictory evidence
By evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty and integrity is bad
By evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony.
Witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts except evidence of his final conviction of an
offense as disclosed by his examination or by the record of the judgment. Witness cannot be impeached by
enumerating in court specific wrongful acts he had committed.
Prior conviction may be shown through:
By his examination (cross examining him)
By presenting the record of his prior conviction.
Impeachment by Contradictory Evidence
Fairness demands that the impeaching matter be raised in the cross-examination of the witness sought to be
impeached by allowing him to admit or deny a matter to be used as basis for impeachment by contradictory evidence.
The usual basis for this mode of impeachment is a declaration made by the witness in his direct testimony. The cross
examiner must show that there were allegations made by the witness that do not correspond to the real facts of the
case.
Can also be used to contradict conclusions made by expert witness during their testimony. After which, the adverse
party may also call another expert to testify to a contrary conclusion
Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statements (sec. 13)
Prior inconsistent statements are those made by the witness on an earlier occasion which contradict the statements
he makes during trial. These are admissible to impeach the credibility of the witness making them.
This is the most commonly used method because of its simplicity and impact it makes when properly used.
Impeachment by this mode requires laying the proper foundation. Laying the proper foundation or laying the
predicate is a preliminary requirement before the impeachment process prospers.
Elements:
Alleged statements must be related to the witness including the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present. If the statements are in writing they must be shown to him
He must be asked whether he made such statements and also to explain them if he admits making them.
The purpose of laying the predicate is to allow the witness to admit or deny the prior statement and afford him an
opportunity to explain the same. Non-compliance may be a ground for an objection based on improper
impeachment
Impeachment by showing bad reputation
One way to impair credibility is to show that the witness has a bad general reputation. Impeachment by this manner
should only refer to the following aspects (of the persons reputation):
For Truth
For honesty
For integrity

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It would be improper for a witness to be impeached because of his reputation for being troublesome or abrasive (not
among the 3 aspects of the witness reputation allowed by the method)
No impeachment by evidence of bad character but by bad reputation
Only impeachment by bad reputation is allowed and not by bad character.
Character: made up of the things an individual actually is and does
Reputation: what people think an individual is and what they say about him.
It is possible that the character of an individual is different from his reputation.
Section 12.
Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He
may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
A party cannot impeach his own witness except if the witness is
An unwilling or hostile witness
Adverse party witness or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Unwilling or hostile witness so declared by the court or the adverse party cannot be impeached by evidence of his bad
character.
A party can impeach his own witness only by:
1.
Evidence contradictory to his testimony
2.
Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
Section 13.
How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. (16)

Section 14.
Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)
The party calling a witness cannot initiate proof of his good character. It is presumed that the witness is truthful and
of good character. Only when the character has been attacked can he prove his being good. The witness must be
discredited first before his reputation or character can be bolstered. Any question by the party calling the witness
which tends to show good character can be validly objected to as improper character evidence
Applicable only to a mere witness. If the witness is the accused in a criminal case, the accused may prove his good
moral character relevant to the offense charged even before his character is attacked. The prosecution cannot initiate
proof of the bad character of the accused, they can only do so by way of rebuttal.
Section 15.
Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The
judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all
shall have been examined. (18)

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Only applies to witnesses and not to parties in a civil case and to the accused in a criminal case. A party to an action
has a right to be present in court while his case is being tried.
If the witness violates the order of exclusion, the court may bar him from testifying or give little weight to his
testimony, aside from his liability for contempt. Contrarily, it is within the power of the trial judge to refuse to order
the exclusion of the principal witness of the government during the hearing of a criminal case and it may not, on that
count alone, be considered as an abuse of his discretion.
REFERENCE TO WRITING
Section 16.
When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred,
or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and knew that the same was
correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the
adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a
witness may testify from such writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with
caution. (10a)
First sentence = revival of present memory. Applies if the witness remembers the facts regarding his entries and is
entitled to greater weight
Second sentence = revival of past recollection. Applies where the witness does not recall the facts involved, and is
entitled to lesser weight
This provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that there is a need to refresh the memory of the witness.
The memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted
as such, because the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory.
Section 17.
When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the
whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence. (11a)
Section 18.
Right to respect writing shown to witness. Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be
inspected by the adverse party. (9a)
People v. Estenzo
The CFI judge allowed the witnesses for the defense to submit only affidavits, subject to cross-examination. The Court
said that such cannot be allowed because requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at trial has
multifariouspurposes. The manner of presentation of evidence must be limited to what is allowed by the Rules of
Court.
George Straub v. Reading Co.
George Straub, an assistant timekeeper for the Reading Company, fell from a ladder while he was working at one of
the Companys terminals. He filed an action for damages against the company and the trial court ruled in his favor. The
Company elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that it had been deprived of a fair trial by reason of certain
deliberate conduct of the plaintiffs attorney throughout the trial. The conduct complained of consisted in hampering
the defense counsel when it was cross-examining witnesses. In addition, it was said that the proof of the plaintiffs
claim was put in, to a large extent, by leading questions.
The Court held that the conduct of the plaintiffs counsel was grossly improper. Where there has been calculated,
sustained, improper conduct procuring biased issues as they went to the jury, the Court said that it cannot decline to

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act. The entire pattern of the trial shows a conscious successful effort on the part of the plaintiffs attorney which
resulted in a confused distorted picture going to the jury to the grave prejudice of the defense. The Reading Company
therefore was deprived of its right to a fair trial.
People v. dela Cruz
Jonalyn, a mental retardate, filed a complaint against Bienvenido Dela Cruz for two counts of rape. She was found to
have the mental age of an 8 year old. During trial, she testified as a witness. TC found Bienvenido guilty in one count
of rape and acquitted him in the other. Bienvenido appealed, questioning the competency and capacity of Jonalyn as a
witness. He also questioned the allowance for the propounding of leading questions.
SC ruled that she was a competent witness. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.
Jonalyn, who may be considered a mental retardate but with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a
competent witness under Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the ROC. Her narration of the events also confirmed her credibility. As to
the propounding of leading questions, such merely conformed to Dr. Tuazons statement that she needed to be
continuously and repetitiously prompted. It is also allowed in cases where a witness is feeble-minded or of sluggish
mental equipment, among others.
State v. Elijah
Elijah was convicted of carnal knowledge. The prosecutrix claims that the act occurred on Mar. 15, but there were no
eyewitnesses. To bolster her accusation, she was permitted to show prior acts of intercourse between her and Elijah,
which was corroborated by Hauder. During trial, in the cross-examination of the defense on prosecution witness
Hauder, there were certain questions asked to the latter which were objected to by the State.
Court held that the evidence of prior acts of intercourse between the girl and Elijah was admissible Because it shows
an inclination of the parties to commit the act complained of. It also held that the trial court erred in not allowing the
defense to inquire on the matters it wanted to ask Hauder. The purpose of the defendants cross-examination of
Hauder was to show that he was more than just someone who was present at the time a prior act of intercourse
happened between Elijah and the prosecutrix. By asking Hauder about his relationship to the prosecutrix and allowing
him to answer such questions, he would have been cast in a different light and he would have been seen as a suitor of
the prosecutrix who was harboring resentment against Elijah.
The defendant had a right to exhibit to the jury not only what sort of person but also what sort of story they were
asked to believe. Cross examination is an agency for the development of truth in judicial inquiries. Its chief purpose is
to enable the trier of fact to determine what evidence is credible and what is not. For that purpose it is important to
show the relation of the witness to the cause and the parties, his bias or interest, or any other fact which may bear on
his truthfulness. Such bias, state of mind, and feelings of a witness upon whose testimony in part the issue is to be
determined is not a collateral or immaterial matter. If the court exercises discretion in disallowing such relevant
matters to be inquired upon, it is considered as error and may be considered a ground for a new trial.
Aluminum Industries v. Egan
Facts: During cross-examination, Egan refused to answer questions regarding his clients, saying that he is not allowed
to disclose their identity. As a result, his testimony during his direct examination regarding his earning capacity was
stricken from the record.
Held: When a witness has gone through direct examination, cross-examination by the adverse party is a matter of
right. For Egan's failure to answer the questions on cross-examination, and there being no privilege to justify his
refusal to answer, the trial court correctly struck out his testimony on direct examination.
Tolomeo v. Harmony Shortline
Facts: When a bus made a left turn, it collided with a car driven by Schack which then crashed into the car of Tolomeo.
The bus was owned by Harmony Co. but was leased to Edwards Co. Tolomeo filed a suit against Harmony and
Tolomeo. Harmony and Tolomeo both denied relationship with the bus driver. Tolomeo then called the driver but
confined his testimony strictly to the subject of his employment. During the cross-examination, counsel for Edwardss
Co. asked leading questions to the driver relating to the incident. Tolomeo objected since the drivers testimony
should be confined to the matters upon which he was examined in chief.
Held: Counsel for Edwards Co. should not have been permitted to ask questions during cross-examination on matters
other than which the driver was examined in chief. Tolomeo only called the driver, who was essentially a hostile
witness, only to question him as to his employment. If the defendant would ask questions on matters other than the

Page 85 of 115
drivers employment would violate the plaintiffs right of cross-examination. According to Wigmore, the right of
cross-examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.
Denver v. Lomovt
This was a case against Denver City Tramway over a child getting run over by one of their street cars. There were
conflicting testimonial evidence as to the negligence of the motorman. At trial, a defense witness, Murray, said during
direct that the car appeared to have slowed down when it was about to hit the child; however on cross, he was
confronted with a statement wherein he allegedly said that [swearword] the motorman ought to be lynched during
the time the incident took place. He denied saying this, although two rebuttal witnesses for the plaintiff were
presented who testified that he did in fact say those words. Counsel for the plaintiff said that the rebuttal testimonies
were to impeach Murrays credibility. The trial court judge overruled the objection, and admitted the rebuttal
testimonies. The admission of both the cross-examination of Murray and the rebuttal testimonies were questioned.
The Supreme Court sustained their admission, saying that (1) proper foundation for this evidence was laid at the time
Murray was on the stand, so he wasnt surprised or misled as to what he was being asked; and (2) the statement he
made was relevant to impeach his credibility because it contradicted the entire purpose of his testimony. He had
testified that he didnt observe any negligence on the part of the motorman during the time of the accident, and yet his
statement implied that he thought the motorman was negligent.
Crago v. State
FACTS: Charles Crago was charged with the statutory rape of Ida Leona Edwards, a minor. Carney, who was with
Charles and Leona on the day the crime allegedly took place, was a state witness. At trial, when asked by the state if he
recalled an admission made by Charles the morning after (telling Carney that he had sex with Leona), he said he didnt
remember. As a result, the state asked him twice if he had made 2 previous statements in writing: 1) that he had seen
Charles and Leona having sex, and 2) that Charles had told him he had sex with Leona. Carney answered that he didnt
remember making the 2 prior statements, and denied that they were true. Over objection by the defense, the 2 prior
statements were permitted to be introduced in evidence and read to the jury.
HELD: Carneys 2 previous statements should NOT have been admitted. It is a well-settled rule that it is error to
permit the state to impeach her own witness, where such witness simply fails to remember, or refuses to state facts,
or fails to make out the states case. A mere failure to make proof is no ground for impeaching a witness. Previous outof-court statements can ONLY be used to neutralize the effect of the evidence given by the witness on the witness
stand. Since its only function is to neutralize, there must be something to neutralize. The testimony to be neutralized
must be prejudicial and detrimental to the party. Otherwise, the previous statements would stand out to the jury, not
as offsetting some proof already given, but as substantive evidence of a fact, even though such statements are hearsay.
When Carney stated that he didnt remember if Charles had made an admission, he didnt state any fact prejudicial or
detrimental to the state. He simply failed to prove a fact which the state wanted to show. In short, there was NO
evidence to neutralize. When he denied having made a statement that he saw Charles and Leona having sex, its at
least be doubtful that his statement was more than a mere denial of the fact that he had seen what they were doing, a
fact not shown by other evidence and therefore not detrimental to the state. But since proof on this point might be
different in a new trial, the court didnt say anything more.
International Banking Corp v. George Yared
Facts: Yared was indebted to the bank. The bank filed a case against Yared. The bank called Yared as its witness.
Yared testified that the debt has been paid by means of a compromise. The trial court ruled against Yared. Yared
appealed and argued that his testimony should be conclusive as to the bank since he testified as the banks witness.
Held: Yareds testimony is not conclusive as to the bank. A litigant, who finds himself compelled to present an
adversary as his witness in a case, is not bound by the latter's testimony against him and may impugn the veracity
thereof by means of evidence to the contrary.
Orient Insurance v. Revilla
Part of a letter between an atty and the president of Teal was already accepted into the record. Defendants atty
wanted to examine the whole letter but Judge Revilla did not allow this. Plaintiff was arguing that the other parts of
the letter were covered by privileged communication since it dealt with contract for fees between teal and the
attorneys.

Page 86 of 115
SC: Contract for fees are not privileged. And even if it was, Teal waved such privilege when it produced part of the
letter. They cannot be allowed to use part of the letter for its complaint and withhold the other parts from the
defendant. He cannot waive the privilege partially. Such waiver includes privileged communication
People v. Odencio
SV: Florencio and Guiamelon were charged with double murder, of which the CFI found them guilty. In the trial,
Patrolman Sanada testified as to the declarations of one of the victims, Talib, while the latter lay dying in the hospital.
Sanada wrote down the declaration, but because of his critical condition, Talib was not able to sign it before he
expired.
The SC sustained the conviction of the accused, holding that there was sufficient evidence to find both accused guilty,
and that there was a conspiracy between them and that treachery attended the killing. The Court also held that oral
dying declarations were admissible, and the person who heard such may use an unsigned declaration as a
memorandum.
Borromeo v. CA
Heirs of the person who sold a parcel of land to the other party are now alleging that the sale was in fact an equitable
mortgage. Evidence presented to support this claim were the notes made by the daughter of the seller. The CA held
that the notes may be admitted as part of res gestae.
SC held that the notes cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae because the daughter was not a party to the
transaction and her act of taking down notes was not demonstrated to have been part of the transaction. The notes
constitute memoranda within the contemplation of Sec. 10 of Rule 132 to which a witness may refer to refresh his or
her memory. Even assuming that the requisites for the application of Sec. 10, Rule 132 are present, the notes
themselves cannot be admitted as evidence. A witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared
wholly by him. As for the other pieces of evidence, the Court held that the CA failed to explain how the documents
were suddenly accorded competence. Therefore, the original CA decision was reinstated and affirmed.
People v. Santos
Rene Santos was charged with the rape of 5-year old AAA. TC found him guilty and meted out the death penalty. There
was automatic review to the SC, case was referred to the CA which also found him guilty. Appellant appealed to the SC.
He alleged that the judge acted like a prosecutor as well, initiating and propounding questions which were short of
supplying the desired answers to the child witness.
SC held that Santos was guilty. Judges are given wide discretion to ask clarificatory questions intended to elicit the
truth all for the interest of justice. They should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask the
question that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, and clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses

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CHILD WITNESS RULE

Sec. 8
The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in open court. Answers
shall be given orally unless the witness is incapacitated to speak or the question calls for a different mode of answer.
The examination in this rule does not refer to the competency examination of the child pursuant to Section 6.
Under Sec. 23, the court may exclude the public and persons who do not have a direct interest in the case, including
the press. The order shall be made if the court determines that to testify in open court would cause psychological
harm to the child, hinder the ascertainment of truth or result in the childs inability to effectively communicate due to
embarrassment, fear or timidity. This can also be done motu proprio if the evidence to be produced during trial is of
such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals.
Court may appoint interpreter to interpret for the child. Interpreter can be another witness in the same case or a
member of the family of the child, they are not disqualified. They can be interpreters if they are the only ones who can
serve as interpreter to the child. As for an interpreter who is also a witness, whe shall testify ahead of the child.
A facilitator may also be appointed if the child is unable to understand or respond to the questions asked. (sec. 10)
Child may be accompanied by 2 or more persons to serve as support persons. These support persons may even
accompany the child to the witness stands to give emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings, but
such person/s shall be instructed not to prompt, sway or influence the child during his testimony. Support person
who is also a witness to the case may be disqualified by the court if it is shown that the attendance of the person
would pose a substantial risk of influencing the testimony of the child. (sec. 11)
An application may be made so that the child is taken to a room outside the courtroom to testify and to be televised to
the courtroom by live-link television. Application may be made by prosecutor, counsel or guardian ad litem at least 5
days before the trial date.
Court may order such procedure if there is a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying
in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor of the case. The trauma should be of such kind that would
impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony.
The court may allow the child to enter the courtroom for limited purpose of identifying the accused. (Sec. 25)
The child may also be allowed to testify in such a manner that the child cannot see the accused by testifying through a
one-way mirror and other devices (sec. 26)
Reports regarding a child shall be confidential and one who violates this shall be liable to the contempt power of the
court (sec. 31)
On Hearsay: a statement made by a child , in child abuse cases, describing any act or attempted act of child abuse, not
otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, although before such hearsay statement may be admitted the following requisites must concur:
The proponent shall make known to the adverse party the intention to offer such statement and its
particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object
If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be present at the
presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party
When the child is unavailable(death, physical infirmity, mental illness, loss of memory or because the child
will be exposed to severe psychological injury), the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the
proponent and the hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if corroborated by other admissible evidence
(sec. 28)
The court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth or disclosure interviews as evidence provided the child is
unable to testify (deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be exposed to
severe psychological injury; or is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means) and the interview was conducted by duly trained

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members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services, in situations
where child abuse is suspected, so as to whether child abuse occurred.
Shield rule is also applicable under this rule.
The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
1. Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
2. Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
Except: Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible.
Party who intends to offer such evidence must file a written motion at least 15 days before trial describing
the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a
different time for filing or permits filing during trial and Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad
litem at least 3 days before the hearing of the motion.

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A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge volume of cases filed each year and
the slow and cumbersome adversarial syste1n that the judiciary has in place;
Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that complainants simply give up
con1ing to court after repeated postponements;
Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines because its courts are unable to
provide ample and speedy protection to their investments, keeping its people poor;
Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases under litigation, on
February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of
judicial affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;
Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about two-thirds the time used for
presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding up the hearing and adjudication of cases;
Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, headed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules on Civil Procedure, headed by Associate Justice
Roberto A. Abad, have recommended for adoption a Judicial Affidavit Rule that will replicate nationwide the success of
the Quezon City experience in the use of judicial affidavits; and
Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the following:
Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the reception of
evidence before:
(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not apply to small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the Shari'a Appellate Courts;
(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence, including the
Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and
(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are subject to disapproval of the Supreme
Court, insofar as their existing rules of procedure contravene the provisions of this Rule.1
(b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or investigating officers shall be uniformly
referred to here as the "court."
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the
court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial
or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked
as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case
of the respondent or the defendant.

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(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his possession, he may, after
the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or
reproduction attached to such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or
witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with
the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed by existing
rules.
Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to the witness
and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the witness and the place
where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does so under oath,
and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents; and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their authenticity in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is authorized by law to
administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn attestation at the end,
executed by the lawyer who conducted or supervised the examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the corresponding answers that the
witness gave; and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness regarding the latter's answers.
(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of
the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just
cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his control available for copying, authentication,
and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to
the witness in this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit
shal1 be understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party presenting the judicial affidavit of his
witness in place of direct testimony shall state the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the
witness. The adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers
found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly rule on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the
marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets under the initials of an authorized court personnel, without
prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

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Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. - The adverse party shall have the right to cross-examine
the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the witness may
also examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court shall take active part in examining the witness to determine
his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his last witness, a
party shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence of his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their
chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers the particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for his objection, if any, to its
admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that describe and authenticate them, it
is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their markings during the offers, the objections, and the rulings,
dispensing with the description of each exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:
(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;
(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days before the pre-trial,
serving copies if the same upon the accused. The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such
documentary or object evidence as he may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial
affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the prosecution, he shall
have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to the court within ten days from
receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary
and object evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies
of the accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit the required
judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission. The court may, however,
allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice
the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the
discretion of the court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the scheduled hearing of the case as
required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's
right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content requirements of Section
3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court may, however, allow only once the subsequent
submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason
and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and provided further, that public or private counsel responsible
for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the
discretion of the court.
Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of Court and the rules of
procedure governing investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence are
repealed or modified insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.1wphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby disapproved.

Page 92 of 115
Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its publication in two newspapers of
general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It shall also apply to existing cases.

Page 93 of 115
AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Authentication is a preliminary step in showing the admissibility of evidence
Litigation always involves the authentication of either object or documentary evidence. A document, unless selfauthenticating, will not be admitted in evidence without a prior authentication.
Authentication under the Rules on Electronic Evidence
Person introducing the electronic evidence has the burden of proving its authenticity
Authentication of an electronic document requires any of the following means
o by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
o by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or
o by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
For documents to be considered as a documentary evidence, it must be offered as proof of its contents, otherwise it is
an object evidence.
Section 19.
Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)
The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)

Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c)

Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein.

All other writings are private. (20a)

Documents may be public or private. Sec. 19 enumerates which documents are public
Sec. 19 (a) also refers to those written official acts and records of a foreign country
Notarized documents are public except for last wills and testaments which are considered private.
Public records of private documents do not refer to the private document itself but the public record of said private
document.
Everything else are private documents.
Church registries are not considered public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are
private writings and their authenticity must be proved.
The reason behind distinguishing private and public documents is for us to be able to determine how a document can
be admitted as evidence
private documents: due execution must be proved
public documents: do not require authentication; they enjoy the prima facie presumption of authenticity and
due execution
Section 20.
Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a)

By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

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(b)

By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21a)
When a private document is offered in evidence as authentic, there is a need to prove its due execution and
authenticity. Can be done in 2 ways:
By anyone who saw the document executed or written
o Relies on personal knowledge of a witness; witness attests to the genuineness because the document
was executed or signed in his presence
By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker
o Here, the document need not be executed in his presence. The witness testifies or shows evidence
that the signature or handwriting of the maker is genuine.
This provision applies only when the document is offered in evidence as authentic (as documentary evidence), if the
evidence is merely offered to prove its existence then it only needs to be identified (like an object evidence)
Section 21.
When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. Where a private document
is more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.
(22a)
An exception to the rule requiring proof of the genuineness and due execution of a private document.
Elements:
private document is more than thirty years old
produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
if the requirements are satisfied then no evidence is needed to be given to prove its authenticity.
Also if both parties admit to the authenticity of the private document, no need for further authentication.
Section 22.
How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
Sec. 22 does not require expert testimony to prove the handwriting of the person
May be proved in 3 ways
he has seen the person write
he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge
Section 23.
Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter. (24a)
Section 24.
Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or

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consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
While generally, public documents need not be authenticated, there is a necessity for showing to the court that indeed
a record of the official acts of official bodies, tribunals or of public officers exists. This may be evidenced by:
official publication thereof
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Where the SPA is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other competent officer in a foreign country, it
cant be admitted in evidence in Philippine courts UNLESS its certified as such in accordance with this provision, by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general/consul/vice-consul/consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public document
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 25.
What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
The certificate(sec. 24) and attestation (sec. 25) are required because of the general rule on the irremovability of
public records provided for in Sec. 26:
Section 26.
Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of
the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27a)
Section 27.
Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
It can be proved by:
the original record
copy of it, attested by the legal custodian of the record (not the private document itself) with a certificate
that such officer has the custody
Section 28.
Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry. (29)
The written statement must contain:
there has been a diligent search of the record
that despite the diligent search, no record of entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office.
Written statement must also be accompanied by a certificate stating that such officer has the custody of official
records (not necessarily the record itself, (LACKING!) but such records like the one being searched)
Section 29.
How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want
of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the
record, in respect to the proceedings. (30a)

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Judicial record: record of judicial proceedings. It does not only include official entries or files or the official acts of a
judicial officer but also the judgment of the court
Section 30.
Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a)
Section 31.
Alteration in document, how to explain. The party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must
account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was
made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration
did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible
in evidence. (32a)
Party producing the document has the duty to account for any alteration found in a document purported to eb
genuine. He may show that:
the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence
the alteration was made with the consent of the parties affected by it
the alteration was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or
language of the instrument
Section 32.
Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as their
admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)
Section 33.
Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid
interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.
(34a)

Heirs of Lacsa v. CA
Petitioners filed 2 cases (recovery of possession and cancellation of title) against respondents. The lower courts ruled
in favor of respondents, holding that they had proper title based on a Settlement of Partition and Deed of Sale. The
petitioners contend that the courts erred in their application of the Ancient Document rule.
The SC held that the application was proper. The documents were both more than 30 years old, were found in the
proper custody, and were unblemished by alteration. There was no evidence of the alleged falsification.
Lopez v. CA
Jesus Martin sought to recover a parcel of land from Pastor Lopez. Lopez claimed that he bought the land from
Gervacio Resoso, Martins grandfather. He offered a deed of absolute sale in evidence to prove this. Martin offered the
testimony of an NBI expert who said that the signature of Resoso in the deed of sale did not appear to be genuine.
Lopez assails this finding.
The SC held that this was correct. Rule 132 Sec. 22 enumerates three means by which a handwriting can be proven in
court. The law provides for no hierarchy among these means. Lopezs assertion that the testimony of the witnesses to
the notarization of the deed of sale should be given priority, therefore, has no basis.
Antillon v. Barcelon
An action for possession and ownership of land was filed by Antillon against Barcelon. Documents were produced to
support Antillons claim over the land. Barcelon opposed this arguing that they should not have been admitted
because they were not properly identified and their due execution and delivery have not been proven

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Court decided in favor of Antillon, and said that Exhibits E and F are acknowledged before the notary public therefore
they are admissible even without proof of their due execution and delivery. Although the general rule is that due
execution and delivery must first be proven in order for private writings to be admitted, this rule does not apply to
documents executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials. A notary public is one
such official, and the authority of the notary public is widely recognized not only under our jurisdiction but in the law
of nations as well. A document duly acknowledged before a notary public under his hand and seal, with his certificate
thereto attached, is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and delivery, unless and until
some question raised as to the verity of said acknowledgment and certificate.
Lazaro v. Agustin
Lazaro et al filed a complaint for partition against Agustin et al, alleging that they are co-owners of a parcel of land.
Basilisa, the predecessor-in-interest of Agustin et al, allegedly executed a statement which was notarized, wherein she
acknowledged her co-ownership with Lazaro et al. The trial court did not admit the sworn statement because Basilisa
was not presented on the witness stand.
Held: The sworn statement should not be admitted. Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. While a notarized document is presumed to have been regularly executed, the presumption can be
rebutted. In this case, the irregularity in the notarization was shown by evidence. Basilisa was already bedridden at
the time the document was notarized. The notary public himself admitted that he notarized the document after
receiving it from a person claiming to be Basilisa whom he did not know.
Abadiano v. Martir
A case over a parcel of land where one party alleges that the lot was sold to them and this was evidenced by a
document of sale (compra y venta)
The trial court did not pass on the issue of the authenticity and due execution of the Compra Y Venta and immediately
ruled on the validity of the sale as evidenced by it.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court should have first ruled on the said issue. Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself. The spouses Martir failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the
document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed.

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A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC
July 17, 2001
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Acting on the Memorandum dated 18 June 2001 of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court to Draft the
Rules on E-Commerce Law [R.A. No. 8792] submitting the Rules on Electronic Evidence for this Court's consideration
and approval, the Court Resolved to APPROVED the same.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on
the first day of August 2001 following thier publication before the 20th of July in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines
17th July 2001.
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Rule 1
COVERAGE
Section 1. Scope. Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply whenever an electronic document or
electronic data message, as defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.
Section 2. Cases covered. These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and
administrative cases.
Section 3. Application of other rules on evidence. In all matters not specifically covered by these Rules, the Rules of
Court and pertinent provisions of statutes containing rules on evidence shall apply.
Rule 2
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION
Section 1. Definition of terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
(a) "Asymmetric or public cryptosystem" means a system capable of generating a secure key pair, consisting of a
private key for creating a digital signature, and a public key for verifying the digital signature.
(b) "Business records" include records of any business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.
(c) "Certificate" means an electronic document issued to support a digital signature which purports to confirm the
identity or other significant characteristics of the person who holds a particular key pair.
(d) "Computer" refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus, which, by electronic, electro-mechanical or
magnetic impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive, record, transmit, store, process, correlate,
analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information, data, text, graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other
modes of expression or perform any one or more of these functions.
(e) "Digital signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an
electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial
untransformed electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine:
i. whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and
ii. whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.
(f) "Digitally signed" refers to an electronic document or electronic data message bearing a digital signature verified
by the public key listed in a certificate.

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(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
(i) "Electronic key" refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that crosses over public
channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.
(j) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing
the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic
document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such
person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document.
For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.
(k) "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions,
streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded
or retained.
(l) "Information and communication system" refers to a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or
otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the computer system or other
similar devices by or in which data are recorded or stored and any procedure related to the recording or storage of
electronic data messages or electronic documents.
(m) "Key pair" in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its mathematically related public key such
that the latter can verify the digital signature that the former creates.
(n) "Private key" refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature.
(o) "Public key" refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature.
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious,
and inexpensive determination of cases.
The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of Republic Act No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act.
Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents. Whenever a rule of evidence
refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall
be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.
Section 2. Admissibility. An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by
these Rules.
Section 3. Privileged communication. The confidential character of a privileged communication is not lost solely on
the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.
Rule 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

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Section 1. Original of an electronic document. An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately.
Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent
techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of
the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original.
Rule 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or
by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. A document electronically notarized in accordance with the
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document
under the Rules of Court.
Rule 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Section 1. Electronic signature. An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticated in the manner prescribed
hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document.
Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. An electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the
following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verify the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.
Section 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signatures. Upon the authentication of an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the
electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein;
and

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(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault.
Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it
shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and,
(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.
Rule 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document,
the following factors may be considered:
(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated, including but not
limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data
message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;
(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including but not
limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors;
(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information system;
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system upon which
the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or
electronic data message.
Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. In any dispute involving the integrity of the
information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or
stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:
(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner that did
not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of
the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest adverse to
that of the party using it; or
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person
who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it.
Rule 8
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct

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of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation
by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this Rule may be overcome by
evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation,
transmission or storage thereof.
Rule 9
METHOD OF PROOF
Section 1. Affidavit evidence. All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic
document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on
authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters
contained therein.
Section 2. Cross-examination of deponent. The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open
court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party.
Rule 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1. Electronic testimony. After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may
authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court shall
determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary under the
circumstances, including the protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
Section 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. When examination of a witness is done electronically, the entire
proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypist or other
recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done by him. The transcript should
reflect the fact that the proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded.
Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. The electronic evidence and recording thereof as well as the stenographic
notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima facie evidence of
such proceedings.
Rule 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions
shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained
or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy
thereof.
Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or
unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the
immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5
shall apply.
Rule 12
EFFECTIVITY
Section 1. Applicability to pending cases. These Rules shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity.

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Section 2. Effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on the first day of August 2001 following their publication before
the 20th of July 2001 in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

While evidence under the ROC makes reference only to judicial proceedings, rules on Electronic Evidence apply to all
civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases
COMPETENCE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Electronic evidence is competent and admissible if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the ROC
and is authenticated in the manner prescribed (Rule 3, sec. 2)
DOCUMENTS UNDER THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
An electronic document is defined under Sec 1 (h) of the rule. Based on this definition, electronic document does not
only refer to the information itself but also to the representation of that information (such as printouts). The test is if
it was received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
An electronic document may be used for the following purposes: (Sec 1(h))
to establish a right
to extinguish an obligation
to prove or affirm a fact.
Electronic documents are the functional equivalents of paper-based documents. Whenever a rule of evidence makes
reference to the terms of a writing, a document, a record, an instrument, a memorandum or any other form of writing,
such terms are deemed to include electronic evidence.
The person offering the electronic document has the burden to prove its authenticity (Rule 5 Sec. 1). The manner of
authentication of an electronic document is outlined in Rule 5 sec. 2 and can be done through the following means
by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme
Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Sec. 2 would only apply if it is a private electronic document and when offered as authentic (as documentary
evidence). Otherwise, Sec. 20 of Rule 132 would be applied and the electronic document only needs to be identified.
Will also not apply if electronic document is electronically notarized (Rule 5 Sec 3) Sec. 30 of Rule 132 will apply.
The original of the document under Rule 4, sec. 1 is its printout or output readable by sight or other means provided it
reflects the data accurately. Copies may also be deemed originals if executed at or about the same time with identical
contents or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original or from the same matrix, or by other
means and which accurately reproduces the original.
Such copies will not be considered originals if a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original is raised or if
the circumstances make it unjust or inequitable to admit a copy in lieu of the original
Electronic document as defined in this rule do not include Facsimile transmission.

EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION

These refer to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, and other forms of
electronic communication, the evidence of which is not recorded or retained (Sec 1(k))

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EEC shall be proven by the testimony of:
a person who was a party to the same
or by one who has personal knowledge of it
in the absence of the first 2, other competent evidence may be admitted (sec. 2 Rule 11)
if the EEC is recorded, it is now no longer ephemeral, and will be proven following the procedure under Sec. 1 of Rule
11 Rule on Electronic Evidence.
The recording
shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court
shall be identified, explained or authenticated by either
o the person who made the recording
o by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy of it
the identification and authentication need not be made by the recorder himself but by some other person who can
testify as to the accuracy of the recording.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Privileged communications apply even to electronic evidence. The confidential character of a privileged
communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.
MCC Industrial Sales corp v. Ssangyong Corp
This is a case where 2 parties allegedly entered into a contract of sale for the purchase of steel. However one party
wasnt able to comply with the conditions for the payment of the steel. Photocopies of facsimile were presented to
prove the existence of the contract.
HELD: The terms electronic data message and electronic document, as defined under R.A. No. 8792, its IRR, and
the Rules on Electronic Evidence do NOT include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
CANNOT be considered electronic evidence. It is NOT the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule, and is NOT admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile transmission isnt an electronic data message or
electronic document, and cant be considered as electronic evidence, then a photocopy of such facsimile
transmission is obviously NOT electronic evidence either.
Nuez v. Cruz-Apao
This is an administrative case where a court employee is being accused of selling CA decisions for a price. Text
messages between the court employee and the person who needed a favorable decision before the CA were offered as
evidence
Held: such text messages are admissible as Ephemeral Electronic Communications. Such communications shall be
proven by a party to the conversation or a person who has personal knowledge of the messages.
NPC v. Cordilla
Napocor offered as evidence photocopies of several documents. Napocor contended that they are admissible because
they are equivalent to their original based on the rules on electronic evidence. It argued that the photocopies are
included in the Rule's catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means"
Held: It is not admissible. An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. The photocopies do not constitute electronic
evidence. A perusal of the contents of the photocopies would reveal that some of its contents, such as the signatures,
may not be recorded or produced electronically.

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OFFER AND OBJECTION
Section 34.
Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)
Without the offer, the court cannot determine whether the evidence is admissible or not and this might prejudice the
opposing party who may object to the admissibility of the evidence after it is offered.
If the testimonial evidence was not formally offered, and yet the adverse party did not object to the absence of offer
and even cross-examined the witness, the court will consider the testimony.
When formal offer of evidence is not required
In a summary proceeding, as its a proceeding where theres no full-blown trial
Documents judicially admitted or taken judicial notice of
Documents, affidavits, and depositions used in rendering a summary judgment
Documents or affidavits used in deciding quasi-judicial or administrative cases
Lost objects previously marked, identified, described in the record, and testified to by witnesses who had
been subjects of cross-examination in respect to said objects
Court has also admitted evidence not formally offered. This was allowed provided the following requirements are
present:
The evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
The same must have been incorporated in the records of the case
Section 35.
When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time
the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer
shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing. (n)
Testimonial evidence: offer is made at the time the witness is called to testify
Documentary and object evidence: offered after the presentation of partys testimonial evidence.
Offer is orally made unless allowed by the court to be in writing.
Identification of a
documentary evidence

Formal offer as an exhibit

Done in the course of trial

and is accompanied by
the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit

Done only when the party

rests its case

How an offer of evidence is made

State the nature or substance of the evidence and the specific purpose for which the evidence is offered
Court will consider the evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered.
Section 36.

Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a different period is
allowed by the court.

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In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)
Purposes:
To keep out inadmissible evidence that would cause harm to a clients cause
To protect the record (tender of excluded evidence)
To protect a witness from being embarrassed on the stand or from being harassed by the adverse counsel
To expose the adversarys unfair tactics like his consistently asking obviously leading questions
To give the trial court an opportunity to correct its own errors and at the same time warn the court that a
ruling adverse to the objector may supply a reason to invoke a higher courts appellate jurisdiction
To avoid a waiver of the inadmissibility of an otherwise inadmissible evidence
An objection must point out the specific ground of the objection, and if it does not do so, no error is committed in
overruling it. No strict rule on how specific as long as it is specific enough for anyone to know the basis of the
objection.
However a general objection is not always not allowed, in cases where the incompetency of the evidence is so
palpable that a mere general objection is deemed sufficient and where the portion of the evidence objected to is
clearly pointed out, and its illegality is apparent on its face, then the objection must be allowed
Objections may be formal or substantive
Formal: directed against the alleged defect in the formulation of the question
o Ambiguous; leading and misleading; repetitious questions; multiple questions; argumentative
questions
Substantive: those objections made against the very nature of the evidence. Either irrelevant or incompetent
evidence.
o Parol; not the best evidence; hearsay privileged communication not authenticated; opinion; res inter
alios acta.
Objection must be timely. The objection must be made at the earliest opportunity which depends upon the manner
the evidence is offered
If offered orally, object immediately after the offer is made
Objection to a question shall be made as soon as the grounds for it shall become reasonably apparent
Offer of evidence in writing: within 3 days after notice of offer unless a different period is allowed by the
court.
Failure to object to the admissibility of documents at the time they were marked, identified and introduced in trial is
not a waiver of objection. An objection before it is offered is premature and no adverse inference may be had against a
party who does not object to the evidence before it is offered.
If objecting to a question, object as soon as the question is completed to prevent the witness from answering and
introducing an inadmissible answer, for example hearsay, to the records of the case. But there are cases where
witnesses are quick to answer, the counsel then may still object, state his reasons and move to strike out the answer
(Sec. 39)
Waiver of objection
There is a waiver when there is failure to point out some defect, irregularity or wrong in the admission or exclusion of
evidence. It may be express or implied.
Although an otherwise inadmissible evidence is admitted, it does not necessarily follow that the same should be given
weight. Admissibility is different from weight of evidence.
Only objection to the admissibility of the evidence is waived. Waiver cannot be construed as an admission that the
evidence is credible. It also does not mean that the non-objecting party waives his right to present controverting
evidence.
Section 37.
When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course
of the examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection

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has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it
being sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)
The objection is deemed waived where the objecting counsel cross-examined the witness on the very matters subject
to the prohibition
Section 38.
Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made, unless the
court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made
during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or
more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied
upon. (38a)
Ruling must be given immediately after the objection is made except when the court desires to take a reasonable time
to inform itself on the question presented. But this ruling must be given during the trial and at such time that would
give a party an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
A statement that the objection will be taken into consideration is not a ruling. The objection must either be sustained
or overruled. The ruling of the court sustaining or overruling the objection need not be stated except if the objection is
based on 2 or more grounds. In such a case court must state the ground relied upon.
Section 39.
Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the
opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall
sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or
otherwise improper. (n)
Motion to strike may be availed of in the following instances
When the answer is premature
When the answer of the witness is irrelevant, incompetent or otherwise improper
When the answer is unresponsive
When the witness becomes unavailable for cross examination through no fault of the cross-examining party
(direct testimony stricken out)
When the testimony was allowed conditionally and the condition for its admissibility was not fulfilled.
Section 40.
Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony. (n)
Also called offer of proof.
Done for 2 reasons
To allow the court to know the nature of the testimony or the documentary evidence and convince the trial
judge to permit the evidence or testimony
Even if he is not convinced to reverse his earlier ruling, the tender is made to create and preserve a record for
appeal
How?

Documentary or object: tender is made by having the document or object attached to or made part of the
record
o State the contents of the document if it is not apparent on its face
o State the purpose for which the object or document is sought to be attached is offered and to ask that
it be marked for identification and have it attached to the record.

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Testimonial: offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. 2 alternative ways
o Counsel tells the court what the proposed testimony will be (prescribed by the rules)
o Question and answer form: this is not prohibited since the use of the first one is not mandatory. Done
by telling the court what would have been the answers to the question objected to (as in he will
enact the scenario if the question was admitted)

Erroneous way of making an offer of excluded testimony is to make a mere general offer of proof (without producing
the witness or stating the evidence where by the fact in issue is to be proved). An objection may be made and allowed
by the court based on this ground.
Abrenica v. Gonda
Abrenica filed an action to compel Gonda to return to him two parcels of land whichAbrenica allegedly sold to him
with a right to repurchase. During trial, defendants counsel did not immediately object to certain questions which
were used to prove the verbal contract. The trial court ruled in favor of Abrenica. Defendants appeal to the SC, alleging
that the evidence was inadmissible.
The SC held that they were admissible. A protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at
the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived. The proper time to make a protest
or objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissiblity of the evidence is, or may be, inferred.
Vda de Onate v. CA
This case was brought by the administratrix of the estate of Leonor Taguba against Elvira MatoVda. De Onate to
compel the latter to execute a public document for the sale of a piece of land (by Elvira to Leonor). CFI ruled in favor of
Taguba. Elvira appealed to the CA arguing that the CFI erred in considering evidence which had been marked but
never formally offered in evidence. CA affirmed the CFI.
SC ruled that evidence marked but never formally offered may be considered by the judge provided that: 1) the same
had been duly identified by testimony duly recorded, and 2) had been incorporated in the records of the case.
Dycoco v. Orina
According to Adelaida, Dycoco was indebted to her in the amount of P250,000, to secure which Dycoco allegedly
executed an REM. For alleged failue to pay his obligation, Adelaida extrajudicially foreclosed the REM and as no
redemption was made, Dycocos TCT was cancelled and another issued in her claim. The caretakers/tenants on the
property didnt want to turn over possession to Adelaida so she filed a complaint for ejectment against them in the
MeTC. Dycoco, on his part, filed a complaint for annulment of the REM and the TCT with the RTC. RTC dismissed
Dycocos complaint. CA affirmed.
SC ruled in favor of Dycoco. One of the evidence presented by him was his US passport with entries indicating that he
was in the USA when the REM was allegedly signed. Contrary to Adelaida and the CAs stance, there was no need to
present Dycoco or the person who made such entries to verify and authenticate the entries. In respondents
Comment/Opposition to Dycocos formal offer of evidence, the passport was objected to as being immaterial,
irrelevant and impertinent. Such comment is a virtual admission of the authenticity of the entries in the passport.
Heirs of Romana saves v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves
This is case where the heirs are questioning how the opposing party was able to obtain the property which they
allege they have a right to. Certain evidence was considered by the court of appeals on appeal which were not formally
offered at the RTC.
Court said that the general rule is that CA cannot consider in its decision evidence which has not been formally
offered. The exception is when the evidence not formally offered has been1) duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and 2) such evidence has been incorporated in the records of the case. Exhibits 7 and 8 comply with these
requirements, therefore, they may be used by the CA as basis of its decision.

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RULE 133 WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Section 1.
Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight
of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number. (1a)
Preponderance of evidence is a quantum of evidence applicable to civil cases. It means greater or superior weight of
evidence. It is the evidence that is more convincing and more credible than the one offered by the adverse party
It means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.
In determining whether there is preponderance of evidence the court will consider the following:
all the facts and circumstances of the case
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony
Witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial
Number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number
Section 2.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a)
Applicable to criminal cases. Burden of proof as to the guilt of the accused lies with the prosecution because of the
presumption that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
When the accused invokes a justifying circumstance for example, burden of proof rests upon the defense to prove that
the killing was justified.
This quantum of proof does not mean such a degree of proof that excludes possibility of error. Only moral certainty is
required. Everything in human experience is subject to possible doubt but Reasonable doubt does no refer to a mere
possible doubt , it refers to a state of the case which, after a comparison of all the evidence, does not lead the judge to
have in his mind a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.
Section 3.
Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession
made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
(3)
Section 4.

Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a)

There is more than one circumstances;

(b)

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)

The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)

Section 5.
Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)

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Applicable in administrative cases (filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. The evidence should
constitute that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Evidence is still substantial evidence even if other minds, equally reasonable might conceivable think
otherwise.
Section 6.
Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the introduction of further
testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same
point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.
(6)
Section 7.
Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear
the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)
People v. Lorenzo
Dolores Lorenzo was accused of committing parricide for killing her husband with a bolo and fan knife. During trial,
she assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses (Liban and Eclipse), claiming that Libans testimony must
corroborate Eclipses testimony or her confession because without such corroboration, Eclipses testimony would
have no probative value.Also, according to the prosecution, she allegedly declared to one of the witnesses, SPO1
Eclipse, that she killed her husband, and the trial court characterized this as a confession.
HELD: under Rule 133 Sec. 3 what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the
person to whom the testimony is made. The corroborative evidence referred to is not the testimony of another person
who heard the confession, but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Smith v. Rapid Transit Inc.,
Facts: Smith sued Rapid due to an accident involving a bus. She tried to show that the bus was owned by rapid since at
the time of the accident, only Rapid owned a franchise which operated in the area.
Held: While the fact that only Rapid operated in the area mathematically favor the proposition that the bus is owned
by Rapid, it did not prove by a preponderance of evidence such proposition. The bus could have been a private or
chartered bus.
New York Life Insurance Co. v. McNeely
Lillian McNeely was attempting to claim double indemnity on her son Howards life insurance policy, which could only
paid out if it was proved that Howards death was due to external, violent and accidental means. New York Life
Insurances defense for non-payment was that his death was a suicide. The court examined if the evidence presented
was sufficient to justify the conclusion that Howards death was due to an automobile accident. Five inferences were
the basis for a conclusion of accident: of these, only one was established with reasonable certainty; the rest were
either probabilities at best or mere possibilities unsupported by evidence.
1.
Proof of ultimate fact could be made either with direct/testimonial or indirect/circumstantial evidence. A
conclusion as to an ultimate fact may be based on inferences drawn on indirect evidence, but the existence of the
indirect evidence must not also be inferred.
2.
While the rules of evidence do not follow the strict principles of logic, the courts will not deprive life, liberty
or property upon bare probabilities.
3.
Inference upon inference: the prior inferences upon which to base subsequent inferences must be
established to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory rather than merely by a probability, in order that the last
inference of the probability of the ultimate fact may be based thereon.
Alferez v. People
Jaime Alferez was convicted for three counts of violations of BP 22.
Held: The Court reversed his conviction, explaining that BP 22 provides a presumption as to the accuseds state of
mind, it being an element that is hard to prove. This presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had received
a notice of dishonor, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to

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make arrangements for its payment. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that Alferez actually received the
notice of dishonor. The sending of the notice of dishonor is not the same as the receipt thereof. Since Alferez was not
proven to have received the notice of dishonor, it cannot be said that the presumption provided in BP 22 arose. Hence,
not all elements of the crime were present and Alferez should be acquitted.
DNA EVIDENCE
First time DNA evidence as a means for determining paternity became the focal issue in controversy was in Agustin v.
CA. In that case DNA is defined as
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A
persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a
persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
The Court held in that case that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
In an earlier case, the court cautioned against the use of DNA evidence being a relatively new science. The decision in
that case (Pe lim v. CA) was not based on any DNA testing.
In 2001, the case of Tijing v. CA showed sign of opening up to DNA evidence when it recognized the existence of the
facility (UP-NSRI). In that case, the court declared that eventually, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence to reject said result is to deny progress
The next year, People v. Vallejo was decided wherein DNA evidence found in the body of the deceased and from cotton
swabs used on the accused were admitted.
Vallejo adopted the following guidelines in assessing probative value of DNA evidence:
how the samples were collected
how they were handled
the possibility of contamination of the samples
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests
the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3 hereof, is offered, used, or
proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.
Sec. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court
and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
Biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,
that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones;
DNA means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules found in every nucleated cell of the body. The
totality of an individuals DNA is unique for the individual, except identical twins;
DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated
from DNA testing of biological samples;
DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person,
which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological
samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of
biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from

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two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological
samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent
compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population.
Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case; and
The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of
the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
Sec. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have been complied with, the
court shall
Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any person or crime scene evidence;
Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the biological sample, the testing
process and the reliability of the test results, including the condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously
disclosed to parties involved in the case; and
If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or
the adverse party and where additional biological samples of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order
requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted.
An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be appealable. Any petition for
certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an
injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence
of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof.
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court
order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological
sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or
modification of the judgment of conviction.
Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative value of the DNA evidence
presented, the court shall consider the following:
The chair of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the possibility
of contamination of the samples;
The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and
disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the
laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and
The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily.
Sec. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is reliable, the
court shall consider the following:
The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or technique can be and has been
tested;
The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community;

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The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data generated;
The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the
significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles.
Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the following:
The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and that
DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of
the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity.
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. The convict or the
prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction
DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if
shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is
justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts,
which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.
Sec. 11. Confidentiality. DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall be
confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA
testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the
court:
Person from whom the sample was taken;
Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
Other persons as determined by the court.
Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper
court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or
sought to be offered and presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that
allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information
obtained from the DNA testing, he same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request.
Sec. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. The trial court shall preserve the DNA evidence in its totality, including all
biological samples, DNA profiles and results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this purpose,
the court may order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows:
In criminal cases:
for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for an offense; or
in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has served his sentence;
In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA evidence was introduced has become final
and executory.
The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the expiration of the periods set forth
above, provided that:
A court order to that effect has been secured; or
The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence.
Sec. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Section 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases
pending at the time of its effectivity.
Sec. 14. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 15, 2007, following publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

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Situations where the rule will apply
criminal actions
civil actions
special proceedings
Significance of DNA: it is unique in every individual except identical twins.
how an order for DNA testing is obtained
a person who has a legal interest in the litigation may file an application before the appropriate court at
anytime
it must also be shown that
o a biological sample exists that has relevance to the case
o The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons
o The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique
o The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case
o The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing
After having the requirements complied with, the court shall now issue an order, if appropriate, to:
o Take biological samples from any person or crime scene evidence
o Impose reasonable conditions on the testing to protect the integrity of the biological sample and the
liability of the test results.
The court may even motu proprio order a DNA testing.
It is not always required that a court order should be acquired first before undertaking DNA testing. It can be done
without a prior court order if done before a suit or proceeding is commenced at the behest of any party including law
enforcement agencies. Court order is only required if there is a pending litigation.
The court order granting DNA testing is not appealable and is immediately executory. The remedy available is a
petition for certiorari but such petition shall not stay the implementation of the court ordering DNA testing, unless a
higher court issues an injunctive order.
There is no automatic admission of the DNA evidence obtained in the testing. The court still has to evaluate the
probative value of the proposed evidence before its admission. This shall be determined by taking into account certain
matters which are enumerated in Sec. 7 of the rule.
Even if a person has already been convicted under a final and executory may still avail of DNA testing. The test is
called post-conviction DNA testing. It may be available to the prosecution, or the person convicted by a final and
executory judgment provided that the following requirements are met:
A biological sample exists
Such sample is relevant to the case
The testing would probably result in the reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Such post-conviction testing may be available without need of prior court order.
If the results of the DNA testing is favorable to the convict then he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
court of origin. The court would then conduct a hearing and in case the court finds that the petition is meritorious, it
shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless his detention is justified
for a lawful cause. This petition may also be filed either in the CA or SC or with any member of the said courts. A
hearing may be conducted in these courts or may instead remand the petition to the court of origin and issue
appropriate orders.
This may also be filed by the prosecution according to the rules.
The DNA profiles of a person are not open to public scrutiny. Whoever violates such prohibition would be liable for
indirect contempt of the court where DNA evidence was offered
DNA profiles will only be released to the ff:

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Person from whom the sample was taken;

Lawyers representing parties in the case or action where the DNA evidence is offered and presented or
sought to be offered and presented;
Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
Other persons as determined by the court.

People v. Vallejo
Gerrico Vallejo was convicted of the rape-slay of Daisy Diolola, based on the totality of circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution. Among the evidence presented were the results of DNA tests conducted on specimens
obtained from both Vallejo and Daisy. The results showed that vaginal swabs taken from Daisy matched Vallejos DNA
profile.
HELD: The SC admitted the DNA results. It noted that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.
Tijing v. CA
Bienvenida Tijing left her child, Edgardo Jr, with Angelita Diamante(her boss, she was a labandera). When she came
back, both the baby and her boss were gone. She searched for them in the latters house in Tondo but was told that
Angelita had moved elsewhere. After four years, she met Angelita again who now had a child with her whom she
called John Thomas. Angelita, however, refused to return the child and so the Sps. Tijing filed a case for habeas corpus.
Their witnesses consisted of the midwife who helped Bienvenida give birth and the brother of Angelitas late
common-law husband. TC granted the petition. CA reversed.
SC ruled that habeas corpus was the proper petition. It also ruled that Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas were one and the
same person, the son of petitioner spouses. There was evidence to show that Angelita and her common-law husband
were unable to sire a child and that the subject minor child in the case bore strong similarities to Bienvenida. It also
found the registration of John Thomas birth in the Civil Registrar of Manila to be dubious. As a final note, the SC said
that DNA testing could now be used to establish the parentage of a child, though there was no need to resort to DNA
testing in this case.