PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No.

L-23326 December 18, 1965

Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA
3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave
to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The
provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class
legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years
of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other
officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of
service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is
another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not
constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a
basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect
scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which
reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and

from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,
no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the
term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as
to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of
the term other emoluments.
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as
salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it
is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

Republic Act No. 6645

December 28, 1987

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS

OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a
special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not
be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for:
provided, however, that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient
for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city
concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three
copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in
each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 28, 1987.

Ligot vs Mathay (G.R. No. L-34676)

Salaries of Representatives Retirement
FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December
30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing
the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was
enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members
of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969,
so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate
received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his
petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The
Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his
claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which
ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases
would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the
increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was
already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and

other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969
are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and
other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members
of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase
the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it
would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what cannot be done directly.
Manuel Martinez vs Jesus Morfe
44 SCRA 22 Political Law The Legislative Department Immunity from Arrest under the
1935 Constitution
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a
publicdocument before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation
of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the Constitutional
Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest. They contend that
under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the charges upon which they
were arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the
constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason,
felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista

were arrested fall under the category 0f breach of peace. Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez
and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.
Sergio Osmea, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to
Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration.
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless
and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea
avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament
in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislatorcomplete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside
the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative

body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member
therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

Jimenez vs Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905)

Freedom of Speech & Debate

Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that
the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president.
The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end.
The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then
filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because
he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place. The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers

to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as

speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices,
in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of
the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same
time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the
lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed
therein alluded to as planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted
that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools
of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the
planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of
entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as
such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as
planners include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.
Adaza vs Pacana (G.R. NO. L-68159)
Singularity of Office/Position
FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same

elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On
March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections;
petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by
placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be
the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to
be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand,
a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be
an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can
assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, taeke the vacated seat of
the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of
prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for
the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP.
This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members

of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate
of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent
falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.
Homobono Adaza vs Fernando Pacana, Jr.
135 SCRA 431 Political Law Congress Singularity of Office/Position
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in
the sameelections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3,
1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984
BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuingelections, petitioner
won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be
the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to
be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand,
a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be
an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can

assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the
governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that
of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for
the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP.
This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members
of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate
of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent
falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.

Cicero Punsalan vs Estelito Mendoza

140 SCRA 153 Political Law Congress Singularity of Office/Position
Cicero Punsalan and Estelito Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of Pampanga
respectively. Both belong to KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his resignation as the
governor but the same should only be effective at the Presidents pleasure. On 30 June 1984,

Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice by the president. On 14 July 1984, he was
concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan Pambansa. On 16 July 1984, he filed a
request to the Minister of Local Government (MLG) to consider him as the governor-on-leave of
Pampanga while the President was considering his resignation. The request was subsequently
approved by the MLG. Mendoza advised Punsalan to take the governorship temporarily while
his resignation is being considered. Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as the
acting governor but as the governor and thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later
however, Mendoza resigned from his Batasan Membership and upon the result of the KBLs
caucus, he returned to Pampanga to assume his governorship. Punsalan denounced Mendozas
return claiming that he has already vacated his office by virtue of his resignation which was
impliedly approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that when Mendoza was a
member of the Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there is an inhibition
against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision
which cannot be compromised. Further, Punsalan claimed that Mendoza had forfeited his right
and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of
appointive Batasan Member because of the incompatibility of the positions with the
Governors office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship.
HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides:
A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the
Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased
while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that the
Constitution made a distinction. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into
three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral representatives

who are either elected or selected as may be provided by law; and those chosen from
Members of the Cabinet. It is the SCs opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to
the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet. The prohibitions, undoubtedly, deal
with a Member who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the
electorate of his constituency, the elected provincial or city or district representative with a
fixed term (6 years) of office i.e an elected governor who, while in office, was elected as a
member of the Batasan cannot concurrently hold those two elective positions. Mendoza was
elected as the governor but was not elected as a member of the Batasan; he was appointed.
Punsalans contention that Mendozas resignation was impliedly approved by the president is not
tenable. The president in fact needed more time to consider the validity of the resignation and
upon the KBLs recommendation, he instead chose to approve Mendozas return to his
governorship.

Raul Villegas vs Valentino Legaspi

113 SCRA 39 Political Law The Legislative Department Appearance in Court by a
Congressman
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of
Congress may appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint
and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the
ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The
presiding judge however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge
said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.

Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken
Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel
for the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation
on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the
Batasang Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFIs acting in
their original jurisdiction. CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original
jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance
of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction.
Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case
at bar are courts without appellate jurisdiction.

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank,
composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal

and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative
agencies, are included.

PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon.
Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in
a SEC Case.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a
private corporation, was held six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be
called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the
Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning
the election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in
force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative
body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance.
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had
purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was
notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for

Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing
as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision.
RULING:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for
the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the
fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto
suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel
for the Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps,
the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in
the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal

participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
prohibited.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting
Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan
252 SCRA 641 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member
of Congress RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a
case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty.
Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three
allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification
from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached
thearraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part
maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies.
Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment.
Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with
Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member ofCongress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives ofcongress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals
with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to
the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.

Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco

83 Phil. 17 Political Law The Legislative Department Election of
Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the
next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of
the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his
allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece.
Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even
ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to
adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair
and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and
asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz

and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz
yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This
was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the
following day.

Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo

warrantoproceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is
in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of
the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the
morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was
in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided
by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such
session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered
into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,
excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members
constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the
House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore
an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator
Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco,
one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that
they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong.
Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president.
There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad
but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if
mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being
only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light
of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the
majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances
of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it
appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos
election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the
Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to

constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough
to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with
substantial justice and with therequirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally
elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of
the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the
majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual
members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not
incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the
jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member
concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for
considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact
that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of
the members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article
VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members
of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949,
were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

United States vs Juan Pons

34 Phil. 729 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine
were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other
hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.
Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were
charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the
Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine
Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue
are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank
circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco
however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions.
The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to
Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that
urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is
tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and
formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which
provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereofshall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not
the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.

HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and
formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as
urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill
would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Herminio Astorga vs Antonio Villegas

56 SCRA 714 Political Law The Legislative Department Journal;When to be Consulted
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who
had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel
Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the

Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was
considered to have never been enacted. When the this said lawpassed the 3rd reading in the
lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee
on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations.
During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was
thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became
RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the
lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in
fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino
and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of
the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to
the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note
however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only
to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein,
the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law.

To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.

Morales v. Subido (1968)

Enrique Morales (pet.) v. Abelardo Subido, Comm. of Civil Service.(resp.)
G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968
26 SCRA 150 (1968)

Facts:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He rose to the rank in the said police force
despite his having no college degree. He was provisionally appointed as chief of police of Manila
which became vacant upon the resignation of the former chief of police, Brig. Gen. Ricardo G.
Papa on March 14, 1968.
The resp. Comm. of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his designation but rejected
his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is that of sec. 10 of the Police Act of
1966 (RA 4864). The resp. instead certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the
attention of the Mayor of Manila to fill the vacancy within 30 days as required by sec. 4 of the
Decentralization Act.
The pet. requested for a mandamus from the Court to compel the resp. Commissioner to include
him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of Manila for the consideration of
the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite lacking a college degree under the
statement of the aforementioned rule:
"has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein
for at least three years"

Issue:
Whether the petition for mandamus be granted due to a different interpretation of the respondent
and the petitioner of Sec 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
Decision
No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to
include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present state of the law, he
is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there may be a possibility of
ommision of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress to the Senate, that may permit
the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in possession of the legislative secretary of
the President, is signed by the Presidents of both the Lower and Upper Houses together with
their respective secretaries and the President and therefore must be deemed valid and binding to
the Court. No inclusion of other enlargements, no matter how sound they are, should be used in
the interpretation of an already enrolled bill.
Version 2 Enrique Morales vs Abelardo Subido
26 SCRA 150 Political Law The Legislative Department Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years
but does not possess a bachelors degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido,
Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected
his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position. Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the
post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has

served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces
for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police
department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the
said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales
went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip
form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what
really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC
act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts
of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.