Ailyn V.

Kindipan
Natural Resources
Section 2B
CASE DIGESTS
GR No. 115634

April 27, 2000

FELIPE CALUB AND RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, AND CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and
twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at
P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose
Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two
hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegallysourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio
Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ".
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENRPENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts
were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.. Felipe Calub,
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before
the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against
Abuganda for violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree 705 as amended
by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon
and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer
Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against

Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the

Public Prosecutor.
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan
and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay
Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an
equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain
Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation
of Section 68 , Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in
order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and
ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle
owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an
application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of
Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued
the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992. Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the
present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application
for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The
Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting
further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private
respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and
forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court
further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and
other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from
deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct
order of the Supreme Court. In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992,
the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for
appropriate disposition.
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of
merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the
authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O.
No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis.
According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of
the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation

and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance

used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to
pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate
court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such
regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the
commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed
to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the
DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to
render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary.
Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued
prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit.
Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate
court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis.[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that
private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit
had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.
Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted
illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit
against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing
or withholding the possession of the property of another..[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based
on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in
custody because they were contradicted by its own findings..[17] Their
petition was found without merit.
.
ISSUE :
Whether the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
RULING:

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all

conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section
78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with
the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles
were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly
no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They
read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation
of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant
any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor

of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the

offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found
spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705,
shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his
duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural
resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize
said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto.
Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending
illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the
nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the
apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be
deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be,
for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to
possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and
their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry
Code.
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably
explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary
nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day
following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles,
forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then
again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for
the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to
the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a
writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure
was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly

deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin.

For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997
EPIFANIO LALICAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FILOMENO A.
VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 52, PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio
Lalican,Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional
Trial Court of that city. That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at
Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa the above-named
accused, without lawful authority or permity have in their possession,
custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of
lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (14,000.00).
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other
forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes
"lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner
alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law
is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal
documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence,
petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not
for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy
of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should
include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut."
The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in
the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from
any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The
prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more
semantical than a question of law.[3]

On September 24, 1991, the lower court,[4] guided by the principles that
penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the
information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is
not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the
two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product
while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product.
Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is
penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with
grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the
lower court categorically stated that:
"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more
danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in
fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to
lumber."
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order,
pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of
Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of
wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which
has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed
that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not
criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended,
the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated
February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin
indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and
that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates
of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were
indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of
lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery
receipts for transportation from one point to another.[6]
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the
DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself
distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber"
in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of
"lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.[7]
On June 10, 1992, the lower court[8] issued the herein questioned Order
setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from
the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the
possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of
"other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still,
lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents
is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of
forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court
denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the
quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground
that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the
phrase "timber or other forest products."
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was
issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."
(Underscoring supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw
or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus."
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in
Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law
which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources
of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and

protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical
difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize
certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations
and realities; x x x"
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would
certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to
allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to
afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an
inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.[10] After all, the
phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68
would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:
"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not
covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest
product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to
the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x x
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of
forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by
the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person
to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have
it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow
an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If
lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that
lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all
they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It
is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever
that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and
penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest
products without lawful authority."
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply
has no legal basis.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 131270, March 17, 2000 ]
PERFECTO PALLADA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation
of 68[2] of the Revised Forestry Code[3] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally
cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in
rice milling and trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police,
raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a
warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a
chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase,
petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of
Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did
not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero
Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more,
the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come
from a licensed sawmill operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all,
constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following
day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces
measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE
stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order[4] was
served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company,
but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber.
Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza,
who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the
operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was
filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the
motion was denied.[5] Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated.

By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As
before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders
issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel
Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of
the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were
charged with violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information
alleged:[6]
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality of Valencia,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of
different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299 .25 board feet or
equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value of FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency, without
any authority, license or legal documents from the government, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994,
judgment was rendered as follows:[7]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto
Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in
their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal
documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. The lumber
subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government.
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which,
on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko
for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the
seized lumber.[8]
ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS

CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE PROPER
DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE
SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER
ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.
RULING:
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as
summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal:[10]
Exh. 6 - Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated December 15,
1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to 12.23 cubic meters, transported
from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. Taken from the forest area of Wahab and H.D. Pangcoga
Exh. 6-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 6-B - Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for short)
Exh. 6-C - Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463 pieces of lumber
equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet
Exh. 6-D - Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from WHP
Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the Corporation for the lumber
mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F - Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP Enterprises,
dated December 16, 1991, for the 5,056.94 board feet of lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 - [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
Exh. 7 - CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to 25.4 cubic
meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain Somira M. Ampuan in Lama
Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM
Exh. 7-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 7-B - CTA

Exh. 7-C - Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces of lumber
equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by SMA
Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to Somira M.
Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991
Exh. 7-F - Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the Corporation in
payment to SMA Trading Company for 10,758.02 board feet of lumber,
dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 8 - CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an equivalent
volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of Wahab Pangcoga and
H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992
Exh. 8-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 8-B - CTA
Exh. 8-C - Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber
Exh. 8-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by WHP
Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 8-F - Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for 8,024.99 board feet
of lumber issued by the Corporation payable to WHP Enterprises
Exh. 9 - CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent volume of 12.24
cubic meters from licensee Somira M. Ampuan of Lama Lico, Bombaran,
Lanao del Sur, consigned to the Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release
3/2/92"
Exh. 9-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 9-B - CTA, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-C - Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-D - Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading Company to the
Corporation, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee

Exh. 9-F - Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189 board feet of
lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 - Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of
Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the
company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.[11] For
indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83[12] states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin
(CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as
accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as
proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation
and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing
guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore,
the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been
considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the
lumber.[13] In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[14]
The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that
lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber"
embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that
case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in 68 of P.D.
No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products
without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those
who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this
case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber
and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber,
lumber and non-timber forest products.[15] As already noted, the opening
paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a
separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have
uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a
substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous
irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.
According to the trial court:[16]

Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the
supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from the
lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . .
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log,
respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest product[s]
as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of
hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of
lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in
the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written
down and enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de Oro",
but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page)
that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the
Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the
consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the
blank space for the name and address of the consignee was smudged with a
typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally
typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation,
Valencia, Bukidnon".
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A"
[were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]".[17]
Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the
data required to be filled are left in blank.
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7
bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were
"scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is
dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes
and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut
lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when
the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of
flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.[18]
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they
are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial
court in giving no credence to the same.[19]

It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not

be taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber
dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts,
being public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity
in their execution.[20]
This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal
effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may
not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case,
as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner
should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken
steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert
that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.[21]
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the
CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The
presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents
are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.[22]
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, 68, provides:
ART. 309. Penalties.- Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed
P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be. . . .
As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,[23] the penalty to be imposed should be six
(6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31,
1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced
to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

G.R. No. 136142, October 24, 2000 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFONSO
DATOR AND BENITO GENOL, ACCUSED (ACQUITTED) PASTOR
TELEN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 convicting the
appellant of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were
charged with the crime of violation of Section 68[2] of Presidential Decree
No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,[3] in an
Information that reads:
That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, in barangay Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province of
Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess 1,560.16 board feet of assorted lumber
flitches valued at TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(23,500.00), Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required
under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on May 27, 1994, Pastor Telen and his co-accused,
Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, assisted by counsel, separately entered the
plea of "Not guilty" to the charge in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro
Rojas of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a
police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San Rafael, Maasin,
Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality,
they noticed a Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward
the town proper of Maasin. Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces
of lumber, Police Station Commander Rojas maneuvered their police
vehicle and gave chase.[4]
Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro,
Maasin, Southern Leyte, they ordered the driver, accused Benito Genol, to
pull over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after his companions
hurriedly left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper

transport of the pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol

informed the police authorities that the pieces of lumber were owned by
herein appellant, Pastor Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate
No. HAF 628 was registered in the name of Southern Leyte Farmers AgroIndustrial Cooperative, Inc. (SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative.
Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and Bacala directed Benito Genol to
proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for further
investigation.[5]
On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his
office at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to inspect the
pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro,
Maasin, Southern Leyte from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate
supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that the cargo consisted of forty-one
(41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber of
different dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.[6]
Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt[7] covering the fifty-one
(51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of
Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber
and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property
Custodian, Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred
custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[8]
The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information.
Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office,
Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to
be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao,
Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it
was prohibited by law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought
the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the
CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the
office of a certain Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in
Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the plan of Telen to cut
teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mother's track of land in Tabunan,
San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed
Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured
him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut
the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of
his mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation
of his house and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he
did by planting Gemelina seedlings.[9]
On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire
for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his
mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged
after Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from

Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before

cutting the said lumber.[10]
After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon that a cargo truck was available for hire, Telen
instructed his cousin to personally supervise the hauling of the sawn
lumber for him inasmuch as he was busy with his work in the office. At
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that
the sawn lumber were confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro,
Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11]
Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station
Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded from him DENR permit for
the sawn lumber. After confirming ownership of the sawn lumber, Telen
explained to Rojas that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy
Leonor to cut Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the
renovation of his house and that he had already replaced the sawn Dita
trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to no avail. Rojas ordered that the pieces
of lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck be impounded at the municipal
building of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of Telen to produce the
required permit from the DENR.[12]
Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in
Maasin, Southern Leyte for investigation in connection with the confiscated
pieces of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-in-Charge Boy Leonor
of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn
lumber on October 29, 1993 and even during the investigation conducted
by the CENRO hearing officer for three (3) times but to no avail, for the
reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu
province.[13]
Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local
cooperative engaged in buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that
on October 29, 1993 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a certain Vicente
Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to
hire the Isuzu cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of
coconut lumber from Barangay San Jose to Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin,
Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the proposal inasmuch as the owner
of the alleged coconut lumber, according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who
is a long time friend and former officemate at the provincial office of the
Department of Health. Besides, the fee to be earned from the hauling
services meant additional income for the cooperative.[14]
At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu
cargo truck of SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern
Leyte, being escorted by a police patrol vehicle, heading towards the
municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he
learned that the Isuzu truck was apprehended by the police for the reason
that it contained a cargo of Dita and Antipolo lumber without the required

permit from the DENR. He explained to the police authorities that the
Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport coconut lumber, however,
it was impounded at the municipal building just the same.[15] Due to the
incident Dator lost his job as accounting manager in SLEFAICO, Inc.[16]
For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the
SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from transporting
abaca fibers, the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for hire.[17]
While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on
October 29, 1993 in Barangay Mantahan, Maasin, Southern Leyte, Vicente
Sabalo approached him and offered to hire the services of the cargo truck.
Genol accompanied Sabalo to the residence of the accounting manager of
SLEFAICO, Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to
the proposal of Sabalo to hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of
coconut lumber from San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte, for a fee.[18]
At 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of
Alfonso Dator, proceeded to San Jose after fetching about six (6) haulers
along the way in Barangay Soro-soro. Upon arrival in San Jose, Genol
remained behind the steering wheel to take a rest. He was unmindful of the
actual nature of the lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol
was instructed to proceed to Barangay Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard
of a certain Jimmy Go. Before the lumber could be unloaded at 8:00 o'clock
in the evening Genol was approached by Police Station Commander
Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR permit for the lumber. The pieces of
lumber were confiscated by Rojas after Genol failed to produce the required
permit from the DENR office.[19]
Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this
case. He testified in substance that he was requested by his cousin, Pastor
Telen, to engage the services of a cargo truck to transport sawn pieces of
lumber from San Jose to be used in the renovation of his house in Abgao,
Maasin, Southern Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to
hire the services of the Isuzu cargo truck that he was driving; that both of
them asked the permission of Alfonso Dator who readily acceded to the
proposal for a fee of P500.00;[20] that he saw Genol remained behind the
steering wheel as the loading of the lumber was going on in San Jose; and
that the lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck were confiscated in Barangay
Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show to Police Station
Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR for the
subject lumber.[21]
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt of

the offense charged and there being no modifying circumstances, and with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable, the herein accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2)
degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty
similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. His bail for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled and he shall be committed to the New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila thru the Abuyog Regional Prisons,
Abuyog, Leyte via the Provincial Warden, Maasin, Southern Leyte;
ACQUITTING co-accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol on reasonable
doubt for insufficiency of evidence; and cancelling their bail;
CONFISCATING and SEIZING the 1,560.16 board feet of illegal lumber
worth P23,500.00 and ORDERING the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte to
sell the lumber at public auction under proper permission from the Court,
with the proceeds thereof turned over to the National Government thru the
National Treasury under proper receipt, and to REPORT the fact of sale to
this Court duly covered by documents of sale and other receipts by
evidencing the sale within five (5) days from the consummation of sale; and
DIRECTING the CENRO authorities to coordinate with its Regional Office
for immediate administrative proceedings and determination of any
administrative liability of the truck owner, SLEFAICO Inc. if any,
otherwise, to release the truck to its owner.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68,
P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH
DENR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, IT BEING A
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY
PROVISION OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE.

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE
CONFISCATED LUMBER IS P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH
VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
It is not disputed that appellant Pastor Telen is the owner of the fifty-one
(51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber with a total volume of
1,560.16 board feet. He alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the
track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte
which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao
of the same municipality. After having been confiscated by the police, while
in transit, in Barangay Soro-soro, appellant Telen failed to produce before
the authorities the required legal documents from the DENR pertaining to
the said pieces of lumber.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of
assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to
produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of
the code provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest
Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy
Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte
before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that
written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such
as the Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to

be used in renovating appellant's house, provided that he would plant trees

as replacements thereof, which he already did. It must be underscored that
the appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is
considered mala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are
considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has
been violated.[23] The motive or intention underlying the act of the
appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the
confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.
In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal
permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO,
Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact
that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the
confiscated pieces of lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case
that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to avail of the testimony of
Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative
evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare
testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.[24]
The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of
DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990[25] which prescribes
rules on the deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of
firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits
that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is
required in the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet
pine and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78,
Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle,
apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao,
sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.
Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held
liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species
enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987.
However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from
the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a
titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land must still be
secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus,
he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705
necessitating prior acquisition of permit and "legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations." The pertinent portion of DENR
Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted hereunder, to wit:
In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote
the planting of trees by owners of private lands and give incentives to the
tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19, 1987
which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of

firewood, pulpwood or timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and

Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to include all other tree
species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE and premium
hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is required in the cutting of
planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with
corresponding application for patent or acquired through court
proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under
DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a
certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products
came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land is
issued accompanying the shipment.
Appellant Telen next contends that proof of value of the confiscated pieces
of lumber is indispensable, it being the basis for the computation of the
penalty prescribed in Article 309 in relation to Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code; and that in the absence of any evidence on record to prove the
allegation in the Information that the confiscated pieces of lumber have an
equivalent value of P23,500.00 there can be no basis for the penalty to be
imposed and hence, he should be acquitted.
The appellant's contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law
that penalty is not an element of the offense. Consequently, the failure of
the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its allegation in the
Information with respect to the value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is
not necessarily fatal to its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of
the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in the official transmittal
letter[26] of the DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte addressed to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00
which is alleged in the Information. However, the said transmittal letter
cannot serve as evidence or as a valid basis for the estimated value of the
confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the proper penalty
to be imposed on the appellant considering that it is hearsay and it was not
formally offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
In the case of People vs. Elizaga,[27] the accused-appellant therein was
convicted of the crimes of homicide and theft, and the value of the bag and
its contents that were taken by the accused-appellant from the victim was
estimated by the prosecution witness to be P500.00. In the absence of a
conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value
of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant
circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes,
[28] this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value
of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the
corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be
the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.
In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita
and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and

therefore not premium quality lumber. It may also be noted that the said
pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public
hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes
but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that
appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other
pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant
circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the
penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount
under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for
simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on
the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods.[29] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] the
penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
G.R. No. 161798, October 20, 2004 ]
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY,
10TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 5, BUTUAN CITY, HON. VICTOR A.
TOMANENG, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF AGUSAN DEL
NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, 10TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 5,
BUTUAN CITY, EDUARDO CASIA, ROGELIO CASTILLO, ULDARICO
CASINGINAN, ELADIO GALANO, CATALINO VIRTUDAZO, RICARDO
BALAD-ON, JOEL VILLAREAL, TIBURCIO IMPUERTO, HILARIO
FERNANDEZ, ANDREA VASQUEZ, SPOUSES REMELITO CODERA AND
MARILYN RANOSO-CODERA, AND FLORIO JOSAFAT, JR., FOR
HIMSELF AND IN REPRESENTATION BY WAY OF A CLASS SUIT THE
MEMBERS OF THE UNIFIED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG
(UFAB), RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J,:

Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multibillion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del
Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License
Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and
develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through
its officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997,[1] February
16, 2001,[2] and April 6, 2001,[3] by virtue of which petitioner was
designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest
products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the
Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) containing Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of
Verification of Private Tree Plantation.[4] The MOA provided, among
others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates of
Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR,
the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these
Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were deputized as DENR
officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used
in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and
possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner
PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions
apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area, violators who
loaded the illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such
as carabaos, for transport out of the plantation area. These illegally cut
forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs impounding area.
On June 18, 2001, private respondents Eduardo Casia, Rogelio Castillo,
Uldarico Casinginan, Eladio Galano, Catalino Virtudazo, Ricardo Balad-on,
Joel Villareal, Tiburcio Impuerto, Hilario Fernandez, Andrea Vasquez,
Spouses Remelito Codera and Marilyn Ranoso-Codera, and Florio Josafat,
Jr., for himself and in representation, by way of a class suit, of the members
of the UNITED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), filed a
complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City against the DENR Regional
Office XIII (CARAGA) and/or its Regional Executive Director Elias C.
Seraspi, Jr., Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City and/or
their respective PENR Officers, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO) of San Francisco, Bunawan, Lianga and Bislig
and/or their respective CENR Officers, and herein petitioner
PICOP/Wilfredo D. Fuentes.[5]

Private respondents-complainants were some of those apprehended by

PICOPS security officers transporting without any permit several hundred
cubic meters of falcata logs allegedly grown in petitioners plantation. The
logs, trucks and other forms of conveyance on which they were carried were
confiscated and kept in petitioners impounding area. Private respondents
alleged in their complaint that the Memoranda dated August 22, 1997,
February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 and the MOA dated May 25, 2001 were
illegal for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They sought to
have the Memoranda declared null and void for this reason and also sought
to restrain the DENR and all those acting for and in its behalf, including
herein petitioner, from enforcing or implementing said Memoranda.
On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision.[6] With regard to
private respondents allegation that the aforesaid Memoranda were illegally
issued, the trial court disregarded the claim and sustained the validity of
the Memoranda. The Memoranda were issuances of a duly-authorized
government agency in the normal and regular course of its duty to enforce
forestry laws and procedures. The RTC added that the application for the
writ of preliminary injunction was the wrong remedy to assail the legality of
the Memoranda, such an action being merely a collateral attack. Private
respondents should instead have filed a petition to declare the Memoranda
null and void. However, the trial court granted private respondents prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction. It noted that administrative or
criminal cases had been filed against private respondents involving the
apprehended conveyances. The RTC ordered RED Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to
recall, withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed
Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and commanded all those acting
pursuant to said Memorandum to refrain and desist from implementing the
Memorandum. Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata
logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the
Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the
administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.[7]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit
on October 17, 2001.[8]
On January 21, 2002, DENR-Region XIII RED Benjamin T. Tumaliuan
issued a Memorandum revoking the February 16, 2001 Memorandum
issued by former OIC-RED Constancio A. Paye, Jr.[9]
On April 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction before
the Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July
23, 2003.[10] The appellate court held there was no grave abuse of
discretion when the RTC issued the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest
products and conveyances. Petitioners compound was used only as a
depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the
Memorandum dated February 16, 2001. Neither did petitioner claim

ownership of the confiscated conveyances. While it claimed that some of

the confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area,
petitioner admitted that the ownership of the confiscated products was still
to be determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the
Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioners
interest in the confiscated forest products was merely contingent and
cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Necessarily therefore, petitioner had no basis to
bring the action against respondents and it was not entitled to the ancillary
remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 15, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this
was denied in the Resolution of January 16, 2004.[11]
Petitioner then filed this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that it is a proper party-in-interest, vested with a material
interest in the outcome of the case. It allegedly has more than just a
contingent interest in the outcome of the dispute.
Petitioner contend that private respondents intrusion was in violation of
petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave
petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and
recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the
concession area.[12] In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its
subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements.
Public respondents never refuted petitioner PICOPs allegation that private
respondents were apprehended by the DENR-deputized PICOP guards at
its checkpoint within PICOPs concession area. Private respondents also
never denied that PICOPs guards had been deputized as DENR officers to
enforce the Memoranda. Petitioner was therefore within its rights in
exercising control over its concession area pursuant to its duty as DENR
depository.
Petitioner also argues that the RTC intruded upon the primary jurisdiction
of the DENR when it took cognizance of private respondents complaint for
damages and issued the writ of injunction. Petitioner invokes DENR
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 97-32[13] in asserting that it
has the obligation to keep custody of the apprehended forest products, tools
and conveyances, the disposal of which rests solely on the DENR.
The RTC also allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
private respondents prayer for issuance of injunction in violation of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioner argues that
private respondents should have awaited the results of the administrative
procedure for summary administrative apprehensions and seizures of the
DENR under Sections 5 and 6 of DAO No. 97-32, instead of filing the
complaint before the trial court. This would have allegedly allowed the

proper administrative officer to ascertain whether a prima facie case lies

against the offenders and whether the apprehended articles should answer
for the offense. By issuing the assailed writ of injunction, the trial court
arrogated unto itself the power to rule on the rightful possession of the
subject conveyances.
Petitioner also contends that the injunctive writ was issued without due
process of law since the transfer of custody of the forest products and
conveyances was not even sought by private respondents in their
complaint. Consequently, the matter of the return of the seized conveyances
was never ventilated during the hearing and the issuance of the writ not
sought for violates the rules of due process.
Petitioners arguments do not convince us. The petition should be denied.
It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the
confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting
proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to
be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. As
observed by the Court of Appeals, any interest petitioner has in the
confiscated properties is dependent on the outcome of the proceedings
before the CENRO-Bislig and the Office of the Government ProsecutionSurigao del Sur. The issue of ownership and possession of the confiscated
products still has to be determined in those proceedings. Petitioner had not
refuted this.
Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended
logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the
DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner
merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the
DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said
products are pending.
The trial court noted that the confiscated vehicles were already subject of
administrative proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and criminal
complaints before the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del
Sur. There were also letters or notices to petitioner from officers of the
CENRO and the Office of the Government Prosecution requesting the
release of some of the conveyances to their owners.[14] There is no reason
for petitioner to refuse to hand over possession of the vehicles and forest
products since, being confiscated items, they will have to be handed over to
the proper government agencies for appropriate disposition proceedings.
Furthermore, the transfer of custody of the confiscated products and
conveyances will not in any way place petitioner at a disadvantage.
Petitioner is merely a depository and the release of the conveyances and
products to the government agencies concerned has to be done but only in
compliance with lawful court orders.

It should also be remembered that the Memorandum dated February 16,

2001, which designated petitioner as a DENR depository, had been revoked
by the Memorandum of January 21, 2002. As of the filing of the petition for
review before this Court on March 11, 2004, petitioner no longer had any
right, as a depository, to retain possession of the conveyances.
All the foregoing considered, petitioners contention that the trial court
violated the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies should also fail. The transfer of custody of the
confiscated products to the CENRO and the Office of the Government
Prosecution was for the purpose of resolving the cases with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
G.R. No. 152160, January 13, 2004 ]
VIRGILIO BON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is
admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it
was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial
evidence necessary to convict the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision[2] and the February 15,
2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR CR No. 15673.
The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner]
Virgilio Bon is hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the penalty in that
[petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to
fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby
ACQUITTED.[4]
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for
violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon
under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay
Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, cut, gather and
manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and
one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued
at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from
proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting
documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner
in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro
Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution
presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita DangalanMendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and]
Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand,
presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon.
The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as
follows:
Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez,
Alexander Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] owns
a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees
inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her
administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to
investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the
help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to
one of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate
Teresita [Dangalan-Mendozas] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On
February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan,
Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land
of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the group

discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao
tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the
land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees
into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he
sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.;
Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on
July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it
was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r]
4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x x.
In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied
the accusation. Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court, as
follows:
All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio
Bon denied the charge[.] [He said] that he was in Manila from December
1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the
purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.
Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted [as such] by Teresitas father.
He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private
complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]
refused to receive the landowners share of produce, he deposited the
money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [DangalanMendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and
pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees
[to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]
upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his complaint.
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired
Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the
crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he
happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter
threaten him with] revenge.
On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged.
Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision,
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal
[to the CA].[5]
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the
prosecution witnesses credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence
proving their guilt.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA sustained the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both testified
that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on
Teresita Dangalan-Mendozas land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct
evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict
petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter
type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133[6] of the Rules of Court were
amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of
Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had
ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son
Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of
the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive
him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the
conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that
Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was
presented to show the latters participation in the offense charged.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under
Section 28 of Rule 130[7] of the Rules of Court would be violated by binding
Jeniebre to petitioners admission, which did not constitute any of the
exceptions[8] to this provision. It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under
oath in open court, is admissible in evidence against him.
II

Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution

witnesses who are not police operatives or media representatives is
admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against
himself[,] if voluntary, is believable for the reason that it is fair to presume
that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not (U.S. v.
Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
III
Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x
that x x x petitioner Bon admitted his guilt to them should be given high
credence by the courts of justice considering that x x x many people who are
being quoted in media today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In
other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness?
IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial
admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether or not] x x x the same [is
constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?[10]
Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the
admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the allegation,
testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of
the trees; and 2) the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of
those witnesses.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded
on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 thereof, only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth may be raised. A reading of the
pleadings reveals that petitioner actually raised questions of fact --the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence
against him. Nonetheless, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion

and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to take
cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the
interest of the proper administration of justice.[11]
In the main, petitioner contends that Lascanos and Dangalans separate
testimonies[12] regarding his alleged extrajudicial admission constitute
hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also argues that his
supposed admission should not have been admitted, because it had been
taken without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already
regarded as a suspect.
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay
evidence as follows:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand.
[13] Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it
reaches the court is considered hearsay.[14]
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12,
1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the
trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons.
First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he
allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact
that had been derived from their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the
utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters
stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person
who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the
hearsay rule.[15] Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto[16] ruled that
evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is
barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony, because he
failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when
parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived
their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted.[17] The absence of an

objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes, from

which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:

Q Did you reach the land in question?

A Yes, sir.

Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.

Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?

A We were not able to see.

Q And how many trees were cut?

A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long
time.

Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?

A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.

Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?

A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he
took the liberty of cutting those trees.

Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean
when he said that he took [the] liberty of cutting those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees.
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.

Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at
that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi.[18]
Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the
testimonies of the persons who heard it[19] fall under Section 26 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, [t]he act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that no man
would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.[20] The
testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was
not given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police
authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.
[21] We have ruled previously that constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner.
[22]
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which --with the assistance
of the barangay tanods[23] -- was conducted by the owners brother,
Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial investigation.
Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of Article III[24] of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully
invoked by petitioner.[25]
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial
investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction.[26] In the
present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his
admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its
unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified.[27]
Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such
findings affirm those of the trial court,[28] as in this case. This Court
refrains from disturbing the CAs findings, if no glaring errors bordering on
a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them.[29] We have

no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,[30] provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the
places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber
or other forest products without the legal documents.[31]
Petitioner was charged with the first offense.[32] It was thus necessary for
the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or
manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of
evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[33] Conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.[34]
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary
that the following elements concur:
There is more than one circumstance.
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.

The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.[35]
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule
in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court
(RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances:
x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and
control over the land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better
chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay
[t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered
the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-in-law,
accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar
Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His
extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was
voluntary and not under custodial investigation.[36]
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following
circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners culpability:
x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel
Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting
of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon
and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,]
demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees
which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon
went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees.[37]
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting,
gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the
prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence:
photographs of tree stumps,[38] the investigation report of an officer of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit
was secured for the cutting of the trees,[39] and the CENROs computation
of the value[40] of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact,
together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other
conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.
Correct Penalty
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter
because of the differing penalties imposed by the appellate and the trial
courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven
(11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as
maximum. The CA, however, increased the penalty to imprisonment

ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No.
277,[41] provides that any violation thereof shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309[42] and 310[43] of Revised Penal
Code. This amendment -- which eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code -- has already been interpreted by this Court.
According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products
without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now independent of
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under
these articles.[44]
Both the trial court[45] and the CA[46] found that the value of the lumber
was P12,000. Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the statutory penalty
should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;[47] or prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law,[48] however, reduces the sentence to an indeterminate penalty
anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the CA are
within the allowable range. In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
offense, the penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of
the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the trial courts
indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years,
six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
ALFREDO Y. CHU, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 23, NINTH
JUDICIAL REGION, MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, and
grave abuse of discretion filed by Alfredo Y. Chu ("complainant") against
Judge Camilo E. Tamin ("respondent judge") of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur ("Branch 23").
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz ("CENRO dela Cruz")
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IX,
applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz
claimed that complainant was in possession of "forest products of dubious
origin" in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[1] ("PD
705"), as amended. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search
Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber
from complainant's fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On
the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement
agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove
specie) with an estimated value of P183,790.
On 22 September 1999, complainant obtained from Branch 23 a copy of the
complete records of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 364, as certified by
Branch Clerk of Court Ma. Asuncion Pabatao-Lumapas ("Clerk of Court
Lumapas"). On 24 September 1999, complainant again obtained, for the
second time, a copy of the complete records of the case, also certified by
Clerk of Court Lumapas. These certified copies did not contain any
transcript of respondent judge's examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his
witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this administrative complaint.
Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge
issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for
violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998,
respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant
Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat
lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records
of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required
examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four
warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground

that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record of the
"deposition" was "misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence."[2]
In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator
("OCA") of this Court to comment on the complaint, respondent judge, in
his Second Indorsement ("Indorsement") dated 16 December 1999, denied
complainant's allegations. Respondent judge asserted that at around 1:15
p.m. of 9 September 1999, he personally examined a certain Reynaldo
Cuaresma ("Cuaresma"), allegedly a witness of CENRO dela Cruz, before
issuing the warrant in question. He claimed that a transcript of the
examination was included in the records of Search Warrant No. 364.
However, he forwarded the records to the OCA on 30 September 1999 in
connection with his request for the transfer of the case to the RTC, Branch
24, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur ("Branch 24"). In lieu of the original copy,
respondent judge attached to his Indorsement an alleged computer
printout of the transcript, claiming that the time and date of its encoding
was verifiable in the computer files in his office.
Due to the conflicting factual allegations of the parties, the Court directed
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1)
verify from Branch 23 whether respondent judge examined any witness
before issuing Search Warrant No. 364; and (2) secure from Clerk of Court
Lumapas her explanation on the apparent discrepancy between the copy of
the records of Search Warrant No. 364, as forwarded by respondent judge
to the OCA and as obtained by complainant.
In his Report, dated 30 July 2001, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge
Franklyn A. Villegas ("Executive Judge Villegas") stated that he verified the
records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch 23. He found on page 5 of the
records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by
respondent judge on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He attached in his report the
explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas.[3]
In his explanation, dated 11 July 2001, respondent judge reiterated the
claim he made in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a
certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He
explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of
the examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that
the legal researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to
complainant on 22 September 1999 failed, through "pure inadvertence," to
recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to the
fact that at that time, the pages of the records were not yet "physically
paged." He claimed that the pages were numbered only upon preparation of
the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following week. He further
asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5.
Branch 24, however, refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus,
respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for their
transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent
judge as their proper custodian.[4]

Clerk of Court Lumapas affirmed respondent judge's claims and defenses in

her explanation dated 11 July 2001.[5]
In the Resolution of 10 September 2001, the Court referred this case to the
OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
OCA's Findings and Conclusions
In its Report dated 10 December 2002, the OCA found respondent judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended the imposition of a
P5,000 fine. The Report reads in part:
Respondent judge stands firm on his claim that he conducted searching
questions on Reynaldo Charesma [sic]. We find this claim highly suspect.
First, the respondent judge [initially] failed to produce a copy of the
transcript of the searching questions allegedly made on September 9, 1999
and append the same to the record of the case. x x x x The transcript of the
searching questions was, in fact, produced [only] after the filing of the
instant complaint. Further, it was noted that during the hearing of
[complainant's motion to quash Search Warrant] Nos. 281, 282, 283 and
28[4] taken on 21 January 1999 at 9:30 a.m.[,] respondent judge
apparently believes that searching questions need not be in writing. This is
borne by the following exchange during the said hearing:
Atty. R. Rambuyong [Counsel for complainant Alfredo Chu]:
In other words Your Honor, they would not admit that the accused
received copies?

Court:
Is there a rule that the searching question must be in writing?

Atty. R. Rambuyong:
From the Case of HATA versus BAYONA, Your Honor, the Supreme Court
has required. As a matter of fact, I cited that in my supplemental motion
and the Court said that, "mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses is not enough. There must be the deposition in writing, and
under oath of the complainants and his witnesses; and searching questions
should be propounded by the examining Judge." As a matter of fact, there
have been several decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that mere

ceremonial searching questions and answers reiterating the contents of the

affidavits will not be sufficient compliance [there] with.

x x x x.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that respondent judge either did
not conduct the required searching questions, or if he did, he did not put it
in writing. Thus, respondent judge erred because Section 5, Rule 126, [of
the ] Rules of Court specifically [requires such] x x x.
This is a basic legal precept which all judges are expected to be conversant
with. Th[e] Court has often impressed upon judges that as mandated by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and legal profession to
know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given case. In this case,
respondent judge failed to observe an elementary rule which amount[s] to
ignorance of the law, thereby subjecting him to disciplinary action.
(Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Court
The report of the OCA is well-taken.
Section 5, Rule 126[6] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known
to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals,[7] reiterated the requirements of
Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which judges must strictly
observe,[8] as follows:
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining the existence of
probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the

examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions

and answers. (Emphasis supplied)[9]
Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant No. 364, he
complied with the rule that he must "personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses." Respondent judge stated, however, that
the certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include
the transcript of his examination because the clerical staff in his office who
prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so. This explanation
fails to persuade us.
Respondent judge's own Clerk of Court certified twice, first on 22
September 1999 and later on 24 September 1999, that the 29-page copy of
the records obtained by complainant constitutes the entire record of the
matter.[10] This renders improbable respondent judge's claim that the
transcript already formed part of the records but the legal researcher in his
office inadvertently missed it in preparing the copy obtained by
complainant on 22 September 1999. The alleged legal researcher, who
presumably also prepared the second certified copy, could not have
committed the same mistake, twice in a row, within two days of each other.
Curiously, in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999, respondent judge did
not point to his legal researcher's negligence as the cause for the
discrepancy. Neither did respondent judge state that the pages of the
contents of the folder of Search Warrant No. 364 were unnumbered when
complainant requested for copies. What he stated in his Indorsement was
that the records contained a copy of the transcript but the same was already
forwarded to the OCA.
If, as respondent judge claims, he personally examined a certain Cuaresma
as the witness of CENRO dela Cruz, he should have secured the affidavit of
Cuaresma. Respondent judge should also have secured the affidavit of the
unnamed "legal researcher" who allegedly prepared the copies of the
records obtained by complainant. Respondent judge failed to secure their
affidavits to corroborate his claims. Lastly, respondent judge should have
shown Executive Judge Villegas, during the latter's investigation, the
magnetic (hard disk) copy of the transcript allegedly stored in his office
computer. These omissions bolster complainant's claim and
correspondingly weaken respondent judge's defense. As it is, other than
respondent judge's bare claim that he examined a certain Cuaresma, the
only proof on record in his favor is an unsigned computer printout of the
alleged record of the examination. Considering that any one can easily
create and print out such document, it does not suffice to exculpate
respondent judge from administrative liability.
We uphold the OCA's findings that respondent judge, who had earlier
professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed either to examine any
witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce the
examination in writing. His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance
of the law. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the

Constitution and the Rules of Court on search warrant issuance, not to

know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.[11] Specifically, respondent judge failed to conform to the high
standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which mandates that:
Rule 1.01. -- A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence.
Rule 3.01 -- A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
What was said in a case,[12] similarly involving gross ignorance of basic
rules, bears repeating here:
[A judge] is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious
of and conversant with basic legal principles. He owes [it] to the dignity of
the court he sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who
depends on him, to know the law which he is called upon to x x x apply. Not
only that, there would be on the part of the litigants less expense and
greater faith in the administration of justice if there be a belief on their part
that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent
deficiency in their grasp [of] legal principles.
On the Penalty to be Imposed
As recommended by the OCA, respondent judge should be fined P5,000.
On 26 June 2003, in Gregorio Limpot Lumapas v. Judge Camilo Tamin,
[13] this Court dismissed respondent judge from the service for
"disobedience to an order issued by a superior court, as well as for gross
ignorance of the law x x x with forfeiture of all benefits due him except for
accrued leave credits." Thus, the fine of P5,000 should be deducted from
respondent judge's accrued leave benefits.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, guilty of
gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a fine of P5,000 to be
deducted from his accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120365, December 17, 1996 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLE, VS. WILSON B.
QUE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation

of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive
Order (E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz,
a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on
said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol
several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.
[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and
SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the
morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue
and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with
plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended
it at the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao,
accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver
identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs.
When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were
sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting
documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of
transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and
(5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he
could show was a certification[7] from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally
acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate
transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task
Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the
members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under
the coconut slabs.[9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force,
together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The
examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn
tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck,
concealing the tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel
inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two

hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of
3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of
P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck
bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258
pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of
Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic
meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft.,
necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities,
thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he
acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the
trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica
Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut,
gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He
alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th
PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and
Sabal as payment for his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of
lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an
illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber
and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive
portion of the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B.
Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the
accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and
the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the

commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the

government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:[18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as
amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations
on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time
mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest
laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for possession
of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be
convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which
amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other
forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest
Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools

illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to
refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time
of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and
would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but
give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest
products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the
documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber,
plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwoodbased products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates
of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the
succeeding sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber
shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO)
issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has
jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the
lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid,
the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt,
and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present
any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court
found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could
not present a single document to justify his possession of the subject
lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices,
he readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs.
Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest
Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a
xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land
where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")

It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be
transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548
were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land
of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the
purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid
up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final
destination, whichever comes first."
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR
to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11,
1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut
slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not
be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not
visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and
rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was
very much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the
lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by
placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police
authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated
March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the
subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto.
Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not
need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit "8", "8-A")
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on
March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the
concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the
morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was
then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that
he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would
be for personal used (sic) and "x x came from PLTP." (Ibid) The letterrequest was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the
stance of the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of
this kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a

person files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency

gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he
has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as
regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned
the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on crossexamination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of
the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could
recognize the person "x x but they were already reshuffled." (TSN,
February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not
know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this
letter-request, to wit:
"x x x
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the
fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs."
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate
of transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not
take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted
source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any
documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession
of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he
proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest
products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished
under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether

or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277
considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without
the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the
seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous
tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in
violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures
as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was
summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this
manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal
effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant
or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding."
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful
arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles,
and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle
to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before

search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a

crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
search appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal
Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through
Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force
were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler
truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos
Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted
that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police
officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant
could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove
the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of
appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to
prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether
appellants right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The
Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.