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Natural selection has become one of the primary explanatory forces within
biology. With this heuristic nearly any change in a biological system has possible
meaning, as that changes can be interpreted according to evolutionary fitness
rather than randomness. While a rather substantial number of experimental
findings have been unified using this framework, the uniqueness of our tree of
life has led some to question just how generalizable our conception of evolution
and natural selection is. In order to test the universality of our understanding of
natural selection, we need either alien life or artificial life. The latter is the
approach most focused on currently.
In An Evolutionary Approach to Synthetic Biology, Thomas Ray argues
that incorporating what we know about biological life into a digital medium is
necessary in order to evaluate what qualities are universal to life and which are
just common to Earth-based life. He recognizes that this shift from a
physical/chemical medium to a logical/informational medium leads to markedly
different physical laws but believes that this shouldnt interfere with
uncovering underlying fundamental truths. In this paper, I build upon Rays
premise by examining the similarities and differences between biological,
cognitive, and artificial systems to determine if and how natural selection is
shared by these different contexts for the ultimate purpose of evaluating
whether current artificial life implementations are actually alive.
COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Typically, systems that repeat for some duration fall under one of
two types. Periodic systems are cyclical and repeat in self-similar patterns before
eventually terminating. In contrast, chaotically behaving systems feature no
discernible pattern amongst their seemingly random outputs. However, a third
type of system is the focus of this investigation. Complex systems feature both
periodicity and randomness; chaos and order. Minds, bodies, and some types of
artificial life fall under this latter category of systems.
Any system has two essential elements: a set of initial values and a
set of rules for determining subsequent values. Systems are incapable of being
reduced to spatial OR temporal definitions as they are comprised of both. In
order to capture the spatiotemporal quality of systems, the term behavior will
be used to describe the fundamental unit of a system. Furthermore, we will
deem behavior as intelligent if it leads to the system being maintained within
its environment, especially so if the environment is itself changing. If a context
or environment evaluates information positively, that information is recurred
for an additional period of time. In the biological context, this process of
evaluation is identical to natural selection, but the more general term will be
used throughout the remainder of this paper.
Some systems have been demonstrated to be capable of universal
computation, the most complex class of information processing currently known.
To do so, constructive proofs are used by creating basic elements such as NOT,
OR, and AND gates that are known to be foundational steps in the creation of
Turing machines and their equivalents. All of the known computational systems
that occur naturally are of the complex type, as a correlation of behavior
between subsequent states is necessary in order for a signal to travel over time.
ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS
fevers lead to chaotic thought patterns while severe chills lead to shakes and
seizures which are essentially periodical.
Many theories about consciousness have been generated, but very few
have become as influential as Tononi& Edelmans dynamic core hypothesis.
Instead of trying to localize consciousness to an anatomical structure or
neurotransmitter, they examined the informational processing dynamics
accompanying consciousness in order to craft a model of consciousness that
actually has some predictive power. Their proposal is based off of the premise
that consciousness features immense amounts of both integration and
differentiation of information, and because of their general informational
dynamics approach many of their claims may be applicable to complex systems
besides cognition. They propose that consciousness is best understood by the
term dynamic core because it is a non-localized body of highly self-referential
information within the cognitive context.
Their claim about the integrative quality of consciousness stems
from noting that each conscious scene is unified and not decomposable into its
constituent elements. From this they conclude that conscious processing is
constituted by the largest active functional cluster, which they define as the
subset of neural activity that shares more information with itself than with the
rest of the system. Thus, consciousness is the subset of global cognitive
information that is the mostly highly self-referential, or integrated, at a given
time.
Tononi& Edelman also noted that each conscious scene is the result
of a selection from a seemingly infinite number of possible states. Thus, the
occurrence of one conscious state over countless others constitutes a
correspondingly large amount of information, in the classical reduction of
uncertainty sense of the term1. They view this body of information as
deterministic, in that it may lead to different consequences in terms of thought
or action.
From these conceptions of integration and differentiation, Tononi&
Edelman put forth a definition of neuronal complexity as a function of the
average mutual information between each subset and the rest of the system,
believing that this term reflects the number of states of a system that result
from interactions among its elements. While the complexity and informational
1They use this premise to explain a recurring question in philosophy of the mind:
what is the difference between a human and a light diode when both are given
the task of discriminating between light and dark? As a photodiode only has two
states, this represents a very small amount of information. In the case of
cognition, the number of possible states trends towards infinity, leading to a
correspondingly large amount of information.
body. In contrast, programs or creatures in AL implementations are entirely selfreferential. Their code is their form and their form is their code. This is perhaps
equivalent to strands of DNA or RNA floating in primordial ooze, devoid of any
body (which are just as questionably living as virus particles). For biological
systems, a body provides an intermediary layer on which natural selection acts
upon. Whether or not an intermediary body is necessary for real natural
selection and real life remains an open question, as the well-studied examples
of cognition and biology do not exclude what possible forms alien systems might
possess. With biological systems, the physical world provides a Euclidean space
in which forms can interact. In cognition, this space is perhaps of higher
dimensionality but is none the less just as capable of hosting competitions
between different patterns of activation. Whether or not a space is necessary for
a proper context is currently unknown, as programs like Tierra may develop
complex dynamics regardless of their arbitrary, non-Euclidean arrangement in
earlier implementations.
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of current AL implementations is their
inability to generate truly novel functions. Every possible action that a bug or
program can take has already been defined by the designer, and thus any
novelty generated can only occur within the realm of possibility afforded by this
set of functions. Better models of life, again, requires intermediary levels of
information, such that basic elements without single functions, which can be
recombined in a near infinite fashion to perform tasks not designed by the
programmer. This problem is compounded by having narrow definitions of
reproduction, energy consumption, and death. Without generalized causes for
these processes, novel adaptations of evolutionary value cannot be formed in
other words, the solution can be determined.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS