No.

DC-15-08920
ASSOCIATION OF TAXICAB
OPERATORS, USA,
Plaintiff,
V.
DALLAS-FORT WORTH
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD;
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; and
LYFT, INC.;
Defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

44TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY

AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Association of Taxicab Operators, USA, complaining of
Defendant, Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board, respectfully showing the Honorable Court
the following in this civil cause of action brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act:
A. Discovery Control Plan
1. Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 190, Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 3 of
Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.
B. Parties
2.

Plaintiff, Association of Taxicab Operators, USA, (ATO), a domestic non-profit

corporation, is a professional association incorporated in the State of Texas, with its principal place of
business in the City of Dallas, Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff may be contacted exclusively through
the undersigned counsel of record.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION - Page 1 of 13

3. Defendant, Dallas-Forth Worth International Airport Board, (DFW Airport Board) a

governmental entity, is a joint board created by the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth under TEX.
TRANSP. CODE 22.074 for the purpose of operating Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. DFW
Airport Board has previously made an appearance in this case.
4.

Defendant, Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), a foreign corporation, is a California

corporation that is continuously and systematically doing business in the State of Texas as Uber and
Uber Texas. Uber may be served by serving its Texas agent for service of process:
National Registered Agents, Inc., 1999 Bryan, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75201.
5.

Defendant, Lyft Inc., (Lyft), a foreign corporation, is a California corporation that is

continuously and systematically doing business in the State of Texas as Lyft. Lyft may be served by
serving its Texas agent for service of process:
Incorporating Services, Ltd., 3610-2 N. Josey, Suite 223, Carrollton, TX 75007-1603.

C. Jurisdiction
6. The Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants because this controversy arises out of
Defendants operations in the State of Texas, and Plaintiff seeks on behalf of its constituent members a
declaration of the status of their property rights under the Texas Constitution in the value of the DFW
Airport taxicab permits issued to the Plaintiffs constituent members, considering the previously
limited number of airport permits that had been issued by the DFW Airport Board, and the inherent
value that was historically attributed to the DFW Airport taxicab permit from 2008 until August 1,
2015.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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D. Venue
7. Venue is proper in this County, as a substantial part of the events or omissions constituting
the basis for this lawsuit occurred in this County.
E. Statement of the Case
8. Plaintiff seeks, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, to have the Court construe
the scope and effect of Defendant DFW Airport Boards recent enactment of taxicab permit rules that
drastically modified the taxicab permit rules that had been in place for years, and severely devalued the
value of the DFW Airport taxicab permits that had previously been issued by the DFW Airport Ground
Transportation Department from approximately mid-2008 through July 31, 2015. Defendants Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc. are being added as necessary parties to the lawsuit with this amended
petition. The rules previously in place, and the limited number of permits issued over most of the last
decade due to those rules, have been relied upon by Plaintiffs constituent membership of taxicab
drivers -- that derive their business and economic livelihood primarily from transporting passengers to
and from the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (The Airport) -- to be able to develop and
maintain their business at the airport.
9. Prior to the new, minimal taxicab permitting rules being approved by the DFW Airport
Board and made effective on August 1, 2015, the prior, more stringent taxicab permitting rules were in
place for approximately 7 years.

Additionally, until August 1, 2015, based on a 2007 study

commissioned by the DFW Airport Board that found that there were too many taxicabs operating at
the Airport, the DFW Airport Board had a policy of limiting the number of taxicab permits granted to
operate at the Airport, and that limit on the number of airport taxicab permits was in place for close to
a decade, during which time the Plaintiffs constituent members have made long-term business

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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decisions about equipment purchases based on the airport business that they have been able to develop
due to the limited number of DFW Airport taxicab permits that have been issued in recent years.
10. However, apparently due to pressure from Defendants Uber and Lyft and their enthusiasts,
Defendant DFW Airport Board implemented a new set of policies effective on August 1, 2015 that not
only provided Uber and Lyft the ability to legally operate at the Airport, but also unnecessarily
eliminated the limit on the number of permits granted to taxicab operators seeking to maintain business
at the Airport. The DFW Airport Board has stated that the reason for the modification of the taxicab
permitting rules was to allow Uber & Lyft to operate at the Airport and provide more competition and
consumer choice, but the DFW Airport Boards elimination of the limitation of the number of taxicab
permits granted was not necessary to allow Uber and Lyft to operate at the Airport. Additionally, the
permits previously granted to and paid for by Plaintiffs constituent members from 2008 through July
31, 2015 lost a significant part of their value when Defendant DFW Airport Board instituted a policy
effective August 1, 2015 that eradicated the limit on the number of DFW Airport taxicab permits
granted, in contravention to the study commissioned in 2007 by the DFW Airport Board that found
that too many taxicabs were operating at DFW Airport.
11. Furthermore -- critical to the issue of public safety and constituting extreme consumer risk
-- Uber and Lyft have lower operating costs than traditional taxicabs partly because Uber and Lyft
expose their customers to risk that traditional taxicabs do not expose their customers. Specifically,
Uber and Lyft both utilize applications (apps) installed on a consumers smartphone or tablet, and
those company specific applications, as is true anytime a consumer installs an application on their
computer, tablet, or smartphone, require a consumer to agree to the terms and conditions of a
clickwrap agreement. Very few consumers ever read these clickwrap agreements, however, and

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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the terms and conditions of the Uber and Lyft applications are like threatening invaders hiding within a
Trojan Horse, because key provisions of the terms and conditions that Uber and Lyft customers rarely
ever read and understand include a limitation on liability that seeks to protect Uber and Lyft from
lawsuits by their customers, and a waiver of their customers right to a trial by jury of any disputes.
These liability waivers that consumers are likely not aware of and do not understand the significance
of in fact limit Ubers and Lyfts liability (in Ubers case to $500), even in the case where a passenger
is sexually assaulted by an Uber or Lyft driver, or is horribly maimed or killed by a negligent Uber or
Lyft driver.
12. The passengers that utilize taxicab services are not exposed to that extreme risk, because
traditional taxicabs do not require their customers to agree to a liability waiver or arbitration
provision in order to ride in a traditional cab. As a consequence of the lower liability insurance costs
that Uber and Lyft take advantage of as a result of the liability waivers and arbitration provisions that
Uber and Lyft impose on their customers, not only are Uber and Lyft customers exposed to more risk
than customers of traditional cab services, but traditional taxicab operators face an unequal market
opportunity, due to the lower operating costs that Uber and Lyft have due to the lack of consumer
protections Uber and Lyft afford to their customers.
F. Factual Background
13. The Association of Taxicab Operators, USA, is a non-profit corporation organized for
purposes including those of being able to make better equipment purchasing deals and advocating on
behalf of its constituent members, which are taxicab operators that primarily obtain their business from
the airport.1 The airport has a taxicab queue through which in recent years all taxicabs seeking to pick

See Appendix at Exhibit 1

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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up fare paying passengers at the airport must cycle through a line (queue) in order to pick up those
passengers. As of July 31, 2015, there were approximately 1,400 taxicab operators that possessed
valid permits to enter the airport taxicab queue in order to pick up passengers, and on any given day,
an estimated 500 to 700 drivers derive their business from patiently working their way through the
queue to obtain fare paying passengers. Even though the DFW Airport Board has issued a limited
number of taxicab permits in recent years, the airport taxicab queue is a busy place, even under the
permitting and taxicab queue procedures that have been in place in the last decade.
14. Even though they typically work long hours and an overwhelming number of days of the
week in order to have the income they need to have viable businesses as drivers, the Plaintiffs
constituent members have come to rely heavily upon the more predictable amount of business they can
obtain by acquiring the necessary inspections, approvals, and background checks that have been
required of taxicab drivers working the queue at the airport. Plaintiffs constituent drivers have made
long-term financial decisions such as vehicle purchases based on the relative predictability of the
business they can obtain from working hard in the business of transporting airport passengers to and
from the airport.
15. However, in recent months, it has become evident that transportation network companies
such as Uber (and its sub-brands such as Uber X) and Lyft have aggressively sought to obliterate the
permitting process that the DFW Airport Board has had in place for many years now, and Uber and
Lyft have been lobbying aggressively at both the DFW Airport Board level and at the City of Dallas to
accommodate their business models (which are in conflict with the previously established policy at the
airport to limit the number of transportation for hire permits). Uber and Lyft and their electronically
organized enthusiasts have been largely successful at intimidating government officials into

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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acquiescing to their demands for accommodation through electronic flash mobs and hired lobbyists
through an extremely well financed lobbying effort, and the recent decision on May 7, 2015 by the
DFW Airport Board to totally eliminate the taxicab permitting infrastructure at the airport is consistent
with that pressure, as is the establishment of a waiting area for drivers of transportation network
companies separate from the taxicab queue.

Additionally, Uber in particular has been able to

intimidate the Defendant into allowing Uber X drivers to operate older personal vehicles owned by
Uber X at the airport that are older than the 2011 model year and newer vehicles that also must be
Smartway vehicles that taxicab operators are required to use for airport business.
16. The entire culture that has developed at the airport taxicab queue is one based on the
American dream of being able to achieve -- through working hard -- a better life for those taxicab
drivers and the families that depend on them for their livelihood and well being. By eliminating the
previous taxicab permitting structure at the airport, there is real, and not only imminent, but already
underway and ongoing damage to the economic well being of the established airport taxicab drivers,
many of whom are recent immigrants to this country originally from many different nations around
the world that have had difficulty finding work in other fields despite a number of them having
professional backgrounds as engineers or other professions requiring significant educational
achievement.
17. Historically in the last decade or so, in order to obtain a permit to operate a taxicab at the
airport, a driver had to submit their vehicle for a 20-point inspection, file the proper application for a
permit, and submit to a background check. With the elimination of the requirement for an airport
specific permit with background checks -- replaced by Defendant DFW Airport Board adopting a
policy on May 7, 2015 that provided that as of August 1, 2015, any transportation for hire vehicle that

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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has obtained an operating permit from either the City of Dallas or the City of Fort Worth may pick up
passengers at the airport -- Plaintiff is extremely concerned that adequate safeguards are not in place to
protect the public, particularly after an Uber driver that was operating under false pretenses was
arrested on July 31, 2015 for sexual assault of a passenger in Dallas, after having been inadequately
screened by Uber.
18. The eventual average number of taxicab drivers that will be fighting each other for
customers without the maintenance of the permitting status quo that was in place prior to August 1,
2015 is unknown, but with the number of new DFW Airport taxicab permits being granted since
August 1, 2015, the Plaintiffs constituent members have experienced a precipitous increase in the
amount of time that they have to spend in the taxicab queue before reaching the front of the queue line
and being able to pick up an airport passenger, and as a result, the number of airport fares these
hardworking professionals have been able to earn in a day has markedly decreased, severely cutting
the Plaintiffs constituent members income, making is much more difficult for them to pay for the
automobiles they have purchased for cab driving work.
G. Conditions Precedent
19. Plaintiff attests that all conditions precedent to the filing of this lawsuit have been satisfied
or have occurred prior to the filing of this civil action.
H. Plaintiffs Standing to Litigate this Controversy
20. Plaintiff has standing to litigate this controversy as a professional association of taxicab
drivers whose businesses are being harmed by the actions of the Defendant DFW Airport Board.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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Previous litigation between the parties has settled the issue of Plaintiffs standing to sue in a
representational capacity on behalf of its constituent members.2

I. Declaratory Judgment Action

21. Plaintiff seeks, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE 37.001 ET. SEQ., for the court to construe the scope and effect of the DFW Airport Boards
recent modification of the airport taxicab permitting protocol that had been in place for many years,
and determine the rights, status, and legal relationships of the parties. Plaintiff seeks the Courts
determination of their property interests under Article I, Sections 17 and 19 of the Texas Constitution
in the DFW Airport Taxicab Permits that were issued to and paid for by Plaintiffs constituent
members prior to August 1, 2015. Plaintiff incorporates into this Declaratory Judgment Action all
allegations and supporting statements and evidence set forth in this pleading.
J. Request for Temporary and Permanent Injunction
A. Plaintiff Seeks Equitable Relief Available Within the Sound Discretion of the Court
22. Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, a person whose rights, status, or other
legal relations are affected by a statute or municipal ordinance may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the statute or ordinance and obtain a declaration of rights, status,
or other legal relations thereunder Village of Tiki Island v. Premier Tierra Holdings, 2015 WL
1392378 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 2015)(quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE 37.044(a)).
See also Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002)(holding Whether to grant or
deny a temporary injunction is within the trial courts sound discretion.)

See Association of Taxicab Operators, USA v. Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board, 335 S.W. 3d 361
(Tex. App. -- Dallas 2010). See also Tex. Assn of Business v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W. 2d 440, 447 (Tex. 1993).
PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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B. The Prerequisite Requirements for Issuance of Injunctive Relief Have Been Met
23. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to enjoin the Defendant from devaluing the property
rights of Plaintiffs constituent members in the DFW Airport taxicab permits that were paid for by and
issued to Plaintiffs constituent members through July 31, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
65.011(1).
24. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of the
suit until the suit is resolved by a judgment. See City of Dallas v. Wright, 36 S.W.2d 973, 975 (Tex.
1931). See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 65.011(2).
a. Imminent and Irreparable Harm
25. The Plaintiff will suffer harm that is not only imminent and irreparable, but already
underway as of August 1, 2015, and that harm will continue without injunctive relief. Plaintiff has
been and will continue to be damaged by Defendant DFW Airport Boards actions due to loss of
taxicab fare revenue, loss of customers and an impaired ability to develop personal taxicab bookings,
and business goodwill. The injury is irreparable, partly because the economic impact, while clear and
direct, is not conducive to being quantified with reasonable economic certainty.
b. Probable Right to a Permanent Injunction
26. Plaintiff has a probable right to a permanent injunction, as the policy adopted by the
Defendant DFW Airport Board on May 7, 2015 severely reducing the value of the DFW Airport
taxicab permits issued to Plaintiffs constituent members through July 31, 2015 has been and will
continue to be devastating to the economic well being of the dedicated professional drivers that have
been operating with an airport taxicab permit in the last decade, and this satisfies the requirement of
showing a probable right to a permanent injunction as outlined by the Texas Supreme Court in Oil

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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Field Haulers Assn v. Railroad Commission, 381 S.W. 2d 183, 196 (Tex. 1964)(holding that affidavit
testimony that businesses will be destroyed by an order of the Texas Railroad Commission sufficient
to satisfy inquiry regarding probable right to a permanent injunction).
c. No Adequate Remedy at Law
27. Plaintiff requires injunctive relief in order for its constituent members to not lose their
businesses as a result of Defendant DFW Airport Boards actions, and equitable relief is necessary to
avoid economic devastation of Plaintiffs constituent members taxicab businesses.
J. Request for Injunctive Relief Based in Courts Equitable Powers
28. As the only adequate and effective relief for the Plaintiff is injunctive relief based in the
Courts equitable powers under the common law, Plaintiff requests the Court to restrain the Defendant
from severely reducing the value of the property interests of Plaintiffs constituent members in the
DFW Airport taxicab permits paid for by and issued to Plaintiffs constituent members from 2008
through July 31, 2015, in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 680 ET. SEQ. and TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE 65.011 ET. SEQ. In order to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this case, Plaintiff
seeks, upon hearing, a temporary and permanent injunction, ordering Defendant DFW Airport Board,
including the Defendant DFW Airport Boards agents, servants, employees, independent contractors,
attorneys, representatives, and those persons or entities in active concert or participation with them
(collectively, the Restrained Parties) as follows:

(a)

Defendant DFW Airport Board is enjoined from implementing the amendment, adopted
on May 7, 2015, to Chapter 4 of the Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport Board that Remove[s] limitations on the number of
taxicab companies, vehicles and taxicab drivers that are authorized at DFW airport, an

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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amendment3 that virtually eliminates the DFW airport taxicab permitting system that
has been in place for the better part of the last decade;

(b)

Defendant DFW Airport Board shall not issue or honor any new taxicab permits that are
either sought or were acquired after July 31, 2015, during the pendency of this
litigation.
J. Attorneys Fees

29. Pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 37.009, Plaintiff seeks all taxable costs and
reasonable and necessary attorneys fees, as are equitable and just, which are incurred or which may be
incurred in this matter, including all such fees and expenses:
a.

For trial preparations and for conducting a trial;

b.

For any necessary appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeals;

c.

For making or responding to an application for writ of error to the Supreme

Court of Texas;

d.

If an application for writ of error is granted by the Supreme Court of Texas.

30. Because of Defendant DFW Airport Boards actions in eradicating the established taxicab
permitting protocol at the airport, Plaintiff has been forced to engage the services of an attorney to
prosecute this civil action in order to seek a determination of the scope and effect of the Defendants
modification of the DFW Airport Boards ground transportation operating rules. Under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, Plaintiff is entitled to plead with the Court to award a reasonable sum for
the necessary services of counsel in the preparation for and conduct of a trial in this action, and for any
appeals necessary to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Texas. Therefore, the Plaintiff

See Appendix at Exhibit 2

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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makes its plea to the Court for an award of attorneys fees, an award which is authorized by TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE 37.009.
Respectfully Submitted,

_________________________
D. SHAWN STEVENS
LAW OFFICES OF D. SHAWN STEVENS
TEXAS BAR NO. 24034693
P.O. BOX 190268
DALLAS, TX 75219-0268
SHAWN@LAWYERHELP.US
TEL: (972)752-3147
FAX: (972)499-1931
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF,
ASSOCIATION OF TAXICAB
OPERATORS, USA
Certificate of Service
I, D. Shawn Stevens, do hereby certify on this, the 16th day of October 2015, that the
foregoing instrument was served on Defendant Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board, said
service being effected by facsimile. Newly added Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc.
are being served through service of process.

____________________
D. SHAWN STEVENS

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 1

'I

ARTICLE OF INCQRPORATION

OF

IfUD

In lilt Ofb oflhe

8ecnIIwy of StICe of T_

MAY 142001
0'1' Wi '.SIf*In

ASSOCIATION OF UNITED1AXICAB OPERATORS

We die 1lIIdonipod D8I\Inl)lClSOlli oftbe 86e ofei81=n (18))'WI or more, midcuts of!be
IlIlO of T-. 8CliDg 81 inOOiJXlialotS of 8 c:orporaUQllIlllda' die TIlXlI!I busi_ COIPOfIliOll act.
411 bcroby adopt die followiDg erticIa fOr lIlIdI WijMatioa:

ARTICLE ONE
Name ofCorpontioD
no _

ofdle iADjHAation is ASSOCIATION Of UNITa>fAXICAB OPEJtATOIlS.

ARTICLE TWO
Type dCarpanlian

"!be llOipcxatiCII is a NllII1JIOfIt COIpOIIlio:n.

ARTICLE THREE
DwlIIioaofCorponliDII

The period crib duratioD is porpcIDaJ.

ARTICLE FOUR
PuIpose

1biI axpcn1iCIII is a IIOII-pnlfit lIIpIIi2aticm for TuicIb driven_ should _ be miscalllllnlCd

CIt iIlmrproled .. a uaicm.

Ttlc purpose ofdalsCXlijHAlIIioa is. foUows:

L To II

b.

c.
d.
II.

8-

., t1ZJY ad lIIIlawfiaI basiD_ for which _jIOl1di.mS IIIlIY be inCOlponled """"'" die

T_ Ba.sina:II CorporlIIioa At/..

To ck:!lIIIIe ...... pramola die m.aa oflAicob ilJlilI- in Ibc ..-DoII8IlIDd fort Worth

uea.

To plOVide b.. &'1 to lIIXicIb drivers sad their

Ahistaneo ill die proclliUliCllC of 5IIpJIIiGt, equiw'llt and scrvieeslbruugb 1IJlI1Ip and
wholesale ~ To provida Legal lIDd FiDam:iaI serYica to all qualified mcmbcn.
To iIlIprove lIlll\'iees to !be Gilics. GOIIIIlic:s. &I8lOl, au blIsin_1IIId IIllCllllicB.

To iIJlprtm llIxieab drivers IIUIIId8id of opalIIian lIlId prdOllllllllCllIbrough niniDa. drivers

edw:8liDIIII pnl8J'8lllll and JDIIIIitllriDa.

To Improve mstomer sarvico Ihroagh pOlllCltiOJ4ll, markctin& IIdvcrtina IIDll public R1lIIiou.

,.....'i.

"

No pan ofthe Dot earaius efthe c:orpoiation shall inure 10 the beaeSt of; or be distributed to its

members, directors. officas, Dr other private pmons. Except that the corporation shall be

. autbotiZed lIlId empowen:d to pay reasonable compeiIS8liOD for services readered tmd to IlllIke
payments IIIld distributions in fiutbermoe of tho pmpose set forth in lIIe neill.
No substantial part of the activities of the corpDJaIion shall be for canyiDlJ out or atleuiptiJl8 to
iDO_ IllllislatioD.
NOIWithstalidillg &rJy other provisiou of these articles, the ClIIpOI'8Iiou shall DOt l:8rI)' OIl lIII)' other
Edivities Dot permitted to be tarried OD (a) by al:OlpOl1lliOD exempted from federal iDcome lBX
mcler SUQliOIl 'OI(cX3)of'the mtcnW revooue code, or COMSPCndiDa sectioo of'aoy fidure
fcderallllX code. Or by a corporaliOll, coulributions to which IlI'e deductible Wider the sectioII
1'0(cX2) of the iDtemal nMliiiIe code, or corresponding sectioa of lIIi)' fuhire CederallllX code.

Upon dissolutiOD of the corponltiou. lISSeI9 sbaI1 !Ill distribullld for one or mon: - p l JlIIIPOSC
within the mElllIliDlJ ofsectien SOJ(3) of the internal reveaue code, or shall be distributed to Ihe
fcdaal goVernJIIelll, or to SlIite, or local AOvemDilliil Cor II publie pwpose.
Any SUcllllS$OlS not disposed ofby the COW1 of common pleas ofthe colllity in wbicll the
priDcipaI office ofllie corporatioa is located, exclusively for the purpose or to IIICh cq.aaiglioo
or organizatiODs, B!I said court shaI1 dlitlJlmiDe, lllhich 8I'B organized 8Ild operated llIZA:lusively for
IIICh purpose.
ARTICLE FIVE

Requirement

The COl]lOratiou will DOt COIDlnenoe business until it has received &om her me:mbe:s 8
cousidenttion ofthe value of Doe 1II0llSBlld doUIn (I.POO.OO) COlISislinIl ofmonl:)'. labor dliliC, or
property 8CIUBIly received.

ARTICLE SIX

LocaIiOlI md Agent

The &lI'lllIt Bddtuss of ilS iDitial JeBiSleRd office is 7S06 Wesz JohII Capanter FRlllWlI)'. Suite 200.
DIllas, Texas 75247.11iiC1 its initial Je3isterod BgeDt afthal eddre&s is Doufllas A. Ucbc::ndu.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Board ofDin:ctors

The number ofdirectors cooslitutin3 the initial Board ofDireclors is fifteen IIIId the name and
address orlbe persllIiS who Bre to l!OI'Ve as Directors unti1lhe fim: lIIIDuaJ IIlClCliDs ofmcmbeq or
lIlllillheir successors is elected 8IId qus\ified 1II'il:
NAMES AND ADDRESSES ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Mohammad T. Xliaii

2402 MIG Arthur Blvd #1307

lrvin& TllXlIlI, 75062

0.

"

Ankamah AllefIiIJI
5212 KoDy HiD drive

ArlinsloD. T-. 76017

MulugrJ11 B. Gizaw

10435 Eest North_ Hishway lID

DII1aa, TCXlIS, "238

Jimu-
2442 Chaning Dr.
Onmd Prairie, Texas, 7S052
Hinuy A. I>8gDo
8209 Me8dow ROId #2011

n.nu. T-.75231

H.bi SA Hassan
1228 NOJIh BrillIin 1J2T1
Jrvma, TIIUI, 75061

AzmarJIMld
U06 Sopopiiiido blvd
EuIeu, TlllaIS, 76040

XODII Sihlnlh
ll32~Road

IrviD& TlllaIS, 75061

JOSllPIl A&Yctum
2504 Si1vabrook 1Ine 1#705
Adinpm, T-. 76006
Clabrilll Upge
1'1' R-mgbrook #2020

Arlington, Texas, 76010

ClIIaTGYGb
307 Vine Snct 1#128
Eul-. Taxas, 76040

AbdlIA.Amm

2791 JcmIoo Cir. flI16F

Da1lu, TClDI, 75229
1lftwly S4llela

1423 W.-su Road '141

ArliDgtou, Texas, 76010

'

S1Illllai ADpalllll8!w1

3110 Poc8IilIIo S1I1llil

IrviJIll, TBIl8II, 75062.

Dou3'lIS A. O. Ucbcadll
3]09 Wesz NOI1IIpIl;l Drlw 111025

IrviD& TllIl8II, 75062

ARTICLE EIGHT

Powa-oflhQ Bo8nI

The Board ofDinll:tors shaD have !be JlOMI'Io maIw. alter. 8IIIllIId or repeal the byl_ orlbe

COlpOilllion or 10 adopt DIlW bybnrtI.

ARTICLENlNE
.

IIldemnlfiCllljoD

The COIpwmon IhallIo die fhlIesr exteIIt 10 which it il ampoWllllld 10 do 80 by die TGIl8S
BusiDBII Corpondioa set or lIII)' other applicabla lawllS msy from tima 10 time ill afl'llCI,
indmmifY lII1Y JIllI'SOD who was, ill or iIIlbre8lenBd 10 lie made e party 10 llIIY t1uiOlllim.m, peodins
or camplded ectioo, nit or procmD& wbdher civil, crimimll, edmiDi&tralive or iDvosliptlva,
by reasoa oflhe tlu:t Ihet he ill or W1llI8 diJeclor or officer oftbe COI]lOiilliOll, or ill or WlIlIlICrYiq
IIllberequest oflbecorpwatillllllS 1I direclb., ofti=~ liIiiployee, lIpIIt, or simiIIr
filagjOlllll)' of OIlolller eJlIPWIllioll, lniIl or oI!IIlr Iliiteiprise, IlIIIliIIBt 111 mqllIiillll ('iIlc:llllliDa
IIlImDey'B rOllll),~ !iDes aad amoilllll paid iD !9It1_tlldull BJUlreuan""ly iDCIImld
by him ill ~lIII wiIh l5lldi IIl:IioD, IIIit or pnICOllCliiJ3. The GOi]lOIliIioa's ob1ipdOlillllldllr
Ibis r<ction iDdude, but me DOl limiled to, the c:onveainS ohllY rneetin& IIIId lbe CCIlIllidmtion or
1m _ _ thereby, nlIj1Iirad by _
in arde:I- to dr:acrp>iDe lhe clftPbiJity olllll)' om_ 01" c1h__
fDl'iDdcnmilicatiOlL Expenses inc:onal in defending Bcivil or criminallUion, IIUit or proceedina
sba1J be paid by Ibe ~ ill Ild_ of tile fiIlIjl cIisposidon of sudl8dion, lILIit or
proceedina upon receipt of8lilllldenalriDll by or on bl:balfoftbe clirec1or. officer. employee or
llpDI wh<I rDlI)' be cmitled 10 lII1Ch indmmifio:alion, tq "'P")' ouch IlIDCIIIIIt ifi. sIuaIJ uJlimaieIy be
d61ermin1ld thl1l be is ilOt enIitled 10 be inckmnify by \be corplli1Ilion, The COipotatilill'. obIilIIlion
10 lndmnnity ad 10 pn:poY llllplliISClIlIIIder this secdQII arise, IIIId all riBhls gIlIiIiIld 10 clireclor,
om...... amplO)l'ill:S or Il8llJdB hel'llllllllm Ihall WlIi, IIlIbe lime ofoccurrence oflbe li1IiIIliCdon 01"
lMIiIIlo wbicb snch IIClion or CODduet 10 MIlch 81Ich ,cliOD, sui. or pro ccc~iDlI re1IltIls _ flnt
takell or llilllBllBd in (or ClIlIiUed 10 ba takeD or CIIlIIllIBd ill), nlJlllIdless Whllillll1Ch I.ClioD, IlIit or
pr~m rIina i. first thmmmed, ("'IiIi1 eacad or CODIplCllld. NoIWidllll!lndjna 8Y otbllr)llVYillion of
tbeae Bybmu or Articles or CertifIcllIe oflDcolpOllllion oflbe cmporatioD, iIO mion takea by the
QllpoiEJlion, ailhcr by 8IDmufmllilt of the Bylaws or tips I:mIi1ilzlIl of~ of dta or
cdJerwim, shall diminis), or adversely alJed lIII)' riglm 10 indemnification or PJfPiYiiIllIlI of
cxpeiIICll ermud m>der this sectiQll which uball have become vesr88 lIfozesaid prior 10 die dille
IbIIl lOCh mnoodmstt or oIhcr CIOfIIOIBlll Bdiou is ~ Fnr1IJcr, if IliIY pnMsion of !bill SllCtion
&ball be held 10 lie illvaJid or uaeofClnlell!lle, the validity IIild eofClJQ:llbility of the remlinillll
)lfOYisiODS shallililt ill rta'I W5Iy ba pffi>c .00 ctl impaiJ'Id.

or

.. .

ARTICLE TEN
InCOI jlOIatlll'
The 1IIID8 lIIId address ofdle Inco!pontor is:
NAME AND ADDRESS
Hartri Sharif Ali Hassan

1228 NortII BrillliD .227

1rviDg. Texas, 75061
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. J, the undcrsigllM !Dcc>1jIOiidUJ of tills
corpondiOll, have executed thc:sc Articles OflnCOijlOlation Oil this dayO oS .h1i'iOOl.

\-t 9. v''-x

~.Q.. ~ ") ~f "'i-.

HaitIl SIIarif' Ali Ha-.

IncoIpOrlilli'

TIlE STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF DALLAS

Nqr~~Pf
cf/P61 '4!~

TCX4S

II. expua
.
~on

,. v

APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 2

DALLAS FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD

OFFICIAL BOARD ACTION/RESOLUTION
Date
05/07/2015

Committee
Operations

Subject
Amendment to the Code of Rules and Regulations of the
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board - Chapter 4,
Ground Transportation

Resolution #

Action
That the Airport Board approve amendments to Chapter 4 of the Code of Rules and Regulations of the
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board relating to Vehicles for Hire.
Description
This action will approve amendments to Chapter 4, Ground Transportation
Retains conformity with Owner Cities Rules governing Transportation for Hire services
Major revisions include
Require Transportation for Hire companies, such as taxicab or pre-arranged operators, to
obtain either a City of Dallas or City of Fort Worth Operating Authority in order to obtain
Operating Authority at DFW Airport
Enable pre-arranged Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) to be authorized to obtain
Operating Authority at DFW Airport
Remove limitations on the number of taxicab companies, vehicles and taxicab drivers that are
authorized at DFW Airport
Require vehicle operators to obtain either a City of Dallas or City of Fort Worth driver permit in
order to operate at DFW Airport
Remove DFW Airport from issuing driver permits for taxicab or pre-arranged drivers
Justification
Supports our Owner Cities in simplifying and further aligning DFW regulations related to
Transportation for Hire services at DFW Airport
Eliminates redundant permitting fees and administration, and ensures conformity with Owner Cities'
rules governing Transportation for Hire
Enables high demand new transportation service offering which is in conformity with Owner Cities
strategic product offering

D/S/M/WBE Information
N/A - Not subject to the Board's D/S/M/WBE Program Policies (Board policies and amendments).
Contract #

Agreement #

For Information contact

F. Paul Martinez
3-7150

Fund

Purchase Order #

Project #

Action Amount

Revised Amount

$0

$0

External Funding Source

Amount
$0

Resolution #
Additional Information
Per State Law and the 1968 Contract and agreement, these amendments will also need to be
approved by the Dallas and Fort Worth City Councils and will be effective upon such approval being
obtained.

Additional Attachments: N
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE DALLAS-FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD
Section 1. That the attached amendments to the Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport Board be and are hereby approved. Section 2. That the Chief Executive Officer, or
Designee, be and is hereby directed to forward the attached amended Code of Rules and Regulations of the
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board to the Cities of Dallas and Fort Worth along with a request that
their respective City Councils take action to approve same. Section 3. That the Chief Executive Officer, or
Designee, be and is hereby authorized to take such further action as he deems necessary to see to the
passage and enforceability of the attached amended Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas/Fort
Worth InternationalAirport Board.
Approved as to Form by

Approved as to Funding by

Approved as to M/WBE by

Rodriguez, Elaine
Legal Counsel
Apr 23, 2015 11:46 am

Miyashita, Glenn
AVP Capital Planning
Finance
Apr 23, 2015 7:29 am

Lee, Tamela
VP Business Diversity & Dev
Business Diversity and
Development
Apr 23, 2015 12:05 am

SIGNATURE REQUIRED FOR APPROVAL

Approved by

Department Head
Operations
Apr 22, 2015 6:25 pm

Pending
Chief Executive Officer

Date

FILED
DALLAS COUNTY
9/8/2015 12:19:41 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK

CAUSE NO. DC-15-08920

ASSOCIATION OF TAXICAB
OPERATORS, USA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DALLAS-FORT WORTH
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD,
Defendant.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

44TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board (DFW), Defendant, files this Amended
Plea to the Jurisdiction and states:
I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a lawsuit with no cause of action. Plaintiff admits DFW did not violate any law in

adopting the challenged new ground transportation rules. Accordingly, plaintiff does not allege
any protected right which DFW violated. Plaintiff does not claim DFW breached any legal duty
owed to it. Without a valid cause of action, the court does not have jurisdiction. The claim for
declaratory relief does not confer jurisdiction.

The Texas Declaratory Judgment Act is a

procedural device for deciding cases already with a courts jurisdiction. The claim for injunctive
relief likewise does not create jurisdiction. An injunction is a remedial writ that depends on the
existence of jurisdiction of the issuing court. Without a cause of action before it, any decision by
the court would be an advisory opinion which the Texas courts have no jurisdiction to render.
II.

NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALLEGED

A claimant is required to plead a short statement of the cause of action. Rule 47 (a),

TEX. R. CIV. PROC. A cause of action is a wrongful act which effects an injury. Moreno v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990). It consists of a plaintiffs right and the
DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
DAL:925278.2

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defendants act or omission that violated that right. Jones v. Ray, 886 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex.
App.1st Dist. 1994, nwh), citing Stone Fort Natl. Bank v. Forbess, 91 S.W. 674, 676 (Tex.
1936). A plaintiff has no right to recover if the defendant did not breach a legal duty it owed to
the plaintiff. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987). There is no cause of
action alleged in the petition. There is no statement of any legal right of the ATO. There is no
statement of any violation by DFW of any legal right of ATO. Rather, as the court recognized at
the TRO hearing, plaintiff taxicab operators complain of increased competition resulting from
the new ground transportation rules. Plaintiff does not identify any legal duty of DFW to keep
its members free from competition. There is no such duty. The competition laws were enacted
to protect, not prevent, competition. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977), cited with approval in Roberts v. Whitfill, 191 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Tex. App.10th Dist.,
2006).
Plaintiff Association of Taxicab Operators, USA (ATO) is a non-profit corporation
whose members are taxicab operators who primarily obtain their business from operating at
DFW. ATO complains of a decision on May 7, 2015 by DFW to eliminate the prior practice of
taxicab permitting by DFW and replacing it with rules and regulations that allow a for hire
vehicle that has obtained an operating permit from either the City of Dallas or the City of Fort
Worth (the owners of DFW) to pick up passengers at DFW.
ATO complains the new rules will increase competition for its members. the number
of drivers seeking to obtain airport customers could double or triple. Petition, 12. ATO wants
to stop the feeding frenzy which it claims will occur at the airport under the new ground
transportation rules.

Petition, 6.

The allegations are clear.

ATO is complaining about

increased completion.

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

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The list of what ATO does not claim is endless. Tellingly, it does not claim DFW
violated any legal duty owed to it by adopting the new rules. It does not claim DFW violated
any statute or rule. It does not claim DFW does not have the authority to adopt the new rules.
There is simply no claim DFW violated any legal duty to ATO by adopting the new rules.
III.

CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF DOES NOT CREATE JURISDICTION

The Texas Declaratory Judgment Act (TDJA) is a procedural device for deciding cases

already within a courts jurisdiction. Texas Assn. of Business v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d
440, 440 (Tex. 1993). It does not permit the rendition of an advisory opinion. Id. Texas courts
have no jurisdiction to render such opinions. Id. Because there is no cause of action alleged, this
court does not have jurisdiction. ATO cannot use a claim for declaratory judgment to create
jurisdiction.
Even if a declaratory judgment action was permissible, ATO does not assert claims
within the scope of the TDJA.

That act permits a suit to determine any question of

construction or validity arising under [an] ordinance . 37 TEX. CIV. PRACTICE &
REMEDIES CODE, 37.004 (a) (emphasis added) (quoted in 18 of the Petition). Here plaintiff
seeks neither a construction of, nor challenges the validity of, the new ground transportation
rules and regulations relating to vehicles for hire at DFW. Rather plaintiff seeks equitable relief
from the Court to enjoin the Defendant from eliminating the taxicab rules that Plaintiffs
constituent members have relied upon . Petition, 6. There is no claim that DFW did not
have authority to adopt the new ground transportation rules.

There is no claim for the

construction of any of the new rules and regulations. Rather plaintiff seeks to prevent the new
rules from continuing in effect. Plaintiffs lawsuit simply does not invoke the provisions of the
TDJA. The court lacks jurisdiction.

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

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IV.

CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DOES NOT CREATE JURISDICTION

The only claim by ATO is for injunctive relief under the TDJA to have its rights

determined with regards the ability of Plaintiffs constituent members to rely upon the airport
taxicab permitting protocol that has been in place for many years now. Petition, 15. The
injunctive relief claim, however, with no cause of action having been alleged, does not create
jurisdiction of the court. Combining injunctive relief with a declaratory judgment action does
not create jurisdiction. It simply results in two non-jurisdictional claims.
Just as an injunction is a remedial writ that depends in the first instance on the
existence of the issuing courts equity jurisdiction, we have held that the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 37.001 - .011 (Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1994) is merely a procedural device for deciding cases already
within a courts jurisdiction. Texas Assn of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). A litigants request for declaratory relief
cannot confer jurisdiction on the court, nor can it change the basic character of a
suit.
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. 1994).
V.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A.

Standard of Review

A plea to the jurisdiction contests a trial courts subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dept of
Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). It challenges the trial courts jurisdiction over
the subject of the controversy. Am. Pawn & Jewelry, Inc. v. Kayal, 923 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex.
App.Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). The purpose of the plea is not to force the plaintiffs
to preview their case on the merits, but to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiffs
claims should never be reached. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.
2000). In Miranda, the supreme court identified the proper analysis for deciding whether a plea
to the jurisdiction should be granted. Tex. Dept of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 226-27 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, the court

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

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determines whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the courts
jurisdiction to hear the cause. Id.
Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be presumed and cannot be waived. Tex. Assn of Bus.
v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). Because of the fundamental
nature of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must determine whether it has such jurisdiction
once the issue is raised. McClennahan v. First Gibraltar Bank, 791 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Tex.
App.Dallas 1990, no writ). The party seeking judicial relief bears the burden of establishing
that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Tex. Assn of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446.
Courts construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders
intent.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.

If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to

affirmatively demonstrate the trial courts jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate
incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should
be afforded the opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-227. If the pleadings
affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted
without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial
court considers relevant evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the jurisdictional issues
raised. Id. at 227. When the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on
the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id.
If a plaintiff has had the opportunity to amend and the plaintiffs amended pleading still
does not allege facts that would constitute a waiver of immunity, then the trial court should
dismiss the plaintiffs action with prejudice. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639
(Tex. 2004).

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

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B.

Sovereign Immunity Protects DFW

In Texas, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction for

lawsuits against the State unless the State consents to suit. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224; Dallas
County v. Wadley, 168 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. App.Dallas 2005, pet. denied). The sovereign
immunity of the State also applies to the benefit of an instrumentality of the state so that it has
governmental immunity to the extent that it engages in the exercise of governmental functions.
See City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 501 (Tex. 1997); Gates v. City of Dallas, 704 S.W.2d
737, 739 (Tex. 1986).

Here, DFW is engaging in governmental functions.

The Texas

Legislature has determined that the operation and regulation of an airport is a governmental
function performed for a public purpose. TRANSPORTATION CODE, 22.002 (2).
The party suing the governmental entity has the burden of establishing the States
consent, which may be alleged by reference either to a statute or to express legislative
permission. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638. Suing a governmental entity requires the plaintiff to prove
the entitys consent to the suit. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. Without the governments consent
to suit, governmental immunity defeats a courts subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
The TDJA requires that a municipality must be joined in a declaratory judgment action
that involves the validity of an ordinance. 37.006 (b). Here, however, there is no issue about
the validity of the new ground transportation rules at DFW. Thus, the potential governmental
immunity waiver created by that section does not exist. DFW would be entitled to governmental
immunity if ATO were asserting a claim under the TDJA involving construction of the new
rules. There is no such claim, and any effort to construe the Petition to assert such a claim,
would be barred by governmental immunity.

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

DAL:925278.2

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WHEREFORE, DFW requests this Court dismiss for want of jurisdiction the Petition, all
requests for relief and the claim for attorneys fees. DFW requests such further or additional
relief to which it may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jerry L. Beane

Jerry L. Beane
State Bar No. 01966000
jerrybeane@andrewskurth.com
ANDREWS KURTH, LLP
1717 Main Street, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201
214-659-4520 (Phone)
214-659-4778 (Fax)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
DALLAS/FORT WORTH
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD

NOTICE OF HEARING
DFW Airport Boards Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction is set for hearing in the 44th
District Court at 3:00 pm on September 11, 2015.

/s/ Jerry L. Beane

Jerry L. Beane

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 8th day of September, 2015, a copy of the foregoing document was served on
counsel of record by means of efiletexas.gov electronic filing system and via facsimile.

/s/ Jerry L. Beane

Jerry L. Beane

DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARDS AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

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