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ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is
proper.
HELD:
NO. The instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet
resorted to an improper Remedy. The last paragraph of
Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by
certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved
party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision of the[MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a
uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the
rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now
required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review.
A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of
government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it isno different
from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43.
Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91
among these agencies are indicate that the enumeration is
not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of
other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed,
should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates
that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will
not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. Thus
Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA .Petitioner
having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the
decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this
ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the
Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia. However, the MAB, subsequently
issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding that neither the POA nor
the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the
DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a
mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary. Celestial and
Blue Ridge made an appeal. The CA Special 12th Division affirmed the
MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to
approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestials
Motion for Reconsideration. While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue
Ridges petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated
the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the
power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes
the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to
cancel mining contracts and privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges. After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO
279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and
case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has
the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements ba
sed on the followingreasons:The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral
agreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management,
and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987.It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that
manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineral
resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all
lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said
lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources
which include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of
the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to
approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said
agreements.
materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was
no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved
[sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment
of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not
follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water
Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because
violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an
essential element of these laws. People v. Relova not in Point.
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that
their prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v.
Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in
Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused
by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set
or overlapping sets of technical elements.
This contention is also without merit. The issue in Relova is
whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under
the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City
Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We
held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two
laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges
was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling
within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same
act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
We held: The petitioner concludes that: The unauthorized
installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not
the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code];
that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.
The above argument made by the petitioner [is] of course correct.
This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional
provision involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. x x x and from our case
law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position
is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first
sentence of Article IV (22) of the1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section. The first
Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June26, 1969 and with DAR
on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within the
Nueva Vizcaya Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11
September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected
petitioners Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground
that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional
Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area covered was
outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in
conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been
extensively explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director
Samuel Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that
petitioner's request for reconsideration be denied; that the
existing rights of mining claim holders be respected; and, that the
prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized. As regards
petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued
a clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11,
1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB).Petitioner maintained that subject
area was within the Magat River Forest Reservation. On June
11,1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the mining
claims of respondents Alberto G.Bumolo et al. that had been
converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942
andDAO No. 96-40, were given due course. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioners motion .
ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of
the PPA was outside theMagat River Forest Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional
Executive Director Paragas indenying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate
from a single
recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that
as early as May 31, 1989 x x xthe Bumolo group of PD 463 claims
which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO
1-30 group of claims x x x x was confirmed by the Forest
Engineering Section of the region to be outside proclaimed
watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing
government reforestation projects x x x x
The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was
rendered against the petitioner. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny
and/or revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent.
HELD:
NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny
and/or revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of
the Panel of Arbitrators, thus: Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x.
Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case
by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:1.
Disputes involving rights to mining areas; 2. Disputes involving
mineral agreements or permits; 3. Disputes involving surface
owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and 4.
Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the
date of the effectivity of this Act.
The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims,
conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of
mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already
granted and existing. As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an
existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40explicitly
provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit . The
Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration
Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the
requirements and for violation(s) of the terms and conditions
under which the Permit is issued. For renewed Exploration
Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director
shall cause the cancellation of the same. According to Section 5 of
DAO No. 96- 40, Director means the Director of the MGB Central
Office, while Regional Director means the Regional Director of
any MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration
Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes
the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same.
Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-
Phil. 259). The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, argues that the
petitioner's mining patents covered by Torrens Titles were granted only in
1962 by the President of the Philippines, by authority of the Constitution of
the Philippines. Under the then Constitution, except for public agricultural
lands, natural resources which includes all mineral lands, shall not be
alienated. (Art. XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution) Therefore, what the
mining patents issued in 1962 conveyed to petitioner was only the
ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals within the
area covered by the petitioner's Torrens Titles but not the ownership of the
land where the minerals are found.
Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the
locations of its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15,1935
when the Government of Commonwealth was inaugurated. In the absence
of proof that the petitioner's claims were perfected prior to the 1935
Constitution, the provision of the latter with regard to inalienable lands of
the public domain will apply. Further, although the original certificates of
titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the titles of the private
respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the provisions of
the Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance prohibited the
alienation of mineral lands of the public domain.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed.