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Fundamental Principles of

Power System Protection

Course Synopsis

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Barrie Moor

bmoor@powersystemprotection.com.au
www.powersystemprotection.com.au
bmoor9@yahoo.com.au

Slide 2

Disclaimer
z
z

Barrie Moor

The material presented in this module is for Educational


purposes only.
This module contains a summary of information for the
protection of various types of electrical equipment. Neither the
author, nor anyone acting on his behalf, makes any warranty or
representation, express or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, nor assumes
any responsibility or liability for the use or consequences of the
use of any of this information.
The practical application of any of the material contained herein
must be in accordance with legislative requirements and must
give due regard to the individual circumstances.

May 2012

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Course Synopsis

Slide 3

Course Synopsis
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Barrie Moor

Fundamental Concepts of Protection Design


Fault Calculations
Over Current & Earth Fault Protection
VTs & CTs
Fundamentals of Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Protection Signalling
Fundamentals of High Impedance Differential Protection
Fundamentals of Transformer Biased Differential Protection
Fundamentals of Busbar Biased Differential Protection
Fundamentals of Feeder Differential Protection
Auto Reclosing
Capacitor Bank Protection

May 2012

Page 2

Seminar costs will vary depending on attendee


numbers and your individual circumstances.
However, by organising your own in-house
seminar:

You can expect savings of between 40%


and 65%.
Plus you eliminate travel and
accommodation expenses for all of your
attendees.

We provide:

2 or 3 day seminar presentation


All seminar handout material, notes, folders,
CDs, etc
Laptop Computer and Data Projector
Note that we guarantee that all seminars will be presented personally by
our principal engineer and seminar author, Barrie Moor

Each attendee receives:

Two or three day seminar presentation


Hard copy manual with all presentations, plus supporting technical
papers
CD with all printed material, plus considerable extra material and tools,
including:
pdf of seminar colour slides 2 per page
additional technical papers
tools for sequence component analysis of single, double and three
phase faults
tools for grading of IDMT overcurrent relays
tools for distance relay calculations, apparent impedance calculations,
fault resistance, mho and offset mho characteristic load limits
Certificate of attendance

You provide:

Seminar conference room (preferably on-site, within your own facilities)


Whiteboard
Any catering for lunch and tea breaks

To discuss your requirements, or to obtain a firm price quotation,


please contact us at:
enquiries@powersystemprotection.com.au

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 2

Basic Calculations : 3 Phase Fault

ZS

ZL

VS

VR

IF

FAULT CALCULATIONS
An Introduction

IF =

VS LN

VRL N = I F Z L

ZS + ZL

Slide 3

Basic Calculations : Ph - Ph Fault

Slide 4

Basic Calculations : Earth Fault

IF

IF
VS

ZS

VS

ZL

ZS

ZL
Multiple return
paths

IF =

VS LL

= I3PH * 3 / 2

IF =

2 (Z S + Z L )

VS L N
Z S + Z L + ZG

Slide 5

System Impedances
and Fault Calculations

Slide 6

Per Unit Values


z
z
z
z

Transformers
Voltages reflected via turns ratio
Currents reflected inversely to turns ratio
Impedances reflected via (turns ratio)2

Barrie Moor

For those who think this is hard you always


operate in a per unit system !!
= 1.6 x 10-19 Joules / Electron
1 Volt
1 Ampere = 6.25 x 1018 Electrons / Second
A current of 1 Ampere flowing through a resistance
of 1 Ohm produces a voltage drop of 1 Volt and an
energy dissipation of
Joules
Joules
1.6 10 19 Electron
6.25 10 18 Electrons
Second = 1 Second

= 1 Watt

May 2012

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 7

Per Unit Values


z

Slide 8

Per Unit Values and Transformers

But I manufacture 100MVA 132/66kV Transformers, so these


figures of 1 Volt and 1 Ampere dont reflect how I work

100 MVA
132kV
12

100 MVA = 1 pu
On the 132kV side 1 pu voltage = 132 kV
On the 132kV side 1 pu current = 437.4 A
On the 132kV side 1 pu impedance = 174.24

66kV
2

Transfer impedances to the HV side (via (turns))2


132kV

) = 20
12 + 2 (132
66

66kV

20

On the 66kV side 1 pu voltage = 66 kV


On the 66kV side 1 pu current = 874.8 A
On the 66kV side 1 pu impedance = 43.56

Convert impedances to per unit on 100 MVA base


132kV

66kV

20
= 0.1148 pu
174.24

0.1148 pu

Slide 9

Slide 10

NB !!
Per Unit Values and Transformers

Per Unit Values


z

100 MVA
132kV

66kV
12

z
z

NB !!

So, with the same base MVA


And base voltage equal to system voltage
Per Unit impedances remain the same across the transformer

Transfer impedances to the LV side (via (turns))2


132kV

66
) =5
2 + 12 (132

66kV

11kV

132kV

66kV

5
Convert impedances to per unit on 100 MVA base
132kV

66kV

5
= 0.1148 pu
43.56

0.1148 pu

Slide 11

NB !!
Per Unit Values
z
z
z

NB !!

Per Unit Quantities : Change of Base


z

So, with the same base MVA


And base voltage equal to system voltage
Per Unit impedances remain the same across the transformer

10pu@11kV
10pu@11kV==52500A
52500A

11kV

10pu@132kV
10pu@132kV==4374A
4374A

132kV

Slide 12

10pu@66kV
10pu@66kV==8748A
8748A

z
z

66kV

VV ==1.0
1.0pu
pu

Barrie Moor

ZZTOT ==0.1
0.1pu
pu
TOT

Manufacturer base quantities most likely will not match the


base values we wish to use.
We must use a constant MVA base across the entire model.
Base voltages must match system voltages.
For example : Consider a generator step up transformer, with
the manufacturer nominal values
75 MVA
11/145 kV
12.5% impedance on rating
But for fault study simulations, we have chosen
100MVA base
132kV system nominal voltage

IIFAULT ==10.0
10.0pu
pu
FAULT

May 2012

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 13

Per Unit Quantities : Change of Base


z
z
z

z
z
z

Slide 14

Per Unit Quantities : Change of Base

Transformer
75MVA, 145kV, 12.5% impedance
Calculate base impedance
1452 / 75 = 280.33
Convert transformer pu impedance to ohms
280.33 * 12.5% = 35.04

Z NEW

System fault study


100MVA, 132kV
Calculate base impedance
1322 / 100 = 174.24
Hence, for our fault study simulation
35.04 / 174.24 = 20.1%

MVANEW
= Z OLD
MVAOLD

Z NEW

kV
OLD
kVNEW

100 145
= 12.5

75 132

Z NEW = 20.1%

z
z
z

Slide 16

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Classical Fault Study


z

Pre-fault voltages set to 1/0


Pre-fault load currents ignored
Transformers on system voltage tap
(eg. 132/66kV to match system voltages,
even if transformer nominal tap is say 132/69kV)
Shunt impedances ignored (Shunt capacitors, etc)
Zero ohms fault resistance
Generator Sub-transient reactance
Assumes generator contribution to the fault remains at its
maximum

SEQUENCE
COMPONENTS
An Introduction

This is adequate for setting of protection relays


Relay setting calculations will all be on the basis of the same fault
level data, and hence coordination is achieved
C factor of 1.1 usually applied in determining equipment ratings

Slide 17

Sequence Components
z

Positive Sequence
ABC
Equal in magnitude
120 degrees apart
Negative Sequence
AC B
Equal in magnitude
120 degrees apart
Zero Sequence
ABC
Equal in magnitude
In phase

Barrie Moor

Slide 15

Slide 19

Sequence Components

I1

V1
I1

I2

I0
IA

V2
I2
I phase

IB

V0
I0

IC

May 2012

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 21

Slide 20

Sequence Components

Sequence Components

IA = IA 0 + IA 1 + IA 2

IA 1 1
IB = 1 a 2

IC 1 a

a = 1120 0

IA 1 1
IB = 1 a 2

IC 1 a

IB = IB 0 + IB1 + IB 2
= IA 0 + a 2 IA 1 + a IA 2

1 IA0
a IA1
a 2 IA2

1 IA 0
a IA 1
a 2 IA 2

1 1
IA 0
IA = 1 1 a
1 3
1 a 2
IA 2

IC = IC0 + IC1 + IC 2

= IA 0 + a IA 1 + a 2 IA 2

IA 0
IA
IB = [A ] IA
1

IA 2
IC

1 IA
a 2 IB
a IC

IA 0
IA
IA = 1 IB
1 [A ]
IA 2
IC

Slide 22

Slide 23

Sequence Components
Three phase conditions

Sequence Networks
V1 = 1 / 0

V2 = 0

V0 = 0
z

Relay
Location

Z1f
I1

Fault
Location

Z2s

Relay
Location

Source
Zero Sequence Network

Z1s

Source

Negative Sequence Network

Positive Sequence Network

Source

Z0s

Relay
Location

Z2f
I2

Fault
Location

Positive sequence only

Three phase load


Three phase fault
No neutral (earth fault) current

Z0f
I0

Fault
Location

Slide 24

Slide 25

Sequence Networks
3 Phase Fault

3 Phase Balanced Current

I 3 _ Phase _ Fault = I1 =

Balanced currents sum to zero


Positive sequence currents
Negative sequence currents
But zero sequence will sum to 3.Io

Barrie Moor

Source

Positive Sequence Network

V
Z POS

Z1s

Z POS = Z1s + Z1 f

Relay
Location

Z1f
I1

Fault
Location

In =In3.Io
=0

May 2012

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 26

Sequence Components
Phase Phase fault
z

Slide 27

Sequence Networks (A phase)


Phase Phase fault

Positive and Negative sequence components only


And consider the special case where
A phase equal in magnitude but opposite in phase

I1 = I 2
z

Z1s

Relay
Location

Z1f
I1

Fault
Location

Source

Negative Sequence Network

Positive Sequence Network

B to C
Phase to Phase fault

Source

Z2s

z
Relay
Location

Z2f
I2

Fault
Location

A phase
IA1 & IA2 antiphase
Sum to zero
B phase
IB1 & IB2 at 60o
C phase
IC1 & IC2 at 60o
IB = - IC

Slide 28

Sequence Networks (A phase)


Phase Phase fault
I1 = I 2 =

Z1s

Relay
Location

Z1f
I1

Z2s

Relay
Location

V
Z pos + Z neg

z
z

|I1| = |I2| = 50% of 3 phase fault level


Thus |IB| = |IC| = 86.6% of 3 phase fault level
(because of 60o angles)

Since Z1 ~ Z2
|I1| = |I2| = 50%
of 3 phase fault
level

Z2f
I2

Fault
Location

Sequence Components
Phase Phase fault

Source

Negative Sequence Network

Positive Sequence Network

Source

Slide 29

Fault
Location

Slide 30

Sequence Components
Earth Fault

Phase to Phase Example


V1 = 1 / 0

Source

Z1s = 0.10

Relay
Location

Z1f = 0.15
I1

Source

Negative Sequence Network

V1 = 0.5

V2 = 0

Positive Sequence Network

V1 = 0.8

Slide 32

Z2s = 0.10

z
Relay
Location

V2 = 0.5

A phase

positive sequence
negative sequence
zero sequence

Equal in magnitude
and phase

Z2f = 0.15
I2

Fault
Location

V2 = 0.2

Fault
Location

I = 2.0

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 33

Sequence Networks
A Phase Earth Fault

Relay
Location

Z1f

Z2s

Relay
Location

Z0s

Relay
Location

Z2f
I2

Fault
Location

Source
Zero Sequence Network

Z1s

I1

Source

Negative Sequence Network

Source

Positive Sequence Network

Sequence Components
Earth Fault

Slide 34

Z0f
I0

Fault
Location

Fault
Location

Slide 35

Sequence Networks
A Phase Earth Fault

V1 = 1 / 0

V
+ Z neg + Z zero

IB = 0
ZS1

IC = 0

Relay
Location

I NEUT = 3 I 0

ZS2

I1

ZS0

I2

Relay
Location
Zl

Zl

Fault
Location

Fault
Location

Fault
Location

Positive
Sequence

Negative
Sequence

I0

Relay
Location

Zl

Source

Positive Sequence Network

IA = I1 + I 2 + I 0

V2 = 0

Z1s = 0.10

V1 = 0.90
Relay
Location

Z1f = 0.15
I1

Zero
Sequence

V1 = 0.75

Fault
Location

V0 = 0

Source

Source

Z2s = 0.10

V2 = -0.10
Relay
Location

Zero Sequence Network

Z pos

Phase to Ground Example

Negative Sequence Network

I1 = I 2 = I 0 =

Slide 36

Z0f = 0.35

V2 = -0.25

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

Sequence Components
Summary

Z1f
I1

Fault
Location

Z2f
I2

Fault
Location

Source

Zero Sequence Network

Negative Sequence Network

Positive Sequence Network

Z0s

Relay
Location

Z0f
I0

Fault
Location
Fault
Resistance

33xxR_fault
R_fault

Barrie Moor

V0 = -0.50

Fault
Location

Slide 38

Earth Fault current is 3 x Io


Source voltage drop across
Source
Hence,
the fault
resistance will be 3 x Io x R_fault
Z1s
But
the sequence modelZ2s
only has Io
flowing
Relay
So,
include 3 x R_fault in Relay
the model
Location
Location

I0

I = 1.0

Slide 37

V0 = -0.15
Relay
Location

Z2f = 0.15
I2

I = 1.0

Sequence Networks
Resistive Earth Fault

Z0s = 0.15

May 2012

Positive Sequence
Balanced three phase load
Balanced three phase fault
No neutral (earth) current
Negative Sequence
Unbalanced load
Phase to phase fault
No neutral (earth) current
Zero Sequence
Earth fault
Neutral current = 3 . Io
Cannot flow into or out of a delta
Can circulate around (within) the delta

Io = 0

Io = 0

Io = 0

Io
Io
Io
3Io

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Fault Calculations
Sequence Components

Slide 39

Positive Sequence Network


ZS

ZS

LV

LV

HV

Z1HL

HV

Slide 40

Negative Sequence Network


Zfdr

ZS

Zfdr

ZS

LV

LV

HV

Z1HL

HV

Zfdr

Zfdr

Slide 41

Zero Sequence Network


ZS

ZS

Barrie Moor

LV

LV

HV

Z1HL

HV

Zfdr

Zfdr

May 2012

Page 7

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 2

Over Current Protection


z

Over Load Protection

Over Current Protection

Over Current
Protection

Operation to the thermal capability of plant


Primarily for clearance of faults
Some measure of over load protection may be
provided

Overcurrent Relays
Directional Relays
Fuses & Fuse Contactors

Slide 3

Discrimination by Time

z
z
z

Discrimination by Time

Setting chosen to ensure CB nearest to the fault


opens first
Often referred to as
Independent Definite Time Delay Relay
Timing intervals selected to ensure upstream relays
do not operate before CBs trip at fault location
Disadvantage
Longest fault clearing time occurs in section closest
to the power source where fault level is the highest

RELAY A

RELAY B

RELAY C

TIME

Slide 4

RELAY A

0.4 secs
RELAY B

0.4 secs
RELAY C

CURRENT

Slide 5

Discrimination by Current
z
z
z

Discrimination by Current

Apply where fault current varies with fault location


due to intermediate impedance
Set to operate at current values so that only relay
nearest to fault trips its CB
Difficulties

RELAY A

Same fault level at the end of one zone and the start
of the next
Fault levels vary with changing source impedance
(eg. As generators come on and go off line)

Barrie Moor

Slide 6

Relay A cannot distinguish


between a fault here, for
which it needs to operate

May 2012

RELAY B

And a fault here for


which it should not
operate

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 7

Discrimination by Current

Slide 8

Discrimination by Time & Current

FDR OC

B
IAmax

HV OC

IBmax

RELAY A

RELAY B

ICmax

RELAY C

TIME

FDR OC

Significant difference between


currents seen for Faults A & B
Set HV OC to 1.3 x maximum
through current for LV Fault

Time and current


coordination

RELAY A

FDR OC

Instantaneous
element

RELAY B

RELAY C

FDR OC

ICmax

IBmax

IAmax

CURRENT

Slide 10

Discrimination with
Inverse Time Over Current Relays

Inverse Over Current Relays


Time of operation inversely proportional to fault
current

Faster operating times at higher fault levels


Faster operating times for faults nearer to the source

IAmax

RELAY A

Curves generally plotted in log - log or


log(current) linear(time) format

TIME

Slide 11

IBmax

RELAY B

ICmax

RELAY C

Inverse time and


current coordination

RELAY A
RELAY B

Instantaneous
element

RELAY C

ICmax

IBmax

IAmax

CURRENT

Slide 13

Slide 12

Relay Curves to IEC 60255


(BS142)
TIME S tan dard _ Inverse =

z
z

Relay Curves to IEC 60255


(BS142)

0.14 TMS
I
P

TIME Very _ Inverse =

0.02

I = Actual relay current


Relay Settings
TMS = Time Multiplier Setting
P
= Plug (Current) pickup setting
Usual curve for transmission and distribution systems

Barrie Moor

May 2012

13.5 TMS
I
P 1

I = Actual relay current


Relay Settings
TMS = Time Multiplier Setting
P
= Plug (Current) pickup setting
Systems where the fault level decreases significantly
between relaying points

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 14

Slide 15

Relay Curves to IEC 60255


(BS142)
TIMEExtremely _ Inverse =

z
z

Relay Curves to IEC 60255


(BS142)

80 TMS

TIMELong _ Time _ Inverse =

I
P 1

z

I = Actual relay current


Relay Settings
TMS = Time Multiplier Setting
P
= Plug (Current) pickup setting
Grading with fuses

120 TMS
I
P 1

I = Actual relay current


Relay Settings
TMS = Time Multiplier Setting
P
= Plug (Current) pickup setting
Long time thermal protection
Motor & Generator Protection

Slide 16
IDMT Relay Grading Curves
100

Standard Characteristics to IEC 60255


10

Standard Inverse (SI)

Seconds

Relay Characteristic

0.14 TMS
I0.02 1

Very Inverse (VI)

Extremely Inverse (EI)

Long Time (LTI)

13.5 TMS
I 1
80 TMS
I2 1

0.1
100

120 TMS
I1

1 .10
Fault Current

1 .10

Standard Inverse
Very Inverse
Etremely Inverse
Long Time Inverse

Slide 18

Slide 19

TD = Time dial (TMS)


M = Multiple of pick-up current

US Characteristics to IEC 60255


Relay Characteristic

disc.

U1 Moderately Inverse

0.0104

TD 0.0226 + 0.02
M 1

U2 Inverse

5.95

TD 0.180 + 2
M 1

U3 Very Inverse

3.88

TD 0.0963 + 2
M 1

U4 Extremely Inverse *

5.64

TD 0.02434 + 2
M 1

U5 Short Time Inverse

0.00342

TD 0.00262 + 0.02
M 1

Barrie Moor

Electro Mechanical Relays


L FLUX PRODUCED BY SHADING LOOP

FLUX PRODUCED BY INPUT CURRENT

k I

(1-k) I

SHADING LOOP

DISC

TAPPED
COIL

DISC

- L

FLUX PRODUCED BY INPUT

May 2012

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 20

Slide 21

Electro Mechanical Relays


Construction
Time multiplier
(TMS) Settings

Electro Mechanical Relays


Inverse Definite Minimum Time
disc.

Trip Contacts
and
Flag

(continuous adjustable)

Current sensitivity selected by Plugs on the magnetic circuit

Magnetic circuit saturates at extreme over current

Shaded Pole
z

Moving Contact

Limits the minimum operating time


Typically around 20x plug setting
Hence IDMT performance : DM = definite minimum

Time coordination via Time Multiplier setting

Current (Plug)
Settings

Trip Contacts

Higher sensitivity selected via more turns


ie. Same Ampere Turns operating quantity
more turns = less current

Standard Inverse Relay Grading Curves

Adjusted the starting point of the induction disk wrt the fixed trip
contact
Often called Lever Setting

Standard Inverse Relay Grading Curves

100

Adjust TMS to
achieve time
coordination

3.5

If we have
sufficient
margin here

10

Seconds

Seconds

2.5

Then with the same


characteristic, we tend to
have greater margin at
lower currents due to
divergence of the curves

1.5

0.1
100

And since we are usually interested in


operating times of 3 seconds or less,
we may get a better perception if we
use
a linear axis for time . 4
3
1 .10
1 10

0.5

1 .10
Fault Current

1 .10

100

Fault Current

Slide 24

OC
OC

OC
OC

IDMT Curves
4

Must not pick up at < 1.00 pu current


Must pick up at > 1.30 pu current
May not have well defined characteristics between
1.3 and 2.0 pu current

2.5

Electromechanical relays tend to a definite minimum


time at high currents, say > 20 x ISET

3.5

Electromechanical relays

Seconds

IDMT Relay Grading Curves

1.5

Due to saturation of their magnetic circuits


0.5

100

Barrie Moor

0.4 Seconds
Margin

Microprocessor based relays will have a genuine


definite minimum time.

May 2012

1 .10
Fault Current
3

1 .10

0.4 Seconds
Margin

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 26

OC
OC

OC
OC

Instantaneous Element
4

3.5

Reduces tripping time at high fault levels


Allows a the discriminating curves behind the high set
element to be lowered

2.5

Grading of upstream relay now occurs at the instantaneous


setting and not at maximum fault level

Minimises fault damage in both cases

Beware
Simple E/M instantaneous elements may have a
substantial transient overreach on fault currents that
include DC offset

Seconds

IDMT Relay Grading Curves

Set Tx HV inst
element and now
grade here

1.5

0.5

100

1 .10
Fault Current
3

1 .10

Slide 29

Relay Coordination Procedure


z

Slide 30

Relay Current Pick-up Setting

Start with selection of relay characteristic


As far as possible, use relays of the same characteristic
Choose current settings
Determine maximum load current limitations
Determine starting current requirements
As far as possible, select operating current of each upstream relay greater
than that of the successive downstream relay
Coordinate relays via time multipliers to achieve appropriate grading margins
Determine, under various system configurations, the values of short circuit
current that will flow through each protective device
Set relays to give minimum operating time at maximum fault currents
Check performance (discrimination) at lower fault levels
Plot and coordinate relay curves on log/log or log/linear format
Plot to a common current base (across transformers)
Earth faults are considered separately and require separate plots

Set above maximum load current

z
z

Allow for emergency loading conditions


Allow safety margin
Allow for relay reset ratio

Set below the current pickup level of the next


upstream relay
Allow for load pickup current

Slide 31

Load Pickup Current


z
z
z
z
z

Slide 32

Load Pickup Current

Motor starting current


Auxiliary heaters
Transformer magnetising inrush
Capacitor charging current
Lighting loads - 10s to 100s of msec

Filaments and electrodes heating


Arc lamps starting

Hot load pickup

Cold load pickup

May 2012

Load pickup, but now with loss of diversity between


cyclic loads

Voltage recovery pickup

Barrie Moor

Short term loss of supply and subsequent load pickup


currents on return of supply

Pickup currents not as severe as for complete loss of


supply and subsequent hot load pickup
But more motors may still be on-line as under voltage
releases may not have disconnected them

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 33

Slide 34

Relay TMS Grading


z

Relay TMS Grading

Must provide for


CB tripping time (0.1 sec ??)
Relay timing errors
Relay overshoot
CT errors (10% ??)
Safety margin (10% ??)
A typical figure of 0.3 - 0.4 seconds is usually OK
0.3 for numerical relays
0.4 for electromechanical relays
Alternatively calculate a margin
Only necessary for slow tripping times (> 1.0 sec)

Slide 35

Slide 36
OC

OC

OC

OC

OC

Relay TMS Grading

Grading of Parallel Elements


z

Relay Technology
ElectoMechanical
7.5

Timing Error %

Static

Digital

Overshoot Time (s)

0.05

0.03

0.02

0.02

Safety Margin (s)

0.1

0.05

0.03

0.03

Typical margin (s)

0.4

0.35

0.3

0.3

Numerical

Hence for an E/M relay tripping in 0.5 seconds


t = (7.5 + 7.5 + 10)% x 0.5 + 0.1 + 0.05 + 0.1
t = 0.375 seconds

Worst case for grading is with only 1 transformer in service


But this will be an unusual operating condition
E/M & Electronic Relays
Only a single relay setting is available
Hence, effectively no option but to set for the worst case,
namely 1 transformer case
And accept slower performance for system normal,
namely when both transformers are in service
Microprocessor based relays
These relays have multiple setting groups
So, maybe set Group 1 for system normal : 2 transformers
And change to group 2 when one transformer is OOS

Automatically ??
Via SCADA & operator intervention ??

CT Errors

Slide 37

Relay Characteristic

SI( P , TMS , I) :=

0.14 TMS

I
P

z
z

20MVA

Fdr_1 OC
800A FLC

33kV

20MVA

Barrie Moor

300A FLC
Fdr_2 OC
SI 400A
TMS 0.2

11kV

HV OC

3 Fault Levels
2 Tx IN : 10000A
1 Tx IN : 7500A

3 Fault Levels
2 Tx IN : 16000A
1 Tx IN : 12000A

Imax:= 10000

Fdr2_Plug := 400

Imax

Fdr2_TMS := 0.2

Fdr2_Plug

Tripping time at maximum fault level

Fdr2_Tmin := SI( Fdr2_Plug , Fdr2_TMS , Imax)

Fdr2_Tmin = 0.421

So select settings for Feeder 1

Fdr1_Plug := 1000

Given data for Feeder 2

Maximum through fault level occurs when both


transformers are in service
But the maximum individual transformer current flows
when the 2nd transformer is OOS
Need to consider both conditions when grading relays
HV OC

Grade Fdr_1 OC over Fdr_2 OC at the maximum through fault level of 10kA
Set Fdr_1 OC above maximum feeder load of 800A
and check against maximum fault level of 10kA

Grading of Parallel Elements


z

0.02

Required tripping time

Fdr1_Tmin := Fdr2_Tmin + 0.4

Assume TMS = 1.0

Fdr1_TMS_1 := SI( Fdr1_Plug , 1.0, Imax)

This would result in a tripping time of

Fdr1_TMS_1 = 2.971

Hence we can calculate the required TMS to achieve the required tripping time

Imax
Fdr1_Plug

= 25

= 10

Fdr1_Tmin = 0.821

Fdr1_TMS := 1

Fdr1_Tmin
Fdr1_TMS_1

Fdr1_TMS = 0.276
Round Up

May 2012

Fdr1_TMS := round ( Fdr1_TMS + .003, 2)

Fdr1_TMS = 0.28

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Feeder 1

Relay_2 := SI Fdr2_Plug , Fdr2_TMS , I2

Feeder 2

Relay_1 := SI Fdr1_Plug , Fdr1_TMS , I1

n
n

Over Current Protection

SI( Fdr2_Plug , Fdr2_TMS , Imax) = 0.421

SI( Fdr1_Plug , Fdr1_TMS , Imax) = 0.832

_T = 0.411

Tx OC Grading (11kV Base Currents)

Grade Transformer HV OC under the maximum current condition, namely with one transformer OOS

3
2.8

Imax:= 12000

2.6

FLC_33kV:=

2.4

20000000
3 33000

FLC_33kV= 350

130 % FLC_33kV= 455

Set
Allow for 33/11kV ratio

2.2

Tx_HV_Plug := 500
Tx_HV_Plug := 3 Tx_HV_Plug
Tx_HV_Plug = 1500

2
1.8

Fdr Tripping time at maximum fault level

Fdr1_Tmin := SI( Fdr1_Plug , Fdr1_TMS , Imax)

Fdr1_Tmin = 0.769

1.6

Transformer HV OC

Tx_HV_Tmin:= Fdr1_Tmin + 0.4

Tx_HV_Tmin = 1.169

1.4

Assume TMS = 1.0

Tx_HV_TMS_1 := SI( Tx_HV_Plug, 1.0, Imax)

1.2

This would result in a tripping time of

Tx_HV_TMS_1 = 3.297

Hence we can calculate the required TMS to achieve the required tripping time

Tx_HV_TMS := 1

0.8

Tx_HV_Tmin
Tx_HV_TMS_1

Tx_HV_TMS = 0.355

0.6

Tx_HV_TMS := round ( Tx_HV_TMS + .003, 2)

Round up

0.4

Tx_HV_TMS = 0.36

0.2
0
100

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

Fdr 2 OC
Fdr 1 OC

Feeder 1

Relay_1 := SI Fdr1_Plug , Fdr1_TMS , I1

Tx HV

Relay_3 := SI Tx_HV_Plug, Tx_HV_TMS, I3

n
n

Slide 42

SI( Fdr1_Plug , Fdr1_TMS , Imax) = 0.769

SI( Tx_HV_Plug, Tx_HV_TMS, Imax) = 1.187

_T = 0.418

Tx OC Grading (11kV Base Currents)


3

Resetting of Over Current Relays

2.8
2.6
2.4
2.2

Electromechanical relays tend to have a slow reset of


their operating mechanism

Other relays may have

1.8
1.6
1.4

1.2

0.8

0.2
0
100

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

Disk simulation resetting


Instantaneous resetting

This becomes important in auto-reclosing schemes

0.6
0.4

eg. For the disk to rotate back to the stops

E/M relays may not have fully reset before re-application of


a fault via autoreclose
They will thus be partially integrated to the trip and will
require less and less time to reach a trip on each
successive reclosure

Fdr 2 OC
Fdr 1 OC
Tx HV OC

Slide 43

Sequential Operation of Over Current


Relays
z
z

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

As CBs trip, fault current magnitudes and flows will


change
We need to integrate how far each relay progresses
towards tripping in each stage

Slide 44

Directional
Over Current
and Earth Fault
Protection

To determine total tripping times


To ensure relays that should not trip, remain stable

Relay 1 operating time must have a suitable margin


above the total of Relay 2 and the subsequent Relay 3
operations
Relay 1
Relay 2

Barrie Moor

Relay 3

May 2012

Page 7

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 45

Directional Over Current Relays


Application to Parallel Feeders

Directional Over Current Relays


z

z
z
z

Slide 46

Extra discrimination may be achieved by making the


response of the relay directional when current can
flow in both directions
Achieved via voltage (polarising) connections to the
relay
Digital and numeric relay achieve phase
displacements via software
EM & Static relays require suitable connection of
input quantities to the relay

OC

OC
Fdr 1

B
Fdr 2

OC

OC

Apply directional relays at the feeder receiving ends

Typically set to 50% of FLC, TMS = 0.1


Grade below non-directional relays at the source end
Ensure DOC relay thermal rating is OK

Slide 49

Earth Fault Protection


z
z

z
z

Earth Fault Protection

Not suitable for


2:1:1 Current
applications
(Transformer HV
current in the case of
Star/Delta or Delta/Star
through phase/phase
faults)

Implement more sensitive protection responding only to


residual current of the system
Low settings are permissible and beneficial

Slide 50

Earth faults are the most frequent


Earth faults may be limited by earth fault resistance
Earth faults may be limited by neutral earth impedance

EF Prot
OC
OC

Typical settings 20 - 40% x FLC


Time grade in the same manner as for phase OC relays
Beware of the burden that electromechanical relays may
place on CTs at low current settings

EF Prot
OC

OC
EF Prot
OC

Although burden does decrease at very high currents with


saturation of the relays magnetic circuits

Slide 51

Directional Earth Fault Protection


z
z

Directional Earth Fault Protection

Voltage Quantity required to polarise relay


Use the system residual voltage

z
z

This is the vector sum of all three phase voltages


This is thus three times the zero sequence voltage

This voltage will be zero for balanced system


voltages

Slide 52

Normal Load conditions


Three phase events
2 phase events not involving earth

3 . V0 is obtained from a VT with the secondary


connected in a broken delta
Primary star point of VT must be earthed
And to provide the path for zero sequence flux
VT must be
Va
5 limb core type
3 x 1 phase units
Vc

Vb

3.Vo

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 8

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 53

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 54

Fuses
z

Fuses
and
Fuse Contactors

Performance effectively
follows I2t law
Pre Arcing time
Arc time
Fuse Fuse grading
requires that the total I2t of
the smaller fuse be less
than the pre-arcing I2t of the
larger fuse

Slide 55

Fuse
Bullrush Curves
maximum
total I2t

minimum
pre-arcing
I2t

z
z

Used where expulsion gases cause no problem such as in


overhead circuits and equipment
Special materials (fiber, melamine, boric acid, liquids such as
oil or carbon tetrachloride ) located in close proximity to fuse
element and arc rapidly create gases
These produce a high pressure turbulent medium surrounding
the arc
Expulsion process deionises gases them as well as removing
them from arc area
In inductive circuits, transient recovery voltage (TRV) will be
maximum at current zero.

250

200

160

125

80

100

63

50

32

Discrimination between fuse


links is achieved when the total
I2t of the minor fuse link does
not exceed the pre-arcing I2t of
the major fuse link
But note that this applies only
for high speed operation where
there is no heat dissipation
ie. I2t adiabatic performance
As a starting point, a current
rating ratio between fuses of
1.6 - 2 is probably OK
(but this depends on the specific
fuse design)
40

Expulsion Fuses

35

Slide 56

Fuse Rating

Slide 57

Fuses & TRV Performance

Current Limiting Fuses (HRC Fuses)


Current
interrupted at
natural
current zero

Current lags
Voltage by 90
deg

Slide 58

1.5

System
Voltage

0.5

0.5

Fuse Voltage
z

1.5

0.002

0.004

0.006

0.008

0.01

0.012

0.014

0.016

0.018

0.02

0.022

0.024

TRV across
blown fuse
element

Circuit Voltage
Fuse Voltage
Current

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Fuse is designed to insert a large resistance


Hence, prospective level of fault current is reduced
And zero crossing of the current and voltage will be
reasonably in phase TRV significantly reduced
Fuse element is completely surrounded with filler material,
typically silica sand
Arc energy melts the sand, thus inserting the required high
resistance
But this design may have difficulty interrupting low level overloads.
Overcome by
M Effect designs
Spring assisted designs

Page 9

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 59

Slide 60

Tin for M Effect low


overload fuse performance
See later

Current Limiting Fuses

Current Limiting Fuses

Slide 61

Current Limiting Fuses


M Effect for low level overloads
z

Slide 62

Current Limiting Fuses

M Effect : A.W. Metcalf - 1939

Slide 63

Grading Relays with Fuses


z
z

Extremely Inverse curve follows


a similar I2t characteristic
Relay current setting should be
approximately 3 times the fuse
rating
Grading margin of not less than
0.4 seconds recommended

EI( P , TMS , I) :=

Slide 64

Grading Relays with Fuses


z

80 TMS
2

I 1

First relay upstream of the fuse should be set to EI


characteristic
Now to coordinate further upstream relays

Option 1 : Also select EI characteristics


Option 2 : Check also for the possibility of setting

Or

T ' 0.4 t + 0.15

Barrie Moor

May 2012

The next relay to a VI characteristic


And subsequent further upstream relays to SI
characteristics

Page 10

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Over Current Protection

Slide 65

Fuse Contactors
z

High fault level applications

Slide 66

Fuse Contactors
eg

100

40kA fault level


Contactor rated to only 10kA
Fuse operates for all faults above say 7 kA
Contactor and associated protection relay operate for
lower fault levels
Warning the fuse may also have a minimum
breaking capacity and the contactor must be set to
operate above this point

0.1

10kA Contactor
operates for faults
below 7kA

Fuse operates for


faults above 7kA
0.01
100

Barrie Moor

Fuse operation
below 2kA is not
permissible

10

May 2012

1 .10

Fuse
Relay / Contactor
Fuse

1 .10

1 .10

Page 11

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 2

Basic Concepts of Distance Protection


z
z

VOLTAGE
and
CURRENT
TRANSFORMERS

Measure V/I
If this falls below some preset value, a fault is detected and
relay operates

Zfault

DIST

V
= Z
I

fault

Slide 3

Slide 4

Specification of VTs
AS1243 (Superseded by AS60044)

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Protection Class

Percentage voltage
ratio error

Phase displacement
(crad)

1P

2P

5P

VOLTAGE
TRANSFORMERS
Specification to AS60044.1

11 crad
crad == 34.4
34.4 mins
mins

Slide 5

AS60044 : Specification of VTs

Slide 6

AS60044 : Specification of VTs


z

Protection Class

3P

6P

Barrie Moor

Ratio error
(percent)

Phase displacement
(minutes)

Percentage voltage

Percentage voltage

100

FV

100

FV

6.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

240

120

120

120

12.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

480

240

240

240

May 2012

Protection VTs to operate between


V = 0.05 pu
V = Voltage Factor : FV pu
Rated Voltage Factor

Rated Time

1.2

Continuous

1.5

30 s

1.2

Continuous

1.9

30 s

1.2

Continuous

1.9

8h

System
Phase earth in effectively earthed
neutral system
Phase earth in non- effectively
earthed neutral system w e/f tripping
Phase earth in isolated neutral
system

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 7

Slide 8

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

AS60044 : Specification of VTs


z

Voltage Error
KN = rated transformation ratio
UP = actual primary voltage
US = actual secondary voltage

Voltage _ Error _ % =

U P K N U S
100
UP

VOLTAGE
TRANSFORMERS

Phase displacement
Primary and secondary voltage phase difference
Said to be positive when the secondary voltage leads
the primary

Transient Performance

Slide 9

Magnetic Voltage Transformer


Energisation & De-energisation

VT Fundamentals
z

Magnetic VTs

Capacitor VTs

Requirements of VT plus Relay

Slide 10

HV systems

EHV systems
z

In Zone Faults
Out of Zone Faults
Switching

Minimal problems with magnetic VT transient performance


Transient effects typically short term
Energisation
Flux Doubling depending on POW switching
OK since VTs are designed to operate at low flux densities
(also minimises errors in normal operation)
De-energisation
Flux cannot immediately decay to zero
Primary Fault
Collapse of voltage on fault occurrence
Recovery of voltage on fault clearance

Slide 11

Capacitor Voltage Transformer


z
z

Voltage Divider Principles

Use a voltage divider principle to reduce system HV


voltage to a lower level
And then use a lower ratio transformer to

Slide 12

RH

provide final step down ratio to protection relay


provide galvanic isolation

N:1

Voltage divider implemented via capacitors


Loading effects eliminated via series tuning choke

RL . V

RL

RH + RL

Barrie Moor

Voltage across RH varies


with current supplied to
VT burden, ZL

May 2012

ZL

Resistive losses heating effects


Performance varies with load burden

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 13

Thevenin Equivalent Circuit


Equivalent to
resistors in
parallel !!

RL.RH
RL+RH

Slide 15

Capacitor Voltage Transformers : CVTs

Intermediate VT voltage
source reduces as
burden current
increases => errors !!

CH
X

N:1

CH . V

CL

ZL

CH + CL

RL.V
RL+RH

ZL

Resistive losses nil


Performance at 50Hz does not vary with load burden

Slide 16

CVT Thevenin Equivalent Circuit

Equivalent to
capacitors in
parallel !!

CH+CL

Slide 17

CVT Thevenin Equivalent Circuit

Capacitive divider and series


tuning choke with identical
impedance at 50Hz.
Impedances cancel.

CH+CL

CH.V
CH+CL

ZL

Capacitive divider and series


tuning choke with identical
impedance at 50Hz.
Impedances cancel.
CVT loading effects eliminated

CH.V
CH+CL

CH.V
CH+CL

ZL

Slide 19

CVT Transient Performance


z

CVT Transient Performance

Resonances

Low frequency transient response between


z

Slide 20

Resonant effects minimised via simple resistive


damping

Intermediate VT magnetising branch


Thevenin equivalent of main capacitors

CH+CL

High frequency transient response between


z
z

Tuning choke
Capacitance of intermediate VT

High Frequency

X
RP

XP
XM RM

CH.V
CH+CL

XS
CM

RS
N2ZL
ZL

Low Frequency

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 21

Slide 22

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

CVTs and Distance Relay Performance


z

Distance Relay Reach Measurement

Distance Relay Directionality

Distance Relay Problems

Accuracy at Zone reach


Immunity to tripping on reverse faults

CURRENT
TRANSFORMERS

Spurious operation on transients


Eg. On simple de-energisation of feeder

Modern Relays

Specification to AS60044.1
and
Comparison with AS1675

May have special facilities to provide for CVTs

Slide 23

Specification of CTs
AS1675 (Superseded by AS60044.1)
z
z

z
z

Class P CTs
Equivalent to IEC P Class CTs
General purpose protection CT
Not usually used in HV systems
Not usually used in high speed
differential systems
Suitable for slower speed systems
where perhaps a few cycles of
distorted output will not seriously
affect relay performance (eg IDMT &
Def Time relays)
Not generally intended for applications
requiring good transient performance
Turns compensation is permissible

Slide 24

Specification of CTs
AS1675 (Superseded by AS60044.1)

Composite
Compositeerror
error
%
%at
ataccuracy
accuracy
limit
current
limit current
Secondary
Secondary
ref
refvoltage
voltage
at
atALF
ALF
Accuracy
Accuracy
limit
limitfactor
factor

z
z

10 P 60 F15

Class P CTs
Composite Error
RMS value of the errors in the instantaneous values of the actual
secondary current expressed as a percentage of the nominal
secondary current
(ie. Basically the CT error, but via instantaneous values to allow for
both magnitude and phase errors) .. See next slide !!
Secondary reference voltage
RMS value of the secondary terminal voltage on which the
performance of the CT is based
Accuracy limit factor
Factor (applied to the rated primary current) for the accuracy limit
of the CT
ie. Factor (applied to the rated primary current) for which the CT
will comply with the requirements for composite error
If not specified F20 is assumed

Slide 25

Specification of CTs
AS1675 (Superseded by AS60044.1)
z
z

z
z
z
z
z

Class P CTs
Composite Error

KN = Rated transformation ratio


IP = RMS value of primary current
iP = instantaneous value of primary
current
iS = instantaneous value of secondary
current
T = duration of 1 cycle

Barrie Moor

Specification of CTs
AS1675 comparison with AS60044.1
z

EC =

Slide 26

100 1
2

(K N iS iP ) dt
IP
T 0

Square of sum of squares to


compute the RMS value of the
difference between the
instantaneous values of the
nominal and actual currents

May 2012

To convert P Class specification to IEC Specification

AS1675 Class P CT
100/5 5 P 60 F 20

IEC Class P CT
100/5 15 VA Cl 5 P 20

Composite
Error

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 27

Specification of CTs
AS1675 comparison with AS60044.1
z

Specification of CTs
AS1675 comparison with AS60044.1

To convert P Class specification to IEC Specification

AS1675 Class P CT
100/5 5 P 60 F 20

IEC Class P CT
100/5 15 VA Cl 5 P 20

Slide 28

Accuracy
Limit Factor

To convert P Class specification to IEC Specification

AS1675 Class P CT
100/5 5 P 60 F 20

IEC Class P CT
100/5 15 VA Cl 5 P 20

Terminal Voltage
Specified
at FAULT Current
Connected Burden
Specified
at LOAD Current

Slide 30

CT Assignment : Class P CTs


A Current transformer, for general purpose use in an
application NOT requiring good transient performance has
been specified, as per AS60044.1 as

200/1
z

5VA Class 5 P20

What is the maximum fault level (Primary Amps) where


the CT performance is guaranteed?
CTpri x ALF = 200 x 20 = 4000A

Slide 31

Slide 32

CT Assignment : Class P CTs

CT Assignment : Class P CTs

A Current transformer, for general purpose use in an


application NOT requiring good transient performance has
been specified, as per AS60044.1 as

A Current transformer, for general purpose use in an


application NOT requiring good transient performance has
been specified, as per AS60044.1 as

200/1
z

5VA Class 5 P20

200/1

At this fault level, what is the maximum secondary burden


[ie. leads plus relay(s)] in OHMS that the CT can supply.

Rated Burden = VA x 1 x 1 = 5 x 1 x 1 = 5 Ohms


A A
1 1

Barrie Moor

5VA Class 5 P20

What will the CT terminal voltage be under this condition

Vct = I x R = (Isec x ALF) x R = (1 x 20) x 5 = 100V

May 2012

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 33

CT Assignment : Class P CTs

CT Assignment : Class P CTs

A Current transformer, for general purpose use in an


application NOT requiring good transient performance has
been specified, as per AS60044.1 as

200/1
z

Slide 34

200/1

5VA Class 5 P20

It turns out that at the particular substation where this CT is


installed, the maximum fault level is actually only 3kA.
The connected burden of leads and relay is however 6 ohms.

5VA Class 5 P20

What is the equivalent (ie. old) AS1675 specification for


this CT

200/1 5P 100 F20


z

Is this CT adequate to supply the connected burden of 6


ohms at this site specific fault level of 3kA.
Vct = I x R = 3000 x 6 = 15 x 6 = 90V OK !!
200
At fault levels below ALF, we can confirm operation provided
rated terminal voltage is not exceeded

Slide 35

CT Assignment : Class P CTs


200/1

10% increase in voltage


requires a 50% increase in
magnetising current

Class PX CTs : AS60044.1


z

5VA Class 5 P20

Now, tests on the CT reveal that it has an internal resistance


of 1 ohm.
z

Comment on the suitability of using this CT at the 3kA fault


location, but now with a connected burden of 7 ohms.

Class PL CTs under AS1675


Applications requiring good
transient performance
High accuracy high speed
schemes

Vreq = I x Rtot = 15 x (7 + 1) = 15 x 8 = 120V OK


At fault levels above ALF, or if rated terminal voltage is
exceeded, we also need to know CT internal resistance to
confirm suitability.

Magnetising
Magnetising
current
currentat
atknee
knee
point
pointvoltage
voltage
CT
CTknee
knee
point
pointvoltage
voltage

General

Vknee = Vterm + Ialf x Rct = 100 + 20 x 1 = 120V

Jointless core wound from


continuous strip
Turns for each section of the
winding to be uniformly
distributed
Turns compensation not
permissible

CT
CTinternal
internal
resistance
resistance

0.1 PX 200 R5

Slide 43

CTs with multiple tappings


z

z
z

Because the Class PX CT has a uniformly wound


secondary winding, it may be possible to utilise
intermediate ratios
For CT with n terminals, .n.(n-1) ratios may be
available
CT specified as 2400/2000/800/1
May also provide 400/1200/1600/1
Beware of simple interpolation between ratios but
in general
Resistance Ratio (number of turns)
Voltage Ratio (number of turns)
Magnetising current 1/Ratio (inverse of turns)
Recommended to confirm performance of
intermediate ratios with the manufacturer
CT continuous rating
Rating of primary conductor
Rating of secondary : perhaps 2 x In

Barrie Moor

Slide 42

2400

Slide 44

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

2000

1200/1

CURRENT
TRANSFORMERS

800

Transient Performance

May 2012

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

v ( t) := Vm sin( t)

Basic CT Requirement : No Transients

E := L

di
dt

i( t) := Im sin t
2

Isec

Current lags voltage by 90


Current cannot change
instantaneously

Fault Current : Inductive Power System


4

Rct

Rleads

Vk

Rrelay

1
v( t)
i( t)

Ifault

VKNEE =

I FAULT
( RCT + RLEADS + RRELAY )
CTRATIO

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.1

t
Seconds

v ( t) := Vm sin( t)

E := L

Fault_Point = 0.025

i( t) := if t < Fault_Point , 0 , Im sin t

di
dt

v ( t) := Vm sin( t)

E := L

Fault_Point = 0.020

i( t) := if t < Fault_Point , 0 , Im sin t

Fault Current : Inductive Power System

Fault Current : Inductive Power System

v( t)
i( t)

di
dt

v( t)
i( t)

OK
I = 0 at fault inception
I lags V by 90 deg

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

NOT OK
I is not 0 at fault inception

0.1

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

t
Seconds

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.1

t
Seconds

v ( t) := Vm sin( t)

E := L

Fault_Point = 0.020

i( t) := if ( t < Fault_Point) , 0 , Im sin t

di
dt

+ DC_Offset
2

v ( t) := Vm sin( t)

E := L

Fault_Point = 0.030

i( t) := if t < Fault_Point , 0 , Im sin t

di
dt

DC_Offset = 100 % Im
Fault Current : Inductive Power System

Fault Current : Inductive Power System

v( t)
i( t)

NOT OK
I is not 0 at fault inception

v( t)
i( t)

NOW OK
I = 0 at fault inception
I lags V by 90 deg
But now there is DC offset

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.1

t
Seconds

Barrie Moor

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.1

t
Seconds

May 2012

Page 7

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

v ( t) := Vm sin( t)

E := L

Fault_Point = 0.030

i( t) := if ( t < Fault_Point) , 0 , Im sin t

di
dt

Slide 56

+ DC_Offset
2

DC_Offset = 100 % Im
Fault Current : Inductive Power System

DC Offset in the fault current waveform

NOW OK
I = 0 at fault inception
I lags V by 90 deg
But now there is DC offset

v( t)
i( t)

Faults occurring away from voltage peak will result in


DC offset in the fault current waveform
Up to 100% DC offset is possible
DC offset may be positive or negative
But the power system is not purely inductive, so the
DC offset will not continue but will decay
exponentially

z
1

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.1

t
Seconds

Primary Transient Fault Current


System Parameters

.1

Primary Transient Fault Current


. L = 31.416

= 0.1 sec

. L

= 88.177 deg

= 1.823 deg

90. deg

System Parameters

.03

. L = 9.425

= 0.03 sec

. L

= 83.943 deg

= 31.416

= 6.057 deg

90. deg

= 9.425

2
0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

0.16

AC Component
DC Component

0.18

0.2

0.02

AC Component
DC Component

SECONDS

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

0.2

SECONDS

Slide 60

Primary Transient Fault Current


System Parameters

.01

. L

= 72.343 deg

= 17.657 deg

90. deg

DC Offset in the fault current waveform

. L = 3.142

= 0.01 sec

= 3.142

DC component of the fault current will magnetise the


CT core
If the CT core becomes fully magnetised (ie. above
its knee point) it cannot transform the primary current
to a proportional secondary quantity.

2
0

0.02

AC Component
DC Component

Barrie Moor

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

0.2

SECONDS

May 2012

Page 8

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Total Flux : AC Component plus DC Component

( AC + DC )

PEAK

= AC peak

B
V

1 + power _ system
R

power _ system

35

CT Flux (times
AC component)

30

25

20

Imag

15

10

z
z

z
5

0.2

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.4

AC
Flux
AC Flux
DC
Flux
DC Flux
Totla Flux
Total
Flux

Seconds

CT terminal voltage is low based on E = N d/dt


ie Simply enough to drive current through the
connected burden
But in specifying a high flux capability we, by
default, have a high voltage capability
The high knee point is required because of the
flux, not the voltage requirements

Slide 64

Slide 63

CT Specification to provide for


Total Flux : AC & DC Components

( AC + DC )
z

PEAK

X 1
= AC peak 1 +
R1

( AC + DC )

For purely sinusoidal quantities, the VT voltage and


flux requirements are directly related

max =
z

Specify CT Voltage requirement to provide


for the AC & DC Flux requirements

VKNEE

Vmax
N

peak

= VAC

peak

PEAK

X 1
= AC peak 1 +

R1

X1
1 +
R1

VKNEE

rms

rms

To provide for the AC &


Component
DC Components
only

I I FAULT
X
VKNEE
= FAULT
1 + ( RCT (+RCT
+ RLEADS
+ RRELAY
VKNEE
=
RLEADS
+ RRELAY
) )
R
CTRATIO
CTRATIO

So, we can effectively specify the AC & DC flux


requirements by specifying the proportional AC
sinusoidal voltage requirements

Slide 66

35

CT Flux (times
AC component)

X1
= VAC 1 +
R1

30

25

CT Transient Performance

20

15

10

CT must cope with exponentially decaying DC


component of fault current
Normal practice is to allow transient factor of (1 + X/R)

0.1

AC
ACFlux
Flux
DC
DCFlux
Flux
Total
Totla Flux
Flux

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Seconds

Beyond the scope of our discussion

VKNEE =

I FAULT X
1+
( RCT + RLEADS + RRELAY )
CTRATIO R

Barrie Moor

May 2012

At Relaying Point
Or at Zone 1 Reach Point
CT saturation, after relay operation, may be acceptable
Modern microprocessor based relay algorithms may
accommodate some CT saturation

Page 9

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 67

CT Assignment : Class PX CTs


z
z
z
z

Slide 68

CT Assignment : Class PX CTs

A distance relay is employed on a simple radial 132kV system,


with source and feeder impedances as per sketch
All figures are on 100 MVA base.
System operates at nominal voltage ie. Source voltage = 1 /0
Distance relay Zone 1 will be set to 85% of the outgoing feeder

ZS = 0.05 /85

ZS = 0.05 /85

Zfdr = 0.10 /75

132kV
Distance Prot

Zfdr = 0.10 /75

z
z

132kV
Distance Prot

Calculate the relay current (in Amps) for a 3 fault


occurring just in front of it, namely, at the relaying point.
Calculate the fault current (in Amps) for a 3 fault
occurring at the proposed 85% zone 1 reach point.

Slide 69

3 Fault at Relaying Point

Ibase :=

100 MVA
132 kV 3

3 Fault at Zone 1 85% Reach Point

Ibase = 437.387

Zs := rect ( 0.05, 85 deg )

Ibase :=

Zfdr := rect ( 0.10, 75 deg )

Ztot := Zs
Ifault :=

Slide 70

100 MVA
132 kV 3

Ibase = 437.387

Zs := rect ( 0.05, 85 deg )


Zfdr := rect ( 0.10, 75 deg )

Ztot := Zs + 85 % Zfdr
1

Ztot

Ifault = 1.743 19.924i

Ifault = 20

Ifault :=

arg( Ifault) = 85 deg

1
Ztot

Ifault = 1.457 7.29i

Ifault = 7.434
arg ( Ifault) = 78.701deg

XR := tan ( arg ( Ifault) )

XR = 11.43

XR := tan ( arg( Ifault) )

XR = 5.005

Ifault := Ifault Ibase

Ifault = 8748

Ifault := Ifault Ibase

Ifault = 3251

Slide 71

VT
VT == 132000/110
132000/110 volts
volts
CT
CT == 600/1
600/1 0.1
0.1 PX
PX 600
600 RR 55

Slide 72

CT Performance : 0.1 PX 600 R5


3 Fault at Relaying Point

CT Assignment : Class PX CTs

Ztot := Zs

ZS = 0.05 /85

Zfdr = 0.10 /75


Ifault :=

8748A

132kV
X/R=11
Distance Prot

z
z
z
z

3251A
X/R=5

Lead resistance is 2 ohms (loop total)


Connected relay burden is 1 ohm
For the fault at the relaying point, check and comment on
the transient performance of the CT.
For the fault at the proposed Zone 1 reach point, check
and comment on the transient performance of the CT.

Barrie Moor

1
Ztot

CT :=

600
1

Rct := 5
Leads := 2
Relay := 1

Ifault = 1.743 19.924i


XR := tan ( arg ( Ifault) )

XR = 11.43

Ifault := Ifault Ibase

Ifault = 8748

Irelay :=

Ifault
CT

Half of lead loop


resistance for 3 fault

Vk := Irelay ( 1 + XR) ( Rct + 0.5 Leads + Relay)

May 2012

Ifault = 20
arg ( Ifault) = 85 deg

Irelay = 14.58

CT 600V knee point is


INADEQUATE
Vk = 1269

Page 10

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Voltage Transformers
Current Transformers

Slide 73

CT Performance : 0.1 PX 600 R5


3 Fault at Zone 1 85% Reach Point

Transient Performance Equation Aspects

Ztot := Zs + 85 % Zfdr
Ifault :=

1
Ztot

Ifault = 1.457 7.29i

Slide 74

How to determine X/R of power system?

Transient performance for close-in faults?

Transient performance for Zone 1 faults?

Transient performance for 3 phase faults?

Transient performance for 1 phase faults

Ifault = 7.434
arg( Ifault) = 78.701deg

XR := tan ( arg( Ifault) )

XR = 5.005

Ifault := Ifault Ibase

Ifault = 3251

CT :=

600
1

Rct := 5
Leads := 2
Relay := 1

Irelay :=

Ifault
CT

Half of lead loop


resistance for 3 fault

Vk := Irelay ( 1 + XR) ( Rct + 0.5 Leads + Relay)

Barrie Moor

Irelay = 5.419

CT 600V knee point is


ADEQUATE

Vk = 228

May 2012

Current angle from fault study simulation


High fault level & high X/R
Lower fault level & lower X/R due to fdr impedance.
No neutral return current in CT secondary wiring
Neutral return current in CT secondary wiring

Page 11

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 1

V
= Zline + Zload
I

Healthy Conditions:-

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Zs

Z line

Z load

DISTANCE
PROTECTION
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 4

V
= Z fault
I

Fault Conditions:-

Zs

Distance Relay Zones

Z line

ZONE 3
TIME

Z fault

ZONE 2

ZONE 3

ZONE 1

Z load

ZONE 2
LOCATION

DIST

ZONE 1

DIST

LOCATION

DIST

ZONE 1
ZONE 2
TIME
ZONE 3

DISTANCE RELAY TIME DISCRIMINATION

Slide 5

Slide 6

Time and Reach Coordination


of Distance Relays

Distance Relay : Basic Scheme

Reach
Coordination

Time
Coordination

Reach
Coordination

ZONE 1
MEASURER

Time
Coordination
Zone 3

ZONE 2
MEASURER

ZONE 2
TIME
DELAY

ZONE 3
MEASURER

ZONE 3
TIME
DELAY

Zone 2

>1

TRIP

Zone 1

DIST

Zone 2

Zone 1

DIST

DIST

DIST

Basic Scheme

Barrie Moor

October 2010

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 7

Non Switched Distance Relay

Slide 8

Zone Switched Distance Relay


ZONE 3

Z3

A-E

Z1/2

ZONE 1
A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

ZONE 2
B-C

C-A

A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

B-E

C-E

A-B

B-C

C-A

ZONE 3
B-C

C-A

A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

B-C

Fdr

C-A

Z1

ZONE 2
TIMER
ZONE 2
TIMER

ZONE 3
TIMER

ZONE 3
TIMER

ZONE 1
A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

B-C

ZONE REACH
SWITCHING NETWORK

C-A

TRIP

NON-SWITCHED DISTANCE RELAY OPERATION

TRIP

Slide 9

Slide 15

Primary & Secondary Impedances

Fully Switched Distance Relay


STARTERS
A

VOLTS
A
B
C
N
CURRENT
A
B
C
N

Vsecondary = Vprimary / VTratio

Isecondary = Iprimary / CTratio

ZONE 2
TIMER

ZONE 3
TIMER

INCREASE
IMPEDANCE
SETTING
TO
ZONE 2 REACH

INCREASE
IMPEDANCE
SETTING
TO
ZONE 3 REACH

STARTER
TIMER

Vsec ondary
VOLTAGE
&
CURRENT
SWITCHING
NETWORK

VOLTS

Isec ondary

CURRENT

Vprimary

I primary

Zsec ondary = Z primary

MEASURER

CTratio
VTratio

CTratio
VTratio

TRIP

Slide 16

Simple Distance Relay Comparator


z

z
z
z
z
z
z

Simple Distance Relay Comparator

So, firstly, provide a ZSEC replica impedance within the relay to


establish the relays zone of operation
A real element of resistive and inductive components in an
electromechanical relay
An algorithm in a microprocessor based relay
And measure VSEC from the VT
And measure ISEC from the CT
The actual fault impedance will be given by VSEC / ISEC
If VSEC / ISEC < ZREPLICA, fault is in the zone and relay trips
If VSEC / ISEC > ZREPLICA, fault is out of zone and relay restrains
But, how can we easily perform the V / I calculation and comparison
with Z

Barrie Moor

Slide 17

October 2010

IX

I
z

IZ V

IR

Pass CT secondary current (I) thru relay replica impedance Z


This develops a relay internal, or replica voltage IZ
So, the R / X diagram has become a IR / IX voltage diagram, with
I simply being a constant of proportionality (Note: I at 0)

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 18

Operating & Restraining Quantities


Simple Distance Relay Comparator

Slide 19

Simple Amplitude Comparator

IX

Trip Condition
Alternatively
z

z
z
z

V Z
R
I

V
IZr

V I ZR

Operate
Quantity

Restrain
Quantity

IR

Hence, simply compare magnitudes of V and I*Zr


Trip if V < I*Zr
Stable if V > I*Zr
Restraining Quantity : V
Operating Quantity
: I*Zr

Operate = I * Zr

Simple
Beam Balance
Comparator

Restrain = V

And even though this is a voltage diagram where we compare V and IZ,
the IR & IX axes are usually labelled simply as R & X,
since I is just a constant of proportionality

Slide 20

Distance Relay Operation

Distance Relay Does :-

Distance relay does not


Store Current I
Store Voltage V
Compute ratio V/I
Determine this to be impedance to the fault
Check to see if this impedance is less than some preset value
Trip or not trip accordingly
Distance relay simply
Trips if the operating quantity lies inside the trip zone
Restrains if the operating quantity lies outside the trip zone
Operates in a simple GO / NO GO mode

Slide 21

Trip if impedance falls inside a


specified domain in the impedance
plain

V
X

No Trip
I.Zr

Inside = Trip
Outside = No trip
On the edge = Maybe !!

V
Marginal
V
Trip
R

Slide 22

Mho Circle Comparator


z

z
z

Consider the quantities


S1 = I.Zr - V
S2 = V
And set the operating criteria to
be the angle between these
quantities, not their magnitude
Select 90 as the criteria
Remember that the diameter of
a circle always subtends 90 at
the circumference
We have thus established a
circular characteristic,
with diameter of : I.Zr

Slide 23

Induction Cup Angle Comparator

X
I.Zr

S1 = IZ - V

S1
I2
S2
I1

S2 = V

Direction of rotation
depends on the phase
angle between S1 & S2,
either to open or close
the trip contacts

Induction Cup Comparator

Barrie Moor

October 2010

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 24

Phase Angle Comparators


z
z
z

Slide 25

Characteristics easily implemented


Pronounced operation, especially at the relay
characteristic angle
Polarising is available

S1 = I Zr V
S2 = V

Cross Polarising

XS2 =
S2
= Va
Va ++ k.Vbc
k.Vbc /+90
/+90 deg
deg

k.Vbc /+90 deg


A

Healthy Phase Cross Polarising


Memory Polarising
Positive Sequence Polarising

Contract for Reverse


Fault

Expand for Forward


Fault

Slide 26

Close-in Faults : MHO


z

Slide 27

Typical Mho Zones of Protection

Close-in faults are difficult to detect


For unbalanced faults, augment
S2 with some healthy phase
voltage
Modern microprocessor based
relays will most likely use the
positive sequence voltage.
(ref slide 39)
For 3 phase faults, augment S2
with some pre-fault memory
voltage
For 3 phase SOTF events,
special SOTF logic is required

S1 = I Zr V

S2 =V

Slide 28

Quadrilateral Characteristic

Slide 29

Three Phase Load Limits


X

Import Watts

Export Watts

X
Leading pf

Lagging pf
LOAD
R

Barrie Moor

Lagging pf

October 2010

Leading pf

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 30

Quadrilateral Characteristics

3 Phase Load Limits


z

Slide 31

Remember to allow for emergency conditions


eg. A single feeder carrying the load normally shared by 2
feeders
Except for the impedance circle characteristic, load transfer will
vary for
export and import conditions
and with power factor.
Allow a safety margin
And ensure the system operators are aware that the safety
margin has been included
And be aware that some relays have a different characteristic
under 3 phase conditions
This applies especially to old fully switched distance relays

Tall, narrow
quadrilateral for long
feeders : Good load
transfer performance

Z3

Z2
Feeder
Z1

R
QUADRILATERAL

Slide 32

Quadrilateral Characteristics

Slide 33

Load Encroachment Characteristic

Short, wide quadrilateral


for short feeders : Good
fault resistance
coverage

Feeder

z
z
z

Z3

Z2
Z1

Export Load near to unity pf


Import Load near to unity pf
Calculate impedance that
corresponds to max load
Limit characteristics for
export load (3 phase only)
Import characteristic is OK
in this example

R
QUADRILATERAL

Slide 34

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 35

Relaying Quantities
z
z
z
z
z

DISTANCE
PROTECTION

What Voltage will we apply to the relay


What Current will we apply to the relay
3 phase faults
2 phase faults
2 phase to earth faults
1 phase to earth faults

Comparator Connections

Barrie Moor

October 2010

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Zl

Ia
Va

ZL =

Zl

Ib

Ib

Zl

VBC
= 2 ZL
IB

Vb

Zl

Ic

ZL =
ZL =

Zl

Ic

Vc

Zl

Vb

Ia = 0
Va

Vc

This could be used for detection of three phase faults.


However, [except by default in the Earth Fault Comparator
connection (see later)] it is not !

z
z
z

... (1)

2 I
V

... (2)

First equation is not used, except for starters in older style switched
distance relays.
The Second equation is used
This correctly detects three phase faults also.
I = Ib Ic
But Ib = Ic
I = Ib Ic = 2 Ib = 2 I

Slide 38

Slide 39

Phase Phase Comparator


and 3 Phase Performance
VA VB
I A IB

V A 3 30
I A 3 30

AB

Source

Z1s = 0.10

V1 = 0.90
Relay
Location

Z1f = 0.15
I1

Hence this - comparator also correctly detects 3 phase faults

Source

V1 = 0.75

V2 = -0.10
Relay
Location

At the relay location


Vph = 0.65 pu
Iph = 3 pu
VPH 0.65
Therefore
=
= 0.217

IPH

Z1f = 0.15
I1

V1 = 0.75

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

Barrie Moor

V2 = -0.10
Relay
Location

Z0s = 0.15

V0 = -0.15
Relay
Location

Z2f = 0.15
I2

V2 = -0.25

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

Z0f = 0.35
I0

ZS1

Relay
Location

V = (I1 + I 2 + I 0 ) Z1 + I 0 Z 0 I 0 Z1
Z 3
V = I Z1 + I 0 (Z 0 Z1 ) 1
Z1 3

Source
Zero Sequence Network

Negative Sequence Network

Positive Sequence Network

V1 = 0.90
Relay
Location

V0 = 0

Source

Z2s = 0.10

V0 = -0.50

I0

I = 1.0

V = I1 Z1 + I 2 Z 2 + I 0 Z 0

V2 = 0

Z1s = 0.10

Z0f = 0.35

V2 = -0.25

Fault
Location

V = (I1 + I 2 ) Z1 + I 0 Z 0

Source

V0 = -0.15
Relay
Location

Residual Compensation for Earth Faults

Wrong !?

V1 = 1 / 0

Z0s = 0.15

Z2f = 0.15
I2

Fault
Location

Source

Z2s = 0.10

I = 1.0

V0 = 0

Zero Sequence Network

V
= A
IA
z

V2 = 0

Negative Sequence Network

V1 = 1 / 0

Positive Sequence Network

Z=

Phase to Ground Example

V0 = -0.50

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

Z Z1

V = I Z1 + 3 I 0 Z1 0
3 Z1

V = (I + 3 K 0 I 0 ) Z1

Z Z1

...... where K 0 = 0
3 Z1

October 2010

ZS2

I1

Relay
Location

ZS0

I2

Relay
Location

Z1

Z2

Z0

Fault
Location

Fault
Location

Fault
Location

Positive
Sequence

Negative
Sequence

I0

Zero
Sequence

Phase
Voltage

Z1 =

V
I + 3 K 0 I 0

Residually
Compensated
Phase Current

How will this measure for a 3 phase fault ?

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Distance Protection
Fundamentals of Performance

Slide 44
z

Correct !!
At the relay location
Vph = 0.65 pu
Iph = 3 pu
Z0 Z1 0.35 0.15
Residual Compensation K0 =
=
= 0.4444

3 Z1
3 0.15
VPH
0.65
=
= 0.150
IPH + 3 K0 I0 3 + 3 0.4444 1

Therefore

V1 = 1 / 0

V2 = 0

Distance Relay Comparator Connections


V0 = 0
ZONE 1
A-E

V1 = 0.90
Relay
Location

Z1f = 0.15
I1

V1 = 0.75

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

Barrie Moor

Z2s = 0.10

V2 = -0.10
Relay
Location

C-E

A-B

ZONE 2
B-C

C-A

A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

ZONE 3
B-C

C-A

A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

B-C

C-A

Z0s = 0.15

V0 = -0.15

V2 = -0.25

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

ZONE 2
TIMER

Relay
Location

Z2f = 0.15
I2

B-E

Source
Zero Sequence Network

Z1s = 0.10

Source

Negative Sequence Network

Positive Sequence Network

Source

Z0f = 0.35
I0

Z1 =

V0 = -0.50

Fault
Location

I = 1.0

October 2010

V
I + 3 TRIP
K 0 I0

Z1 =

ZONE 3
TIMER

I
NON-SWITCHED DISTANCE RELAY OPERATION

Page 7

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Protection Signalling

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 2

Distance Relay Zone Discrimination

ZONE 3
TIME
ZONE 2

ZONE 3

ZONE 1
ZONE 2

DISTANCE
PROTECTION

LOCATION

DIST

ZONE 1

DIST

LOCATION

DIST

ZONE 1

Protection Signalling

ZONE 2
TIME
ZONE 3

DISTANCE RELAY TIME DISCRIMINATION

Slide 3

AEMC Requirements

Protection Signalling

(Australian Energy Market Commission)

National Electricity Rules : NER

Automatic Access Standards


To maintain system stability

To not constrain inter or intra regional power flows

Slide 5

z
z

Analogue
Digital
Communications Bearers

Maximum Fault Clearance Times (milliseconds)

System Voltage kV

Faulted End

Remote End

Breaker Fail

400kV

80

100

175

250kV to < 400kV

100

120

250

>100kV to < 250kV

120

220

430

100kV

As necessary to prevent plant damage and meet


stability requirements

Microwave
Fibre Optics (OPGW & ADSS)
Radio
Cable Carrier
Power Line Carrier
External Communications Network

Slide 6

Protection Signalling Equipment


z

Protection Signalling Schemes

External stand alone equipment

Duplex operation
Single signal
Multiple signals
Maintenance aspects

z
z

Built into protection relays

Duplex operation
Multiple signals
Maintenance aspects

Barrie Moor

Slide 7

May 2012

Permissive Intertripping
Under Reaching
Over Reaching
Blocking Intertripping
Direct Intertripping
Series Intertripping

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Protection Signalling

Slide 8

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 9

Permissive Intertripping
z
z

Applies primarily to non-switched distance relays


Remote end relay has a dedicated Zone 2 measurer

PROTECTION
SIGNALLING

Two schemes in use

Permissive Intertripping

Zone 2 measurer has detected the fault but has to wait


for expiration of Zone 2 timer before tripping
Signal sent to permit that measurer to trip in fast time

Permissive Underreaching ... PIT signal from Zone 1


(will not signal for faults beyond feeder end)
Permissive Overreaching PIT signal from Zone 2
(may signal for faults beyond feeder end)

Slide 10

Non-Switched Distance Relay


ZONE 1
A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

Permissive Underreaching

ZONE 2
B-C

C-A

A-E

B-E

C-E

A-B

PIS

ZONE 3
B-C

C-A

ZONE 2
TIMER

A-E

Slide 11

B-E

C-E

A-B

B-C

C-A

ZONE 1
MEASURER

ZONE 2
MEASURER

ZONE 3
TIMER

At the feeder remote end,


one of these Zone 2
will have detected
NON-SWITCHED DISTANCE RELAYelements
OPERATION
the fault, but has to wait for
expiration of Zone 2 timer
before tripping is allowed

TRIP

PIR
ZONE 3
MEASURER

ZONE 2
TIME
DELAY

>1

TRIP

&
ZONE 3
TIME
DELAY

Slide 12

Permissive Underreaching
z
z
z

Permissive Overreaching

PUTT : Permissive Underreaching Transfer Trip


Permissive signal sent via the Zone 1
underreaching element
Simply implemented

Slide 13

PIS
ZONE 2
MEASURER

No concerns since a signal is only sent when the fault


is actually on the protected feeder

PIR

ZONE 2
TIME
DELAY

&

>1

TRIP

ZONE 1
MEASURER
ZONE 3
MEASURER

Barrie Moor

May 2012

ZONE 3
TIME
DELAY

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Protection Signalling

Slide 14

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Permissive Overreaching
z
z
z

POTT : Permissive Overreaching Transfer Trip


Permissive signal sent via the Zone 2 overreaching
element
Not simply implemented

Slide 15

PROTECTION
SIGNALLING

Concerns exist since a signal may be sent when the


fault is beyond the protected feeder

Blocking Intertripping

Slide 16

Blocking Signalling
z
z

Slide 17

Distance Relay Blocking Scheme

Local end relay has Zone 2 set to trip in fast time.


Remote end relay sends a signal to inhibit this fast Zone 2 trip.

ZONE 2
MEASURER

ZONE 3

ZONE 2
SHORT
TIME
DELAY

TIME
NORMAL ZONE 2
ZONE 1

ZONE 2
TIME
DELAY

&

FAST ZONE 2

BR

DIST

>1

TRIP

LOCATION

ZONE 1
MEASURER
ZONE 3
MEASURER

Reverse looking Blocking Zone

ZONE 3
TIME
DELAY

REVERSE
LOOKING
ZONE 4

Signal sent from B to 'Block'


the fast Zone 2 of relay A

BS

Slide 18

Blocking Signalling Considerations


z

Blocking Send

Blocking delay timer coordination - Fast Z2


coordination delay setting must allow time for receipt
of blocking signal
For security, 2 signals are sent

Slide 19

POS

BS A

BS A
SYSTEM A
BS A
BLK A

BS B

Different signalling paths

Guard fail scheme provides security in the case of


communication system failure

SYSTEM A
Signalling Equipment

Feeder 'Y' Protection


BS B
SYSTEM B
BS B
BLK B
SYSTEM B
Signalling Equipment

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Protection Signalling

Slide 20

Slide 21

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Blocking Receive & Guard Fail Logic


BR A
BR A

Feeder 'Y' Protection


POS

OR

BR A
GFB A

SYSTEM A

BR B

DIST
PROT
'Y'

POS
GFA

BLK A

GFB

SYSTEM A
Signalling Equipment

BR B

SYSTEM B

BR_A

BR B
BLK B
GFB B

BR_B

1
1

GF_A
SYSTEM B
Signalling Equipment

PROTECTION
SIGNALLING

AND

GF_B

Inhibit
Fast
Zone 2

Direct Intertripping
Series Intertripping

&

Slide 22

Direct Intertrip
z
z
z
z

Slide 23

DIT for CB Fail Event

Trips remote CB directly


Used where security not paramount
Single DIT for back-up protection applications
(eg. CB fail protection)
Duplicate DIT for primary protection applications
(eg. Line end transformer protection)

CB Fail
Prot

DIS

DIR

X uses one signalling path


Y uses a separate signalling path

Slide 24

Duplicate Direct Intertripping


Transf
Prot X

Slide 25

Series Intertrip
z

DIS

DIR

Trips remote CB directly


Security paramount

Increased security over direct intertripping


Reduced reliability compared with direct intertripping

Transf
Prot Y

DIS

DIR

Single SIT for back-up protection applications


(eg. CB fail protection)

Transf
Prot X

DIS

DIR

Duplicate SIT for primary protection applications


(eg. Line end transformer protection)

Transf
Prot Y

DIS

DIR

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Two signals over separate paths

X uses two signals over one signalling path


Y uses two signals over a second signalling path

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Protection Signalling

Slide 26

Series Intertripping

Slide 27

Series Intertrip Send

POS

CB Fail
Prot

SIS A

SIS A&B

SYSTEM A
SIS A

SIS

SIR

SIT A
SYSTEM A
Signalling Equipment

Intertrip Cubicle
SIS B
SYSTEM B
SIS B
SIT B
SYSTEM B
Signalling Equipment

Slide 28

Series Intertrip Receive

Slide 29

Duplicate Series Intertripping


Intertrip Cubicle

SIR A

SYSTEM A

POS

SIR A
SIT A

Transf
Prot X

SIS

SIR

Transf
Prot Y

SIS

SIR

SYSTEM A
Signalling Equipment
SIR A&B

SIR B

SYSTEM B
SIR B
SIT B

SYSTEM B
Signalling Equipment

Slide 30

Duplicate Series Intertrip Send


POS

SIS A

Slide 31

Duplicate Series Intertrip Receive


'X' Intertrip Cubicle

SIS A1

SIR A1

SIS A1

POS

SIR A1

SYSTEM A

SYSTEM A

SIS A2

SIR A2

SIS A2

SIT A1
SIT A2

SIT A1
SIT A2

SIR A2

SIR A

'X' Intertrip Cubicle


SYSTEM A
Signalling Equipment

POS

SIS B

SYSTEM A
Signalling Equipment

'Y' Intertrip Cubicle

SIS B1

SIR B1

SIS B1

POS

SIR B1

SYSTEM B

SYSTEM B

SIS B2
SIR B2

SIS B2

SIT B1
SIT B2

SIT B1
SIT B2

SIR B2

SIR B

'Y' Intertrip Cubicle


SYSTEM B
Signalling Equipment

Barrie Moor

SYSTEM B
Signalling Equipment

May 2012

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Protection Signalling

Slide 32

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 33

Power Line Carrier


z
z

HF signal sent over the transmission line


Coupling Equipment & Line traps

To allow signal injecting


To limit signal distribution

PROTECTION
SIGNALLING
Power Line Carrier

Slide 34

CVTs & PLC Signal Injection

Slide 35

CVTs & PLC Signal Reception

Line Trap

Line Trap
CH

CH

Inject HF Signal

N:1

N:1

CL

ZL

ZL

CL

CH . V
Receive
HF Signal
CH + CL

CH . V
CH + CL

Slide 36

Power Line Carrier


z

Low Power

OK for Blocking Schemes


Probably OK for DIT & SIT schemes
Some concerns for permissive schemes

z
z

Cannot be guaranteed to signal through a fault

Low Power Permissive schemes do seem to work in any case


Quiescent Scheme
Low power under normal circumstances (guard tone)
High Power to guarantee signalling through faults

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

High Impedance Differential Protection

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 2

!!!

Bus Zone Protection Requirements


z
z

HIGH IMPEDANCE
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

M
I
S

Dependability

Busbar Protection
and
Galvanically Connected Plant

E
L

Dependability
Must trip for all in-zone faults
Discrimination
Must not trip for any out-of-zone faults
Security
Against all sources of mal-tripping

&

Security

Speed of operation
As quickly as possible

Slide 4

Internal Fault

CT Connections & Polarity

P1

RELAY

I1

P1
S1

I1

S1

I2

I2

S2
S2
P2

Barrie Moor

P2

Internal Fault

External Fault

RELAY

RELAY

May 2012

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

High Impedance Differential Protection

Slide 8

3 Phase CT Connections

Slide 9

Current Mismatch
z
CT MARSHALLING

z
z

CT Manufacturing Variations
Inequality of CT Burdens
CT Saturation

Highest Fault Current on CT exposed to through fault


Worst possible mismatch is
z
z

Total saturation of the CT on the faulted plant


All other CTs transform perfectly

HZ RELAY

Slide 10

External Fault

External Fault & CT Saturation

CT Saturates :
Magnetising branch
impedance becomes zero

External Fault
Rlead
Rct

High
Impedance
RELAY
Relay
Rlead

RELAY

15000A

5000A

5000A

5000A

VRELAY = IFAULT (R CT + R LEADS )

Slide 12
CTs will saturate under internal fault conditions.
But relay operation is assured provided absolutely all
CTs meet the requirement

Internal Fault

Setting Voltage and Margins


z

Fault current comprises

No additional margin on the setting is required

And considering 0% / 100% CT saturation case

High
Impedance
RELAY
Relay

Hence, employ a DC Stabilised Relay

AC Component
DC Component

This in an unrealistically extreme case


100% safety margin is automatically built in

So, no additional safety margin on setting is required

Barrie Moor

VKNEE 2 VRELAY

May 2012

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

High Impedance Differential Protection

Slide 14

Magnetising
Magnetising
current
currentat
atknee
knee
point
pointvoltage
voltage

CT Selection
z
z

CT
CTknee
knee
All CTs to be the same ratio
point
pointvoltage
voltage
All CTs to have Vk 2.Vsetting
This is an absolute MUST
CT
CTinternal
internal
Preferably Vk 5.Vsetting
resistance
resistance
Need to know
Knee Point voltage
CT Resistance
Class Requirements
Not critical
But easiest to specify class PX CTs
CTs will almost certainly saturate under in-zone fault conditions
Not suitable for connection to other protection relays

0.1 PX 200 R5

Slide 15

Current Operated Schemes


z
z
z

Voltage operated
Current operated, incl
stabilising resistor
Typical current settings
as low as possible, but
> 20% of plant rating
< 30% of fault current

200 ohms
V = I.R
= 0.2 x (200 + 10)
= 42 volts

20% setting is usually OK

Relay
0.2A
10 ohms

Assuming the CT has


been selected to match
plant rating

Slide 16

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Summary
z

Slide 17

Ensure Stability under through faults

VRELAY = IFAULT (R CT + R LEADS )

VKNEE 2 VRELAY
z

HIGH IMPEDANCE
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

Ensure Operation for genuine in-zone faults

Beware of short cut methods

Do not simply set

Preferably
Preferably55times
timestotooptimise
optimise
relay
relayperformance,
performance,but
but22isisthe
the
absolute
absoluteminimum
minimumtotoensure
ensure
reliable
reliablerelay
relayoperation
operation

VRELAY =

Application to other Plant

VKNEE
2

Slide 18

HZ Protn Application to Plant


z
z
z

Slide 19

Auto Transformers

Requires Galvanic Connection


All CT ratios the same
Can Apply To

All CT ratios to
be the same
This CT will carry
maximum current
and hence
dictates ALL CT
ratios

Busbars
Transformers
Generators & Motors
Capacitors
Reactors

Barrie Moor

DIFF

May 2012

But this CT is internal


and may have a single
fixed ratio.
Thus, must be specified
correctly at time of
purchase !!

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

High Impedance Differential Protection

Slide 20

Restricted Earth Fault Protection

Slide 21

Reactors Earthed Neutral

A
CT terminals
near to
protected object
are connected

DIFF

DIFF

DIFF

CT terminals
away from
protected object
are connected

REF

Slide 22

Reactors Floating Neutral

DIFF

DIFF

DIFF

Floating neutral
bus is also protected

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformers and
Sequence Components

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 2

Transformer Current Flows


z

Star / Star Transformer : LV Earth Fault

Current flows in corresponding HV winding


Appears as EF on the HV system also

TRANSFORMERS
and
SEQUENCE COMPONENTS

I1,
I1, I2
I2 &
& I0
I0

DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS

I1,
I1, I2
I2 &
& I0
I0

Slide 4

Transformer Current Flows

Transformer Current Flows

Star / Star Transformer : LV Earth Fault


But, suppose we dont have an upstream power system earth
However, consider the effect of adding a delta connected tertiary winding
HV line current flows in a 2:1:1 ratio
No I0 on the HV system as there is no path for neutral current flow

Slide 5

Star / Star Transformer : LV Earth Fault


Retain the delta connected tertiary winding
But, lets reinstate the generator earth
Power system and delta winding zero sequence current flow
distributions will depend on their relative Z0 impedances

I0
I0
I1,
I1, I2
I2

I0I0

I1,
I1, I2,
I2, I0I0

I1,
I1, I2
I2 &
& I0
I0

I1,
I1, I2
I2 &
& I0
I0

So
So where
where did
did the
the I0
I0 go
go ??
??

Slide 6

Transformers, Sequence Components


and Differential Protection
z

Transformer Current Flows


z

Star/Star transformers, with a delta tertiary winding:


Will have a mismatch between zero sequence current flows
on the HV & the LV windings
It is thus necessary to exclude zero sequence current from
the differential relay protection algorithms
Star/Star transformers, without a delta tertiary winding:
May still have a mismatch between zero sequence current
flows on the HV & the LV windings

Delta / Star Transformer : LV Earth Fault

Current in corresponding HV winding only


Appears as phase to phase fault from the perspective
of the HV system

I1
I1 &
& I2
I2 only
only

The transformer tank can act as a low quality tertiary delta


winding

It is thus still necessary to exclude zero sequence current


from the differential relay protection algorithms

Barrie Moor

Slide 7

I1,
I1, I2
I2 &
& I0
I0

So
So where
where did
did the
the I0
I0 go
go ??
??

May 2012

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformers and
Sequence Components

Slide 8

Transformer Current Flows


z

Transformer Current Flows

Delta / Star Transformer : LV phase to phase fault

Slide 9

Current in 2 LV windings
Current in 2 HV windings
Appears as 2:1:1 fault on the HV system

I1
I1 &
& I2
I2

Star / Delta Transformer : LV phase to phase fault

Current in all 3 LV windings


Current in all 3 HV windings
Appears as 2:1:1 fault on the HV system

I1
I1 &
& I2
I2

I1
I1 &
& I2
I2

I1
I1 &
& I2
I2

Slide 11

Slide 12

30 deg

Sequence Components
Transformer LV ph-ph fault

Sequence Components
Transformer LV ph-ph fault
HV

30 deg

Consider B-C fault on the LV of either of


Star Delta transformer
Delta Star transformer
30 deg phase shift
will shift + 30 deg
Positive seq components
Negative seq components
will shift - 30 deg

LV phase to phase fault


A phase I1 & I2 cancel
B & C phase I1 & I2 are 60o apart

HV distribution is 1 : 2 : 1

LV

I1 & I2 are shifted 30o across the transformer


On two of the HV phases, I1 & I2 are now 120o apart
On one of the HV phases, I1 & I2 are now exactly in phase !!

Slide 13

Transformers, Sequence Components


and Differential Protection
z
z

Compensate for the transformer phase shift


Exclude zero sequence current from the differential
relay protection scheme

Zero sequence current can flow into and out of


earthed star windings
Zero sequence current cannot flow into or out of delta
windings
Zero sequence current can circulate around delta
windings (said to be trapped in the delta)

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformer Protection

Slide 1

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 3

Types of Fault
z
z
z
z
z

TRANSFORMER
PROTECTION

z
z
z
z

Phase-ground faults - from winding to core or winding to tank


Phase-phase faults - between windings
Interturn faults - between single turns or adjacent layers of the
same winding (Buchholz)
Arcing contacts
Local hotspots caused by shorted laminations
Low level internal partial discharges (moisture ingress or design
problems)
Bushing faults (internal to the tank)
Tapchanger faults (often housed in a separate tank)
Terminal faults (external to the tank, but inside the transformer
zone)

Slide 4

Slide 5

Gas Sample

Float

Buchholz Protection

Pressure Relief Device (Qualitrol)

Alarm

Trip
Float

Two floats in the relay:


Upper float

z
z
z

To Tank

detects accumulation of gas


detects loss of oil
Incipient faults

To Conservator

z
BUCHHOLZ RELAY

z
z

Partial discharge
Winding & core overheating
Bad contacts and joints

Spring assisted pressure relief devices


Relieves pressure impulses due to massive internal fault
conditions.
Helps prevent the tank bursting or splitting
Relay contacts are also connected to trip the transformer.

May alarm only or may be set to trip

Lower float
z
z

Since pressure waves travel with a finite velocity, they may


rupture the tank locally before the pressure wave has reached
the pressure relief device, if it is some distance away. Several
units may therefore be required on larger transformers.

detects surge in oil < 100ms


although it does take a finite time for
pressure waves to initiate Buchholz
tripping

Slide 6

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Basic Transformer Protection


z

Fuses
Transformers without CBs
Perhaps to a few MVA
Overcurrent & Earth Fault Protection
Transformers with CBs
Perhaps 5 - 50MVA
Differential Protection
Transformers > 10MVA
z
z
z

TRANSFORMER
PROTECTION

Fast
Can be sensitive
May detect terminal faults also

Barrie Moor

Slide 7

Biased Differential Protection

May 2012

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformer Protection

Slide 8

Slide 9
IT IS NOT THE P1/S1 OR P2/S2
ORIENTATIONS THAT ARE
IMPORTANT, BUT THE
PREFERENCE FOR THE
AWAY SIDES OF THE CTs
TO CONNECT TO THE RELAY

Differential Protection

Differential Protection
CURRENT FLOWS
INTO PLANT

CURRENT FLOWS
OUT OF PLANT

P1

P2

S1

S2

Differential
Relay
CURRENT FLOWS
INTO RELAY
P1

P1

S1

S1

CURRENT FLOWS
OUT OF RELAY

Differential
SIDE OF CT AWAY
FROM PROTECTED
PLANT CONNECTS
TO RELAY

Relay
TRIP
ELEMENT

SIDE OF CT AWAY
FROM PROTECTED
PLANT CONNECTS
TO RELAY

Differential
Relay

Slide 10

Differential Protection of Transformers

Transformer Differential Mismatch

132/66kV
100/1

100A

Slide 11

z
200/1

200A

z
z
z
z

TRIPPING ELEMENT
DETECTS ONLY THE
MIS-MATCH CURRENT

1A

1A

Transformer turns ratio & tap changing


Inrush on energisation (2nd harmonic)
Over excitation (5th harmonic)
CT Mismatch
Some CT Saturation on through faults
Transformer phase shifts
Earth fault (neutral zero sequence) currents

TRIP
ELEMENT
BIAS or
RESTRAINT
ELEMENT

BIAS or
RESTRAINT
ELEMENT

Slide 12

Inrush Current on
Energisation of Transformer

Slide 13

Second Harmonic on Inrush


z

Transformer inrush current on energization.

TRIP
ELEMENT

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Inrush current produces a current from the energizing


side only, appearing as an internal fault.
Inrush current magnitude can be as great as a through
3 phase fault.
This current is characterized by the appearance of
second harmonics, so additional restraint can be
based on this 2nd harmonic signature
Relay setting below the 2nd harmonic level is required
(Ratio of 2nd harmonic to fundamental)

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformer Protection

Slide 14

Second Harmonic on inrush

Slide 15

Fifth Harmonic on over excitation


z

Transformer Inrush Current


12

10

Current
8
6

4
2

Overfluxing, caused by too high a voltage, or too low a frequency.


Increased magnetising current
This is characterized by third & fifth harmonics.
Fifth harmonic restraint to retrain tripping of the differential
element
Typically no user calculations or settings are required
Sustained overfluxing may damage the transformer
Time delayed V/f tripping function (long time)
Especially applicable to generator transformers
z

2
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

Not so necessary for transmission or distribution applications


z

Seconds

Transformer Inrush Current

Frequency can be anywhere from zero to nominal during run-up


and run down
Frequency will not deviate significantly from nominal

Slide 16

Unbalance Currents
z

Bias Differential Protection

Mismatched CTs

Slide 17

CTs do not exactly compensate for transformer turns


ratio
Transformer turns ratio changes with tap changing
Implement a biasing restraint system

P1
S1

Bias Windings

Magnetizing current in the CTs, especially as some


saturation due to DC fault current sets in.

P1
S1

Operating
Winding

The amount of bias is increased under heavy through


fault conditions to compensate for possible CT
saturation

z
z
z

Allow for Transformer turns ratio


Allow for Transformer phase shifts
Eliminate Zero Sequence currents from the relaying system

Slide 19

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 20

CT Connections and Ratios


z
z

TRANSFORMER
PROTECTION

z
z

CONTINUED

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Star/Delta and Delta/Star transformers have a 30 degree phase


shift
Compensate with CTs connected opposite to the transformer
connections. ie:
Star connected CTs on the delta side of the transformer
Delta connected CTs on the star side of the transformer
Phase shift compensated
Zero sequence currents flowing in the transformer star windings
prevented from entering the relaying system
But how do we get the correct delta connection for our CTs ???

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformer Protection

Slide 21

Determination of CT Connection

Slide 22

Determination of CT Connection

Yd11

Dy11

Diff Prot

Diff Prot

D1
D1

D11
D11

CT Primary is star connected


CT secondary is D11 connected
Overall connection is thus YD11

CT Primary is star connected


CT secondary is D1 connected
Overall connection is thus YD1

Slide 23

Star/Delta and Delta/Star Transformers


CT Connection Summary
z

Slide 24

CT Connection Summary
z

Transformer HV is STAR connected


HV CTs are delta connected
HV CTs EQUAL to the transformer phase shift
LV CTs in star

Compensates for the phase shift across a star-delta


transformer.

Prevents any zero sequence currents flowing in the


star winding from entering the relay

And for Star / Star transformers ??

Transformer LV is STAR connected


LV CTs delta connected
LV CTs OPPOSITE to the transformer phase shift
HV CTs in star

The correct vector group must be chosen for the CTs


to ensure that through currents balance.

Since they are not present in the line on the delta side.
It is still necessary to eliminate Io from the relaying
system
Connect CTs delta / delta
Or use the D12 / D12 feature of microprocessor relays

Slide 25

CT YD11 Connections

CT YD1 Connections
A

S2

S2

S1

D11
D11

Slide 26

S1

D1
D1

A phase output is at "11 o'clock"


A phase "S1" connects to B phase "S2"
B phase "S1" connects to C phase "S2"
C phase "S1" connects to A phase "S2"

May 2012

S2
B

S1
C

D11

A phase output is at "11 o'clock"


A phase "S1" connects to B phase "S2"
B phase "S1" connects to C phase "S2"
C phase "S1" connects to A phase "S2"

Barrie Moor

S1
C

S2

S2

S1

D11

S1

S2

S1

S2
S2

C
S1

S2

S1

D1

A phase output is at "1 o'clock"


A phase "S2" connects to B phase "S1"
B phase "S2" connects to C phase "S1"
C phase "S2" connects to A phase "S1"

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformer Protection

Slide 28
Away side of CTs connected to relay.
Hence, transformer current in or out
corresponds to relay current in or out

P1

P2

S1

S2

A1

A2

a2

a1

P2

P1

S2

S1

Transformer Current Flows

There must be a path for the current to flow


There must be an Ampere Turns balance
If there is current flowing in one winding

If there is no current flowing in one winding

z
z
Bias Windings

Operating
Windings

There must be current in the coupled winding


There can be no current in the coupled winding

Notice that the


connections for
the Delta windings
are the same !!
Away side of CTs connected to relay.
Hence, transformer current in or out
corresponds to relay current in or out.

External Phase Earth Fault


P1

P2

S1

S2

A1

A2

a2

External Phase Phase Fault

a1

P2

P1

P1

P2

S2

S1

S1

S2

A1

A2

Bias Windings

a2

a1

Operating
Windings

Protection Scheme remains balanced


HV 0:1:1 (HV looks like a phase phase fault)
LV 0:0:1 (LV is actually a single phase fault)

Delta CTs and Ratio Selection

Operating
Windings

Protection Scheme remains balanced


HV 1:2:1 (HV has a 2:1:1 current distribution)
LV 0:1:1 (LV is actually a phase phase fault)

Barrie Moor

Delta CTs and Ratio Selection


z

1 / 0 1/-240

-24

= 1.732 /-30

1/

Slide 32

1/

CT ratios must allow for the


fact that current flowing into
the relay from the delta
connected CTs is 3 times
the CT secondary current
Hence, a standard 1A CT will
result in relay current of 3
times the CT secondary
current
Thus, CTs with ratios such as
1000/0.577 are, for this
reason, quite common.

P1
S1

Bias Windings

Slide 31

P2
S2

1 / -120

May 2012

CT ratios must allow for the


fact that current flowing into
the relay from the delta
connected CTs is 3 times
the CT secondary current
Hence, a standard 1A CT will
result in relay current of 3
times the CT secondary
current
Thus, CTs with ratios such as
1000/0.577 are, for this
reason, quite common.

1 / 0 1/-240

Ia - Ic = 1.732 /-30

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Transformer Protection

Slide 33

Slide 34

Modern Microprocessor Relays


z
z
z

Modern Microprocessor Relays

All CTs connected in Star


Relay has to process phase shifts
Relay has to remove neutral current

P1
S1

S1

S1

S1

S1

P1

P1

P1

IA RELAY = IA IC

P1
S1

P1

IBRELAY = IB IA

P1

ICRELAY = IC IB

P1
S1

S1

S1

S1

S1

S1

P1

P1

P1

P1

IARELAY
1 0 1 IA
1
IB


RELAY = 3 1 1 0 IB
ICRELAY
0 1 1 IC

Slide 36

Modern Microprocessor Relays

D1

IArelay
1 0 1 IA
IB
:= 1 1 1 0 IB

relay
3
0 1 1 IC
ICrelay

D11

IArelay
1 1 0 IA
IB
1 0 1 1 IB
relay :=

3
1 0 1 IC
ICrelay

S2

C
S1

S1

S2
B

S1
C

D1

A phase output is at "11 o'clock"


A phase "S1" connects to B phase "S2"
B phase "S1" connects to C phase "S2"
C phase "S1" connects to A phase "S2"

Relay internal processing adjusts for phase angle


Relay internal processing rejects zero sequence
components

CT ratios mismatches can also now be


accommodated

S1

S2

S2

D11

All CTs can now be connected in Star

S1
B

S2

S2

S1

Modern Microprocessor Relays

Internal processing within relay then adjusts CT


current to match transformer turns ratio
CTs can be fine tuned to match middle tap position
Allows for more sensitive relay settings

A phase output is at "1 o'clock"


A phase "S2" connects to B phase "S1"
B phase "S2" connects to C phase "S1"
C phase "S2" connects to A phase "S1"

Slide 37

Transformer Bias Differential Protection


4

CT Phase and Ratio Adjustment

Differential
Current

TAP POSITION

Diff := I1 + I2

Dyn1
20MVA 33/11kV

3.5

Transformer
Transformer
Internal
InternalFault
Fault
Protection
ProtectionTrips
Trips

3
2.5
2

400/1

350A

1050A

OPERATE
OPERATE

1500/1
1.5

00

0.875A

00

RESTRAIN
RESTRAIN

-300
-300

Magnitudes normalised to transformer FLC


Phase angles compensated
Zero sequence current eliminated

1
0.5

0.7A

Software
CT Ratio
Adjustment

Barrie Moor

Software CT
x 1.143

00
1A

Differential
Element

00

Yd11

1A

Software CT
x 1.429

0.5

1.5

15% Differential Setting


25% Differential Setting
35% Differential Setting

Transformer Microprocessor Differential Protection Relay


Yy0

Through
ThroughFault
Faultwith
with
CT
CTSaturation
Saturation

May 2012

2.5

3.5

Bias Current

Through
ThroughFault
Fault
Mismatch
Mismatchdue
duetotoCT
CTRatios
Ratios&&
Transformer
TransformerTap
TapChanging
Changing
4.5
5
5.5
6

Bias :=

I1 + I2
2

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Low Impedance Busbar Differential Protection

Slide 2

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Slide 3

Low Impedance Busbar Protn


z

Utilises Bias Restraint

Often applied as a retrofit


Expensive
Are not simple schemes

LOW IMPEDANCE
BUSBAR DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

z
z

1 x 3 phase input for every item of plant

Slide 4

Basic Types
z

Special Features

Central Unit

GE B30
SEL 487B
REB 670 & RED 521
Areva P746

Mismatched CTs

Areva P740
ABB REB500

Applicable where CT ratios vary


Applicable where CT classes vary

Poor quality CTs

Bay units with connection to central unit

Slide 5

Increased operating current pickup


Reduced knee point for increase in bias
Increased bias slope
CT saturation algorithms

Slide 7

Slide 8

CT Saturation
and Through Fault Performance

LZ Busbar Bias Differential Characteristic


Internal Fault
Operating
Current

Operating
Current

TRIP
ZONE

Internal Fault

Increased
operating
current pickup

CT
CT
Saturation
Saturation
Increased bias
slope
Reduced knee
point for
increase in bias

Monitor
Monitorthe
thelocus
locusand
anduse
usethis
this
to
todetect
detectCT
CTsaturation
saturationand
andrestrain
restrainthe
the
relay
relayunder
underthrough
throughfault
faultconditions
conditions
Through Fault

Through Fault

Bias Current

Barrie Moor

TRIP
ZONE

Bias Current

May 2012

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Low Impedance Busbar Differential Protection

Slide 9

Special Features
z

Feeder and coupler


CTs for BZ1 scheme

One relay covers (say) up to 6 zones


Do not need separate CTs where zones overlap
Do not need separate CTs for Master & Check Zones

Feeder CTs for


overall check zone

Allow for dynamic switching of bus zones

Mis-matched CTs
Poor quality CTs

Provide for multiple bus zones

Multiple Bus Zones

CT problems accommodated

Slide 10

Feeder and coupler


CTs for BZ2 scheme

Requires Isolator status (a & b) inputs

Provide CB Fail and CB Fail Bus Trip Facilities

Slide 12

Dynamic Switching of Bus Zones

Slide 13

Dynamic Switching of Bus Zones

Two separate BZ
schemes
Diameter closed.
Single BZ scheme for
entire substation

Check
zone

Check
zone

Slide 14

Dynamic Switching of Bus Zones

Slide 15

Bus Zone CB Fail Protection


z

CB Fail for a bus zone fault

Fault on bus
CB Failure detected by BZ relay inbuilt CBF feature
BZ relay initiates tripping of remote CB(s)
z
z

Bus 2 disconnector
now open.
BZ schemes
reconfigured OK.

Remote end CBs for plant connected to bus


Next bus for coupler or section CB failure

Check
zone

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Low Impedance Busbar Differential Protection

Slide 16

CB Fail Protection & CBF Bus Tripping


z

CB Fail for a plant fault (eg feeder fault)


Plant protection detects fault and initiates tripping of its
CB(s)
Plant protection also initiates BZ relay inbuilt CBF feature
(via opto input)
CB Failure detected by BZ relay inbuilt CBF feature
BZ relay knows what bus the plant is connected to
BZ relay knows what other plant is connected to that bus
BZ relay initiates CBF Bus Trip of required CBs
Especially important for switched busbars
BZ relay is the only system that knows the busbar
topology !!

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Feeder Differential Protection

Slide 1

Slide 2

Pilot Wire Relaying


Limitations and Requirements

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Pilot Length
Pilot Cost
Pilot Wire Resistance
z
z

FEEDER
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

Pilot Wire Capacitance


z
z

Pilot Wire Protection


z

Must not exceed relay design limitations


But, add separate (padding) resistors to bring the pilots to the relay
manufacturers design value (say 1000 ohms)
May disable relay operation : circulating current scheme
May unstabilise relay operation : opposed voltage scheme

Relays at each feeder end tripping local CBs for


Strong infeed
Weak infeed
Zero infeed
Two Elements
Operating element - trips relay on mismatch
Bias element - restrains relay on through current

Slide 3

Circulating Current Scheme

Circulating Current Scheme

R
O

Slide 4

Through current results in relay current circulating between line end relays

z
z
z

Through current results in relay current circulating between line end relays
Feeder fault current results in current flowing in the relay operating
elements
And the effect of Pilot capacitance ??
Desensitises or even disables the relay operating elements

Slide 6

Opposed Voltage Scheme

z
z
z
z

Slide 7

Opposed Voltage Scheme

to relay
restraint
Through current results in relay current limited
circulating
between
line elements
end relays
Pilot wires crossed to create an opposed voltage scheme
And reconfigure the operating and restraining elements
And the effect of Pilot capacitance ??
Disables relay restraint : may trip on through faults

Barrie Moor

May 2012

Feeder fault current results in current flowing in the relay operating


elements

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Feeder Differential Protection

Slide 8

Summation Transformer
z
z
z
z

Slide 9

Summation Transformer

This arrangement ensures


correct operation under
2:1:1 current distributions

Allows comparison of composite quantity


Must trip for all internal faults
Must be stable for all external faults
Various sensitivities ..... OK

1.25

FAULT
TYPE

RELATIVE
PICK-UP

A-B
B-C
C-A
A-B-C
A-N
B-N
C-N

0.8A
1.0A
0.44A
0.51A
0.19A
0.25A
0.33A

B
1
C

N
SUMMATION TRANSFORMER

Slide 10

Slide 11

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Complete Scheme
Padding resistance at each
end to bring total pilot
resistance to the relay
specification requirements

PADDING
RESISTOR

PADDING
RESISTOR

STABILISING
RESISTOR

PILOT WIRES

TAPPED
PILOT ISOLATION
TRANSFORMER

Just a few ohms to improve


stability under heavy through
fault conditions

FEEDER
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

SUMMATION
TRANSFORMER
PILOT WIRE
RELAY

PILOT WIRE
RELAY

SUMMATION
TRANSFORMER

TAPPED
PILOT ISOLATION
TRANSFORMER

Digital Current Differential


Protection

STABILISING
RESISTOR

Tapped pilot isolation


transformers R Turns2

Slide 12
12

i2
i1

Digital Current Differential Schemes


z
z
z
z

Digital Communications
Individual measurements per phase
Channel delay automatically compensated
Data security checks

i4

i5
i6
12

2 N 1

I S = sin( n t in )
N n=1

CRC & Parity bits

IC =

Barrie Moor

i3

May 2012

i8
i7

2.

2 i0 iN N 1

+ + cos( n t in )
N 2 2 n= 1

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Feeder Differential Protection

Slide 14

Slide 15

In-Phase & Quadrature Components

Current Differential Data Synchronisation


z
z
z

How can the local and remote end data samples by


synchronised
GPS
Ping Pong Topology

Asynchronous Samples
Synchronised Samples

Slide 18

RELAY
A
Curre

tA1

Data alignment for non-synchronised


schemes

RELAY
B
nt V e

Adjust
Adjustthe
thenonnonsynchronised
synchronised
samples
samplesvia
via
relay
relay
computation
computation
algorithm
algorithm

ctors

tB1
tp1

tA2

tA1

tA3

td

tp1 = tp 2 =

tB3*

(tA * TA1 td )
2

tA4
Curre

tp2
tA5

tA*

tB3

tA6

tA1

tB2

Remote
relay
samples

tB*

tB3
Local
relay
samples

ctors
nt V e

tB4

td

tB5
Relay ping-pong system
determines that it needs a sample
at tB3, whereas samples exist at
tA3 and tA4 choose the closest. tB6

Slide 19

IX

IY

Ping Pong Topology


Asynchronous Samples
z

Relay selects nearest available and uses the Ping Pong to


adjust the non-synchronised samples via its computation
algorithm

Both systems require equal send and receive times (paths)


GPS Synchronisation
Truly Synchronised Samples (time tagged)
Send and receive times (paths) do NOT have to match
Ping Pong Back-up

Barrie Moor

k2=100%
k2
k2=100%

Feeder
Feeder
Fault
FaultEvent
Event
TRIP
TRIP

NO
NO TRIP
TRIP
k1
k1=30%
k1=30%

Ping Pong system aligns the samples which can then be


compared directly

IBIAS = 0.5 (IX + IY + IZ )

IZ
Z

Synchronised Samples
z

DIFFERENTIAL
CURRENT

Current Differential Data Synchronisation

IDIFF = IX + IY + IZ

Through
Through
Load
Loador
or
Fault
FaultEvent
Event

IS1=0.2
IS1=0.2pu
pu
IS1

IS2 pu
IS2=2.0
IS2=2.0
pu

May 2012

BIAS CURRENT

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Feeder Differential Protection

Slide 21

Slide 22
Trip
Trip
Restrain
Restrain

Alpha Plane Representation


Ziegler : Numerical Differential Protection

Alpha Plane Representation


z
z

Some relays now use the ratio of remote to local end


feeder currents to define their characteristic
This will ideally be -1 under through load and
through fault conditions

Increasing
IncreasingBias
BiasSlope
Slope

Conventional Differential
vs Restraint characteristics
can also be represented on
the alpha plane

Trip
Trip
Restrain
Restrain

Slide 23

Alpha Plane
Restrain Zone Requirements
z

Slide 24

Alpha Plane
Balance : Restrain & Trip Zone Requirements

Restrain Zone must, as a minimum, be adjusted to


provide for magnitude and angular deviation for

Line charging current


CT saturation

Relay trip region needs to expand


to accommodate angle variation
under in-zone fault conditions.
Similarly, the restrain zone needs
to expand to ensure stability
under through load and fault
conditions.
That is, allow for variations and
simultaneously increase both
zones to achieve the optimum.

Slide 25

Alpha Plane
SEL311L Recommendation
z
z

Barrie Moor

Current Differential Signalling

Trip Zone to ensure correct


tripping for all in-zone faults
Restrain Zone to ensure
stability for all external load
and fault conditions
195 recommended

Slide 26

z
z
z

2 ended schemes single comms


3 ended schemes dual comms
Daisy chained schemes

SEL advises that this allows 35


of margin for other sources of
error

May 2012

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Feeder Differential Protection

Slide 27

2 Ended Scheme Single Comms

Slide 28

3 Ended Scheme Dual Comms

DIFF

DIFF

DIFF

DIFF

DIFF

Slide 30

Daisy Chain Scheme : >3 Ended

Slide 31

Daisy Chain Scheme : with Redundancy

D
DIFF

DIFF

B
DIFF

ID

IA + IB

B
DIFF

ID

IB + IC + ID

IA + IB

IA + IB + IC
DIFF

DIFF
IC + ID

IC + ID
IA

Schemes covering up to 6 ended


tee feeders are available

IA

Close the Daisy Chain

DIFF
A

Barrie Moor

IB + IC + ID

IA + IB + IC

May 2012

Redundant path is normally idle


Redundant path becomes active
when any other link is broken

DIFF
A

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Auto Reclosing

Slide 1

Slide 2

Application of Auto Reclosing

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

z
z
z

Most faults are single phase


Most faults are transient
Hence, an automatic reclosure is often provided to
restore faulted feeders to service

AUTO RECLOSING

EHV Systems
HV Systems
Distribution Systems

To improve transient and voltage stability of the


system
To restore the system to normal levels of security
To restore supply to customers

Slide 3

Safety Aspects of Auto Reclosing


z
z

Auto Reclosing Sequence

Auto Reclosing is usually blocked or inhibited for


Cases where the following plant may be affected

z
z

Cables
Transformers

Cases where the initial protection operation may


have involved backup for

Slide 4

z
z

CB Fail Event
Blind Spot Event
Failure of a remote protection scheme

Initiate by protection operation


CB Auto Recloses after Dead Time
With checks to ensure the CB was actually previously
closed
With checks to ensure the fault was actually on the feeder
and that protection operation is not a back-up function
Scheme resets after Reclaim Time
Scheme lockouts
Transmission schemes typically lockout upon occurrence of
a 2nd fault within reclaim time
Distribution schemes may allow multiple reclosures

Slide 5

Auto Reclosing Initiate Signal


z

Feeder differential protection


Distance relay Zone 1 protection
Distance relay Fast Zone 2 protection

Transformer or Shunt Reactor fault

CBF or Blind Spot faults


Following manual close of CB
AR Check systems

z
z

eg. Distance relay Slow Zone 2 protection

Usually not for tripping for remote faults


Allow for trip signal resetting

Usually not for slow speed tripping

Blocking of Auto Reclosing

Usually for high speed tripping only

Slide 6

May need to extend the relay trip signal

Barrie Moor

May 2012

eg. On receipt of DIT or SIT from remote end

Dead line check to prevent the master end reclose


onto a back-energised system
Live line check to only allow the slave end reclose
onto a healthy feeder
Sync check at the slave end to prevent re-connection
between systems that are now out of synchronism

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Auto Reclosing

Slide 7

Auto Reclosing Dead Time


z

Auto Reclosing Dead Time

Time delay between operation of protection and


initiation of CB close - has to provide for

Beware of AR effects on nearby power stations

Fault clearance (local and remote end clearance)


Dissipation of ionised air
Effects of parallel feeders, parallel phases (SPAR) &
coupling
z
z

Slide 8

AR onto multiphase fault should be avoided until


oscillations of the generator shaft have subsided,
perhaps:
z
z

5 seconds for double phase to ground faults


10 seconds for three phase faults

Inductive
Capacitive

Resetting of protection relay

Slide 9

Auto Reclosing Reclaim Time


z
z

EHV Auto Reclosing

To prevent multiple reclosures onto permanent faults


Time delay following autoreclosure during which
another fault is considered to be re-occurrence of the
original fault

Slide 10

Not to be set too short as reoccurring faults may not


be properly identified
Not to be set too long as totally independent faults
may be incorrectly identified as reoccurrence of the
original fault

To ensure the CB capability for Trip - Close - Trip


sequences is not be compromised

Weakly interconnected systems


System stability is of prime concern
Strongly interconnected systems
Return of system security is of concern
SPAR and/or TPAR
SPAR for 1 phase faults
TPAR for 2 and 3 phase faults
Perhaps with different dead times
Typically only single shot
Failed reclose attempts will have a serious effect on system
stability
Trip all 3 poles and lockout if AR is unsuccessful

Slide 11

Slide 12

Single Pole Auto Reclosing (SPAR)

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Advantages

Single Pole Auto


Reclosing
(SPAR)

Requires phase selective circuitry

CB Pole discrepancy

Barrie Moor

May 2012

In-service phases maintain system synchronism


In-service phases improve system robustness
Less system disturbance on reclose
Tripping, Closing and CB Fail
Breaker must accept the single pole open operation
during SPAR

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Auto Reclosing

Slide 13

Single Pole Auto Reclosing (SPAR)


z

(Due to coupling effects, particularly capacitive coupling)

Weakly interconnected systems : 2 phasing


scenarios

May need to be increased over TPAR time


z

Single Pole Auto Reclosing (SPAR)

Dead Time

Slide 14

Minimal affect on power stations


But beware of possible cross country faults on
double circuit feeders

Reasonably short dead time may be required

Each feeder experiences a single phase fault


But the system, and nearby power stations, are
subjected to a double phase to ground fault

Strongly interconnected systems

Longer dead times may be acceptable

Slide 15

Single Pole Auto Reclosing (SPAR)


z

SPAR & Transformer Ended Feeders


z

No requirement for sync check

Slide 16

System synchronism is ensured by the remaining


2 in-service phases

Typically, no live line check implemented either

Single pole tripping of transformer ended feeders must not occur


The open phase remains magnetically coupled
100% voltage is likely on the open phase
Fault is sustained for the complete dead time
Disastrous consequences for the transformer and for system
stability
Flux from B & C
phases continues to
energise A phase

Single phase faults do not pose a significant risk to


system stability or to nearby plant
Common practice is to not implement such check
facilities.
Both ends simply reclose and both will be subject to
the effects of a permanent fault and will then trip (all 3
phases) and lock-out

A phase fault
current continues
Whoops !!

Slide 17

Slide 18

Three Pole Auto Reclosing (TPAR)

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

EHV Systems

Three Pole Auto


Reclosing
(TPAR)

SPAR often implemented for single phase faults


TPAR implemented for multi-phase faults
z

SPAR rarely implemented for single phase faults


TPAR usually implemented for all fault types
z

TPAR implemented for all fault types


z

May 2012

Master/Slave system usually implemented

Distribution Systems

Barrie Moor

Master/Slave system always implemented

HV Systems

System is usually radial

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Auto Reclosing

Slide 19

Three Pole Auto Reclosing (TPAR)


Live Line Check
z

Three Pole Auto Reclosing (TPAR)


Synchronism (Sync) Check

Simple Voltage check to implement a Master/Slave


system

Slide 20

Strongly Interconnected Systems

Master end recloses after the dead time


Slave end only recloses if the feeder is healthy
Prevents multiple reclosures onto permanent faults

Master end must have a secure source of supply

But near to Power Stations, the remote end may be


selected as Master

Minimising the power station effects of reclosure onto


permanent faults

Hence, usually the stronger end

Feeder tripping is unlikely to split the system


Synchronism is maintained
Sync Check is not needed
Dead times can be longer

Weakly interconnected systems

Feeder tripping may split the system


Synchronism may be lost
Sync check is needed
Dead times need to be shorter

Slide 21

Slide 22

Three Pole Auto Reclosing (TPAR)


Synchronism (Sync) Check
z

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Sync Check may allow reclosure for:


LLLB : Live Line, Live Bus, in synchronism
LLDB : Live Line, Dead Bus
DLLB : Dead Line, Live Bus
DLDB : Dead Line, Dead Bus
Sync Check monitors both sides of the CB for:
Frequency
Voltage
Phase angle
Rate of change of frequency (df/dt)

Distribution System
Auto Reclosing

(To ensure the systems are not drifting at an unacceptable rate)

Slide 23

Distribution System Auto Reclosing


High Speed Tripping

Distribution System Auto Reclosing


z

z
z

Longer fault clearance times


Fault damage (eg. arc burning) can cause a transient fault to
become permanent
Longer fault clearance times
Slow clearance can allow a semi-permanent fault to burn clear
Connected load
Industrial Customers
z

Dead times must allow expensive, complex or dangerous processes to


become fully disconnected before restoring supply

Domestic Customers
z
z

Simple loss of supply is of prime importance


Autoreclose delay is chosen to optimise protection performance,
minimise fault damage, and to automatically return supply to as many
customers as possible

Barrie Moor

Slide 24

May 2012

High speed tripping results in minimal fault damage and


minimises the possibility of transient faults becoming
permanent
But protection discrimination is lost
Downstream faults may result in the rapid and non-selective
tripping of upstream circuit breakers
Auto reclose returns supply to all customers
Multiple reclosures are usually implemented
High speed tripping is inhibited after reclosure
On reclosure, permanent faults will be tripped by time
coordinated schemes, ensuring discrimination
After reclosure, permanent faults then result in tripping of
only the faulted portion of the system

Page 4

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Auto Reclosing

Slide 25

Distribution System Auto Reclosing


Semi-Permanent Faults
z

CB
(Recloser)

System disturbances minimised


Transient faults cleared and system restored

Slower time graded tripping after reclosure

Sectionaliser

Sectionaliser

N=3

N=2

Perhaps due to contact with a tree

High speed tripping on the initial event

Distribution System Auto Reclosing


Sectionalisers

Slower protection operations allow for semipermanent faults to be burnt away

Slide 26

Slower, coordinated tripping clears just the faulted


portion of the system
Slower tripping allows for semi-permanent faults to be
burnt away
May involve multiple reclosures

Applies to radial distribution systems


Feeder fault is cleared at the source end CB (Recloser)
Sectionaliser
Cannot clear fault current
But counts the number of recloses
And sectionalises the feeder during the open dead time

Slide 27

Slide 28

Distribution System Auto Reclosing


Sectionalisers
CB
(Recloser)

z
z

z
z

Sectionaliser

Sectionaliser

N=3

N=2

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection
Auto Reclosing
and
Safety

Fault occurs N = 1
CB Trips
No action by sectionalisers
Auto Reclose
Fault re-occurs N = 2
CB Trips
N = 2, so sectionaliser opens during the AR dead time
Auto reclose
System restored, but with faulted section isolated

Slide 29

Auto Reclosing and Safety


SEF Protection

Auto Reclosing and Safety


z
z
z

Slide 30

In autoreclosing fails, manual closing will be delayed


to ensure public safety
Autoreclosing should be turned off in times of power
system maintenance
Autoreclosing should not be initiated for faults not
likely to be transient

z
z

Barrie Moor

Distribution system sensitive earth fault protection

May 2012

Detects very low level earth faults


These pose a significant danger to the public
These are rarely transient events
Faults to trees, fences, even to dry roads
Long time clearance : 10 or more seconds

Auto Reclose Reclaim time must be set longer than


SEF protection times
SEF protection trips should inhibit or block any
subsequent auto reclosing sequences.

Page 5

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Auto Reclosing

Slide 31

Auto Reclosing and Fire Considerations


(Victoria Black Saturday)
z
z
z

Auto Reclosing and Fire Considerations


(Victoria Black Saturday)

Of special relevance to distribution and SWER systems


Longer fault clearances increase the likelihood of fire ignition.
High speed autoreclosure also increases the likelihood of fire
ignition
The initial event may not cause fire ignition, but it
predisposes dry forest fuel to ignition on subsequent events
(reclosure)
Probability of fire ignition is perhaps 3 times greater on
reclosure than on the initial event

Barrie Moor

Slide 32

In times of fire risk:


Protection operations need to be high speed
Second shot, slow protection tripping should be avoided
Autoreclosing dead times should be extended (30 secs or
more)
Autoreclosing should be turned off
z
z

May 2012

Periods of extreme fire risk


Locations with extreme consequences

Page 6

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Capacitor Bank Protection

Slide 1

Slide 2

Capacitor Bank Protection

Fundamental Principles
of
Power System Protection

Overcurrent & Earthfault protection

CAPACITOR BANK
PROTECTION

Differential protection

z
z

IDMT
INST
Eg. For HV & EHV applications
HZ or LZ biased schemes

Balance protection
Over Voltage protection

Slide 3

Capacitor Bank Ratings


z

In-Rush Current
z

Maximum continuous operation at 110% Voltage

Add these sinusoidal quantities

But the system typically operates 1.05pu voltage or


higher
Thus typically specify capacitor bank to provide for this
Eg. A 20MVar 33kV bank would be specified and
purchased as 24MVar at 36kV

Steady state (load) current


Inrush from the system
Inrush from adjacent banks

) (
2

ITOT _ RMS = IL + e 1t ISYS _ RMS + e 2 t IADJ _ RMS


2

Maximum continuous operation at 130% Current

Slide 4

(Extra component on current is to allow for harmonics)

z
z

1
Zc =
2 freq C

Slide 6

In-Rush Current
z

Effect of inrush on protection may be eliminated by


using stabilised relays
(ie. not sensitive to higher frequency components)

IDMT OC Protection
z

z
z

Series Reactor(s) installed to limit inrush current


May be installed at line potential
May be installed at neutral potential, one per phase, above the star
point
Apply to (n-1) banks to limit inrush from adjacent banks
Apply to all banks to limit inrush from the system
Also limits outrush to system faults
Inrush current may also be limited by POW switching

Barrie Moor

This is a worst case solution


As an absolute worst case approach, use this
current in determining IDMT O/C relay TMS Settings

Slide 5

In-Rush Current - Adjacent Banks

High set (Inst) OC Protection


z
z

May 2012

Probably no problems in any case


Typically set to 150%, 0.1 0.2 TMS
Should be stabilised
And even then, 1 or 2 cycle time delay may be
necessary

Page 1

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Capacitor Bank Protection

Slide 7

Earth Fault Protection


z

Slide 8

Differential Protection

Un-Earthed Capacitor Banks (non-effectively earthed systems)


With no earth connection, phase currents balance and residual
current on inrush is thus small.
Sensitive and fast IDMT EF protection can be applied.
Earthed Capacitor Banks (effectively earthed systems)
EF tripping on in-rush and also on out-rush is likely.
EF protection maybe disabled in such circumstances.
Stabilised EF protection can be simply set above load current.
Setting less than 2% of terminal EF levels not recommended.
Beware of setting electromechanical IDMT relays excessively
sensitive as the large relay burden can cause CT saturation under
heavy terminal fault events.
No timing issues, so TMS of 0.1 may be appropriate.

Slide 9

Differential Protection

Slide 14

Internally Fused Can


z

Failed element has negligible effect


Failure mode of a capacitor element is for it to short circuit
Associated fuse blows
Only a small part of capacitor is lost
Adjacent elements
z
z

Small current increase


Small voltage increase

Requires at least 8 elements


in parallel
Applicable to larger cans
Discharge resistor
Reduce can voltage to 50V
within 5 minutes

z
z

Slide 15

Externally Fused Can


z

z
z

Fuseless Can

Failed element shorts the parallel elements


Whole row is shorted and is effectively OOS
z

Slide 16

Can impedance reduces


Can current increases

z
z

With further failures, external fuse operates


Typically for lower kVar cans
Few elements in parallel
Many elements in series
Cap bank made up of series and parallel cans
Parallel cans allow bank to remain in
service with one can out (fuse blown).
Discharge resistor
Reduce to 50V within 5 minutes

Barrie Moor

Failed element shorts the parallel elements


Whole row is shorted and is effectively OOS

May 2012

Can impedance reduces


Can current increases

Typically for lower kVar cans


Few elements in parallel
Many elements in series
HV Capacitor bank
Cans in series, none in parallel
LV Capacitor bank
Cans in parallel, few (or none) in series
Discharge resistor
Reduce to 50V within 5 minutes

Page 2

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Capacitor Bank Protection

Slide 17

Balance Protection
z

Slide 18

Balance Protection

Unbalance detected by simple


neutral displacement voltage
measurement
But this will also be sensitive to
system voltage unbalances
Steady state
During faults
Monitor 3 phase terminal volts
also to compensate for any
system voltage unbalance
Time delay to allow system
faults to clear

z
z
z

Cans positioned at commissioning for minimum neutral


unbalance current flow
Monitor unbalance neutral current
Unaffected by system unbalances

Voltage
Displacement

Current
Balance

Slide 19

Balance Protection
Phase Segregated Scheme
B

Balance

Balance

Note that these two schemes give different results


Unearthed system neutral voltages are locked together, and
will change with unbalance
Earthed system neutral simply remain locked at earth
potential

Balance

Balance Protection
z

Slide 20

Current
Balance

Slide 21

Slide 22
1 Capacitor
Can

Capacitor Bank Construction


and Failure Mode

Balance Protection
Principles

Balance
Protection

Internally Fused
Capacitor Can

z
1 Capacitor
Can

Balance
Protection

Internally Fused
Capacitor Can

Barrie Moor

One Phase of a
36kV, 24MVAr Capacitor Bank

When initially commissioned, zero current flows via balance


protection
On failure of one element in one can, a small current is now
detected
The parallel elements in that can also now have a small
over voltage condition
Hence, all other things being equal, the most likely
subsequent failure is another element in the same row in
the same can
Unbalance current subsequently increases and is detected

One Phase of a
36kV, 24MVAr Capacitor Bank

May 2012

Page 3

Fundamental Principles of
Power System Protection

Capacitor Bank Protection

Slide 23

Slide 24

1 Capacitor
Can

Balance Protection
Principles
Internally Fused
Capacitor Can

Over Voltage Protection

Balance
Protection

One Phase of a
36kV, 24MVAr Capacitor Bank

Trip before 10% overvoltage on the parallel cans small time


delay
Typically about 50% of elements failed
Alarm at half this value small time delay
Typically about 25% of elements failed
Unbalance current is very small maybe <1A primary
CT ratio typically 1 / 1A
CT does not need a protection class specification, in fact a
measurement class CT should probably be specified

Barrie Moor

z
z
z

May 2012

To trip the bank if the continuous voltage capability (110%) is


exceeded
To protect the system from over voltage due to the capacitor
banks
Coordinate with any nearby generator under excitation
protection
Trip capacitors to reduce system voltage before any
generator protections may operate
Staged tripping recommended
To prevent wide spread capacitor tripping and hence
prevent a subsequent under voltage event from occurring
eg. Where more than one bank is installed at a substation
eg. Where banks are installed a nearby substations

Page 4

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