RAYMUND MADALI AND RODEL MADALI, Petitioners, - versus - PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 180380
FACTS :
The accused and the victim proceeded to climb the stairs, atop of which was
the reservoir just beside the Romblon National High School. The victim, AAA,
ascended first; behind him were Rodel (16 years old), Raymund (14 years
old), Bernardino and witness Jovencio. As soon as they reached the reservoir,
Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at
once blurted out, Join the rugby boys. AAA replied, Thats enough. Bernardino
then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut frond. AAA lost his
balance and was made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino.
Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same
coconut frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to
his head and body from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. The
punishments proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness.
Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with
its ends tied to a dog chain. With the contraption, the three malefactors pulled
the body up a tree.
Jovencio, cousin of AAA, witnessed what happened. He was threatened by
the malefactors not to tell anyone or he will be next. He did not divulge the
incident to anyone for the next few days.
It was three days later that a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported to the police
authorities about a dead man found in Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon
National High School. When the policemen went there, they found the
cadaver emitting a foul odor, with maggots crawling all over, hanging from a
tree with a handkerchief tied around the neck and a dog chain fastened to the
handkerchief. Also found in the area were paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, as
well as empty bottles of gin and a coconut frond.
Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and pointed to Raymund,
Rodel and Bernardino as the perpetrators of the crime. The accused, on the
other hand, advanced the defense of denial and alibi. They claimed they had

nothing to do with the death of AAA, and that they were nowhere near the
locus criminis when the killing occurred.
Convinced by the version of the prosecution, the RTC rendered a guilty
verdict against the three accused. On account of the prosecutions failure to
prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
they were only convicted of homicide. The RTC observed that the incident
was a sort of initiation, in which the victim voluntarily went along with the
perpetrators, not totally unaware that he would be beaten. The RTC also
appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of the
three accused.
On 6 August 2003, Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund
and Rodel elevated their convictions to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the RTC that Rodel and Raymund killed the victim. However,
pursuant to Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which exempts from criminal liability
a minor fifteen (15) years or below at the time of the commission of the
offense, Raymunds case was dismissed. Rodels conviction was sustained,
and he was sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, but the imposition of said penalty
was suspended pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344.
Hence, the instant case.
ISSUE :
Whether the accused are exempt from criminal liability.
HELD :
As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court
of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed
the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to
the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of
Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt

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from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention

program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. If it has been
determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below,
the authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or
in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give
notice to the local social welfare and development officer who will determine
the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person
having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives
cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released
to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization; a barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the
Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer;
or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has
been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be
abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the
parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No.
9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given
retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual
criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although
at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not
extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No.
9344.
As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted
with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. x x x.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should
be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case.
The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when it opined that
Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned
Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill
him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and
should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his
unlawful act.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon
a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 68, the maximum penalty should be
within prision mayor, which is a degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent
any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be
in the medium period of prision mayor or 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.

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Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere

within the penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision correccional. Therefore,
the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is 6 months and one day
of prision correccional to 8 years and one day of prision mayor, is in order.
However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended
pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law.
________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICHARD O.

SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 169641
September 10, 2009
FACTS :
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two
other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango
tree.

Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and underwear.
He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie
down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into
[AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement
("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said
"aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin] witnessed appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs cousin]
instinctively rushed to the house of [AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told
the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother answered that they (referring to
{AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to
put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling
Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone.
[AAAs cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to
her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further
question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her
because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother
washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter,
[AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came to their house and told
[AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down
movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say anything. At
that time, [AAAs] father was working in Manila.
After almost four (4) years, AAAs father filed a complaint for acts of
lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review
of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay
upgraded the charge to rape.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the

backyard of Saling Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant,
[AAAs cousin] followed them.

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On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accusedappellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned
above.
Upon appeal, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by
the trial court.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further
review.
ISSUE :
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA
HELD :
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable
doubt.

reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the

mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this
Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of
the accused regarding his age.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor
under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided
in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the
Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of damages should be
reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed
the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be
imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this
case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was
committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the
presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January
16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.

A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted
offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term
"indemnification," which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article
104 of the same Code, as follows:

However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the
CA. We cannot agree with the CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant
cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to
entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified
on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that
in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident
could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the
prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was
committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he

According to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual

and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and
that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of
the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the
victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this
case. Here, the accused-appellant could have been eighteen at the time of
the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his

Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential

damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.

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actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty
of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by
one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential
trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the
compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This
was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario, a case decided
on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time,
the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for
moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was
lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of
the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still
proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award
is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact
that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of
P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression
of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity."
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison
pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20,
2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17,
2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of
conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended
as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code46 and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was
previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred
to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence.
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at
the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of
this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to
those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time
of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall
apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence
of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or
more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the
Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the
offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide
that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict
with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of

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statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who
has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted
of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.

or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
(emphasis ours)

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic

suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from
the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted
below:

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the

RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344.
Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now
moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,

accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted
with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the
Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare
and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of

sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the
law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period

________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ALLEN
UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 186227
FACTS :
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in
Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba,
who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4,
Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers
who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the
purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the
marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City
for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was
sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the
poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant
handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the
marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police

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officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers
Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was
leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of
barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the
appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the
barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the
appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the
police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant.
Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo
for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline
substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as
the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan
City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and for illegally possessing shabu, a
dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Thus, the present appeal.
ISSUE :
HELD :

Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it
appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence.
The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took
place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at
the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said
appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in
accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension
of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its
retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at

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the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of
this Act. x x x

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under

Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia that while Section
38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same
law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other

Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the
law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
mandated in Section 98 of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165
merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is
provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable
by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be
graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided
for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this
Court in People v. Simon, thus:

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years
can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to
his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is
highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records
show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005),
hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old,
and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to
the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as
opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing
the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should
not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder,
and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the
Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty
in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is
for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of

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Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and

that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not
to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law
may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot
be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of
and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be
appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated
above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion
perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating
circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the
penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable
penalty.
Finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's
conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FLORENCIO
AGACER,* EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and
ERIC*** AGACER, Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 177751

January 7, 2013
For resolution is appellants' Motion for Reconsideration of our December 14,
2011 Decision affirming their conviction for the murder of Cesario Agacer, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7,
2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding
appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the following
modifications:
(1) actual damages is DELETED;
(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer
P25,000.0 as temperate damages; and
(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer h interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages
awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Appellants assert that their mere presence at the scene of the crime is not
evidence of conspiracy; that there was no treachery since a heated argument
preceded the killing of the victim; and that even assuming that their guilt was
duly established, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should
have been appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin Agacer (Franklin) who
was only 16 years and 106 days old at the time of the incident, having been
born on December 21, 1981.6
In our February 13, 2012 Resolution,7 we required the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration particularly on
the issue of Franklins minority.
ISSUES :

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Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of

appellant Franklin?

This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of
B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila.

HELD :
As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of
Minority.
Franklins Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20,
1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
It provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the
accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending
such leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused is
presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact
that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate
was belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will
not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
Penalty to be Imposed Upon Franklin.
Pursuant to the above discussion, the penalty imposed upon Franklin must be
accordingly modified. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. A
degree lower is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and ordinary
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on Franklin should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, which ranges from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
next lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium period of which ranges
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Due to the seriousness
of the crime and the manner it was committed, the penalty must be imposed
at its most severe range.
________________________________________________________
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]
FACTS:

On or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue
to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino
Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors
Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila
Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to
issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital
bills are paid. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the
demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open
an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers
immediate discharge.
Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by
registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the
seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of
violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced
Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the
amount of the check, in each case.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of
involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of

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her checking accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act
of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum
prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance.
ISSUE :
Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability
HELD :
No.
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear
must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at
least equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such
gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A
mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore
that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting
not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as
to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a condition
the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
discharged or fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the
inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated
by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so lifethreatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death.
Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from

criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or
insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument
without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to
commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities
available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted
that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she
was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had
all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks
without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her
counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem. Besides,
apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.
** Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and
Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par.
4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to
exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to
be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one
done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated
or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have
taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her
own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security
instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater
injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or
imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the

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issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay
her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had

Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done
without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear
that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury
prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.

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