Response by the Wagmatcook Band Council to the Officer in Charge Concluding

Report regarding the shooting death of John Simon on December 2, 2008

Summary

The Concluding Report by HRP superintendent Michael K. Burns (“the Burns Report”), even in the
heavily edited version released to the Wagmatcook Band, reveals that the investigation into the
shooting, and the Burns Report itself, were exercises in result determinism. That is, the conclusions
were apparently settled on before the reasons for those conclusions were contrived.

The Burns Report is replete with errors, omissions, and questionable inferences. The scope of the
analysis is focused, in every instance, in order to relieve the RCMP of responsibility and where
possible, through the misuse or misinterpretation of facts, to shift that responsibility to the deceased
John Simon or to others in the community.

The conclusions of the Burns Report occupy themselves with a review of operational policies in
circumstances such as those encountered on the evening of December 2, 2008. What the Report ignores
is, there was a proper, coherent operational plan in place that evening which, if followed, would have
likely resulted in a resolution of the circumstances that did not involve shooting an emotionally
distraught man three times and killing him.

The Burns Report describes itself as a Concluding Report, but it is conclusive of little to do with the
difficult and imperative questions arising, and still remaining, from the events of December 2, 2008.
The shortcomings of the Report itself are a strong argument in favour of a public enquiry.

Rebuttal Analysis

The Burns Report begins by noting that the RCMP had information that, on the night of December 2,
2008, John Simon and his wife, Patsy MacKay, were involved in a domestic dispute, and that both were
drunk (000003/21). This is a false statement intended to create a misleading and negative initial
impression of the two main victims of this shooting.

It is apparent from the uncontested statement of Patsy MacKay that (a) she was not involved in a
domestic dispute with her husband, and indeed had not even been in the house with him since earlier
that day; and (b) she was not intoxicated and, had never in her life been intoxicated. This latter
1 The page references are to the indicated pages in the Burns report, followed by the paragraph number; as in “page #/
para. #”
statement is particularly suspect. It is well and widely known in the Wagmatcook community that Patsy
MacKay has never drunk alcohol. It is highly unlikely that anyone would have given this obviously
false information to the RCMP. However, it is the kind of detail that one would expect to be included in
a report if the intent was to create an impression from the outset of the report of an unpredictable and
chaotic scene.

Of course, the RCMP spoke with Patsy MacKay during the evening of December 2, 2008, so they
knew that she was not intoxicated. Since this false allegation is never mentioned again as being
relevant to any of the actions or events of that evening, it seems a wholly gratuitous slander of a victim
in the circumstances.

It is apparent that Staff Sargent Thompson gave only one order on the evening of December 2, 2008,
which was, “sit tight, ERT was on the way”(000003/4). This order was never varied or rescinded. Any
actions taken by officers that were contrary to these standing order were not taken without orders but,
rather, contrary to orders. Staff Sargent Thompson had developed and communicated a plan to deal
with the situation. He “initiated an evacuation, established containment, and called out additional police
resources which included the “H” division Emergency Response Team.”(000003/3) This was, in fact,
an entirely reasonable plan in the circumstances of an emotionally troubled, intoxicated man holed up
alone in his own home.

In the face of this, Constable Frenette, after initiating his own approach to the Simon residence, “in the
absence of authorization decided to act alone” by breaking and entering into the Simon residence. In
fact, these actions were not taken “in the absence of authorization”, they were taken contrary to orders
by his on-scene superior officer, Staff Sargent Archie Thompson.

Having approached the Simon residence, Cst. Frenette “challenged Simon from the window”. It is then
reported that “Simon failed to comply and turned to retrieve a firearm from the bedroom.” (000003-
4/4) Common sense must lead one to conclude that challenging a disturbed and intoxicated individual
would not only be against standing orders in the circumstances, but would be guaranteed to inflame an
already difficult situation and likely provoke the troubled individual. Indeed, at about 2132hrs that
evening, during a conversation between Constable Jason Bernard and John Simon, John Simon told
Cst. Bernard that he (John) would kill himself if the police attempted to enter his house. Whether or not
John intended to carry out the threat to harm himself, it surely ought to have weighed heavily in any
consideration of a plan to approach or enter the residence.

The Report's characterization of John Simon's reaction to Cst. Frenette's challenging behaviour are also
presumptuous of facts that could not have been known to Cst. Frenette when he was carrying out
whatever plan he had that night. Cst. Frenette challenged John Simon while John was alone in his
bathroom. If John Simon left his bathroom in response to Cst. Frenette's challenges, Cst. Frenette could
not have known at that point that John was necessarily heading to his bedroom or that he was
intending to retrieve his gun.

The Burns report concludes, “It is the opinion of the Review Team that initial responding officers and
particularly Cst. Frenette, were not given concise directions and/or a plan on the procedures to
successfully resolve a critical incident”(000004/4) This is a frankly baffling statement. The Report
never attempts to justify this conclusion in the face of the fact, set out earlier in the Report, that Staff
Sargent Thompson gave notably concise directions and a plan at the outset of the incident: “sit tight,
ERT was on the way”. The Burns Report also does not detail the conversation among Staff Sargent
Thompson and Constables Bernard and Frenette that took place at the “Red Barn”. The Report says that
the “situation they were facing was discussed at some length”, but gives no details about whether an
operational plan was discussed. In fact, it surely had to have been discussed.

Although other possible outcomes of that evening can only, necessarily, be speculated upon; it can be
said with certainty that, had Staff Sargent Thompson's orders been followed, Cst. Frenette would not
have shot John Simon dead in Simon's own bedroom within an hour of Cst. Frenette actually arriving at
the Simon residence.

The Detailed Account of the Incident

The Burns Report notes that ”Mackay stated she and Simon had been arguing earlier in the day and that
he ordered her out of the house.” This is false, Patsy MacKay never said that to anyone. In fact, her
husband John was a periodic heavy drinker. He would go lengthy periods (while working, mostly)
without alcohol, but tended to binge drink at times. However, he was sensitive to the bad example that
his drinking set and to the upset it caused his family. So, he told his wife, Patsy, that he wanted to be
alone that day, and he asked her not to let the children come see him while he was in that state. The
Burns Report purports a confrontation between the two that never happened.

John and Patsy did not fight over a rifle. It is the case that Patsy removed a firearm from the residence
that day, but did not have to “fight” with John to remove it.

It is apparent that, from an early point, Cst. Frenette and others knew that the operating plan was one of
containment. It appears, as noted above, that this must have been the plan discussed at the “Red Barn”
meeting, which took place between 2100hrs and 2132hrs, and involved Staff Sargent Thompson, and
Constables Bernard and Frenette.

Containment was a sensible plan, in fact, for the reasons that (1) John Simon posed no credible threat to
anyone but himself from the point that the RCMP arrived at Katie's Lane, and (2) Patsy MacKay
specifically urged the RCMP on at least one occasion that night to simply “wait John out”, as she, who
knew John best, understood that he was sick, near exhaustion, and would simply fall asleep very
shortly. Remarkably, this urgent and specific plea by John' Simon's wife is never mentioned in the
Burns Report.

At approximately 2145hrs, Cst. Frenette became concerned that there was more than one person in the
Simon residence (000007/3). This, of course, was wrong. John Simon was all alone that evening. What
Cst. Frenette had heard was John Simon speaking on the telephone. He was, at this point, likely talking
to Cst. Bernard. Cst. Bernard called John at 2139hrs and spoke with him for over seven minutes
(000017/1). Cst. Frenette's failure to keep himself informed and properly coordinated with his fellow,
and superior, officers led him to jump to an erroneous conclusion that had to have created an
unwarranted, increased urgency in Cst. Frenette's actions, and thereby put John Simon's life in
increased jeopardy at that point.

The time line in the Burns Report is not rigorously described, which makes calculating the actions of
the RCMP in a coherent time frame somewhat difficult. A review of the Detailed Account of the
Incident does reveal the pattern, such as it was, of Cst. Frenette's actions that night. The time stamps
used are taken from the Burns Report; they are necessarily approximate, but must be very close to
accurate.
• Cst. Frenette probably arrived at Wagmatcook at about 2100hrs. He met with Cst. Bernard and
Staff Sargent Thompson at the “Red Barn”, then went to get gasoline at the local Ultramar, from
which location he could see 15 Katie's Lane.
• Cst. Frenette first joined Cst. Bernard at Katie's Lane at 2130hrs. At this time, Cst. Frenette
must be taken to have known that the operational plan in place was containment of the situation
until ERT arrives.
• At 2145hrs, Cst. Frenette moved from his containment position to the house.
• At 2155hrs, Cst. Frenette moved from the house to the car in the Simon residence driveway.
• Shortly after this, he moved from the car to the treeline at the limits of the Simon property.
• From here, he soon moved back to the the car in the driveway.
• Cst. Frenette then moved from the car to the side of the house.
• Cst. Frenette then moved from the side of the house to the kitchen window, and then to the deck
that was attached to the house.
• It was now approximately 2200hrs, and Cst. Frenette had made six or seven changes of position
in the span of about five minutes. His movements appear, when presented in this time frame,
somewhat agitated and unfocused.
• At 2204hrs, Staff Sargent Thompson called Cst. Frenette and told him that Cst. Bernard would
be joining him. For some unexplained reason, Cst. Frenette took this call as a cue to change his
position once again, and he moved to another location proximate to the house and awaited the
arrival of Cst. Bernard.
• Cst. Frenette met Cst. Bernard and “instructed him” to remain where he was, Cst. Frenette then
moved from this location to the deck attached to the house. Two things are odd here: firstly, Cst.
Bernard seemed to assume a position of authority over Cst. Bernard, which he maintained
throughout the evening, even after he shot John Simon; and secondly, Cst. Frenette left Cst.
Bernard but did not tell Bernard where he was going. For a crucial ten minutes, Cst. Bernard
stayed where Cst. Frenette instructed him to stay and had no clear idea where Cst. Frenette
might be. In fact, Cst. Frenette was, during this ten minutes, busily setting in motion the events
that would lead to the death of John Simon.
• At 2212hrs, Staff Sargent Thompson called Cst. Frenette and asked him if “Cst. Bernard was
with Cst. Frenette.” Cst. Frenette replied that he was; which reply was, of course, an inaccurate
and likely misleading statement. Constables Bernard and Frenette were not together. Cst.
Bernard did not even know Cst. Frenette's whereabouts at that point. Staff Sargent Thompson
advised all members, including Cst. Frenette, that the ERT was on its way. Although Staff
Sargent Thompson could have been more explicit, this statement ought to have been taken by
all members as a direction to sit tight and await the imminent arrival of the ERT.
• Obviously, that is not what Cst. Frenette did. Instead, he again began prowling around the
Simon house looking for an opportunity to enter the premises and confront John Simon.
• During this time, Cst. Bernard was watching Cst. Frenette's movements, but he “was not sure
why Cst. Frenette was there or what his intentions were.” This is understandable confusion on
the part of Cst. Bernard, since Cst. Frenette's actions at that time were contrary to the “sit tight”
standing orders and the immediately recent admonition by Staff Sargent Thompson that ERT
was on its way.
• Within fifteen minutes of Cst. Frenette assuring Staff Sargent Thompson that he was with Cst.
Bernard, Cst. Frenette was all alone in the Simon residence, kneeling on the body of a dying
John Simon.
It certainly appears from the time line as reconstructed above that whatever plan of action Cst. Frenette
had that night, it was inconsistent with the plan formulated and communicated to him by his superior,
Staff Sargent Thompson.

It may have been that Cst. Frenette had a mistaken impression of the threat level posed by John Simon.
Cst. Frenette thought John Simon was “armed”. There was a rifle in his house, as there is in many, if
not most, houses, especially in rural Nova Scotia. The rifle that John Simon allegedly had in his hands
when Cst. Frenette shot him was unloaded. This fact is mentioned once in the entire 40 pages of the
Burns Report, and only then in contrast to a statement that some unnamed person told the RCMP that
John's rifle was loaded. This informant is not named, nor is it stated that Cst. Frenette knew, at the
relevant time, of the informant's wrong information in this regard.

As noted earlier, it may have been that Cst. Frenette thought John Simon had someone with him in the
house that evening. Cst. Frenette's testimony indicates he held that suspicion as a result, it turns out, of
Cst. Frenette overhearing John speaking with one of Cst. Frenette's fellow officers. Again, Cst. Frenette
suspicion that John had someone in the house with him was wrong.

It may also have been that Cst. Frenette had been told that John Simon was “violent and known to
resist” (000019/3). There was no evidence or basis presented for this allegation. It was, of course, not
true. John Simon did not have a criminal record of violence or of resisting lawful police authority. He
had exhibited no violence during the day of December 2, 2008. Cst. Bernard had numerous telephone
and personal conversations with John that evening and no threat or threatening behaviour was
described by Cst. Bernard as arising during these discussions.

With respect to the “loaded” rifle, it is stated in the Burns Report that “a cartridge found at 15 Katie's
Lane had been worked through the action of the rifle.” (000022/4) This is presumably intended to
imply, without factual basis, that John had a loaded rifle at some point that evening and, inexplicably,
unloaded it sometime prior to Cst. Frenette breaking into his home. That is an absurd proposition.
There is no reference to forensics evidence establishing that the cartridge had “worked through the
action” of the particular rifle found with John Simon, or when that cartridge had been worked through
whatever rifle it had been in, or where that cartridge was found in relation to the crime scene.

After Cst. Frenette saw John Simon on the toilet in his bathroom smoking a cigarette, at 2225hrs on the
evening of December 2, 2008, Cst. Frenette apparently concluded that he had to make his move – it
was “now or never.”(000021/4) This is another baffling statement: “now or never” for what? The
standing order was “sit tight”. John Simon was sitting on a toilet, unarmed, having a cigarette, with an
unloaded rifle in another room. These are the actions of someone readying himself for bed, not for a
stand-off with the police. The “now or never” imperative was to do with Cst. Frenette's own,
undisclosed plan of action that night. It was not imperative to any operational exigency legitimately
arising from the situation itself or from Staff Sargent Thompson's standing orders.

In any event, and for reasons never explained, Cst. Frenette took these actions as provocative and,
although receiving no orders, despite asking for them, proceeded in his disastrous break and enter
strategy.

Cst. Frenette states that he yelled at John Simon: “It's Jeremy, RCMP”, and that, when they looked at
each other, John did not seem to recognize him. Of course, that might have been because John did not
recognize him. It is obvious that these two individuals barely knew each other, if at all. In fact, earlier
in the evening, Cst. Frenette referred to John Simon as “Jonathan Bernard”, and had to be corrected.
(000019/3)

The necessary premise upon which to found a conclusion that there was no wrongdoing in the homicide
death of John Simon is that Cst. Frenette was lawfully in the Katie's Lane residence when he shot John
Simon to death. Otherwise, the necessary conclusion is that John Simon was the victim of a homicide
in the course of a break and enter. The Burns Report advances the “lawful entry” premise on the basis
that Cst. Frenette was (1) acting in the course of his duty, and (2) used force that was justifiable in the
circumstances. (000023/4)

“acting in the course of his duty”

The Burns Report notes that Cst. Frenette's initial entry was excusable because it was necessary to
conduct surveillance, confirm the presence of a firearm, and determine John Simon's “health and
sobriety”.

This is a singularly weak rationalization. Firstly, Cst. Frenette's own statement, such as has been
released, indicates that these were not the operative reasons he entered the Simon residence. He entered
the house to bring what he erroneously perceived as a “stand-off” to an end - ”now or never”. He was
done with surveillance by that time. Further, the RCMP knew of the presence of firearms from Patsy
MacKay and from the observations of Constables Bernard and Frenette themselves. Finally, breaking
and entering someone's house and shooting them in the chest is a singularly ineffective method of
determining health and sobriety. The RCMP knew from early in the evening that John was intoxicated,
depressed, and suffering the effects (typically including depression) of being off the insulin upon which
he was dependent. In short, and putting aside for the moment that surveillance was not Cst. Frenette's
stated reasons for breaking in on John Simon that night, none of the purported surveillance objectives
were validly in play, so the surveillance purpose cannot operate as an excuse.

The Burns Report says that “It was not until Simon turned to grab his gun that Cst. Frenette felt
committed to enter” This is false. The facts, even as set out in the Burns Report itself, establish that
John Simon did not leave the bathroom and begin heading for his bedroom (where the only firearm
allegedly was) until after Cst. Frenette made his first attempt to gain entry through a window. Indeed, it
is clear that John Simon left the bathroom in response to Cst. Frenette attempting to enter his home
through a window. Cst. Frenette had obviously committed to attempt a break and enter before John
Simon made any move towards the bedroom. To contend, in the face of all the evidence, that Cst.
Frenette somehow did not “fully commit” to entry until John Simon went for a gun is sophistry.

The Burns Report contends that, even though “the police had to wait for an opportune moment to enter
and end the dangerous situation”, it was still an exigent circumstances. The Report goes on to say that
Cst. Frenette saw an opportunity to end the situation and having “no contrary order”, he took the
initiative. (000023/4).

Of course, this again misuses the known facts. The officer in charge, Staff Sargent Thompson, issued
orders - sit tight and wait for the ERT – which he at no time afterwards either varied or rescinded. It
was obviously Staff Sargent Thompson's intention that ERT be the police that would, if necessary,
“enter and end the dangerous situation”. Cst. Frenette sought permission to enter the premises
(implying he knew he knew he needed specific orders to do so) and did not receive such permission. It
surely cannot be that, in the RCMP, and particularly in what the Burns Report describes as an “ongoing
emergency” situation, a junior officer may ask for permission to do something contrary to a standing
order and then take silence as assent to his contrary actions. The only reasonable conclusion is, Cst.
Frenette entered the Simon residence and engaged John Simon in violation of a standing order to
maintain containment of the situation and await ERT backup.

If Cst. Frenette acted contrary to orders when he entered the Simon premises, then his entry was illegal.
As the Burns Report notes “if Cst. Frenette was justified in entering Katie's Lane, his subsequent
actions in the shooting of John Simon once John Simon pointed the rifle at him would be found to be
self-defense under sections 34 and 37 of the Criminal Code of Canada.” The converse, logically, must
be that, if he was not justified in entering Katie's Lane, his subsequent shooting of John Simon cannot
be characterized as self-defence.

In fact, the Burns Report itself states that, if Cst. Frenette's entry of the premises was unjustified, then
his entry would be illegal. (000024/4) In that case, the question would be, was John Simon's response
to this illegal entry justified as a defence of property. This enquiry, in turn, is only relevant if one is
proposing to excuse Cst. Frenette's shooting of John Simon as having been in self-defence. The
rationale being, if John Simon was acting in excess of his right to defend his property, then Cst.
Frenette's shooting of John Simon could then be self-defence, instead of, for instance, murder in the
commission of an offence.

“the use of force was justifiable in the circumstances”

The Burns Report implies that John Simon may not have been in “peaceable possession” of his
property at the time of Cst. Frenette's break and enter because John was intoxicated, depressed, and had
a gun in the house. (000025/3) Of course, if these, or a combination of these, characteristics operate to
negate a citizen's peaceable possession of his home, most of Canada's law-abiding population is thus
likely subject to warrantless entry at some time or another. That should come as an unsettling surprise
to people.

In fact, “peaceable possession” of one's home simply means enjoying the right to occupy one's home
free of rival claimants or processes (like eviction) designed to oust one's possession. Peaceable
possession is ongoing legal possession that does not require the use of force to maintain it against
legitimate rival claims. The Burns Report simply misuses the term to suggest, wrongly, that being
suspected of some offence (though the Report actually alleges none against John Simon) is sufficient to
undermine one's peaceable possession of real estate. This is flat wrong.

The Burns Report also notes that “Cst. Frenette clearly believed he had the jurisdiction to enter the
Simon dwelling”. (000025/4) There is no evidence to support this proposition, other than the fact that
Cst. Frenette did actually enter the premises; so, the Report presumes, he must have thought he could.
The Burns Report notes, in support of this proposition, that Cst. Bernard had, himself, contemplated
entering the premises earlier. Of course, Cst. Bernard didn't enter John's home; because those were not
his orders and he, like Cst. Frenette, knew it.

If there were “exigent circumstances” at play on December 2, 2208, rather than the crisis management
situation Staff Sargent Thompson appeared to believe he was managing, then those circumstances
became exigent only when Cst. Frenette last approached, and breached the legally protected sanctity of
John Simon's home. The circumstances were not exigent before that, so the only lawful entry would
have been under authority of a warrant.

The Burns Report concludes that Cst. Frenette's actions would not be found to be “wanton and
reckless”, and so could not be criminally negligent. (000026/3) The argument the Report makes is, Cst.
Frenette had a reasonably held belief that he could end the situation peaceably, and so he was not
wantonly reckless.

Putting aside for the moment that Cst. Frenette entered the Simon residence contrary to orders from a
superior officer, what did he reasonably think John Simon would do in response to the break-in? Cst.
Frenette stated that he understood John Simon was intoxicated, emotionally disturbed, and potentially
armed. Can it really be objectively concluded that Cst. Frenette was not reckless in thinking his
unauthorized “plan”, such as it was, would end well?

An objective reading of the Burns Report reveals that, wherever assumptions and inferences can be
made, they seem to be consistently made in favour of Cst. Frenette's legal position, and against Mr.
Simon's. This may be one of the disadvantages of being killed that evening; John Simon cannot now
justify his actions with reference to Criminal Code threshold tests.

An example of this apparent bias can be found in the Operational Review portion of the Burns Report,
under Findings of the Review Team. (000028/1) The Report finds that Cst. Frenette had no reasonable
option aside from shooting John Simon because of “the rapidity with which the engagement took
place”. What the Report again ignores is that, at the time Cst. Frenette decided to enter the premises,
John Simon was sitting on his toilet, unarmed, smoking a cigarette, and that “the rapidity with which
the engagement took place” was wholly the result of Cst. Frenette precipitating the rapid engagement
that left John Simon fatally wounded and in handcuffs.

Also in this section, under “Target Isolation”, the Report notes that Cst. Frenette's use of his firearm
was justifiable because gun fire constituted, in that context, “a minor risk to public safety” (presumably,
aside from John Simon's) as it was a rural environment with no one close by.(000028/3) This is an odd
rationalization, since the risk of John Simon shooting someone out his window is used earlier in the
Report as justification for Cst. Frenette actions in entering the home in the first place. This is an
example of the Burns Report using contradictory assumptions, in different parts of the Report, to justify
findings that support a predetermined outcome.

Conclusion

The shooting death of John Simon was absolutely preventable. His death was caused by mistakes
committed by a RCMP officer, apparently compounded by a flawed command and control structure.

There are numerous questions left answered, or never even addressed, by the Burns Report. What
training did the officers on scene have in dealing with troubled individuals? Why, if Staff Sargent
Thompson gave orders consistent with a containment strategy, did Cst. Frenette feel free to approach
and provoke an obviously distraught John Simon? Were there particular weaknesses in the policing
model used at Wagmatcook, or the first nations policing model in general, and led to some or all of the
mistakes that resulted in John Simon's death? Why didn't the RCMP use John Simon's wife as a source
of valuable information about, and a connection to, John Simon during the time he was contained in his
home? If the ERT was alerted to the situation and was on its way, why were they not part of the
decision-making structure throughout that evening, even before they arrived on scene? Finally, why
were John Simon's closest family members prohibited from approaching and touching his dead body as
is the Mi'kmaq custom?

But the aftermath of the shooting gives rise to many other questions that have become obvious only
after the fact of the tragedy of December 2, 2008. Why were the initial interviews and investigative
measure taken by the RCMP on its own? Why were the RCMP permitted to be integral participants in
the entire investigation of their own potentially criminal actions? What precisely was the RCMP's role
in preparing the reports and other documents that were the inputs to the Burns Report? Did the RCMP
have the opportunity to review, and provide input into or comment upon, the Report itself before it was
released?

Finally, how did it happen that the RCMP, in such a high profile and deeply troubling incident as this
one, manage to permit the passing of a limitation period that ensures there now cannot even be internal
disciplinary action taken as a result of this tragedy? What is the connection between the one year
limitation period and the fact that it took almost exactly, but just over, one year to complete and release
the Burns Report?

Even if the Burns Report was not deeply flawed and its conclusions weak and poorly argued, the focus
of the Report is overly narrow. The scope of the mistakes made and the flaws revealed in this tragic
case can only be answered by a broadly framed, transparent enquiry. The Wagmatcook Band demands a
public enquiry and the Burns Report is a strong argument in favour of the Band's demand.

The Band now learns that the Commission for Public Complaints has self-initiated a enquiry into the
circumstances of the shooting of John Simon. This is an unusual step, and one that reinforces the
Band's position that the Burns Report is an inadequate response to the tragedy. Although the Band
welcomes the investigation by the CPC, that investigation does not eliminate the need for a full and
public enquiry into the broad cultural, social and political context that permitted the shooting of John
Simon and wholly shameful aftermath of negligent or non-existent efforts to establish the
accountability that John's family and community have demanded and so clearly deserve.