Ruby Shelter Builders (RSB) vs.

Formaran
Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by
Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: RSB obtained a P95M loan in from Tan and Obiedo, secured by REM over five parcels
of land located in Naga City. RSB failed to pay the loan despite being granted several
extensions. It was agreed that RSB should execute deeds of absolute sale over the five
parcel
of
lands
in
lieu
of
payment
(i.e.
dacion
en
pago).
Without payment having been made by RSB, Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of
Absolute Sale, as a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of
land in their names.
RSB filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan and Obiedo for declaration of
nullity of deeds of sales and damages. RSBs causes of actions were: (a) pactum
commissorium;
and
(b)
bad
faith
by
Tan
and
Obediedo.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, RSB paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other
legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially
considered the case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the
docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court.
Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the civil case
involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with
Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner did not pay the
appropriate docket fees for the civil case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said
case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring RSB to pay the
correct and accurate docket fees and should RSB fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the case.
RTC ordered RSB to pay additional filing fee and Tan was also ordered to pay docket and
filing
fees
on
his
counterclaim.
CA upheld RTC, saying that the objectives of RSB in filing the complaint were to cancel the
deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same. It is therefore a real action.
Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in
accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must be applied in the
assessment and payment of the proper docket fee.
RTC, instead of dismissing outright RSBs Complaint, granted RSB time to pay the additional
docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the
additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct
amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Issue: For the purposes of paying the correct amount of docket fees, whether or not the
annulment of deed of sale involving a real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Held: No. Case is a real action.
After Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale presented to the Register of Deeds,
they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in question, in their own names. No

matter how fastidiously RSB attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought
in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by
RSM of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land from Tan and Obiedo.
While it is true that RSB does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is RSB's primary objective. The prevalent
doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not
operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action.
Considering that the complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed value of
the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
and
shall
be
the
basis
in
computing
the
fees.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still
be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only
difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for
cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated
value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax
Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher)
or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of
faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision
that for teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three
(3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester
during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on
forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating points. Respondent sought recourse from
the CBAs grievance machinery, but to no avail. Respondent filed a case with DOLE but
circulation and mediation again failed. The parties submitted the issues between them for
voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). Respondent argued that the CA already

resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave for
teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be
coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year period. Petitioner argued that said
CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed the complaint. Respondent filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to
attach the material portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with
the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition.
ISSUES:
Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondents petition despite her
failure to appeal (docket) fee within the reglementary period.
RULINGS:
Remedial Law
(1) Yes. The CA erred in its ruling. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege,
thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by
filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of
judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of
court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements
shall be a sufficient ground for the petitions dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees
within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential
requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if
no appeal has been filed. Here, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full
docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
There are, however, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without the appellants fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved;

and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
NOTE: There is no justiciable issue here in Labor Law.