BAR MATTER NO.

702 May
12, 1994
Gentlemen:
Quoted
hereunder,
for
your
information, is a Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated May 12, 1994.
Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter
of Petition to authorize Sharia'h
District Court Judges to Appoint
Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public,
Atty. Royo M. Gampong, petitioner)
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a
Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of
Notre Dame University who was
admitted to the Philippine Shari'a
Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the
instant petition praying that this
Court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order authorizing
all Shari'a District Court Judges to
appoint
Shari'a
Lawyers
who
possess the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications as notaries
public within their respective
jurisdictions.
On the theory that Shari'a District
Courts are co-equal with the
regular Regional Trial Courts in the
hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial
System, petitioner claims that by
analogy, Shari'a District Court
Judges may be authorized to
appoint the members of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner
further argues that, being a special
member of the Philippine Bar and a
practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial

work
is
indispensable
and
imperative in the exercise of his
profession;
therefore,
he
is
qualified to be appointed as notary
public by Shari'a District Judge.
Petitioner likewise claims that
Shari'a
lawyers
cannot
be
appointed as notaries public in
their places of residence and in
cities and other pilot centers where
Shari'a courts are established
because the RTC Executive Judges
in Cotabato and Maguindanao
require
them
to
secure
certifications
from
the
IBP
Secretary that there are no
practicing lawyers in the place
where they are applying. Thus,
Shari'a lawyers lose their chance to
be appointed as notaries public
because of the policy of the IBP
chapters in Region 12 to appoint
regular IBP members practically in
all municipalities and provinces.
The petition is denied.
The appointment, qualification,
jurisdiction and powers of notaries
public are governed by the
provisions of the Notarial Law
embodied in Sections 231 to
Section 241, Chapter 11 of the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
Section 232 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended
by Executive Order No. 41, May 11,
1945 provides:
Section
232.Appointment
of
notaries public. Judges of Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial

Court) in the respective may

appoint as many notaries public as
the public good requires, and there
shall be at least one for every
municipality in each province.
Notaries public in the City of Manila
shall be appointed by one of the
judges of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
to be chosen by the judges of the
branches of said court" (Words in
parenthesis supplied)
Strictly speaking, Shari'a District
Courts do not form part of the
integrated judicial system of the
Philippines. Section 2 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Acts of
1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates
the courts covered by the Act,
comprising the integrated judicial
system. Shari'a Courts are not
included
in
the
enumeration
notwithstanding that, when said
B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August
14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise
known as "Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines") was
already in force. The Shari'a Courts
are mentioned in Section 45 of the
Act only for the purpose of
including them "in the funding
appropriations."
The fact that judges thereof are
required by law to possess the
same qualifications as those of
Regional Trial Courts does not
signify that the Shari'a Court is a
regular court like the Regional Trial
Court. The latter is a court of
general jurisdiction, i.e., competent

to decide all cases, civil and

criminal, within its jurisdiction. A
Shari'a District Court, created
pursuant
to
Article
137
of
Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a
court
of
limited
jurisdiction,
exercising original only over cases
specifically enumerated in Article
143 thereof. In other words, a
Shari'a District Court is not a
regular court exercising general
jurisdiction within the meaning of
Section 232 of the Notarial Law.
The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts
are called "courts" does not imply
that they are on equal footing or
are identical with regular courts, for
the word "court" may be applied to
tribunals which are not actually
judicial in character, but are quasijudicial agencies, like the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Land
Registration
Authority,
Social
Security
Commission,
Civil
Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of
Patents,
Trademark
and
Technology,
Energy
Regulatory
Board, etc. 1
Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a
District Courts are not elevated to
this Court by appeal under Rule 41,
or by petition for review under Rule
45, of the Rules of Court. Their
decisions are final "whether on
appeal from the Shari'a Circuit
Court or not" 2 and hence, may
reach this Court only by way of a
special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, similar to those
of the National Labor Relations

Commission, or the Central Board

of Assessment Appeals. 3
Furthermore, the qualifications for
appointment as a judge of a Shari'a
District Court are different from
those required of a judge of a
Regional Trial Court under Section
15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which provides:
Section 15. Qualifications No
person shall be appointed Regional
trial Court Judge unless he is a
natural
born
citizen
of
the
Philippines, at least thirty-five
years of age, and, for at least ten
years, has been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice
of
law
as
an
indispensable
requirement.
In case of Shari'a Court judges, on
the other hand, a Special Bar
Examination for Shari'a Courts was
authorized by the Supreme Court in
its En Banc resolution dated
September 20, 1983. Those who
pass said examination are qualified
for appointment for Shari'a court
judges and for admission to special
membership in the Philippine Bar
to practice law in the Shari'a courts
pursuant to Article 152, in relation
to Articles 148 and 158 of P.D. No.
1083. Said Article 152, P.D. No.
1083 provides, thus:
Art. 152. Qualifications. No
person shall be appointed judge of
the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he

is a natural born citizen of the

Philippines, at least twenty-five
years of age, and has passed an
examination in the Sharia' and
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be
given by the Supreme Court for
admission to special membership
in the Philippine Bar to practice law
in the Shari'a courts.
The authority thus conferred by the
Notarial Law upon judges of the
Court of First Instance, now the
Regional Trial Court, in their
respective provinces to appoint
notaries
public
cannot
be
expanded to cloth the judges of the
Shari'a District Court with the same
statutory authority. The authority to
appoint
notaries
public
contemplated under Section 232 of
the
Notarial
Law
and
the
corresponding
supervising
authority over them authorized
under Section 248 thereof require
the qualifications and experience of
an RTC Judge.
It must be made clear in this
regard that since a person who has
passed the Shari'a Bar Examination
does not automatically become a
regular member of the Philippine
Bar, he lacks the necessary
qualification to be appointed a
notary public. Section 233 of the
Notarial Law provides for the
qualifications for appointment as
notary public, thus:
Section
233.Qualifications
for
Appointment. To be eligible for

appointment as notary public, a

person must be a citizen of the
Philippines (or of the United States)
and over twenty-one years of age.
He must, furthermore, be a person
who has been admitted to the
practice of law or who has
completed and passed in the
studies of law in a reputable
university or school of law, or has
passed the examination for the
office of the peace or clerk or
deputy clerk of court, or be a
person who had qualified for the
office of notary public under the
Spanish sovereignty.
In the chartered cities and in the
capitals of the provinces, where
there are two or more lawyers
appointed as notaries public, no
person other than a lawyer or a
person who had qualified to hold
the office of notary public under
the Spanish sovereignty shall hold
said office.
In municipalities or municipal
districts where no person resides
having the qualifications herein
before specified or having them,
refuses to hold such office, judges
of first instance may appoint other
persons temporarily to exercise the
office of notary public who have
the requisite qualifications or
fitness and morality.
In an En Banc resolution of the
Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar
Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to
Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise

their profession at the regular

courts," this Court categorically
stated that a person who has
passed the Shari'a Bar Examination
is only a special member of the
Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged
member thereof even if he is a
Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As
such, he is authorized to practice
only in the Shari'a courts.
Only a person duly admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar in
accordance with the Rules of Court
are entitled to practice law before
the regular courts. Section 1, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1. Who may practice law.
Any
person
heretofore
duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of
this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
This Court further emphasized in its
resolution in Bar Matter 681, that:
In order to be admitted as member
of the Philippine Bar, the candidate
must pass an examination for
admission covering the following
subjects: Political and International
Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile
Law; Criminal Law; Remedial Law;
and Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (Sec. 11, Rule 138)
Further, in order that a candidate

may be deemed to have passed

the bar examination, he must have
obtained a general average of 75%
in all the aforementioned subjects
without failing below 50% in any
subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the
other hand, the subjects covered
by the special bar examination for
Shari'a
courts
are:
(1)
Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary
laws (Adat); (2) Persons, Family
Relations
and
Property;
(3)
Successions, Wills/Adjudication and
Settlement
of
Property;
(4)
Procedure in Shari'a Courts (See
Resolution dated September 20,
1983).
It is quite obvious that the subject
matter of the two examinations are
different.
The
Philippine
Bar
Examination covers the entire
range of the Philippine Laws and
jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar
Examination
covers
Muslim
personal laws and jurisprudence
only. Hence, a person who has
passed
the
Shari'a
Bar
Examination, who is not a lawyer,
is not qualified to practice law
before the regular courts because
he has not passed the requisite
examinations for admission as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the Shari'a bar lawyer
may appear before the Municipal
Trial Courts as agent or friend of a
litigant, if appointed by the latter
for the purpose but not before the
Regional Trial Courts as only duly
authorized members of the Bar

may conduct litigations in the latter

court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore
that a
person who has passed the Shari'a
Bar Examination is only a special
member of the Philippine Bar and
not a full-fledged member thereof
even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws
Degree, he is not qualified to
practice to qualified to practice law
before the regular courts. As a
general rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is
not possessed of the basic requisite
of "practice of law" in order to be
appointed as a notary public under
Section 233 of the Notarial Law in
relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
to
authorize Shari'a District Court
Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers
as
notaries
public
in
their
respective jurisdiction is DENIED.
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P.
1997]

February

real estate and housing company.

Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and
used to be friends.

void ab initio. Said sales agent

acting in bad faith perpetrated
such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my
rights and interests."

It appears that through Alawi's

agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned
firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage
Finance
Corporation
(NHMFC).

He then proceeded to expound in

considerable detail and quite
acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad faith,
deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty
and
abuse
of
confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with
the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree
for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I
am terminating the contract **. I
hope I do not have to resort to any
legal action before said onerous
and manipulated contract against
my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."

Not long afterwards, or more

precisely on December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He
wrote:

24,

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs.

ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court
VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably
still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a

" ** I am formally and officially

withdrawing from and notifying you
of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into
between me and your company, as
represented
by
your
Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
of your company's branch office
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was
vitiated
by
gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty
and
abuse
of
confidence by the aforesaid sales
agent which made said contract

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to

the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co.
at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City. The envelope containing
it, and which actually went through
the post, bore no stamps. Instead
at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the
words, "Free Postage PD 26," had
been typed.
On the same date, December 15,
1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President,

Credit & Collection Group of the

National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for
cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was
payable from salary deductions at
the rate of P4,338.00 a month.
Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I
am terminating, as I hereby annul,
cancel, rescind and voided, the
'manipulated contract' entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa
& Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously
and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against
my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view
of the attending circumstances,
that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty,
and
abuse
of
confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me."

February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996,

and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for
the same reasons already cited, he
insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on
account thereof.a He also wrote on
January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoez,
Head
of
the
Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division, both
of this Court, to stop deductions
from his salary in relation to the
loan in question, again asserting
the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering
into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996,
the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court
requesting
it
to
stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996," and began
negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for
the buy-back of ** (Alauya's)
mortgage, and ** the refund of **
(his) payments."c

And, as in his letter to Villarosa &

Co., he narrated in some detail
what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.

On learning of Alauya's letter to

Villarosa & Co. of December 15,
1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and
of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words,
"Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:

Alauya wrote three other letters to

Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated

1. "Imputation of malicious and

libelous charges with no solid

grounds
through
manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and
blemishing
her
honor
and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the
privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of
"attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references
to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,
forger, manipulator, etc." without
"even a bit of evidence to cloth
(sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and
coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed
with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be
appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya
to comment on the complaint.
Conformably
with
established
usage that notices of resolutions
emanate from the corresponding
Office of the Clerk of Court, the
notice of resolution in this case was
signed
by
Atty.
Alfredo
P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk
of Court.[2]

Alauya
first
submitted
a
"Preliminary Comment"[3] in which
he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan
to
require
an
explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to
"a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of
Court." but only to the District
Judge, the Court Administrator or
the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was
the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred
that the complaint had no factual
basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only "the Executive Clerk
of court and ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff and District Registrar," but
also "a scion of a Royal Family
**."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty.
Marasigan, but this time in much
less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the
former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.[6] He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were
done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him
to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10
from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter

submitted under date of June 5,
1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury,
mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[7] He declared that
there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted
in defense of his rights. He denied
any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus
transportation fare to a subordinate
whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the
words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by
some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of
Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached
to the comment as Annex J);[8] and
as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of
the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail
of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title,
"attorney," by the assertion that it
is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to
which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he

prefers the title of "attorney"

because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal
or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting
a
local
legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.
He
pleads
for
the
Court's
compassion, alleging that what he
did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."[10] He
claims he was manipulated into
reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.[11] He was
induced to sign a blank contract on
Alawi's assurance that she would
show the completed document to
him later for correction, but she
had since avoided him; despite
"numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the
property -- subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although
she promised to return it the next
day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that
in connection with his contract with
Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature
on
such
pertinent
documents as those regarding the
down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house,
salary deduction, none of which he
ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in
question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of

the complaint for lack of merit, it

consisting of "fallacious, malicious
and baseless allegations," and
complainant Alawi having come to
the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity
in
the
fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in
contrast to his two (2) letters to
Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22,
1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15,
1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does
not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator
for
evaluation,
report
and
recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya
is that in his aforesaid letters, he
made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no
solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith,"
resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter
alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to
the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,

dishonesty
confidence;"

and

abuse

of

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and

perpetrated
**
illegal
and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial
to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and
"swindling") sales agent" who had
fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and
fraudulently
manipulated
the
contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without ** (his)
authority and against ** (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that
in making these statements, he
was merely acting in defense of his
rights, and doing only what "is
expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and
untold
financial
suffering,"
considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia
enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the
public service.[16] Section 4 of the

Code commands that "(p)ublic

officials and employees ** at all
times respect the rights of others,
and ** refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has
this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the
Court consistent with good morals,
good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to
couch
denunciations
of
acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to
be
deceitful,
fraudulent
or
malicious,
in
excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of
action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that
right with propriety, without malice
or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, supra;
or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due,

and observe honesty and good

faith."[19] Righteous indignation,
or vindication of right cannot justify
resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a
member of the Shari'a Bar and an
officer of a Court, Alawi is subject
to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of
the law, he may not use language
which
is
abusive,
offensive,
scandalous,
menacing,
or
otherwise improper.[20] As a
judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act
and word should be characterized
by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from
these
salutary
norms
might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot
be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title
of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a
Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts.
[21] While one who has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an "attorney." The

title of "attorney" is reserved to

those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted
to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

G.R.
No.
August 31, 1964

Alauya says he does not wish to

use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his
region,
there
are
pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiffappellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L.
Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as
intervenor-appellants.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged

unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing
the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M.
Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for
the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of
attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

L-18727

JESUS
MA.
CUI,
plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendantappellant,
ROMULO
CUI,
Intervenorappellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto
originally filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator
of the Hospicio de San Jose de
Barili. Judgment was rendered on
27 April 1961 in favor of the
plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and
appealed to us by the defendant,
Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable
institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for
the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated
and
helpless
persons." It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No.
3239 of the Philippine Legislature

passed 27 November 1925) and

endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a
series of donations, principally the
deed of donation executed on 2
January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the
initial management to the founders
jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such
persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed
to them." Section 2 of the deed of
donation provides as follows:
Que
en
caso
de
nuestro
fallecimiento o incapacidad para
administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al
tiempo de nuestra muerte o
incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro
sobrino
politico
Dionisio
Jakosalem.Si nuestro dicho sobrino
Mariano
Cui
no
estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad
de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a
nuestro otro sobrino legitime
Mauricio
Cui.Ambos
sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI.
A la muerte o incapacidad de estos
dos
administradores,
la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon,
mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de
nuestros
sobrinos
legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo

de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero

civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos titulos, el que pague al
Estado
mayor
impuesto
o
contribution.
En
igualdad
de
circumstancias, sera preferida el
varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la
administracion.
Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de
estas
cualificaciones,
la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al
senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea
el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que
tuviere asiento en la cabecera de
esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su
defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de
Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his
widow continued to administer the
Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon
the
administration
passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio
Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second on 1 July
1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro
Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui,
became
the
administrator.
Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a
series of controversies and court
litigations ensued concerning the
position of administrator, to which,
in so far as they are pertinent to
the present case, reference will be
made later in this decision.
Plaintiff
Jesus
Ma.Cui
and
defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are
brothers, being the sons of Mariano

Cui, one of the nephews of the

spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960
the then incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial
document. The next day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his
oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui,
however, had no prior notice of
either the "convenio" or of his
brother's
assumption
of
the
position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August
1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the
office be turned over to him; and
on 13 September 1960, the
demand not having been complied
with the plaintiff filed the complaint
in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the
same office, being a grandson of
Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews
mentioned
by
the
founders of the Hospicio in their
deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the
main issue turns upon their
respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is
the older of the two and therefore
under equal circumstances would
be preferred pursuant to section 2
of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference

to the one, among the legitimate

descendants
of
the
nephews
therein named, "que posea titulo
de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero
civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos titulos el que pague al estado
mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the
mealing of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from
the University of Santo Tomas
(Class 1926) but is not a member
of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as one.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand,
is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court on
29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated by
resolution promulgated on 10
February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de
Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this
point in favor of the plaintiff, said
that
the
phrase
"titulo
de
abogado," taken alone, means that
of a full-fledged lawyer, but that
has used in the deed of donation
and considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it
should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one,"
and therefore means a law degree
or diploma of Bachelor of Laws.
This ruling is assailed as erroneous
both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether

taken alone or in context the term
"titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one
for the practice of law. In Spanish
the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado
para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion"
(Diccionario
de
la
Lengua Espaola, Real Academia
Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and
the word "abogado," as follows:
"Perito en el derecho positivo que
se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos o
intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que se
le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's
degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the
legal
profession.
The
English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer
or attorney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification, and
has reference to that class of
persons who are by license officers
of the courts, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, and
upon
whom
peculiar
duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence.

Court. According to Rule 138 such

admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate
from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to
practice
the
profession.
The
academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws in itself has little to do with
admission to the Bar, except as
evidence of compliance with the
requirements that an applicant to
the examinations has "successfully
completed
all
the
prescribed
courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by
the Secretary of Education." For
this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the
prescribed courses may be shown
in some other way. Indeed there
are instances, particularly under
the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone
through any formal legal education
in college were allowed to take the
Bar examinations and to qualify as
lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required
possession
of
"the
necessary qualifications of learning
ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons
do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the
academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws from some law school or
university.

In this jurisdiction admission to the

Bar and to the practice of law is
under the authority of the Supreme

The founders of the Hospicio de

San Jose de Barili must have
established the foregoing test

advisely, and provided in the deed

of donation that if not a lawyer, the
administrator should be a doctor or
a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in
that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the
highest
taxes
among
those
otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first
of all, because under Act No. 3239
the managers or trustees of the
Hospicio shall "make regulations
for the government of said
institution (Sec. 3, b); shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to
which invalids and incapacitated
and destitute persons may be
admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3,
d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions
promulgated
for
admission are not in conflict with
the provisions of the Act; and shall
administer
properties
of
considerable value for all of
which work, it is to be presumed, a
working knowledge of the law and
a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we
hold that the plaintiff is not
entitled, as against the defendant,
to the office of administrator. But it
is argued that although the latter is
a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue
of paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on
the ground, among others, of
ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound
moral character. Reference is made

to the fact that the defendant was

disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957
for
immorality
and
unprofessional conduct. It is also a
fact, however, that he was
reinstated on 10 February 1960,
before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is
a
recognition
of
his
moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less
than that required for his admission
to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully
pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall
be reinstated rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of
the court. The court action will
depend, generally speaking, on
whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice
will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity
of an attorney and counselor at
law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the court that he is a person
of good moral character a fit and
proper person to practice law. The
court will take into consideration
the applicant's character and
standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the

charge for which he was disbarred,

his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment
and
the
application
for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec.
301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required
before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the
attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement
have been held to be the same as
for original admission to the bar,
except that the court may require a
greater degree of proof than in an
original
admission.
(7
C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an
application for reinstatement are
whether applicant is "of good moral
character" in the sense in which
that phrase is used when applied to
attorneys-at-law and is a fit and
proper person to be entrusted with
the privileges of the office of an
attorney, and whether his mental
qualifications are such as to enable
him to discharge efficiently his duty
to the public, and the moral
attributes are to be regarded as a
separate and distinct from his
mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is
concerned, the standard required
of one seeking reinstatement to
the office of attorney cannot be

less exacting than that implied in

paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation as a requisite for the
office which is disputed in this
case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions
and
disabilities
resulting
from
his
previous
disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other
ground: it is already barred by
lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under
Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec.
16, Rule 68, taken from section 216
of Act 190), this kind of action must
be filed within one (1) year after
the right of plaintiff to hold the
office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed
himself entitled to the office in
question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a
complaint in quo warranto against
Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2
July 1931. Mariano Cui, the
plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance upon a demurrer by
the defendant there to the
complaint
and
complaint
in
intervention. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court from the order of
dismissal, the case was remanded
for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui,
60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff,
however, did not prosecute the
case as indicated in the decision of

this Court, but acceded to an

arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui
continued
as
administrator,
Mariano Cui was named "legal
adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant
administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to
get the position by a series of
extra-judicial maneuvers. First he
informed
the
Social
Welfare
Commissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made
clear" his intention of occupying
the office of administrator of the
Hospicio." He followed that up with
another letter dated 4 February,
announcing that he had taken over
the administration as of 1 January
1950. Actually, however, he took
his oath of office before a notary
public only on 4 March 1950, after
receiving
a
reply
of
acknowledgment, dated 2 March,
from
the
Social
Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that
he had already assumed the
position
as
stated
in
his
communication of 4 February 1950.
The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to
the Secretary of Justice, who, in an
opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No.
45, S. 1950), correcting another
opinion previously given, in effect
ruled that the plaintiff, not beings
lawyer, was not entitled to the
administration of the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again

became the subject of a court
controversy. On 4 March 1950, the
Hospicio commenced an action
against the Philippine National
Bank in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because
the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's
deposits therein. The Bank then
filed
a
third-party
complaint
against herein plaintiff-appellee,
Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated
above, taken oath as administrator.
On 19 October 1950, having been
deprived of recognition by the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice
he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he
was relinquishing "temporarily" his
claim to the administration of the
Hospicio. The motion was denied in
an order dated 2 October 1953. On
6 February 1954 he was able to
take another oath of office as
administrator
before
President
Magsaysay, and soon afterward
filed a second motion to dismiss in
Civil case No. R-1216. President
Magsaysay, be it said, upon
learning that a case was pending in
Court, stated in a telegram to his
Executive Secretary that "as far as
(he) was concerned the court may
disregard the oath" thus taken. The
motion to dismiss was granted
nevertheless and the other parties
in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal.
The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte
motion to be excluded as party in
the appeal and the trial Court again
granted the motion. This was on 24

November
1954.
Appellants
thereupon instituted a mandamus
proceeding in the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. L-8540), which was
decided on 28 May 1956, to the
effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be
included in the appeal. That
appeal, however, after it reached
this Court was dismiss upon motion
of the parties, who agreed that "the
office of administrator and trustee
of the Hospicio ... should be
ventilated
in
quo
warranto
proceedings to be initiated against
the incumbent by whomsoever is
not occupying the office but
believes he has a right to it" (G.R.
No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956.
At that time the incumbent
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui,
but no action in quo warranto was
filed against him by plaintiff Jesus
Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant
Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by
this Court as member of the Bar,
and on the following 27 February
Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as
administrator in his favor, pursuant
to the "convenio" between them
executed on the same date. The
next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his
oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute his claim judicially after
this Court decided the first case of
Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769),
remanding it to the trial court for

further
proceedings;
his
acceptance instead of the position
of assistant administrator, allowing
Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file
an action in quo warranto against
said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956,
when the appeal in Civil Case No.
R-1216 of the Cebu Court was
dismissed upon motion of the
parties precisely so that the
conflicting claims of the parties
could be ventilated in such an
action all these circumstances
militate against the plaintiff's
present claim in view of the rule
that an action in quo warranto
must be filed within one year after
the right of the plaintiff to hold the
office arose. The excuse that the
plaintiff did not file an action
against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July
1956 because of the latter's illness
did not interrupt the running of the
statutory period. And the fact that
this action was filed within one
year of the defendant's assumption
of office in September 1960 does
not make the plaintiff's position
any better, for the basis of the
action is his own right to the office
and it is from the time such right
arose that the one-year limitation
must be counted, not from the date
the incumbent began to discharge
the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo,
62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and
appellant Romulo Cui. This party is
also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente

Cui, one of the nephews of the

founders of the Hospicio mentioned
by them in the deed of donation.
He is further, in the line of
succession, than defendant Antonio
Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano
Cui, another one of the said
nephews. The deed of donation
provides:
"a
la
muerte
o
incapacidad
de
estos
administradores (those appointed
in the deed itself) pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon,
mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros
sobrinos
legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado ... En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferido el
varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la
administration." Besides being a
nearer descendant than Romulo
Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than
he and therefore is preferred when
the circumstances are otherwise
equal. The intervenor contends
that the intention of the founders
was to confer the administration by
line and successively to the
descendants
of
the
nephews
named in the deed, in the order
they are named. Thus, he argues,
since the last administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the
Mauricio
Cui
line,
the
next
administrator must come from the
line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor
belongs.
This
interpretation, however, is not

justified by the terms of the deed

of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and set
aside, and the complaint as well as
the complaint in intervention are
dismissed, with costs equally
against
plaintiff-appellee
and
intervenor-appellant.

CITIZENS
WHO
ACQUIRE
FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63,
AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:

ARTICLE XII
NATIONAL
PATRIMONY

ECONOMY

AND

Section 14. The sustained

development of a reservoir of
national talents consisting of
Filipino
scientists,
entrepreneurs,
professionals,
managers, high-level technical
manpower and skilled workers
and craftsmen in all fields shall
be promoted by the State. The
State
shall
encourage
appropriate technology and
regulate its transfer for the
national benefit.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy

- It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to
have
lost
their
Philippine
citizenship
under
the
conditions of this Act.

9225

Section
3.
Retention
of
Philippine Citizenship - Any
provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine
citizenship
upon
taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:

MAKING
THE
OF
PHILIPPINE

"I _____________________, solemny

swear (or affrim) that I will
support
and
defend
the

The practice of all professions

in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens, save
in cases prescribed by law.
Republic
Act
August 29, 2003
AN
ACT
CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. Short Title this act

shall
be
known
as
the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."

No.

Constitution of the Republic of

the Philippines and obey the
laws
and
legal
orders
promulgated
by
the
duly
constituted authorities of the
Philippines;
and
I
hereby
declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will
maintain
true
faith
and
allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon
myself
voluntarily
without
mental reservation or purpose
of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section
4.
Derivative
Citizenship - The unmarried
child,
whether
legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of
this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities - Those
who
retain
or
re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be
subject
to
all
attendant
liabilities and responsibilities

under existing laws of the

Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise
their right of surffrage must
Meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003" and other existing
laws;
(2) Those seeking elective
public in the Philippines shall
meet
the
qualification
for
holding such public office as
required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a
personal
and
sworn
renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any
public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice
their
profession
in
the

Philippines shall apply with the

proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such
practice; and

Gazette or two (2) newspaper

of general circulation.
Approved,

(5) That right to vote or be

elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are
occupying any public office in
the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as
commissioned
or
noncommissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized
citizens.

B.M.
No.
December 17, 2007

1678

PETITION
FOR
LEAVE
TO
RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN
M.
DACANAY,
petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Section 6. Separability Clause If any section or provision of

this
Act
is
held
unconstitutional or invalid, any
other section or provision not
affected thereby shall remain
valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act
are
hereby
repealed
or
modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause
This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its
publication
in
the
Official

This bar matter concerns the

petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the
Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments.
He
subsequently
applied
for
Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canadas free medical aid program.
His application was approved and
he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to

Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice.
There is a question, however,
whether petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship in May
2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007,
the Office of the Bar Confidant cites
Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of
Court:
SECTION 2.Requirements for all
applicants for admission to the bar.
Every applicant for admission as
a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of
the Philippines; and must produce
before
the
Supreme
Court
satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of
the Bar Confidant opines that, by

virtue of his reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in
the bar. It recommends that he be
allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned
on his retaking the lawyers oath to
remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation
of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions.2 It is so
delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and
a duty of the State (through this
Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the
public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal
profession, compliance with the
mandatory
continuing
legal
education
requirement
and
payment of membership fees to
the
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. Any
breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the

courts and clients repose in him for

the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law.
Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or thereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of
this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person
admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with
the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing
is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires
certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of
the Philippines.5 He must also
produce
before
this
Court
satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no
charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar
involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of

educational, moral and other

qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of
attorneys and receiving from the
clerk of court of this Court a
certificate of the license to
practice.10
The second requisite for the
practice of law membership in
good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the
annual
professional
tax;12
compliance with the mandatory
continuing
legal
education
requirement;13 faithful observance
of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually
subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer
who has lost his Filipino citizenship
still practice law in the Philippines?
No.
The Constitution provides that the
practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure

terminates the privilege to practice

law in the Philippines. The practice
of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino
citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.
This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of
[RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never
to
have
lost
his
Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right
to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends
to practice the legal profession in
the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to
its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or
permit
to
engage
in
such
practice."18
Stated
otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court
the authority to do so, conditioned
on:

(a) the updating and payment in

full of the annual membership dues
in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional
tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36
credit
hours
of
mandatory
continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioners knowledge of
Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers
oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as
a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions
will restore his good standing as a
member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
of
Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby
GRANTED,
subject
to
compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of
proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may
retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]

JULIETA
complainant,
DOMINADOR
respondent.

B.
vs.
M.

NARAG,
ATTY.
NARAG,

then member of the Sangguniang

Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag
courted Ms. Espita, gradually
lessening her resistance until the
student acceded to his wishes.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Good
moral
character
is
a
continuing qualification required of
every member of the bar. Thus,
when a lawyer fails to meet the
exacting
standard
of
moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may
withdraw his or her privilege to
practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta
B. Narag filed an administrative
complaint[1]
for
disbarment
against
her
husband,
Atty.
Dominador M. Narag, whom she
accused of having violated Canons
1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Ethics for Lawyers.[2]
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao
engaged the services of Atty.
Dominador M. Narag in the early
seventies as a full-time college
instructor in the College of Arts and
Sciences and as a professor in the
Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina
Espita, 17 years old and a first year
college
student,
enrolled
in
subjects handled by Atty. Narag.
Exerting his influence as her
teacher, and as a prominent
member of the legal profession and

They then maintained an illicit

relationship known in various
circles in the community, but which
they managed to keep from me. It
therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with
unspeakable grief and pain when
my husband abandoned us, his
family, to live with Ms. Espita, in
utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his
power and influence as a member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cagayan to cause the employment
of Ms. Espita at the Department of
Trade and Industry Central Office at
Makati, Metro Manila. Out of
gratitude perhaps, for this gesture,
Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty.
Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness
and morals completely corrupted
by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in
the
community
that
Atty.
Dominador
M.
Narag
has
abandoned us, his family, to live
with a 22-year-old woman, who was
his former student in the tertiary
level[.][3]
This Court, in a Resolution dated
December 18, 1989, referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation,

report and recommendation.[4]
On June 26, 1990, the office of then
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
received from complainant another
letter seeking the dismissal of the
administrative
complaint.
She
alleged therein that (1) she
fabricated the allegations in her
complaint to humiliate and spite
her husband; (2) all the love letters
between the respondent and Gina
Espita were forgeries; and (3) she
was suffering from emotional
confusion arising from extreme
jealousy. The truth, she stated, was
that her husband had remained a
faithful and responsible family
man. She further asserted that he
had neither entered into an
amorous relationship with one Gina
Espita nor abandoned his family.[5]
Supporting her letter were an
Affidavit of Desistance[6] and a
Motion to Dismiss,[7] attached as
Annexes A and B, which she filed
before the IBP commission on bar
discipline.[8] In a Decision dated
October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of
Governors
[9]
dismissed
the
complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure
to prosecute.[10]
The case took an unexpected turn
when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court[11]
received
another
letter[12] from the complainant,
with her seven children[13] as cosignatories, again appealing for the
disbarment of her husband. She
explained that she had earlier

dropped the case against him

because of his continuous threats
against her.[14]
In
his
Comment
on
the
complainants letter of November
11, 1991, filed in compliance with
this Courts Resolution issued on
July
6,
1992,[15]
respondent
prayed that the decision of the
Board of Governors be affirmed.
Denying that he had threatened,
harassed or intimidated his wife, he
alleged that she had voluntarily
executed
her
Affidavit
of
Desistance[16] and Motion to
Dismiss,[17] even appearing before
the
investigating
officer,
Commissioner Racela, to testify
under oath that she prepared the
Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of
Desistance on her own free will and
affirmed the contents thereof.
In addition, he professed his love
for his wife and his children and
denied abandoning his family to
live with his paramour. However,
he described his wife as a person
emotionally disturbed, viz.:
What is pitiable here is the fact
that Complainant is an incurably
jealous and possessive woman, and
every time the streak of jealousy
rears its head, she fires off letters
or complaints against her husband
in every conceivable forum, all
without basis, and purely on
impulse,
just
to
satisfy
the
consuming demands of her loving
jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a

few hours afterwards, when her

jealousy cools off, she repents and
feels sorry for her acts against the
Respondent. Thus, when she wrote
the Letter of November 11, 1991,
she was then in the grips of one of
her bouts of jealousy.[18]
On August 24, 1992, this Court
issued another Resolution referring
the Comment of respondent to the
IBP.[19] In the hearing before IBP
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose,
respondent alleged the following:
[20]
2. Your Respondent comes from
very poor parents who have left
him not even a square meter of
land, but gave him the best legacy
in life: a purposeful and meaningful
education.
Complainant
comes
from what she claims to be very
rich parents who value material
possession more than education
and
the
higher
and
nobler
aspirations in life. Complainant
abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving
upbringing, nurtured in the gentle
ways of love, forgiveness, humility,
and
concern
for
the
poor.
Complainant was reared and raised
in
an
entirely
different
environment. Her value system is
the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family
very dearly, and has done all he
could in thirty-eight (38) years of
marriage to protect and preserve

his family. He gave his family

sustenance, a comfortable home,
love, education, companionship,
and most of all, a good and
respected name. He was always
gentle and compassionate to his
wife and children. Even in the most
trying times, he remained calm and
never inflicted violence on them.
His children are all now full-fledged
professionals, mature, and gainfully
employed. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the
sanctity of marriage as a social
institution.
On the other hand, consumed by
insane and unbearable jealousy,
Complainant
has
been
systematically and unceasingly
destroying the very foundations of
their marriage and their family.
Their marriage has become a
torture chamber in which Your
Respondent has been incessantly
BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
TORTURED,
ABUSED,
and
HUMILIATED, physically, mentally,
and
emotionally,
by
the
Complainant, in public and at
home. Their marriage has become
a nightmare.
For
thirty-eight
years,
your
Respondent suffered in silence and
bore the pain of his misfortune with
dignity and with almost infinite
patience, if only to preserve their
family and their marriage. But this

is not to be. The Complainant

never mellowed and never became
gentl[e],
loving,
and
understanding. In fact, she became
more fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the
light at the tunnel for Your
Respondent does not seem in sight.
The darkness continues to shroud
the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a
catharsis,
a
liberation
from
enslavement.
Paraphrasing
Dorfman in Death and the Maiden,
can the torturer and the tortured
co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely
uncomprehending
and
uncompromising mind whose only
obsession now is to destroy,
destroy,
and
destroy,
Your
Respondent, with perpetual regret
and with great sorrow, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage,
Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent
husband-beater,
vitriolic
and
unbending. But your Respondent
never revealed these destructive
qualities to other people. He
preserved the good name and
dignity of his wife. This is in
compliance with the marital vow to
love, honor or obey your spouse,
for better or for worse, in sickness
and in health. . . Even in this case,
Your Respondent never revealed

anything derogatory to his wife. It

is only now that he is constrained
to reveal all these things to defend
himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at
all,
except
a
jealous
rage,
Complainant
tells
everyone,
everywhere, that her husband is
worthless, good-for-nothing, evil
and immoral. She goes to colleges
and
universities,
professional
organizations, religious societies,
and all other sectors of the
community to tell them how evil,
bad and immoral her husband is.
She tells them not to hire him as
professor, as Counsel, or any other
capacity because her husband is
evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love?
Since when did love become an
instrument to destroy a mans
dearest possession in life - his good
name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainants virulent
disinformation campaign against
her husband, employing every
unethical and immoral means to
attain his ends, Your Respondent
has
been
irreparably
and
irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and
humiliated. Your Respondent is not
a scandalous man. It is he who has
been mercilessly scandalized and
crucified by the Complainant.[21]
To prove the alleged propensity of
his wife to file false charges,
respondent presented as evidence
the following list of the complaints

she had filed against him and Gina

Espita:
3.1
Complaint
for
Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x
3.2
Complaint
for
Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG,
Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage.
Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. x x x
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices and concubinage.
OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083.
xxx
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support.
RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No.
4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage.
Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan.
I.S.
No.
92-109.
DISMISSED.(x x x). Complainant
filed Motion for Reconsideration.
DENIED.(x x x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x
x)
with
S[upreme]
C[ourt].
Withdrawn (x x x). DISMISSED by
IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Reinstituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment,
again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405.
Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage,
again (x x x). Third MCTC,

Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. x x

x[22]
In his desperate effort to exculpate
himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters
and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x
x) are inadmissible in evidence as
enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996. (x x x).
xxxxxxxxx
II. That respondent is totally
innocent of the charges: He never
courted Gina Espita in the Saint
Louis College of Tuguegarao. He
never caused the employment of
said woman in the DTI. He never
had or is having any illicit
relationship with her anywhere, at
any time. He never lived with her
as husband and wife anywhere at
any time, be it in Centro Tumauini
or any of its barangays, or in any
other place. He never begot a child
or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the
other allegations of Mrs. Narag are
false and fabricated, x x x
xxxxxxxxx
III. Respondent never abandoned
his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her
two sons forcibly drove respondent
Narag out of the conjugal home.
After that, Atty. Narag tried to
return to the conjugal home many

times with the help of mutual

friends to save the marriage and
the family from collapse. He tried
several times to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. In fact, in one of the
hearings of the disbarment case,
he offered to return home and to
reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs.
Narag refused all these efforts of
respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is
an unbearably jealous, violent,
vindictive, scandalous, virulent and
merciless wife since the beginning
of the marriage, who incessantly
beat, battered, brutalized, tortured,
abuse[d],
scandalized,
and
humiliated respondent Atty. Narag,
physically, mentally, emotionally,
and psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim
in her counter-manifestation dated
March 28, 1996, to the effect that
the affidavit of Dominador B.
Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996
was obtained through force and
intimidation,
is
not
true.
Dominador,
Jr.,
executed
his
affidavit freely, voluntarily, and
absolutely
without
force
or
intimidation, as shown by the
transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimonies of Respondent Atty.
Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge
Dominador Garcia during the trial
of Criminal Case No. 12439, People
vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al.,
before the Tuguegarao MTC on May
3, 1996. x x x.

xxxxxxxxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now
an old man - a senior citizen of 63
years
sickly,
abandoned,
disgraced,
weakened
and
debilitated
by
progressively
degenerative gout and arthritis,
and hardly able to earn his own
keep. His very physical, medical,
psychological,
and
economic
conditions render him unfit and
unable to do the things attributed
to him by the complainant. Please
see
the
attached
medical
certificates, x x x, among many
other similar certificates touching
on the same ailments. Respondent
is also suffering from hypertension.
[23]
On July 18, 1997, the investigating
officer submitted his report,[24]
recommending
the
indefinite
suspension of Atty. Narag from the
practice of law. The material
portions of said report read as
follows:
Culled
from
the
voluminous
documentary
and
testimonial
evidence
submitted
by
the
contending parties, two (2) issues
are relevant for the disposition of
the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a
commission
of
alleged
abandonment of respondents own
family and [whether he was] living
with his paramour, Gina Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath

that his illegitimate children with
Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador) as appearing on
paragraph 1(g) of respondents
Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten
love letters, the due execution and
contents of which, although he
objected to their admissibility for
being allegedly forgeries, were
never denied by him on the witness
stand much less presented and
offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of
respondents
witnesses
whose
testimonies tend to depict the
complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an
incurably
jealous
wife
and
possessive
woman
suffering
everytime with streaks of jealousy,
respondent did not present himself
on the witness stand to testify and
be cross-examined on his sworn
comment; much less did he
present his alleged paramour, Gina
Espita, to disprove the adulterous
relationship between him and their
having begotten their illegitimate
children, namely: Aurelle Dominic
N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N.
Espita. Worse, respondents denial
that he is the father of the two is a
ground for disciplinary sanction
(Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence
presented, we find the respondent
subject to disciplinary action as a
member of the legal profession.
[25]

In its Resolution[26] issued on

August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted
and approved the investigating
commissioners
recommendation
for the indefinite suspension of the
respondent.[27] Subsequently, the
complainant sought the disbarment
of
her
husband
in
a
Manifestation/Comment she filed
on October 20, 1997. The IBP
granted this stiffer penalty and, in
its Resolution dated November 30,
1997, denied respondents Motion
for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the
records of the proceedings and the
evidence presented by the parties,
we find that the conduct of
respondent warrants the imposition
of the penalty of disbarment.
The
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not

only a condition precedent[28] to
the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all
members of the bar. Hence, when a
lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred.[29]
Immoral conduct has been defined
as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the
community.[30] Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high
degree[31] or committed under
such
scandalous
or
revolting
circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.[32]
We explained in Barrientos vs.
Daarol[33] that, as officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives
in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating

the belief that he is flouting those

moral standards.
Respondent Narag is accused of
gross immorality for abandoning
his family in order to live with Gina
Espita. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[34]
Presented by complainant as
witnesses, aside from herself,[35]
were:
Charlie
Espita,[36]
Magdalena
Bautista,[37]
Bienvenido
Eugenio,[38]
Alice
Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B. Narag,[40]
Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41] and
Nieves F. Reyes.[42]
Charlie Espita, brother of the
alleged paramour Gina Espita,
corroborated complainants charge
against
respondent
in
these
categorical statements he gave to
the investigating officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty.
Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in
partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

(Witness
pointed
respondent,
Atty.
Narag)

to
the
Dominador

Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?

A Yes, sir.

Q How do you know that Atty.

Narag is living with your sister? Did
you see them in the house?

ATTY. NARAG:
A Yes, si[r].
Already answered. He said I am the
live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner
of my sister and that they are now
living together as husband and wife
and that they already have two
children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador.
During
cross-examination
conducted by the respondent
himself, Charlie Espita repeated his
account that his sister Gina was
living with the respondent, with
whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty.
Narag is now living with your sister
as husband and wife. You claim
that?

xxxxxxxxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and
your sister have two children,
Aurelle
Dominic
and
Kyle
Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are
the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together
in that house and you have left
your family.[44]
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted
(1) that it was he who handed to
Mrs. Narag the love letters
respondent had sent to his sister,
and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to
dissuade him from appearing at the
disbarment proceedings.[45]

A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?

Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you

point [to] him?

dont allow me that my sister is

living with a married man like you.

A Because at present you are living

together as husband and wife and
you have already two children and I
know that that is really an immoral
act which you cannot just allow me
to follow since my moral values

Witness
Bienvenido
Eugenio
strengthened the testimony of
Charlie Espita in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the
respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.

Q Could you please tell us why do

you know him?
A Because he was always going to
the house of my son-in-law by the
name of Charlie Espita.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the
residence of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in
the house of Reynaldo Angubong,
sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q
And
you
specifically,
categorically state under oath that
this is the residence of Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
Q And under oath this is where
Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are
allegedly living as husband and
wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.[46]
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor
and friend of the estranged couple,
testified that she learned from the
Narag children -- Randy, Bong and
Rowena -- that their father left his
family, that she and her husband
prodded the complainant to accept
the respondent back, that the

Narag couple again separated

when the respondent went back to
his woman, and that Atty. Narag
had maltreated his wife.[47]
On the strength of the testimony of
her witnesses, the complainant was
able to establish that respondent
abandoned his family and lived
with another woman. Absent any
evidence
showing
that
these
witnesses had an ill motive to
testify
falsely
against
the
respondent, their testimonies are
deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented
as evidence the love letters that
respondent had sent to Gina. In
these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and
her two children, whom he
acknowledged as his own. In
addition,
complainant
also
submitted as evidence the cards
that she herself had received from
him. Guided by the rule that
handwriting
may
be
proved
through a comparison of one set of
writings with those admitted or
treated by the respondent as
genuine, we affirm that the two
sets of evidence were written by
one and the same person.[48]
Besides,
respondent
did
not
present any evidence to prove that
the love letters were not really
written by him; he merely denied
that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon
the complainant, respondent has

the duty not only to himself but

also to the court to show that he is
morally fit to remain a member of
the bar. Mere denial does not
suffice. Thus, when his moral
character is assailed, such that his
right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled,
he must meet the charges squarely
and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating
body and this Court, that he is
morally fit to have his name in the
Roll of Attorneys.[49] This he failed
to do.
Respondent
adamantly
denies
abandoning his family to live with
Gina Espita. At the same time, he
depicts his wife as a violent
husband-beater,
vitriolic
and
unbending, and as an insanely and
pathologically
jealous
woman,
whose only obsession was to
destroy, destroy and destroy him
as shown by her filing of a series of
allegedly
unfounded
charges
against him (and Gina Espita). To
prove his allegation, he presented
ninety-eight
(98)
pieces
of
documentary evidence[50] and ten
(10) witnesses.[51]
We note, however, that the
testimonies of the witnesses of
respondent did not establish the
fact that he maintained that moral
integrity required by the profession
that would render him fit to
continue practicing law. Neither did
their testimonies destroy the fact,
as proven by the complainant, that

he had abandoned his family and

lived with Gina Espita, with whom
he had two children. Some of them
testified on matters which they had
no actual knowledge of, but merely
relied on information from either
respondent
himself
or
other
people,
while
others
were
presented to impeach the good
character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided
well for his family -- they enjoyed a
comfortable life and his children
finished their education. He may
have also established himself as a
successful lawyer and a seasoned
politician.
But
these
accomplishments are not sufficient
to show his moral fitness to
continue being a member of the
noble profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents
have not only rights but also duties
e.g., to support, educate and
instruct their children according to
right precepts and good example;
and
to
give
them
love,
companionship and understanding,
as well as moral and spiritual
guidance.[52] As a husband, he is
also obliged to live with his wife; to
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity; and to render help and
support.[53]
Respondent himself admitted that
his work required him to be often
away from home. But the evidence
shows that he was away not only
because of his work; instead, he

abandoned his family to live with

his paramour, who bore him two
children. It would appear, then,
that he was hardly in a position to
be a good husband or a good
father. His children, who grew up
mostly under the care of their
mother, must have scarcely felt the
warmth of their fathers love.

CONTINUATION.

Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag,

showed his resentment towards his
fathers moral frailties in his
testimony:

Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you

life, his blood runs in your veins,
his flesh is your flesh, his bones are
your bones and you now disown
him because he is the worst man
on earth, is that what you are
saying.

Q My question is this, is there any

sin so grievous that it cannot be
forgiven, is there a fault that is so
serious that it is incapable of
forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or
fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is
with the emotional part of myself, I
suppose I cannot forgive a person
although I am a God-fearing
person, but I h[av]e to give the
person a lesson in order for him or
her to at least realize his mistakes,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx

A With the reputation that he had

removed from us, I suppose he has
to be given a lesson. At this point
in time, I might just forgive him if
he will have to experience all the
pains that we have also suffered
for quite sometime.

A Sort of, sir.

Q You are now telling that as far
[as] you are concerned because
your father has sinned, you have
no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel
much from my father even when I
was still a kid because my father is
not always staying with us at
home. So, how can you say that?
Yes, he gave me life, why not? But
for sure, sir, you did not give me
love.[54]

COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming
for the sake of argument that your
father is the worst, hardened
criminal on earth, would you send
him to jail and have him disbarred?
That is the question.

Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr.,

narrated before the investigating
officer the trauma he went
through:
Q In connection with that affidavit,
Mr. Witness, which contains the
fact that your father is maintaining

a paramour, could you please tell

this Honorable Commission the
effect on you?

Q In your wifes family?

A This has a very strong effect on

me and this includes my brothers
and sisters, especially my married
life, sir. And it also affected my
children so much, that I and my
wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to
say that I and my wife parted ways.
This is one reason that affected us.

Q And what do you mean by that?

Q Will you please tell us specifically

why you and your wife parted
ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed
of what happened to my family and
that she could not face the people,
our community, especially because
my wife belongs to a well-known
family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your
brothers and sisters? Please tell us
what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected
the health of my elder sister
because she knows so well that my
mother suffered so much and she
kept on thinking about my mother.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things
that had happened in our family,
Your Honor.

A In our family, sir.

A What I meant by that is my

father had an illicit relationship and
that my father went to the extent
of scolding my wife and calling my
wife
a
puta
in
provincial
government, which my mother-inlaw hated him so much for this,
which really affected us. And then
my wife knew for a fact that my
father has an illicit relationship with
Gina Espita, whom he bore two
children by the name of Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador,
which I could prove and I stand firm
to this, Your Honor.[55]
Although respondent piously claims
adherence to the sanctity of
marriage, his acts prove otherwise.
A husband is not merely a man
who has contracted marriage.
Rather, he is a partner who has
solemnly sworn to love and respect
his wife and remain faithful to her
until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova
vs.
Cordova[56]
The
moral
delinquency that affects the fitness
of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes
a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.

In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the

respondent was disbarred from the
practice
of
law,
when
he
abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who
had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,
[58] the respondent was disbarred
after the complainant proved that
he had abandoned her and
maintained
an
adulterous
relationship with a married woman.
This
Court
declared
that
respondent failed to maintain the
highest
degree
of
morality
expected and required of a
member of the bar.
In
the
present
case,
the
complainant was able to establish,
by clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent had breached the
high and exacting moral standards
set for members of the law
profession. As held in Maligsa vs.
Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be
disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty,
probity
and
good
demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag
is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this
Decision be in the personal record
of
Respondent
Narag;
and

furnished to all courts of the land,

the
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines, and the Office of the
Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
[AC-5365. April 27, 2005]
Spouses
FRANKLIN
and
LOURDES OLBES, complainants,
vs. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Constituting
a
serious
transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility was the
malevolent act of respondent, who
filled up the blank checks entrusted
to him as security for a loan by
writing on those checks amounts
that had not been agreed upon at
all, despite his full knowledge that
the loan they were meant to secure
had already been paid.

After he had filed his Comment[2]

on the Petition, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of
the
Philippines
(IBP)
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline
(CBD),
through
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay,
held several hearings. During those
hearings, the last of which was
held on May 12, 2003,[3] the
parties were able to present their
respective
witnesses
and
documentary evidence. After the
filing of the parties respective
formal offers of evidence, as well
as petitioners Memorandum,[4] the
case was considered submitted for
resolution.
Subsequently,
the
commissioner rendered his Report
and
Recommendation
dated
January 30, 2004, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution
No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30,
2004.

application for a loan from Rodela

Loans, Inc., in the amount of
P10,000. As security for the loan,
she issued and delivered to
respondent five Philippine National
Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos.
0046241-45), which served as
collateral for the approved loan as
well as any other loans that might
be obtained in the future.[6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid
respondent
the
amount
of
P14,874.37 corresponding to the
loan plus surcharges, penalties and
interests, for which the latter
issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted
as follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37
as payment of the loan of
P10,000.00
taken
earlier
by
Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99

The Facts
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition[1]
for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V.
Deciembre,
filed
by
Spouses
Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court.
Petitioners
charged
respondent
with
willful
and
deliberate acts of dishonesty,
falsification
and
conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

P10,000.00
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes
allege that they were government
employees working at the Central
Post Office, Manila; and that
Franklin was a letter carrier
receiving a monthly salary of
P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter,
P6,000.[5]
Through
renewed

respondent,
Lourdes
on July 1, 1999 her

PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]

Notwithstanding the full payment
of the loan, respondent filled up
four (of the five) blank PNB Checks
(Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243
and 0046244) for the amount of
P50,000 each, with different dates
of maturity -- August 15, 1999,
August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999

and
November
respectively.[9]

15,

1999,

On October 19, 1999, respondent

filed
before
the
Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal an
Affidavit-Complaint
against
petitioners for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He
alleged therein that on July 15,
1999, around one-thirty in the
afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they
personally approached him and
requested that he immediately
exchange with cash their postdated
PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and
0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January
20, 2000, respondent filed against
petitioners
another
AffidavitComplaint for estafa and violation
of BP 22. He stated, among others,
that on the same day, July 15,
1999, around two oclock in the
afternoon at Quezon City, they
again
approached
him
and
requested that he exchange with
cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the
afternoon of July 15, 1999, they
never went either to Cainta, Rizal,
or to Quezon City to transact
business
with
respondent.
Allegedly, they were in their office
at the time, as shown by their Daily
Time Records; so it would have
been physically impossible for
them to transact business in
Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval

of only thirty minutes, in Quezon

City, especially considering the
heavy traffic conditions in those
places.[12]
Petitioners averred that many of
their office mates -- among them,
Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta
and Eugenia Mendoza -- had
suffered the same fate in their
dealings with respondent.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent
denied petitioners claims, which he
called baseless and devoid of any
truth
and
merit.
Allegedly,
petitioners were the ones who had
deceived him by not honoring their
commitment regarding their July
15, 1999 transactions. Those
transactions, totaling P200,000,
had allegedly been covered by
their four PNB checks that were,
however, subsequently dishonored
due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he
filed criminal cases against them.
He claimed that the checks had
already been fully filled up when
petitioners signed them in his
presence. He further claimed that
he had given them the amounts of
money indicated in the checks,
because his previous satisfactory
transactions with them convinced
him that they had the capacity to
pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the
loans were his private and personal
transactions, which were not in any
way connected with his profession
as a lawyer. The criminal cases

against petitioners were allegedly

private
actions
intended
to
vindicate his rights against their
deception and violation of their
obligations. He maintained that his
right to litigate should not be
curtailed by this administrative
action.
Report
of
the
Commissioner

Investigating

In his Report and Recommendation,

Commissioner Dulay recommended
that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two
years for violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The
commissioner
said
that
respondents version of the facts
was not credible. Commissioner
Dulay rendered the following
analysis and evaluation of the
evidence presented:
In his affidavit-complaint x x x
executed to support his complaint
filed
before
the
Provincial
Prosecution
Office
of
Rizal
respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the
jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN
A. OLBES x x x, personally met and
requested me to immediately
exchange with cash, right there
and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be
immediately used by them in their
business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint

executed to support his complaint
filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor
of
Quezon
City
respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, at
around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES
E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x
x x, personally met and requested
me to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their
postdated
checks
totaling
P100,000.00
then,
to
be
immediately used by them in their
business venture.
The above statements executed by
respondent under oath are in direct
contrast to his testimony before
this
Commission
on
crossexamination during the May 12,
2003 hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q. Based on these four (4) checks
which you claimed the complainant
issued to you, you filed two
separate criminal cases against
them, one, in Pasig City and the
other in Quezon City, is that
correct?

complainants on July 15, 1999, is

that correct?
A. I will consult my records, You
Honor, because its quite a long
time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two
checks is in the morning and the
next two checks is in the afternoon
(sic).

Q. What is that, is that your law

office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name
retainer client of yours?

of

that

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?

Your Honor, may I object because

what is the materiality of the
question?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
The first two checks covering check
Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the
morning. And Check No. 46243 and
46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular
time in the morning that these two
checks with number 0046241 and
0046242 xxx have been issued to
you?
A. I could not remember exactly
but in the middle part of the
morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what
particular place?

That is very material. I am trying to

test
your
credibility
because
according to you these checks
have been issued in Pasig in the
place of your client on a retainer.
Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not
material I think. It is enough that
he said it was issued here in Pasig.
What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the

checks were deposited at different
banks.

A. Here in my office at Garnet

Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

What is the materiality of knowing

the name of his clients office?

Q. Is that your house?

Q. These
four
checks
were
accordingly issued to you by the

ATTY. PUNZALAN:
A. No, its not my house?

Because,
Your
Honor,
the
materiality is to find out whether
he is telling the truth. The place,
Your Honor, according to the
respondent is his client. Now I am
asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at
AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the
complainants in the afternoon
issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243
and 0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this
Honorable office that there were
four checks issued in the place of
your client in Pasig City, two in the
morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondent was clearly not being
truthful in his narration of the
transaction with the complainants.
As between his version as to when
the four checks were given, we find
the story of complainant[s] more
credible. Respondent has blatantly
distorted the truth, insofar as the
place
where
the
transaction
involving the four checks took
place. Such distortion on a very

material fact would seriously cast

doubt on his version of the
transaction with complainants.
Furthermore
respondents
statements as to the time when the
transactions took place are also
obviously
and
glaringly
inconsistent and contradicts the
written statements made before
the public prosecutors. Thus further
adding to the lack of credibility of
respondents
version
of
the
transaction.
Complainants version that they
issued blank checks to respondent
as security for the payment of a
loan of P10,000.00 plus interest,
and that respondent filled up the
checks in amounts not agreed upon
appears to be more credible.
Complainants herein are mere
employees of the Central Post
Office in Manila who had a previous
loan
of
P10,000.00
from
respondent and which has since
been paid x x x. Respondent does
not deny the said transaction. This
appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In
fact, complainants were even late
in paying the loan when it fell due
such that they had to pay interest.
That respondent would trust them
once more by giving them another
P200,000.00 allegedly to be used
for a business and immediately
release the amounts under the
circumstances
described
by
respondent
does
not
appear
credible given the background of

the
previous
transaction
and
personal
circumstances
of
complainants.
That
respondent
who is a lawyer would not even
bother to ask from complainants a
receipt for the money he has given,
nor bother to verify and ask them
what businesses they would use
the money for contributes further
to the lack of credibility of
respondents
version.
These
circumstances really cast doubt as
to the version of respondent with
regard to the transaction. The
resolution of the public prosecutors
notwithstanding
we
believe
respondent is clearly lacking in
honesty in dealing with the
complainants. Complainant Franklin
Olbes had to be jailed as a result of
respondents filing of the criminal
cases. Parenthetically, we note that
respondent has also filed similar
cases against the co-employees of
complainants in the Central Post
Office and respondent is facing
similar complaints in the IBP for his
actions.[15]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and
conclusions
of
Commissioner
Dulay, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
However, the penalty should be
more severe than what the IBP
recommended.
Respondents
Liability

Administrative

Membership in the legal profession

is a special privilege burdened with
conditions.[16] It is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only
learned in the law, but also known
to possess good moral character.
[17] A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is
clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose
primary duty is the advancement
of the quest for truth and justice,
for which he [or she] has sworn to
be a fearless crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair
and impartial administration of
justice.[19] Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach, in order to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession.
[20]
The
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
specifically
mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxxxxxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
A high standard of excellence and
ethics is expected and required of
members of the bar.[21] Such
conduct of nobility and uprightness
should remain with them, whether
in their public or in their private
lives. As officers of the courts and
keepers of the publics faith, they
are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and
are thus mandated to behave at all
times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to
likewise impresses upon them the
duty of exhibiting the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and
candor in their relationships with
others. The oath is a sacred trust
that must be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times. Thus,
lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct,
whether
in
their
professional or in their private
capacity, if such conduct renders
them unfit to continue to be
officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP
commissioner gave credence to the

story of petitioners, who said that

they had given five blank personal
checks to respondent at the
Central Post Office in Manila as
security for the P10,000 loan they
had contracted. Found untrue and
unbelievable
was
respondents
assertion that they had filled up
the checks and exchanged these
with his cash at Quezon City and
Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review
of the records, we find no reason to
deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is
no
need
to
stretch
ones
imagination to arrive at an
inevitable conclusion. Respondent
does not deny the P10,000 loan
obtained from him by petitioners.
According
to
Franklin
Olbes
testimony on cross-examination,
they asked respondent for the
blank checks after the loan had
been paid. On the pretext that he
was not able to bring the checks
with him,[24] he was not able to
return them. He thus committed
abominable dishonesty by abusing
the confidence reposed in him by
petitioners. It was their high regard
for him as a member of the bar
that made them trust him with
their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the
Code of Professional Responsibility
was seriously transgressed by his
malevolent act of filling up the
blank checks by indicating amounts
that had not been agreed upon at
all and despite respondents full

knowledge that the loan supposed

to be secured by the checks had
already been paid. His was a
brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document, resorted to
for his material gain.

behavior.[30] Lawyers must be

ministers of truth. Hence, they
must not mislead the court or allow
it to be misled by any artifice. In all
their dealings, they are expected to
act in good faith.[31]

And he did not stop there. Because

the checks were dishonored upon
presentment, respondent had the
temerity to initiate unfounded
criminal suits against petitioners,
thereby exhibiting his vile intent to
have them punished and deprived
of liberty for frustrating the
criminal duplicity he had wanted to
foist on them. As a matter of fact,
one of the petitioners (Franklin)
was detained for three months[26]
because
of
the
Complaints.
Respondent is clearly guilty of
serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. He committed an act
indicative of moral depravity not
expected
from,
and
highly
unbecoming, a member of the bar.

Deception and other fraudulent

acts are not merely unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a
basic moral flaw. The standards of
the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct that merely
enables
one
to
escape
the
penalties of criminal laws.[33]

Good moral character is an

essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice
of law. It is equally essential to
observe this norm meticulously
during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the
privilege.[27] Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
[28] No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important
than truthfulness and candor.[29]
The
rigorous
ethics
of
the
profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous

Considering the depravity of the

offense committed by respondent,
we find the penalty recommended
by the IBP of suspension for two
years from the practice of law to be
too mild. His propensity for
employing
deceit
and
misrepresentation is reprehensible.
His misuse of the filled-up checks
that led to the detention of one
petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the
forging of a special power of
attorney (SPA) by the respondent
to make it appear that he was
authorized
to
sell
anothers
property, as well as his fraudulent
and malicious inducement of Alicia
Rubis to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement to give a semblance of
legality
to
the
SPA,
were
sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law for five years.
Here, the conduct of herein

respondent is even worse. He used

falsified checks as bases for
maliciously indicting petitioners
and thereby caused the detention
of one of them.
WHEREFORE,
Atty.
Victor
V.
Deciembre is found guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED
from the practice of law effective
immediately. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished all courts as
well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which is directed to
append a copy to respondents
personal record. Let another copy
be furnished the National Office of
the
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO
TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
passed the bar examinations held
in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in

petitioner's conviction, arose from
the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime
in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to
homicide charges. The eight (8)
accused later withdrew their initial
pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded
guilty
to
reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial
court rendered judgment dated 11
February 1993 imposing on each of
the
accused
a
sentence
of
imprisonment of from two (2) years
four (4) months :and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court
granted
herein
petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court
issued an order approving a report
dated 6 April 1994 submitted by
the
Probation
Officer
recommending
petitioner's
discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed
before this Court a petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge
from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through
then Senior Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C.

Argosino to submit to the Court

evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the
requirement
of
good
moral
character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above
resolution, petitioner submitted no
less
than
fifteen
(15)
certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five
(5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members
of
religious
orders.
Petitioner
likewise
submitted
evidence
that
a
scholarship
foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter's family and the eight
(8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court
required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan,
father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December
1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the
infliction of severe physical injuries
which led to the death of his son
was
deliberate
rather
than
accidental. The offense therefore
was not only homicide but murder
since the accused took advantage
of the neophyte's helplessness
implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's

plea of guilt to the lesser offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the
accused who went to their house
on Christmas day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on
their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They
also told him that the father of one
of the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven
petitioner and his co-accused for
the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son
whom he had hoped would succeed
him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and
the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say
whether petitioner is now morally
fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the
sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege
granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers
who are instruments in the
effective
and
efficient
administration of justice. It is the
sworn duty of this Court not only to
"weed out" lawyers who have

become a disgrace to the noble

profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the lawyer's
oath, thereby further tarnishing the
public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before
us
required
weighing
and
reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law.
The senseless beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to
the bar since they were totally
irresponsible,
irrelevant
and
uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in
this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical behavior,
[which] makes impossible a finding
that
the
participant
[herein
petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however,
we stated that the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has
purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court
understands
and
shares
the

sentiment
of
Atty.
Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child
is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes
even
more
pronounced
and
profound in cases where the death
is due to causes other than natural
or accidental but due to the
reckless
imprudence
of
third
parties. The feeling then becomes
a struggle between grief and anger
directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before
the Court- manifesting his having
forgiven the accused is no less
than
praiseworthy
and
commendable. It is exceptional for
a parent, given the circumstances
in this case, to find room for
forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits
that he is still not in a position to
state if petitioner is now morally fit
to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of
this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll
of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession
with
the
following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes
that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary,
the various certifications show that
he is a devout Catholic with a

genuine concern for civic duties

and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr.
Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to
give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the
lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony
or
formality
for
practicing law. Every lawyer should
at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional
Responsibility,
the
administration
of
justice
will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and
easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr.
Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to
his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to
the more unfortunate members of
society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner
Al Caparros Argosino is hereby
ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to
sign the Roll of Attorneys and,

thereafter, to practice the legal

profession.
SO ORDERED.
Section 1.Title. - This Act shall be
known as the "Legal Education
Reform Act of 1993."
Section 2.Declaration of Policies. It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to uplift the standards of
legal education in order to prepare
law
students
for
advocacy,
counselling, problem-solving, and
decision-making, to infuse in them
the ethics of the legal profession;
to
impress
on
them
the
importance, nobility and dignity of
the legal profession as an equal
and indispensable partner of the
Bench in the administration of
justice and to develop social
competence.
Towards this end, the State shall
undertake appropriate reforms in
the legal education system, require
proper selection of law students,
maintain
quality
among
law
schools,
and
require
legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal
education.
Section 3.General and Specific
Objective of Legal Education. - (a)
Legal education in the Philippines is
geared to attain the following
objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the
practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among

members of the legal profession of
the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of society;

a foundation for future training

beyond the basic professional
degree, and to develop in them the
desire and capacity for continuing
study and self-improvement;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(4) to contribute towards the
promotion and advancement of
justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system
and legal institutions in the light of
the historical and contemporary
development
of
law
in
the
Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to
accomplish the following specific
objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a
broad knowledge of law and its
various
fields
and
of
legal
institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research
abilities to enable them to analyze,
articulate and apply the law
effectively, as well as to allowthem
to have a holistic approach to legal
problems and issues;
(3) to prepare law students for
advocacy, counselling, problemsolving and decision-making, and
to develop their ability to deal with
recognized legal problems of the
present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any
field of law as is necessary for
gainful employment or sufficient as

(5) to inculcate in them the ethics

and responsibilities of the legal
profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who
conscientiously pursue the lofty
goals of their profession and to
fully adhere to its ethical norms.
Section 4.Legal Education Board;
Creation and Composition. - To
carry out the purpose of this Act,
there is hereby created the Legal
Education
Board,
hereinafter
referred to as the Board, attached
solely for budgetary purposes and
administrative support to the
Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.
The Board shall be composed of a
Chairman, who shall preferably be
a former justice of the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals, and the
following as regular members: a
representative of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP); a
representative of the Philippine
Association of Law Schools (PALS);
a representative from the ranks of
active law practitioners; and, a
representative
from
the
law
students' sector. The Secretary of
the Department of Education,
Culture
and
Sports,
or
his

representative, shall be an
officio member of the Board.

ex

With
the
exception
of
the
representative of the law students'
sector, the Chairman and regular
members of the Board must be
natural-born
citizen
of
the
Philippines and members of the
Philippine Bar, who have been
engaged for at least ten (10) years
in the practice of law, as well as in
the teaching of law in a duly
authorized or recognized law
school.
Section
5.Term
of
Office;
Compensation. - The Chairman and
regular members of the Board shall
be appointed by the President for a
term of five (5) years without
reappointment from a list of at
least three (3) nominees prepared,
with prior authorization from the
Supreme Court, by the Judicial and
Bar Council, for every position or
vacancy, and no such appointment
shall need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman
and the representative of the IBP
shall hold office for five (5) years,
the representatives of the PALS and
the PALP, for three (3) years; and
the representative from the ranks
of active law practitioners and the
representative of the law students'
sector, for one (1) year, without
reappointment. Appointments to
any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpire portion of the term of the
predecessor.

The
Chairman
and
regular
members of the Board shall have
the same salary and rank as the
Chairman
and
members,
respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions: Provided, That their
salaries shall not be diminished
during their term of office.
Section 6.Office and Staff Support.
- The Department of Education,
Culture and Sports shall provide
the necessary office and staff
support to the Board, with a
principal office to be located in
Metropolitan Manila.
The Board may appoint such other
officers and employees it may
deem
necessary
in
the
performanceof its powers and
functions.
Section 7.Powers and Functions. For the purpose of achieving the
objectives of this Act, the Board
shall havethe following powers and
functions:
(a)
to
administer
the
legal
education system in the country in
a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in
the country, consistent with its
powers and functions as herein
enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of
accreditation for law schools taking

into account, among others, the

size
of
enrollment,
the
qualifications of the members of
the faculty, the library and other
facilities, without encroaching upon
the
academic
freedom
of
institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that
meet
the
standards
of
accreditation;
(e)
to
prescribe
minimum
standards for law admission and
minimum
qualifications
and
compensation of faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula
for the course of study aligned to
the requirements for admission to
the Bar, law practice and social
consciousness, and such other
courses of study as may be
prescribed by the law schools and
colleges under the different levels
of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for
taking the Bar which a law student
shall undergo with any duly
accredited private or public law
office or firm or legal assistance
group anytime during the law
course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to
exceed a total of twelve (12)
months. For this purpose, the
Board shall prescribe the necessary
guidelines for such accreditation
and the specifications of such
internship which shall include the

actual work of a new member of

the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing
legal education. For this purpose,
the Board may provide for the
mandatory
attendance
of
practicing lawyers in such courses
and for such duration as the Board
may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions
and prescribe such rules and
regulations necessary for the
attainment of the policies and
objectives of this Act.
Section 8.Accreditation of Law
Schools. - Educational institutions
may not operate a law school
unless accredited by the Board.
Accreditation of law schools may
be granted only to educational
institutions recognized by the
Government.
Section
9.Withdrawal
or
Downgrading of Accreditation. The Board may withdraw or
downgrade the accreditation status
of a law school if it fails to maintain
the
standards
set
for
its
accreditation status.
Section 10.Effectivity of Withdrawal
or Downgrading of Accreditation. The withdrawal or downgrading of
accreditation
status
shall
be
effetive after the lapse ofthe
semester or trimester following the
receipt by the school of the notice
of withdrawal or downgrading

unless, in the meantime, the school

meets
and/or
upgrades
the
standards
or
corrects
the
deficiencies
upon
which
the
withdrawal or downgrading of the
accreditation status is based.
Section 11.Legal Education Fund. There is hereby created a special
endowment fund, to be known as
the Legal Education Fund, which
shall be under the control of the
Board, and administered as a
separate fund by the Social
Security System (SSS) which shall
invest the same with due and
prudent regard to its solvency,
safety and liquidity.
The Legal Education Fund shall be
established out of, and maintained
from, the amounts appropriated
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
13 hereof, and from sixty percent
(60%) of the privilege tax paid by
every lawyer effective Fiscal Year
1994; and from such donations,
legacies, grant-in-aid and other
forms of contributions received by
the Board for the purposes of this
Act.
Being a special endowment fund,
only the interests earned on the
Legal Education Fund shall be used
exclusively for the purposes of this
Act, including support for faculty
development grants, professorial
chairs, library improvements and
similar
programs
for
the
advancement of law teaching and

education
schools.

in

accredited

law

The Fund shall also be used for the

operation of the Board. For this
purpose, an amount not exceeding
ten percent (10%) of the interest
on the Fund shall be utilized.
The Board, in consultation with the
SSS, shall issue the necessary rules
and regulations for the collection,
administration and utilization of the
Fund.
Section
12.Coverage.
The
provisions of this Act shall apply to
all schools and colleges of law
which are presently under the
supervision of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports.
Hereafter, said supervision shall be
transferred to the Board. Law
schools and colleges which shall be
established following the approval
of this Act shall likewise be
covered.
Section 13.Appropriation. - The
amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00)
is
hereby
authorized to be charged against
the current year's appropriation of
the Contingent Fund for the initial
expenses of the Board.
To form part of the Legal Education
Fund, there shall be appropriated
annually, under the budget of the
Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) for

a period of ten (10) years effective

Fiscal Year 1994.

standing, is entitled to practice

law.

Section 14.Separability Clause. - If

any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or the application
thereof
to
any
person,
circumstance or transaction is held
invalid,
the
validity
of
the
remaining provisions of this Act and
the applicability of such provisions
to other persons, circumstances
and transactions shall not be
affected thereby.

Section 2.
Requirements
for all applicants for admission
to the bar. Every applicant
for admission as a member of
the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.

Section 15.Repealing Clause. - All

laws, decrees, executie orders,
rules and regulations, issuances or
parts thereof inconsistent with this
Act is hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
Section 16.Effectivity. - This Act
shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette
or in any two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Approved: 23 December 1993.
RULES OF COURT RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1.
Who
may
practice law. Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance
with the provisions of this rule,
and who is in good and regular

Section 3.
Requirements
for lawyers who are citizens of
the United States of America.
Citizens of the United States
of America who, before July 4,
1946,
were
duly
licensed
members of the Philippine Bar,
in active practice in the courts
of the Philippines and in good
and regular standing as such
may, upon satisfactory proof of
those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue
such practice after taking the
following oath of office:
I........................
. . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law
in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the
supreme
authority
of
the

Republic of the Philippines; I

will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of may
knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well as to
the courts as to my clients; and
I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me
God.
Section 4.
Requirements
for
applicants
from
other
jurisdictions. Applicants for
admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys
in
good
standing
in
the
Supreme Court of the United
States or in any circuit court of
appeals
or
district
court
therein, or in the highest court
of any State or Territory of the
United States, and who can
show
by
satisfactory
certificates that they have
practiced at least five years in
any of said courts, that such
practice began before July 4,
1946, and that they have never

been suspended or disbarred,

may, in the discretion of the
Court, be admitted without
examination.
Section 5.
Additional
requirements
for
other
applicants. All applicants for
admission other than those
referred
to
in
the
two
preceding section shall, before
being
admitted
to
the
examination,
satisfactorily
show that they have regularly
studied law for four years, and
successfully
completed
all
prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially
approved and recognized by
the Secretary of Education. The
affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate
from the university or school of
law, shall be filed as evidence
of such facts, and further
evidence may be required by
the court.
No applicant shall be admitted
to the bar examinations unless
he has satisfactorily completed
the following courses in a law
school
or
university
duly
recognized by the government:
civil
law,
commercial
law,
remedial law, criminal law,
public and private international
law, political law, labor and
social
legislation,
medical
jurisprudence,
taxation
and
legal ethics.

Section 6.
Pre-Law. No
applicant for admission to the
bar
examination
shall
be
admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied
the Secretary of Education
that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring
for
admission
thereto
the
completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the
following subjects as major or
field of concentration: political
science, logic, english, spanish,
history and economics.
Section 7.
Time for filing
proof of qualifications. All
applicants for admission shall
file with the clerk of the
Supreme Court the evidence
required by section 2 of this
rule at least fifteen (15) days
before the beginning of the
examination. If not embraced
within section 3 and 4 of this
rule they shall also file within
the same period the affidavit
and certificate required by
section 5, and if embraced
within sections 3 and 4 they
shall
exhibit
a
license
evidencing the fact of their
admission
to
practice,
satisfactory evidence that the
same has not been revoked,

and certificates as to their

professional
standing.
Applicants shall also file at the
same time their own affidavits
as to their age, residence, and
citizenship.
Section 8.
Notice
of
Applications.

Notice
of
applications for admission shall
be published by the clerk of
the
Supreme
Court
in
newspapers
published
in
Pilipino, English and Spanish,
for at least ten (10) days
before the beginning of the
examination.
Section 9.
Examination;
subjects. Applicants, not
otherwise
provided
for
in
sections 3 and 4 of this rule,
shall
be
subjected
to
examinations in the following
subjects: Civil Law; Labor and
Social Legislation; Mercantile
Law; Criminal Law; Political
Law (Constitutional Law, Public
Corporations,
and
Public
Officers);
International
Law
(Private and Public); Taxation;
Remedial Law (Civil Procedure,
Criminal
Procedure,
and
Evidence); Legal Ethics and
Practical
Exercises
(in
Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10.
Bar examination,
by questions and answers, and
in writing. Persons taking
the examination shall not bring
papers, books or notes into the

examination
rooms.
The
questions shall be the same for
all examinees and a copy
thereof, in English or Spanish,
shall
be
given
to
each
examinee.
Examinees
shall
answer
the
questions
personally without help from
anyone.
Upon verified application made
by an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it
will be difficult to read his
answers without much loss of
time., the Supreme Court may
allow such examinee to use a
typewriter in answering the
questions.
Only
noiseless
typewriters shall be allowed to
be used.
The committee of bar examiner
shall take such precautions as
are necessary to prevent the
substitution
of
papers
or
commission of other frauds.
Examinees shall not place their
names on the examination
papers. No oral examination
shall be given.
Section 11.
Annual
examination. Examinations
for admission to the bar of the
Philippines shall take place
annually in the City of Manila.
They shall be held in four days
to
be
disignated
by
the
chairman of the committee on
bar examiners. The subjects
shall be distributed as follows:

First
day:
Political
and
International Law (morning)
and
Labor
and
Social
Legislation (afternoon); Second
day: Civil Law (morning) and
Taxation
(afternoon);
Third
day: Mercantile Law (morning)
and Criminal Law (afternoon);
Fourth day: Remedial Law
(morning) and legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12.
Committee
of
examiners.

Examinations
shall
be
conducted
by
a
committee of bar examiners to
be appointed by the Supreme
Court. This committee shall be
composed of a Justice of the
Supreme Court, who shall act
as chairman, and who shall be
designated by the court to
serve for one year, and eight
members of the bar of the
Philippines, who shall hold
office for a period of one year.
The names of the members of
this
committee
shall
be
published in each volume of
the official reports.
Section 13.
Disciplinary
measures. No candidate
shall endeavor to influence any
member of the committee, and
during
examination
the
candidates
shall
not
communicate with each other
nor shall they give or receive
any assistance. The candidate
who violates this provisions, or
any other provision of this rule,

shall be barred from the

examination, and the same to
count as a failure against him,
and further disciplinary action,
including
permanent
disqualification, may be taken
in the discretion of the court.
Section 14.
Passing average.
In order that a candidate
may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent
in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any
subjects. In determining the
average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil
Law, 15 per cent; Labor and
Social Legislation, 10 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law; 10 per cent:
Political and International Law,
15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per
cent; Remedial Law, 20 per
cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15.
Report
of the
committee;
filing
of
examination papers. Not
later than February 15th after
the examination, or as soon
thereafter
as
may
be
practicable,
the
committee
shall file its report on the
result of such examination. The
examination papers and notes
of the committee shall be filed
with the clerk and may there

be examined by the parties in

interest, after the court has
approved the report.
Section 16.
Failing
candidates to take review
course. Candidates who have
failed the bar examinations for
three
times
shall
be
disqualified
from
taking
another examination unless
they show the satisfaction of
the court that they have
enrolled in and passed regular
fourth year review classes as
well as attended a pre-bar
review course in a recognized
law school.
The professors of the individual
review subjects attended by
the candidates under this rule
shall certify under oath that
the candidates have regularly
attended classes and passed
the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students
and the ratings obtained by
them in the particular subject.
Section 17.
Admission
and
oath of successful applicants.
An applicant who has passed
the required examination, or
has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the
bar, shall take and subscribe
before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.
Section 18.
Certificate.

The
supreme
Court
shall

thereupon admit the applicant

as a member of the bar for all
the courts of the Philippines,
and shall direct an order to be
entered to that effect upon its
records, and that a certificate
of such record be given to him
by the clerk of court, which
certificate
shall
be
his
authority to practice.
Section 19.
Attorney's roll.
The clerk of the Supreme Court
shall kept a roll of all attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll
shall be signed by the person
admitted when he receives his
certificate.
Section 20.
Duties
of
attorneys. It is the duty of an
attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines
and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the
Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he
believes
to
be
honestly
debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose
of maintaining the causes

confided to him, such means

only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of
fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in
connection with his client's
business except from him or
with
his
knowledge
and
approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation
of a
party
or
witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which
he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the
commencement
or
the
continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive
or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any
consideration
personal
to
himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person
accused of crime, by all fair
and
honorable
means,
regardless of his personal

opinion as to the guilt of the

accused, to present every
defense that the law permits,
to the end that no person may
be deprived of life or liberty,
but by due process of law.
Section 21.
Authority
of
attorney to appear. an
attorney is presumed to be
properly
authorized
to
represent any cause in which
he appears, and no written
power of attorney is required
to authorize him to appear in
court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion
of
either
party
and
on
reasonable grounds therefor
being
shown,
require
any
attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to
produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to
any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and
may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An
attorneys wilfully appear in
court for a person without
being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has
misbehaved
in
his
official
transactions.
Section 22.
Attorney
who
appears
in
lower
court
presumed to represent client
on appeal. An attorney who

appears de parte in a case

before a lower court shall be
presumed
to
continue
representing
his
client
on
appeal, unless he files a formal
petition
withdrawing
his
appearance in the appellate
court.
Section 23.
Authority
of
attorneys to bind clients.
Attorneys have authority to
bind their clients in any case
by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in
taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot,
without
special
authority,
compromise
their
client's
litigation, or receive anything
in discharge of a client's claim
but the full amount in cash.
Section 24.
Compensation of
attorneys; agreement as to
fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the
extent
of
the
services
rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No
court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper
compensation,
but
may
disregard such testimony and
base its conclusion on its own

professional
knowledge.
A
written contract for services
shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by
the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable.
Section 25.
Unlawful
retention of client's funds;
contempt. When an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has
been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has
misbehaved
in
his
official
transactions; but proceedings
under this section shall not be
a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26.
Change
of
attorneys. An attorney may
retire at any time from any
action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his
client filed in court. He may
also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding,
without the consent of his
client, should the court, on
notice
to
the
client
and
attorney,
and
on
hearing,
determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of
substitution, the name of the
attorney newly employed shall
be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the
change shall be given to the
advance party.

A client may at any time

dismiss
his
attorney
or
substitute another in his place,
but if the contract between
client and attorney has been
reduced to writing and the
dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover
from
the
client
the
full
compensation stipulated in the
contract.
However,
the
attorney may, in the discretion
of the court, intervene in the
case to protect his rights. For
the
payment
of
his
compensation
the
attorney
shall have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein
his services had been retained
by the client.
Section 27.
Attorneys
removed or suspended by
Supreme
Court
on
what
grounds. A member of the
bar
may
be
removed
or
suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such
office,
grossly
immoral
conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any

lawful order of a superior

court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a
party
to
a
case
without
authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Section 28.
Suspension
of
attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First
Instance
may
suspend
an
attorney from practice for any
of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after
such suspension such attorney
shall
not
practice
his
profession until further action
of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Section 29.
Upon suspension
by the Court of Appeals or
Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court.
Upon such suspension, the
Court of Appeals or the Court
of First Instance shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court
a certified copy of the order of
suspension
and
a
full
statement of the facts upon
which the same was based.
Upon the receipt of such
certified copy and statement,
the Supreme Court shall make
a full investigation of the facts

involved and make such order

revoking or extending the
suspension, or removing the
attorney from his office as
such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30.
Attorney to be
heard
before
removal
or
suspension. No attorney
shall be removed or suspended
from
the
practice
of
his
profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges
against
him,
to
produce
witnesses in his own behalf,
and to be heard by himself or
counsel. But if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and
answer the accusation, the
court
may
proceed
to
determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31.
Attorneys
for
destitute litigants. A court
may assign an attorney to
render professional aid free of
charge to any party in a case, if
upon investigation it appears
that the party is destitute and
unable to employ an attorney,
and that the services of
counsel
are
necessary
to
secure the ends of justice and
to protect the rights of the
party. It shall be the duty of
the attorney so assigned to
render the required service,
unless he is excused therefrom
by the court for sufficient
cause shown.

Section 32.
Compensation
for attorneys de oficio.
Subject to availability of funds
as may be provided by the law
the court may, in its discretion,
order an attorney employed as
counsel
de
oficio
to
be
compensates in such sum as
the court may fix in accordance
with section 24 of this rule.
Whenever such compensation
is allowed, it shall be not less
than thirty pesos (P30) in any
case, nor more than the
following amounts: (1) Fifty
pesos (P50) in light felonies;
(2) One hundred pesos (P100)
in less grave felonies; (3) Two
hundred pesos (P200) in grave
felonies other than capital
offenses; (4) Five Hundred
pesos
(P500)
in
capital
offenses.
Section 33.
Standing in court
of person authorized to appear
for Government. Any official
or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with
law
to
appear
for
the
Government of the Philippines
shall have all the rights of a
duly authorized member of the
bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an
interest direct or indirect.
Section 34.
By
whom
litigation conducted. In the
court of a justice of the peace a
party
may
conduct
his
litigation in person, with the

aid of an agent or friend

appointed by him for the
purpose, or with the aid an
attorney. In any other court, a
party
may
conduct
his
litigation personally or by aid
of
an
attorney,
and
his
appearance must be either
personal
or
by
a
duly
authorized member of the bar.
Section 35.
Certain
attorneys not to practice. No
judge or other official or
employee
of
the
superior
courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member
of the bar or give professional
advice to clients.
Section 36.
Amicus Curiae.
Experienced
and
impartial
attorneys may be invited by
the Court to appear as amici
curiae to help in the disposition
of issues submitted to it.
Section 37.
Attorneys' liens.
An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have
lawfully
come
into
his
possession and may retain the
same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid,
and may apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the
same
extent
upon
all
judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued

in
pursuance
of
such
judgments,
which
he
has
secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time
when he shall have the caused
a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon
the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and
shall have the caused written
notice thereof to be delivered
to his client and to the adverse
paty; and he shall have the
same right and power over
such judgments and executions
as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and
disbursements.

A.C. No. 244

1963

March 29,

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION

FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO
A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO
G.
MARTINEZ,
petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After
successfully
passing
the
corresponding examinations held in
1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted
to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino

Martinez charged him with having
falsely represented in his application
for such Bar examination, that he had
the requisite academic qualifications.
The matter was in due course referred
to the Solicitor General who caused
the charge to be investigated; and
later
he
submitted
a
report
recommending that Diao's name be
erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in
his petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the
required
pre-legal
education
prescribed by the Department of
Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high
school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing
College, and never obtained his A.A.
diploma
therefrom

which
contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application
for examination, and of his allegation
therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and
complaint,
Telesforo
A.
Diao,
practically admits the first charge: but
he claims that although he had left
high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test
given therein, which (according to
him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to

civilian life, the educational authorities

considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high
school.
We have serious doubts, about the
validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school
officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge
is clearly meritorious. Diao never
obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an
A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had
obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949, he
says he was erroneously certified, due
to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school
records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully
pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by
this
Honorable
Court,
without
prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for
the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed
his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University,
it
would
also
have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law

studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949)

six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he
would not have been permitted to take
the bar tests, because our Rules
provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath,
"That previous to the study of law, he
had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao
was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to
take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under
false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the
Bar
examinations
is
immaterial.
Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to
strike from the roll of attorneys, the
name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the
latter is required to return his lawyer's
diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Lawyer's Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines, I

will support the Constitution
and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with
all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without
any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me
God
ARTICLE VI

any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality
thereof,
including
any
governmentowned
or
controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account
of his office.
Section 15. The Congress shall
convene once every year on
the fourth Monday of July for
its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law,
and shall continue to be in
session for such number of
days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening
of its next regular session,
exclusive
of
Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays.
The President may call a
special session at any time.

functions of his office, nor shall

he be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any
contract
with,
or
in
any
franchise or privilege granted
by the Government, any of its
subdivisions,
agencies,
or
instrumentalities,
including
government-owned
or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
G.R. No. L-19450
27, 1965

May

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO
VILLANUEVA,
defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General
for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendantappellant.
PAREDES, J.:

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 14. No Senator or
Member of the House of
Representatives
may
personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals,
or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any
contract
with,
or
in
any
franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF

THE
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES ARTICLE IX
Section 2. No member of a
Constitutional
Commission
shall, during his tenure, hold
any
other
office
or
employment. Neither shall he
engage in the practice of any
profession or in the active
management or control of any
business which, in any way,
may
be
affected
by
the

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of

Police
of
Alaminos,
Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace
Court of said municipality. Said
accused
was
represented
by
counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as
private prosecutor, after securing

the permission of the Secretary of

Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that
every time he would appear at the
trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not
receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City
Attorney Fule as private prosecutor
was questioned by the counsel for
the accused, invoking the case of
Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it
was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City
Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice."
Counsel then argued that the JP
Court
in
entertaining
the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in
the case is a violation of the above
ruling. On December 17, 1960 the
JP issued an order sustaining the
legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961,
counsel for the accused presented
a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section
32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing.
Counsel claims that City Attorney
Fule falls under this limitation. The
JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to
appear and further stating that he

(Fule) was not actually enagaged in

private law practice. This Order
was appealed to the CFI of Laguna,
presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
Jarencio, which rendered judgment
on December 20, 1961, the
pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for
malicious mischief. There being no
reservation by the offended party
of the civil liability, the civil action
was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the
right to intervene in the case and
be represented by a legal counsel
because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court provides that in the court of
a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney.
Assistant
City
Attorney
Fule
appeared in the Justice of the
Peace Court as an agent or friend
of the offended party. It does not
appear that he was being paid for
his services or that his appearance
was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
he had no control or intervention
whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes
committed
in
the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,
because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the

Provincial Fiscal and not by the City

Attornev of San Pablo. There could
be no possible conflict in the duties
of Assistant City Attorney Fule as
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. On the other hand,
as already pointed out, the
offended party in this criminal case
had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her
rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with
the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court
holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before
the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos,
Laguna
as
private
prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of the offended
party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the
order of the Justice of the Peace
Court
of
Alaminos,
Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of Ariston
D. Fule as private prosecutor is
dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of
the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed,
for
patently
being
without
merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations
advanced by the learned trial
judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the

fallacy of the theory of defense

counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule
127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides that
"no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or
of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients."
He claims that City Attorney Fule,
in appearing as private prosecutor
in the case was engaging in private
practice. We believe that the
isolated
appearance
of
City
Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning
and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The
following
observation
of
the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially,
the
word
private
practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are
available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
For one thing, it has never been
refuted that City Attorney Fule had
been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary
of
Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar,
who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE
FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs
against appellant..
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE
RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT AND OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, FOR
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PROVISIONS HEREOF BY THE
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, AND TO
REPEAL COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED AND
THIRTY-SIX
Section 1. When a Justice of the
Supreme Court or of the Court of

Appeals who has rendered at least

twenty years' service either in the
judiciary or in any other branch of
the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age
of seventy years, or (b) resigns by
reason
of
his
incapacity
to
discharge the duties of his office,
he shall receive during the residue
of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary
which he was receiving at the time
of his retirement or resignation.
And when a Justice of the Supreme
Court or of the Court of Appeals
has attained the age of fifty-seven
years and has rendered at least
twenty-years'
service
in
the
Government, ten or more of which
have been continuously rendered
as such Justice or as judge of a
court of record, he shall be likewise
entitled to retire and receive during
the residue of his natural life, in the
manner also hereinafter prescribed,
the salary which he was then
receiving. It is a condition of the
pension provided for herein that no
retiring Justice during the time that
he is receiving said pension shall
appear as counsel before any court
in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or in any criminal
case wherein and officer or
employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office, or collect any
fee for his appearance in any
administrative
proceedings
to
maintain an interest adverse to the

Government, insular, provincial or

municipal, or to any of its legally
constituted officers.
Section 1. When a Justice of the
Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals who has rendered at least
twenty years' service either in the
judiciary or in any other branch of
the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age
of seventy years, or (b) resigns by
reason
of
his
incapacity
to
discharge the duties of his office,
he shall receive during the residue
of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary
which he was receiving at the time
of his retirement or resignation.
And when a Justice of the Supreme
Court or of the Court of Appeals

has attained the age of fifty-seven

years and has rendered at least
twenty-years'
service
in
the
Government, ten or more of which
have been continuously rendered
as such Justice or as judge of a
court of record, he shall be likewise
entitled to retire and receive during
the residue of his natural life, in the
manner also hereinafter prescribed,
the salary which he was then
receiving. It is a condition of the
pension provided for herein that no
retiring Justice during the time that
he is receiving said pension shall
appear as counsel before any court
in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or in any criminal
case wherein and officer or

employee of the Government is

accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office, or collect any
fee for his appearance in any
administrative
proceedings
to
maintain an interest adverse to the
Government, insular, provincial or
municipal, or to any of its legally
constituted officers.