Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.

(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
Fatih Seyhanoglu is currently a PH.D student in History at the CUNY Graduate Center. He is also
an Overseas Associated Member of CAEI (Argentine Center for International Studies). Between
2002 and 2005 he worked as a journalist in Turkey. He has written many publications about Islam,
Iranian discourse and dialogue, and Turkish and Arab identity.

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

First of all, I would like to explain the genesis of this paper. In 2006, The UN Security
Council sent an international force to stabilize Lebanon. It was a pivotal decision for the Turkish
government whether or not to take part in the Middle East conflict. Despite widespread public
opposition, the Turkish parliament approved sending soldiers. It was first time since the
dissolution of The Ottoman Empire that Turkey had decided to be a part of Middle East politics,
and there was tremendous disagreement among Arab and Iranian politicians whether or not Turkey
should take play a role in the peacekeeping force in Lebanon. At this time, I was working as a
journalist in Turkey, writing a lot about issues in the Muslim world, and I received over 100 phone
calls and emails questioning Turkeys decision. They wondered about Turkeys intentions. They
asked: Why does the Turkish government want to be part of Middle East? What is going on in
Turkish foreign policy? Why, suddenly, does Turkey want to extend its influence beyond Turkish
borders? Most of these journalists felt that if Turkey were to take part in Middle East politics, it
would escalate the tension in the region rather than bringing peace and stability.
One of the obvious answers is Islam. Today, Middle Eastern government tend to combine
Islamic and nationalist imperatives in their foreign policies. However, this tends to be disastrous,
not only regionally, but also internationally, at least in part because we continue to live in an age of
nation states, with the Iranians for Iran, the Syrians for Syria, the Turkish for Turkey, and so on.
At this moment, I would argue, because of the joint burdens of recent world history, ethnic

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
nationalisms, and the structure of the international system, Islam is not an applicable card to use in
foreign policy. In fact, history has shown us that, despite the many empires and nations that have
tried to use Islam as a means to unify their populations and politics, nationalism has almost always
taken primacy over Islam.
Before I go on to talk about the role of Islam in contemporary Turkish and Iranian foreign
policy, I would like to think back on history, particularly on the past mistakes of the Islamic
dynasty in their international arena. Indeed, Id like to suggest that history can guide us in
understanding current Turkish and Iranian foreign policy. By taking a closer look at the role of
religion, and specifically Islam in foreign policy, we can see a pattern that began in the Umayyad
Dynasty and continues to this day in modern Turkey and Iran. During the Umayyad Dynasty,
internal and foreign policy was dictated by Arab nationalism. Instead of unifying the population,
this policy further polarized the population because it alienated non-Arab Muslims. And so, I am I
now going to you on a brief journey from the Umayyad Dynasty through the Turkish and Iranian
foreign policies of today.
Turkey
I. Repercussions of Umayyad Dynasty foreign policy (the first Muslim dynasty (661-750))
Id like to point to two watershed events or processes in Iranian history. First, Iranian history
began with the death of Hz. Muhammeds grandchild, Hussein in 680 during The Battle of
Karbala. The death of Hussein was the defining point in Islam and led to the two main sects of
Islam (Sunni and Shia). This Battle, then, was the defining event in Iranian history and identity,
one that has shaped not only the culture but also the politics of Iran, including its citizens
themselves.1
1

See further information: History of Syria (volume two), Philip K. Hitti, Gorgias press, USA 2002;The Arab
Conquest in Central Asia, H.A.R. Gibb, London 1932;The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, J. Wellhausen, Calcutta 1927;

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
Secondly, when the Umayyad Dynasty began to spread Islam with their Arab nationalistic
ideas to the Kurdish region, they, like many conquerors, ignored the local Kurdish culture. They
used more violence than persuasion to make them Muslims and Kurds resisted what they
perceived as Arab nationalism, particularly through Kurdish scholarship on the matter. In the 12th
century, Imam Hadi tried to develop a political theory which would protect Kurdish identity. He
wrote a book in Kurdish named 'Black Book' (Mushafe Resh) that served as a bulwark against
Arab nationalism. In this book, Imam detailed the repercussions of nationalist policies of Islamic
states, and discussed Islam, Christianity and Judaism together, creating an entirely new religious
understanding.2 Today, current Kurdish nationalists use his grave as a symbol in the revival of
Kurdish identity.3 The Umayyad Dynasty triggered this process.
II. Abdulhamid II Reign (Istibdat): Oppression in Internal policy and Pan Islamic foreign Policy
(18761909)
Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid used the Caliphate as a symbol of Islam in his call to Muslims
around the world to fight against European intervention. Probably, he thought that it would be
useful to mobilize Islam as foreign policy to save the Empire. The most important Islamist
decision he made was to build the Hejaz and Baghdad railways for the pilgrims to Mecca.4
However, his policy of oppression of non-Muslims hastened the end of the Ottoman Empire. As
the Empire fed off of Turkish and other nationalist movements and sought to protect its borders as
well, it became a prison for Greeks, Kurds, Armenians and Arabs.

The Cambridge History of Islam, ed. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis; The Encyclopedia of Islam,
first and second editions; The First Dynasty of Islam, G.R. Hawting, London 1986; God's Caliph, P. Crone and M.
Hinds, Cambridge 1986;The Umayyad Caliphate, A.A. Dixon, London 1970.
2
3

Kurdish historians believed that Yezidilik in the Kurdish region reflected a political extension of Armenia, however,
I think that, rather, the Umayyad Dynastys foreign policy was responsible.
4
Zurcher Erik J., Turkey A modern History, Victoria house, New York, 1997,P83.

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
This policy was not successful, and ultimately led to the Young Turks revolution.
Unfortunately the Young Turks did not learn from the mistakes of the previous rulers, and they
continued this policy of oppression, which ultimately triggered the rise of nationalistic feelings
among the minority groups. In modern day Turkey, the leading political party, Ak Party, fails to
see the similarity between current Turkish foreign policy and the domestic and foreign policy
during the Young Turks period and, so doing, repeats its historical mistakes.
III. Young Ottoman period (1908-1918)
The nationalist Young Turks drove a wedge between Arab and Turkish peoples by, among
other things, opposing any political participation with non-Turks. Not only did they thus destroy
the quality of the Ottoman Empire as a multicultural entity, but they also accelerated the
differentiation of identities.
Zeine Zeine believes that the reason behind the deterioration of ArabTurkish relations
stems from the political movement of the Union Advancement (Ittihad and Terakki movements),
known as Making Turkish, which also became the source for Arab nationalism.5 The Young
Turks were the most influential group amongst the members of the Union Advancement. The
nationalism of the Young Turks provoked more Arab nationalism. Subsequently, new nation-states
were born and nationalist political sentiments and movements were further intensified. Their
policies led to the dissolution of Ottoman Empire into states and intensified numerous nationalist
movements in the region. (The Young Turks took courses from French Tarde & Le Bon)6.
5

Z. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, Beirut,1958

Serif Mardin, Jn Trklerin siyasi fikirleri 1895-1908, iletiim Yaynlar,1999 Istanbul, see further detail, M. Skr
Hanioglu, Bir siyasal dsnr olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dnemi,Istanbul, 1981; M. Skr Hanioglu, Bir
Siyasal rgt olarak Osmanl Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jn Trklk (1889-1902), Istanbul, Iletisim, s.d.
(1986); M. Skr Hanioglu ,Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford University Press, 1995;M. Skr
Hanioglu ,"Transformation of the Ottoman intelligentsia and the idea of science," Anuarul Institutului de Istorie si
Arheologie A.D., Xenopol, 1987; M. Skr Hanioglu ,"Notes on the Young Turks and the Freemasons," Middle
Eastern Studies, 25 (1989).
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Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
IV. Revival of Islam in Turkish foreign policy and Arabs fears
The first time Islam appeared in Turkish foreign policy was during the administration of
Erbakan (Welfare party). The first aim of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1995-1997) was to
try to unify the Islamic world under the one umbrella. However, when he began to travel to
Islamic countries, he confronted both internal and external pressures from Western and Islamic
nations, particularly from Libyan president Muammer Kaddafi (Gaddafi) who criticized Erbakans
policies harshly and helped bring about the end of the Erbakan administration in Turkey.
Criticizing Turkey's close ties to the West and its NATO membership, Kaddafi said in a famous
speech, I am talking about the Kurdish nation. This nation should have its place under the Middle
Eastern sun. Kaddafi didnt really care about the Kurdish nation (or lack thereof), he was really
trying to express to Erbakan the concerns that Arabs had over Turkish leadership in the Middle
East. I think here he used the Kurdish issue to cover very real Arab concerns about Turkey playing
a leadership role in the Middle East.
V. AK Party, Justice Development Party (JDP) Period (2003-2007)
The second time Islam appeared in Turkish foreign policy was during the administration of
Erdogan (Justice and Development Party). The Justice and Development Partys political language
wavers between promoting nationalism and claiming the role of leader within the Islamic World.
JDP Policies utilize nationalism internally to rally support and mobilize the historical importance
of Islam in order to be a major power in the Region. Turkeys good relations with Arab world,
with Sudan, and in particular Turkeys role in the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) show
important diplomatic effort based on its promotion of its self as an Islamic state. I believe that after
the U.S withdraws from Iraq, Turkey will probably lose its diplomatic importance in the region,
because Iran and Syria dont want Turkey as a political actor in the Middle East. Turkeys current

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
relations with the Arab world is the outcome of recent and contingent political situations and
cannot be sustained only by Islamist diplomacy.
Iran
I. Islam in Iranian Foreign Policy
At the end of the 1960s, some political experts argued that modernization would minimize
the importance of religion.7 However, with 1979 Iranian revolution and after the Cold War,
religion has again become a powerful force in world politics. Current Iranian foreign policy is very
much at the heart of this revival.
Iranian nationalism has spread throughout the region with the Shia religious sect. Until
now, the Sunni have been dominant in administration of the Islamic World. The Iranian
government has attempted to spread its version of Islam by creating Shia centers in the Muslim
world, particularly in the Balkans, Africa, and Central Asia, where Sunni Islam dominates. If the
Iranian government continues their foreign policy of attempting to subjugate Sunni Islam in favor
of Shia Islam, tensions will continue to escalate and there will be a risk of internal war in the entire
Islamic world.
In addition, the combination of Shiism and Iranian nationalism has also created internal
problems. In Iran, there is no room for other beliefs in the political sphere, and non-Muslims are
not the only ones that are treated badly and discriminated against; non-Shia Muslims also
experience the harsh and discriminatory nature of Iranian policy. Indeed, in 2001, when I was Iran,
I listened to one of the speeches of the Iranian Supreme Leader Seyyid Ali Hamaney. He said that,

Fox. Jonathan, Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations, International Studies Review, Vol.3,
No.3. (Autumn, 2001), pp.55

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
All minorities who live in Iran are our brothers but if they want to be part of politics, we will end
our brotherhood.8
II. Rafsanjani Period (1989-1997)
Even though Rafsanjani wrote a book that was critical of nationalism, he was one of the
most oppressive nationalist leaders in Iranian politics. He used violence against minority groups
and violence became part of foreign policy during his administration. The Kurds that I interviewed
in Iran believed that he was responsible for the majority of the assassinations of Kurdish leaders
and scholars. 9
III. Khatemi period (1997-2005)
Although Khatemi tried a softer foreign policy toward the West and the Islamic world, he
was not capable of changing Iranian policy. He wanted to make Iran a model for the Islamic world
by focusing on internal rather than international politics. He argued that: Those power-seeking
fanatics who ignored the people's demands and resisted reforms... [they are] the ones who
destroyed Iran's image in the world.10 Though his administration was able to play a role in taking
apart Hezbollah in Turkey, Khatemi was ultimately unsuccessful in reaching his goals.
Conservative religious opposition overwhelmed him.
The current Prime Minister of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-), is following in the
steps of Khomeini, which is making current Iranian politics more complex. Khomeini did not trust
or communicate with Western countries. Unfortunately, he fails to see Khomeini's idea was
constructed during the war between Iran and Iraq and that it will not help the current Iranian
government in the long run.
8

Ayatollah Seyyid Ali Hamaney, Public speech on Iranian TV, September 13, 2001.
Personal interview with some Iranian Kurds, September 7, 2001.
10
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4072887.stm
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Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
The competition between Iran and Turkey: Iranian Islam versus Turkish Islam 11
During the Cold War the international community used religion as a part of their strategy
against the Soviet Union. This policy strengthened religious movements in the region. And now,
after the Cold War, the lasting effects of this policy have brought religious issues into world
politics. In order to maintain an influential position in all Muslim countries, Iran has taken
advantage of conflicts in a range of international regions in order to gain more influence. Iran
financially supports the Lebanese Hezbollah organization in order to increase tension in the
region, with the long-term goal of promoting Shiism in the region. In addition, Iran also builds
and gives monetary support to many Shia centers in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Irans support of
pro-Islamic groups cannot be viewed as just altruistic actions because there are deeper as well as
historical reasons behind these actions. Therefore, Muslims who live in the Balkans, Africa,
Middle East or other conflict regions need to think carefully about their current positions and their
relationship with Iran.
There is also competition between Turkey and Iran in the legacy of the post-Ottoman era
and the post-Soviet era. While the Iranian government builds Mevlana Centers and Mosques in
order to spread Iranian culture and language, Turkey has built more Turkish colleges in Central
Asia and the Balkans in order to counterbalance Iranian influence in the region. This is also why
the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, invited the leaders of Hamas to Turkey. Turkey
wanted to be a part of the Palestinian question not for the good of peace in Palestine, but in order
to counteract Irans influence. I think that this can be interpreted as the Turkish governments
attempt to prevent the rise not only Al-Qaeda but also the Shia movement in the region.12

11

See further details, M. Hakan Yavuz, Is there a Turkish Islam? Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 24:2 (2004),
pp.213-232.
12
Seyhanoglu, Fatih, The Palestinians between the Empires, Pravda Daily News, July 24,2006.

Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
In order to halt the growing influence of Iran, the international community must engage
Muslims in these regions and draw them into the political sphere, particularly in conflict areas.
The international community must also protect the Muslim minority in areas dominated by nonMuslims. If they fail in doing this, they will help spread Iranian influence all over the world.
Ayatollah Ali Hamaney said that Iran should be the voice of all Muslims where they have
problems with their governments and that Iran must support all Muslims in the world because of
their religious obligation. 13 Therefore, without proper intervention now, there will be many
important challenges between Iran and Western countries in the next century.
When Ibn Khalduns stressed that there is no nostalgia for the golden age of the past; he is
the recognition of historical continuity and change.14 He meant that the golden age syndrome led
to the collapse of many Islamic dynasties and states. Iranian and Turkish decision makers are now
in a similar predicament. They have a very idealistic view of the past and they are unable to see
how their political mistakes are mirroring those of past empires. Therefore, they should heed Ibn
Khalduns warning and infer a lesson from the past. If not, Iranian and Turkish governments will
end up the like Umayyad Dynasty, Ottoman Empire and so on.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Islam has played a role in Middle Eastern politics for centuries. If countries
like Iran and Turkey do not change their political perceptions, both at home and abroad, they will
encounter resistance both domestically and externally. Therefore Turkish and Iranian policymakers
should not ignore minorities identities. It is time to rethink their policies towards minorities and
the Others. Particularly, they must face their nationalist policies. The voices of minority groups
must be taken into account in policy-making. Currently, the existence of minorities is likely to be
13

Ayatollah Seyyid Ali Hamaney, Friday Speech, Tehran University, 2001.

Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965. P.28.

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Islam in Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy

M. Fatih Seyhanoglu, Ph.D student in History at CUNY Graduate Center.
(MSeyhanoglu@gc.cuny.edu)
reflected negatively in Iranian and Turkish politics because of the absence of pluralism and
multiculturalism.
Iranian and Turkish politicians must admit that blending nationalism with religion has not
helped current Muslim issues. So, politicians should return to the core beliefs of Islam and
advocate a new political vision that is inclusive in order to prevent clashes between Turkey, Iran
and Western countries. Turkish and Iranian intellectuals need to take a long and hard look at their
pasts, and realize that they belong to the same political culture. Iranians must be aware of the
radically changing environment in which they live and the need to take a fresh but drastic
approach to current policies. Otherwise, they will not be able to adapt to modern and changing
times. Unless they can work together, Muslims will always be dominated within the existing
international system. Turkey and Iran must search for another direction, and inspiration besides
combining Islam and nationalism to truly promote stability and peace within in the region.

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